Processual relationalism is a camp (e.g., Elias, 1978; Emirbayer, 1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999, 2019; Dépelteau, 2008, 2013, 2018a,b; Abbott, 2016; Qin, 2016; Selg, 2016a,b; Selg and Ventsel, 2020) within the “relational turn” in the Social Sciences that presumes the primacy of relations over the units/elements/actors (e.g., individuals, states, and structures) involved in these relations. Processual relationalism further assumes that relations are constitutive of these units/elements/actors and that relations are at the same time, unfolding, dynamic processes. It distinguishes itself from other relational theories like “critical realism” (e.g., Donati, 2011) or social network analysis (e.g., Crossley, 2010), especially in the latter aspect as these approaches took more realist or inter-actionalist stances. In simpler terms, relationalism is concerned with the dualism between substantialism and relationalism and aims to develop an approach that views the world via the prism of relations and not substances, as almost any other social theory does.³

Via the relational prism “the very terms or units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 287). This means that units/elements/actors are never fixed and their constitution—and identity—is in a constant flux based on the relations they have with other units/elements/actors. Furthermore, this would also render an analysis with a focus on these units/elements/actors useless, and the attention should be placed on relations (or trans-actions according to the vocabulary of many processual relationalists; Emirbayer, 1997, p. 287). A helpful addition for the analytical focus has been introduced by Jackson and Nexon (1999) who stress the distinction between owned and un-owned processes. Based on this, when we consider processes triggered by actions of entities, they are “owned” and still keep us in the substantialist world. However, we should view processes as “un-owned,” independent from entities as they are the one's constituting entities. Based on this, for example, a change in Germany's migration policy is not a process that is triggered by Germany's political system but must be understood as a process that emanates in the interplay of the relations of entities. Therefore, the analysis requires us to consider the relations between all actors involved (Germany, other EU states, non-EU states, migrants, etc.). This distinction is especially helpful when we direct our attention to wicked problems.

The wicked problem concept has been first coined by Rittel and Webber (1973) by categorizing certain urban planning issues as “wicked.” They considered 10 properties that make a problem wicked: (1) there is no definition; (2) there is no stopping-rule; (3) there are only “good-or bad” solutions; (4) there is no immediate solution; (5) every solution attempt counts significantly; (6) there is no exhaustive set of solutions; (7) every wicked problem is unique; (8) every wicked problem is the symptom of another problem; (9) the choice of explanation determines the resolution; (10) the planner has no right to be wrong (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p. 161–167). The classical text is a useful starting point to understand wicked problems, however, in the twenty-first century, many wicked problems are global (like the European Migrant Crisis), and it is useful to expand the definition further. Therefore, it is also necessary to consider that time is running out and that those seeking to end the problem are often the ones that cause it (Levin et al., 2012, p. 127–129). Additionally, it stretches across multiple value systems and involves multiple organizations; there are no boundaries between action and reaction, and it transcends spaces and knowledge systems (Noordegraaf et al., 2017, p. 392–393).

These points might lead us to a descriptive definition of the concept, but it still makes it hard to use for analytical purposes. For this, it has been proven useful (see, e.g., Selg et al., forthcoming; Selg and Ventsel, 2020) to distinguish two aspects of problems to categorize them as wicked, complex or simple problems: (a) the definition/formulation of the problem and (b) the solution to the problem. Based on this, we have simple problems where the problem definition and the solution can be clearly defined (e.g., issuing ID cards). Complex problems are problems that we can clearly define but have no clear solution or at least a very contested one (e.g., implementation of educational policies). In the case of a wicked problem, we have no clear definition or understanding of the solution. If we are considering the European Migrant Crisis, we have certainly no clear idea of how to solve it or -even who needs to involved. Even worse, we are also unable to define what constitutes the crisis. In the introduction, I hinted at the multiple dimensions of the crisis (and section four will make this point more explicit) that ranges from the humanitarian, to the political and societal. We cannot (at least anymore) say that the crisis is defined by immigration into the European Union but is not intrinsically linked with many other factors.

