Institutional arrangements, social relations, and food loss and waste in Tanzania’s export avocado value chain

Abstract

Food loss and waste (FLW) in low- and middle-income countries is often framed as a problem of technical inefficiency, poor infrastructure, or inadequate post-harvest handling. Such explanations, however, give insufficient attention to the institutional arrangements and social relations through which FLW is produced and unevenly distributed. This study examines how governance arrangements, power asymmetries, and risk-allocation practices shape FLW in Tanzania’s export avocado value chain. It draws on multi-sited qualitative research conducted across the Northern and Southern Highlands of Tanzania between 2018 and 2022, supplemented by follow-up interviews in 2024. A total of 114 in-depth interviews were conducted with farmers, exporters, farmer-group representatives, field officers, packhouse actors, and government stakeholders, together with 15 days of go-along participant observation during harvesting, grading, sorting, and packhouse processing. The findings identify four modes of selling relations: contracted out-grower arrangements, direct selling through non-contracted farmer groups, mediated selling through cooperatives and associations, and spot buying or side-selling. Across these arrangements, FLW resulted not only from the material perishability of avocados or failure to meet quality standards, but also from unequal control over harvesting decisions, opaque pricing and grading systems, contract sanctions, selective buying practices, delayed harvesting, and inequitable rejection-sharing mechanisms, and farmers’ own risk-avoidance strategies. The study shows that exporters and buyers often reduced their exposure to market and quality risks by shifting costs and uncertainty onto farmers. Farmers responded through strategies such as side-selling and increasing farmgate weight by harvesting immature fruit or non-exportable avocado varieties, which can generate further losses and waste. By demonstrating that FLW is a material outcome of how power, value, risk, and responsibility are organised within export-oriented horticultural chains, the paper contributes to critical FLW scholarship and calls for interventions that go beyond technical fixes to address transparent pricing and grading, farmer representation, fairer contractual arrangements, strengthened producer organisations and more equitable risk-sharing arrangements across the value chain.

1 Introduction

In Tanzania, agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, employing 65% of the total population and is one of the largest contributors to the economy (28% of GDP - 18 billion USD) (URT, 2024). The agriculture sector is viewed by policymakers as one of the key pillars in the country’s effort towards achieving a higher middle-income country status by 2050, as set out in the new Agriculture Master Plan (AMP) (URT, 2024).

At the heart of the agriculture transformation agenda is export horticulture production. The horticulture sub-sector is the fastest growing in the agriculture sector, with a 9–12% annual growth rate and the highest forex exchange earnings - 38% of total earnings from agriculture (George, 2022). Horticulture exports have grown from USD 412 million in 2015 to USD 779 million in 2019 and are set to achieve 2 billion USD by 2026 as set out in the National Five-Year Development Plan III (URT, 2021a). The horticulture sub-sector employs about 4 million people, with many medium and large-scale investors that either operate independently or have integrated smallholders as out-growers.

While the challenges facing the export horticulture are well documented (for example, URT, 2024; REPOA, 2022; George, 2022; URT, 2021b, c; REPOA, 2018), there is a lack of focus on how transitioning to export production shapes institutional arrangements and the implications of these relations for food loss and waste in horticulture production systems.

Globally, 1.2 billion tonnes of all food produced is lost or wasted on farms per year, representing 15.3 per cent of global agricultural production (World Wide Fund - UK, 2021). Fresh fruits and vegetables are the most wasted food commodities and are significant contributors to total food loss and waste. In low- and middle-income countries, FLW in fruit and vegetables is particularly acute due to poor infrastructure. Losses at the farm and post-harvest stages undermine sustainability goals and limit inclusive development. Understanding FLW in such contexts is therefore essential for helping countries achieve SDG 12.3 while also improving the resilience and equity of agri-food systems.

In Tanzania, FLW in the horticulture sub-sector is estimated at around 40–50% (URT, 2021c; Ekka and Mjawa, 2020). A study of the mango value chain in the Morogoro region found that FLW ranged between 48 and 60% along the chain (Msogoya and Kimaro, 2011). A recent estimate indicates that in domestic avocado production, FLW during harvesting range from 5–30%, with an additional 30–40% at the wholesale/retail stage due to mechanical damage and pests or diseases (Juma et al., 2019; Cromwell, 2022). In the export avocado sector, FLW are estimated at 30–50% of the total production for smallholders and some large-scale farmers, and 10–20% for exporter-producer farms due to fruits not meeting quality standards. Similar post-harvest loss rates have been reported in Kenya’s avocado supply chains (Snel et al., 2021a, b). With approximately 900,000 people (13% of a population of 7.1 million people) in Mainland Tanzania experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (URT, 2023), reducing food waste is considered a public health imperative (Neff et al., 2015).

However, policy interventions to reduce FLW in low and middle-income countries often frame the problem as ‘inefficiency and technological inadequacy within supply chains’ (Gille, 2013, p. 39). Therefore, policy interventions place emphasis on technological improvements in production, storage, and distribution (Sheahan and Barrett, 2017; Minten et al., 2009; Affognon et al., 2015). There is far less empirical work on how institutional arrangements, power asymmetries, and social relations among value chain actors structurally generate FLW. Gille (2013, p. 41) argues that there is the need for approaching FLW “as arising from social relations, and from ‘macro’ structural and institutional forces that operate across multiple scales” in global supply chains.

Existing scholarships, particularly in the global South, have yet to sufficiently explore, for example, how risk distribution, information asymmetries, unequal power, and forms of coordination between farmers and exporters reproduce patterns of vulnerability that directly create or exacerbate FLW. Insufficient attention has been paid to how unequal power relations between producers and buyers shape FLW production and the distribution of risks. This gap is critical, especially as an emerging export sector, where Tanzania’s accelerating market transformations unfold and intersect with complex pre-existing governance structures, which determine the bargaining power of different actors.

By foregrounding these institutional arrangements, this article addresses this gap in the FLW literature by asking: (1) How do institutional arrangements structure selling relations in Tanzania’s export avocado value chain? (2) How do these arrangements produce or reinforce power asymmetries and unequal risk distribution among farmers, farmer groups, and exporters? and (3) How do these power asymmetries and risk distributions generate FLW, and what strategies do actors use to reduce their own risk burdens?

The article makes three key contributions to debates on FLW in global supply chains. First, it contributes to critical FLW debates by showing that FLW in export-oriented horticultural chains is not simply a technical failure but a manifestation of social relations within agri-food systems. Second, it foregrounds governance arrangements, risk, and power asymmetry within value chain relations as key components of FLW generation. Third, it identifies the concrete mechanisms through which the burdens and risks of FLW are unevenly distributed, including through certification demands, contract enforcement, actors’ risk avoidance strategies, and monopsony market structures. Understanding FLW as a socially and institutionally produced phenomenon offers new insights for designing sustainable value chains and supports growing calls to incorporate equity, governance, and power relations into FLW research.

2 Theoretical framing

2.1 Institutions and institutional arrangements

Understanding how FLW emerges within globalized horticultural value chains requires an approach that goes beyond technical explanations to examine the institutional and relational structures through which production and exchange are organized. Institutional economics conceptualizes institutions as the “rules of the game” that structure how actors negotiate transactions, allocate rights, and manage uncertainty within markets (North, 1992, p.477). The approach assumes that actors calculate the best course of action to maximize their interests within a specific institutional arrangement (Ostrom, 1986). The institutional arrangement refers to “a set of rules or agreements governing the activities of a specific group of people pursuing a certain objective” (Eaton et al., 2008, p. 10; Williamson, 1998). Institutional arrangements consist of formal and informal rules that govern the activities of a group of people or network of people (Keefer and Shirley, 2000; Williamson, 2002).

