The primary data source was selected by the purposive sampling method, in the form of legal documents that include laws and Constitutional Court Decisions. Meanwhile, secondary data sources include academic literature, government policy reports and official institutional publications. These secondary sources help triangulate and verify the interpretation of primary legal documents.

Legal documents are selected based on the following criteria:

Direct relevance to political recruitment, conflicts of interest, and meritocracy, especially in the context of post-reform Indonesian democracy;

The selected documents, which include Laws and Constitutional Court Decisions and their respective implications for meritocracy and conflicts of interest, are described in Table 2.

Meanwhile, several case studies explicitly related to political dynasties and the weakening of meritocracy are examined. The cases were selected based on empirical relevance and representation of legal and political phenomena, with specific criteria: demonstrating the interaction between legal norms and political interests; and produce institutional consequences for meritocracy. The case studies studied include:

Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XXI/2023 concerning the interpretation of the age of the vice presidential candidate. This case concerns the interpretation of the age limit for presidential and vice presidential candidates, which has significant implications for political dynasties, such as Gibran Rakabuming Raka.

Incorporates comparative legal analysis on the countries of Thailand, Australia and Italy to expand the scope of the analysis. The main indicators of comparison are transparency, political accountability and the financial arrangement of the party, including how the management of conflicts of interest, internal democracy of the party and its law enforcement are regulated within political parties. This is intended to examine the structural and procedural differences between the political parties of these countries and Indonesia. Indonesia can adopt how the mechanisms of their legal system and political structure can be applied to strengthen meritocratic governance.

To ensure the validity and reliability of the data, this study uses a three-stage analysis procedure, namely:

Textual analysis: Identify legal provisions and judicial interpretations related to conflicts of interest and meritocracy;

Triangulation is carried out with the aim of ensuring the validity of data, through cross-referencing of primary legal documents with secondary data in the form of academic references and institutional reports. Consistent coding categorization is carried out in these data sources, so that it can identify patterns, facilitate analysis, find meaning and ensure the objectivity of the research.

The technique of coding data and research documentation that is carried out transparently and consistently is carried out as bias management. Overcoming the limitations of data accessibility is carried out by a combination of interdisciplinary and comparative data sources, so as to enrich the depth of data interpretation and analysis. Although the study used publicly available legal documents, the study acknowledges that informal networks and political dynamics not covered in the documents can influence the results of the study.

In addition, this comparative analysis has some limitations, as the political system in other countries may be different so that it affects the application of the findings in Indonesia. However, this challenge is overcome by integrating diverse sources, resulting in a comprehensive and thorough analysis.

Since 1998, post-authoritarian Indonesia has formally moved toward strengthening meritocracy and organizing conflicts of interest as the creation of “equality of opportunity” for citizens. However, an analysis of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration shows that the regulation of conflicts of interest still stops at the level of definition. Articles 42–43 do define conflict of interest as a situation when officials have personal interests that can affect the neutrality and quality of decisions, and mention elements of personal, business, and family relations (Minister of Law and Human Rights, 2014). However, this law does not describe concrete forms of conflict of interest, does not regulate reporting and handling procedures, and does not contain strict sanctions. In practice, the absence of this enforcement design makes the implementation of conflict-free governance highly dependent on the individual ethics of officials, not on systematic institutional mechanisms.

The constitution and derivative regulations have also not fully complied with Indonesia’s commitments after ratifying the 2003 UNCAC, which encourages the comprehensive regulation of conflicts of interest (United Nation, 2004). Corruption is strictly prohibited, but the resolution of conflicts of interest outside the context of procurement of goods/services is still partially implemented in procurement (Minister of State Secretariat, 1999). Empirically, this creates a normative picture, where Indonesia formally recognizes the importance of integrity, but materially does not provide an operational framework capable of preventing and dealing with conflicts of interest.

