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Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon. Unfortunately, both processes have been investigated differently and without much reference to each other. In this contribution, we therefore set out to fill this lacuna by examining the conceptualizations of the assumed underlying cognitive processes of both phenomena, and by also referring to the research traditions and paradigms of the respective field. Based on early work put forward by
There are situations, in which decision makers arrive at an idea or a decision not by analytically inferring the solution but by either sensing the correct solution without being able to give reasons for it, or by realizing the solution all of a sudden without being able to report on the solution process. Roughly, the former phenomenon has been called intuition, the latter insight. Both have fascinated the public as well as the scientific audience.
Here are two historical cases that illustrate the two phenomena (
For an example of a sudden insight into the solution of a complex problem, consider Wagner Dodge, a smokejumper who survived the Mann Gulch Fire in August 1949 (Mclean, as cited in
Based on these examples, both phenomena – intuition and insight – may be conceived of as
First, we will give an overview of predominant definitions of intuition and insight from a cognitive-psychological perspective. Second, we will elaborate on the underlying cognitive processes of both phenomena, thereby aiming to pin down similarities and differences. Both, similarities and differences will be addressed against the background of the research history of intuition and insight as well as in light of predominant, experimental paradigms that have been used to investigate the two phenomena. The paper ends by outlining open questions and highlighting future directions in scientific research that may progress our understanding of the underlying cognitive processes of intuition and insight (as well as on their relatedness).
Although most people “intuitively” know what an intuition is, the scientific community is split over its definition as well as its conceptualization. Despite disagreement about any definition, common ground is that intuition is an experienced-based process resulting in a spontaneous tendency toward a hunch or a hypothesis (
Firstly, there is the aspect of
In line with these aspects,
In addition to the aspect of experientiality and the unconscious read-out of implicitly learned cue-criterion relationships,
In contrast to the above elaborations on intuition, the term insight has been used to refer to the
Such insightful solutions are associated with a privileged storage in long-term memory. Likewise as single trial learning. Recent studies observed a memory advantage for items that were solved by insight compared with non-insight solutions (
Yet, it has to be emphasized that an exact definition of the term insight has proven to be difficult, not least because the term insight has been used in many different ways in problem-solving research. Another hindrance is that it is very difficult to empirically operationalize the psychological construct of insight (
In order to help clarifying the conceptual muddle on insight,
After having defined both cognitive phenomena, intuition and insight, it becomes obvious that both share a similarity in terms of persisting conceptual difficulties. Moreover, with regard to the subjective phenomenology they reveal a distinct picture: While intuition means to non-consciously understand environmental patterns and to act according with this first impression without being able to justify it (
Intuition research has been deeply integrated in research on judgment and decision making that investigates how humans decide between alternatives and judge situations (
To anticipate elaboration taking place later in this contribution, we mention a third approach in intuition research, which has developed independently from any dual- or single perspective and has its roots in the creativity and problem-solving literature (
On this view, intuitive responses have been understood as “intuitive antecedents of insight” (
In contrast, research on insightful thinking has its roots in Gestalt psychology, which investigated the integration and ordering mechanisms of human perception and problem solving (e.g.,
In sum, both concepts, due to their elusiveness, had to fight for recognition as an established field of research. Nevertheless, regrettably, research on intuition and research on insight has developed mostly independently from each other. However, this is in sharp contrast to a lay perspective on the two phenomena, which would rather endorse the perspective that intuition and insight are inherently intertwined with intuition being an antecedent of insight (in terms of a slight previous impression on the fringe of consciousness). Yet, the two branches of research evolved from different research traditions using different scientific paradigms and, unfortunately, have referred to one another only marginally (i.e., for instance by
In the majority of conceptualizations, intuitive processing has been described within a continuity model locating intuition on one end of the continuum and insight on the other. A prominent example is the two-stage model put forward by
Based on
To put it in a nutshell, according to the continuity model, – as
Along these lines, when investigating insights from a naturalistic perspective (i.e., in a field setting and not in controlled laboratory settings),
Contrary to the idea of a gradual solution approach, there is the discontinuity model of problem solving: insight is strongly linked to cognitive processes that restructure mental problem representations in order to allow the generation of a solution to a complex problem. A prominent example of a discontinuity model is the