In export-oriented horticulture production, formal institutions include food safety rules and regulations, grades and quality standards, trade rules, and certification schemes that determine how crops must be grown, harvested, transported, processed, and traded (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Busch, 2000). But also, the contractual arrangements between farmers and exporters, the rules for joining and leaving, and sanctions when rules are broken (Scott, 2004). North (1992) argued that formal institutions reduce transactional costs by enhancing contract enforcement, increasing available information, reducing uncertainty, and risks for actors. However, Dorward et al. (2005) assert that the aim of institutional arrangements is not necessarily to reduce transactional costs but to reduce transaction risks. Formal institutions such as contracts, standards, and certification schemes shape incentives and define obligations, thereby influencing how risk, value, and responsibility are distributed.

Eaton et al. (2008) identified three predominant forms of hybrid institutional arrangements for the integration of smallholder farmers into agricultural value chains within Tanzania’s horticulture industry: namely, contract farming arrangements, registered producer organizations (farmer association and cooperative), and a combination of contract farming and producer organizations. Several empirical studies on contract farming arrangements have demonstrated that supermarkets and retailers in Europe control the production process through intermediaries – importers and exporters, who ensure that compliance with standards, quality, scale, and volume of procurements and presentation are met (Ajwang, 2020; Gramzow et al., 2018; Okello et al., 2011; Boselie and van de Kop, 2005; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). Such arrangements specify who controls harvesting decisions, how quality is defined, how pricing is determined, and who bears the consequences when produce is rejected. Although the benefits and disbenefits of institutional arrangements in Tanzania horticulture value chains have received considerable attention (e.g., De Blasis, 2026; Ndimbo and Haulle, 2024; van der Maden et al., 2021; De Blasis, 2020; Gramzow et al., 2018; Eaton et al., 2008), there is little understanding and evidence of how these impact FLW generation.

2.2 Social practice

While institutional arrangements establish formal rules and informal norms – relating to food safety, quality standards, among others - social practice theory draws attention to the everyday interactions, norms, and informal relations that shape how these rules are enacted in practice. According to Schatzki (2002, p. 87), ‘a social practice is a temporally evolving, open-ended set of doings and sayings.’ The doing and saying involve rules, specific ways of understanding, knowledge of how things work and how to use things, but also the state of emotion (Schatzki, 2002; Reckwitz, 2002). Currently, there is a lack of critical engagement with how social practices emanating from the institutional arrangements impact FLW generation. For example, how does power asymmetry in institutional arrangements lead to practices that generate FLW unequally for the least powerful actors in the supply chain? And how do power asymmetries lead to risk distribution practices? While social practice theories have been applied to FLW studies through ethnographic approaches at the consumer stages of supply chains to understand ‘why’ FLW occurs (e.g., Evans, 2011, 2012; Moreno et al., 2020; Watson and Meah, 2013), such nuanced analyses have not been applied to the early stages of food supply chains and in the global South context. Therefore, it is important to understand how the interactions between social practices and governance arrangements result in how FLW are produced directly or indirectly. For instance, how social relations influence when harvesting occurs, who gains access to buyers, and how actors respond to contractual sanctions or price information asymmetries.

2.3 Food waste regimes

Drawing on food waste regimes theory by Gille (2013), we situate FLW within both broader political-economic systems and local interactions by showing how waste is produced through social relations, the logic of markets, risk mitigation strategies, and standards-driven governance. Gille (2013, p. 29) suggests that ‘waste constitutes a social relationship and as such should be studied as something produced materially and conceptually as social relations.’ The food waste regimes concept, according to Gille (2013, p. 29), “consists of social institutions and conventions that not only determine what wastes are considered valuable but also regulate their production and distribution.” The concept incorporates cross-national and cross-scalar linkages that affect food waste production, representation of food waste, and politics of food waste. Approaching FLW from this perspective allows us to consider the role of institutions, conventions, and practices in food waste production. Researchers such as Gille (2013), O'Brien (2012), and Krzywoszynska (2012) have examined the role of institutions and social structures to ask essential questions about value, governance, and power in waste production. However, such analysis has yet to be extended to specific contexts in the Global South.

Taken together, these three approaches are used in this article as complementary analytical lenses rather than as a single unified theory. Institutional arrangements help identify the formal and informal rules through which export avocado production and exchange are organized, including contracts, association by-laws, cooperative rules, certification systems, quality standards, and pricing mechanisms. Social practice theory allows us to examine how these arrangements are enacted in everyday interactions among farmers, farmer groups, exporters, field officers, and packhouse actors, particularly through practices of harvesting, grading, side-selling, sanctioning, delaying, and rejecting produce. Food waste regime thinking situates these rules and practices within broader market-oriented and globalized value chain dynamics, where actors seek to manage uncertainty, protect value, and shift risk onto others. Together, these perspectives make it possible to analyze FLW as a material outcome of social and institutional relations: how power, risk, value, and responsibility are organized across the value chain. This analytical positioning guides the empirical sections that follow by examining how different selling arrangements produce distinct forms of vulnerability, farmer response, and FLW generation.

3 The rise of export-oriented horticulture in Tanzania

The shift to export-oriented horticulture production in Tanzania must be understood against the backdrop of broader agriculture policy shifts. The post-independence socialist Ujamaa era (1967-mid-1980s) saw a period in which agriculture was heavily regulated through agricultural marketing boards, farmers’ cooperatives, and state farms, with the government effectively controlling production and marketing systems. However, post-Ujamaa, the country underwent structural adjustment and market liberalization that opened up agriculture to private and foreign investment (Coulson, 2013; Cooksey, 2011a, b). The economic liberalization, the crisis in the coffee industry in the 1990s, and favorable climatic conditions, coupled with policies¹ aimed at attracting foreign investment together stimulated the development of the cut flowers export industry, spices, and later packaged vegetables (especially French beans and peas) and fruits – avocados and passion fruit destined for the European supermarket chains (De Blasis, 2020; Mkuna, 2022).

Barrett et al. (1999) explain that prior to the 1990s, fresh horticulture trade in Eastern Africa occurred through “arm’s length market relationships,” where, for example, exporters purchased produce at the farmgate or the domestic wholesale markets and exported to Europe, including the UK. In the post-1990s, market relations became more coordinated, with retailers and supermarkets working closely with exporters and UK importers (Ajwang, 2020; Gereffi, 2005). Ajwang (2020) argues that this period also saw an expanded adoption of contracts in export value chains, with UK retailers predominantly depending on a small number of importers and exporters to ensure monitoring and compliance with food safety standards. Many empirical studies on contract farming arrangements have demonstrated that supermarkets and retailers in Europe who do not have direct investments in the production sites control the production process through intermediaries – importers and exporters, who ensure that compliance with standards, quality, scale and volume of procurements and presentation are met (Ajwang, 2020; Gramzow et al., 2018; Okello et al., 2011; Boselie and van de Kop, 2005; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). Such arrangements specify who controls harvesting decisions, how quality is defined, how pricing is determined, and who bears the consequences when produce is rejected.

The Tanzanian government and donor agencies have played a direct role in shaping the direction and growth of the export horticulture industry. Within the policy arena, policies designed to attract private and foreign capital and promote capitalist farming include land leases, tax incentives, and the establishment of agricultural corridors (Chung, 2024; Ndimbo and Haulle, 2024; Sulle, 2017). Importantly, the Horticultural Development Strategy (HDS) 2012–2021, promoted the establishment of ‘horticultural corridors’ and ‘export processing zones’, which have resulted in the development of export-production companies with investment in commercial farms, cold-chains and packhouses. Within this context, development agencies and the Tanzania Horticultural Association (TAHA) have provided support and encouraged the adoption of contract farming arrangements, as mechanisms for smallholder inclusion and rural transformation (URT, 2024). Gramzow et al. (2018) have observed that registered farmer organizations and contract farming are the two most common approaches that have been used to integrate smallholder farmers into agricultural value chains in Tanzania. For instance, USAID’s Smallholder Horticulture Out-grower Promotion (SHOP) program, which was implemented from the early to mid-2010s, linked smallholders with exporters through multi-million-dollar investments. The donor-backed projects prioritized crops such as French beans, peas, avocados, and passion fruit, which had clear export markets (De Blasis, 2026).

