Harnessing the climate mitigation, conservation and poverty alleviation potential of seagrasses: prospects for developing blue carbon initiatives and payment for ecosystem service programmes

Seagrass ecosystems provide numerous ecosystem services that support coastal communities around the world. They sustain abundant marine life as well as commercial and artisanal fisheries, and help protect shorelines from coastal erosion. Additionally, seagrass meadows are a globally significant sink for carbon and represent a key ecosystem for combating climate change. However, seagrass habitats are suffering rapid global decline. Despite recognition of the importance of ‘Blue Carbon’, no functioning seagrass restoration or conservation projects supported by carbon finance currently operate, and the policies and frameworks to achieve this have not been developed. Yet, seagrass ecosystems could play a central role in addessing important international research questions regarding the natural mechanisms through which the ocean and the seabed can mitigate climate change, and how ecosystem structure links to service provision. The relative inattention that seagrass ecosystems have received represents both a serious oversight and a major missed opportunity. In this paper we review the prospects of further inclusion of seagrass ecosystems in climate policy frameworks, with a particular focus on carbon storage and sequestration, as well as the potential for developing payment for ecosystem service (PES) schemes that are complementary to carbon management. Prospects for the inclusion of seagrass Blue Carbon in regulatory compliance markets are currently limited; yet despite the risks the voluntary carbon sector offers the most immediately attractive avenue for the development of carbon credits. Given the array of ecosystem services seagrass ecosystems provide the most viable route to combat climate change, ensure seagrass conservation and improve livelihoods may be to complement any carbon payments with seagrass PES schemes based on the provision of additional ecosystem services.


Introduction
upland coastal management' (43rd). Our view is that research is needed on multiple fronts to create 48 enabling conditions and the evidence base needed to craft innovative new policy tools for 49 conservation and mitigating the potential adverse effects of climate change. Table 1 Seagrass ecosystem services and the corresponding information needed to contribute towards incentive scheme development

Ecosystem Service
What we need to know a Climate regulation (carbon storage and sequestration) (a) The spatial distribution, density and species assemblage of seagrass meadows. Two relatively accurate and reliable means of achieving this are:  Acoustic side scan sonar which is useful up to 25m depths and has been used to map seagrass communities in the Mediterranean (e.g., Montelfalcone et al. 2013;Sanchez-Carnero et al. 2012).  Remote sensing, for example, Landsat 5 TM and 7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper, which is more appropriate for shallow waters of between 2 to 5m and has been used in Australia (e.g., Dekker et al. 2005;Phinn et al. 2008), Zanzibar (e.g., Gullström et al. 2006) and the Coral Triangle (Torres-Pulliza et al. 2014) (b) Assessment of carbon stocks, rate of accumulation (e.g., Duarte et al. 2013a;Fourqurean et al. 2012;Macreadie et al. 2013), in particular:  Belowground biomass and soil: soil depth (thickness of deposit), dry bulk density and organic carbon content (Duarte et al. 1998;Fourqurean et al. 2012)  Aboveground biomass: represents only ~0.3% of total organic carbon stock (Duarte and Chiscano 1999)  Accumulation rate: direct measurement, radiocarbon, 210 Pb, soil elevation (Duarte et al. 2013a) Erosion and natural hazard regulation (coastal and shoreline protection) (a) Local vegetative characteristics such as canopy height, shoot density and belowground biomass (e.g., Bouma and Amos, 2012;Christiansen et al. 2013;Ondiviela et al. 2013) (b) Bulk density, organic content of sediment and porosity (e.g., de Boer 2007) Biodiversity (a) Species inventory, richness, diversity and community structure (e.g., Bell and Pollard, 1989;Barnes 2013) (b) Habitat usage of fish species and correlations with life-cycle stages (e.g., Heck, 2003;Jaxion-Harm et al. 2012;Seitz et al. 2014) (c) Presence of charismatic and Red List species (e.g., Williams and Heck Jr, 2001) Fisheries (a) Fish species caught, landed and sold (e.g., average catch sizes, market value etc.) (b) Frequency, location(s) and time spent fishing, for example, by using participatory GIS (e.g., Baldwin, Mahon & McConney 2013;Baldwin & Oxenford 2014) (c) Degree of overlap between commercial and artisanal fish species (i.e. commercial fishing impacts on artisanal fishing activities) (d) Types of fishing methods and gear employed and their capacity to damage seagrass beds (e.g., Tudela, 2004) (e) Invertebrate gleaning activities (e.g., species gleaned, frequency of gleaning etc.  Nutrient cycling and water quality Regulation (a) Seagrass biomass and production (e.g., de Boer, 2007) (b) Levels of leaf litter (e.g., Chiu et al. 2013) (c) Water turbidity (e.g., Petus et al. 2014 Cultural services (socialecological) (a) Composition of household income and reliance on seagrass-derived ecosystem services (b) Gender differences in use and benefits derived from seagrass meadows e.g., gleaning vs. fishing (e.g., ) (c) Cultural significance of seagrass meadows to 'traditional way of life' (e.g.,  Ecosystem Service Threats (a) Agricultural land run-off : nutrient loading (e.g., Waycott et al. 2009) (b) Coastal developments and population and urban impacts: infrastructure, conversion of seagrass meadow beds to alternative uses, sewage discharge (e.g., Short et al. 2011; 77 78 79 80

