Western societies today subscribe to the ideals that all citizens have equal rights and responsibilities, are equal before the law, and hold no privileges based on heritage or group membership. In other words, the ideas of individual freedom and independence reflect a doctrine of equal treatment, which citizens of Western countries hold in high esteem, according to international surveys (e.g., Inglehart, 2018). On the other hand are many Western countries also keen to implement social interventions and redistribution through taxes in order to decrease differences in outcome between individuals and groups. When applied to demographic categories, such as sex, race, or socioeconomic status, such unequal treatment obviously conflicts with the doctrine of equal treatment. The most common rationale for nevertheless applying unequal treatment is to compensate for other forms of bias (in the context of quotas, see Dahlerup, 2008).

A quota is the selection of individuals to some sort of position based on group membership according to quantitative goals, such as selecting or reaching a certain proportion. Other similar concepts are “affirmative action,” “positive action,” “positive discrimination,” “equal opportunities promotion,” and “preferential treatment.” It is confusing with this large number of more or less established and common terms, whose precise definition varies across countries and contexts. For the purpose of the present analysis we need to define two different principles that are covertly present within these terms and their practices. The first principle is to impose an overt and systematic bias in the selection process in order to achieve a different—and typically more equal—outcome than would otherwise have been the case. “Bias” should here be understood in the technical sense as an inclination toward selecting one group over the other. Accordingly, biased selection may refer to anything that has this effect, from quotas, with any specified proportion, to choosing a member of the preferred group when merits are deemed to be indistinguishable. Even the latter practice obviously constitutes a systematic bias, because one group always gets the benefit of the doubt when the ranking of applicants is difficult. Biased selection is here defined as the overt, intentional, and systematic bias that is formally employed by selection committees and the like. The second principle is to make resources available to members of one group but not another, which may be termed “biased treatment.” Analogously with biased selection it technically constitutes a bias even when the applied measures are mild, such as proposing or encouraging one group but not the other to apply for courses or grants that are open to both groups. In academia, for example, Swedish authorities have made courses, training, mentoring, funding, and paid time for self-development available to women but not to men (Utbildningsdepartementet, 2004, p. 250). Thus, biased treatment differs from biased selection by attempting to increase the ability of the favored group.

The purpose of the present study is to analyse the arguments by which politicians propose biased selection and treatment, according to the above definitions, in order to infer the underlying model. This is important for assessing the role that public policies can and do play to decrease inequality. Sex is the demographic category most frequently subjected to quotas and preferential treatment across the globe (Högström, 2016). Women at large have assumed dramatically increased power in the public sphere as well as more financial and social independence in the last century. These changes have been accompanied by eliminated or even reversed sex ratios in many areas, while the sex ratio remains heavily skewed toward men in certain domains and for certain positions. The arguments surrounding measures to increase equality may add to our understanding of the dynamics of group inequality.

The issue is timely, as several Scandinavian countries are considering implementing such measures in legislation, and Norway has, for example, ruled that companies must have at least 40 percent women on their boards of directors (Strøm, 2015). In Sweden, a government bill forcing a limit on the sex ratio amongst private company board members was retracted from a parliamentary vote (Justitiedepartementet, 2016), and the government is currently policing universities to limit the sex ratio amongst academic professors (Nilsson, 2014; Hellmark Knutsson, 2017).

Obtaining equal outcomes across women and men is desirable, according to a range of common arguments. Organizations with equal sex proportions are claimed to be more productive, to provide a better work environment, and to foster sex equality. These arguments seem to be very attractive, as they are repeated in the media and the public debate. However, there are not many studies that provide original, empirical data that bear on these relationships. They are, moreover, almost exclusively correlational, such as one of the most frequently cited studies that was based on official statistics in Finland (Kotiranta et al., 2007). The experimental studies that would be needed to determine a certain causal relation are wanting. Studies whose design enable some level of causal analysis do not find any effects of sex-equal staffing on company performance (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014; Isidro and Sobral, 2015). A correlation may just as well indicate that more successful companies can afford the resources needed to obtain equal proportions on the executive level. Such window-dressing is often motivated by improving the organization's brand and/or complying with the prevailing norms or legislation (Storvik and Gulbrandsen, 2016). Although the reality of these claims per se are beyond the scope of the present study, it is important to convey what seems to attract politicians and the public to quotas.

