Edited by: Timothy L. Hubbard, Arizona State University, United States
Reviewed by: Ulrich Ansorge, Universität Wien, Austria; Thomas Sanocki, University of South Florida, United States
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology
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High-level cognitions can enter consciousness through the activation of certain action sets and the presentation of external stimuli (“set-based entry,” for short). Set-based entry arises in a manner that is involuntary and systematic. In the Reflexive Imagery Task, for example, subjects are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We examined whether or not set-based entry can also occur in the case of involuntary counting. Subjects in Experiment 1A were instructed to not count the number of objects presented in an array. Involuntary counting arose on a high proportion of the trials (a mean proportion of ∼0.90) for stimulus arrays having 2–5 objects, and such counting arose less frequently across trials when the array consisted of 6–10 objects (a mean proportion of ∼0.21). The data from Experiment 1B revealed that, when people choose to perform Set
Understanding the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of “entry into consciousness" (“entry," for short;
Regarding high-level cognitions (e.g., mental imagery and subvocalizations), the involuntary entry of these cognitions can arise as a consequence of the activation of
The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT;
The RIT (see review in
There are more complex versions of the task. In one study, RIT effects arose even though the involuntary effect involved a word-manipulation task similar to the childhood game of Pig Latin (e.g., “CAR” becomes “AR-CAY”). In this variant of the RIT (
Questions remain concerning the validity of the RIT effect. For instance, one criticism is that the paradigm relies on the technique of self-report. Self-reports can be inaccurate as a result of (a) inaccurate memories of fleeting conscious contents that lead to incorrect self-reports (
In one version of the RIT, subjects reported on the majority of trials that the involuntary subvocalization felt “immediate” (
Germane to Wegner’s views of the monitor bringing undesired contents into consciousness, in the basic RIT involving involuntary subvocalizations in response to the presentation of visual stimuli, the following might be transpiring. The subject, in order to monitor whether his or her performance was successful on a given trial, might employ the practice of imagining what the undesired mental operation would be (e.g., the name “triangle”). Conceptually, this imagination of the undesired outcome (a simulation of sorts) could be construed as qualitatively distinct from the actual execution of the (undesired) mental operation. For the subject, the activation of such a mental representation of a simulacrum, which simulates what the undesired mental operation would be, might be indistinguishable from the representation resulting from the actual undesired mental operation, leading to the illusion that the undesired mental operation was executed.
This hypothesis, however, appears to be incapable of accounting for RIT effects requiring mental operations that are more complex in nature. The simulacrum for these variants of the RIT would require the actual execution of the undesired mental operation. For example, in
Previous research has conveyed that the automatic counting of visual objects (often referred to as “subitizing”;
As in
When creating the stimulus arrays, we took the opportunity to manipulate whether all the visual objects were presented in the same color (color uniformity condition) or not (disuniform condition), as such stimulus properties are known to influence the nature of involuntary counting (
San Francisco State University students (
Stimuli consisted of non-readily nameable shapes selected from
Schematic depiction of a typical trial with an array of objects that are all presented in the same color.
Schematic depiction of a typical trial with an array of objects presented in different colors.
Each object shape was outlined with a solid black border (3/4 pt) to make the objects more perceivable to the subject. The shades and colors of the objects had been used successfully in previous studies (
Instructions, presented on the computer screen, informed subjects that they would be shown a series of object arrays. Each subject was presented with 72 trials, 32 of which presented arrays having a number of objects within the subitizing range, and 40 of which presented arrays having a number of objects outside of this range. Half (
Before each trial, the phrase “
After each trial, subjects were presented with two questions: “
Before performing the critical trials, subjects first completed four practice trials in which they were instructed to not count the number of objects. The practice trials resembled the critical trials. The object arrays used during the practice trials remained the same across subjects. The object arrays used in the practice trials were distinct from the object arrays presented during the experimental trials.