Within this context, the production of export avocado gained momentum. In Tanzania, there are two distinct avocado production systems and value chains - domestic and export supply chains, with different cultivars and distribution systems (Cromwell, 2022). First introduced by German missionaries in the early 1890s as a food crop and to provide shade for coffee farms, commercial production did not start until 2007 with private investment and donor support (Cromwell et al., 2025; Mruma, 2013). As noted by Cromwell et al. (2025), commercial avocado production did not receive any substantial research and support during the colonial era or after independence, which hindered the industry’s development. Mwakalinga (2014) reported that the first attempt to introduce commercial export varieties occurred in the early 1990s with donor support, but uptake was slow due to farmers’ and consumers’ preferences for traditional varieties. The ‘Hass’ variety is the most widely cultivated export variety, although other important commercial varieties like Carmen, Ryan, Pinkerton, and Gem cultivars are produced under special license by a few commercial producers (Cromwell, 2022).

Avocado production has expanded significantly over the past decades, establishing itself as a promising sector within the country’s horticulture exports. The country produces around 190,000 tonnes of avocados annually and is ranked 19th globally in terms of export (Tanzania Trade Development Authority, 2019). Recent data from the International Trade Center (ITC) indicates that as of 2024, Tanzania accounted for a 1% share of the global avocado market, with an estimated 3,000–4,000 hectares under production. The Tanzanian government has set a national target to increase production from 190,000 to 290,000 tonnes annually by 2025 by promoting avocado production as a key driver for sustainable agricultural transformation under the ‘One Country One Priority Product’ (OCOP) initiative supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2025). Smallholder farmers, often managing orchard sizes of 1–5 acres, account for about 90% of this production, highlighting the crop’s role in supporting rural livelihoods.

Between 2013 and 2022, export volumes increased from 1,393 tonnes to 18,668 tonnes, representing a growth of over 1,340% (International Trade Centre – ITC, 2025), and export earnings also rose from just 0.42 million USD in 2011 to over 20 million USD in 2022 (Figure 1). Although export volume dipped in 2020 compared to 2019 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an upward trend in export volumes (Figure 1). Earnings from avocado export are projected to reach 714 million USD by 2030 (URT, 2024). In terms of export destination, the EU is the largest market for Tanzanian avocados, with significant growth in the UK, Asia (China and India), the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and South African markets. The government and exporters are particularly exploring the Asian markets due to fewer restrictions on phytosanitary and quality standards and to diversify the export market (Cromwell et al., 2025).

Figure 1

4 Materials and methods

4.1 Methodological approach

To understand the institutional arrangements and the social relations that shape FLW generation within the avocado value chain, we adopted a “follow-the- thing” approach proposed by Cook (2004, 2006). The follow-the-thing approach allowed us to follow the avocados from the farm to the packhouse, engaging with diverse stakeholders and actors along the value chain (Gregson et al., 2010; Hulme, 2017). In following the avocado, we aimed to understand how institutional arrangements and social relations in the trading of avocados lead to FLW generation and use the avocado to tell stories of ‘everything in and around it’ (Cook, 2006; Crang, 2008; Crang et al., 2003). As Harvey (2001, p. 442) argues, commodities “obscure the intricate geography of production and the myriads of social relationships embedded in the production system.

We combined the follow-the-thing approach with go-along participant observation. The go-along is a focused ethnographic observation method in which the researcher accompanies participants during their routine activities while observing practices and eliciting situated accounts. This method actively explores “participants’ stream of experiences and practices as they move through, and interact with, their physical and social environment” (Kusenbach, 2003, p. 463). The combined approach allowed different actors and stakeholders who engaged with the avocado through its journey (from production to processing factory) to be part of the research participants, thereby giving a richer contextual and nuanced understanding of how FLW production occurs in the avocado supply chain.

Our methodological approach offered several analytical advantages. Firstly, it enabled us to examine harvesting, pricing, grading, and grading practices as they unfolded in real time on the farm, collection centers, and in the packhouses. This allowed us to capture not only reported practices but also the real-time negotiation of value, quality, and risk as they unfolded, enabling close attention to the interaction between material conditions, social relations, and decision-making. This is critical for understanding and capturing how FLW is produced in practice. Secondly, it allowed us to capture how different institutional arrangements underpin the trading relations by identifying actors’ strategies for risk allocation and how power asymmetries operate in the institutional arrangements to produce FLW. Thirdly, the study design allowed for multiple forms of data collection - in-depth interviews, participant observation, and informal conversations, which aided triangulation of findings and a comprehensive understanding of the differences and inconsistencies in participants’ accounts (Creswell, 2013).

4.2 Data collection

We conducted the research across several sites in the Northern Highlands (NH) and Southern Highlands (SH) of Tanzania (Supplementary Table 1) (Marcus, 1995). We collected data in 6 districts and 14 wards across four regions – Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions in NH, and Mbeya and Njombe regions in SH. Supplementary Figures 1, 2 further show the location of the study sites in the NH and SH. These sites were selected because of their significant contribution to the export avocado industry, in terms of volume of production and export. As major production hubs, these sites enabled us to engage with key actors and stakeholders involved in the supply chain. Conducting data collection in the NH and SH enabled comparison across production sites, the social relations, and the institutional arrangements operating in these production regions. Field work was conducted between 2018 and 2022 over several extended and short visits and follow-up conversations with key informants in 2024.

Initial recruitment of participants was through key local gatekeepers (for example, Village and Ward Chairman, field officers, and out-grower groups), with subsequent participants recruited through snowball sampling. In addition, purposive sampling was used to ensure inclusion of key actors occupying unique roles within the avocado value chain (e.g., farmers, exporters, cooperative/farmer group leaders). The sample presented in Table 1, therefore, reflects an effort to capture the diversity of roles and relationships within the export avocado value chain, including small-scale, medium scale as well as large-scale farmers, intermediaries, and buyers. While this approach allows for rich contextual insights, it may potentially underrepresent actors who are less connected within local networks, and this limitation is acknowledged in interpreting the findings.

4.2.1 In-depth interviews and go-along observations

A total of 114 in-depth interviews were conducted with different stakeholders across the four regions. Sixty-five (65) in-depth interviews were conducted with farmers, consisting of 57 smallholders, 4 large-scale farmers, and 4 export company farms. The majority of the smallholders (43) in this study owned less than 100 trees and grew avocado as part of their mixed cropping subsistence farming systems, with average farm size around 0.5–2.5 acres. Of the 114 participants, 97 were males compared to only 17 females across the supply chain. Historically, men tend to dominate cash crop production, and this is intrinsically linked to the land tenure system, where men own the land and therefore handle all farming contract issues, and the production system is heavily gendered (Cromwell, 2022; Juma et al., 2019). Most of the female farmers involved in the study were family heads (female-headed families). Notwithstanding, women tend to be engaged in the lower-paid segments of the horticulture value chains (De Blasis, 2020). Other stakeholders interviewed included farm managers, field officers, out-grower managers, farmer groups, export managers, packhouse supervisors, and government officials (Table 1). The in-depth interviews with different actors helped to gain insight into the institutional arrangements, rules, norms, practices, standards, certifications, and social relations embedded within the export avocado supply chain, and how these interact and intersect to produce FLW.

We conducted 15 (days) go-along events with farmers (small-scale and commercial farmers), field officers, and packhouse supervisors and managers focused on the practices of harvesting and selling, sorting and grading at the farmgate and packhouse (see Table 1). This allowed for direct observations and informal conversations with participants, while actively participating in the activities and events as they unfolded. This allowed for a critical understanding of how harvesting activities are organized – harvesting schedules, delivery of harvesting materials, sorting and grading, and the rules and norms that govern harvesting processes, quality, the reject sharing system, transportation, and handling and processing of fruits. Critically, the methodological approach afforded a nuanced understanding of the different social relations between farmers, field officers, and exporters - from contract arrangements, quality standards, and how they are applied, as well as the strategies used to reduce risks.