Quotas have also been criticized for not acquiring the desired effects and for creating adverse side-effects. It has been argued that quotas deflate organizations' overall ability and the status of the favored group (Seierstad, 2016; Terjesen and Sealy, 2016, p. 27), and fosters conflict and resentment due to perceived threat (see, e.g., Faniko et al., 2017) and unfairness (Holli et al., 2006; Holli, 2011). Female board members that are included to meet the quota requirement tend to have less influence, and are to a greater extent recruited from outside the company (a.k.a. independent board members) (Böhren and Staubo, 2016). Rather than fostering equality, this would seem to conserve the very sex role stereotypes whose eradication was one purpose of quotas and other forms of biased selection and treatment. On the same note, women in leadership positions are perceived as more agentic—a traditionally masculine trait—the degree to which is modulated by the magnitude of “preferential treatment” given to them (Faniko et al., 2017). For example, “women who obtain higher managerial positions demonstrate the same set of characteristics as men…the promotion system is designed for candidates that demonstrate typically male characteristics” (Kreckova et al., 2016, p. 354). Many women reject quotas, on the basis that it “would undermine our achievements” and “side-line the merit principle that ensures the best person for the job” (Kakabadse et al., 2015, p. 275). A recent review summarizes the critique from opponents of electoral quotas such that “…quotas violate principles of equality, promote unqualified individuals, do not further women's interests in policy making, are undemocratic, and are demeaning to women” (Hughes et al., 2017, p. 337).

Ability is a central concept, defined as the concurrent capacity to successfully and efficiently perform the behaviors required by a certain occupation or position. It is thus not the potential to acquire ability. In the present study, ability is mainly discussed in terms of the group level, because that is the level at which biased selection and treatment is applied, and for which outcomes are assessed in terms of group means. These means are obviously tacit about the underlying structure of ability within each group. It should therefore be noted that they are not informative about the typical ability of each individual or the number of individuals above a certain level of ability, for example. Another constraint is that when we consider selection to specific occupations and positions, as do the legislative proposals considered here, the ability of the group in question refers only to eligible individuals. The sex differences discussed in the following are constrained to select groups with certain domain-specific skills, rather than to men and women generally. Another central concept is sex, defined as being biologically male or female. This is used rather than gender, consistent with the fact that formalized discrimination, such as quotas, biased selection, and biased treatment, is exclusively applied to sex, not to people's perceived gender identity¹ (Halpern, 2012). In conclusion, statements representative of the legislative power will be subject to thematic analysis and examination of their internal consistency, in order to infer the underlying model of the relevant variables and their relationships.

I begin with the statement about university professors, signed by the Minister of Higher Education and Research Helene Hellmark Knutsson. It is phrased as an official statement from the Cabinet, and was simultaneously published on the Swedish government website and in a major newspaper. Of the original 575 words are the relevant parts translated below, excluding headings.

Note that most instances of the word “equality” in this translation correspond to the term “jämställdhet,” which in Sweden is defined as equal opportunities, rights, and obligations specifically for the two sexes (e.g., Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Förskolan, 2004, p. 29). This statement can be summarized as follows. Women and men act on unequal terms and have different career opportunities¹, because males are favored by internal recruitment³, networks^{3, 15}, and a notion about male genius². Equal opportunities require equal opportunities promotion^{5, 8}, e.g., increasing the proportion of women amongst newly recruited professors with 9 percentage points over the next 3 years⁶. Institutions shall measure the sex distribution of research funding within each discipline⁹, and see to that it becomes equal^{10, 13}. Women have higher demands with regard to career paths, as follows from the proposition that women shy away from unattractive or unclear paths in greater proportions than do men¹¹. Finally, the present lack of open competition favors men¹², and more equal numbers of professors of each sex will improve science and research^{4, 14}.