2.1
Regulating services: climate regulation 81 Historically, seagrass meadows had been virtually ignored in global carbon budgets (Duarte 82 et al., 2005). More recently their role in combating climate change through carbon storage and 83 sequestration has become more clearly recognised, while simultaneously the spatial extent of 84 seagrass meadows has continued to decline Kennedy et al. 2010;Fourqurean et 85 al. 2012;Duarte et al. 2013a;Lavery et al. 2013). Although a small fraction (18 to 60 x 10 6 ha) of 86 the world's ocean area seagrass meadows sequester 20% of global marine carbon and store 10% of 87 annual buried organic carbon (C org ) (Fourqurean et al. 2012;Pendleton et al. 2012 change, a question ranked 8th in global importance by marine scientists (Rudd 2014). 90 Seagrass meadows are highly productive systems, especially in Indo-Pacific regions, and 91 provide habitat for diverse communities (Short et al. 2011). However, worldwide, seagrass standing 92 biomass is small (76-151 Tg C) relative to the biomass of the vegetation in other coastal ecosystems 93 (Fourqurean et al. 2012). Nonetheless, the high productivity of seagrass meadows, with potential 94 a In relation to the information outlined three points need to be emphasised: First, it is not necessary to obtain detailed information on all ES provided by seagrasses to develop a payment scheme. Second, their needs to be agreement between the operating scale of the payment scheme and the scale at which ES information is acquired. Third, the information we list is not meant to be exhaustive. relation to adjacent non-vegetated sites (Hansen and Reidenbach 2013). By reducing wave action 146 and current velocities seagrass habitats also protect the seafloor against hydrodynamic 'shear 147 stresses' ( de Boer 2007). 148 Seagrass canopies act as efficient filters, stripping particles from the water column and 149 adding to sediment accumulation (Hendriks et al. 2007). Soil accretion ( ~1.5mm yr -1 ) is important 150 in helping coastal wetlands, and seagrass meadows in particular, adapt to sea level rise (Kirwan and 151 Megonigal 2013; Lavery et al. 2013), thus contributing to Rudd's (2014) 26 th ranked question on 152 sea level rise and vulnerable coasts. Below-ground seagrass biomass is particularly important for 153 sediment accretion as well as stabilization against storm erosion (Bos et al. 2007;Christiansen et al. 154 2013). By helping to immobilise sediment, seagrass meadows also reduce re-suspension and 155 increase water transparency (Duarte 2002;Ondiviela et al. 2013). In the Arabian Gulf, for example, 156 sediment stabilization and shoreline protection represent important ecosystem service functions of 157 seagrass meadows (Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012). Overall, the effectiveness and efficiency of the 158 coastal protection services provided by seagrass ecosystems varies across spatial and temporal 159 scales due to differences in species type (i.e. vegetative characteristics), coastal distribution, flow-160 vegetation interactions and water dynamic properties (Ondiviela et al. 2013 The physical and biological structure of seagrass meadows is central to their significance as 165 a marine biotope (Gullström et al. 2008;Saenger et al. 2013). The high primary productivity of 166 seagrass, their epiphytes and associated benthic algae provide an important energy source to support 167 local, transient and distant food webs (Heck et al., 2008). In addition, the structural complexity of 168 seagrass meadows offers sites for attachment and a place to avoid predation (Farina et al. 2009).