Finally, after understanding what problems are considered wicked, there is still a need to define a wicked problem in relational terms to successfully link the concept with processual relationalism. As argued above, wicked problems are constituted by several different aspects, suggesting that a piece-meal analysis of these aspects could be fruitful. However, the level of complexity and uncertainty is unparalleled and subsequently does not allow for a piece-meal treatment (see, e.g., Byrne, 1998; Cilliers, 1998). Instead, the level of complexity can be found in the relations between components. “Systems with relatively few parts can be complex because of the intensity of interaction between those parts” (Wagenaar, 2007, p. 23). This points us to the notion that wicked problems are not mere problems composed of several components. However, in processual-relational terms, their wickedness derives from “un-owned processes whose constituent elements cannot be considered separately from the changing relations they are embedded in and vice a versa” (Selg et al., forthcoming, p. 22–23). This leads to the conclusion that wicked problems are “processual all the way down” and it is imperative for grasping the problem at hand that any “process-reduction” (Elias, 1978; Emirbayer, 1997), i.e., piece-meal treatment, is avoided. This is further, where processual relationalism is identified as the chance to avoid exactly this and offer a fully processual analysis of wicked problems. The next section will display what this processual-relational agenda contains.

Several methodological consequences are deriving from the ontological commitments brought forth by processual relationalism. A processual-relational approach

The quote above points out again the incapacity to use piece-meal approaches and a focus of analysis on actors/units/entities. Instead, the analytical focus needs to be placed on, unowned processes, as brought forth in the preceding paragraphs. Epistemologically, this means that we cannot learn about reality when we study units (states, individuals, and societies) but “dynamic, unfolding process, become (…) the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements themselves” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 287). In Emirbayer's quote, we find another important aspect of processual-relational methodology, which is the need for a constitutive inquiry. This type of inquiry or explanation has been directly linked with processual relationalism (Selg et al., forthcoming; Selg, 2019; Selg and Ventsel, 2020) and demarcates itself from causal inquiry. Causal inquiry is more or less the standard approach to conducting (social) science and establishes knowledge by uncovering causal mechanisms between X and Y (e.g., King et al., 1994; Gerring, 2005, 2012a,b). A causal argument would go more or less like this: “in saying that ‘X causes Y,' we assume three things: (1) that X and Y exist independent of each other, (2) that X precedes Y in time, and (3) that but for X, Y would not have occurred” (Wendt, 1998, p. 105, italics added; cf. Wendt, 1998, p. 79). Points (1) and (2) are not combinable with a processual-relational research agenda, as we cannot consider aspects of a phenomenon to be independent of each other (remember above's condition that entities can be considered “separately, but not as being separate”). It is also impossible to talk about timelines in constitutive explanations as constitution is not happening in separate moments but diachronically (see Selg et al., forthcoming based on Ylikoski, 2013). Point (3), on the other hand, is shared by both causal and constitutive explanation and leaves constitutive arguments to ask questions like “What makes Y Z?” or “Why is Y Z?” (Wendt, 1998, p. 113). This paper's specific case would lead us to ask the processual-relational research question, “what makes the European Migrant Crisis wicked?” Please note that this research question is quite different from its causal variations that would something along the lines of “how did the European Migrant Crisis become wicked?,” or “why did the European Migrant Crisis become wicked?” The latter two questions are inquiring about the process/mechanism/cause that made the EMC wicked, whereas the first question asks a more fundamental question about the crisis' being (or constitution). It is necessary to scrutinize the interdependence of relations that create the complexity and, therefore, the problem's wickedness to answer the question. To do this, I presume that it is sensible to deconstruct the crisis into several lower-level crises and display the issue's wickedness via their interdependence and constitutive relationship. It is important not to forget our necessary dictum and keep in mind that we can view the crises as being “separately, but not as being separate” (Elias, 1978, p. 85). Even though I suggest to divide the crisis into several ones, we have to be careful to not treat it in a “piece-meal manner” which I have warned against above, but at all time keep the constitutive nature of the phenomenon in mind. Inline to avoid further criticism, it is also important to realize that when looking at them from close detail,

The humanitarian crisis is the most obvious to spot and forms the starting point for the crisis on European soil. In 2015 around 28 million people were displaced due to conflict, violence and disaster, joining the 244 million international migrants already moving throughout the globe (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 73). According to the UNHCR, this is the “highest level ever recorded” (2015). Within this international development, the EU (and its historic territory) faced the most massive and most complex surge in migration since the Second World War. Between January 2015 and February 2016 alone, more than 1.1 million people fled from conflict and poverty and landed in the EU (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 73). Humanitarian challenges are always the main reason for migration (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 79). In fact, according to the Humanitarian Practice Network, “the flight to European shores reflect (…) not only the pull of greater long-term security in Europe but also the failure of the international humanitarian community to meet basic needs in other places” (DeLargy, 2016, p. 5).

