ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Comput. Sci., 22 October 2026

Sec. Human-Media Interaction

Volume 8 - 2026 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomp.2026.1854879

Grounded theory insights into human insider threats: a qualitative study of expert perceptions

  • 1. Department of Computing Sciences, State University of New York at Brockport, Brockport, NY, United States

  • 2. Muma College of Business, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, United States

Abstract

Human insider threats continue to increase as digitalization grows, especially with the rise of remote work. Most studies of cybersecurity enhancements focus on technological solutions; however, the costliest cybersecurity events originate from human and insider threat risk factors. This novel, qualitative study identified drivers of human factor insider threats while addressing a need for in-depth, qualitative studies based on expert perceptions. This study conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 cybersecurity experts across government, healthcare, and cybersecurity sectors. A grounded theory methodology strengthened the analysis of codes and themes to generate dominant factors related to drivers and solutions of insider threats that led to developing a Human Insider Threat (HIT) framework. The HIT framework has practical implications for managers to assess insider threat vulnerabilities and for researchers to create scalable instruments to evaluate emerging insider threats. The HIT framework can support organizations in identifying human risk factors, improving security training programs, and aligning technology access controls with employee roles.

1 Introduction

As the digitalization rate increases, so do cybersecurity vulnerabilities related to human behavior and insider threats via social engineering and phishing. Despite increasing recognition of human factors in cybersecurity, existing insider threat frameworks remain largely technology-focused and lack empirical qualitative insights from experienced cybersecurity professionals. Internal threats can originate from individuals with authorized access within the organization, making them difficult to identify and manage. Managing cybersecurity infrastructures to prevent unauthorized access has become critical due to a rise in remote workers, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Coincidentally, malicious behavior from insider threat incidents rose 44% in 2022 (Reed, 2022). Meanwhile, the average number of cyberattacks increased by 28% per organization in Q1 of 2024, compared to Q3 of 2023 (Check Point Team, 2024). Statistics also highlighted the severity of insider attacks, responsible for approximately 20% of attacks on organizations, and 74% of attacks involved humans (Verizon, 2023). Finally, according to Evans et al. (2016), human risk factors directly contributed to half of the worst incidents of 2015.

Prior research attributed insider threats to the threat actor due to their motive, means, and opportunity, and to behaviors such as disgruntlement and greed (Sohrabi Safa et al., 2016; Cappelli et al., 2012). Cybersecurity behavior studies conducted by Greitzer et al. (2011, 2008, 2018, 2014) and Greitzer and Frincke (2010) offered ontological frameworks that used expert knowledge and qualitative models to highlight individual and organizational socio-technical factors to understand insider threat activity. Greitzer et al. (2011) suggested using information security data and social data to examine and predict threat activity and behaviors. Some researchers attempted to expand the literature beyond a technical focus by examining human factors of insider threats, specifically related to individual and organizational elements (Raval, 2019; Ansbach and Sharton, 2020; Reveron and Savage, 2020; Hadlington, 2021; Saxena et al., 2020).

1.1 Related work in human insider threat factors in cybersecurity

Sulaiman et al. (2022) and Sepehrzadeh (2023) suggested that humans are the point of most failures in cybersecurity systems as digitalization advances. A literature analysis of 60 studies published between 2008 and 2020 in cyber and information systems journals found that humans continue to be the most vulnerable point of attack, despite organizations implementing sophisticated cybersecurity systems (Sulaiman et al., 2022). Sulaiman et al. (2022) called for further studies focused on theoretical perspectives, especially designed to understand how responsibility is attributed in cybersecurity, whether it's personal or group. Sulaiman et al. (2022) concluded that when employees felt security policies were too inconvenient and the cost of compliance was high, then they were less likely to comply. Sepehrzadeh (2023) used prior literature to identify human and organizational factors, to assess the potential insider threat level, and to determine when an insider decides to cause harm or damage to the organization's cybersecurity assets. Sepehrzadeh (2023) also referred to humans as the weakest link when managing organizations' information security and offered a modeling approach for assessing potential insider threats to potentially influence the severity of threats between employees.

A systematic literature review by Jeong et al. (2019) of 27 articles from peer-reviewed publications from 2009 to 2019 focused on human factors in cybersecurity suggested that we can improve the security of digital environments by enhancing our understanding of human risk factors. Jeong et al. (2019) also found that most studies were technically focused and lacked qualitative perspectives of human factors, citing only 2 (a case study and a panel interview) of the 27 studies they analyzed. Jeong et al. (2019) literature analysis found that individual human factors such as age, personality, education, training, experience, and culture may influence cybersecurity behaviors. Recently, Nabi et al. (2025) reinforced this imbalance in the field; although their study advances technical continual learning pipelines for detecting insider threats, it also acknowledges that insider incidents stem from human behavioral patterns that technical systems alone cannot fully capture. This further underscores the need for qualitative, human-centric research such as the present study.

