Different literature reviews (see Barth and de Jong, 2017; Kokolakis, 2017; Gerber et al., 2018) have been published outlining that many investigations on information disclosures in different online contexts including social networks focus on the idea of rather rational or reflective calculations, which is grounded in different theories (often addressing offline contexts) such as the Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964), the Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975), the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980), the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985), or the Privacy Calculus Theory (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999). For instance, according to the latter, individuals are expected to perform a kind of risk–benefit calculation on a rational level as a basis for their behaviors. Applied to self-disclosure decision making on social networks, it is assumed that users weigh the risks and benefits of sharing personal information and engage in self-disclosure if the expected gains outweigh observed potential negative consequences (e.g., Debatin et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2013; Li et al., 2016). Yet, many studies in the field of online privacy and information disclosure have included such theories (e.g., Dinev and Hart, 2006; Krasnova et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2011; Yao, 2011; Dienlin and Trepte, 2015; Dienlin and Metzger, 2016).

However, assuming that there is always a rational weighing of benefits and risks can be challenged, since especially long-term negative consequences (e.g., undesired commercial or criminal use of shared information) are likely more abstract and less salient compared to possible short-term rewards (e.g., immediate gratification due to Likes). This results from the fact that social networks do not provide thorough information about corresponding risks (Taddicken and Jers, 2011; Efroni et al., 2019). Consequently, this may complicate their evaluation (as part of individual’s inner decision-making processes) and possibly leads to more impulsive or intuitive rather than reflective decisions (Ostendorf et al., 2020). The assumption of limited rational processes is also represented in other theoretical approaches used to explain privacy-related online behaviors (see also Barth and de Jong, 2017; Kokolakis, 2017; Gerber et al., 2018). For example, different works refer to the notion of incomplete information when investigating online information sharing, which goes along with further aspects such as over−/underestimation of negative outcomes and benefits (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005; Flender and Müller, 2012). Besides, the Theory of Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1982), a well-known concept in cognitive and social psychology, has also been applied to online information sharing (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005; Wang and Yan, 2017). This theory proposes that human beings do not have full access to all relevant information, that they are cognitively limited, and also do not always have sufficient time to make their decisions in a fully rational manner (see Simon, 1982), which is also applicable to online self-disclosure decision situations. Moreover, cognitive biases and heuristics (e.g., optimism bias) have also been investigated in different publications (e.g., Acquisti and Grossklags, 2003; Cho et al., 2010; Gambino et al., 2016; see also Irwin, 1953; Slovic et al., 2002). However, research on non-reflective processes still needs to increase, which especially applies to the investigation of interoceptive processes. Studies on the role of interoceptive processes in the context of social networks are to date very scarce, but appear important for a deeper understanding of individuals’ online self-disclosure decisions (see section 1.2).

Besides those approaches, there are also a few valuable theoretical models specifically focusing on the concepts of self-disclosure and privacy (offline and online; see also Masur, 2018). The Disclosure Decision Model by Omarzu (2000), for example, is a process model that incorporates situational cues and individual differences, which are expected to shape the salience of specific (social) goals, as well as three stages of self-disclosure decision making (“entering the situation,” “selecting a strategy and searching for targets,” and “subjective utility versus subjective risk,” pp. 178/179). If one or more (potentially overlapping or even conflicting) goals are salient in stage one, an individual is expected to evaluate in stage two whether self-disclosure would be an appropriate strategy or not (i.e., to reach the goal) and whether a suitable target is available or not (i.e., desired recipients). If both applies, individuals are assumed to enter the third stage in which they decide how much, how long, how intimately, and how broadly they self-disclose. Thereby, the model proposes that there is a weighing of the subjective utility of possible benefits and the subjective probability of risks.

Another framework is the Disclosure Processes Model by Chaudoir and Fisher (2010). This model importantly highlights the role of possible long-term outcomes and resulting feedback loops that should not be left behind when conceptualizing individuals’ self-disclosure decision making on social networks. Besides the consideration of antecedent goals, the resulting disclosure event, and factors mediating between the disclosure event and long-term outcomes, it accentuates the potential influence of long-term outcomes on future disclosure decisions in terms of “upward spirals toward greater visibility” versus “downward spirals toward greater concealment” (Chaudoir and Fisher, 2010, p. 250). This view of reinforcing mechanisms and feedback is also well known in other theoretical frameworks of risky decision making (e.g., Brand et al., 2006; Schiebener and Brand, 2015).

