Edited by: Mats Lekander, Karolinska Institutet (KI), Sweden
Reviewed by: Wenhai Zhang, Hengyang Normal University, China; Ivan V. Brak, State Scientific-Research Institute of Physiology & Basic Medicine, Russia
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Shame and disgust are believed to be evolved psychological solutions to different adaptive challenges. Shame is thought to promote the maintenance of social hierarchies (Gilbert,
Traditionally, shame and disgust have been treated as orthogonal emotions. Disgust is described as a basic or primary cross-cultural emotion (Ekman et al.,
Shame is considered broadly as an emotion that involves self-reflection and evaluation (Tangney,
Shame can be triggered by both moral transgressions and social norm violations (Ferguson et al.,
In addition to social rules, shame may also be linked to the corporeal, bodily self. Gilbert (
Finally, shame has also been described as “maladaptive,” because it encourages dysfunctional behaviors, particularly behavioral avoidance (Tangney,
Like shame, disgust is a negative moral emotion that involves bodily concerns and has important implications for social behavior. Darwin (
The BIS is a constellation of psychological responses that are evolved solutions to the adaptive challenge of infectious disease (Schaller,
Disgust is perhaps the most studied BIS mechanism. It can be conceptualized in terms of a mechanism that can be activated (i.e., turned on or off) by a range of sensory information indicative of contamination, such as the taste of sour milk or the smell of garbage. Because disgust is believed to be an evolved solution to an adaptive challenge, most individuals experience it on at least some level. However, there is significant variability in disgust sensitivity. Thus, like most psychological traits, disgust can be assessed as a personality characteristic. Those who are more sensitive to disgust are overly concerned with potential contamination. They are susceptible to Type I errors (i.e., believing that something is a disease threat when it is not) and are more sensitive to disgusting stimuli. From this perspective, the cost of being too sensitive to disgust is the loss of potentially viable resources due to fear of contamination, whereas the benefit is reduced exposure to infectious disease.
Disgust has been described as a moral emotion concerning purity related social norms (e.g., taboo; Haidt,
In addition to moral judgments, disgust is also associated with negative attitudes and avoidance of other people. One of the primary vehicles for disease transmission is other human beings. Thus, people who pose a significant disease threat should evoke disgust. Schaller and Duncan (
It has also been suggested that disgust may encourage avoidance of potentially contaminated outgroup members by encouraging the formation of socially conservative value systems that promote adherence to social norms and tradition as well as negativity toward and avoidance of outgroup members (Tangney and Stuewig,
Based on the previous review, there are a number of similarities between shame and disgust. Both emotions appear to play an important role in social interactions, promoting avoidance of others, but for very different purposes (Orth et al.,
Shame and disgust seem to also provide similar functions in terms of the maintenance of social norms. Both have been defined as moral emotions, which encourage adherence to social norms and moral behavior (Haidt,
Some theorists have argued that shame and disgust are linked in that they both involve bodily or self-condemnation, whereas guilt and anger are emotions that involve condemnation of action or behavior (Roseman,
Another similarity between shame and disgust is the body language and posture that are associated with the two emotions. Darwin (
Additionally, both shame and disgust share is concerned with the body or the self. The bodily concern that is associated with shame is evinced by its association with body image disorders (Gilbert,
Finally, there is some neuroimaging work that suggests that shame and disgust may have underlying physiological commonalities. Shame has been associated with activation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Michl et al.,
One possible explanation for the apparent relation between disgust and shame is that they are overlapping psychological systems. Evolution is a haphazard yet efficient process that takes advantage of existing architecture (Buss et al.,
Accordingly, shame may stem, at least in part, from the emotion of disgust. That is, the secondary, self-conscious emotion of shame may be experienced when the primary emotion of disgust is reflected on the self. From this perspective, disgust may serve as an internal moral and social regulatory system in that once a social transgression has been perpetrated, the self is perceived as a source of contamination. The stigmatization that accompanies self-disgust and contamination then serves as an internal contingency that can motivate hiding and avoidance in order to prevent further contamination. In other words, shame may emerge from disgust. As a result of this relation, shame should not only be related to disgust sensitivity, it should also be related to contamination concerns, or disease avoidant cognitions (e.g., Perceived Vulnerability to Disease, PVD).