Georgiadou et al. (2022) identified behavioral and technical, individual and organizational, qualitative and quantitative indicators via a literature review, then categorized each study by the contributing factor to create the Cyber-Security Culture Framework, which was applied to two case studies. Georgiadou et al. (2022) concluded that insider threat is connected to an ā€œindividual's personality traits, behavior, attitude, beliefs, and skills,ā€ which should be considered when assessing security indicators and developing organizational cybersecurity policies. Asasfeh et al. (2024) used a literature review to parse out motivation, behavioral characteristics, and psychological factors related to human factor-related insider threat activities to propose a comprehensive approach to deal with insider threats effectively. Das et al. (2026) further underscored the importance of integrating human behavioral considerations into cybersecurity strategies; although their AI-driven threat detection and response framework advances technical protection for U.S. critical infrastructure, the authors emphasize that human decision-making and behavioral patterns remain central to understanding and mitigating cyber risks. This strengthens the need for research that examines insider threat behaviors from human perspectives, as explored in the present study.

In their literature analysis of 24 articles presented at the Human Factors in Cybersecurity conference between 2015 and 2020, Rohan et al. (2021) identified 17 human factors in cybersecurity. Rohan et al. (2021) also assessed methodological approaches and found that most were quantitative, relying on survey data of non-experts, which may yield inaccurate and confusing results. Rohan et al. (2021) posit that future research should seek cybersecurity experts' perceptions using qualitative analysis to enrich and augment existing knowledge of the human aspect of cybersecurity. Khadka and Ullah (2025), in their literature analysis of 41 articles published in peer-reviewed journals between 2011 and 2024, introduced a Human-Centric Cybersecurity Framework. Khadka and Ullah (2025) suggested eight (8) research gaps, including a lack of longitudinal studies, a narrow focus on psychological constructs, limited coverage of cybersecurity culture, and fragmented socio-technical research, with a call for interdisciplinary collaboration to better integrate human factors into cybersecurity frameworks. Although previous studies have identified psychological and organizational indicators of insider threats, many frameworks rely on theoretical constructs rather than empirical qualitative insights derived from practitioners.

1.2 Related theory and standards

Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) was the most used theory when discussing human factors in cybersecurity (Sulaiman et al., 2022; Sepehrzadeh, 2023; Jeong et al., 2019; Georgiadou et al., 2022; Asasfeh et al., 2024; Rohan et al., 2021; Khadka and Ullah, 2025) because it helped to understand protective behaviors, such as how individuals might respond based on perceived severity, vulnerability, and cost of a cybersecurity control. PMT has also been extended to include variables such as rewards, contextual conditions, and psychological capacities in the context of cybersecurity management (Khadka and Ullah, 2025). The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and General Deterrence Theory (GDT) were also mentioned to a lesser extent in the literature to discuss consequences and norms related to cybersecurity behaviors. Herath and Rao (2009) provided a model to combine PMT, TPB, and GDT to suggest that employees complied with cybersecurity policies when they perceived them to be of limited hindrance to their daily lives.

United States government agencies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have provided companies with relevant background, risks, and mitigation techniques to assess cybersecurity measures [Cyberspace and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), 2025]. Most federal recommendations do not include investigating human factors; however, CISA defines an insider threat in the context of how an insider might use their authorized access, either intentionally or unintentionally, to harm the organization. In January 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) updated its Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 to guide organizations in managing cybersecurity risks, regardless of size, sector, or maturity [National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2024]. The CSF 2.0 is useful for framing the outcomes of cybersecurity practices to help manage and reduce risks by improving critical organizational infrastructure through a framework. The CSF 2.0 guides organizations on creating processes to identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from cybersecurity events (see Figure 1, Calder, 2018).

Figure 1

CSF 2.0 centers around governance because it is a critical driver of the other five (5) functions. Categories and subcategories further arrange the primary CSF functions to indicate groups of and specific outcomes, respectively. Cybersecurity professionals and organizations may reference the CSF 2.0 to guide their cybersecurity decisions and to develop cybersecurity programs.

The literature demonstrated a variety of gaps related to understanding human insider threat activity in the context of cybersecurity strategies. Khadka and Ullah (2025) called for more interdisciplinary studies and emphasized eight focus areas with a need for more real-world validation of emerging frameworks. Rohan et al. (2021) and Jeong et al. (2019) suggested that more qualitative analysis from cybersecurity experts could benefit the discipline. Furthermore, most of the emerging frameworks in the literature were developed based on prior literature rather than on empirical data, highlighting an opportunity for researchers. Following thematic analysis, the resulting HIT constructs were mapped to NIST CSF functions to demonstrate alignment with existing cybersecurity governance practices.

2 Research methodology

This qualitative study generated a new framework for organizations to use when assessing human factor-related insider threat activity by following the principles of the grounded theory methodology. Grounded theory methodology is ideal when there is limited data about the study area, the generation of a framework is the goal, and participants have experienced the subject being studied (Corbin and Strauss, 2014; Creswell and Poth, 2016; Mills et al., 2014). In this study, the grounded theory methodology was ideal for exploring human factors in cybersecurity insider threats through cybersecurity experts who shared their experiences of insider threat activities.

Grounded theory, initially introduced by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967, offered a set of procedures for constructing a framework of participants' shared experiences, while focusing on ā€œpeople's actions, interactions, and social processesā€ (Corbin and Strauss, 2014; Creswell and Poth, 2016). Grounded theory in Information Systems (IS) research was validated by Wiesche et al. (2017), whose literature analysis found that grounded theory studies were often cited because they contributed details and context to existing knowledge. Analysis by Wiesche et al. (2017) found that Corbin and Strauss (2008, 2014) ā€œStraussianā€ approach to grounded theory was the most widely used form of grounded theory in IS research, with 43 (81%) of articles in their study using it. The ā€œStraussianā€ approach provides an unambiguous series of steps to organize data into categories, subcategories, and dimensions related to a central phenomenon, which is helpful for generating a framework. Each interview lasted approximately 45–60 mins and was conducted via secure video conferencing.