169
These attributes mean seagrass meadows function as foraging areas, refuges and nursery habitats 170 for diverse communities of marine life, many of which are commercially important or endangered 171 (Bujang et al. 2006;Orth et al. 2006;Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012;172 Jaxion -Harm et al. 2012;Browne et al. 2013;. Organic 173 matter produced in seagrass meadows is also exported to adjacent ecosystems and supports a large 174 range of marine and terrestrial consumers (Heck et al., 2008). Connectivity between mangrove and 175 seagrass ecosystems has also been shown to be important for supporting inshore fisheries, the 176 abundance and assemblage of fish and crustacean communities and fish life-cycle stages (Bosire et 177 al. 2012;Saenger et al. 2013). Seagrass ecosystems are thus important for ocean priority research 178 questions on biodiversity contributions to ecosystem function (ranked 6 th ) and biological 179 connectivity (ranked 28 th ) (Rudd 2014 seagrass ecosystems maintain stocks of commercial and artisanal importance, and their exploitation 192 makes significant economic and food security contributions to many coastal communities (Jackson 193 et al., 2001). In some cases seagrass supported fisheries may provide a harvest value of up to 194 US$3500 ha -1 yr -1 ). In Tarut Bay, (Arabian Gulf), seagrass ecosystems support 195 a US$22 million yr -1 fishery (Erftemeijer and Shuail 2012). Prawns are also the basis for extensive fisheries, particularly along warm-temperate and tropical coastlines, and previous estimates of the 197 potential total annual yield from seagrass ecosystems in Northern Queensland, (Australia), equated 198 to a landed value of between AUS$0.6 million to AUS$2.2 million yr -1 (Watson et al., 1993   Overall, the lack of in-depth local studies spanning different continents and regions valuing

298
Moreover, extension of current LULUCF definitions to cover wetland ecosystems is lacking 299 (Murray et al. 2012). However, with the publication of the IPCC Wetland Supplement the case for 300 not including a broader set of definitions that specifically mention wetlands is harder to justify.

301
Furthermore, activities under LULUCF could include avoided wetland degradation via alternative 302 use or prohibiting disturbance (Herr et al. 2012). With regards to baseline credit mechanisms such 303 as the CDM, in 2011 a mangrove project was approved as an afforestation and reforestation 304 activity. However, the methodology applied is specifically for mangroves and not (so far at least) 305 transferable to tidal marshes or seagrass meadows (Lovelock & McAllister 2013). Moreover, the 306 much more substantial avoided emissions resulting from protecting Blue Carbon pools remain 307 outside this mechanism .    Delta the ACR has developed a wetland restoration protocol (UNEP and CIFOR 2014).

363
Furthermore, VCS has also developed a soil carbon sampling methodology that could be transferred  Pacific (Lima Convention) and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).
Although predominantly management and advocacy-related, some of these programs offer financial 394 support for Blue Carbon activities (Laffoley 2013).  involving the active transfer of carbon credits (Locatelli et al. 2014). In this regard, securing private 427 financing of Blue Carbon activities will become increasingly important (Thomas, 2014). Presently,