A similar situation can be seen in the arrangement of political parties (Minister of Law and Human Rights, 2008, 2011). The 1945 Constitution gives constitutional rights to parties as election participants and proposers of the President-Vice President pair, but does not stipulate constitutional obligations regarding internal democracy, financial transparency, or recruitment standards based on meritocracy. The 2008 Political Parties Law and its 2011 amendments regulate the function of the party as a vehicle for political participation and citizen education (Minister of Law and Human Rights, 2008, 2011), but it does not explicitly answer whether the party is a public entity with special accountability obligations or a private entity with an affirmed public responsibility. This ambiguity of status has implications for weak supervision arrangements, management of party funds, and financial audits. The absence of special norms about conflicts of interest within the party makes the party dependent on the foundation of influential figures, so that the party can easily turn into a “political vehicle” belonging to a few elites (Lin, 2004; Piketty, 2020).

Normatively, the law opens up space for the formation of party wings and structures that should be channels for grassroots participation as well as a vehicle for internal democracy (Khaitan, 2020; Porto, 1991). However, the findings of the study show that the role of this organizational wing tends to be symbolic. The recruitment mechanism for prospective members of the DPR/DPRD is carried out through a closed “internal selection” and is highly determined by the party elite. As a result, competency-based regeneration and grassroots participation have become weak, while capital-driven “top-down” politics have strengthened (Arianto, 2019). In this context, parties fail to function as horizontal checks and balances mechanisms, and the opposition is more often co-opted than positioned as a government counterweight (Katz and Crotty, 2006; Streeck, 2011).

The political financial aspect is increasingly dominant when analyzing the 2017 Election Law, especially the provisions on campaign financing (Articles 325–331). The law formally regulates campaign fund reporting obligations and disclosing sources of funds, but field findings show that reporting is often late and does not fully reflect actual fund flows. In modern democratic systems, the need for political funds is inevitable, but without strong regulation, money can be a source of legal and integrity problems, including corruption and undue influence (Browne, 2023; Ng, 2021).

A comparative review of the political finance literature places Indonesia between two ideal models of party organization as a public entity, namely the full public funding model; and the model of combining public funds and donations with strict conditions (Balashova and Sydoruk, 2018; Marriott and Rashbrooke, 2023). A full public funding model has the potential to prevent party dependence on private donors and reduce “political debt” to funders (Hopkin, 2004). The state also gains full access to audit the use of party funds. However, if supervision is weak, state subsidies can encourage party cartelization and reduce the party’s incentives to be critical of the government (Linz, 2000; Slater, 2018). Indonesia is still in a position between state aid, but without clear indicators of effectiveness and without strong evaluation and sanctions mechanisms (Faisal Barid and Mulyanto, 2018). This makes the reform of the party’s funding law has not resulted in substantive changes to the practice of oligarchs that rely on informal funding.

An analysis of several Constitutional Court (MK) rulings shows a consistent pattern: normatively, they are framed as protecting the constitutional rights of citizens, but in the context of elite-centered institutions and parties, they tend to expand the space for dynastic politics and reduce the chances of meritocratic competition.

Likewise with the Constitutional Court’s decision and the nomination rules at the national and regional legislative levels. Some of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictions are highlighted here, regarding political, national, and regional issues related to candidate eligibility screening and selection processes, as explained below. These are some of the Constitutional Court Decisions highlighted by the researchers:

Constitutional Court Decision No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015. This Decision annuls Article 7, letter r, of Law No. 8/2015 regarding Elections of Governors, Regents, and Mayors, which prohibits the families of incumbents from running for Election if they have not yet served one term of office (Kartika, 2015). This Decision is considered to legalize the practice of dynastic politics and strengthen the political oligarchy in the region, as it opens up opportunities for the incumbent family to maintain power from generation to generation, as seen in the case of the political dynasty of Ratu Atut Chosiyah in Banten and the case of Rita Widyasari, the former regent of Kutai Kartanegara, who was involved in dynastic politics with her father, Syaukani Hasan Rais.

