
**Supplementary Materials**


**Appendix I**

**List of Sources for Empires**

1. **Empire Start Year**


****

1. **Empire End Year**


****

Note: Sensitivity Analysis was conducted on the Spanish Empire specifically for 1898 as the end year, briefly described in the Results section.

1. **Empire Peak Year**

****

1. **Empire Peak Land Area (In Million Sq. Miles)**

****

**Appendix II**

**Results of Analysis**

*1. Pattern of Power Life Cycle*

The results of the polynomial trendline analysis support the hypothesis that empires follow a predictable cycle of rise, peak, and decline. The key factors considered to build the trendline for US power projection are as follows

**Average Empire Duration**: The analysis shows that the average duration of the 29 studied empires is approximately 240 years.

**Time to Peak**: On average, empires peak in the middle of the period of their empire lifecycle to control their total landmass or power during their lifecycle.

Based on the historical model, the U.S. is estimated to be in a plateau phase, with potential signs of entering a decline depending on how internal and external pressures are managed.

#### 2. Projection of US Power


Using the historical trajectories of other empires, the study models three potential scenarios for the U.S. trajectory. The study has taken the starting point of U.S. global power in 1898, following the Spanish-American War, where the U.S. emerged as a colonial power and its peak post-World War II, when the U.S. controlled approximately 40% of the global GDP. A turning point in U.S. power occurred in 2001 after the events of 9/11, marking a shift in America's perception of its global role, though not immediately affecting its GDP.

**The Fall:** To estimate the decline of U.S. power, the study considered the decline periods of the 6 largest empires, as well as the 29 largest modern industrial-age empires. These comparisons provide a range for the U.S.'s potential future trajectory.

**GDP at End Year:** The U.S. GDP at the estimated "end year" of the decline is projected to return to around 15% of global GDP—roughly the same share it held in 1898.

The fall of the different set of empires have been considered to get an estimate of the date of fall of the US’ power trajectory

* 1. **Scenario 1 (Modern Industrial Age Empires):** Based on the average rise and fall trajectory of the Modern Industrial Age Empires, the U.S. could reach its end by 2032




**Trajectory: Average of Six Industrial Age Empires; US Power ‘Ends’: 2032**

A graph with numbers and a line

Description automatically generated

% of World GDP

* 1. **Scenario 2 (Largest Empires):** Based on the average rise and fall trajectory of the six Largest Empires, U.S. global dominance might last until 2067




**Trajectory: Average of Six Largest Empires; US Power ‘Ends’: 2067**

A graph with numbers and a line

Description automatically generated

% of World GDP

* 1. **Scenario 3 (Average of All Empires):** Using the overall average of all 29 empires, U.S. power might extend until 2122, suggesting a long and gradual decline



A graph with numbers and a line

Description automatically generated

% of World GDP

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