428
Blue Carbon programs are predominantly research-oriented, in the early stages of development and 429 mangrove-focused, with few directed efforts towards seagrass ecosystems (    Many possible institutions are available to control and direct fishing activities along coasts 520 and marine ecosystems (Rudd 2004). They may involve fishing gear and net restrictions, limiting 521 Stacking refers to the receipt of multiple payments for different ES provided from a single plot or parcel (Bianco, 2009;Cooley and Olander 2012). Cooley and Olander (2012) recognise three forms of stacking, namely: horizontal (whereby individual management practices performed on spatially distinct areas each receive a payment); vertical (where a single management practice employed on spatially overlapping areas receives multiple payments) and temporal (essentially a vertical form of stacking where payments are disbursed over time according to the production of different ES).
Advantages of stacking: (i) delivers management that provides multiple services from programs concerned with specific services; (ii) potentially increases programme uptake rates and therefore ES provision, (iii) encourages largescale projects that could not operate through single payments e.g., wetland restoration, (iv) may increase buyer diversification, and (v) incrementally stacking payments in an optimum way for a particular project can help raise necessary funds (Bianco 2009;Cooley and Olander 2012;Robert and Sterger 2013).
Disadvantages of stacking: (i) stacking can make it difficult to demonstrate how ES delivered by mitigation projects have abated environmental impacts allowed through offset sales; (ii) stacking may undermine project 'additionality' e.g., if payments are more than that required to initiate a project, or are for an activity that would have occurred in the absence of the project, and (iii) stacking indirectly encourages 'double counting'paying twice for (in essence) the same service where similar services overlap e.g., water quality credits and wetland mitigation credits (Bianco 2009;Cooley and Olander 2012).
In the case of bundling, single payments are received for the provision of multiple ES from an individual parcelimportantly payment amounts are not (generally speaking) based on the summation of the individual values of each ES (Cooley and Olander 2012).
Advantages of bundling: (i) recognises the interconnectedness of ES processes and production; (ii) is beneficial for biodiversity and conservation (where broad conservation outcomes are sought); (iii) may increase the overall provision of individual ES from a parcel; (iv) can reduce administrative and transaction costs and raise price premiums, and (v) may reduce the degree of infrastructure needed to support a functioning market (Greenhalgh 2008;Wendland et al. 2010;Deal et al. 2012;Robert and Sterger 2013).
Disadvantages of bundling: (i) optimising multiple ES is difficult and given the uncertainty regarding quantification may lead to unintended trade-offs; (ii) limited knowledge concerning ES provision means accurately modelling ES spatial delivery and distribution is highly complex; (iii) regulatory requirements may mean that it is necessary to 'unbundle' specific services from the broader set; (iv) it can be difficult to demonstrate additionality and mitigate against double counting, and (v) performance related payments can be difficult to manage as ES bundle provision varies with time (Greenhalgh 2008;Wendland et al. 2010;Deal et al. 2012;Robert and Sterger 2013).
Projects that employ either stacking or bundling need to ensure they have resolved the issues of additionality and double counting before proceeding (Bianco 2009 compensating local fishers for lost income resulting from harvesting restrictions (Table 6).

529
Designating 'no-take-zones' to increase habitat cover and fish stocks, and compensating fishers for   Established to combat issues of overfishing, pollution, habitat destruction and coastal construction.  Local communities involved in the structuring of the conservation agreement and in the management of the conservation area.  Conservation agreement covers lobster fishing, no-take areas, fishing regulations and patrol zones.  Benefits to the community include employment in patrolling, management and user rights, access to markets for alternative income streams and capacity building.  Funded by the Nature Conservancy and Conservation International (via conservation stewardship programme) and Walton Foundation (via eastern tropical pacific seascape) requires government investment to maintain the program in the long-term.
Fiji, Bio-prospecting and Live Rock Harvestingearliest projects since 1997  Example of locally managed marine areas (of which 200 currently exist involving 300 communities covering 30% of inshore fisheries).  Bio-prospecting: External private organisations make agreements with local communities facilitated by the University of South Pacific (USP) and regulated by the government; with benefits directed to local resource owners (fees paid by these companies are channelled to a district conservation and education trust fund).  Comprises a marine protected area, a no-take-zone (to protect spawning grounds) and a rights-based sustainable fishery (also involving a local fishery cooperative partnering with a local fishing company).  Established to protect biodiversity, maintain a sustainable fishery and enhance community development.  A community foundation has been created (TUBIRNUIATA) to implement project activities such as patrols which employ paid community members.  Funding is mainly through philanthropic sources as well as WWF-Indonesiaalso attempting to establish a number of ecotourism initiatives.