Primary data collection for this study was guided by the research question: What cultural, technological, and individual factors influence cybersecurity insider threats? Pilot interviews took place to help refine the interview protocol and align the data with the research question. The University of South Florida's (USF) institutional review board approved this study under protocol 001991, and verbal consent was received from each participant. This study captured shared experiences through semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity experts who shared their experiences with human factor threats in their affiliated industries.

2.1 Participant summary

Participants were recruited using purposive sampling through professional cybersecurity networks. The study participants were fifteen (15) cybersecurity experts representing thirteen (13) organizations with an average tenure of eighteen (18) years in their respective roles. Participants primarily held cybersecurity employment positions in three key industries: government, healthcare, and cybersecurity. Participants also held key industry certifications to imply their understanding of complex cybersecurity factors; for example, 13 (86%) held Certified Information Systems Security Professionals (CISSP) or comparable cybersecurity certifications. Additionally, 100% of the participants had at least twelve (12) years of experience in information security and information technology, while almost half (7) had over twenty (20) years of cybersecurity experience. Participants held positions in various cybersecurity roles, including senior analysts, director of security, chief technology officer, chief information security officer, cybersecurity training developers, cybersecurity auditors, and cybersecurity consultants. These sectors were prioritized due to their high exposure to insider threat risks. Table 1 provides details of each participant's industry, occupation, education, years of experience, and highest level of cybersecurity certification for reference. Due to existing non-disclosure agreements with their current and/or former employers, individual organizational information was not supplied.

Table 1

ParticipantIndustryOccupationFormal educationExperience (years)Industry certifications
1GovernmentCybersecurity ConsultantMaster's15CISSP
2GovernmentCybersecurity/Intel Exercise Designer and PlannerMaster's14Security Plus
3GovernmentCybersecurity Branch ManagerDoctoral student13CISSP
4GovernmentCybersecurity/Intel Exercise Designer and PlannerMaster's20CISSP
5Health careCybersecurity AuditorMaster's27CISA
6CybersecurityCybersecurity AuditorMaster's15CISSP
7CybersecurityCybersecurity CEOBachelor's14CISSP
8CybersecurityCybersecurity ConsultantMaster's12CISSP
9CybersecurityCybersecurity ConsultantBachelor's20Security Plus
10Health careChief Information Security OfficerMaster's21CISSP
11Health careChief Technology OfficerMaster's20CHCIO
12Health careChief Information Security OfficerBachelor's23CISSP
13CybersecurityCybersecurity ConsultantDoctorate15CISSP
14GovernmentCybersecurity ConsultantDoctorate12CISSP
15CybersecuritySenior Director of SecurityDoctorate30CISSP

Participant summary by industry, occupation, education level, experience, and certifications.

CISSP, Certified Information Systems Security Professional; CISA, Certified Information Systems Auditor; CHCIO, Certified Healthcare Chief Information Officer.

2.2 Data analysis and coding

Two researchers independently coded transcripts and resolved discrepancies through discussion? Each interview was recorded, transcribed, and manually coded before being added to the NVivo software for further analysis. Following the Straussian approach, data collection and analysis were done until categories were saturated, and concepts could be defined and explained. NVivo helped document and organize memos, thoughts, and questions to compare interviews and to organize codes by categories and subcategories. This iterative process, guided by grounded theory practices, identified emerging connections among concepts that drove greater conceptual analysis of the data. Coding included three (3) phases: initial coding, axial coding, and selective coding, each leading to higher levels of conceptual understanding of the data.

The initial coding phase involved assessing each interview line-by-line to assign step-by-steps codes to the participant's contribution, resulting in over 500 codes. The data analyzation and coding development steps consisted of two cycles: the first cycle involved the coding concepts memoing, initial (open), and exploratory, procedural, and holistic. This was followed by the second cycle of coding of pattern, focused, axial, and theoretical. Interviews were coded in rounds of four or five to facilitate constant comparison and categorization of codes while examining for saturation. There were two categories, ā€œdriversā€ and ā€œsolutions,ā€ with subcategories corresponding to the research question. For example, the ā€œdriversā€ category related to reasons for committing cyber insider threat infractions, from which individual, technological, and organizational subcategories emerged. The initial coding phase resulted in the findings of the crosswalk diagram, as shown in Figure 2 (Green and Dozier, 2023).

Figure 2

The axial coding phase required a further evaluation of the initial categories and subcategories to assess causal conditions, strategies, contextual or intervening conditions, and consequences to create a visual coding model called the axial coding diagram (Creswell, 2013). In the axial coding phase, a central or core phenomenon is identified, from which interrelationships are developed using categories and subcategories from the initial coding phase. Figure 3 of the Results section presents this study's resulting axial coding paradigm.