The most recent rise in the number of refugees in Europe is mostly related to the Syrian Civil War that started in 2011. However, this is not the sole reason, and it is a combination of political instability, social unrest, violence and socio-economic reasons in the Middle East, the Maghreb Region, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 74). Besides that, the climate crisis had already an impact on migrants in other regions (like South-East Asia), and it only appears to be a matter of time that it will also affect the movement toward Europe. This, in turn, has a potential to emanate into a huge Human Security risk for the people staying put in their homeland and for the ones on the move that more often than not have to travel through regions of distress and face new security risks unique for a displaced person such as survival, coordination, transportation, communication and other physical resources such as food, shelter, medicine, and clothing (Thurnay et al., 2017, p. 240).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015) estimates that over one million people have reached Europe via the Mediterranean, and over 3,700 of them went missing alone in 2015. Apart from the apparent disaster of thousands of humans drowning in the Mediterranean Sea the failure of establishing adequate policies has seen countries violently blocking their passages, migrants remaining in camps with appalling conditions at Europe's borders, the displacement of thousands of people that are now known to be “missing,” the rise of human smuggling with all its criminal by-products, and a presumed situation in which around one million people will remain un-authorized in Europe (Phillips, 2018; p. 63–64). The EU has attempted to outsource this issue by working with its neighbors—most notably Turkey but also Morocco and Lybia—to stop refugees from even approaching Europe's borders (Jäntti and Klasche, 2021). In fact, this might be Europe's biggest challenge of the twenty-first century confronting the continent with long-lasting implications for humanitarian practice, regional stability and international public opinion (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015).

The humanitarian crisis is embedded in a complex system which makes successful intervention especially problematic (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 262). Approaching a problem in such a complex system with a linear mindset can lead to interventions that result in unintended consequences (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 81) and “the failure to understand or (…) acknowledge the non-linear and highly complex nature of global linkages on every level of governance leads to growing weakness. It can paralyze decision-making” (Goldin and Mariathasan, 2014, p. 3). This paralysis in decision-making and governance constitutes, among other things, the political crisis the EU and some of the national governments of its member states face (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 262).

In the following, three mutually constitutive processes are identified as the political crisis of the EU (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 262). We will learn that these are intimately intertwined with the humanitarian crisis as political actions and inactions will impact human suffering. This is rather obvious, however, the changing situation on the humanitarian front then requires engagement on the political.

The first process is the crisis of democracy, displayed in the demise of general democratic tendencies in Europe, allowing for anti-democratic and anti-establishment parties to gain confidence (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 262). The other crisis is one of legitimacy, leading to the growing mistrust in the EU institutions, the idea of the EU itself or even the nation-state (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 262). This is expressed by voters in national and European elections turning to anti-establishment and anti-EU parties, but also by national governments and politicians who actively seek more independence from the EU. It is further expressed in criticizing existing neoliberal global governance structures (such as the Bretton Woods System or the UN). Thirdly, a crisis of values is noticeable, when the EU leaves behind its humanitarianism and stresses security concerns over solidarity which used to be one of the main pillars of its self-conception.

The crisis of democracy is based on the appeal of far-right, anti-establishment and anti-constitutional parties that were able to celebrate great successes in the 2010's. This crisis is without a doubt exacerbated by the increased migration in 2014/15, where these parties saw the opportunity to intensify their anti-immigration rhetoric and phrased it as an undeniable security threat to European societies (see, e.g., Klasche and Selg, 2020). However, this crisis existed before the intensified migration in 2014 and already had a strong hold on societies beforehand. Therefore, I would argue that it impacted the humanitarian crisis from the start, where we saw, for example, the Hungarian Fidesz regime come down with utmost brutality on the refugees (Bender, 2020). This type of border control, something Europeans had not seen since the 1990's, will also play a role in the next section on the geopolitical crisis.