The goal of the proposed studies was to investigate the role that disgust plays in the self-evaluative emotion of shame. Shame and disgust are thought to have evolved to solve different adaptive challenges (i.e., establishing social hierarchies and disease avoidance, respectively; Gilbert,
Little research has investigated the association between disgust and shame. Consequently, the goal of the current studies was to investigate the extent to which shame is uniquely related to disgust, as well as disease avoidance concerns more broadly (i.e., contamination concern). Although shame and guilt are often highly correlated (Tangney,
If shame and disgust share some evolved psychological architecture in which the experience of shame emerges from perceiving the self as a source of disgust and contamination, disgust sensitivity and disease-avoidant cognitions (e.g., PVD) should predict shame proneness. Additionally, if the effect is specific to shame, disgust sensitivity and disease-avoidant cognitions should not be correlated with guilt and should remain significant even after controlling for negative affect. Furthermore, if shame emerges from disgust, there should be a causal relation between the two systems such that inducing disgust should result in increased shame proneness, but not guilt proneness (i.e., a greater likelihood to respond to prompts of social transgressions with shame consistent responses such as avoidance as opposed to guilt consistent responses such as apologizing). Thus, it was hypothesized that individual differences in disgust sensitivity would be positively correlated with shame, but not guilt, propensity. Moreover, inducing disgust would increase shame, but not guilt, propensity.
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate whether individual differences in disgust sensitivity and contamination fears were associated with individual differences in shame propensity and sensitivity. If shame emerges from disgust, disgust sensitivity should be positively correlated with shame. Furthermore, shame should be associated with broader disease avoidance concerns, so shame should also be associated with contamination concerns. To ensure that these relations are not mere products of negative affect, we controlled for negative effects in all analyses. Additionally, the relations should be specific to shame (i.e., disgust sensitivity should not be correlated with guilt), so we included guilt-proneness measures to demonstrate discriminant validity.
There were 195 introductory to psychology students from Virginia Commonwealth University (71% female), who participated in the study for course credit. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 47 years-of-age (
The participants completed a series of questionnaires online in the following order. The questionnaires included measures of disgust sensitivity, contamination concerns, shame and guilt-proneness, mood, and demographic questions.
General disgust sensitivity was assessed using the Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt et al.,
Pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivities were measured using the Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al.,
The Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised was used to assess disgust reactivity (DPSS-R; van Overveld et al.,
Fear of contamination was assessed using the contamination obsessions and washing compulsions subscale of the Padua Inventory (PI-COWC; Burns et al.,
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney and Dearing,
The Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; Cohen et al.,
Mood was controlled for using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al.,
The means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for all measures are presented in
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 1.
DS | 2.70 | 0.52 | 0.91 |
TDDS-Pathogen | 4.10 | 1.14 | 0.88 |
TDDS-Sexual | 3.51 | 1.44 | 0.84 |
TDDS-Moral | 3.80 | 1.38 | 0.81 |
DPSS-R | 2.68 | 0.68 | 0.88 |
Propensity Subscale | 2.88 | 0.74 | 0.85 |
Sensitivity Subscale | 2.48 | 0.80 | 0.82 |
PI-COWC | 1.52 | 1.00 | 0.92 |
TOSCA-Shame | 2.99 | 0.68 | 0.84 |
TOSCA-Guilt | 3.98 | 0.66 | 0.89 |
GASP-Shame | 4.18 | 1.00 | 0.79 |
NSE Subscale | 5.16 | 1.31 | 0.83 |
Withdraw Subscale | 3.21 | 1.20 | 0.76 |
GASP-Guilt | 5.01 | 1.12 | 0.84 |
NBE Subscale | 4.72 | 1.37 | 0.79 |
Repair Subscale | 5.33 | 1.12 | 0.73 |
PANAS-Negative Affect | 1.71 | 0.69 | 0.89 |
PANAS-Positive Affect | 2.67 | 0.88 | 0.89 |
Zero-order correlations between all measures were calculated to examine general patterns among the constructs (see
Zero-Order Correlations for all Measures in Study 1.