Figure 3

In the selective coding phase, the axial coding paradigm is used to develop propositions to interrelate the categories in the model to create a story that describes the interrelationships (Creswell and Poth, 2016). According to Creswell and Poth (2016), the resulting output can take the form of a narrative statement, a visual picture, or a series of hypotheses or propositions articulated toward the end of the study, as demonstrated by Morrow and Smith (1995). In this study, the resulting Human Insider Threat (HIT) Framework is the visual picture shown in Figure 4 of the results of the selective coding phase.

Figure 4

3 Results

The coding process drove a clear path from analyzing data to building information. The data strongly indicated the need for a sensible construct to build the data around. Creswell's qualitative coding paradigm was chosen during the incipient data coding and analysis stages. As represented in Figure 3, this study's paradigm model begins with the core phenomenon, which in this case was the need to better understand insider threat drivers leading to activities and solutions to remediate the incidents. Feeding into the phenomenon were causal conditions that triggered the activities. Other conditions in the paradigm are contextual and intervening conditions that ultimately affect the incidents and provide crucial information for developing remediation strategies. Data pointed to consequences or goals as being the final piece of the paradigm.

3.1 Core category relating to insider threat activities

The data revealed a single core category. This central theme was the focus of everything surrounding insider threat activities. Causal conditions such as insider threat incidents, increasing reputational risk, and experiencing financial hardships drive the core category (issue) as presented in Figure 3. Organizations needed to understand what drove insider threat activities and how to combat them through vital solutions to secure entire infrastructures. The data reflected this core category and galvanized the need for these two critical areas, which every security aspect began with.

3.2 Causal conditions driving insider threat activities

The research revealed seven main areas that contributed to the core category phenomenon. These conditions had a direct causal effect on insider threat activities. Furthermore, these causal items set the conditions for activities to occur, which motivated companies to want to understand the activities better in order to ultimately create solutions to combat the activities. These external and internal conditions set internal conditions for insider threat activities to grow and prosper. The data revealed that insider threat activities were a concern in almost every company. Respondents also discussed how some of the activities were driven by external threat actors who routinely targeted employees to carry out illegal activities either wittingly or unwittingly. Respondents also highlighted how companies were constantly worrying about insider threat incidents affecting their brand and reputation. Another causal condition was increased digitalization, which came with an increase in insider threat activity. This seemed to occur concurrently with companies that implemented predominantly technology-focused cybersecurity strategies. Still another causal condition was that companies experiencing financial hardships often dealt with employees using technology who did not comply with company policy. Driving this negative effect were laws and mandates that lacked comprehensive guidance, which effectively directed how companies should implement and enforce cybersecurity policies.

3.3 Contextual conditions surrounding insider threat drivers

The data from this study revealed crucial contextual conditions that drive the core phenomenon of insider threat activities. These contextual conditions are broad situational factors that facilitate understanding of practical solutions for the core phenomena. The first of these conditions occurs and resides at the individual employee level, where multiple characteristic actions lead to insider threat infractions. In the quote below, a Government Cybersecurity participant described how employees' lack of awareness may lead to them unknowingly committing infractions. Twenty-three (23) codes were associated with this characteristic, which accounted for 11% of driver codes.

ā€œThat's not something that I think most people do, to train everybody on every single web page they visit may be a little much, but at least when it comes to the secretary sending a dollar amount. I think it just came down to familiarity.ā€ā€”Government Cybersecurity Professional.

Closely related are employees who commit infractions that don't intend to harm others. Usually, employees commit these infractions without malicious intent or simply when they are trying to complete tasks related to their job function, as described by a Healthcare Cybersecurity Professional below. There were 48 instances of this code, which accounted for 22% of all insider threat driver codes.

ā€œThere will naturally be people who work around some controls or shortcut them to just deliver care; their heart is in the right place, but their head is not. And, sometimes that's just a matter of education, sometimes they don't know that leaving their workstation open because they can treat a patient and then come back, and then not have to put their credentials back in and just go faster.ā€ā€”Healthcare Cybersecurity Professional.

Data pointed to selfishness as the final individual driver, which occurs when employees purposely commit insider threat infractions to harm others. There were 40 codes from this theme, which accounted for 18% of all driver codes. Terms associated with this code were ones normally associated with cybercrimes, including embezzlement, revenge, disgruntlement, personal gain, and ego, as described below.

ā€œYou could see this person just starting to lash out at the coworkers a little bit more every week, slowly building his anger. And you're like, man, this guy, I don't know about this guy. And finally, one of the administrators, after blowing off his complaint, ended up in a senior position in our office. Now the employee is too much of a risk... This guy is now kind of a loose cannon, so they just fired him on the spot.ā€ā€”Cybersecurity Industry Professional.

Technological issues are additional contextual conditions that lead to insider threat activities. Forty-one codes made up this category, which equated to 19% of the total driver codes. Key codes included access, audit, authentication, computer literacy, outdated technology, and cross-domain violations. Data indicates that these infractions occur when companies fail to develop and implement effective cybersecurity access policies, often prompting employees to access unauthorized networks and systems, as summarized by a Government Cybersecurity Professional below. The word ā€œaccessā€ alone was mentioned 57 times by respondents, who posited that administrative rights holders were among the major violators.

ā€œThe time that it takes to gain access to a system, or to gain access to whatever it is they need to be able to, to do their job so that's really when I talk about security can get in the way it can be something as simple as a username and password, get in the way of them being able to perform the job and they want to be able to do that to perform it.ā€ā€”Government Cybersecurity Professional.