The legitimacy crisis was created by the EU's responses to the humanitarian crisis, which in return led to contestations by governments, opposition parties and citizens (Murray and Longo, 2018, p. 571). The issues relating to the humanitarian crisis' governing and the differences in practices that various actors are promoting (Murray and Longo, 2018, p. 571). The crises' constitutive nature becomes apparent as the political crisis begins to be inextricably linked with the humanitarian crisis, which is a part of its very identity (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 263). Here each response will alter the other crises, which then trigger the need for new responses that do not only consider the humanitarian crisis but also the legitimacy and democracy crises. The “politicization” of the (initially) administrative issue of handling the incoming migrants—an issue that experts should handle has been made a “people's” issue, by right-wing populist parties all over Europe (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 263). The abating of incoming migrants does not mean the end of the EMC, as it simply changed its identity and can no longer be defined in terms of a humanitarian issue.

Some of these solution-attempts that ultimately changed the crisis are ranging from welcoming refugees to Europe to the strict closing of borders. Solutions have also affected EU members very differently. The frontier states of the EU (Italy, Greece, Spain, and Malta) must carry a “disproportionate burden” (Murray and Longo, 2018, p. 574) which has never been addressed in any asylum policy initiative. Some might argue that the whole problem boils down to the lack of common European asylum policy that would ensure the burden is carried by all member states equally. When the European Commission's decisions to relocate 120,000 refugees in 2015 was objected to and ignored by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (European Commission, 2017) it indicated for many an apparent lack of resonance of the EU's values (Murray and Longo, 2018, p. 575). This “rebellion by member states (…) is unprecedented in its breadth and depth, given that i[t] constitutes not only contestation but direct opposition to the EU's authority and legal framework” (Murray and Longo, 2018, p. 575). It clearly shows the level of distrust of national governments in the EU's ability to handle the crisis adequately. Subsequently, the migration crisis represents one of the most notable and consequential episodes of political failure in the history of European cooperation, which many worry, retains the capacity to challenge the core of the European project (Phillips, 2018, p. 62).

The crisis has also shed a bad light on the international community and global governance structures that cannot seem to address violence, conflicts and human rights violations in the sending countries (Kaundert and Masys, 2018, p. 80). There is no clear plan or framework for the solution of many transboundary problems that require the cooperation of international actors. Even if there would be an end to the Syrian Civil War in sight, there does not seem to be any guarantee for this country's forthcoming stability. At least this would be reasonable to presume, given Somalia or Afghanistan's experience that even despite years of international intervention remain highly unstable with chronic poverty, inequality, weak governance, and lack of solutions for environmental changes (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, the legitimacy crisis could be seen to move further on from the European governments and the European Union to international organizations (e.g., the UN and its sub-bodies) founded on Western values and are not contributing to solving the global problems they were aimed at doing.

Stretching this argument even further, we can find the crisis challenging the Westphalian state system's legitimacy by maneuvering the nation-state's foundation into a crisis. At least in the Western world, the nation-state is the most fundamental building block of the system. The nation and the concept of nationhood find many interpretations, have always been evolving and at the same time challenged and contested (Jacob and Luedke, 2018, vi). The twenty-first century presented already many challenges to the nation-state, with its growing globalization forces that threaten the sovereignty and perceived ability to control its destiny (Jacob and Luedke, 2018, vii). Due to the interconnectivity with international and supranational institutions, the reactions of national governments to these forces have been often insufficient. This is particularly visible in the case in the European Union that for a moment placed much less emphasis on borders and bounding nationstates but finds itself now scrambling how to proceed. This is constitutively related to the humanitarian crisis since adapting and controlling human migration will be one of the most crucial tests for the nation-state (Jacob and Luedke, 2018, xiii). Simultaneously, the lack of supranational cooperation and even outright conflict between nation-states in solving the humanitarian crisis defines the latter, again, as not merely administrative, but a political crisis.

The humanitarian crisis constitutes a political crisis, but also the opposite is true: the political crisis frames the extent and nature of the humanitarian crisis. Migration waves will not stop in the future as living-conditions in many parts of the world deteriorate, and migration will be the only answer to this (Castelli, 2018). “The political crisis is not only a result of the humanitarian crisis. They are intrinsically intertwined. They cannot be seen independent from each other, but as mutually constituting each other” (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 264).

