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Conversation analysis and sociological theory

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Conversation analysis and sociological theory

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Editorial: Conversation analysis and sociological theory

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Editorial on the Research Topic
Conversation analysis and sociological theory

The relations between Conversation Analysis (CA), sociology, and social theory are complex, often ambiguous, and have sometimes been rather fraught. CA has both institutional and intellectual roots in the discipline of sociology, especially in the United States (Heritage and Stivers, 2013). Institutionally, CA has existed in often uneasy relations with "mainstream" sociology, sometimes being located within designated "sociology" departments, but often existing outside of them, connecting with other disciplines in creative ways. Intellectually speaking, CA has both rebelled against the parent discipline, while also being the inheritor and elaborator of some of its key themes and ideas (Heritage, 2008).

While there might be agreement amongst their practitioners on what CA is, what it does, and what it is meant to achieve, that is not so much the case for the more open and broad terrains of sociology and social theory. Moreover, each of the domains in question has changed in orientation, composition, and academic location since CA first came into existence in the late 1960s. While initially a child of sociology, as CA has matured and extended its substantive and methodological reach, it has become a large intellectual domain in its own right, with inputs from, and relevance for, a host of other disciplines, notably linguistics, anthropology, and psychology. It is now no longer at all clear how CA relates to sociology and social theory, what each side currently does, or what it could bring to the other in the future.

The Research Topic *Conversation Analysis and Sociological Theory* aims at reflecting upon such matters. It seeks to facilitate a productive dialogue between empirical research on interactional practices and different strands of social and sociological theorizing. In the articles of the Research Topic, researchers in social and sociological theory whose work resonates with conversation analysis have sought to advance the frontiers of knowledge on such matters, critiquing and re-evaluating older positions and elaborating new perspectives on core questions about the nature of human interaction.

Micro-macro linkage

Early sociological dismissals of CA (e.g., Coser, 1975) regarded it as being ill-equipped to deal with issues of real sociological interest. Yet, CA has over its history been connected with one central problem area of sociology—how "smaller" social phenomena can be

related to "larger" ones, and vice versa. Linguistic labels put onto this set of problems include "action" and "structure" relations, and "micro" and "macro" types of phenomena. Such matters are inexorably bound up with issues of how to model forms of social power and power-laden social inequalities (Reed and Weinman, 2018). The twin questions posed by such concerns are: how do power-laden macro-level phenomena manifest themselves in micro-level interactional dynamics, and how does macro-level social order emerge out of those micro-level dynamics? CA needs to be supplemented by social theory in these regards, while simultaneously augmenting the range of social theory's purview of such matters (Arundale).

The early phase of CA (Sacks and Schegloff, 1974) was obviously indebted to two overlapping sets of ideas, each of which had its own distinctive approach to such matters. The first source was Garfinkel's (1967) claims about the meaningful nature of individuals' actions, and social reality as ongoing accomplishment by interacting persons—phenomena which could only be understood by analysts examining the categories used by such persons themselves, instead of deploying conventional sociological categories. The second source was Goffman's (1955) understanding of the nature of human interaction as a profoundly moral exercise, involving the construction and perpetuation of "face". The notion of conversation as operating according to its own distinctive logics that could be discovered by careful attention to the details of naturally occurring interaction took inspiration from Goffman's notion of the "interaction order" as a *sui generis* entity, which was only "loosely coupled" to other "social institutions" (Goffman, 1983). CA both extended the fight against "conventional" sociology inaugurated by Garfinkel, while significantly contributing to the elaboration of the "interaction order" identified by Goffman. CA found conversation to be a highly structured domain that worked through multiple forms of organizing devices, such as turn-taking (Heritage, 2008).

As CA developed, it came to encompass analyses of the more circumscribed forms of talk that happen within the settings of key social institutions, such as courtrooms and medical facilities (Drew and Heritage, 1992). Such studies illustrated in detail how these institutional contexts actually operate. By adding analysis of transcripts of historically occurring linguistic interactions and comparing these with their present-day counterparts, analysts could demonstrate how changing social norms impacted upon the organization of talk in institutions. This focus on the interrelations between concrete, situational immediacies and organizations (Smith and Stirling), when the latter were examined over time, was a significant step toward understanding how macro-level social change operates in relation to conversational dynamics (Clayman and Heritage, 2002). Analyzing journalistic interactions has also been a resource for understanding how actors' conceptions of "wider society" are manifested in mass media and therefore may influence everyday interactions (Rautajoki).

CA and its ethnomethodologically-inflected variants also developed to encompass the multiple dimensions of interaction (Ayaß), including visual ones (Arminen and Heino). Thus, CA today is a more multifaceted, more interdisciplinary, and more capacious entity than ever before. However, CA's tools to investigate "micro" and "macro" phenomena must be constantly overhauled. Garfinkel's work was once thought by some sociologists to shun considerations of macro-level "structures," but it is now widely accepted that it contains subtle comprehensions of how social inequalities along the lines of gender and ethnicity play into *in situ* interactions (Duck and Rawls, 2023). While Goffman left open precisely how the "couplings" between the "micro" and "macro" operate (Inglis and Thorpe, 2023), much sociological theorizing since then has endeavored to work out such linkages (e.g., Giddens, 1984; Collins, 2005). Already over the last three decades, work has been done to take CA more in the direction of accounting for forms of social power in interaction, such as in terms of gender and sexualities (Kitzinger, 2005). In this Research Topic, social power is discussed in several articles (see e.g., Ekström and Stevanovic; Stevanovic).

Behind the more obvious Garfinkel/Goffman legacy in CA implicitly lay the ideas of earlier thinkers that those notables themselves had drawn upon, such as the phenomenology of Schutz (1962) and the account of the orderliness of social interaction offered by Durkheim (1984). These and other intellectual resources have subsequently been found to offer both conceptual dead-ends and sometimes surprisingly rich resources for further thinking about how micro-level things relate to macro-level ones. Horgan suggests unexpected but creative resonances between CA and the hermeneutically-attuned version of Durkheim proposed by the Yale School of cultural sociology. To deal more effectively with social hierarchies deeply embedded in certain languages, Sidnell and Vũ propose complementing Durkheim with Marx. Ayaß proposes a fusion of CA with the kinds of theorizing of communication genres pioneered in the German-speaking social sciences. Koskinen et al. demonstrate the resonances between social-theoretical accounts of "recognition" and empirical analyses of esteem, respect and love/care in conversational interactions. Meyer considers the resonances between CA and contemporary practice theories—which already drew upon ethnomethodological insights—in order to reconcile analyses that stress either the context-free or context-sensitive nature of interactional practices.

Perhaps the most radical move in the direction of further connecting CA to bodies of social theory is to do so with reference to assemblage theory in general, and to Actor-Network Theory in particular. The latter denies that there are pre-existing "macro" and "micro" levels and phenomena at all. These, and forms of power, are brought into existence by arranging them into networks of heterogeneous human and non-human actants. Such a perspective opens the possibility of studying the agency of non-humans in human/non-human interactions (Muhle). It also suggests new analytical vistas as to what "social context" might mean in relation to situated interactions, and how larger assemblages relate to localized activities, which are themselves construable as types of assemblage (Raudaskoski).

Bottom-up vs. top-down

CA's radically empirical enterprise presented an alternative to experimentally driven social psychology and so-called "top-down" deductive social theorizing (Haakana et al., 2009). CA operated in a clear "bottom-up" manner, avoiding premature

theory construction (Heritage and Clayman, 2010). However, some recent developments in CA (see e.g., Stivers, 2015) have blurred the clear distinction of top-down/bottom-up analysis. For example, coding interactional phenomena for the purposes of quantification has usually been associated with top-down, theory-driven approaches that involve a risk of an epistemological shift from the member-relevant *emic* accounts *toward* the researcher-relevant *etic* categories (e.g., Markee, 2012; see also Pike, 1967). In CA-informed quantitative studies, however, the coding is usually based on careful, empirical analysis of member-relevant aspects of interaction before moving on to the more researcher-relevant coding of interactional events. In the current Research Topic, a similar complication of a simple top-down/bottom-up distinction in CA occurs with respect to social theory. For instance, in the study conducted by Smith and Sterling, the initial plan for a straightforward bottom-up analysis of conversational data was hindered by methodological obstacles, prompting the authors to delve into theory. Similarly, in the research by Ayaß (p. 1), genre analysis, though firmly rooted in CA methodology, "exceeds it conceptually and theoretically."