Data also pointed to other contextual conditions that negatively exacerbated issues leading to insider threat activities. One of these areas pertained to the organizational arena. A major driver of insider threat activities in the organizational sector pertained to leaders and substandard actions by these leaders and their substandard actions. Respondents discussed how tightly woven the concept of organizational leaders driving culture would negatively affect how employees acted. These employees would watch actions and decide what to observe and which cybersecurity standards to follow as described below.

ā€œ[the culture was…] Oh well we can't make this inconvenient for the senior leadership, [for example…] if a CEO the financial office doesn't like having to restart their system then we don't patch the financial audits but that's where the attackers are going because you're not patching the systems and they can just move willy-nilly through the environment because you don't have the same security standards.ā€ā€”Cybersecurity Professional.

Participants also discussed how a lack of education and training could set contextual conditions that would often lead to employee insider infractions. Respondents lamented that companies would administer archaic, outdated, and ineffective education sessions to employees, failing to capture current cybersecurity threat trends. This failed oversight extended to cybersecurity remediation training, where employees were often directed to complete non-advantageous training that failed to address their specific cybersecurity infraction address their cybersecurity infraction specifically, as described below.

ā€œEverybody, you know, will kind of scoff and look at the online training, or whatever, it's always the same, maybe it changes a little bit.ā€ā€”Government Cybersecurity Professional.

ā€œAdditionally, companies would not provide felicitous technological training related to job functions as described below. ā€œThe only way we're able to do this is by increasing either desktop simulations or by increasing our awareness and training. For example, using simulation phishing campaigns to try to identify what our people do, what is their behavior.ā€ā€”Government Cybersecurity Professional.

The final contextual condition that data pointed to as driving insider threat activities was communication. This area was closely tied to all previous drivers and directly affected solutions. Transparent communication is needed for short—and long-term success in any cybersecurity insider threat program. The findings indicate that leaders are the most important agents in establishing transparent communication. Companies that struggled with communication had directly correlated insider threat incidents. Transparency was the code that was discussed the most by the interviewees. One participant discussed the importance of honest communication and building rapport in keeping a company's infrastructure secure.

ā€œI think it's important that a program of policy not be overly punitive for users, because if they're afraid, too afraid of the consequences, the detrimental consequences to reporting on our threat of self-reporting, violations, then your organization misses out on a good opportunity for lessons learned. So, it's not necessarily that the organization can't learn from mistakes, if people don't self-report, but moreover, that it kind of engenders a culture of fear amongst users.ā€ā€”Government Cybersecurity Professional.

3.4 Intervening conditions influencing insider threat

The study pointed to specific situational factors that influenced insider threat activities. These settings created environments that significantly impacted employees' actions. The intervening settings affected employees' actions both positively and negatively. This ultimately drove the formation of company strategies. Three main areas encompassed the intervening conditions: unwitting/witting, non-malicious/malicious, and leadership.

The interviewed subject matter experts discussed how different types of employees' motivations drove different kinds of infractions. Data pointed to two foundational psychological knowledge categories of infractions: either employees knew (witting) they were committing an infraction or employees did not know (unwitting). Data also revealed two foundational psychological intention categories of infractions: employees committed actions with either non-malicious intent, or employees committed actions with malicious intent. Further examination of these four psychological categories revealed that incidents had combined characteristics of the categories. These four logically refined categories were unwitting/non-malicious (UW-NM), unwitting/malicious (UW-M), witting/non-malicious (W-NM), and witting/malicious (W-M). Unwitting/non-malicious (UW-NM) incidents involved employees committing actions without realizing they were violating policies, and they lacked malicious intent. An example of this is when an employee forgets to log out of their system or violates a policy without knowing of the policy. The second category, unwitting/malicious (UW-M), exists in theory, but our limited data did not reveal an incident where an employee unknowingly committed an infraction with malicious intent. Witting employees who didn't intend harm drove witting/non-malicious (W/NM) incidents. Data reflected that these incidents involved employees focused on caring for people, accomplishing assigned tasks, or taking actions that they didn't believe would harm others. Finally, employees who knowingly intended harm committed witting/malicious (W-M) actions. Embezzlement, revenge, sabotage, and selfishness were terms respondents used when discussing incidents in this category.

Another intervening condition that drove strategies to decrease insider threat incidents was leadership. Data indicated that this monumental condition is one of the most important in any of the categories previously discussed throughout this manuscript. The leadership conditions were both positive and negative. Respondents spoke about the sheer necessity and weight of this condition in determining a company's security posture. There were 67 codes associated with leadership and their effect on culture and environments. These codes accounted for 31% of driver categories overall, as well as 42% of solution codes. Participants discussed how leaders failed to set good examples, establish positive environments, and create ethically sound atmospheres. Leaders also routinely negatively affect company organizations by failing to set a positive culture. Participants lamented that these leaders' negative actions adversely impacted their organizations' cybersecurity postures.

