Abstract
Electoral integrity has become a central procedural benchmark for assessing democratic quality in the Andean region, where competitive elections coexist with persistent distrust, post-electoral polarization, and recurring allegations of fraud. This policy brief develops a comparative analysis of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru combining electoral observation reports, legal frameworks and field-based insights in Ecuador and Bolivia. Across cases, findings point out formal convergence around universal suffrage, specialized electoral administration, and comprehensive regulation of the electoral cycle, alongside meaningful variation in implementation priorities and transparency practices. Key challenges include trade-offs between technical security and openness, weak political finance oversight, limited inclusion of underrepresented groups and institutional fragmentation. The brief proposes targeted recommendations to strength coherence, inclusiveness and trust in electoral processes.
1 Introduction
In Latin America, democratic systems are traced to nineteenth-century independence processes shaped by the Enlightenment and revolutionary ideas associated with political figures such as Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín. Democratic consolidation, however, has not followed a linear trajectory. In recent decades, electoral democracy has coexisted with recurrent political instability and episodes of authoritarianism. Broader consolidation accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century () during what Huntington termed the “third wave of democratisation,” a period linked to democratic institutionalisation through freer and more competitive elections, expanded rights, and renewed constitutional frameworks.
The literature reflects disputes over how to delimit the number of existing democracies and where one regime begins or ends. Democratic theory also has limits specifying operational criteria that differentiate democratic from non-democratic. In practice, countries are often identified as non-democratic based on public opinion assessments and symptoms of autocratization difficult to deny (). Although more than four decades have passed since the region’s first democratic transition, support levels remain low: no Latin American democracy has reached significant levels of support in more than 30 years; just by outlining confidence in electoral institutions, data show a decline from a 47% confidence in 2006 to 34% in 2024 ().
This context has contributed to what authors describe as “imperfect democracies,” undermining core democratic principles—especially rights and participation—and the institutions and practices through which those principles are implemented (). In addition, the emergence of hybrid regimes has portrayed a contemporary decline in the promotion of democracy, a phenomenon driven by leaders who gain power through competitive elections and, in the long run, undermine institutions in ways that gradually erode democratic governance (; ). Within this framework, electoral systems become a fundamental institutional device translating citizen participation into political representation. Elections—open, free, and fair—remain an indispensable democratic sine qua non ().
From this perspective, Latin America’s recent empirical record provides a basis for analysing democratic practice. Although competitive elections were widely adopted from the second half of the twentieth century, their stability and effective functioning have been shaped by structural inequality, institutional fragmentation, and political conflict. A key constraint concerns barriers to the sovereignty of the vote imposed by interest groups, resulting in electoral capture not by voters but by corruption, economic power, and fragmented party systems, among other factors (). Latinobarómetro—the region’s leading public opinion survey—reports that 2024 reflected a tension between citizens’ stated preference for democracy and their willingness to support any regime perceived as capable of delivering tangible solutions. From the pandemic period through 2024, support for democracy remained below 50%, with a low point of 48% in 2018. Nevertheless, support increased in 2024: it rose by four percentage points relative to 2023, reaching 52% (). Trust in electoral institutions stood at 34% in 2024. The lowest trust levels were reported in Honduras (16%), Colombia (17%), and Bolivia (18%) ().
Against this backdrop, electoral observation has consolidated as an institutionalised practice devoted to enhancing confidence and legitimacy by improving electoral procedures, supporting democratic institutionalisation, and strengthening trust (). The relevance of electoral observation is reflected in its use across both democratic and non-democratic contexts. Literature on the impact of electoral observation argues that, beyond portraying a tool of legitimation for current governments, missions under certain circumstances may represent an important mechanism for promoting democratisation across the world, among other things, because it improves electoral competitiveness and constrains incumbents’ ability to engage in manipulation (). Scholarships suggest that electoral observation operates by increasing the political and reputational costs of malpractice, deterring fraudulent behaviour by both exposing irregularities and by discouraging them ex ante; subsequently, domestic or international repercussion probabilities increase (; ). These effects appear particularly relevant in contexts where political freedoms are not fully consolidated, making observation more impactful on hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes ().
By 2021, Andean countries (Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia) led regional rankings in the full implementation of observation missions (). In 2022, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders underscored that electoral observers contribute to defending pluralism, tolerance, alternation in power, and the rule of law, positioning them as consequential actors for the democratic state. Through recommendations and by facilitating dialogue between local and international stakeholders, these missions have supported policy improvements aimed at enhancing democratic quality.
