AUTHOR=Inarimori Kiichi , Honma Souichiro , Miyazono Kengo TITLE=Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research JOURNAL=Frontiers in Psychology VOLUME=Volume 15 - 2024 YEAR=2024 URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369399 DOI=10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369399 ISSN=1664-1078 ABSTRACT=

This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals’ compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose “natural compatibilism” and “natural incompatibilism”. These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the “Free Will No Matter What” hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals’ inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.