The history of changes in the age threshold in local government regulations—starting from the tiered arrangements in the New Order era, the post-revision of the 1999 Regional Autonomy Law, to the recentralization of 2004 and changes during the time of Presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo—shows that the age limit was always negotiated in the context of central-regional relations and political interests at that time (Minister of Law and Human Rights, 2014, 2015; Minister of State Secretary, 1974; Minister of State Secretary of State, 1999; Secretary of State, 2004). The study’s findings do not conclude that any age change “causes” dynasties, but that in elitist party configurations, easing of the age threshold tends to be exploited by the families of incumbent officials to expand their political presence at various levels.

From various existing case studies, the researcher made a Table of Directed Evidence (Case Sketch) as shown in Table 3.

Table shows the interesting fact that the combination of legal design, weak oversight and elite-centered party structure will result in the same and repeated pattern, namely family connections and proximity to access to capital giving a candidate a pre-village and a great advantage, compared to relying solely on professional competence or other prestigious track records. Every stage in the candidate nomination process—from internal party selection, including administrative requirements, campaign funding, to oversight and sanctions—contains risk points that have the potential to erode the principles of meritocracy and strengthen elite dominance.

Figure 2 (Candidate Candidacy Risk Map) represents this risk map schematically and forms the basis for further analysis in the Discussion section on its impact on the quality of bureaucracy and public policy outcomes.

To assess whether the patterns found in Indonesia are unique or part of a broader trend, the study compared them with several international cases. In Italy, for example, Forza Italia founded by Silvio Berlusconi has been widely described as a personal “political vehicle,” with a strong reliance on the leader’s capital and business network (Baldini and Ventura, 2024; Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999). In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra revived political parties through a large supply of capital, transforming the party into a business-oriented party with managed populism and strong patronage (Nelson, 2006). These two examples show that in the context of a pragmatic political culture, elite-focused parties tend to shift into “capital-intensive” parties that blend business and political interests (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999; Raniolo, 2006).

By comparison, Australia offers a contrasting reference when it comes to political finance regulation, by applying:

Annual donation limits per donor in some announced (NSW, Victoria),

Overall, the comparative policies between Indonesia and Australia are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 summarizes the key differences between Indonesia and Australia in terms of donations, disclosures, audits, and sanctions. Key findings show that:

Indonesia does not yet have a strict donation limit, so the amount of donations can exceed the capacity of supervision and increase the risk of conflicts of interest.

Comparative lessons can be drawn from Australia that strict regulation of donation limits, real-time transparency, independent audits and effective sanctions can significantly limit the influence of money and curb the space for elite dominance in the party. With it, we can propose a roadmap for political party reform in the Discussion section to strengthen meritotics in the appointment of public officials to improve democratic governance in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s post-reform political system reflects a hybrid regime—a mixture of democracy, authoritarianism, and legalism that allows for the dominance of the political elite even though it is nominally democratic. This hybrid or dual-state framework is often described as “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 2010) where formal democratic institutions, such as elections and political parties, coexist with entrenched informal power structures that limit political competition and undermine meritocracy. The journey to post-reform democracy was hampered by the power of authoritarian chains and dynastic politics (Corrales, 2015).

The main essence of hybrid rezim in Indonesia is that the country has a binary system within one country; the state of law on the one hand symbolizes obedience to the law toward a democratic state. On the other side is the face of the prerogative state that serves elite power that spreads into the core of state power—dominating and then degrading the rule of law that has been created (Daly, 2019; Linz, 2000). The post-reform constitutional framework is not adequate in the process of consolidating democracy; the rule of law is still symbolic. In practice, Indonesia’s legal system and political system are still more inclined to serve the interests of elite groups, allow autocracies to lead and control the state, weaken the system of checks and balances in an effort to strengthen the octopus of elite power (Scheppele, 2018).