There are thus five main, distinct themes: (1) women on the highest academic level are in general at least equally able as men, because it is stated that the proportions would be equal⁷ in the absence of bias favoring men^{2, 3, 15}. That a higher proportion of women would increase the overall ability of academia further implies that women are more able than men^{4, 8, 14}. Furthermore, (2) less able men are currently being recruited as professors over at least equally able women^{2, 3, 15}. This follows logically from the fact that only about 35% of newly recruited professors are women, although they are stated to be at least equally able. Because of (1) and (2), several measures shall be applied to (3) increase the proportion of female professors and receivers of research grants to 50%. These measures constitute quotas by definition, because the goal as well as the level of increase are specified in magnitude^{6, 7} and in time⁶, although the term quota is not used in the statement. This is less explicit for research funding, although the overall impression points in the same direction: Funding should be subject to equal opportunities promotion⁸, based on monitoring of the sex distribution⁹, and should be countered if skewed¹⁰. Fourthly, women have (4) higher demands with regard to career paths¹¹. There is also an intimation (5) that a larger proportion of women would increase the quality⁴ and eminence¹⁴ of research in Sweden, although it is not clear if the reason for this is the higher contributions of women per se, or that curbing male chauvinism and favoritism^{2, 3} will halt the selection of less able men.

The most recent attempt to legislate quotas for company boards of directors was turned down by the counsel's office for public administration on January 18th 2017. The statement in question was a 68-page promemoria with concrete changes and additions to the law, issued by the Department of Justice. Under the heading “general pre-requisites,” it offers 583 words of motivation for the proposed law:

The main themes in this quote are similar to those in the case of quotas for professorships and research funding. Using the same numbering as before, (1) women in the business world are more able than is reflected by their numbers. This follows from the statement that the current low proportion fails to take advantage of their ability²¹. As in the previous statement, (2) less able men are currently being recruited over more able women as board members, as implied by the propositions that women have less possibilities to reach positions of power and influence^{17, 18}, in spite of being able to meet the required qualifications¹⁹. Finally, (3) at least 40% of each sex shall be reached²⁵. Again, such a demand constitutes a quota by definition, but is considered to be justified if the companies have failed to reach this goal themselves²⁴. A few differences from the professor case can be noted. Women are not explicitly said to be more or equally able, only underrepresented. Rather, it seems to be implied that women can develop sufficient ability¹⁹. There was no mention of (4) higher demands from women, but women confer unique, sex-specific ability²¹ that might boost competitiveness²² supposedly through increased diversity, which is consistent with (5).

The third statement is the most recent parliamentary bill from 2013, a successor to the seminal bill about company board of director quotas from 2006. The whole statement is 2,313 words and contains a lot of detail about political turns that is omitted.

The same three main themes are repeated: (1) women are more able than is reflected by their numbers, as implied by the proposition that companies are unable⁵¹ to reap the benefits of having women as CEOs⁵² and in their managements^{31, 37, 53}, (2) less able men are currently being recruited over at least equally able women through the application of covert quotas^{33, 55}, in the guise of male chauvinism^{43, 46, 48}, and (3) quotas is the cure. As in the promemoria, (5) women are different from men in a positive and profitable sense^{37, 52, 53}, even to the extent of increasing the market on which companies operate⁵⁰. It should be noted that no other means than quotas are considered to reach the goals⁴¹, so one must conclude that quotas is the only conceivable instrument of political will⁵⁴ to increase the proportion of women.

Several new ideas appear in addition to those hitherto compiled. The increase of women in domains with initially small proportions seems to be conceived as a (6) linear process³⁶ set on a track to reach 50%, whose rate is either decreased by resistance to change^{30, 35} or chauvinism^{30, 43, 46, 48, 49, 54} and “patriarchal structures”⁴⁷, or increased by political⁵³ or progressive forces³⁷. Another new idea is that (7) a higher level of education and a lower level of participation in business for one group reflects discrimination⁴². Also raised is (8) the concern that individuals selected based on quotas may be challenged³⁸, which is, however, dismissed without any argument³⁹. The authors conceivably suggest that (9) a larger proportion of one sex tends to amplify further still, because they state that artificially boosting the numbers⁴¹ will set them on a course to increase naturally⁴⁴. Yet, they express dissatisfaction with the extent to which women harness their nowadays formally equal rights and possibilities, as they (10) focus on women's equal right to influence⁴⁵, rather than the classical definition of equality, which is equal opportunities to assume positions of influence. The proposition that the nominating committees should “need education to learn to wear their gender glasses when recruiting”³³ seems to imply that the authors reject the idea of educating women for a future role in a company board of directors³². However, it illustrates an inherent problem with biased selection and treatment. Glasses distort the trajectory of light to compensate for a distortion within the eye, but this has to be done to exactly the same amount as the aberration to restore focus, as everyone in need of glasses knows. Likewise, the magnitude of the suggested sex discrimination has to be known exactly in order to deploy a compensatory level of biased selection or treatment, unless there is some rational yardstick, such as the ability to perform the work one is selected to do.