Once subjects completed the experiment, they responded to a series of funneled debriefing questions (following the procedures of
The data from five subjects were excluded from analysis because it was obvious to the experimenter that these subjects were not following instructions (i.e., always reporting the incorrect number of objects on trials in which they reported that they subitized the number of objects, not pressing the spacebar to indicate that they had counted the number of objects in the array even though they reported the number of objects they subitized), and in one case, the experimental session was terminated due to a computer malfunction.
The mean proportion of trials in which involuntary counting occurred was 0.90 (
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Range (within versus outside) as one factor and Color (same versus different) as the other factor, there was a significant main effect of Range,
Similar effects were found when the analyses excluded the data from trials in which the subject miscounted the objects. When the number of stimuli were within the subitizing range, involuntary counting occurred on an average proportion of 0.97 of the trials (
Accuracy rates were high when the number of stimuli fell within the subitizing range (
We examined the absolute difference between a subject’s count and the actual number of stimuli that were presented in the array. With this measure, it was revealed that subjects were more accurate when the number of stimuli fell within the subitizing range (
The mean latency of button-pressing was 1,348.65 ms (
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Range (within versus outside) as one factor and Color (same versus different) as the other factor, there was a main effect of Range,
When involuntary counting occurred, it was deemed to be immediate on a mean proportion of trials of 0.83 (
In a fully within-subjects ANOVA with Range (within versus outside) as one factor and Color (same versus different) as the other factor, there was a significant main effect of Range,
We provided a replication of the RIT in the context of the phenomenon of counting. The rate of involuntary counting was greater for object arrays within the subitizing range than for those outside of the subitizing range. Regardless of the task instruction (“
In Experiment 1A, the experimenter somehow activated the set to count objects through the negative instructions (see Footnote 4). To the subject, the set to count was undesired and unselected, yet the set induced entry. Importantly, the set influenced conscious processing, and that which enters the conscious field, but it did not influence overt behavior. Consistent with this observation, it has been proposed that, during action selection, urges and other action-related thoughts can be construed as “action options” (
In Experiment 1A, it was the experimenter who rendered the set to count to be an undesired action set. In everyday life, it is often one, the actor, who determines which sets are desirable or not. Would effects involving involuntary entry arise if it is the actor who selects which sets are undesirable and if the actor also selects, in the place of the undesired set, another, alternative set? We investigated this possibility in Experiment 1B, in which subjects were trained extensively on one set (e.g., to count objects) and then, when presented with stimuli (e.g., five nonsense objects;
Stimuli used for Experiment 1B. Not drawn to scale.
Subjects performed a block of 60 trials in which, at the beginning of each trial and before being presented with an array of stimuli (
When planning the experiment, we were concerned that there would be floor effects of set-unrelated imagery, for several reasons, including that the action plan of counting may be substantially weaker, at baseline, than the more frequently used plan of color naming. Hence, before the test phase of the experiment, subjects were exposed to an extensive set of trials in which they either color named or object named. This additional, between-subjects manipulation permitted additional contrasts and allowed us also to control to some extent subjects’ pre-test experiences with each of these action sets. For the sake of comparison, we took the opportunity to add a second block of trials in which the action set was determined, not by the subject, but externally (by computer program). This block was always presented as the second block, because we wanted subjects’ free selection of sets during the first, “Self-Select” block to be uninfluenced by any prior exposure to a set-selection process. For example, if subjects were presented in the first block to a regimen in which color-naming occurred on 50% of the trials, then this could influence set selection rates in the second, Self-Select block.