Measure | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1. DS | 0.65** | 0.62** | 0.15* | 0.44** | 0.36** | 0.43** | 0.62** | 0.29** | 0.35* | 0.14 | 0.41** | 0.16* | 0.27** | 0.36** | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.04 | |
2. TDDS-Pathogen | 0.49** | 0.17* | 0.42** | 0.34** | 0.39** | 0.49** | 0.25** | 0.27** | 0.17* | 0.24** | 0.11 | 0.18* | 0.19** | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.06 | ||
3. TDDS-Sexual | 0.43** | 0.29** | 0.13 | 0.39** | 0.48** | 0.31** | 0.33** | 0.21** | 0.32** | 0.23** | 0.29** | 0.38** | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.01 | |||
4. TDDS-Moral | 0.18* | 0.10 | 0.23** | 0.21** | 0.27** | 0.32** | 0.37** | 0.13 | 0.36** | 0.41** | 0.43** | 0.30** | 0.03 | 0.02 | ||||
5. DPSS-R | 0.88** | 0.89** | 0.51** | 0.45** | 0.33** | 0.14 | 0.37** | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.22** | 0.00 | |||||
6. DPSS-Propensity | 0.57** | 0.32** | 0.31** | 0.26** | 0.11 | 0.29** | −0.01 | 0.03 | 0.07 | −0.03 | 0.17* | 0.04 | ||||||
7. DPSS-Sensitivity | 0.56** | 0.49** | 0.32** | 0.14 | 0.37** | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.16* | 0.04 | 0.21** | 0.03 | |||||||
8. PI-COWC | 0.27** | 0.24** | 0.08 | 0.29** | 0.04 | 0.15* | 0.24** | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.07 | ||||||||
9. TOSCA-Shame | 0.53** | 0.41** | 0.43** | 0.33** | 0.27** | 0.32** | 0.16* | 0.06 | −0.10 | |||||||||
10. GASP-Shame | 0.81** | 0.77** | 0.38** | 0.57** | 0.61** | 0.41** | 0.01 | −0.05 | ||||||||||
11. NSE | 0.25** | 0.52** | 0.68** | 0.63** | 0.59** | −0.11 | 0.00 | |||||||||||
12. Withdraw | 0.07 | 0.20** | 0.31** | 0.02 | 0.14 | −0.07 | ||||||||||||
13. TOSCA-Guilt | 0.63** | 0.56** | 0.58** | −0.17* | 0.13 | |||||||||||||
14. GASP-Guilt | 0.92** | 0.88** | −0.16* | 0.18* | ||||||||||||||
15. NBE | 0.61** | −0.15* | 0.15* | |||||||||||||||
16. Repair | −0.14* | 0.18* | ||||||||||||||||
17. Negative Affect | 0.02 | |||||||||||||||||
18. Positive Affect |
In order to ensure that the relation between shame and disgust was specific to shame, guilt and negative affect were partially out of the correlations. Additionally, separate analyses were conducted to examine the relation between guilt and disgust. For those analyses, both shame and negative affect were partially out of the correlations. The partial correlations are presented in
Partial Correlations of Shame and Guilt with Disgust and Contamination Concern for Study 1.