The contexts where CA might face methodological hurdles and where social theory can be helpful include studying power imbalances, atypical populations, and subtle breaches in recognition that escape explicit accountability demands. Ekström and Stevanovic transcend the top-down/bottom-up distinction by holding a conceptual separation of power as an *antecedent* of social action, which can be observed in participants' orientations to their own and each other's accountabilities in various fields of action, and power as a *descendent* of interaction that sheds light on the socially constructed nature of reality, all the while keeping in mind the "dialectic of control" (Giddens, 1984, p. 16) where the two forms of power can be intertwined. Koskinen et al. suggest that violations at the "recognition level" of interaction are particularly difficult to raise to explicit reflective metalevel discussion, as this would necessitate the topicalization of social relations in a way that might become costly for the initiator of the discussion. Hence, to be able to also examine these critical issues they complemented the empirical analysis with concepts and tools gained from recognition theory. Smith and Sterling make the claim that when investigating interactions of atypical populations, the interlocutors can fail to be held to account for transgressions of social order, for example when they start to be oriented-to as mentally ill. In this lack of accountability, there is a weakening of the basis for the "next turn proof procedure" (Sacks and Schegloff, 1974), a fundamental methodological tool for CA scholars. The authors propose that, to solve this dilemma, a dialectic approach might be recommended between processes of model construction and bottom-up processes of observation.

Here, we can observe the presence of a dialectical relationship between deductive, top-down theory and inductive, bottom-up empirical analysis, commonly known as *abductive reasoning* or *abduction* (Peirce, 1935, p. 525). Abductive reasoning "seeks a situational fit between observed facts and rules" (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012, p. 171). Abduction involves a dynamic process of reevaluating data in light of theory, fostering theoretical breakthroughs and novel research hypotheses (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). While this kind of approach may seem unconventional to some CA scholars, it's worth noting that several foundational categories in CA are already employed in the "bottom-up" analyses, including, for example, turn-constructional units, sequential implication, and epistemic status/stance. The authors of this Research Topic make a deliberate effort to articulate the pre-existing categories and theoretical frameworks they utilize.

Despite the explicit commitment to theorizing, the authors in the Research Topic differ from each other with reference to the role that *conceptualizations* should have in the analysis of social interaction. Several authors share Schegloff's (1997) critique toward the "academic and theoretical imperialism" (p. 165) that "gets to stipulate the terms by reference to which the world is to be understood" (p. 167). Arundale stresses the need to refrain from using conceptual typifications in the analysis of social interaction. Meyer extends such criticism also to encompass the shared practices as reified units of sociality. Others, however, promote the opposite view. According to Alasuutari, "we are born to a world that presents itself through self-evident concepts, the built environment and artifacts, practices, conceptions of proper conduct, and identifications with various communities" (p. 7). The importance of conceptualizations is also highlighted by Mühle, who points to the insight of MCA that "participants in interactions must categorize their counterparts in order create expectations of their activities, motives, and characteristics" (p. 4). If participants themselves display their capability for basic sociological theorizing when dealing with others (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 4), researchers shouldn't completely ignore the participants' "folk sociology" when trying to account for their own orientations to what is happening.

Another divide between the articles in the Research Topic is related to the previous one: Should social interaction action be understood solely based on the publicly observable behaviors or are such behaviors to be seen as cues based on which the participants may *interpret* each other's actions, motives, and intentions? While some writers argue that "social order is not created through the interpretive acts of actors" (Duck and Rawls, 2023, p. 246; cited in Arundale), others emphasize the interpretive resources that ordinary members use to account for and justify their own and others' conduct. For example, Horgan refers to "culturally structured collective representations" and "structures of meaning" as resources for such interpretations and argues that people interpret everyday interaction as a moral order. Taking a position along this divide has important implications for research. The former view places the participants themselves and the researchers of interaction into an equal position, as high-quality video-recordings can capture the participants' publicly observable behaviors into a high level of detail. The latter view, in contrast, necessitates that the analysis of interaction considers the cultural context and personal histories of the participants that extend the boundaries of every video-recording.

Linking theory and CA findings

Looking at the contributions to this Research Topic, we can see an array of sociological concepts that the authors argue have been or can be elucidated by CA findings. Some of these concepts reflect

classical themes of sociological theorizing, such as "inequality" (Stevanovic), "division of labor" (Sidnell and Vũ) and "social change" (Mlynar and Arminen). Others reflect more contemporary sociological debates: "assemblage" (Raudaskoski), "recognition" (Koskinen et al.), "societal membership" (Rautajoki), "sociological institutionalism" (Alasuutari), "strong programme in cultural sociology" (Horgan, "agency of non-human entities" (Mühle) and "practice theories" (Meyer). Finally, there are contributions that discuss theoretical concepts that have been developed in dialogue with CA, such as "social emergence" (Arundale), "communicative genres" (Ayaß), and "constitution of common-sense world" (Smith and Stirling).

The task in each contribution is similar: to explore the ways in which CA research has, or can, contribute to the understanding of the given sociological concept and to the ways in which the given concept can elucidate CA. Even though such considerations are not common in earlier research, there are some discussions into which the contributions of this Research Topic can be contextualized. In earlier research, there are broadly two kinds of arguments concerning the linkages between sociological theory and interaction analysis: "generic" and "specific." The "generic" argumentation offers broad proposals regarding the societal significance of interactional practices. The emergence thesis (discussed and criticized by Arundale) is a case in point: in a rather all-encompassing way, it suggests that the macro-sociological structures emerge from regularities in social interaction. The more "specific" arguments single out particular sociological concepts and particular interactional phenomena. Drew and Heritage's (1992) influential work of institutional interaction is a case in point. It located the concept of institution in the structure of particular (mostly work-related) encounters, and specified facets of the organization of interaction such encounters. Drew and Heritage came up with lexical choice, turn design, sequence organization, overall structural organization, professional neutrality and interactional asymmetries as such facets. The sociological concept of institutional action became thus specified in conversation analytical terms.

The general task of searching for new linkages between CA and the concerns of sociological theory is realized in different ways in different contributions to the Research Topic: in some articles, quite specific CA findings are linked to quite specific theoretical concepts, while in other articles, more generic concerns of sociological theory are linked to CA programme on a more general level. Both types of contributions advance our understanding of CA and sociological theory.

Among the most specific arguments regarding the linkages between sociological concepts and CA findings are to be found in the contribution by Sidnell and Vũ. They explore the significance of the key sociological concept "division of labor" (derived from the classical works of Marx and Durkheim) to the understanding of CA findings concerning practices of other-initiated repair. In their data from Vietnamese conversations, there is a division of labor in the maintenance of intersubjectivity through other-initiated repair: the high and low status participants use different practices of repair initiation. Another contribution suggesting a rather specific linkage between sociological concept and interactional practice comes from Raudaskoski. She discusses contemporary theories on "assemblages" (coming from New Materialism and Actor Network Theory) suggesting, among other things, that Goodwin's (2013) findings of *lamination* can elucidate their local accomplishment as well as the "sociocultural passing on of practices and the material tools involved in them" (Raudaskoski, p. 5).

On a more generic end of arguments regarding the linkages between sociological theories and CA, we find the work of Mlynár and Arminen. The concept that they discuss is most general, "social change"—a concern that arguably penetrates most sociological thinking. While the authors present quite specific CA findings, having to do with the openings of landline and mobile phone calls, their argument is more far-reaching: CA studies on interactions in technological and institutional settings can be read as documentation of practices that in many cases have become or will become obsolete. In some sense, *any* practice discovered by CA can be treated as historical material. The authors thus suggest a new, historically sensitive way of reading CA research.