4.3 Data analysis

All interviews, including informal conversations during go-along and follow-ups, were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Using practice framing, the interview data were coded thematically using an inductive approach, in which themes were allowed to emerge through careful reading of data (Charmaz, 2014). This approach ensured that nuanced and context-specific insights could be captured (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Elliott-Mainwaring, 2021). Interview transcripts, field notes, and go-along observation records were coded in multiple stages in NVivo 12. All transcribed materials were coded until a point of saturation was reached, when new codes ceased to emerge through continued analysis. Initial open coding focused on identifying recurrent practices and interactions across the supply chain, particularly moments of negotiation and selling practices, quality assessment, enforcement of rules, standards, and norms regarding harvesting, handling, and processing, and grading. These were then grouped into higher-order analytical categories, including governance arrangement and mode of selling relations, risk distribution, power asymmetries, and food loss and waste outcomes.

In a second stage, these categories were examined comparatively across actors and sites to identify patterned ways in which risk was distributed and how power asymmetries manifest in the governance arrangements and social relations to structure food loss and waste production. Throughout the analysis, particular attention was paid to the interaction between institutional arrangements and actors’ risk avoidance practices. This allowed us to move beyond descriptive accounts of FLW toward an explanation of how FLW is systematically produced and unevenly borne within the supply chain. Our analytic approach was to provide a ‘thick description’ by illustrating everyday experiences of avocado waste generation with textured accounts drawn from multiple voices, locations, and scales (Saldana, 2016).

5 Results

5.1 Governance arrangements and modes of selling relations

Export-oriented production systems in the global South are structured and controlled through governance mechanisms that ensure that farmers and exporters meet quality and safety standards and certification requirements (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Busch, 2000). Through interviews, go-along observations, and document analysis, we found that governance arrangements shape the mode of selling relations between exporters and farmers. We identified four modes of selling relations through which farmers sell their produce (Figure 2):

• Contracted out-grower selling relations.

• Direct selling relations between non-contracted farmer groups (association or cooperative) and exporters.

• Mediated selling relations through farmer groups – where the cooperative/ association acts as the marketing agent.

• Spot buying relations and side-selling – where the farmer sells directly to the exporter/broker.

Figure 2

Some of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of different selling modes are presented in Supplementary Table 2.

5.1.1 Mode 1: contracted out-grower selling relations

We identified two types of selling relations in contracted-out-grower arrangements. In the first type of contracted out-grower arrangement, the farmer is part of an out-grower scheme; the exporter signs a contract with the association, which in turn signs a contract with individual farmers. This form of arrangement is predominantly in the NH. In the second type of contracted out-grower selling relation, the exporter signs contracts with individual farmers in their out-grower scheme. In both types of contracted-out-growers schemes, the exporter manages and owns the Global GAP certification. In this mode, the exporters specify the production, harvesting, and handling protocols, and farmers must adhere to production, harvesting, and handling guidelines and keep records to meet contractual obligations.

We observed that at some of the production sites, some farmers did not have access to a physical copy of their contracts and were not engaged in the contract negotiations. Often, contract terms are set by the exporters, giving rise to control, a lack of transparency, and inequalities in the relationship. Weakness in leadership and a lack of capacity among farmer groups mean that they cannot operate independently – i.e., managing and monitoring compliance, including the cost of certification. While farmers acknowledge the benefits of having a contract: ready market access, security, and a guarantee to sell directly to a company, they face severe consequences if they fail to follow the rules and guidelines for production and marketing:

“As a group, we must not sell [our fruits] to anyone else apart from the company [.]. One thing that most farmers fear is [that] if you breach the contract with the company, you cannot get another buyer just to come and buy your fruits as an [individual] farmer” [Lead farmer; PTK_EF_0077].

In the SH, contractual relations are based on input supply, where the exporter provides loan and extension services to the farmer, and the farmer is required to sell to the exporter, with the cost of the loan deducted from the sale after harvest.

5.1.2 Mode 2: direct selling between non-contracted farmer groups and buyers

The second mode of governance arrangement involves members of non-contracted farmer groups selling directly to exporters approved by the group. This arrangement was predominantly in the SH. Participants noted that unfair treatment of farmers, lower prices, and conflict within the only exporter company that managed the contracted out-grower arrangement in the early years (2009–2016) of export avocado production led to the dissolution of the scheme in 2017. This resulted in farmers self-organizing into groups or cooperatives. An example is Mbeya Avocado Farmers Association (MBEAFA), which operates at the regional level with several smaller farmer groups as its members. The association has its own rules and conditions for membership and determines how members sell their avocados as expressed by the leadership:

“As an association we ask that our members should sell their produce to the companies specified by the association. Members are linked to the buyers with a good price. For example, last farming season, Kuza Africa offered 1,400 TZS per kilogram, and Kuza gives loans to the farmers. Rungwe Avoacdo Company offered 1,450 TZS per kilogram but did not provide loans. So, we asked members to sell to Kuza Africa” [PTSH_MBEAFA].

In this selling relation, concrete transactions are not agreed upon in advance, so the farmer remains flexible in their marketing decisions, thereby reducing risks usually associated with contractual relations (see Supplementary Table 2).

The downside of this governance arrangement is the membership fee and mandatory sales deductions. Members pay 110,000 TZS (42.00 USD), consisting of entrance fees (10,000 TZS) and five shares (100,000 TZS). There are also mandatory deductions of between 3-6% (of the value) per kg of avocado sold by the farmer.

5.1.3 Mode 3: mediated selling relations through farmer groups

The third governance arrangement involves a farmer group (co-operative or association) acting as the marketing agent and / or as the buyer for its members. This arrangement is normally through Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies (AMCOS). AMCOS are among the non-financial co-operatives that engage in the purchase of agricultural input supplies and marketing of members’ produce, thereby providing a direct selling relationship between the farmer group and its members (Shirima, 2022). Examples of AMCOS include Rungwe Avocado Growers Association (UWAMARU) and Njombe Avocado Farmers Network (NAFN), both operates in the SH.

We found that in this selling relation, there are shared risks, in terms of marketing produce and increased market access and control over the harvesting decisions, compared to modes 1 and 2 selling relations (see Supplementary Table 2). However, critical decisions on buyers, price negotiations, and selling decisions are taken by the group leadership. The farmer has no control over the choice of buyer or over price decisions. As a condition for membership, farmers sign an agreement to sell their products through the co-operative, as explained by the group’s leadership:

“Our mode of operation as cooperative is that when a buyer comes, we ask how many tonnes the buyer wants to buy. For example, if the buyer wants to buy 20 tonnes, we negotiate the price and the buyer then must pay the total amount into the association bank account. Only when payment has been made can we take the buyer to the farmers, and the buyer is allowed to harvest only the agreed quantity. If the farmers are supposed to be paid 1,500 TZS per 1 kg, the cooperative pays the farmer 1,450 TZS per 1 kg and the cooperative keeps 50 TZS for the management of the association and undertaking other development activities” [PTSH_UWAMARU_0232].

“A member must sell his/her produce via the association. It is the responsibility of the association to look for the market, and the member will be paid by the association. The association retains 100 TZS for each kilogram of avocado sold by the member. For instance, this year [2020] the price of one kilogram is 1,600 TZS, the farmer is paid 1,500 TZS, and buyer pays 100 TZS to the association” [PTSH_NAFN].

For the selling transaction to occur, the exporter must first establish contact with the association’s leadership and indicate the quantity they want to buy. Once the price has been agreed, the leadership then determines which farmers the buyer can harvest from. There is a high dependency on cooperative leadership to find buyers, and there is a lack of flexibility among members in choosing a buyer. In addition, the lack of financial resources and expertise limits cooperatives in providing training, inputs, and other farm services to members compared to farmers in governance arrangement modes 1 and 2 (see Supplementary Table 2). For instance, UWAMARU depends on external technical support to provide training and advice for its members.