An interviewee spoke about an instance he observed firsthand when dealing with a high-level management person who did not understand the value of securing cyber systems. The executive valued convenience over security, which showed in his actions. This directly affected the company's culture toward cybersecurity, and ultimately led to an exponentially higher employee insider threat infractions. The leader was oblivious to their actions being observed by subordinates and affecting the overall culture within their organization. Data from this study strongly pointed to upper-level management affecting the culture by either caring or not caring through their everyday actions when using cyber systems on the company's IT infrastructure. Data also showed that leaders exist who conversely exhibited traits of caring about security took the extra time to follow company security policies and established positive relationships with employees to ultimately elicit buy-in from employees into the correct cybersecurity culture. Organizations with these types of leaders had exponentially lower insider threat infractions. One subject spoke about one instant that was witnessed on a firsthand account.

ā€œStress that cybersecurity importance, coming from the top leadership of the organization, so that every individual inside the org knows that from the top down, it's, it's serious. It's a matter not to be taken [lightly] and is one of the main driving policies of the organization. Proper education and senior leader support in a cyber program will make it successful in combating insider threats.ā€ā€”Cybersecurity Healthcare Professional.

Subjects provided feedback on managers who established solid standards in companies by setting positive examples. Data pointed to this type of leadership as being the most important overall attribute in mitigating insider threat activities.

3.5 Strategies for combating insider threat activities

There are many ways companies could effectively act in response to the previously mentioned core category phenomena. These actions are crucial if companies want to secure the areas and protect their employees and investments. One of the first strategies involves leaders and managers. Companies must ensure they implement directives that drive the growth of their leaders. Better leaders lead to be better employees, which in turn equals a safer and more secure environment. The next strategy that works symbiotically with leadership is culture. Companies must focus on building positive cultures that encourage employees to act appropriately when nobody else is watching. This culture begins and ends with leaders practicing good cyber hygiene and showing employees how to do the right thing. Along with culture, companies must also ensure employees create and refine training and education programs focusing on cyber hygiene. This includes remedial training that is tailored to the employee's specific infractions. Yet, another strategy is the alignment of technology with specific job functions. Our research data revealed numerous non-malicious incidents that directly resulted from employees misusing systems as workarounds in order to accomplish normal job functions. Finally, strategies to combat insider threat incidents must include active plans to have better communication throughout the company. This begins with leaders' actively building trust and rapport with employees. Communication continues with clearly constructed cybersecurity policies that direct how employees should stay secure and report incidents.

3.6 Consequences of strategies for combating insider threat activities

There are many consequences companies can take advantage of by effectively implementing the items outlined in the previous section. Respondents discussed these strategies for combating insider threat activities during interviews. They provided firsthand accounts of how effective these items were for companies wanting to harden their entire infrastructures. Companies that instituted the strategies experienced extremely positive results. One of the first consequences is the ability to monitor drivers of employee insider threat incidents. Companies will be able to observe better employee awareness who are faced with cyber dilemmas. The data also points to organizations being able to ensure employees' caring attitudes are wholesome, as opposed to leading to actions that could lead to suggests that organizations can ensure employees' caring attitudes are wholesome, rather than leading to actions that could result in infractions. Monitoring will also extend to assessing employees' motivations for devotion, which, unchecked, often leads to employees using technology in ways that are unaligned with a company's policy. Another key consequence of intuiting solutions is the ability of companies to monitor better and remediate insider threat activities driven by employees who act selfishly. Data also indicated the need for improved development of policies and procedures to monitor technology access better, thereby reducing the aforementioned insider threat activities. The consequences of implementing these solutions will extend to areas beyond individual employee benefits. Data from this study points to companies ultimately being able to develop educational and training programs that are advantageous to a company's cybersecurity needs while simultaneously building programs that are felicitously tailored to specific cybersecurity infractions. Strategies will also allow companies to achieve communication that is deeply transparent. Companies can achieve deep transparency in communication between leaders and employees. Still another positive consequence of solutions involves being able to build and maintain complete technology infrastructures that are aligned with employee job positions, which data points to significantly lowering risk profiles. Finally, companies will realize one of the most crucial consequences, as leaders will be able to effectively monitor the previously stated drivers of insider threat activities while concurrently implementing solutions identified during this study.

3.7 Human insider threat (HIT) framework

Data from this study identified multiple key characteristics of insider threat activities. These characteristics were present from the core category, extending through to the strategies and consequences. Insider threat activities and characteristics pointed to the need for a logical framework encompassing both drivers and solutions. The Human Insider Threat (HIT) framework, as seen in Figure 4, contains five insider threat employee drivers: awareness, caring, devotion, selfishness, and access. The HIT contains four insider threat solution characteristics: advantageous, felicitous, transparency, and alignment. Most importantly, the HIT framework contains a crucial component that drives insider threat activities, while also serving as a critical part in solutions: leadership.

Data also pointed to a missing gap during the normal progression process from core category identification to strategies, finally to achieving intended consequences. Specifically, the gap resides within the strategies arena. Respondents alluded to a severe lack of clear understanding of insider threat characteristics during strategy development. The HIT framework effectively remediates this flaw by providing companies with a foundational knowledge of the most critical driver and solution characteristics associated with employee insider threat activities. The coded data pointed to two major categories: drivers and solutions. Ten dominant human factors emerged across the two major categories. The first major category described the drivers of human factors related to cyber threats, such as awareness, caring, devotion, selfishness, and access. The second major category described solutions related to decreasing human factors related to cyber threats, such as advantageous, felicitous, transparency, and alignment. The tenth dominant factor, leadership, is related to both the drivers and solutions categories because it is influential in both.