The contributions to the Research Topic

The Research Topic consists of 15 articles, which we will summarize very briefly below:

Meyer delves into a detailed examination of the uniquely non-metaphysical, situated way in which the terms "practice" and "practicality" have been understood in ethnomethodology. However, according to Meyer, today's CA tends to reify practices and study them as independent, context-free units of sociality, which points to a gap between ethnomethodology and contemporary CA.

Arundale asks how macro-social order emerges from micro-level human interactions, proposing what he calls the Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating. According to this model, macro-level social systems arise from the recurrent emergence of micro-level social order, as individuals engage in observable social practices across various interactions over time.

Mlynár and Arminen explore the concept of social change due to evolving technologies, which—they argue—can be observed in the details of everyday interactions. The article also discusses the temporal aspects of social practices, proposing that CA studies can serve as historical documents that capture their transient nature, particularly as some practices become obsolete with technological advancements.

Mühle examines the boundaries of the social world, showing how people's basic processes of categorizing their interactional partners can sometimes encompass non-human entities. His analysis, however, points to the moment-by-moment sequentially unfolding and non-determinate nature of such categorization processes, which would need to be better captured by social theorists.

Raudaskoski considers the intersection of CA and the material turn in social sciences, examining two strands of socio-materialism—actor-network theory (ANT) and new materialism(s)—and their emphasis on the entangled nature of practices. Raudaskoski proposes that CA can serve the analysis

of these entanglements and highlights the usefulness of Charles Goodwin's concept of lamination in this regard.

Rautajoki examines the construction of society through media communication, delving into how societal membership and collective existence are actualised in media practices. Rautajoki analyzes the opening segments of TV discussions, where journalists address the audience and set the stage for the program's topic, simultaneously ascribing multilayered societal memberships and identities to the participants of the program.

Arminen and Heino operationalize Erving Goffman's concept of civil inattention to explore its impact on relational segregation, highlighting the existence of subconscious monitoring that pre-structures the interaction order. The study also indicates that gaze behavior is influenced by the recipient's appearance, which forms a basis for recognition disparity and can hinder the inclusion of stigmatized groups to the civic sphere.

In his article on interaction ritual, Horgan seeks to build a bridge between CA and cultural sociology. By examining accounts of encounters with rude strangers in public space as breaches of civil inattention, Horgan shows how the analysis of these accounts necessitates the investigation of both local interactional practices and wider structures of meaning that that people use as interpretative resources.

Koskinen et al. draw on recognition theory to analyze complex cases of (mis)recognition. The authors show that solidarity can occur at distinct levels of action and recognition, which can however sometimes be incongruent with each other. The article highlights the capacity of CA to bring the abstract ideas of recognition to life and to inform and promote the development of interactionally based social and societal critique.

Stevanovic discusses the concept of accountability in social interactions and its relation to interactional inequality. Drawing on a distinction between accountability as a tool for making sense of interactions and accountability as a means of maintaining social order, she argues that demands for these two forms of accountability are raised in unfair ways when different groups of people account for their problematic interactional experiences.

Smith and Stirling explore how individuals with schizophrenia may experience disruptions in their common-sense world. Drawing from phenomenological psychiatry and ethnomethodology, the authors present a model of five worlds of meaning and experience. The model is used to elucidate how schizophrenic talk may reflect a loss of integration between these domains.

Sidnell and Vũ discuss the division of labor in the maintenance of intersubjectivity, drawing on the case of repair initiation practices in Vietnamese conversations. The authors argue that these efforts are unevenly distributed among the junior and senior participants. The findings challenge the tacit assumptions of equality in CA and highlight the influence of social hierarchy on conversational practices.

Ayaß discusses genre analysis as a way of bridging language and society. Communicative genres are to be seen as consolidated forms of communication that allow participants to rely on reciprocal orientation and offer solutions to communicative problems. Ayaß substantiates this idea by drawing on three families of communicative genres as examples, presenting CA as the method par excellence for their sequential analysis.

Ekström and Stevanovic argue for an expansion of CA to engage with sociological theories of power, examining how power is interactionally negotiated, but also conditioned by social structures and realities that precede interactional encounters. The authors criticize the tendency in CA to conflate structure and action, which limits the analysis of power in informing action formation.

Alasuutari suggests that insights of neoinstitutional scholarship could help CA to extend its scope to macro-sociological questions. In CA of institutional encounters, participants are seen to negotiate social order under special conditions and restrictions, which often lead into ritualistic ceremonial behavior that is detached from the actors' immediate goals. These rituals play a key role in constituting, maintaining, and naturalizing social order.

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Conversation analysis and power: examining the descendants and antecedents of social action

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Conversation Analysis (CA) tends to adopt an ambivalent attitude to the concept of power. The concept is fundamental in sociology but secondary or even disregarded in CA. A closer look at research and the conceptual foundations of CA however demonstrate significant contributions to theories of power. In this paper we aim to demonstrate and discuss these contributions, however, also arguing for an expansion of the CA approach in dialogue with sociological theories to engage in the sociological analysis of power as an essential feature of social relationships and social organization. Based on a general definition of power, as the transformative capacities of social agents in virtue of their social relationships, we discuss how power is interactionally achieved and negotiated, but also conditioned by social institutions and structures that extend beyond the contexts of situated encounters. The paper is divided into two main sections. The first section presents central contributions of CA in relation to the distinctions between power over and power to, authority as a legitimate form of power, and deontics as a key concept in the analysis of power. The second section critically considers the tendency in CA to localize power solely to actions in interaction, and to conflate structure and action, which constraints the analysis and explanations of power. We present examples of how analyses of power, grounded in CA, can be extended to account for the dynamics of social structures and realities beyond the interactional encounters.

KEYWORDS

conversation analysis, power, deontics, authority, social interaction

Introduction

Human social existence is permeated by power. It is an essential feature of social relationships and social organization in all forms of political, organizational, and institutional life. Yet, power is a concept that tends to be avoided in conversation analysis (CA). This avoidance can be clarified with reference to the ethnomethodological roots of CA. Constituting a break from the traditional social scientific approaches, ethnomethodology sought to explain social order with reference to the mundane practices by which members make sense of the world and act in it (Heritage, 1984). What is thus demanded of social science is to document "the processes by which social life is constituted rather than treating social phenomena as given objects in the world" (Hammersley, 2003; p. 755). In this paper we aim to demonstrate the significant contributions of CA to the study of power, however, also arguing for an expansion of the approach in dialogue with sociological theories.

The rhetoric of CA involves the researcher being able to "sit back and observe the structuring quality of the world as it happens" (Boden, 1994; p. 74). This idea presupposes a view in which social reality is realized in and through the publicly observable features of interaction and is in this form also researchable (e.g., Heritage, 1984; Schegloff, 2007). In this sense, CA is committed to "ontological muteness" (Gergen, 1994; p. 72) regarding those aspects of social reality that go beyond what can be observed in the participants' conduct. Similarly, CA has rejected the "bucket theory of context" (Heritage, 1987; Goodwin and Heritage, 1990; p. 286) in which pre-existing social structures are seen to determine interaction from above. Rather than seeing the context as an abstract social force imposed on the participants, CA researchers have observed how the participants actively display their orientations to the context (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; p. 147). In other words, contextual features are not considered relevant for research if the participants themselves do not orient to their relevance in their publicly observable behavior (see Arminen, 2000; p. 446). In this sense, CA is permeated by a form of "agnosticism" that treats the existence of the higher-level social phenomena, such as power, as unknowable (Hutchby, 1996, 1999; p. 482; p. 86).

The focus on participants' publicly displayed orientations as the only basis for making analytic claims, combined with a general reluctance to engage in sociological theorizing, has led many sociologists to question the bearing of CA on what might be called the sociological agenda (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999; Hutchby, 1999). Much of this criticism has to do with the notion of power and the ways in which power relations may affect what different people can do in their interactions with others and how they can legitimately treat their interaction partners (Burr, 2015; p. 5). For example, there are situations (e.g., sexual harassment) in which a researcher may have compelling reasons to assume that the participants' relationship is in some way fundamentally unequal or unbalanced. In these cases, a sole focus on the participants' publicly displayed orientations leaves the researcher at the risk of disregarding those ideological and cultural-historical aspects of power (Mann, 1986) that shape both their own publicly observable behaviors and their patterns of interpreting other people's behaviors (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999). In this way, the capacity of CA to engage in social and societal critique is severely compromised.