5.1.4 Mode 4: spot selling relations and ‘side-selling’

In spot selling arrangements, no relationship exists between farmers and the exporter or buyer – prices are negotiated on the spot and fruits harvested, although sometimes it may involve an informal arrangement with repeated transactions where some trust has been established. This mode of selling is mainly used by independent farmers – farmers that do not belong to any out-grower scheme or farmer group. In this case, the farmer is free to sell to any exporter offering higher prices, and there can be multiple transactions with different buyers. We found that farmers engaged in modes 1, 2, or 3 sometimes sell to buyers outside their contractual agreements or approved buyers - characterized as ‘side-selling’. Farmers engage in side-selling relations to create value, especially through higher prices and prompt payment (Supplementary Table 2), as expressed by some farmers:

“This year [in April 2020], I first sold some of my fruits to KUZA Africa limited, who bought the fruits for a low price; but when the Kenyans came, they offered a better price, so I sold the rest of the fruit to them. However, the problem with the Kenyan buyers is that they left me a lot of fruits on the trees, which I sold to the trader(s)(Wasaketera) from the local market in Kiwira for a very low price” [Male, smallholder, PTSH_EF_0215].

Side-selling is viewed as a significant challenge to the sustainability of the industry, as expressed by a senior manager of Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT):

“These Kenyan briefcase buyers [brokers], they come to the farmers and just adding, 100, 150, or 200 TZS to the price being offered by the export companies. For these farmers, adding just 50 TZS to the price adds up for them. So, that is the challenge for the industry. As you might have been told, here in Rungwe, the farmers have a contract with Rungwe Avocado Company and other exporters like LIMA Kwanza, KUZA Africa, but farmers sell to these briefcase buyers” […] [Male, PTSH_SAGCOT_0218].

5.2 Power asymmetries and risk distribution within institutional arrangements

Institutional arrangements do not simply structure how farmers are integrated into export-oriented production systems; they are also critical sites through which power is exercised. Power often operates through the relational and socially embedded dynamics of these arrangements, shaping how authority is exercised, negotiated, and contested among actors within the value chain. We found that across selling relation modes 1,2, and 3, farmers who breach contract agreements, or farmer group/cooperatives constitutions and by-laws, which specify the terms set for the growing, harvesting, and selling of fruits, are sanctioned and disciplined. In some parts of the NH production sites, the out-grower scheme was tightly controlled, and members were not allowed to apply artificial fertilizers and chemicals except organic manure. Any violation of the production regime could result in the farmer being withdrawn from contract or from the association. Often group members monitor and report on activities of members if they are not adhering to the production protocols and rules (Cromwell et al., 2025; Gramzow et al., 2018). Critically, unequal power relations mean that the exporters set the terms of the contract with little to no engagement from farmers, and sanctions can result in losses/waste and farmers being removed from the contract (or the farmer group).

For instance, twenty-eight farmers were sanctioned in the 2018–2019 cropping season and removed from the out-grower scheme because they ‘side sold’ their fruits to Kenya brokers. An interesting case was a large-scale farmer (Nko) who owned 42 acres orchard. As an out-grower of a large exporter/producer company, he was frustrated with the contractual arrangement, lack of transparency in pricing mechanisms, delayed payment periods and how grading was done. Discontented by these issues, he decided to breach his contract with the company:

“Before the company came around to assess the fruit maturity and estimate my harvest, I had some Kenyan brokers, who were coming around to convince me to sell to them. I decided to sell to the Kenyans. The price was good, they offered me 1,500 TZS per kg, whereas with the company, the highest price I could get would have been 1,200 TZS per kg. With the brokers, it is down payment before harvest. So, I decided to swallow the bait and face the risk.”

Sanctions within selling relation mode 3, unequal power relations among cooperative members and leadership can lead to undue exercise of power when it comes to selection of farmers from whom buyers can harvest. Such exercise of power can disadvantage smallholders who are less resource endowed. Some farmers reported favoritism in the selection of farmers by cooperative leaders: “If a farmer is not on good terms with the leadership, he or she may not be selected in time for a buyer” [smallholder; PTSH_0235]. Such situations of delayed harvesting can result in over-maturity of fruits. Besides, larger-scale farmers (particularly in NAFN) tend to have more control and influence over harvesting decisions. They may be allocated buyers first and the buyers also prefer buying from medium or large farmers to reduce transaction costs. The larger farmers also have leverage to look for their own buyers leaving smallholders vulnerable: “For us as a big farmer, we can look for a buyer ourselves, but we are still required to inform the association about the buyer we are dealing with” [member of NAFN; PTSH_EF_0185].

Some large-scale farmers have a cluster of smallholders that they have influence over. For example, one of the research participants worked with a cluster of 20 smallholders who were loyal to them, enabling the participant to exert control over how these farmers sold their fruits. This was observed by a technical manager of an export company:

“The problem is that most of the smallholders got free seedlings from innovator farmers [the largescale farmer], each innovator farmer has a group of smallholders, so he has got a voice for them - they tell the farmers, wait until I give you a company which is coming to buy your fruits. There are only a few farmers who can decide on their own what they want to do” [Manager, export company; PTSH_TMGR_0220].

Moreover, across all four modes of selling relations, farmers have very little control over harvesting decisions. Although farmers in non-contracted farmer groups and spot selling relations have some freedom to sell to a buyer of their choice (Supplementary Table 2), the harvesting decisions rest with exporters/buyers. Our findings show that exporters decisions to harvest depend on evaluating the interactions of several factors – market prices, best market window, profitability and risks: as explained by a manager of a leading export-producer company:

“We do not want to harvest when everybody [other avocado producing countries] else is harvesting; we know we are just going to be sinking money. We have our market window - around April to mid-June, and from August onwards, which we are focusing on. That is our opportunity window; if we miss it, we will not make money[…]. If we want to get the fruits to the market after July, we must harvest in June, when the trees are also flowering, and fruits would be overmatured. So, that is the dynamics of things, finding compromises is challenging” [Technical manager; PTSH_TMGR_0207].

This is particularly challenging for farmers in contractual relationships, as they can only harvest their produce based on the exporter’s harvesting schedule. In cases where the exporter is also a producer, they prioritise harvesting from their farms in response to market conditions, thereby significantly disadvantaging contracted farmers.

Contemporary horticultural value chains are buyer-driven, and exporters are pressured to meet large retailers and importers strict private standards, and just-in-time delivery schedules, often shift compliance costs and risks downstream to farmers (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Minten et al., 2009; Ponte, 2019). Production and marketing risks are shifted down to growers who are less resourced to deal with risks. For instance, the contracted out-grower scheme in the NH, with over 2000 smallholders, are not allowed to apply any artificial fertilizers and pesticides by the exporter as expressed by the farmer:

“Since I planted these avocados, I have never used artificial fertilizers and chemicals; The company has instructed us not to use it; we are only to use animal manure. For the animal manure, its origin is grass, so it is good.” [Female, smallholder, PTK_EF_0088].

Such contractual restriction increases farmers’ risks of crop failure and losses due to pest infestations and damage which affect fruit quality (size, shape, and appearance). While smallholders’ production is organic by default, farmers are not paid a premium price (Cromwell et al., 2025).

Exporters also shield themselves from market risks through opaque contracts and market information asymmetries. Farmers do not have access to price information and have no power in price negotiations. Farmers in the NH complained about lack of transparency in contract as farmers are not engaged in contract negotiations, price mechanism and farmers do not know the price for their fruits at the time of selling as exemplified in the sentiments by a medium-scale farmer and a lead farmer (smallholder):

“You see, so you can never know the price of avocados […]; the market in Europe determines the price. So, you sell your avocados to the company, and you still do not know the price. When the company finishes processing and selling all the avocados in Europe, the company will tell you that the price for this period is this Shillings, so, this is what you get. That is one of the contract terms; it is a challenge to the farmers’ because you are not sure what price you are getting” [Male, medium-scale farmer; PTK_EF_0169].

“[…] The company sells the avocados at the international market, deducts all the costs, and then we share the profits; between us the farmers and the company” [Male, Smallholder, Lead farmer; PTK_ELF_0073].