The political/legitimacy crisis points to the existence of another crisis that is raging in relative inconspicuousness in Europe. The political crisis which is highly interconnected with the humanitiarian crisis also finds itself to be exploited by Russia—which unsurprisingly to a knowledgeable observer intervenes in the political discourse to seed chaos and divide in European societies. This is where the European Migrant Crisis finds itself firmly expressed as a geo-political crisis—a crisis in which another power attempts to weaken the EU. However, also this crisis finds its beginning before 2014. The earliest realization of the geopolitical crisis started in 2008, with Russia re-claiming their imperial ambitions via the Georgian-Russian war and later with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Wivel and Wæver, 2018, p. 318). The new security environment emanating out of this also affected the geo-economic constellations of the EU and its Eastern neighbors (Youngs, 2017). The geopolitical power of the EU is expressed in its unity, which has suffered during the last 3 years (Selg and Ventsel, 2020, p. 264). The Russian Federation favors this situation and feasts on the instability of its competition. Seeking instability is part of the “hybrid warfare” playbook that is less concerned with traditional military strategies but with the ability to default to “plausible deniability”. The tactics include the use of propaganda to initiate insurgencies and divide societies which can be easily deployed in the context of polarizing migration policies. For example, Germany offers an ideal playing field for the Kremlin's tactics that have proven useful during the last German election (Aaltola, 2017) and increased the divide between right and left. Naturally, this is also visible today when the German public and political sphere are split over supporting Ukraine to fight off the Russian invasion. This divide is reached through the manipulation of the political discourse that decides on the blame for the situation (political-economic structures, the displaced persons themselves), demarcates the “deserving” migrant from the “undeserving” refugee and generally activates the fear of cultural, religious, and ethnic differences (Holmes and Castañeda, 2016, p. 12).

More precisely, Russia attempts to capitalize on the refugee crisis to re-enter Europe after its exclusion in the aftermath of the invasion of Crimea by (1) casting Europe in a more conservative light in contrast to the self-proclaimed liberal cosmopolitan self-understanding of the Europeans and (2) by “othering today's Orientalized Europe” (Braghiroli and Makarychev, 2017, p. 823). In my terms, this intervention exacerbated the crisis of democracy above as it supported many Eurosceptic parties, which then were able to intensify the anti-immigrant and anti-establishment narratives. It also heightens the humanitarian crises as the effective narratives of othering of migrants made more violent and inhume handling more acceptable.

As stated above, none of these crises is actually over—or dealt with—and so also the geopolitical aspects still loom, for example on more recent events at the Eastern border of the EU. In the Winter of 2021, the “EU-Belarus Border Crisis” saw the Putin regime openly use refugees to pressure the EU by putting it in the strange position of choosing between its humanitarian values and security ideations. Similar strategies have been used by Turkey's Erdogan, where he used the opening or closing of borders are bargaining chips to gain political capital. Finally, it also seems to be one of the main strategies of the Kremlin in its War in Ukraine to displace as many Ukrainians as possible to put political pressure on European leaders. These aspects also point neatly to the fact that the “European Migrant Crisis” was by no means a single and confined event but should be rather understood as part of a process of migration toward Europe and political competition of manifold actors. We also must stress that the crisis is not over or managed and merely changes its face. This points firmly to the conclusion that the processes that culminate into what we refer to as the “European Migrant Crisis” is a wicked problem.

Even though the crises seem somewhat of chronological order, with the humanitarian crisis preceding the others, it is important to recall that they are independent of each other and in a constitutive relationship, at least as soon as they all exist. Causality might be present at the very start. Still, as soon as we can describe the EMC as a political crisis, humanitarian and political crises, they are in a constitutive relationship. The crises “can be viewed separately, but not as being separate. This makes the (…) [c]risis an un-owned process, a ‘doing,' that is not attributable to a particular ‘doer.' However, it becoming an un-owned process took time” (Selg et al., 2022, p. 39). The illustrative case above showed, according to constitutive inquiry, “what makes Y a Y in the first place and how it turns into something else or remains the same in time” (Selg et al., 2022, p. 39). The EMC started as a humanitarian crisis but quickly transformed into something else and is now a humanitarian crisis, a political crisis, a geopolitical crisis and potentially more that was not covered in the brief sketch. Also note, therefore, it would not be possible for the humanitarian crisis to have the shape it has right now without the relationship with the political and geopolitical crises. The same applies to the political crisis, as well as the geopolitical crisis. The mutually constitutive relationships between the various crises are here the key to the wickedness—the higher the intensity of interconnections, the higher the complexity, the higher the wickedness—and therefore answers the processual-relational research question “What makes the European Migrant Crisis wicked?” successfully.