The HIT framework explains the relationships of the uncovered dominant human factors for this study's categories of drivers and solutions. As shown in Figure 5, these dominant human factors contribute to either driving insider threat activities or contributing to successful solutions in remediating insider threat actions.

Figure 5

4 Discussion and analysis

This study improved our understanding of drivers and solutions related to human insider threat activity and supports the call for more in-depth qualitative studies through the lens of cybersecurity experts by Jeong et al. (2019) and Rohan et al. (2021). It also supports Rohan et al. (2021), who advocated for cybersecurity researchers to use a grounded theory approach because it enables them to derive a theory (or framework) from the collected data. This study also reinforced the critical role of culture, especially when influenced by leaders, on insider threat activity, which often receives little attention from cybersecurity researchers (Asasfeh et al., 2024).

Organizational factors, especially the role of compromised leaders, as described by Asasfeh et al. (2024), were reinforced by participants in this study who described scenarios where individuals with authorized access may deliberately circumvent technical security measures. This study supports (Khadka and Ullah, 2025) analysis of the pivotal role of organizational culture in shaping compliance and how leadership styles might foster a cybersecurity culture by promoting proactive employee behaviors. Furthermore, the HIT framework addresses (Khadka and Ullah, 2025) call for a multifaceted approach integrating human (cultural, behavioral) elements with technical systems to address insider threats.

Individual factors such as the fluctuation of motivations, as described by Asasfeh et al. (2024), were confirmed by study participants who described scenarios related to various combinations of motivations such as witting, unwitting, malicious, and non-malicious. Four of this study's six factors—awareness, caring, devotion, and selfishness—support the factors contained in (Bishop et al., 2010) model related to psychosocial risk factors (Corbin and Strauss, 2014). Some of the organizational (access, transparency) and individual (awareness, behavior) factors from (Georgiadou et al., 2022) Cyber-Security Culture Framework overlapped with this study's findings and the HIT framework.

This study supported the conclusions of Khadka and Ullah (2025) and Sulaiman et al. (2022) that PMT can be applied and adapted to cybersecurity as the prevailing theory. For example, in this study, one participant described a specific healthcare scenario where a provider might not comply with certain controls to provide care to a patient due to a sense of duty and the perceived severity of providing care vs. complying.

The HIT framework supports and closely relates to models from previous literature and the NIST CSF 2.0. The HIT conceptual framework presents ten dominant human factors contributing to insider threat activities. The HIT factors directly connect to and support the six areas of NIST CSF 2.0: govern, identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The HIT factors provide more profound clarity in understanding how and why insider threat activities occur, enabling managers to utilize the components of NIST CSF 2.0 more efficiently. The framework provides clearer guidance on how leaders can effectively govern their organizations to reduce insider threat risks. The HIT framework enables organizations to better understand key human factors, which assist in identifying insider threat risk patterns and activities. The HIT framework further provides human factor information that enables organizations to integrate the proper tools for their entities to better protect against insider threat activities and more quickly detect when they occur. Finally, the HIT framework provides a better understanding of human factors, enabling organizations to respond more quickly to activities and then employ remediation techniques to properly recover after an insider threat attack.

Information from the above study shows a fresh construct that greatly assists in advancing the comprehension of human factors within the cyber domain by documenting and showing what precipitates and drives organizational personnel to commit cyber infractions, as well as highlighting potential solutions. Study participants also reinforced the importance of training and education to minimize insider threat activity; however, the participants extended training types to include the use of simulations as part of a holistic cybersecurity training approach.

4.1 Contributions

4.1.1 Theoretical contributions

Qualitative, non-quantitative methods studied by everyday cyber professionals can greatly assist academic persons in comprehending, with great context, how employee threats happen. Our structure addresses the blinding light that demandingly beacons for further qualitative research focused on human factors associated with employee non-malicious and malicious activities while using organizational cyber-based systems. This study's qualitative design responds to the call for more qualitative studies on human factors. Also, more studies in this domain will assist in creating a quantitative tool to prove our HIT framework, which spans a bigger dataset of organizational personnel. The information from our data brings a more profound understanding that permeates areas that are non-computer-based by inviting prospective research on what precipitates computer-focused occurrences of organizational personnel factors and malicious activities, and the linkage to organizational assignments of specific computer systems. Information from this research also furthers the span to better contextual understanding of why the aforementioned organizational personnel commit malicious and non-malicious infractions, presents solutions, and offers a framework to apply to cybersecurity resilience strategies. For example, (Sepehrzadeh, 2023) proposed model to evaluate potential threats from insiders could be extended to include data, especially the drivers, from this study. Additionally, researchers are encouraged to continue research in this space by expanding the understanding basis into what makes the insider threat infractions occur, to grow the list of resolutions that can, in turn, lower the infractions that are committed by the organizational personnel. This research's HIT provides a novel, industry-driven perspective approach and methodology that focuses on the behavioral control aspect to better formulate a plan to deal with risk when dealing with organizational personnel who commit cyber infractions. More studies using this intensive view should be focused on improving technical and non-technical organizational procedures and guidance. Most insider threat activity frameworks were based on prior literature, whereas this study's HIT framework was developed using empirical data from cybersecurity experts.