Shame1 | Guilt2 | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TOSCA | GASP | NSE | Withdraw | Composite | TOSCA | GASP | NBE | Repair | Composite | |
DS | 0.27** | 0.27** | −0.01 | 0.40** | 0.31** | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.20* | −0.06 | 0.06 |
TDDS-Pathogen | 0.25** | 0.24** | 0.12 | 0.25** | 0.28** | −0.01 | 0.00 | −0.01 | 0.00 | −0.01 |
TDDS-Sexual | 0.28** | 0.24** | 0.03 | 0.31** | 0.30** | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.23** | 0.01 | 0.15 |
TDDS-Moral | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.30** | 0.32** | 0.34** | 0.22** | 0.35** |
DPSS-R | 0.47** | 0.34** | 0.13 | 0.37** | 0.47** | −0.12 | −0.16 | −0.12 | −0.15 | −0.16 |
Propensity | 0.33** | 0.26** | 0.12 | 0.26** | 0.35** | −0.08 | −0.11 | −0.08 | −0.11 | −0.11 |
Sensitivity | 0.51** | 0.35** | 0.11 | 0.40** | 0.50** | −0.13 | −0.17* | −0.14 | −0.16* | −0.17* |
PI-COWC | 0.29** | 0.28** | 0.07 | 0.34** | 0.33** | −0.14 | −0.06 | 0.05 | −0.17* | −0.11 |
As hypothesized, disgust sensitivity and contamination concern were positively correlated with shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect. The only measure of disgust that was not correlated with shame was moral disgust. These results suggest that the relation between disgust and shame involves physical or bodily contamination rather than symbolic moral contamination. Interestingly, the Negative Self-Evaluation subscale of the GASP, which assesses global self-condemnation, was the only indicator of shame that was not significantly correlated with disgust. On the other hand, disgust was strongly correlated with the Withdraw subscale, which assesses an individual’s desire to avoid situations that could induce shame.
Guilt was not consistently correlated with the disease-avoidance components of disgust (i.e., core/pathogen and sexual disgust) when controlling for shame and negative affect. However, guilt was consistently positively correlated with moral disgust. Although this finding was not hypothesized, it is consistent with the literature which describes guilt as a moral emotion that is concerned with social contract violations (Tangney et al.,
Study 1 provided initial correlational evidence that there is a unique relation between disgust and shame. Disgust sensitivity and contamination concern were consistently positively correlated with shame propensity even after controlling for guilt propensity and negative affect. Guilt, on the other hand, was generally not correlated with the disease-avoidant components of disgust when controlling for shame and negative affect. These findings provided partial evidence that shame may involve disgust. Nevertheless, Study 1 was limited in that it was a correlational design and therefore unable to provide any evidence for a causal relation between disgust and shame.
Additionally, Study 1 provided some evidence that moral disgust as opposed to the other disgust sensitivity measures (i.e., pathogen/core disgust and sexual disgust) was consistently positively correlated with guilt propensity even after controlling for shame propensity and negative affect. Interestingly, moral disgust was the only measure of disgust sensitivity that was not correlated with shame propensity. This finding is consistent with the primary distinction between shame and guilt (i.e., that shame is characterized by self-evaluation whereas guilt is characterized by behavioral-evaluation; Niedenthal et al.,
The purpose of Study 2 was to test a causal model in which inducing disgust results in higher levels of shame proneness (i.e., a greater likelihood of responding to prompts of social transgressions with shame consistent responses). If shame is an emotional experience that emerges from feeling disgusted with the self, inducing disgust should trigger shame. Again, the effect was hypothesized to be specific to shame, so the disgust induction was not expected to affect feelings of guilt. Moreover, the effect was expected to be specific to disgust and not the result of general negative affect. Thus, it was hypothesized that inducing disgust would result in higher levels of shame than both a neutral condition and a condition in which a negative mood state was induced. Additionally, as individuals who are sensitive to disgust are presumably more receptive to the disgust manipulation than those who are less sensitive to disgust (see Terrizzi et al.,
There were 175 introductory to psychology students from Virginia Commonwealth University (62% female) who received course credit for their participation. They ranged in age from 18 to 41 years-of-age (
Upon arriving at the lab, participants provided informed consent. Next, participants were randomly assigned to either the disgust, negative, or neutral condition and completed the mood induction task, which was masked as a lexical decision task. Following the mood induction, the participants completed the same battery of questionnaires that was used in Study 1, with the addition of the PVD scale (Duncan et al.,
To induce the different mood states, a subliminal priming procedure was utilized through a lexical decision task. Previous research has demonstrated that this is an effective and unobtrusive methodology for priming affective states (e.g., Ferré and Sánchez-Casas,
Following the procedure used by Dijksterhuis et al. (
The priming words were matched as closely as possible for length (i.e., number of letters) and starting letter. The priming words for the disgust condition were chosen based on the cross-cultural elicitors of disgust (see Curtis et al.,
Since disgust sensitivity has been shown to predict reactivity to disgusting stimuli (van Overveld et al.,
The PVD scale was used to assess germ aversion (
Shame and guilt were assessed using the same measures as Study 1, the TOSCA (Tangney and Dearing,
Mood was controlled for using the PANAS (Watson et al.,
The means, standard deviations, and reliabilities for all measures are presented in
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 2.