Despite the traditional skepticism of CA with the notion of power, CA studies on power have recently become increasingly frequent. As we will discuss further below, this tendency seems to be particularly prevalent in applied CA—that is, in research on various institutional contexts where power relations are central, such as family therapy (e.g., Ong et al., 2021), court and police interrogations (e.g., Haworth, 2006), parliamentary debates (e.g., Antaki and Leudar, 2001), classrooms (e.g., Stephenson, 2020), and meetings (e.g., Boden, 1994). However, CA still has not really embraced sociological theorizing on power. Instead, the existing CA studies on power are published in journals primarily addressing the CA community. Furthermore, some CA researchers have emphasized that the analysis of power in sequences of talk does well without any sociological theoretical underpinnings external to CA (see e.g., Hutchby, 1996; p. 483). Instead, neighbor concepts, such as asymmetries, have been embraced more readily.

In this paper, we address the interface between CA and power, also engaging in more abstract sociological theorizing on how power can be intertwined with the local organization of action. The paper is organized in the following way. Next, we will discuss social power as a concept. We adhere to the conceptualization of power as transformative capacities of agents in their social relations (Giddens, 1984; Isaac, 1987a; Sayer, 2012), which we find particular relevant, and essentially consistent with, the action in context approach in CA. Thereafter we discuss the capacities of an individual to act in virtue of social relations in sequences of social interaction, specifically drawing on the distinction between *power over* and *power to*. Thereafter, the remainder of the paper is divided into two main sections. In the first, we will consider *authority* as a form of power, enacted in virtue of social and institutional relationships. In the second section, we rely on insights offered by critical realism with regards the agency/structure relation and the stratification of social reality and discuss some implications to the contribution of CA to the analysis of power. Finally, we suggest a few hypotheses to be tested in future CA-informed sociological studies on power.

The concept of power

As a concept, power has been widely theorized and discussed in social science (Clegg, 1989). Power is analyzed as underlying features of social relations and structures in general and shown to exist in different forms; in actors' capacities to influence and control; in dominance and dependencies; in authority, coercion, and access to means of violence. As Sayer (2012; p. 81) has argued "there is no such thing as power-as-such." Power is always the power of actors in social relations. Moreover, power is not a particular resource but performed through various resources mobilized by actors to achieve the goal of the action.

Weber (1978; p. 53) presented what has become a seminal definition of power. Power refers to "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance ...." Weber's perspective on power includes two basic components, elaborated in theories on power. First, power is about agency *within* social relations. Second, power refers to what actors *can do* but also *the influence over others* which may manifest in domination as well as resistance. Following the literature, we will refer to this as the *power-to* and *power-over*.

Power has been described as a "transformative capacity" (Sayer, 2012; p. 181), a capacity of agents (individuals, groups, and organizations) to influence and make a difference in the world, on social and material conditions and concrete course of events (Giddens, 1984; p. 14; Isaac, 1987a; p. 21). In sociology, the primary object of analysis is *social power*, focusing on capacities in the social domains of reality. This is well articulated in the following definition to which we adhere: Social power refers to "the capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate" (Isaac, 1987a; p. 22). This locations of power in agency, is essentially different from, for example, Foucault's theory of power, suggesting that power is best

understood as being everywhere, operating independent of agency, diffused in discourses constituting agents (Foucault, 1991, 1998).

Isaac's definition of power distinguishes several critical aspects. In defining power as *capacities* of *social agents* we avoid the limiting behaviorist account, where power tends to be reduced to actual behaviors and their results on the behaviors of others (Isaac, 1987b; p. 76). The analysis instead focuses on capacities to make an impact and to achieve intentions or goals, conditioned by the social relations and normatively constituted activities in which actors participate. Capacities are largely enduring (Sayer, 2012; p. 186), mobilized, differently exercised, and negotiated in concrete actions in interaction. Capacities thus exist even when not activated. Though, as Isaac (1987b; p. 81) notes "a social power that is never exercised can hardly be said to exist". The idea of latent capacities for exercise of power and resistance, possibly shaping what happens in interactions, seems contradictory to the CA idea of reality as realized in displayed and observable behaviors. We will however argue that the idea of enduring and latent capacities is a prerequisite for understanding the performance of power in social interaction.

It is agents, and not structures, who have power. However, agents have power only *in virtue of* social relationships. This applies to governments and authorities dependent on public support and legitimacy to rule and get things done, as well as individuals exercising power within established roles and relations in everyday life. The *virtue of* is a main object in the analysis of social power, to explain the dynamics of power, inequalities in power, and the enactment (and the lack) of capacities. Actors rely on and invoke authority, a legitimate power to influence others, in virtue of roles and identities in institutionalized activities, but also depending on whether others ascribe legitimacy to their actions. Actors' capacities and resources to influence their own situation and make a difference in society are constrained and enabled by their positions in social structures. Resources are, as Giddens (1984; p. 15) has noted, "properties of social structures," invoked and drawn upon by agents in social interaction. Analyses of power thus elucidate the capacity/relationship nexus in normatively constituted activities and layers of social reality; in situated interaction, institutional arrangements, and societal structures.

As pointed out above, social theory identifies two basic forms of power: *power-over* and *power-to*. The distinction further clarifies the conceptualization of power presented above. *Power-over* refers to relations of dominance and control; actors' abilities to govern the situation and action of others, to make others act in a way they would not otherwise have done (Pitkin, 1972; Isaac, 1987b; Morriss, 2002). A social relation in terms of *power over* is thought of as necessarily conflictual and is mostly used as a synonym for domination (VeneKlasen and Miller, 2002). *Power-to*, in contrast, refers to the capacities to accomplish actions and make a difference, by virtue of the social relations (Morriss, 2002). As it is not defined with reference to the consequences of the individual's actions for others, it is regarded as a consensual and intrinsically legitimate instantiation of power. Some accounts of power suggest that both *power-over* and *power-to* should be included in any comprehensive understanding of power. For example, Pansardi (2012) argued that both *power-to* and *power-over* should be seen as relational concepts—that is, as two aspects of a single, more general concept of social power. As put by Pansardi (2012), "power to and power over refer to the same social facts, they both consist in the changing of someone else's incentive structure and in the obtainment of a specific outcome, no matter whether they refer to something I can do by myself, having obtained the non-interference of others, or in the specific product of someone else's action" (p. 84). However, *power-to* does not imply a *power-over* in the form of domination (Sayer, 2012; p. 183). The power to accomplish certain actions in social relations have different outcomes depending on the actions of others. Domination may be avoided and resisted.

Capacities to act in virtue of social relations in sequences of social interaction

From the perspective of CA, the notions of *power-over* and *power-to* are essentially about the participants' capacities to act in virtue of social relations in sequences of social interaction. *Power-over* can be identified based on the constraints that a participant imposes on another participant's freedom of choice, which allows them to achieve interactional goals and aims. Some of these constraints have to do with actions in general, which also encompasses those that go beyond the interactional encounter, while other constraints deal specifically with what happens in the interaction here and now. In contrast, *power-to* is about the capacities of the individuals to act on their own. In social interaction, *power-to* may be seen in the extent to which a participant is able to implement social actions in a sequence and to act within the currently existing sequential constraints.