Forty San Francisco State University students (
We used the same hardware and software that was used in Experiment 1A. Latencies of the spoken responses were recorded via microphone (Model 33-3014; Radio Shack; Fort Worth, TX, United States), placed approximately 4 inches from subjects’ mouths. Four of the five nonsense stimuli were objects selected from
All subjects first completed a training block with 375 trials. For training, subjects were randomly assigned to either the Color Naming condition (
After training, subjects were informed that they would now be given the option to choose, on a trial-by-trial basis, either to name the color of the objects or count the number of objects (Self-Selected trials). Subjects were also informed that they would be responding to two mental imagery questions after viewing the object(s) on the screen. Examples of mental imagery and what it means to have visual and auditory imagery were displayed on the screen and read aloud by the experimenter to the subject (instructions were taken from
After the instructions, subjects first completed three practice trials and then 60 Self-Selected trials. Practice trials were exactly the same as the critical trials. During this time, the experimenter clarified any questions the subject had. At the beginning of each Self-Selected trial, subjects were asked, “
Schematic depiction of a typical trial (Experiment 1B). Not drawn to scale.
After a spoken response was made, subjects were asked two questions about their mental imagery: “
Following the block of Self-Selected trials, all subjects completed 60 Externally-Selected trials. These trials were exactly the same as the Self-Selected trials except that the instruction set was randomly selected for the subjects. The instruction set, indicating what kind of response to make, stated to either
Once subjects completed the experiment, they responded to a series of funneled debriefing questions (following the procedures of
Based on previous research (
During the first block of trials, in which subjects could choose the action set (object counting versus color naming), subjects did not select one set significantly more often than the other. The raw proportions (
In a mixed design 2 × 2 ANOVA, with
Analysis of the trial-by-trial data revealed that the average number of consecutive trials on which subjects would select the same set was ∼5 (e.g.,
The most interesting finding was that, during the trials, set-unrelated imagery was experienced often by subjects (see this and other descriptive statistics in
Mean Latencies (ms), proportions of imagery, and error rates as a function of block and training (Experiment 1B).
All trials | Color training | Counting training | |
---|---|---|---|
Set-related imagery | 0.72 (0.05) | 0.72 (0.06) | 0.71 (0.07) |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.57 (0.04) | 0.56 (0.06) | 0.58 (0.06) |
Color imagery | 0.62 (0.04) | 0.62 (0.06) | 0.62 (0.07) |
Number imagery | 0.66 (0.04) | 0.66 (0.05) | 0.67 (0.06) |
Imagery of both sets | 0.42 (0.05) | 0.38 (0.06) | 0.46 (0.07) |
Error rates | 0.01 ( |
0.004 ( |
0.01 ( |
Latencies | 898.08 (33.50) | 895.57 (53.84) | 900.58 (41.33) |
Set-related imagery | 0.73 (0.05) | 0.79 (0.05) | 0.67 (0.07) |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.54 (0.04) | 0.45 (0.05) | 0.63 (0.06) |
Color imagery | 0.63 (0.04) | 0.65 (0.04) | 0.61 (0.07) |
Number imagery | 0.64 (0.04) | 0.59 (0.04) | 0.69 (0.07) |
Imagery of both sets | 0.38 (0.05) | 0.31 (0.05) | 0.46 (0.08) |
Error rates | 0.02 ( |
0.02 ( |
0.02 ( |
Latencies | 843.29 (36.22) | 829.35 (56.05) | 857.24 (47.17) |
Importantly, the proportion of trials in which subjects explicitly reported the experience of both set-related and set-unrelated imagery was non-trivial and reliable. For the first block of trials, the proportion (
Regarding the experiences of color imagery versus number imagery, an ANOVA, along with the data presented in
An ANOVA with Training as a between-subjects factor and Choice as a within-subjects factor revealed that there was no main effect of Training,
As expected, for the Self-Select block (Block 1), the proportion of trials with set-related imagery (
Mean error rates were very low (
Perhaps our pattern of results, in which set-unselected thoughts occurred for roughly 50% of the trials, arises only after subjects perform both sets over the course of several test trials. To examine this possibility, we examined subjects’ responses on the first trial of the first block. This analysis revealed that, across subjects, set-unrelated imagery occurred often during the first trial (
Supporting this interpretation, we conducted an additional, single-trial version of Experiment 1B with a different group of subjects [37 San Francisco State University students (
Across the 37 subjects, imagery of the three kinds occurred quite frequently:
Faced with these additional corroboratory data, one could argue that our pattern of results stemmed from subjects knowing
Only 1 out of 36 subjects experienced no imagery of any kind, while many subjects experienced imagery of some kind:
In light of the findings from these two single-trial experiments, we entertained the possibility that, regarding the basic RIT effect (in which subjects cannot suppress the subvocalization of the names of visual objects presented to them), perhaps the effect will fail to arise if, before the presentation of the stimulus, subjects had activated the set, not to name objects, but rather to do something else (e.g., to name the colors in which stimulus words are presented). To investigate this possibility, we conducted another single-trial version of the RIT. In this experiment, which was based on the classic Stroop task (
After the Stroop trials, subjects were presented with a prompt, “Name the Color of the Object” in which subjects indicated their response by speaking the answer into the microphone. Subjects were then presented with a line drawing of a colored table, based on the black-and-white line drawing of
The results indicated that the RIT effect persisted for the majority of the subjects: a proportion of 0.80 (
Surprisingly, set-unrelated imagery occurred on roughly 50% of the trials of Experiment 1B, regardless of whether the set was self-selected or externally selected and regardless of whether subjects were trained to name colors or to count objects. The results are consistent with the
Another limitation of Experiment 1B, including the single-trial variants of this experiment, is that we cannot corroborate that subjects’ self-reports about their subjective experience reflects what actually transpired during the trial. Some of the probe questions could be construed as “leading questions,” questions that increase the likelihood of artifacts from experimental demand. Future variants of the single-trial versions of Experiment 1B might be able to corroborate subjects’ self-reports by examining neural measures (e.g., the neural correlates of counting versus color-naming). In addition, future behavioral studies could employ questions that are more open-ended and that could not be construed as leading questions.
Consistent with theorizing (
Perhaps the involuntary counting that occurred in Experiment 1A arose only because the set to count objects was activated repeatedly by what was mentioned, regarding counting, after each trial. To provide some evidence against this alternative hypothesis, we conducted a single-trial version of Experiment 1A in which counting was not mentioned at all before the single trial. This variant of Experiment 1 would provide further evidence that subjects’ report of involuntary imagery in Experiment 1 stemmed from their knowledge of the actual number of objects presented in the stimulus array.
These data were collected from a different group of subjects (28 San Francisco State University students who participated for course credit). We used the same hardware and software that was used in Experiment 1A. The target stimulus was an array of nonsense stimuli displayed within a visual angle of 13.07° × 15.15
Each object array appeared for 4 s. Directly after the presentation of the object arrays, subjects were asked two questions, (a)
For the subjects (
The RIT reveals that, through the activation of sets, conscious thoughts can be triggered into existence by external stimuli in a manner that is nontrivial, principled, reliable, and systematic. Our experiments build on this past research by revealing how action sets can, when combined with certain forms of environmental stimulation, trigger the occurrence of high-level conscious thoughts, including those associated with counting, which is a sophisticated cognitive operation. In Experiment 1A, we provided a replication and extension of the RIT, one which illuminates further the nature of set-based entry. To our knowledge, this is one of the first demonstrations of the RIT involving the phenomenon of involuntary counting. Despite the task instruction (“Do Not Count the Number of Objects”), the involuntary counting still arose on a substantive proportion of the trials. Moreover, involuntary counting was more likely for object arrays within the subitizing range than for those outside of this range. Such an effect is unlikely to arise from experimental demand, for it would require for subjects to know how they should comport themselves in response to stimulus arrays that fall within the subitizing range and outside of this range.
It is parsimonious to conclude that the difference between the condition having 2–5 objects and the condition having more than five objects reflects a real occurrence of automatic, involuntary counting, a conclusion that is supported by the trial-by-trial immediacy measure provided by subjects. The immediacy measure revealed that involuntary counting was more likely to be perceived as immediate in the subitizing condition than in the conditions in which the number of objects were outside the subitizing range. The analyses did not reveal any differences in the latencies of involuntary counting when the color of the arrays was manipulated experimentally. Further research can be conducted to assess whether this will remain so with a larger sample size or with an experimental approach that is otherwise more sensitive.