DS | 2.69 | 0.50 | 0.89 |
TDDS-Pathogen | 4.12 | 1.14 | 0.84 |
TDDS-Sexual | 3.46 | 1.45 | 0.84 |
TDDS-Moral | 3.80 | 1.32 | 0.87 |
PVD | |||
Germ Aversion | 3.90 | 1.21 | 0.71 |
Perceived Infectability | 3.23 | 1.37 | 0.84 |
TOSCA-Shame | 2.90 | 0.64 | 0.80 |
TOSCA-Guilt | 4.00 | 0.51 | 0.77 |
GASP-Shame | 4.09 | 0.92 | 0.72 |
NSE Subscale | 5.21 | 1.21 | 0.69 |
Withdraw Subscale | 2.97 | 1.03 | 0.61 |
GASP-Guilt | 5.18 | 0.98 | 0.79 |
NBE Subscale | 4.77 | 1.30 | 0.74 |
Repair Subscale | 5.59 | 0.88 | 0.56 |
PANAS-Negative Affect | 1.46 | 0.55 | 0.84 |
PANAS-Positive Affect | 2.65 | 0.96 | 0.91 |
The data were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression following the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (
In order to ensure that the effect was not due to a general state of negative mood, the negative affect subscale of the PANAS was entered in the first step of the regression model. For analyses involving shame as the dependent variable, guilt was also entered in the first step as a covariate. For analyses involving guilt as a dependent variable, shame was entered in the first step as a covariate. The dummy coded condition variables and the disgust sensitivity composite were entered in the second step of the analysis
In Step 1, both of the control variables, negative affect [
Condition by Disgust Sensitivity Interaction predicting Shame in Study 2.
Simple slopes analyses indicated that at high levels of disgust sensitivity (i.e., +1
In Step 1, shame [
As in Study 1, disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor of shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect. However, unlike Study 1, disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor of guilt even after controlling for shame and negative affect. Although there was no evidence for a main effect of the disgust manipulation, Study 2 provided initial evidence that inducing disgust increased shame for individuals who were sensitive to disgust. These results were significant even after controlling for negative affect and guilt. Moreover, the effect seemed to be particular to shame and disgust. When guilt was analyzed as the dependent variable, there was no interaction between condition and disgust sensitivity when controlling for shame and negative affect. Thus, the results highlight the unique relationship between shame and disgust.
Across both studies, shame was positively correlated with both disgust sensitivity and contamination concerns (i.e., those who were sensitive to disgust and/or concerned with contamination were more sensitive to shame). More importantly, in both studies, disgust sensitivity and contamination concern were significant predictors of shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect, emphasizing that the relation between disgust and shame is unique. That is, the relation between disgust and shame was not due to negative affect (i.e., that they are both negatively valenced emotions) and the same pattern was not seen with shame’s sibling emotion, guilt.