From the perspective of constraints imposed on action in general, *power-over* may be associated with the class of directive speech acts including orders, commands, and requests. Imperatives, for example, represent the most stereotypical way of giving orders and commands to another person (Craven and Potter, 2010; p. 442) and thus constitute a central practice for exercising *power-over*. It is worth stressing, however, that imperatives can also be used to perform actions that have little to do with power over, such as instructing someone toward the means of achieving something that they themselves want to pursue or making an offer or an invitation (Sorjonen et al., 2017). Another stereotypical way of exercising *power-over* other people's actions involves the use of deontic modality, as the modal verbs such as *ought*, *must*, and *should* can be used by a speaker to impose constraints on another person (see Sterponi, 2003; Curl and Drew, 2008). However, again, the mere existence of a deontic modal verb in an utterance is not enough to make the utterance count as an instance of *power-over*. For example, pieces of advice from a friend are often likely to contain such verbs (*you must see a doctor*), but it is the person themselves who may still be entitled to choose freely whether to follow that advice or not.

From the perspective of people's possibilities to act in the interaction here and now, *power-over* may be seen to encompass any dominant interactional behavior that is unresponsive to other people's concerns and constraints their possibilities to address

them. For example, someone may talk much more than their co-participants, determining the topics of conversation and imposing their views on the things talked about (Linell et al., 1988; Hutchby, 1996, 1999), while others cannot but try to cope with the type of power that is exercised over them. Some forms of *power-over* may also be identified in situations in which participants position themselves as more competent and knowledgeable than others (Thornborrow, 2002), in this way seeking to influence their co-participants' beliefs, attitudes, or actions. Persuasion as *power-over* may operate, for example, through explanatory accounts (Heritage, 1988; Houtkoop, 1990), strategical displays of emotion (Fitch and Foley, 2007; Nikander, 2007), and through other discursive, rhetorical, and argumentative practices by which people manage to silence others.

Power-over becomes also visible in those situations in which control over the agenda of the interaction is in the hands of a specific person. This is typical in various institutional interactions, in which the participants construct an asymmetrical turn-taking systems that endow them with quite inequal amounts of freedom in terms of their talk (Macbeth, 1991; Kendall, 1993). Control over agenda is unequally distributed also in various group interactions, such as meetings (Drew and Heritage, 1992; Boden, 1994; Angouri and Marra, 2011). Although the role of the chairperson in a meeting may be considered merely as an effective practice to manage turn-taking in a complex multi-person setting and to facilitate joint decision-making on topics of great significance, research has shown that the role of the "mere" agenda manager easily slides into one that also encompasses control over the content of the decisions to be made (see e.g., Valkeapää et al., 2019; Stevanovic et al., 2022). Likewise, many social institutions would not operate smoothly and fill their purposes in society without power relations (see e.g., Pilnick, 2022), but this does not mean that we should ignore the existence of constraints on people's freedoms caused by the exercise of *power-over* in these settings.

The notion of control over the local agenda of interaction is deeply intertwined with a phenomenon of still more "local" nature—that is, that of the "conditional relevance" of a specific responsive action upon the occurrence of a specific initiating action (Schegloff, 2007; pp. 20–21). This principle is held together by accountability: should an adequate responsive action be missing, an account for the omission or failure will be required (Heritage, 1984; pp. 245–253). Notable, the notion of conditional relevance refers to utterances or actions and their relationship with one another—that is, it is about "items" and not people (Schegloff, 2010; p. 39). However, starting from Stivers and Rossano's seminal attempt to tease apart the components of conditional relevance (Stivers and Rossano, 2010a,b), and continued by Heritage's notion of the "epistemic engine" as the driving force of sequences (Heritage, 2012; see also Drew, 2012), an opportunity space has been opened to shift the focus of interest in conditional relevance from items—that is, actions and their relationship with one another—to the *actors* who produce these items. Indeed, the items do not operate by themselves. Instead, it is the *participants* producing the initiating actions that put their co-participants under the normative constraints either to produce relevant responsive actions or to become accountable for not doing so (Stevanovic, 2018). In other words, conditional relevance operates based on *power-over*.

From this perspective of CA, *power-to* realizes in different forms depending on the sequential position. In the context of sequence-initiating actions, *power to* realizes as the capacity to carry out powerful actions, such as announcements of unilateral decisions, without an orientation to a need to get others' approval for them (Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012). *Power-to* also involves the capacity of a person to demand specific types of responses from others and the possession of effective ways to deal with others' possible reluctance in providing these responses. In the context of responsive action, *power-to* can be observed in people's ways of creatively dealing with the constraints imposed on them by other. Possibilities to resist constraints without becoming accountable for doing so vary depending on the person's position, involving, for example, strategical ignorance or claims of ownership of the action imposed (Stevanovic, 2021a). In a sequential third position, *power-to* becomes visible in a person's capacity to stick to one's initial line of action, which may realize, in its most simple form, as sequential deletion or, in its most complex form, as an integration of the other people's resistance to the initial line of action.

In sum, in CA, *power-to* and *power-over* are studied as social interactional phenomena. The effects of actions in social interaction depends on the understanding and responses of others. Hence, *power-to* is not an ultimate capacity but (at least potentially) open to resistance, even within social structures of supremacy and subordination and institutionalized relations of inequal capacities and resources. Giddens (1984; p. 16) referred to this as the "dialectic of control." *Power-over* in social interaction relies on forms of dependency, which also offers resources for the subordinated to respond and influence the activities and relations to the superior. Thereby, *power-to* and *power-over* are deeply intertwined. On one hand, the opportunity context which constitutes *power-to* is made up of specific social relations of *power-over*. In other words, if you determine the actions of other people, you can also achieve a lot through these people, which further increases your own individual capacities. On the other hand, if you determine your actions unilaterally, others will need to adjust their own actions accordingly. Therefore, there is not always a need to distinguish between these two aspects of power. However, as we will demonstrate further below, this distinction can help shed light on certain social interaction patterns that would otherwise be hard to make sense of.

Authority in virtue of social and institutional relationships

Authority is a basic form of power, where governing and directives are followed and treated as *legitimate*. In short, authority is legitimate power. The understanding and approval of the exercise of power as legitimate is thus a quality of social relationships that give actors the capacity to determine the actions of others. In sociological theory, authority is typically contrasted to power exercised by coercion and violence.

In social theory and political philosophy, authority has been described with reference to multiple distinctions. Most famously, Weber (1978) distinguished three sub-types of authority: "legal" (the approval of legislations and the right of actors to issue laws and directives), "traditional" (acceptance based on habits and

traditions) and "charismatic" (a willingness to follow based on the trust in the leader's extraordinary personal qualities). Other distinctions have described the concept as involving two sides to it. One widespread view has distinguished between authority "by fact" (*de facto*) and authority "by law" (*de jure*) (Peters, 1967). Other conceptualizations distinguish between "authority over belief" vs. "authority over conduct" (Lukes, 1978) and "epistemic authority" vs. "deontic authority" (Bochenski, 1974). Some of these distinctions deal with the specific *sources* of power in virtue of which a person is an authority (e.g., law, as it the case in "legal authority"), while others are more about the ways in which authority *realizes* in practice (e.g., as control over decisions, as is the case in "deontic authority").

CA has contributed to the analysis of authority both in terms of (1) its sources and (2) its ways of realization. In addition, and quite prevalently, CA has demonstrated the ways in which (3) authority is negotiated—claimed, justified, approved, or resisted—in turn-by-turn interactions. Although these different aspects of authority are necessarily intertwined in any empirical analysis of authority in a specific context, we maintain—and hope to be able to demonstrate below—that it is still theoretically beneficial to keep these aspects conceptually separate.

Sources of authority

As for the sources of authority, it is grounded in realities structuring distinctive relationships in institutional contexts. Parsons (1939; p. 461) distinguished between *authority in virtue of a specific competence* and *authority in virtue of office*. The two forms of authority are both, but in different ways, "functionally specific" and legitimized by institutional systems such as the education and credentialing of doctors and the laws and rules that give officials rights to make decisions in specific areas.