Despite its growing relevance, a significant gap remains in academic literature: outputs figure as technical reports or country-specific assessments, rarely integrated into broader comparative debates and lack comparatively oriented studies that integrate electoral legal frameworks with empirical findings from observation. To address this gap, this policy brief adopts a qualitative and comparative approach based on secondary-source analysis and the systematisation of prior electoral observation experience. Three elements are combined: a review of the most recent electoral observation reports from the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) covering Colombia (2022), Ecuador (2025), Peru (2021) and Bolivia (2025); a comparison of electoral legal frameworks across these countries; the incorporation of field-based insights from observation experience in Ecuador and Bolivia. This design enables a comparative policy-orientated assessment of electoral integrity and institutional performance in the Andean subregion.
The information contrasted and systematised throughout this policy brief is primarily drawn from electoral legal frameworks and official electoral observation reports, including documents produced by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly of Bolivia, the Congress of the Republic of Colombia, the National Electoral Council of Ecuador, the Democratic Constituent Congress of Peru, the European Union and the Organisation of American States (, , ; ; ; , , ; , , , ; , , , ). The raw data upon which the analysis was conducted can be found in the table presented in the production forum.
2 Policy options and implications
The comparative assessment of electoral legislation, the latest observation reports, and the available evidence for Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru identifies patterns in formal democratic design alongside persistent divergences relevant to electoral integrity in the Andean axis. While the four systems adhere to universal suffrage, specialised electoral administration, and regulation of the electoral cycle, tensions persist between legal design, implementation, and public perceptions of legitimacy.
Across cases, institutional architecture reflects consolidated democratic standards, but priorities differ, generating trade-offs with direct implications for policy design. Ecuador features high regulatory density and emphasises technical security, particularly in the production, custody, and distribution of electoral materials and in the control of voting procedures. The evidence synthesised here suggests that this orientation supports standardised and centralised operations with limited operational discretion. Bolivia follows a more procedural and publicly visible approach, with integrity grounded more in procedural publicity and direct observation than in prominent technical controls. Colombia occupies an intermediate position, combining growing technological modernisation—especially in results transmission and administrative digitisation—with a more fragmented institutional structure, suggesting the need for stronger inter-institutional alignment mechanisms. Peru stresses as well an intermediate position within a tripartite system which outlines significant levels of institutional specialisation and autonomous development, but at the same time, requires higher alignment efforts. However, it has been highlighted how the overall quality of the electoral cycle is still underpinned by a normatively dispersed framework, resulting in persistent challenges due to coherence among actors.
These differences are reflected in scrutiny and transparency. Bolivia relies on explicit public vote counting and early dissemination of preliminary results to reduce post-electoral uncertainty. Ecuador formally recognises public scrutiny but applies more restrictive practices after polling stations close, prioritising procedural control over access, potentially affecting the perception of openness. Colombia and Peru’s mixed systems and reliance on access primarily for accredited actors suggest a constrained model of effective transparency. In Peru, the absence of an institutionalised rapid result system further reinforces reliance on official channels, which may shape transparency perceptions in areas affected by political conflict, even when legal standards are met. Overall, the comparison highlights a recurrent trade-off between technical security and effective openness, indicating that policy reforms should aim to integrate transparency-enhancing mechanisms without undermining procedural integrity.
A further axis concerns political inclusion. Even though formal recognition and commitment to intercultural and plurinational statehood, diversity has not been translated into enforceable mechanisms for representation. Ecuador and Colombia lack binding provisions to ensure Indigenous participation on candidate lists or require systematic materials and training in native languages. In Colombia, Indigenous inclusion largely depends on special constituencies and party initiatives rather than a cross-cutting intercultural civic education policy. Likewise, in Peru, Indigenous representation has been predominantly relegated to subnational levels, whereas representation in the Legislative body or presidential offices remain non-mandatory and lacks reliable data on ethnic representation. Furthermore, the electoral framework left aside requirements on minimum youth and women’s representation in high-level positions. Bolivia has expanded recognition of Indigenous identities, yet it does not establish provisions to promote minimum youth participation in candidacies, limiting generational renewal. These findings suggest that current frameworks rely mostly on symbolic recognition or voluntary party compliance, highlighting the need for affirmative measures, improving data collections and incentives to ensure effective representation.