Besides, the procedural Privacy Process Model by Dienlin (2014) is placing special emphasis on the concept of privacy. The privacy context (denoted as being objective) is proposed to be perceived subjectively by an individual and this perception is expected to subsequently influence the respective behavioral decision, namely self-disclosure. Further, as part of an evaluation process, individual’s privacy perception and behavior are assumed to be constantly compared to a desired status, whereby a privacy regulation (with regard to the context or the behavior) is taking place if there is an imbalance between the current and the desired status.

Masur (2018) further introduced his view of Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure. Closely related to Omarzu (2000), he (even stronger) argues that situational circumstances play an important role in the context of self-disclosure. The model presents three procedural stages: “(1) pre-situational privacy regulation processes, (2) situational privacy and self-disclosure processes, and (3) post-situational evaluation processes” (Masur, 2018, p. 177), with a central role of the second stage. It is argued that an individual’s self-disclosure extent depends on different personal and environmental features and their interplay. Especially interactions between non-stable personal features and environmental features in a given situation are expected to shape individuals’ self-disclosures, whereby this is further influenced by trait and trait-like personal features. Subsequently, post-situational evaluation processes (e.g., regarding the efficiency of self-disclosure) are expected to occur. Further, in the pre-situational stage, individuals potentially choose and manipulate the respective environment to achieve a desired privacy level before engaging in self-disclosure.

In summary, the aforementioned models already provide important theoretical and process-oriented assumptions. Important distinctions are made between individual characteristics, situational/context-related factors, and specific decision-making steps (see Disclosure Decision Model by Omarzu, 2000; Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure by Masur, 2018). Further, the role of possible (long-term) outcomes and their potential reinforcing effects with regard to subsequent decision situations (see Disclosure Processes Model by Chaudoir and Fisher, 2010) and the importance of perception processes and possible privacy regulations in the context of online self-disclosures are highlighted (see Privacy Process Model by Dienlin, 2014; Masur, 2018). However, besides that it is sometimes quite vague what is actually meant by individual differences and situational cues (e.g., in the Disclosure Decision Model by Omarzu, 2000, as also mentioned by Masur, 2018), these frameworks take the perspective of rather strategic self-disclosure decisions and are especially lacking the explicit consideration of underlying non-reflective processes. As highlighted above, processes beyond reflective ones need to be considered for human decision making and thus also for self-disclosure decisions on social networks. From a neurocognitive perspective, it is hence of great importance to provide a compelling account of psychological mechanisms underlying self-disclosure decisions on social networks. However, a theoretical framework that explicitly incorporates potentially involved inner processes and their interplay, and that broadens the perspective by including reflective as well as intuitive/impulsive and interoceptive processes, is still lacking. The aim of the current paper is to fill this gap. Dual-and tripartite-process theories, which focus on processes that are at the core of human decision making, will thereby serve as a basis for our propositions (see next section).

The literature in the fields of (neuro-)cognitive and social psychology holds many dual-process theories with different foci and perspectives (for overviews see Evans, 2008; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Although different perspectives exist, there is a common idea which brings those different approaches together: It is expected that two different forms of processing are in place that shape human reasoning and decision making (e.g., Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Evans, 2003, 2006; Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Kahneman, 2011; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). In more detail, it is assumed that processes of, for instance, intuitive, emotional, or impulsive kind, as well as processes of, for instance, strategic, reflective, or analytical kind can be involved when making a decision (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). In this paper, we follow the idea that these two forms of processing involve two neural systems that are not strictly separated from each other but rather interact with one another when forming the final decision (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). The reflective system is considered to function slowly, serially, and cognitively-controlled, and it is also known as system 2 or rational-analytical system (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Kahneman, 2003, 2011). The impulsive system is considered as a fast and parallel processing system (also termed system 1 or intuitive-experiential system) that draws on past experiences and emotions, and only needs low effort (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Kahneman, 2003). It is also assumed that immediate gratification (or punishment) is processed via the impulsive system and that cognitive control over impulsive responses in order to reach higher long-term goals is enabled by the reflective system (see also Bechara, 2005). Thus, if information is processed via the impulsive system, it is likely accompanied with emotional reactions or somatic activity (e.g., increased heart rate), while a reflective information processing involves executive functions and working memory (see Evans, 2008; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). On a neural level, the impulsive system involves structures associated with the limbic-ventral striatal loop, such as the ventral striatum and the amygdala, and the reflective system involves structures associated with the prefrontal-dorsal striatal loop, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Rogers et al., 1999; Labudda et al., 2008; Kühn et al., 2011; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). Further, it is assumed that both systems can be active in parallel and can interact with each other during decision making, whereby one of the systems will act as the leading mode (Schiebener and Brand, 2015). The balance between these two neural systems is thus essential for the shortsightedness of the respective decision. Moreover, Schiebener and Brand (2015), for example, point out that individual, environmental, and situational features influence the inner decision-making processes and thus trigger a predominant system. This view of different inner processes being involved in human decision making hence appears important to both better understand why individuals provide much personal information despite potential risks and how they can be supported to improve their decision making.