Professional authority is a type of authority extensively analyzed in sociology, including contributions from CA (Heritage and Clayman, 2010; Stivers and Timmermans, 2020). The concept was introduced by Parsons (1939, 1951) in his theory explaining the central role of professions in the increasingly complex and differentiated modern society. Much of professional authority can be clarified with reference to *authority in virtue of a specific competence*. Professions are assumed to represent rational values such as neutralism and universalism, and a specialized technical competence required to carry out the work. Professional authority is thus based on, and always restricted to, a particular field of achieved knowledge and the epistemic regime of academic expertise. As Parsons (1939; p. 460) notes, this type of authority has "a peculiar sociological structure," in not being grounded in a general relationship of superiority, but "the technical competence of the professional man," who in this relationship also have power over people who would be otherwise superior in status and position in society. One important subtype of professional authority, which Parsons discussed extensively, is *medical authority*.

However, professional authority is also largely about *authority in virtue of office*, which refers to the power to do things and to command others in acting on behalf of an administrative office. This is the case, for example, in public agencies and welfare services, in which officials regularly meet clients in conversations about applications, eligibility and decisions about various services, social support and economic benefits (Bruhn and Ekström, 2017). In these institutional contexts, officials act on behalf of laws, regulations, and routines. This is evident when officials justify decisions with references to regulations, as in these examples from a study on the Swedish Board for Study Support: "No we have no ability to do that," "We cannot do that, we have our rules to follow," "We have hard restrictions about that" (Bruhn and Ekström, 2017). The justifications are produced in a context where the official declines a request about a reduced repayment of a debt. Note that officials talk on behalf of a "we" (the office) and present the decline as non-negotiable. These officials act, and respond to clients' requests, within a system of laws and detailed rules and routines.

The sources of authority can, however, be more multiple than implied by the Parsonian distinction. For example, this is the case for what Clayman has defined as the *question authority*. The legitimate right to ask questions is fundamental to the performance of institutions in modern society including judiciary, police, social work, health care, social research, and journalism (Antaki et al., 2002; Ekström et al., 2006; Haworth, 2006; Clayman et al., 2010; Iversen, 2012; Danermark et al., 2019). The question authority is central in journalism, in which the intended interviewees "should make themselves accessible" to interrogations, accept and try to answer the questions that the interviewer deems relevant to ask (Clayman, 2002; p. 198). Importantly, however, CA has provided evidence that journalists claim authority neither in virtue of a specialized competence, nor in virtue of office. Instead, the legitimacy of questioning is grounded on *authority in virtue of institutionalized practices*, which in this case have to do with the practices of interviewing in the media, the assumed norms and values of professional journalism in liberal democracy, and a related "unspoken contract" between journalists and public figures (Clayman and Heritage, 2002a; Ekström et al., 2006; p. 29). As Carlson et al. (2022; p. 120) note, in a study of Trump's and the right-wing populists' attacks on news media, and the undermining of journalists' authority in for example press conferences, this is particularly challenging for journalism as they have "few means of enforcing their authority outside the appealing to norms to support their work."

The realization of authority

As for the ways in which authority realizes in everyday life, it becomes central do bear in mind those definitions of authority that distinguish between the authority in the field of *knowledge* and the authority in the field of *action* (Bochenski, 1974; Lukes, 2005). In CA, these two areas in the application of authority are commonly referred to as *epistemic authority* (e.g., Heritage and Raymond, 2005) and *deontic authority* (e.g., Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012). Research in CA has shown how participants orient to their own and each other's epistemic rights (access to knowledge) and deontic rights (rights to determine action) in the ways in which they design their utterances and respond to those of their co-participants.

The distinction between epistemic authority and deontic authority can be clarified, for example, with reference to *medical*

authority. Parsons who used the physicians as an example of how professionals have the right to ask questions, make judgments, and prescribe actions that the layman/the patient is expected to accept and follow 'on authority' (Parsons, 1939; Heritage and Clayman, 2010). To use the terminology of Searle (1976), epistemic authority is about getting the "words to match the world", deontics is about getting the "world to match the words" (Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012). Thus, for example, doctors' right to make diagnoses are clearly a matter of epistemic authority, while treatment recommendations and medicine prescriptions are a matter of deontic authority (e.g., Landmark et al., 2015; Lindström and Weatherall, 2015). Just like in the case of medical authority, concerns of knowledge are often only the first step toward those concerns that have to do with actions based on what can be known about the current matter at hand. Therefore, concerns of power are most straightforwardly linked to the notion of deontic authority—though, importantly, power has often been noted to operate in the disguise of knowledge and epistemic authority (Stevanovic, 2013, 2015, 2017; Landmark et al., 2015; Lindström and Weatherall, 2015; Svennevig and Djordjilovic, 2015).

Although rights to determine action are an omnirelevant aspect of social interaction, deontic authority has been specifically investigated in the contexts of specific activities and interactional phenomena. These include directive instruction (Henderson, 2020; Frick and Palola, 2022), support work (Antaki and Webb, 2019), joint decision making (Stevanovic, 2012), participatory democracy (Magnusson, 2020; Wåhlin-Jacobsen and Abildgaard, 2020), leadership (Clifton et al., 2018; Van De Mieroop, 2020), agenda management (Stephenson, 2020), and teaching development (Ripatti-Torniainen and Stevanovic, 2023). In all these contexts, the rights to determine action may concern future action (*distal deontics*) or joint action unfolding locally in the encounter (*proximal deontics*), these two temporal fields being often intertwined in complex ways (see e.g., Stevanovic, 2015; Clifton et al., 2018; Magnusson, 2020; Stephenson, 2020; Van De Mieroop, 2020; Stevanovic et al., 2022).

Negotiations of authority

As pointed out above, CA has been specifically influential in showing how authority is negotiated—claimed, justified, approved, or resisted—in turn-by-turn interactions. Most generally, CA research on deontic authority has focused on how participants' deontic rights are oriented to and drawn upon, as observable in the ways in which the participants design their actions and organize them as sequences of action. A typical example involves a first speaker making a stronger claim of deontic authority than the recipient is willing to validate, which leads to the recipient manipulating the terms of their responsive action. In their responses, the recipients may claim for themselves a greater share of power and "ownership" of the participants' line of action than what was initially offered to them (see e.g., Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012; Stevanovic and Monzoni, 2016; Keevallik, 2017). The recipients may also selectively orient to or disregard either the distal or proximal aspects of deontic authority, which enables most intricate negotiations of leadership, expertise, and power (see e.g., Van De Mieroop, 2020; Stevanovic, 2021a).

Another example of a standard way in which people commonly negotiate their authority relationship is about whether some constraint has been imposed by external forces or by the co-participant. People tend to avoid personal imposition and thus often refer to external forces. Thus, for example, in the context of aggressive journalism, a particular practice to justify adversarial questioning is, for example, to invoke knowledge about people's interests, in which case the journalist merely enacts the role of a watchdog of society, who works on behalf of the public (Clayman, 2002). Analogous phenomena appear also in the field of medical authority, where doctors commonly invoke external facts as persuasion strategies to deal with patients' resistance (Stivers and Timmermans, 2020) and present public evidence for their diagnostic statements (Peräkylä, 1998), as well as in the field of education and teaching, where instructions are often constructed ambiguously as for their epistemic vs deontic nature (Stevanovic, 2017). What is common to these strategies is the mitigation of deontic authority, without yet compromising epistemic authority.

Most importantly, CA has shown that the legitimacy is never unconditional, but it must be achieved (Clayman, 2002; p. 198). In focusing on the design and sequences of turns of talk in medical encounters, CA has shown how authority not only presents itself in diagnoses and treatment recommendations delivered as authoritative, but also in how that authority is further constituted and approved in patient's responses, as well as in how certain responses intrude to this authority (Stivers, 2005; Heritage and Clayman, 2010; p. 159). Similarly, while politicians may approve the question authority of journalism by demonstrating a willingness to answer even critical questions and questions that cannot be answered (Ekström, 2009a), the legitimacy of journalism may also be challenged within (and outside) interviews. Politicians may undermine the journalist's status by criticizing the questions asked, holding the journalist accountable for the assumptions made, or simply ignoring (even disdainfully) certain journalists in public press conferences (Clayman, 2002; Ekström, 2009b). Likewise, even in the highly standardized institutional context such as public agencies and welfare services, in which power takes the form of *authority in virtue of office*, authority does not assume predetermined forms. When an official says: "well I could make an exception here", we may observe authority that is flexible in how to apply the regulations in particular situations (Bruhn and Ekström, 2017; p. 208).