The next challenge that should be considered for the development of democracy and meritocracy in Indonesia is the cartelization of political parties. Political parties, which actually play a role as a vehicle for articulating and aggregating the interests of the people, have instead changed their form into a tool of elite control, protecting the interests of accumulating power resources, instead of prioritizing the people’s will and maintaining democratic stability (Warburton, 2024). Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties and its amendments have failed to establish clear standards for democracy and internal party accountability, making political parties increasingly elitist and disconnected from the public (Mietzner, 2015). Ketentuan normatif tentang Partai Politik dalam UU No, 2 Tahun 2008 dan aturan perubahannya gagal menetapkan standar yang tegas untuk akuntabiitas internal partai, mengakibatkan Parties in Indonesia are characterized as “all-catch parties,” with an ideological basis that is vague because it places too much emphasis on electoral pragmatism (Mietzner, 2013b; Power and Warburton, 2020). This dynamic undermines meritocracy by shifting the focus of political parties from selecting competent candidates based on competency qualifications to those with elite connections, wealth, and patronage networks. The deficit of internal democracy within the party body means that candidates are often chosen on the basis of personal connections rather than merit and competence, which strengthens the power of the established elite and inhibits the emergence of competent new leaders (Smith, 2009; Warburton, 2024).

Although the 2017 Election Act has introduced campaign funding transparency mechanisms, the lack of direct disclosure and weak enforcement of financial reporting exacerbate the influence of money and cartelization in politics. Although there is an Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) tasked with overseeing campaign funds, the scope is still very limited, they are not authorized to track informal donations that allow elites to maintain financial dominance over the electoral process (Aman and Tomsa, 2023). This situation creates a feedback loop in which elite-controlled parties use their financial advantages to dominate the political landscape, further strengthening Indonesia’s political oligarchy structure (Bachmid and Rachmitasari, 2022). Without significant reforms in political party funding, the recruitment of meritocratic political leaders remains an elusive goal.

The erosion of meritocracy in Indonesia is largely driven by the concentration of power in family politics and elite networks. This concentration is often manifested in dynastic politics, where political power is inherited within elite families or groups, overriding meritocracy-based recruitment and preserving a culture of patronage (Feinstein, 2010). The lack of clear regulation of conflicts of interest in the political system further exacerbates this problem, as elected officials often exploit their positions for personal gain or keluarga (Donald, 2011).

The Constitutional Court’s decisions in cases such as Gibran Rakabuming Raka and Kaesang Pangarep (President Joko Widodo’s son) show how legal rulings indirectly perpetuate dynastic politics by lowering the age limit for candidates (Flassy et al., 2025; Sari et al., 2025). This ruling, although framed as an expansion of political participation, primarily benefits political elites and their families, which further limits opportunities for non-elite candidates and reduces competition. The rise of political dynasties weakened the principles of equality of opportunity and meritocratic governance, since power was centralized in several families, perpetuating a system that prioritized connections over competence. In this context, meritocracy becomes a formal ideal rather than a practical reality, with access to power increasingly dependent on family ties and wealth rather than individual competence and public service records (Levitzky and Way, 2010).

Comparative reviews with other countries, such as Australia, Italy and Thailand, are believed to provide enlightenment for reform of political party financial management in maintaining democratic values. The Australian government implements effective measures in the regulation of political donations, including real-time disclosure and cap on nominal donations accompanied by budget transparency and a strict accountability system so as to effectively reduce the influence of money politics within political parties (Nwokora et al., 2019; Tham, 2010). Enforcement of provisions on restrictions and strict audits of donations in Australia ultimately creates a fairer, more accountable and more transparent political system (Ng, 2021).

Legal and bureaucratic reforms in Indonesia have not been adequate to support the same as those implemented in Australia. Political parties can act secretly in their financial affairs. Transparency and accountability in internal party funding or election campaign funding are not enforced, as a result of which oligarchy is increasingly corrupting the party. The party’s ideology is no longer the commander-in-chief, but rather the most royal donor will become the new mecca of the party. Formal regulations were not created to prevent this from happening (Esavwede et al., 2025).

To align with the lessons learned from Australia and improve the functioning of Indonesia’s democracy, key reforms are recommended:

Implement real-time donation disclosure to ensure full transparency in political funding.

These reforms aim to reduce the influence of money in politics, curb the power of political dynasties, and strengthen the principle of meritocracy in political recruitment, ultimately creating a more competitive and fair political environment in Indonesia.