However, neurocognitive research on decision making is not limited to dual-process approaches, but recently also focuses on a tripartite perspective. This perspective suggests that a third system – covering interoceptive awareness – can alter the balance between the reflective and the impulsive system (Wood and Bechara, 2014). On a neural level, previous research found that the interoceptive system is mainly associated with the insula, which is expected to translate somatic states into more conscious states of mind (Noël et al., 2013). Xue et al. (2010) further found that the activation of the insula during decision making was associated with the personality trait of urgency and influenced the extent of subsequent risky decisions. They concluded that “the insula plays an important role in activating representations of homeostatic states associated with the experience of risk, which in turn exerts an influence on subsequent decisions” (Xue et al., 2010, p. 709). This highlights the additional relevance of an interoceptive system for human decision making. Other research in different contexts also focused on a tripartite approach. For instance, the role of the insula in modulating the balance between the impulsive system and the reflective system has been highlighted and examined in the context of problematic eating and when facing tempting food cues (see Chen et al., 2018; He et al., 2019). Wei et al. (2017) further proposed a tripartite neurocognitive model of Internet Gaming Disorder and Turel et al. (2021) found that gamers who were deprived of gaming showed an increased activation of the left insula when being exposed to video gaming cues versus neutral cues. Further, left insula activation was also positively associated with left ventral striatum activation and negatively with left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation, supporting the tripartite perspective (Turel et al., 2021). Based on research on problematic and addictive behaviors (e.g., Naqvi et al., 2007; Noël et al., 2013), another study by Turel and Bechara (2016) applied assumptions regarding the role of interoceptive processes to the area of general and impulsive information technology use. They investigated a tripartite model with regard to the extent of social networks use (in terms of duration and frequency) and impulsive social networks use. They found that temptations (representing the interoceptive system) strengthened the effect of habit (representing the impulsive system) on the extent of social networks use as well as on impulsive social networks use, while temptations reduced the effect of satisfaction and behavioral expectations (standing for the reflective system) on both the extent and impulsiveness of social networks use. These findings give important indications that not only an impulsive and a reflective system can guide human behavior and decision making, but also an interoceptive system. As stated by the authors, “technology use behavior, […], can also often be influenced by salient situational temptations, which violate the balance between users’ reflective and impulsive information processing processes” (Turel and Bechara, 2016, p. 7). Consequently, body physiology and visceral status may also play an important role in the context of online self-disclosures. Following the important conceptualizations of dual-and tripartite-process models of decision making, we believe that it is also necessary for research on online self-disclosure to extent the frequently proposed perspective of a rather rational decision maker and to provide an integrative framework that additionally includes intuitive/impulsive as well as interoceptive processes.

In line with Schiebener and Brand (2015), Masur (2018), and Omarzu (2000), the first component of the TSDD model consists of individual and environmental features (see Figure 2). Previous research has investigated manifold variables and their relations and contributions to individuals’ online self-disclosure decisions. With respect to our theoretical process model, we try to cover many of these, but do not intend to be exhaustive.

After reviewing individual and environmental features that can impact self-disclosure decisions on social networks, one aspect still remains not sufficiently understood: the mechanisms that underlie the decision for or against the disclosure of personal information. In the following, we therefore describe the inner decision-making processes that are assumed to be central to such decisions.