Analysis of the subsequent three statements in the list (Appendix 1) revealed no additional themes, and none of statements 4–12 are therefore included in the results section.

The emergent themes have been categorized and numbered from 1 to 10: Women are (1) at least as able as men, but (2) less able men are currently being recruited over more able women, and (3) quotas shall be applied to adjust the proportion to the target value within 40–60 percent. Furthermore, (4) women have higher demands in terms of career paths, and are also (5) different from men in ways that leads to higher performance in organizations, in terms of quality, eminence, and profitability. The outcome in terms of sex proportions is (6) described as an attractor set at 50 percent, any deviation from which is attributed to oppression. Across groups, there (7) should be an association between merits at different levels, specifically that the level of education amongst women should be reflected in their level of participation in business leadership. There is (8) no risk that an individual's ability might be challenged if that individual has been selected by quotas, (9) increasing the proportion of women by means of quotas will in itself lead to further increase, and the ultimate goal is (10) that women have equal influence, rather than just equal opportunities to have influence. Before analysing these arguments further, some limitations and constraints should be considered.

First, verbal data do not necessarily reflect what the people talking or writing actually think or believe. As any other form of behavior, it might constitute posturing, deceit, and a range of more or less conscious intentions to achieve a certain effect, such as changing the receiver's opinions or appearing to be a virtuous person. This is all the more likely with political discourse and with public debate, in contrast to personal conversations between individuals. Given that the present data are end-products that have been vetted by many individuals, they are nevertheless representative of the way that these individuals and the institutions they represent choose to present themselves and argue for their position. These complications may be considered in the analysis, as for example attempting to identify arguments that feed into some cultural norm or conflict.

Second, this kind of thematic analysis goes beyond what is explicitly covered in the statements. Although a common and established approach (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2014), the results of discourse analysis approaches are not necessarily consistent with what respondents would report if asked directly (Bailey, 1998). There may be several different reasons for this discrepancy but when it cannot be addressed through follow-up interviews, for example, we do not know. It could be that respondents are unaware about their models of reality, that they consciously withhold their model for tactical reasons, or that they refuse to admit to certain beliefs due to social desirability. The results are nevertheless legitimate, for the reasons argued above.

Third, the entire population of statements has not been sampled, with or without applying certain inclusion and exclusion criteria, but to do so is not relevant for the present study. Its purpose is to analyse the structure of typical arguments, not to describe the frequency or distribution of various arguments. As such, it is a substantial strength that these issues are on the political agenda, as their authority is readily quantified by their place in a hierarchical structure defined by executive power. The current data selection procedure therefore asserts a high level of representativeness with respect to the target population, that is, the political elite.

The rest of the discussion is organized according to the emergent themes, followed by a review of historical policy statements that may explain some of the inconsistencies in the structure of the arguments.

The arguments that women are (1) at least equally able as men and that (2) less able men are selected are inconsistent. If women are at least equally able, and ability is relevant for selection and success in fulfilling the demands of the position, then they would be selected in at least equal numbers if selection is meritocratic². Meritocratic selection is in the interest of the organizations, in order to have the most able staff. Nevertheless, it is suggested that women are discriminated against in both academia and business. However, inasmuch as companies with a larger proportion of women do better, as argued by both Justitiedepartementet (2016) and Ericson et al. (2013), they will thrive and thus employ even more women, whereas companies with a smaller proportion of women will do worse, and eventually shrink or go out of business. In this light, executives, boards, and shareholders would, long before disaster is inevitable, see to it that more women are hired, as profitability is the central factor leading to success or failure for companies. Thus, (2) cannot be true if (1) is correct, given the powers of meritocracy and commercial self-interest. When those who suggest that meritocratic assessment is not working properly propose quotas rather than improving meritocratic assessment to increase the proportion of women, they act as if they believe that women are currently in fact less able.