Interestingly, however, guilt was consistently positively correlated with moral disgust even after controlling for shame and negative affect. This effect may be due to the fact that shame and guilt differ in regard to the nature of their self-conscious evaluations. For shame, the self is the object of the negative evaluations whereas for guilt, the behavior serves as the attitude-object (Niedenthal et al.,
Study 2 provided some initial support for a causal relation between disgust and shame. Although there was no main effect for the disgust induction (i.e., inducing disgust did not increase shame for all participants), relative to the negative induction, the disgust manipulation increased shame for individuals who were more sensitive to disgust. Importantly, this effect was consistent even after controlling for negative affect and guilt. Moreover, the manipulation did not have the same effect on guilt (i.e., inducing disgust did not affect guilt).
As a whole, these studies provide some preliminary evidence for a unique relation between shame and disgust. That is, shame may piggyback on evolved disease avoidance architecture. But, it is clear that much more work needs to be done in order to elucidate the exact nature of the relationship between shame and disgust.
One primary limitation of the current studies is that disgust with the self was not directly manipulated. Study 2 induced disgust, but did not directly link disgust with self (i.e., it was not clear that the self was the object of the disgust). Furthermore, it is impossible to rule out participant bias and demand characteristics as potential explanations for the findings in Study 2. As we did not include a pretest measure of shame, it is also impossible to rule out preexisting differences. Future studies should include pretest measures and evaluate whether manipulating disgust toward the self (e.g., having participants imagine or recall scenarios in which they got sick in public) results in more consistent findings. If shame is experienced as disgust with the self, manipulations that evoke disgust with self should be more likely to consistently increase shame.
Additionally, all of the studies assessed shame using explicit measures. Social desirability can be a problem particularly for self-report measures of attitudes toward the self, because people tend to engage in positive illusions (i.e., presenting the self in a more positive light; Heatherton and Wyland,
Lastly, although the current studies presented consistent positive correlations between shame and disgust sensitivity and demonstrate that these correlations remain significant even after controlling for negative affect and guilt, it is still possible that the relations may be explained by an unmeasured third variable (e.g., behavioral inhibition or neuroticism). Both disgust and shame have been correlated with behavioral inhibition or behavioral avoidance and neuroticism (Orth et al.,
The results from the current research provide some preliminary evidence for a link between shame and disgust. Though additional work needs to be done in order to understand the causal nature of this relation, it may have some important clinical implications for clients who suffer from shame-related psychological disorders (e.g., body dysmorphic disorder and eating disorders). Indeed, given the accumulation of evidence linking disgust sensitivity with anxiety disorders (see Olatunji and McKay,
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to the corresponding author.
The studies involving human participants were reviewed and approved by Virginia Commonwealth University IRB. The patients/participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.
Both authors made substantial contributions to the framework of the study and both authors were involved in writing the manuscript.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
This manuscript contains content that originally appeared in the primary author’s dissertation.
1These results appear to be an anomaly. In Study 2 and other studies from this lab, guilt was either positively correlated with negative affect or not significantly correlated, as has been found in previous research (Cohen et al.,
2Separate analyses were conducted controlling for guilt and negative affect. Both guilt and negative affect marginally attenuated the relation between disgust and shame. For ease of presentation, only the partial correlations in which both guilt and negative affect were controlled simultaneously are presented here.
3Separate analyses were conducted for each of the measures of shame, guilt, and disgust sensitivity. As the results were relatively consistent across measures, only the analyses with the composite variables are presented.
4Separate analyses were conducted for each of the scales used in the disgust sensitivity composite (i.e., DS, TDDS-Pathogen, TDDS-Sexual, and PVD-Germ Aversion). As the measures were highly correlated and separate analyses exhibited comparable results, only the analyses for the composite measures are presented.
5Prior to running the regression analyses, Levene’s test for equality of variances revealed no significant differences across conditions.
Primes for Study 2.
Disgust | Negative | Neutral |
---|---|---|
Pus | Pity | Plain |
Fart | Fault | Farm |
Scab | Scar | Square |
Snot | Snob | Street |
Puke | Pinch | Plant |
Poop | Penalty | Paper |
Urine | Useless | Unit |
Vomit | Vandal | Vest |
Mucus | Maniac | Month |
Diarrhea | Disappointing | Door |