Toward the separation of a priori and a posteriori

In sum, CA has contributed to a better understanding of the sources of authority, its ways of realization, and the ways in which it is negotiated in turn-by-turn interactions. As these aspects of authority are necessarily intertwined in any empirical analysis of authority in a specific context, CA studies on authority have seldom tried to keep these aspects conceptually separate. This means that what is considered at a given moment of interaction a precondition

of interaction (*a priori*) and what is considered as its outcome (*a posteriori*). This limits the opportunities to analyze power in interaction.

Maintaining that it is theoretically beneficial to keep the *a priori* and *a posteriori* aspects of power conceptually separate, we will now draw specific attention to the distinction between *deontic status* and *deontic stance*, which has been recently used in the CA research on deontic authority. *Deontic status* refers to the *latent capacity* of a person to do so, independent of whether the person has publicly claimed it or not, while *deontic stance* refers to the publicly displayed rights to determine action (cf. the distinction between capacities and activation in section two above). The distinction is important in that the deontic stance that a participant takes in and through the publicly observable features of action-design may be *congruent* or *incongruent* with the participant's deontic status (Heritage, 2013; Stevanovic, 2018). Expectedly, people generally want to design their publicly displayed deontic stance to be congruent with their deontic status (Heritage, 2013a; p. 570), as a strongly authoritative deontic stance without the deontic status backing it up runs at the risk of being challenged by others (Wåhlin-Jacobsen and Abildgaard, 2020; p. 47). However, various types of deontic incongruencies are also common.

One example of a deontic incongruence is the so-called "first position downgrading incongruence" (Stevanovic, 2018). It involves the first speaker publicly displaying a low deontic stance while relying on their high deontic status to achieve the desired interactional consequences. The capacity to design one's utterances with this type of deontic incongruence is *power* in its most evident form—there is no need to command or order. The mere position of power allows the person to exercise both power-over and power-to, simply by virtue of others seeking to comply with the person's wishes even when these have not been expressed. However, this type of deontic incongruence is also a risky endeavor. For example, a mother may first seek to direct her child with a soft reminder that is oriented to the child's own desires and autonomy (*d'you wanna go pop your toothbrush back and give it a try*). Yet, if the child does not comply, the mother may ultimately need to reveal the real nature of her action: in reality, the child has no choice but to comply (see Henderson, 2020).

From this perspective, the analysis of power is essentially about considering the ways in which participants give weight to each other's deontic statuses and deontic stances. Instead of always needing to claim their deontic rights (*deontic stance*) a powerful participant may also trust in their co-participants being aware of and considering these rights anyway (*deontic status*). As pointed out by Tomasello (2008), in all human social interaction, the relationship between the participants' overt interactional conduct and the intersubjective context of the interaction is *complementary*: "as more can be assumed to be shared between communicator and recipient, less needs to be overtly expressed" (p. 79). In this sense, deontic status as an interactional resource is not equally available for everyone. This notion, in turn, opens a way to link the descriptive considerations of power to the normative notions of inequalities and to use them as a tool of social and societal critique.

Beyond the local negotiation of power in talk and interaction

In CA, power is localized primarily to actions in interaction. CA does not ontologically exclude macro- and institutional features of society but claims to contribute by linking interaction to such higher-level features in the analysis of power (Hutchby, 1999; Wooffitt, 2011). However, the linking is assumed to happen only within interaction, or as Hutchby (1999; p. 86) argues "high level features of society are only instantiated in and through talk." We believe this constrains the analysis of power, and the relevance of CA, regardless of whether it is perceived as an ontological or methodological position. The social structures in which power is exercised are not solely interactional phenomenon. The concept of social structure is thoroughly discussed in ethnomethodology and CA (Boden and Zimmerman, 1991). In these theoretical traditions, social structures are conceptualized as something people do, as practical accomplishments. Social structures are shaped in and through patterns of talk and interaction. In institutional settings, structures are, for example, shaped in actors' orientations to institutional identities and participant roles. The empirical evidence of these social mechanisms is extensive. However, the approach also tends to conflate structure and action, and reduce their different properties and dynamics (Danermark et al., 2019).

The structures by virtue of which actors have power to determine action—both in the sense of *power-over* and *power-to*—partly exist *outside* agents' actions in interaction. They are not invented in moments of interaction. And as argued above, actors have capacities and deontic rights also when not activated in moments of interactions. This idea of structures as already existing for actors seems to be assumed in CA, when referring to the *pre-allocation* of roles and resources in institutional interaction. Moreover, what makes social structures enduring is not only the normative orientations to patterns in interaction, but also their manifestation in institutional arrangements outside interactions, in formal organizations and processes, legal and regulatory documents, allocation of resources and so on. As Heritage (1997, p. 223) notes, CA is concerned with how such institutional realities are "evoked, manipulated and even transformed in interaction", but don't assume that institutional realities are "confined to talk".

Following the philosophy of Critical realism (Archer, 2000, 2017; Danermark et al., 2019) presents a model explaining structures and agency as mutually dependent yet qualitatively different phenomenon. It is actors, and not structures, that have agency. Actions take place within enabling and constraining social structures, which exist as an outcome of human actions. However, by taking emergence into account, and introducing a temporal dimension in the analytical model, Archer clarifies that actions in virtue of structures and structures in virtue of actions are not moments of the same process (Danermark et al., 2019; p. 81). Archer proposes an analytical model with three phases in a cycle. The *first* phase consists of the enduring social structures emerging from previous generations of agents and social interactions. The *second* phase consists of moments of actions and social interaction. This is the phase of agency. Only people have capacities to make a difference in social life, however conditioned by the preceding, already existing, social structures. Hence, structures are not created

in the moments of interaction, but evoked, realized, negotiated, or manipulated. The *third* phase consists of the reproduction and transformations of social structures (e.g., positions and roles in social relations and institutions) with implications for the structures preceding future actions (phase 1 in the cycle). This analytical model is of course an abstraction. Archer (2000, 2017) substantiates the model in extensive analyses. In this context, we introduce the model to frame and expand the analysis of power in CA. In what follows, we discuss two dimensions: the *temporal*- and the *multi-layered* analyses of social power.

The temporal dimension: preceding structures, deployment, and transformations

CA is at its best in the analysis of what happens in the interactional sequences produced in clearly delineated interactional encounters, the boundaries of which coincide with the start and end of the videorecording. Extending the analysis of interaction to reach the social world beyond the encounter is therefore a challenge that needs to be considered from two different angles: (1) from what precedes the interactional encounter (*antecedents*) and (2) from what follows the encounter (*descendents*). In both cases, it is worthwhile to explore the critical realist insights regarding the separation of structures and agency (Archer, 2000, 2017; Danermark et al., pp. 76–79). In the context of social interaction, agency is basically about any publicly recognizable action implemented by the participants in an interactional encounter, while structures are those features of the social world that precede and follow the implementation of each such action. This means that any sequence of interaction is a locus of constant deployment of structures, and this is also something that can be investigated empirically through traditional CA methods.

The consideration of the antecedents of action is connected to the discussion on action formation (Levinson, 2013). CA researchers have commonly dealt with the phenomenon by focusing on various "social action formats" (Fox, 2007)—that is, regularly patterned clusters of publicly observable resources that are deployed to convey specific actions, such as offers (e.g., Kärkkäinen and Keisanen, 2012), proposals (e.g., Stevanovic, 2013), and complaints (e.g., Ogden, 2010). Furthermore, the complex ways in which the verbal dimension of the participants' conduct is embedded in the material and embodied elements of the situated courses of action have been referred to as "multimodal gestalts" (Mondada, 2014), "social action formats" (Rauniomaa and Keisanen, 2012), or "multimodal action packages" (Lilja and Piirainen-Marsh, 2019; Stevanovic, 2021b). Instead, less focus has been paid to the considerations of the broader structural features, such as power relations, that inform the design of and accountabilities associated with specific actions (Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2014; on requests, however, see Antaki and Kent, 2012). While systematic empirical claims about the precise role of these contextual features on action formation are challenging to make, there is no reason to believe that action formation would operate independently of these features.