The coexistence of compulsory voting and procedural democracy also raises important policy considerations regarding participation quality. Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru maintain mandatory suffrage and reinforce it through voting-certificate requirements linked to sanctions and administrative procedures. Colombia relies on voluntary voting with incentives. These scenarios portray a fundamental policy dilemma between maximising electoral participation and fostering meaningful civic commitment.
Operational challenges persist across the four systems, particularly in training polling station members and ensuring consistent procedural application. Observation reports converge on recurrent errors and the need to strengthen training and incentives. Candidate withdrawal and substitution timelines also appear as a practical vulnerability, especially in Bolivia, where misalignment between legal deadlines and logistics can generate confusion and affect ballot clarity. In this way, policy interventions should prioritise professionalisation, standardised training systems, and increasing cohesion between legal deadlines and operational planning.
Political finance oversight emerges as a systemic vulnerability with significant implications for democratic competition. Despite the use of mixed public–private financing, all four countries exhibit weaknesses in monitoring, auditing, and sanctioning mechanisms. Gaps remain, especially regarding the absence of comprehensive spending limits and incomplete enforcement across phases. These deficiencies not only affect competitive equity but also are consequential given regional concerns about the expansion of illicit economies and potential political penetration.
Finally, civic education and information ecosystems represent an underdeveloped policy area across the region. Although Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru electoral authorities maintain formal education functions, territorial reach and thematic scope appear limited, with programs focused on procedural issues and less emphasized on disinformation, political polarization and citizen oversight. Peru’s establishment of a Technical Committee for Factchecking in 2021 reflects and important step toward misinformation addressed by electoral authorities, yet its impact remains limited without broader institutional integration. Strengthening electoral integrity requires expanding civic education beyond technical instruction toward fostering critical engagement and resilience against disinformation.
Taken together, current patterns suggest that improving electoral integrity in the Andean region requires not only enhancing the effectiveness, coherence and inclusiveness of existing frameworks, but also adapting them to emerging challenges related to representation, political dynamics and evolving societal demands. Policy responses should therefore address both technical and procedural dimensions while responding to the broader institutional and societal conditions that shape confidence in electoral processes.
3 Actionable recommendations
Improving electoral integrity in the Andean regions requires targeted, feasible, and context-sensitive policy interventions stressed on addressing both institutional design and implementation gaps. Derived from the comparative findings, the following recommendations are proposed:
First, strengthening inclusive representation frameworks requires moving beyond formal recognition toward enforceable mechanisms. Binding quotas or placement mandates for Indigenous representation in national-level candidacies should be introduced by governments supported by systematic self-identification mechanisms in candidate registration. Without reliable data, representation gaps remain invisible and unaddressed. Youth and women’s parity and alternation should be reinforced through incentive methods such as targeted public financing schemes, as earmarked campaign funds focused on reaching executive or high-ranking offices.
Second, institutional coherence must be addressed, particularly in Peru, where electoral regulation remains fragmented across multiple legal instruments. A harmonised reform should be developed to consolidate electoral norms into a unified framework, reducing interpretative ambiguity and improving coordination among electoral bodies. This would be useful to enhance both administrative efficiency and public trust.
Third, political finance oversight requires urgent strengthening across all four countries. Authorities should reinforce periodic binding financial reporting mechanisms during campaigns with clear, enforceable sanctions for non-compliance. Specifically in Ecuador, spending caps should be extended to include limits on payments to party observers, ensuring greater equity between political actors and limiting informal advantages.
Fourth, civic education on electoral matters must be expanded in scope and reach. Existing programs should move beyond procedural instruction to include political rights, critical media literacy and disinformation awareness, particularly in rural and marginalised areas, where programs must be culturally adapted. This would improve both the flow and accessibility of information among electors about key aspects of elections, further than merely operational knowledge, enabling more informed and conscious participation, while enhancing the overall quality of democratic processes.
Fifth, the role and conditions of temporary electoral personnel should be professionalised and strengthened. Standardised training programs, clear operational guidelines, and consistent incentives should be implemented, combined with minimum welfare guarantees and working conditions that ease their working hours. This would improve the uniformity and credibility of electoral outcomes by reducing procedural inconsistencies. Additionally, caps could be established on the frequency with which citizens may be appointed to these roles, as recurrent selections may erode operational effectiveness and weaken broader civic engagement.
Sixth, due to the sight of electoral participation models that coexist between compulsory and voluntary voting systems, it is suggested to commission empirical studies evaluating the impact of mandatory voting on turnout quality and civic engagement, while exploring alternative incentive-based mechanisms to foster meaningful participation rather than mere compliance.