Smallholders are paid 50% of the profit as the final price after cost deductions, while large-scale commercial producers are paid 70% of the profit as the final price. An interview with one of the largest contracted commercial out-growers showed that while larger commercial farmers may have access to market price and cost information associated with exporting and marketing their produce by the exporter, smallholders do not have access to price and cost deductions information, which creates mistrust among farmers who view the behavior of the exporter as opportunistic. Farmers, especially in NH, complained of delayed payment - farmers are paid between 3 and 5 months after harvest, thus often shift market risks to farmers.

Similarly, in the SH, between 2011 and 2017, the only exporter in a contracted selling relation initially controlled price information and extracted maximum value by paying farmers lower prices to discourage them from abandoning tea production, as the same company owned the largest tea processing factory in the production area. However, since 2018, intervention from the local government and competition from new avocado processors and exporters have resulted in the establishment of a minimum price mechanism – At the start of the harvesting season, all the exporters and the local government will meet and agree on the minimum price for the season. Notwithstanding the effort by government officials to establish a minimum price in the SH, exporters and processors still have the bargaining power due to information asymmetry (Poku et al., 2018; Mazwi, 2020).

5.3 Food loss and waste outcomes

In this section, we examine how social relations, power asymmetries, and risk burdens within the institutional arrangements lead to FLW outcomes. Across the four modes of selling relations, our findings show new ways of how FLW occur in governance arrangements as actors within the value chain use the power to distribute risks, but also adopt risk avoidance strategies.

5.3.1 FLW generations through sanctions

We found that any contractual breaches in both contracted-out-grower schemes and associations/cooperatives resulted in discipline and sanctions, which have direct implications for FLW generation. For instance, in 2016/2017, twenty-eight farmers in a contracted out-grower scheme in the NH were sanctioned and removed from the out-grower association because they ‘side sold’ their fruits to Kenyan brokers (buyers). The farmers faced significant losses and waste since they could not sell their fruits to the only exporter in the subsequent years. During the fieldwork and the entire period of this research (2018–2021), several cases of losses and waste were reported by farmers because of contract sanctions. An interesting case is a large-scale farmer, Nko, who owned 42 acres of Hass avocado orchard and lost 4 tonnes due to contract sanctions in 2019. As an out-grower of a large exporter-producer company, he was frustrated with the contractual arrangement, lack of transparency in the pricing mechanism, delayed payment, and how grading is done at the packhouse. Discontented by these issues, he decided to breach his contract with the company:

“Before the company came around to assess the fruit maturity and estimate my harvest, I had some Kenyans brokers[buyers], who were coming around to convince me to sell to them. I also needed money for urgent medical operation before the harvest period. So, I decided to sell to the Kenyans, since the company refused to advance me the money [….]. The price was good, they offered me 1,500 TZS [0.56 USD] per kg, whereas with the company, the highest price I could get would have been 1,200 TZS [0.45 USD] per kg. The good thing is that with the brokers, it is down payment before they harvest. I wanted this money! So, I decided to swallow the baits and face the conditions [that comes with breaching the] contract. Because, if you sell your fruits to another buyer, they remove you from their list [contract]. I said OK, let it come, I will bear that risk.”

Nko sold 9 tonnes to the brokers (in April 2019), but the brokers only picked mature and big fruits, leaving him with an estimated 4 tonnes of fruit on the trees. The brokers promised to come back in June to harvest the remaining fruits but did not turn up and the company he has contract with would not harvest the remaining fruits because of contract sanctions resulting in losses and waste generation as Nko could not sell the remaining fruits in the domestic fruits market because domestic consumers prefers the local avocado varieties over the main export variety (Cromwell, 2022; Cromwell et al., 2025; Mwakalinga, 2014).

The exercise of power and control over the selling relations by the companies and farmer groups through sanctions creates risks and vulnerabilities for farmers. Smallholders with limited social capital deem it “safe” to remain in unfavorable contracts to avoid losses, as expressed succinctly by a 65-years-old retired teacher and farmer:

“[…] But the brokers from Kenya, if they will be coming every year, that would be good; but if they come this year, they do not show up the following year. Where are you going to sell your crop? That is why we find it safe for the time being to sell to the company. Otherwise, we would sell to brokers, but if you do it, you are in big trouble” [smallholder; PTK_EF_0102].

5.3.2 FLW generations through spot-selling

Farmers who are not members of associations/cooperatives groups and contracted out-grower schemes sell their fruits through spot selling (mode 4). These independent farmers seek to create value through higher prices and prompt payment as they are free to sell to any buyer offering a good price. However, spot-selling provides an avenue for losses and waste generation due to the selective harvesting practices and behavior of the buyers (brokers) as expressed by a smallholder:

“I sold my fruits to the Kenyans [brokers], but they only picked the good fruits; I was left with a lot of rejects, which I sold to a local trader. But this was a loss to me because the local trader bought the rejects at a very low price. The trader did not even measure the fruits; she just looked at the heap of fruits and said I would pay you this amount” [Smallholder, PTSH_EF_0177].

Farmers in modes 1, 2, and 3 sometimes side-sell to buyers outside those that they have a contractual agreement with, or buyers approved by the farmer group leadership to create value for their product. But also, they side-sell as a way of protest or resistance to unfair treatment in contractual relations or dealings within cooperatives and associations.

Selective harvesting practices by Kenyan buyers to extract value from farmers present a critical challenge to farmers regarding losses. Sometimes, losses can be as high as 70% of the total harvest, as explained by a senior manager of an export buying company: “The problem we face here is the Kenyan brokers, they just buy from the farmers, and they are very selective - they select the best fruits and leave almost 70% of the fruits to the farmers to look for their own local market” [PTSH_TMGR_0220].

Lack of monitoring of the activities of buyers (including Kenyan brokers), especially in selling relation mode 3, where the association leadership mediates the selling process, can lead to high levels of losses at the farm. In some cases, buyers only harvest a small percentage of the total harvest or reject the whole crop, leading to losses:

“Last year [2019], the association (NAFN) sent a company to our village, the company supplied us with crates to harvest our fruits, I harvested 62 crates [approximately 1.24 tonnes], but when the buyer came back to weigh the fruits, they rejected all fruits, not only my fruits but other farmers in the village as well” [smallholder farmer; PTSH_EF_ 031].

The unscrupulous activities of brokers through spot buying and side-selling from farmers can cause significant downstream losses (in the importing countries) due to the harvesting of immature fruits, when prices are high in global markets. This practice threatens the long-term sustainability of the industry, in terms of quality and reputational risk for established exporters, as expressed in the quote below by an MD of a large producer and exporter company:

“[…] The problem with the Kenyan brokers is that they harvest the fruits too early to get higher prices in the international market. The practice destroys the “name” [Tanzania avocado brand], which is well sought after in the international market. I mean, the last market report, which came out last week [April 2019], did mention that they have started to receive fruits from Tanzania, and most of them are immature, which creates a bad image for the brand” [Director, PTK_MD_0151].

Narratives from the farmers, exporters and stakeholders revealed that although side-selling may generate some value for farmers, the practice leads to rejections, causing losses and waste generation, loss of trust and contract breaches, affect exporters’ volume projections with negative effects on the supply chain in terms of meeting importers demands, and create reputation issues (regarding fruit quality) which threatens the long-term sustainability of the industry.

5.3.3 FLW generation arising from risk distribution

Exporters evaluate the interaction of several risk factors to make harvesting decisions, often shifting market risk to those who are less powerful in the value chain. Farmers’ high dependence on exporters and buyers’ harvesting decision means that they cannot shield themselves from market risks. The best market window for Tanzania avocados to Europe (which is the largest market) is around April to mid- June, and from August onwards, as there will be fewer fruits from Latin America on the market. To get the fruits to the market in the ‘right window’ means exporters must harvest either when the fruits are immature or over-mature, resulting in food losses and waste. This conundrum sometimes requires evaluating risks and weighing different consequences for food losses and waste production at the farm, processing facility, and import markets.