We argue that, based on individual and environmental features, individuals subsequently perceive specific self-disclosure situations differently (see also Privacy Process Model by Dienlin, 2014). That means that the perception of, for example, specific internal and external triggers (e.g., current mood and notifications), possible short- and long-term benefits and risks (e.g., reduction of negative mood), or one’s personal control (e.g., over personal information) is subjective, which then influences the interplay of the impulsive, reflective, and interoceptive system. In accordance with this notion, an individual who has, for instance, in general a high need to belong and in a specific situation feels socially isolated may perceive this feeling as highly unpleasant and may especially perceive the expected benefits associated with the decision to self-disclose on social networks as salient. Hence, the individual may perceive an incoming notification as a welcome distraction and may react with increased attention towards this notification or further cues on social networks (e.g., the possibility to mention others in posts and to receive Likes). Thus, the subjective perception of a situation may be accompanied by specific affective and cognitive responses and subsequently, it can influence the triggering of a leading processing system and the resulting evaluation of possible options. This is in line with a recent study by Du et al. (2019), showing that an increased attention towards notifications (including perceived distraction frequency) can increase individuals’ failure to control the desire to use social media, which in turn could increase individuals’ self-disclosure tendency (see Walrave et al., 2012; Chang and Heo, 2014). In the depicted example, an individual’s lacking perception of possible negative consequences and their riskiness may be common in everyday life and may additionally lead to an increased self-disclosure tendency. The complexity of social networks and veiled negative (long-term) consequences may influence users’ perception in the way that they may not fully conceive the riskiness of self-disclosing, which in turn can influence their respective decisions. Consistently, other authors noted that possible negative (long-term) consequences are in principle not mentioned and thus not perceivable (Taddicken and Jers, 2011; Efroni et al., 2019), whereas social networks are primarily designed to fulfill their users’ needs and to let them experience immediate gratification (Taddicken and Jers, 2011).

Regarding the interplaying processing modes, cognitive control functions (such as inhibitory control) and the weighing of perceived short-/long-term benefits and risks associated with a specific disclosure decision (i.e., the core concept of the Privacy Calculus Theory, see Culnan and Armstrong, 1999; Dienlin and Metzger, 2016) can be allocated to the reflective system. In contrast, deciding based on gut feelings, heuristics, anticipated rewards, or urges would be attributed to the impulsive system (Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Schiebener and Brand, 2015). Due to the fact that social networks lack indications for strategic decisions (i.e., information and immediate feedback on possible negative consequences), which probably increases the relative degree of uncertainty of the respective decision situation, reflective processing can be complicated and the involvement of the impulsive system can be increased, similar to what is found for effects of stress on decision making in situations with increasing uncertainty (see Starcke and Brand, 2012). Furthermore, prior research also found that self-disclosures were related to neural responses ascribed to the impulsive system (including limbic structures). Tamir and Mitchell (2012), for instance, noted that self-disclosure may hold an intrinsic value due to the chance to introspect about oneself and to share this information with other people. This was supported by empirical data: neural regions that are associated with reward processing and part of the mesolimbic dopamine system (i.e., the nucleus accumbens, belonging to the ventral striatum, and the ventral tegmental area) have solidly been activated during self-disclosures (Tamir and Mitchell, 2012). This supports our critical questioning of the often proposed rational “calculus” for self-disclosure decisions, which would require especially prefrontal control. Actually, the decision to self-disclose can also be guided by the impulsive system since the respective situation may hinder cognitive control, which probably also explains other researchers’ remark that users often appear to be unhesitant when they share abundant information about themselves online (Tufekci, 2008; Kokolakis, 2017).

