AUTHOR=Grubiak Kevin P. 

TITLE=Promises, image concerns, and excuses–An experimental investigation

JOURNAL=Frontiers in Behavioral Economics

VOLUME=Volume 4 - 2025

YEAR=2025

URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/behavioral-economics/articles/10.3389/frbhe.2025.1631806

DOI=10.3389/frbhe.2025.1631806

ISSN=2813-5296

ABSTRACT=This paper tests the robustness of promise keeping in economic interactions using a laboratory experiment. Our design allows us to examine the roles of both social- and self-image concerns, and to investigate whether these concerns are diminished when participants are provided with responsibility-diffusing excuses. When the responsibility for a broken promise is undeniable, promise keeping is high. However, when plausible excuses are available that allow participants to preserve their social image, a significant number choose to break their promises. Yet, cooperation remains higher compared to treatments without a communication stage, and we find no evidence of participants engaging in self-deception to evade their promise-induced commitments. These findings suggest that while some individuals keep their promises reluctantly, others exhibit stable preferences for promise keeping that are not easily eroded by moral wiggle room.