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DMN function, attention shifting and attention holding compared across humans and monkeys

Natalie Caspari1*, Rik Vandenberghe2, 3 and Wim Vanduffel1, 4, 5
  • 1 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Biomedical Sciences/Cognitive Neurosciences, Belgium
  • 2 KU Leuven, Neurosciences, Belgium
  • 3 University Hospitals Leuven, Neurology, Belgium
  • 4 Harvard Medical School, United States
  • 5 MGH Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, United States

A unifying function of the default mode network (DMN), activated during rest compared to active task conditions in human and monkey (Raichle et al., 2001, Mantini et al., 2011) has been difficult to define. In humans, it is engaged during internal modes of high level cognition (Buckner et al., 2008). However, this DMN definition is difficult to sustain in other animal species such as monkeys or rats. As an answer to this, we propose that cognitive shifts in general, between and within externally and internally directed events, recruit DMN regions. In line with this, monkeys recruited DMN areas during one type of cognitive shifting, namely, spatial attention shifting (Caspari et al., 2014). Here we aimed to assess to which degree shifts in spatial attention may explain DMN function in human, by comparing attention shift and default mode networks within and across species. Monkeys (N=3) and humans (N=31) performed the same covert selective attention task in the MR scanner, with interleaved periods of shifts and sustained attention (Molenberghs et al., 2007, Caspari et al., 2015). In monkeys, a mixed effects analysis revealed a high degree of overlap (on average 63%) between shift-related activations and the currently used monkey DMN definitions. In human, a random effects analysis revealed an overlap of 45% (on average) between shift-related activations and typically used DMN-definitions. Sustained contralateral attention, compared to the DMN, activated an entirely different set of areas in both species, except for lPFC, portions of ACC and IPS in monkey. The smaller percentage of the DMN core activated for spatial shifting in humans is in line with a large expansion of this part of cortex and, likely, an additional gain of function, namely the ability to perform a higher variety of cognitive shifts as compared to monkeys.

References

Buckner RL, Andrews-Hanna JR, Schacter DL (2008) The Brain's Default Network. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1124:1-38.
Caspari N, Janssens T, Mantini D, Vandenberghe R, Vanduffel W (2015) Covert Shifts of Spatial Attention in the Macaque Monkey. The Journal of Neuroscience 35:7695-7714.
Caspari N, Vandenberghe R, Vanduffel W (2014) A cognitive function of the default mode network in monkeys: Shifting of selective attention? In: Society for Neuroscience 2014 (Neuroscience, S. f., ed) Washington D.C.
Mantini D, Gerits A, Nelissen K, Durand JB, Joly O, Simone L, Sawamura H, Wardak C, Orban GA, Buckner RL, Vanduffel W (2011) Default Mode of Brain Function in Monkeys. The Journal of Neuroscience 31:12954-12962.

Keywords: attention shifting, default mode network (DMN), interspecies, human, macaque, fMRI

Conference: Second Belgian Neuroinformatics Congress, Leuven, Belgium, 4 Dec - 4 Dec, 2015.

Presentation Type: Poster Presentation

Topic: Brain Imaging

Citation: Caspari N, Vandenberghe R and Vanduffel W (2015). DMN function, attention shifting and attention holding compared across humans and monkeys. Front. Neuroinform. Conference Abstract: Second Belgian Neuroinformatics Congress. doi: 10.3389/conf.fninf.2015.19.00018

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Received: 13 Nov 2015; Published Online: 17 Nov 2015.

* Correspondence: Miss. Natalie Caspari, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Biomedical Sciences/Cognitive Neurosciences, Leuven, 3000, Belgium, natalie.caspari@med.kuleuven.be