In an eye movement study, for example, participants were asked to transform an incorrect arithmetic statement, which is made up of Roman numbers made of matchsticks, into a correct one moving only one single matchstick. Interestingly, it could be observed that before the correct solution of difficult problems was generated, suddenly, solvers attended such problem elements of the equation (e.g., the operators) longer that they had hardly noticed before. This was taken as evidence that successful solvers overcame self-imposed constraints (
To summarize, according to a discontinuity model, the cognitive processes of intuition and insight seem to be qualitatively distinct. No crosstalk between them is possible. Moreover, the first (intuitive) look on a problem resulting in a mental impasse biases the subsequent solution. To be more precise, the intuitive apprehension of a problem necessarily leads to an impasse and restructuring processes are needed so as to overcome the bias and to solve the problem. This can be demonstrated, for example, via the utilization of magic tricks in order to probe insight problem solving. To explicate,
This discontinuity approach resembles the experimental procedure in typical judgment and decision-making studies conducted within the heuristics-and-biases framework (
Despite the large number of contributions that support the dual-systems view both theoretically and empirically, such theories have nevertheless recently come under strong fire (
After having shortly named the key assumptions of the dual-system framework as well as potential critical points, we will continue by elaborating on why we think the experimental approach of the insight problem solving literature (e.g.,
Together, experiments from both scientific fields show that by exploiting peoples’ intuitive apprehension of a problem, the solution is precluded from the beginning. To overcome the impasse or bias, it is suggested that the problem solver may engage in restructuring the problem space or in analytic strategies so as to eventually being able to solve the problem and to arrive at the objectively correct answer. Thus, there might be a reasonable mapping of the discontinuity model to the common dual-system model: first, the intuitive system starts (whether by default first or in parallel to System 2), and will lead to an over-constrained or biased problem representation that subsequently may lead to an impasse or conflict. Essential for reaching a solution is, (i) that the problem solver or decision maker realizes that the fast initial apprehension of the problem precludes its solution and (ii) engages in a representational change to overcome the initial problem representation (
Equally important, System 1 is considered subordinate to System 2 and its hasty responses needs to be tamed (cf.
Hence, within the discontinuity conception of insight, intuition is not regarded as helpful or diagnostic for the generation of a pending insight. In line with this idea,
As an interim summary, it may be concluded that intuition research advocates a continuity model, in which intuition and insight build upon each other in a gradual and cumulative fashion: people are non-consciously sensitized toward pattern or meaning in the environment and act accordingly (e.g.,
Interestingly, in the semantic domain, intuition research following
According to
For such divergent triads,
To conclude, we set out to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of intuition and insight so as to clarify their relationship. At first sight, intuition and insight seem to be very differently conceptualized: while the intuition literature favors a continuity model, insight has been described within in a discontinuity model. In a continuity model, early (semantic) readout processes are taken as diagnostic for the non-conscious detection of environmental patterns and/or meaning (in terms of an antecedent of later explicit mental representation or insight). Intuition is described as aiding decision making and problem solving when time and cognitive capacity is limited and necessary information is temporarily unavailable. Contrary to this, in a discontinuity model early intuitive responses misdirect the generation of a correct solution or are experimentally utilized to bias solution attempts. In this case, intuitions lead people astray. Instead of employing intuition, mental restructuring processes (i.e., qualitative changes in the non-conscious search processes) are needed to overcome biased intuitive impressions or apprehensions so as to eventually solve the problem. In that respect, a discontinuity model resembles dual-process accounts in judgment and decision making.
Except early work by
TZ developed the theoretical conception; wrote the article. MÖ developed the theoretical conception; revised the manuscript. KV developed the theoretical conception; revised the manuscript.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
This work was funded by the Werner Reichardt Centre for Integrative Neuroscience (CIN) at the University of Tübingen (an Excellence Cluster within the framework of the Excellence Initiative (EXG 307) funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
There is the idea that a period, in which a person after encountering an impasse is not being consciously engaged in finding the solution anymore and puts the problem aside (i.e., the
For the sake of completeness, it has to be emphasized that metacognitive processes may play a role as well in intuitive processing. To strengthen the scope of our argumentation, we decided not to detail on this notion. Please see