Seventh, in a context characterised by the broad scope of social media and diverse information, regulating political communication and combating disinformation becomes a necessity. Electoral authorities should adopt clear regulatory frameworks and enforceable codes of conduct for political advertising, including rules on transparency of sponsorship and sanctions for non-labelled or misleading content, especially on digital environments. This should be complemented by monitoring mechanisms.
Finally, inter-institutional coordination should be stressed to improve transparency and public scrutiny by balancing technical security with openness. Access to scrutiny processes should be expanded through diverse means beyond accredited actors, as well as seeking mechanisms to ensure timely and accessible publication of results. At the same time, in fragmented systems, particularly Colombia and Peru, formal coordination mechanisms should be strengthened to clarify responsibilities, reduce overlaps, and improve accountability across electoral bodies.
Collectively, these measures aim to adapt existing electoral frameworks to evolving democratic current challenges by matching legal robustness and effective implementation, social legitimacy and inclusive representation.
4 Conclusion
The analysis in this brief shows that electoral integrity in the Andean region depends less on the existence of formal democratic rules than on their effective implementation, coherence and social legitimacy. Three of the four cases show broad normative convergence but meaningful divergence in implementation, while Peruvian frameworks still point out the need to seek cohesion. In Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, persistent gaps between legal frameworks, institutional performance and citizen trust continue to undermine democratic quality. In this context, competitive elections alone become insufficient to sustain legitimacy, particularly amid polarisation, disinformation, and recurrent fraud narratives.
The findings highlight that the key vulnerabilities are structural rather than procedural. Differences are visible in electoral administration models, scrutiny and transparency arrangements, compulsory voting regulations, inclusion mechanisms for historically underrepresented groups, and political finance oversight. Taken together, these patterns align with the literature on “imperfect democracies,” where electoral processes function formally but face tensions that can undermine legitimacy. The analysis supports treating electoral integrity as multidimensional, shaped by the interaction of legal rules, institutional capacity, sociopolitical conditions, and citizen trust—not solely by legal design or technology.
A further contribution is to underscore the limits of using observation reports mainly as descriptive or ex post validation tools. A comparative linkage between electoral rules, observation findings, and field-based evidence helps surface regional patterns that remain fragmented in country-specific reporting. In particular, the research highlights persistent gaps in intercultural and generational inclusion, ambiguities regarding the practical openness of scrutiny, weaknesses in training key electoral actors, and shortcomings in the control of political finance—issues that become more salient amid concerns about illicit economies and low-intensity authoritarian practices.
The findings also suggest that procedural approaches remain useful for empirical analysis in Latin America, while benefiting from closer engagement with legitimacy, trust, and substantive participation. Compulsory voting alongside low confidence in electoral authorities, and delegitimating discourse from both incumbents and opposition actors, complicate the assumption that electoral competition alone can stabilise democratic regimes. In this setting, electoral observation operates not only as a technical assessment instrument but also as a factor in contemporary disputes over democratic legitimacy.
Finally, the policy brief contributes an updated comparative synthesis of Andean electoral rules and observation-based evidence under institutional weakening. The results point to the value of research agendas that integrate electoral observation more systematically into comparative scholarship and to reform debates that consider not only procedural efficiency but also the strengthening of citizen trust and electoral democracy in practice.
Statements
Author contributions
SC-P: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Supervision, Validation. AM: Data curation, Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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Supplementary material
The Supplementary material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2026.1820830/full#supplementary-material
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Summary
Keywords
Andean region, civic education, democratic legitimacy, electoral governance, electoral integrity, electoral observation, political finance, transparency
Citation
Carranco-Paredes S and Merino A (2026) Electoral observation and integrity in Andean democracies: challenges and insights from Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. Front. Polit. Sci. 8:1820830. doi: 10.3389/fpos.2026.1820830
Received
01 March 2026
Revised
28 April 2026
Accepted
30 April 2026
Published
15 May 2026
Volume
8 - 2026
Edited by
Régis Dandoy, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador
Reviewed by
Nataly Viviana Vargas Gamboa, DePaul University, United States
Updates
Copyright
© 2026 Carranco-Paredes and Merino.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Santiago Carranco-Paredes, sacarrancopa@uide.edu.ec; Ariel Merino, armerinoal@uide.edu.ec
Disclaimer
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.