One limitation of Experiment 1A is that it is challenging to create a variety of stimulus arrays that do not include recognizable patterns within them. Such patterns could influence perceptual grouping and the process of counting. For example, one of the stimulus arrays, composed of nine objects, was created in such a way that three objects were presented in rows of three. This might have led subjects to subitize the number
Setting aside the limitations of the present project, it is important to emphasize that the RIT is the kind of paradigm that, because it builds incrementally on robust phenomena, has of recent been encouraged by leading researchers in the field (e.g.,
It is also important to note that the kind of involuntary entry into consciousness found in the RIT arises also in tasks that lack any kind of negative instruction to not perform some kind of mental operation. For example, involuntary entry of contents into consciousness arises for ambiguous objects (e.g., Necker cube). In one experiment (
Consistent with theorizing (
Interestingly, animal research may provide some additional evidence for the notion that representations of unselected actions are activated during action control. This has been demonstrated in the rat. Specifically, when the animal solves a T-maze by, say, taking the left path, there is activation of neural circuits associated with both this path and the incorrect path (e.g., to go right;
In all of the present experiments, there was the involuntary entry of contents associated with action sets that were undesired or unselected by the subject (to compare the results across all the present studies, see
Imagery as a function of set, training, and mental operation: Counting, object naming, or color naming.
Involuntary counting | Mean proportion of trials |
---|---|
Uniform color (Exp. 1A) | 0.90 ( |
Disuniform color (Exp. 1A) | 0.91 ( |
Single-trial version (Exp. 2) | 1.00 |
Uniform color (Exp. 1A) | 0.24 ( |
Disuniform color (Exp. 1A) | 0.19 ( |
Single-trial version (Exp. 2) | 0.36 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.57 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.56 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.58 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.54 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.45 ( |
Set-unrelated imagery | 0.63 ( |
Color imagery | 0.89 ( |
Number Imagery | 0.75 ( |
Name imagery | 0.78 ( |
Name imagery | 0.80 ( |
The findings presented in
More generally, the present RIT effects reveal that the generation of conscious contents, one of the greatest mysteries in science (
SB conducted Experiment 1A, Experiment 2, and the some of the supplemental data collection. SB also assisted with all of the other projects. CM conducted Experiment 1B and some of the supplemental data collection. CM also assisted with the other projects. HC conducted some of the experiments for the supplemental data collection and assisted with the other projects. EM assisted with the design of the studies and the data analyses. All authors contributed to the analyses and to the writing of the manuscript.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Object Range | Visual Angle |
---|---|
2 | 6.56° × 9.53° (5.5 × 8 cm) |
3 | 9.53° × 9.53° (8 × 8 cm) |
4 | 8.34° × 10.71° (7 × 9 cm) |
5 | 10.71° × 14.25° (9 × 12 cm) |
6 | 11.89° × 14.84° (10 × 12.5 cm) |
7 | 11.89° × 14.25° (10 × 12 cm) |
8 | 13.07° × 15.15° (11 × 13 cm) |
9 | 14.25° × 15.15° (12 × 13 cm) |
10 | 11.89° × 16.59° (10 × 14 cm) |
A “conscious content” is any thing that one is aware of (
This RIT effect requires the process of object naming, a sophisticated, multi-stage process in which only one of tens of thousands of phonological representations is selected for production in response to a stimulus (e.g., CAT yields /k/, /æ/, and /t/;
One of the many differences between the involuntary subvocalization that constitutes the RIT effect and the kinds of effects that have been obtained in most experiments concerning ironic processing is that, in the latter, subjects are presented with a verbal description (e.g., verbal instructions such as “
It is unlikely that subjects participating in a basic version of the RIT would experience the phonological representations of the names of the objects that are perceived visually without first having activated somehow the set to name objects. The activation of the set is somehow initiated by the instruction to