4.1.2 Practical contributions

Industry organizational security experts should integrate the HIT framework presented in this research to refine and improve security approaches to improve risk postures when combating human factors presented by personnel within their company. The data from this research shows and highlights that personnel infractions using cyber systems could very well occur differently based on industry types. Because of this, cybersecurity industry professionals should very well-understand different industry characteristics, including cyber-attack vectors and vulnerabilities, as well as personnel aspects, when investigating means to implement measures focused on combating human factors that drive personnel-focused attacks. Information from this research also established a basis and position for ensuring that technology assigned to organizational personnel is established with an understanding of the person's employment role and assigned duties. Further, information from this study will assist in the creation of policies and constructs focused on certifying personnel who are assigned cyber systems, determined and driven by specific employment responsibilities.

Insider threat activities continue to increase at an enormous rate. These activities weaken technology systems, often compromise company data, and cause financial loss by giving way to many cybersecurity attacks, including ransomware. Organizations typically lack the tools and framework to assess insider threat activities. This paper identifies factors that are at the core of driving these activities, as well as factors that mitigate the activities. This study involved industry cybersecurity subject-matter-experts to identify the human factors used in developing the HIT framework. Managers can use the HIT framework to assess how insider threat activities occur. They can also use the HIT framework to implement successful solutions to strengthen their company's security posture. The HIT framework was developed to integrate with the widely used NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.

Further still, this study's information will provide clarity in comprehending why leader involvement is crucially vital when creating information security and cyber programs, more importantly, illuminating the overall power executive management has when developing and leading company culture, wittingly or unwittingly. Machine learning systems using security algorithms, as well as, creation of artificial intelligence, would be wise to ponder the positions of employee factors to acquire information used to better detect cyber intrusions.

4.2 Limitations and future research

This study has several important limitations that should be acknowledged to provide a balanced interpretation of the findings. The sample size was limited, and the scope of participants was constrained by the inability to interview individuals directly involved in insider threat incidents, particularly employees who had committed such infractions. This restriction reduces the depth of firsthand insight into offender motivations and behaviors. Additionally, the compressed project timelines and reliance on industry professionals may introduce bias, as perspectives are shaped by organizational roles, reporting structures, and varying levels of exposure to insider threat events. The study's methodological constraints also limit the broader applicability of the findings. Because data collection occurred within a strict timeframe, participation was limited to cybersecurity professionals, resulting in a small and intentionally selected sample. This purposive sampling approach, combined with the concentration of participants from specific industries, may restrict the generalizability of the results to other organizational contexts. Furthermore, access to highly qualified cybersecurity professionals, particularly those with advanced certifications, was limited, which may have introduced industry-specific bias into the perspectives captured. Non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) further constrained the depth of insight by preventing participants from sharing detailed information about particular incidents.

This research provided a novel approach to better understanding insider threat activities and employee behaviors that drive these malicious actions. The identified themes, connections, and framework are well-constructed. Future research is recommended in multiple facets to strengthen these constructs further. One of the first ways to do this is through interviewing a larger and more diverse pool of participants. Future research should focus on interviewing both actual employees who committed insider threat infractions and interviewing more cybersecurity professionals. More qualitative research should also be conducted to document employee experiences when dealing with insider threat activities, which ultimately enables us to better understand why an attack occurred. Future research should also focus on integrating industry usage of the HIT framework. Future potential research should include measurement development, such as survey development, behavioral cybersecurity experiments, and organizational case studies.

5 Conclusion

This study advances the understanding of insider threats by providing expert-based qualitative insights into the human factors influencing cybersecurity risks. Using a grounded theory approach and interviews with experienced cybersecurity professionals, the research identified key behavioral, organizational, and technological drivers associated with insider threat activities. The findings highlight that insider threats often emerge not only from malicious intent but also from complex interactions among employee behavior, organizational culture, leadership practices, and system access structures.

The proposed Human Insider Threat (HIT) framework synthesizes these insights into a structured model that emphasizes both drivers and mitigation strategies associated with insider threat behavior. Importantly, the framework demonstrates how human-centered factors can be integrated with existing cybersecurity governance models, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, to support more comprehensive risk management strategies. By linking behavioral insights with cybersecurity policy and operational practices, the HIT framework offers organizations a practical approach for strengthening insider threat prevention and response. Future research should further validate the framework across diverse organizational contexts and develop quantitative instruments to operationalize its constructs.

Statements

Data availability statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by University of South Florida Institutional Review Board. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

MG: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. PD: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. EO: Writing – review & editing.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Generative AI statement

The author(s) declared that Generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.

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Publisher’s note

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References

Summary

Keywords

cybersecurity risk, digital infrastructure, human insider threat, human insider threat framework, organizational

Citation

Green ML, Dozier PD and Owusu E (2026) Grounded theory insights into human insider threats: a qualitative study of expert perceptions. Front. Comput. Sci. 8:1854879. doi: 10.3389/fcomp.2026.1854879

Received

13 April 2026

Revised

22 September 2026

Accepted

28 September 2026

Published

22 October 2026

Volume

8 - 2026

Edited by

Akshat Gaurav, Asia University, Taiwan

Reviewed by

Athar Marwat, Iqra National University, Pakistan

Ahmed Shan-A-Alahi, University of the Potomac, United States

Updates

Copyright

*Correspondence: Marcus L. Green,

Disclaimer

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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