Indonesia, Penemu and Bambu Islands, West Papua -Marine Conservation Areafrom 2011 to 2036
 Comprises a no-take-zone and sustainable fishery, for the purposes of conservation, ecotourism and community development.  Project developed with a local non-profit organisation Taman Perlindungan Laut (TPL) and Sea Sanctuaries Trust (SST).  Marine conservation agreement is a contract between TPL/SST and the Pam Island Communities, with the purpose of developing ecotourism businesses to provide alternative livelihood revenue streams and sustain the program long-term. Benefiting local communities through employment opportunities, technical assistance and access to goods and services.  Aims to be self-funding after ten years.
Tanzania, Chumbe Island Coral Park, Zanzibarestablished since 1992  Private marine reserve, which includes 30 hectares designated as a marine reef sanctuary (coral reef and seagrass beds) plus an additional 20 hectares of coral rag forest, for the purposes of conservation, research, eco-tourism and local education.  Chumbe Island Coral Park Ltd established the park through management contracts and a lease from the Zanzibar government, and has since become an international ecotourism destination and conservation area.  The ecotourism component fully covers management costs. Several international conservation and development donors have been involved with specific local conservation and education programmes.  The Park trains and employs local people as rangers, guides and hospitality personnel.
Guides and rangers also function as educators to communicate to local fisherman the importance of the reef bed and maintaining a no-take-zone. Local people have benefitted through increased incomes, access to markets for local goods, technical assistance and improved fish stocks.

544
MPA managers and coastal businesses may establish "green" levies or taxes for resort 545 tourists and charge user-fees for diving access and licenses. Revenues generated by these charges 546 can be re-invested to support continued management activities to enforce the operating rules and 547 ensure compliance, conserve and restore seagrass beds, and create employment opportunities for 548 local community members (Lutz, 2011). In this respect, participation of the private sector can be  were included (Fonseca, 2006). In addition, restoration programs suffer from a number of 608 challenges associated with validation (i.e., monitoring), site selection, artificial colonization 609 methods, management processes and lack of adequate scientific knowledge regarding seagrass 610 ecology (Fonseca, 2011). Nonetheless, with respect to restoration program outlays, recent estimates 611 in Australia have suggested somewhat more feasible restoration costs of between AUS$10,000 and 612 AUS$629,000 per hectare, with investments in restoration at the lower end implying pay-back times 613 of 5 years or less (Blandon and zu Ermgassen, 2014). This is further supported by the work of

651
In order to deliver these, programs need to be based on a platform of transparency,  , whilst also undermining social capital (Rudd et al. 2003;Shiferaw et al. 656 2008). In addition, programs that fail to consider the issue of inclusivity can ultimately disempower 657 participant groups, and as a consequence, embed benefit sharing inequalities between households 658 and communities ).

660
Devolving decision-making to stakeholder groups can be enormously beneficial (Larson and 661 Soto 2008), at once enhancing and strengthening intra-community ties as well as a sense of 662 common identity (Rudd et al. 2003). Conversely, centralized administration can often stifle local-663 scale innovations and the development of shared visions (Pokorny et al. 2013). Programs need to 664 engage and connect with local stakeholders in order to maximise participation, which is central to

671
These processes can be supported by clarifying stakeholder roles and responsibilities and 672 promoting leadership (Chhatre et al. 2012;Dent 2012). Leadership, and especially local leadership, has been shown to be fundamental to delivering successful coastal management (Sutton and Rudd 674 2014). Finally, it is important to acknowledge how participation is framed in the context of power 675 relations, as these can represent potent forces capable of distorting the meaningful involvement, 676 agency and legitimacy of grassroots actors (Dewulf et al. 2011;Cook et al. 2013).  The central tenant of incentive schemes relates the provision of specified outputs to 712 agreement obligations and payments (Ferraro 2008;. Consequently, monitoring 713 and compliance represent key contractual conditions for programs to deliver their principal 714 objectives (Hejnowicz et al. 2014). These can be distilled into four broad areas:

715
First, measuring ES provision (Porras et al. 2013). This reduces the likelihood of producing 716 a false picture of service provision, and provides a scientifically robust case for PES program design 717 (Hejnowicz et al. 2014). It has been suggested that even though coastal systems may be data poor,

718
there is sufficient knowledge of the management activities that improve resource protection and ES 719 provision (Lau, 2013). Second, evaluating scheme additionality and demonstrating 'added value' by 720 addressing the links between management interventions and program delivery (Ghazoul et al. 721 2010). Validating additionality requires baseline data, suitable metrics and performance indicators 722 plus the targeting of PES to locations likely to maximize program benefits (Sommerville et al. 723 2011; Wünscher and Engel, 2012;Lau, 2013).
Third, assessing potential of spill-over effects (i.e., leakage) resulting from program 725 implementation that may offset additionality gains Porras et al. 2013). Fourth, 726 monitoring contract conditionality and ensuring compliance (Ferraro 2008). This requires 727 establishing who is monitoring (i.e. users, communities or officials) and how frequently 728 (Sommerville et al. 2011), providing sufficient payments to programme participants (Porras et al. 729 2013), and ensuring agreements are long-term arrangements with enforceable penalties for breaches 730 of contract (Ferraro 2008;. All have substantive effects on transaction costs of 731 governance (ranked 57 th , Rudd 2014) and will influence the long-term viability of PES structures. 732 6.6 Costs and funding 733 The viability of PES programs relies upon consistent and sufficient financial flows, both in 734 the short-term (i.e., covering costs needed to initiate and implement a project) and the long-term 735 (i.e., securing the funds necessary to sustain an active project), without which lasting transformative 736 change cannot be achieved (Hejnowicz et al. 2014). Programs need to be designed so that they 737 sustain themselves through self-generated revenues (Pirard et al. 2010). An added complication for 738 seagrass PES schemes is that monitoring and enforcement in marine and coastal environments may 739 require extra technical and specialist equipment not needed in the terrestrial sphere, adding 740 significantly to program outlays (Lau, 2013). Securing long-term funding that reduces fiscal 741 constraints but is not overly reliant on external donor funding is particularly important (Bennett et 742 al. 2013;Fauzi and Anna 2013;Hein et al. 2013 communities. In addition, they also play an important role in the conservation and maintenance of 751 marine biological diversity and influence national or international non-market benefits deriving 752 from endangered species such as sea turtles (Rudd 2009 funding his PhD, which also helped to make this work possible.  Choice modelling: involves more elaborate sets of scenarios (or choices) from which participant select their preferred alternatives based on a set of choice attributes. Choices are constructed to reveal the marginal rate of substitution between a specific attribute and the trade-off item.
Contingent Valuation: this method suffers from several sources of bias, inconsistent preferences, it is costly and labour intensive to develop and implement and can miss non-trivial information. However, it is able to estimate option and existence values.
Choice Modelling: hypothetical bias and the choices can be complex where attribute numbers are high. However, compared to standard CV the experimenter has much more control, the statistics are more robust, attribute range is greater and the method suffers less from respondent strategic behaviour.

Value Transfer
Benefit Transfer: transference of values at one location (study site) to another location (policy site) of which there are four types: unit BT, adjusted BT, value function transfer and metaanalytic transfer Large number of uncertainties not wholly accounted for between study and policy locations.
Transfer of values from one context to another is difficult. Nevertheless, it is a quick and cheap method.

Participatory Valuation
Deliberative valuation: combines states preference methods with deliberative processes from political science, involving small groups of participants in reflective iterative dialogues.
Less bias encountered compared to standard stated preference methods. Values are constructed in a social process. Inclusive of all stakeholder groups, but depending on the power-relations of stakeholders involved some value preferences may be articulated more forcefully than others.