The interaction between exporters’ harvesting decisions, market forces and materiality of the avocado lead to FLW generation but with farmers bearing the burden of losses. For instance, in 2018, a large commercial farmer and indeed smallholders in the NH were faced with a significant loss due to the exporter’s decision to delay harvesting because of low prices in the European market. In the case of the commercial farmer, because the farm is set in a lowland, the fruit reaches optimal maturity in late April and is picked over two months (late April – June). However, the exporter did not pick the fruits until between July and August, in anticipation of better prices, which caused huge losses. In one of our ‘go-along’ harvesting observations with the commercial farmer in July 2018, 1,176 Kg (42%) out of a total of 2,800 Kg of fruit harvested were rejected due to over-maturity and blackening of the fruits. According to the farm manager, if the fruits were picked at the optimal harvesting time, the rejections at the packhouse would be between 15% and 17%. The farm manager asserted that ‘delaying the harvest alone’ resulted in over 2 tonnes of rejections on the farm in addition to the over 72 tonnes of rejections at the packhouse, as the farm exported over 240 tonnes of quality fruits in the 2018–2019 crop year.

The same is true for smallholder farmers. For example, one of the smallholders we followed during the fieldwork lost all her crop in that year due to over-maturity of the fruits. Her fruit was picked in August instead of late April, resulting in total rejection of 750 Kg harvested from her 5-acre farm, leading to a loss of income:

“I got very little money; the price was very low. For a whole year, you get 300,000 TZS (approx. 112 USD). Is it worth the trouble? …because that amount is just two months’ salary for my farm labourer, not even money for myself. It does not pay; it is very discouraging!” [PTK_EF_0118–0120/0137].

Furthermore, farmers who depend on external buyers – especially Kenyan buyers who do not have a processing factory in Tanzania - create uncertainty and risks for farmers, especially during a bumper harvest, and when the harvesting season in Tanzania coincides with the harvesting season in Kenya. In 2018, due to a bumper harvest, brokers from Kenya did not buy from Tanzania (especially the Njombe region), leading to losses and waste for most farmers as they struggled to find buyers.

5.3.4 FLW generation through rejection sharing system and farmers’ risk avoidance strategy

We found that in a contracted out-grower scheme operating in the NH, produce from all smallholders in the scheme is aggregated together when processing the fruits at the packhouse, and the rejections are shared among the farmers proportionally based on the individual farmgate weight (volume) of their harvest. At the farm level, the farmer’s harvest is weighed and the volume recorded, but the farmer is only paid the final weight of exportable fruits after processing (see Table 2). Interviews with farmers and analysis of harvesting and payments records revealed inequalities and exploitation in the ways rejections are allocated. A farmer with higher production is allocated a higher percentage of rejections based on their farmgate weight (kg), irrespective of the quality of fruits from their farm (as can be seen in the case of farmers E, G, H, and I -Table 2), as explained by farmer B (Table 2):

“Sometimes you can be careful during harvesting, but other farmers may not be careful and bring many rejects. Maybe you have a tiny [number] of rejects, but the company does not care about that; usually, all the rejects are added together and shared among the farmers according to the volume [Kg] the farmer sells to the company. If you have sold a lot of kilos, it means you will have a lot of rejects” [Farmer B; PTK_EF_0077].

For instance, during a harvesting observation with farmer I, he harvested 2,200 kg, and the fruits were of high quality due to the farm location (Highlands) and good agronomic practices. However, the farmer received the highest volume of rejections (800 kg) among the group of farmers in the village. “This resulted in the farmer losing 550,400 TZS [approx. 237 USD] in income” [smallholder, PTK_EF_0158]. Besides, he could not access the rejected fruits at the packhouse.

Farmers’ responses to this may lead to further generations of FLW as they seek to reduce their share of rejections at the packhouse. Some farmers increase their farmgate weight by harvesting immature fruits or non-exportable varieties and mixing them with their harvest to compensate for any rejections they might receive from the packhouse. Figure 3 shows samples of immature fruits removed from the harvest during initial sorting at the farmgate at one of our harvesting observation events in NH. On another occasion, during a packhouse observation event, 280 kg of non-exportable variety were pulled from the packing line.

Figure 3

We observed that the practices of harvesting immature and non-exportable fruits were prevalent among farmers in Highland areas compared to farmers located in the Midlands and Lowlands areas, as expressed by a field officer:“This year [2019] a lot of the rejects were due to immature fruits [off-season fruits] mainly fruits from Tarakea, Ushiri and highlands areas.” [PTK_FO_0129]. Farmers in theHighlands generally produce good quality fruits with fewer rejections due to the favorable climatic conditions than farmers in the Midlands and Lowlands. Therefore, they feel disadvantaged by the inequitable rejection system as they bear the burden of rejection from other farmers.

Moreover, the lack of transparency in the rejection system exacerbates the problem. The lack of farmers’ presence or of a representative during processing and grading at the packhouse means they cannot verify the veracity of the actual rejections from their harvest, as shown by an interview with a smallholder farmer: In 2018, the farmer harvested 1.5 tonnes after initial sorting at the farmgate. After visiting the packhouse, he was shown a rejection of 150 Kg. However, when he received his payment after three months, he was paid an equivalent of 750 kg, which means 50% of the fruits were rejected. His account was corroborated by a conversation with a key informant:

“The rejection sharing system is very confidential – the ‘real or actual reject’ is what remains in the packhouse within the 48 h after grading. But, after 3 or 5 months of grading, when the accountant comes to do the calculations for the company, the rejections increase. If the calculation is done within 48 h of grading, there is no way the rejects will increase. So, the company just tries to balance its figures” [Field Journal, 2018].

Thus, the system that ensures certification and enables smallholders to access the export market effectively shifts market risks to vulnerable farmers.

6 Discussion and conclusion

This study examined how institutional arrangements and social relations between farmers, farmer groups, and exporters shape food loss and waste (FLW) in Tanzania’s export avocado value chain. The findings show that FLW is not simply the result of poor infrastructure, weak technical capacity, or inadequate post-harvest handling. Rather, FLW is produced through the ways export-oriented value chains are organized, governed, and negotiated in practice. Across the four modes of selling relations identified in this study, farmers are exposed to different forms of power asymmetry, risk distribution, and vulnerabilities. These arrangements shape who controls harvesting decisions, who has access to price and market information, who bears the costs of rejection, and who absorbs losses when produce is left unharvested, rejected, downgraded, or wasted.

6.1 FLW as a product of unequal risk distribution and power asymmetry

The nature of social relations of production between farmers, farmer groups, and export companies revealed a complex context of how value creation and value extraction (by both farmers and buyers) lead to losses and waste and inequalities in the export avocado production system. This finding builds on and provides further empirical evidence of the concept of food waste regimes by Gille (2013). In this study, value creation and extraction are inherently linked to risk reduction, whether it is farmers forming cooperatives and associations to create value for the product, or buyers tightly controlling out-grower schemes or price information to extract value.

Several agrarian political scholars have argued that contract farming is a risk avoidance strategy that agribusiness uses to transfer production risks to farmers (Watts, 1994; Little and Watts, 1994; Mazwi, 2020). For example, farmers in NH are exposed to price risks; they sell their products without knowing the exact price. A similar situation has been reported by Mwambi et al. (2016), who provide similar evidence that contracted avocado growers in the Kandara district in Kenya sell with no prior agreements on prices and quantities of the harvest to be delivered to the buying company, exposing smallholders to price and production risks. In this study, contracted out-growers in the NH bear all the costs associated with processing and marketing of their fruits and share profits with the exporter, limiting farmers’ potential earnings and ability to reinvest in production activities. Similar findings have been reported among contracted smallholder avocado farmers in Kenya (Mwambi et al., 2016; Kollenda et al., 2024; Amare et al., 2019) and sugarcane out-growers in Uganda and Malawi (Adams et al., 2019; and Martiniello et al., 2022), where out-growers only received 40% of the total price after cost deductions.