The argument that (2) less able men are currently being recruited over more able women require two conditions to be fulfilled: meritocratic assessment is poor and men are preferred. If men were generally preferred, meritocratic assessment would still select the more or equally able women. If meritocratic assessment were poor and there were no sex preference, the most able individuals would not be selected, but there would be no systematic sex bias. Improving meritocratic assessment would therefore both reduce any possible sex bias and improve ability-based selection generally, leading to more productive and effective organizations. As mentioned, the statements do not propose any measures for improving the selection process, but propose measures that favor the selection of women (3). Specifically, they argue for biased selection⁵⁴, biased promotion¹³,, biased treatment and work conditions tailored for women^{9, 10, 11}, and quotas^{25, 40, 41}, in the guise of compelling quantitative goals^{5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 10, 14, 23}. While these measures would increase the proportion of women, they would not increase the overall ability, unless women are in fact already more able overall. No direct claim to this effect has been made. Rather, the propositions in support of the argument that less able men are currently being recruited over more able women are all indirect, through the implication that an unequal sex ratio per se indicates foul play. These propositions are condensed with the original numbering below. For example, that “three out of four professors are still men” shows that women and men do not “act on equal terms and have the same career opportunities¹, according to Hellmark Knutsson (2017). Similarly, she asserts that “notions about the male genius [has] trumped competence ², … [that] internal recruitment and networks played a greater role than hard work³, … academia has too long been too good at recruiting its sons”¹². It is further argued that women and men “shall have equal possibilities to form their lives and reach positions of power and influence¹⁷… is not how it is today¹⁸, … the “business world equals competence with being a man⁴³, [and] the gender-power order…is the source of how women as a group are subordinate to men as a group in influence and resources ⁴⁶. Finally, men are “recruiting men⁴⁸… [and the] covert male quota that currently takes place needs to be drawn into the light⁵⁵.” By the same standard, males are oppressed or discriminated against according to the fact that 90% of veterinarians, 65% of school principals and chief executives in the public sector, 63% of university graduates, and 57% of newly graduated physicians are female (all figures from Statistics Sweden, 2014).

I exclude the argument (4) that women have higher demands, because it was only mentioned once, and does not tie into the discussion of ability.

The argument (5) that an increased proportion of women amongst professors and company managements would increase the overall ability of academia^{4, 8, 14} and the business world^{21, 31, 37, 51, 52, 53} requires that women have higher ability. This follows from the fact that to increase the overall ability, those (men) who are replaced must have lower ability. However, most propositions argue that women are (1) at least as able as men, but not more able. Equal ability is also implied by propositions to the effect that the sex ratio would be equal ⁷ in the absence of bias favoring men^{2, 3, 5, 15}. Therefore, these main propositions are internally inconsistent with regards to the argument that a larger proportion of women would increase quality and performance. A few propositions^{4, 14, 21, 22, 37, 50, 52, 53} do however state or imply that women are more able or confer advantages. Thus, both sex differences^{11, 14, 21, 22, 42, 49, 51, 52, 53} and the lack of sex differences^{7, 9, 10, 19, 8} are wielded as arguments for quotas. This is inconsistent in two ways. First, it would seem that the sexes cannot be, at the same time, both different and similar. Second, it would seem that if one argues that being equal justifies quotas, then being different cannot also be brought to justify quotas. The exception would be if different types of arguments were raised, for example that certain traits or properties were argued to justify quotas because they differ between the sexes, and other traits were argued to justify quotas because they do not differ between the sexes, but no such distinction is made in these statements. Moreover, stating only advantages of selecting women^{21, 22, 37, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53} but not of selecting men appears to constitute a sex bias: If the sexes do differ, it seems unlikely that any dimension on which this is the case would unanimously confer advantages to one sex but not the other. Surely, any behavioral tendency that is useful in one situation may be a liability in another situation, and therefore it cannot be correct that any given difference is unanimously advantageous.