As noted above, individual and environmental features and resulting perceptions can impact the interplay of the inner systems so that individuals may decide rather reflectively or impulsively. For instance, knowledge about possible risks, which would actually support deliberation and controlled processes (reflective system), may be passed over by a strong anticipation of rewards and gratification, thus resulting in a shift towards impulsive processes as the leading mode. However, a high fear of risks (impulsive system) may also trigger the reflective system by exerting self-control and inhibition (see also Schiebener and Brand, 2015). Besides the interplay of the impulsive and reflective system, the interoceptive system is assumed to additionally interact with both systems. By processing bodily stages (e.g., in the form of sensing temptations resulting from an increased heart rate) it can be seen as a kind of mediator between the reflective and the impulsive system (Wood and Bechara, 2014), whereby it is expected to often lead to “the promotion of impulsive behaviors and the hijacking of decision-making processes concerned with the control of these impulses” (Turel and Bechara, 2017, p. 92; based on Naqvi and Bechara, 2010). In the case of self-disclosures on social networks, individuals could, for example, consciously experience urgent temptations and desires (e.g., the temptation to share a picture when being in a state of arousal) that augment an impulsive information processing and reduce possible reflective processes (e.g., the usage of knowledge about the probability of privacy risks). This interaction can then influence the evaluation of possible options (level of evaluation). The resulting evaluation processes can thereby take place very quickly (depending on the leading processing mode) and may also be dynamic and iterative (see also Cunningham et al., 2007; Van Bavel et al., 2012). For instance, an individual may evaluate, predominantly driven by the impulsive system, that sharing specific information is the favorable option, and thus (quickly) decides to self-disclose. However, this option might also be checked via the reflective system before the decision is made (e.g., deliberate consideration of potential risks), which illustrates that both systems may also continue to interact during the final evaluation. Further, additional information (e.g., negative or positive comments in other posts) can also be integrated, so that further options may be evaluated and the level of evaluation may be deepened.

The propositions presented in this section can help to better understand self-disclosure decisions on social networks. It is likely that the impulsive system is predominantly involved in many self-disclosure decision situations – potentially strengthened by bodily awareness – while reflective processes may be diminished. Even if research on a behavioral and neurocognitive level regarding such a tripartite decision-making model is generally scarce, it is notably progressing and thus underpins our effort to also apply such propositions to the area of self-disclosure on social networks. In this area, we are not aware of any work that has theoretically conceptualized such a tripartite structure of inner decision-making processes in detail yet.

Following the evaluation of possible options, an individual is expected to make a respective self-disclosure decision. A person can, without further adjusting any privacy-related environmental aspects, decide to self-disclose with regard to different dimensions, including an informational and psychological dimension (see Burgoon, 1982), and with regard to, for instance, a certain depth or breadth (see also Disclosure Decision Model by Omarzu, 2000). For example, an individual could share very intimate information (e.g., feelings with regard to a new romantic relationship) within a post on social networks which is not restricted to a specific audience and can thus be seen and further shared by anyone. This case may arise if the impulsive system is triggered as the leading mode, for instance, if risks are mainly intangible and the individual has to rely on gut feelings and is led by anticipated short-term gratification, which is potentially fortified by bodily states (e.g., a fast heartbeat). Here, the interoceptive system could amplify impulsive processes and may alleviate reflective ones (see Turel and Bechara, 2016). Thus, the decision to share very intimate or extensive information without further adjustments may predominantly be led by the impulsive system that is potentially amplified by interoceptive processes. Apart from that, the decision to self-disclose without any privacy adjustments may also be the result of rather reflective processes, if an individual is, for example, quite aware of possible negative consequences and the lack of control over personal information, but strategically hazards the consequences in order to achieve specific long-term outcomes (e.g., increased popularity and impact on social networks). However, even if this might hold true for some users, we argue that most users are probably engaging in extensive self-disclosures on social networks due to the prospect of short-term rewards (such as positive feedback from friends), which appear more salient than possible negative long-term consequences and thus complicate reflective weighing processes.

Moreover, individuals may also decide to self-disclose (e.g., to a certain depth or valence) on condition that privacy-related environmental aspects are adjusted (i.e., preservative/corrective privacy regulations), for instance by changing the visibility of a post (see also Privacy Process Model by Dienlin, 2014; Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure by Masur, 2018). Especially here, the proposed interaction between the different neural systems appears to be quite observable. Such a self-disclosure decision making is also in line with studies reporting that some users indeed restrict access to their information (on a horizontal level) by defining the audience, which is, however, not necessarily accompanied by lower self-disclosure levels (Stutzman et al., 2012, 2013). Further, a study by Wang et al. (2013) used different nudges including one that was meant to remind users of who would be able to see the post they are currently creating and the authors concluded that with this supporting information, users can be encouraged to (at least in some situations) change their privacy settings before posting. Thus, reflective processes may be triggered by such additional information and could lead, whilst also taking into account further intuitive or impulsive as well as interoceptive processes, to more deliberate self-disclosures.