Non-monetary Deliberative and Participatory Approaches
Focus groups, Participatory Action Research (PAR), Health-based, Q-methodology: These are a set of group-based methods that are both participatory and deliberative, and seek to obtain information regarding human-nature relationships. PARs were developed specifically for use in developing countries to elicit local knowledge and enable local people to participate in decision-making. Health-based measures relate valuations to factors that affect quality of life and human-wellbeing. Qmethodology is a means of assessing the subjectivity of people's views and values.
Overall, these methods are able to provide values regarding biodiversity, provisioning, regulating and cultural services, and they enrich the qualitative components of value. Although they require literate participants, new data collection, trained individuals and can be affected by local nuances. However, protocols can be adjusted to illiterate individuals; values can be aggregated to the scale required and in some cases they can be relatively straightforward to undertake. Furthermore, they engage a wide-range of stakeholders and are conveyable to policy makers.
Adapted from Mendelsohn and Olmstead (2009) Hedge and Bull (2011) and Groom and Palmer (2012) The project operated across several villages and aimed to establish a viable alternative livelihood, agro-forestry and carbon credit scheme. Agroforestry was designed to generate carbon offsets alongside new 'on-farm' labour activities, whilst the alternative livelihood element promoted 'off-farm' micro-enterprises. Initially funded by the European Union, the programme became self-financing following sales of verified emissions reductions (VERs) in the voluntary carbon market. VER sales were used to establish an annual PES fund that dispensed payments to farmers over a seven year period. Remaining revenue was channelled into a community trust fund for development projects such as healthcare support. Adoption of agro-forestry practices meant households generated new 'on-farm' income by selling crops or harvesting non-timber forest products following cessation of carbon payments. Micro-enterprises such as bee-keeping, plant nurseries, carpentry and even a community sawmill provided viable and secure alternative revenue sources for farmers. In addition, some local people were hired by the project.
Criticisms: Carbon offset payments were less important (proportionally) than income from the project's alternative revenue sources. Micro-enterprises potentially undermined the sustainability of 'on-farm' activities through changes in labour allocation. Gender discrimination contributed to uneven income distribution between male-and female-headed households, and project costs were significant; with two thirds of carbon offset sales revenue directed towards overheads.  (2010) WKIEMP was initiated to provide a viable community-livelihood development model. Implemented across 15 micro-watersheds WKIEMP focused on land productivity and sustainable-use by supporting on-farm and off-farm conservation strategies and building institutional capacity; alongside promoting management interventions geared towards biodiversity and carbon sequestration and storage. Overall the project was moderately successful. Households did not receive payment; but derived income through improved land productivity, livelihood diversification and technical capacity. Estimated net present value to participating households is considered to be US$1193 to US$2844. Moreover, 60% of beneficiary households reported an increase in food production and consumption directly addressing poverty alleviation. Furthermore, the project established institutional networks to enhance the sustainability of community activities following project cessation such as basin technical committees that promoted cross-collaboration.
Criticisms: Two problems undermined WKIEMP's notion of sustainability. First, project permanency: the project ran for only five years from 2005 to 2010. Second, the programme encountered fiscal constraints that hampered its implementation and operation leading to disjointed upstream and downstream management interventions. Overall, the failure to secure adequate co-financing of funds significantly impaired project performance.
Socio Bosque: Ecuador Source: de Koning et al. (2011) and Krasue and Loft (2013) Socio Bosque is a nationwide government initiative designed to realise biodiversity conservation, climate mitigation and poverty alleviation benefits. Participants receive direct monetary transfers on a per hectare basis for protecting native forests and ecosystems through voluntary but monitored twenty year conservation agreements. Payments are made on a descending scale, with amounts reduced incrementally as the land enrolled increases providing a built-in equity mechanism. Participants are individual landowners or local indigenous communities, and so land is privately or communally owned. Only land that has a high probability of deforestation, sufficient carbon storage, water regulation and biodiversity capacity and is found in relatively socially-deprived areas is eligible for enrolment. Overall 260000 Ha yr-1 of forest have been protected. Remuneration is conditional, requiring compliance with a social investment plan (directing how incentives might best be used to improve social conditions) and conservation obligations. Social benefits are realised through monetary investments in health, education, household consumption, debt repayments, infrastructure and institutional capacity.
Criticisms: Payments allocated to participants are not equal: less than a fifth of households in community agreements receive more than US$500 yr-1 compared to 92% of private landholders. The scheme has underperformed with regards to distributing individual and collective contracts in a way that accounts for the number of beneficiaries per contract and their poverty status.