Another problem is that essential underlying assumptions are not made explicit, which is particularly pertinent for the theme that (6) a sex ratio of 1.0 (50%) constitutes an attractor across various environmental conditions. First, in the absence of any other factors, the current proportion in a certain position depends on the base rate in the sector or in the lower level from which selection to this position is made. If the proportion of eligible women is 35%, for example, equal ability of the sexes on the group level should result in 35% in the selected position. However, that would still be outside the stated goal of 40–60% (3). Second, the relevant individual properties may not scale equally for men and women across levels of ability. Thus, the theme (7) that the higher level of education amongst women should be reflected in their proportion in the higher echelons of business and academia rests on the assumption that education and its underlying psychological traits are the only relevant factors for occupational success. The Norwegian law from 2006 that forced listed companies to have at least 40 percent women on their boards of directors constitutes a natural experiment that tests this proposition. It is almost identical to the one proposed in the Government bill above. According to Kristina Jullum Hagen at Naeringslivets Hovedorganisation, the Norwegian confederation of employers, evaluations of the reform are overwhelmingly critical: “The expectation was that the effects would spill over to the rest of the companies and thereby increase the proportion women at large, which did not happen. Quotas do not lead to increased equality in the business world … I share the opinion that equality in business life is desirable, but I do not see that quotas is the way to go. The law has produced 900 female board members, but has not been able to change the underlying structures. This shows that quotas do not constitute a quick-fix for equality” (Svenskt Näringsliv, 2016). Thus, the idea (6) that sex-equal outcomes constitutes an attractor or natural law has failed to play out across 10 years, when given the opportunity.

Nearing the end of the list of themes, female professionals feel that being selected by quotas bereaves them of their legitimacy and the recognition of their own achievements (Kakabadse et al., 2015), in contrast to (8) dismissing the possibility that it might jeopardize their perceived ability. Rather, group favoritism in the guise of quotas or other forms of biased selection and treatment has been reported to create tension and foster resentment (see, e.g., Faniko et al., 2017) and be perceived as unfair (Holli et al., 2006; Holli, 2011).

Another argument leveled for quotas is that (9) changing the sex ratio has significant dynamic effects, such that, for example, increasing the proportion by force (i.e., quotas) will in itself lead to further increase. The assumption underlying this theme seems to be that social factors are the ultimate determinants of behavior, in the guise of norms, identity, role models, and the like. Individuals are thought to mimic other individuals belonging to the group they identify with, and to avoid behaviors associated with other groups, which might be called a role model effect. According to official government statements, the mere presence of women in high positions within an organization is believed to convince other women that it is possible and appropriate to assume such a position oneself (Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Högskolan, 2009; e.g., Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Högskolan, 2009, p. 13). According to this model, both men and women should shy away from jobs with few of their own sex, but be attracted to jobs with many of their own sex, because they are assumed to want to adhere to the “norm” (Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Förskolan, 2006). We can thus see how such a social model of sex and group differences may favor quotas, even though it might constitute selecting less able individuals and hence attenuating quality. These models predict that (9) actually changing the composition of people from different groups is a powerful way to make such a change happen, because individual behavior is seen to be determined by the behavior of large shares of the population in a society. This would also explain the affinity to the idea (10) that women shall have equal influence, rather than just equal opportunities to have influence, because the role model effect implies that actual influence leads to ability, but ability does not lead to influence (if there is discrimination). Consequently, the quality of the organization will eventually recover as the formerly less able group develops its ability as a response to the new norm.

Given the internal inconsistencies demonstrated above, one may ask if any other motive than increasing quality and productivity might better fit the structure of the arguments. To this end, policy statements from the Swedish government and its institutions, such as the department of education, may be informative. It turns out that the dominating view of sex equality expressed in these statements is formulated in terms of outcomes rather than opportunities: “One aspect of sex equality can be described in purely numerical terms, and concerns the sex distribution amongst PhD students, teachers, and researchers”³ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 1994, p. 26), Likewise, “[q]uantitative equality constitutes an even distribution between men and women within all areas in society, for example within various educations, professions, leisure activities, and positions of power.”⁴ (Statistics Sweden, 2016, p. 2, my translation), consistent with the current goal that the sex ratio specifically amongst professors in academia be no greater than 40/60% (Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Högskolan, 2009, p. 5; Delegationen för Jämställdhet i Högskolan, 2011, p. 166).