Further, the findings show that unequal power relations and information asymmetry between exporters and farmers limited farmers’ bargaining power and resulted in value extraction through lower prices offered to farmers as reported elsewhere (Martiniello et al., 2022; Karing'u et al., 2021; Ruml and Qaim, 2020; Mazwi, 2020; Ochieng et al., 2017). A recent study of the French bean and peas sector in Tanzania showed that contracted farmers had no say in price determination, with prices unilaterally fixed by exporters (De Blasis, 2026).

In both contracted out-grower schemes and registered farmer associations and cooperatives, any contract or group by-laws breaches resulted in sanctions, often with farmers expelled or removed from the contract or the association. Sanctions lead to unwanted FLW generations not only in the cropping season but also in subsequent seasons following the explosion, especially where there are no alternative markets (De Blasis, 2026). Ruml and Qaim (2020) argue that such sanctions can be problematic when they involve a specialized contracting crop (not easily tradeable locally, as in the case of Hass avocados) and the company enjoys a monopoly; thus, making farmers dependent and vulnerable to the contract (Cai et al., 2008; Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Moreover, power asymmetries within cooperatives and how they are exercised can have unintended consequences for FLW generation. For example, when large farmers are given preferential treatment – allowed to look for their own buyers or allocated buyers first, and less resourced farmers do not receive buyers in time.

Furthermore, the exporter’s decision of when to harvest creates vulnerabilities and dependencies for farmers with increased risks for FLW production. As evidenced in this study, any decision by exporters to harvest the fruit early or delayed harvesting results in losses at the farmgate and packhouse or the importing country due to immature or over-matured fruits, and farmers are not compensated for losses due to exporters’ decisions (De Blasis, 2026; Ajwang, 2020). Thus, farmers are subjected to and dependent on exporters’ risk avoidance decisions, making farmers vulnerable and reliant on the company’s harvesting schedule (Johnson et al., 2019). Growers’ risk vulnerabilities and FLW are heightened in situations where the exporter is also a producer, as they often prioritize harvesting from their farms over out-growers and contract farmers.

6.2 Farmer agency, value creation, and risk-avoidance practices

Although farmers are often positioned as less powerful actors within the export avocado value chain, they are not passive.

Side-selling is an important example of farmer agency. Farmers engage in side-selling to obtain higher prices, prompt payment, immediate cash, or relief from opaque and delayed payment systems. Similar cases have been reported among contracted avocado out-growers in Kenya. Amare et al. (2019) reported a high rate of side selling among contracted out-growers because of the costs of harvesting and transporting avocados to the packhouse. In some cases, side-selling also functions as a form of protest or resistance against perceived unfairness in contractual relations, cooperative mediated selling relations, or exporter behavior. Ajwang (2020) and De Blasis (2026) reported similar motivations in Kenyan fruit and vegetable value chains and Tanzania horticulture, respectively.

However, side-selling can also produce FLW through selective harvesting, contract sanctions, immature fruit harvesting, and loss of trust between farmers and exporters. Brokers and informal buyers may offer higher prices and prompt payment, but they often harvest only premium fruit and leave lower-quality, smaller, or less mature fruit on the tree. Such practices shift rejection and disposal risks back onto farmers. Similar cases have been reported among export avocado farmers in Kenyan (Karing'u et al., 2021; Amare et al., 2019; Johnny et al., 2019; Mwambi et al., 2016); and in other fresh fruits and vegetables production systems in West Africa (Ruml and Qaim, 2020; Poku et al., 2018; Freidberg, 2004).

Side-selling also creates risks for the wider export sector. Exporters and stakeholders argued that when brokers harvest immature fruit to take advantage of high international prices, this can lead to downstream rejection and reputational damage to Tanzania’s export avocado brand. This means that side-selling may provide short-term income gains for farmers while creating longer-term risks for exporters, farmers, and the avocado industry. The practice therefore reflects the contradictory position of farmers within export value chains: they use side-selling as a strategy to reduce their risk burdens, but the strategy can reproduce further FLW and instability of the industry. In Tanzania’s fresh French bean and peas sector, there have been reports of exporters folding due to side-selling (De Blasis, 2026).

These practices demonstrate that FLW is generated not only by exporter decisions or formal governance arrangements, but also by farmers’ responses to those arrangements. Farmers’ risk-avoidance strategies are rational within the conditions they face, yet they can create additional rejection, waste, and mistrust. This complicates interpretations that attribute FLW to poor farmer practice alone. The practices observed in this study are better understood as responses to unequal systems of pricing, grading, rejection allocation, and market access.

6.3 Certification and standards as unintended sites of inequality

The findings also show that certification and quality standards can become unintended sites of inequality and FLW generation. Export standards and certification systems are designed to reduce risks for exporters, importers, and retailers by ensuring quality, traceability, and compliance with market requirements. They can also help smallholders access export markets that would otherwise be difficult to enter. However, the way these systems are implemented can shift risks to farmers and produce new forms of inequality (Gille, 2013).

The rejection-sharing system linked to group certification in the Northern Highlands is a central example. Under this system, produce from multiple smallholders is aggregated at the packhouse, and total rejections are shared among farmers according to the farmgate weight of their harvest. This means that farmers with higher volumes may be allocated higher rejection quantities regardless of the actual quality of their fruit. Farmers who deliver high-quality fruit can therefore be penalized for the poor quality or handling practices of others. The lack of farmer representation during grading and rejection calculation further exacerbates the problem. Farmers are often unable to verify the actual level of rejection from their own harvest once produce reaches the packhouse. Other empirical evidence within contract farming arrangements shows that even where farmers’ produce is not aggregated together, farmers received a large proportion of rejections from the pack house (De Blasis, 2026; Ajwang, 2020; Ruml and Qaim, 2020; Gramzow et al., 2018).

Certification systems, therefore, do not operate as neutral technical instruments. They are embedded in social relations and power asymmetries. While they may reduce risk for downstream actors, they can increase vulnerability for farmers when implemented without transparency, farmer representation, or mechanisms for contesting rejection decisions. In this sense, certification and quality standards may unintentionally stimulate FLW generation by encouraging farmers to engage in compensatory practices, such as harvesting immature fruit or mixing non-exportable varieties into consignments.

7 Conclusion

The findings have important implications for how FLW is understood and addressed in export-oriented food systems. Conventional approaches often frame FLW in low- and middle-income countries as a problem of technical inefficiency, poor infrastructure, inadequate storage, or weak post-harvest handling. While these factors matter, this study shows that they do not fully explain FLW in Tanzania’s export avocado sector. FLW is also produced through institutional arrangements, market logics, power asymmetries, and risk-avoidance strategies.

This means that interventions to reduce FLW must go beyond technical solutions. Improved handling, storage, transport, and processing may reduce some losses, but they will not address the structural conditions that cause farmers to bear disproportionate risks. Reducing FLW requires more transparent pricing systems, clearer and fairer contracts, farmer representation during grading and rejection calculations, more equitable risk-sharing arrangements, and stronger farmer organizations capable of negotiating with exporters.

Overall, this study contributes to critical FLW scholarship by showing that waste is not simply the endpoint of inefficient supply chains. It is a material expression of how value, risk distribution, and power asymmetry are organized within globalized horticultural production. The empirical evidence presented in this study makes significant contributions to the food waste regime concept (Gille, 2013) and critical approaches to researching food loss and waste. It reveals a relationship between farm-level FLW generation and risk burdens and calls for the need to take a social relations approach, giving primacy to institutions and social practice to expose the underlying systemic issues and provide a better understanding of FLW generation, often hidden behind the walls of inadequate technology and infrastructure.

Future research could examine whether similar institutional and relational dynamics shape FLW in other export-oriented horticultural sectors and how these dynamics change over time as markets, certification regimes, and governance arrangements evolve. Such research would deepen understanding of how FLW is structured differently across value chain contexts and how more inclusive governance arrangements might reduce both waste and inequality.

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