Finally, individuals may also decide not to engage in self-disclosure on social networks. An individual may evaluate that self-disclosing would be too risky in a given situation (even though specific cues may also hint at potential benefits) and based on mainly reflective processes including monitoring and inhibitory control the individual decides not to self-disclose. Of course, it can also be argued that such decisions can as well be guided by the impulsive system – for example, if an individual is in general very risk-averse and perceives many situations as risky, thus also the respective self-disclosure decision situation, and the individual is then, for instance, led by strong emotions such as fear, which leads to the decision not to disclose. An individual could also generally (meaning in a rather automatic way based on past experiences and negative attitudes) not engage in self-disclosures across various situations. However, we argue that in many cases, the decision not to self-disclose on social networks is probably resulting from mainly reflective processes triggered by specific factors (e.g., the presence of profound skills or a warning message; e.g., Büchi et al., 2017; Ostendorf et al., 2022) which may lead to a correspondingly strong risk perception, although the impulsive system (and interoceptive processes) can be involved as well.

After a self-disclosure decision has been made and individuals engaged in the respective behavior, various consequences can occur. These can be categorized as follows: short-term positive, short-term negative, long-term positive, and long-term negative. Depending on the self-disclosure extent, these consequences can also differ in their scope. An exemplary classification of possible consequences can be found in Figure 3. For instance, individuals may experience high immediate gratification or an increased reduction of negative mood (short-term positive) due to high self-disclosure on social networks, but may also in some situations experience an increased amount of negative reactions or dislike (short-term negative). In turn, both can - as a form of feedback - impact specific individual features (e.g., stabilizing individual’s reward sensitivity or broadening personal experiences), but also the inner decision-making processes in subsequent self-disclosure decision situations. It can further be argued that, for instance, the recurring experience of gratification due to individual’s self-disclosure on social networks could, in turn, lead to habitual disclosing behaviors that may automatically take place in specific situations. Following Schiebener and Brand (2015), risk-reinforcing feedback (e.g., experienced rewards) can promote a processing via the impulsive system, while risk-punishing feedback (e.g., negative comments from others) can promote a processing via the reflective system (see also Figner et al., 2009). Since risk-reinforcing feedback is probably most frequently experienced in the context of self-disclosures on social networks, a subsequent processing via the impulsive system (including an increased disregard of long-term consequences) may be amplified (cf. Schiebener and Brand, 2015; Müller et al., 2017), which can in turn be associated with the development of habituated and automatic behaviors (cf. Turel and Bechara, 2016). Moreover, the sensitivity towards specific cues (e.g., an application’s logo) as part of conditioning processes can be an important factor that may increasingly contribute to inconsiderate self-disclosing decisions on social networks (cf. Schiebener and Brand, 2015). This is also in line with research focusing on usage behaviors in media-rich environments (e.g., Naab and Schnauber, 2016; Hofmann et al., 2017; van Koningsbruggen et al., 2017, 2018). Further, certain positive long-term consequences (e.g., strengthened relationships) and negative long-term outcomes (e.g., increased vulnerability for unintended usage of personal content) due to extensive self-disclosures can also act as a form of positive or negative feedback (see also Disclosure Processes Model by Chaudoir and Fisher, 2010), whereby especially negative long-term effects may often not be recognized as being induced by the specific behavior. Thus, their impact on subsequent decisions may be lower than the impact of short-term, especially short-term positive, consequences. However, this still needs to be investigated more deeply in future studies. Overall, positive and negative short- and long-term consequences may also lead to the initiation of subsequent environmental adjustments (e.g., changing general privacy settings, deactivating push-notifications). For example, an individual may have posted a picture visible for the public (e.g., anyone on or off Facebook) and self-disclosed without modifying any environmental aspects. Subsequently, due to the experience of hostile comments, the individual may change default settings (e.g., who can comment their public posts) and further aspects (e.g., general profile visibility). On the contrary, experiencing positive comments and approval may also lead to a change from a previously limited post visibility (e.g., friends only) to the default of a public visibility for subsequent posting situations.