Turning to the means to this end, a large number of actions had been taken to increase the number of women at higher levels of academia already in 2004: “…accounting responsibility for research officers, course elements about sex equality, sex equality centers, a special vice chancellor council, positive action, directed resources for leadership development and ability development, interventions for thesis advisors, conscious recruitment, career development programs, directed educational programs, focus on management consciousness, extra resources for women to do research after their PhD, mentor programs, promoted parental leave, widening of fields of study when recruiting, and new merit evaluation instruments”⁵ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 2004, p. 250). A total of about 950 state funded projects for increasing sex equality within academia are reported to have taken place between 1985 and 1994 (Utbildningsdepartementet, 1994, p. 26), but I have not been able to find any figure total of how many have taken place in the 23 years since then.

Yet, these 950 projects and the ensuing pressure put on academic staff, administrators, and leadership have not been sufficient, as “…the rate of increase is slow, and in 2003 were still 85 percent of professors men and only 15% women. The leveling that has now been started must accelerate… [which] will demand further efforts and a more active work on the part of the universities. This could take the form of special efforts like identifying female candidates for various positions and consider if they can be advertised within areas where there are able female applicants. It is also a matter of appearing as an attractive work environment for students and doctoral students, with equal opportunities for career development for women and men. Transparency and clarity in processes for acceptance and employment is important … [which] must be designed with an awareness that women at every career stage tend to have had poorer opportunities to advance than men. An increased awareness about women's preconditions and opportunities for conducting research on the same conditions as men is fundamental for formulating effective equality strategies”⁶. (Utbildningsdepartementet, 1994, p. 123). No empirical support is given for these claims, such as “women at every career stage tend to have had poorer opportunities to advance.” As a countermeasure to this, the authorities “…shall demonstrate that they can perform sex neutral evaluations, and in the case of otherwise equivalent applications prioritize the underrepresented sex. The Cabinet further expects that the authorities investigate and strike at the causes if the sex distribution amongst the applications is skewed in relation to the general distribution within a discipline”⁷ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 2004, p. 46). In the context of a special effort to establish additional positions as professors, the Cabinet furthermore prioritized women by choosing disciplines and fields of study while “…considering that there are qualified prospective applicants who belong to the underrepresented sex” and mandating that if required and possible, a position may be filled with a “competent applicant of the underrepresented sex, even if she is less qualified than a co-applicant of the other sex”⁸ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 1994, p. 36).

Thus, these official steering documents prescribe both biased treatment and biased selection, as well as their application even if the favored group is in fact less able. But why would those politically responsible for academic or commercial and industrial life sacrifice ability for sex equality in outcomes? One explanation is implied by the view that influential positions constitute an opportunity for exercising power on behalf of the group that an individual is attributed to: “The cabinet's actions to increase the number of female professors shall be seen against the background of the professor's role as a model for students and younger researchers, as well as a teacher and researcher. Through their position they have great impact on education, choice of research areas, problem formulation, choice of methods, etc. Professors also have great influence outside their own institution, for example as members of funding bodies. They are also employed as experts and commentators in various contexts.”⁹ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 1994, p. 26). If academia and the business world are perceived as arenas for representative democracy, rather than for expert development of products and knowledge, there is a certain logic to “[t]he sex distribution within different areas and within different levels regarding students as well as staff shall be even”¹⁰ (Utbildningsdepartementet, 2006, p. 5). However, the people who work in these domains are all but representative for the population as a whole, in terms of intelligence, education, income, social capital, and so forth. No argument is provided for why their sex would be of any particular significance as a representativeness criterion, compared to all other possible demographic categories, and given that the cited statements repeatedly emphasize that sex differences are minimal.

Nevertheless, these policy statements clearly convey an ambition to increase the proportion of women, to the effect that women have equal influence rather than merely equal opportunities to have influence. They are thus, in fact, strikingly consistent with the essence of the propositions that advocate quotas, biased treatment, and biased selection, which is to (10) increase the proportion and influence of women, regardless of negative consequences.

In conclusion, the structure of these arguments reflects a model according to which the proportion and influence of the favored group should be increased although even if it is less able. This is consistent with government policy and steering documents that over a period of more than 30 years express an ambition to achieve equal outcomes rather than equal opportunities. For as much as the present analyses have uncovered logical inconsistencies, omission of critical underlying premises, and ignoring possible negative effects, they demonstrate a substantial bias in the anti-bias business.

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.