Event Abstract

Can the free energy principle be used to generate a theory of consciousness?

  • 1 Monash University, Philosophy, Australia
  • 2 University of Wisconsin, Psychiatry, United States of America
  • 3 University of Sussex, Informatics, United Kingdom
  • 4 Monash University, Psychology, Australia

This talk presents the free energy principle (FEP) and develops aspects of it that can be used to address core aspects of conscious experience. In particular, the talk focuses on how the inferential and hierarchical aspects of FEP may pertain to perceptual binding, how the agency-related notion of active inference central to FEP can explain unity of consciousness, and how the notion of precision optimization in FEP can speak to the relation between consciousness and attention. On this background, I then set out how FEP in various ways share aspects with the information integration theory but also how FEP presents a theoretical and explanatory advance over the integration information theory (IIT) of consciousness.

Keywords: Consciousness, predictive processing, Integrated information, scientific explanation, The free energy principle

Conference: XII International Conference on Cognitive Neuroscience (ICON-XII), Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 27 Jul - 31 Jul, 2014.

Presentation Type: Symposia

Topic: Sensation and Perception

Citation: Hohwy J, Tononi G, Seth A and Tsuchiya N (2015). Can the free energy principle be used to generate a theory of consciousness?. Conference Abstract: XII International Conference on Cognitive Neuroscience (ICON-XII). doi: 10.3389/conf.fnhum.2015.217.00420

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Received: 14 Apr 2015; Published Online: 24 Apr 2015.

* Correspondence: Prof. Jakob Hohwy, Monash University, Philosophy, Clayton, Victoria, 3800, Australia, jakob.hohwy@monash.edu