Extensive research on interaction in institutional contexts has shown a distribution of roles and resources that is "characteristically asymmetrical" (Drew and Heritage, 1992; p. 47), "pre-inscribed" (Thornborrow, 2002; p. 4), and thus precedes the moments of talk and interaction. The participant roles, enacted within certain turn types, are associated with rights and capacities to influence the activity. The preceding structures are indicated when the roles are taken for granted at the beginning of the interaction, without being described or justified, and when deviations are noticed and handled by the participants as such. As summarized by Thornborrow (2002; p. 4) "institutional discourse can be described as talk which sets up positions for people to talk from and restricts some speakers' access to certain kinds of discursive actions."

The antecedents of action may also be considered from the perspective of wider cultural and historical developments. In his study on doctor's diagnostic statements, Peräkylä (1998) saw the doctors to coordinate the location and design of their diagnostic turns to preserve the accountability of some aspects of the grounds for their diagnoses. While a plain assertion of diagnosis would convey a high degree of institutional power and authority, the doctors used such turn design only when the diagnostic statement was produced immediately after the examination. When this was not the case, the doctors incorporated references to the evidential basis of the diagnosis or explicated that basis. In other words, the diagnostic statements were not presented from the position of an unconditional authority based on the doctor's superior institutional status. Peräkylä discussed his findings with reference to profound changes in doctor-patient relations during the last decades of the twentieth century, suggesting that the doctors' consistent orientation to their accountability for the evidential grounds of the diagnosis is a historically new phenomenon.

Historical development has also been considered in the context of broadcast news interviews (Clayman and Heritage, 2002a) and presidential press conferences (Clayman and Heritage, 2002b; Clayman et al., 2006, 2007, 2010). These studies identified a rise of an increasingly aggressive journalism from the 1970's to the end of the twentieth century. As potential reasons for the trend the authors, for example, referred to the heightened skepticism toward the president in the face of the Vietnam war and Watergate scandal, as well as to a more general propensity to monitor presidential performance with respect to the economy. This overall lack of trust led to the journalists becoming less inclined to accept presidential pronouncements and policies at face value and more prone to challenge presidents and hold them accountable for their actions (Clayman et al., 2010).

Long-term changes are also linked to "shift in the normative culture of journalism" (Clayman and Heritage, 2021; p. 232). Changes have been observed in the journalists' detailed practices in designing questions, which have gradually become to indicate more initiative, directness, assertiveness, and adversarialness, and less deference to the president (Clayman et al., 2006). The emergent forms of questioning have been described as "materialized" resources and practices "added to or subtracted from the journalist's repertoire" (Clayman and Heritage, 2021; p. 233). Hence, the longitudinal research on journalism indicates that structures in the form of pre-existing resources, related roles, and question authority, are reproduced but also transformed as an outcome of

interactions. More recently, journalists' authority in using such resources in press conferences has been seriously challenged by Donald Trump in particular, and similar by far-right populists in other countries (Wodak et al., 2021). Politicians challenging the legitimate right of journalists to ask certain questions is nothing new (Clayman, 2002; Ekström, 2009a; Clayman and Heritage, 2021). However, the established norms in the interaction seem to be more dramatically violated in the era of far-right populism.

In the most general terms, long-term changes in the antecedents of social action may also be observed in all the ideological and cultural-historical aspects of power (Mann, 1986) that shape participants' publicly observable behaviors (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999). Here, power influences the preconditions of social action by shaping access to information and cultural objects and possibilities to express views on them, opportunities to engage in various types of social actions in various types of contexts, and norms and ideals regarding the practices of bodily expression, language use, and social interaction in general (e.g., Engelstad, 2009; Nguyen and Nguyen, 2022).

Like the *antecedents* of social action, also its *descendents* must be considered on multiple timescales. As described in our prior discussion on *power-over* and *power-to*, accountabilities are tied to social power relations—structures that serve as fundamental antecedents of social action in interaction. Simultaneously these structures are descendents of social interaction. On the shortest timescale, they show in the relations between the different ways of constructing social action and the subsequent sequential development of interactions. For example, as demonstrated by Robinson (2006), doctors' social enquiries at the beginning of medical consultations may vary in terms of their turn design (*How are you doing?* vs *How are you feeling?*), which are associated with different types of patient responses (*Fine* vs *Much better, I feel good*). In addition to the immediate sequential consequences, many social actions are directly bound to longer-term consequences. This is the case, for example, in decision-making interactions, in which every decision involves a "commitment for future action" (Huisman, 2001; p. 70) and the capacity to avoid such commitment, in turn, may be regarded as a specific type of display of power (Stevanovic, 2021a).

The descendents of social action also include transformations of social relations. For example, as people attribute much value to the sharedness of information, their ways of referring to persons, places, objects, and events are not only about the efficiency of communicational, but about constructing the degree of distance or intimacy in a relationship (Enfield, 2006). Furthermore, members of certain communities may treat their "ownership" of certain forms of knowledge as the defining characteristic of their community (Sharrock, 1974; Knorr-Cetina, 1999), in which case successes or failures in specific types of knowledge displays may have drastic social consequences. Similarly significant social consequences can also be assumed to exist with reference to successes or failures in the displays of power and deontic authority.

To investigate the development of the deontic facet of social relations over time, some researchers have adopted a longitudinal CA perspective (Pekarek Doehler et al., 2018; Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler, 2021). Investigating the trajectory of a relationship between colleagues in a scientific laboratory, Jones (2023) showed that, at the beginning of their relationship both participants seem to orient to their own and each other's unilateral rights to determine their own actions. Over time, however, the participants started to intervene in each other's actions in an increasingly straightforward manner, also giving their co-participants access and possibilities to do so. Thus, instead of gaining in unilateral "power to," the area of this capacity became *narrower* over time. However, the area of those actions in which the participants were accountable to each other, became *broader*: both participants became to have increasingly more "power over" in relation to each other. Such transformation of power relations was observable in the minor details of the participants' conduct, as they carried out their routine activities.

Again, in the most general terms, long-term changes in the descendants of social action may be observed in all the ideological and cultural-historical aspects of power that shape participants' patterns of interpreting other people's behaviors—for example, as appropriate or inappropriate. Intriguingly, language itself is deeply intertwined with the accountabilities associated with its usage. This paradoxical phenomenon can be seen, for example, in the observation that—until recently—many everyday manifestations of sexism have usually gone unnoticed as "natural" conduct, while novel terms like "mansplaining" have begun to gain ground in shaping normative expectations of appropriate conduct and thus to change the configurations of power within society (Joyce et al., 2021).

Multi-layered approach to social power

The explanation of social power develops when the analysis of actions in interaction is related to social structures that go beyond the interaction. Social agents have capacities to influence and control, to achieve intentions or goals, in virtue of social relations constituted not only in situated interactions. The unevenly distributed access to resources for people in different social positions and roles—such as employer and employee, official and client, property owner and tenant, police and criminal suspect—is grounded in enduring, cultural and material, structures and institutions (Danermark et al., 2019; p. 84). However, as research in CA has made clear, power realizes not only in these wider social/institutional roles or identities, but also in the discursive/participant roles that are tied to the interaction (e.g., interviewer and interviewee). Thornborrow (2002; p. 35) argued that "any detailed analysis of power in interaction … needs to be informed by an account of context, the social relationships it sets up between participants, and speakers' rights and obligations in relation to their discursive and institutional roles and identities." What we are now pointing toward is, of course, a complex of research agendas and theoretical discussions. In what follows, we will limit ourselves to illustrating the multi-layered analysis of social power with a few examples related to CA research on institutional interaction.

Actors' power in their institutional roles is determined by institutional arrangements and activities outside the interactions. Exogenous conditions affect the power that can be exercised in the interaction. CA research, for example, has shown how interviews with clients are used in welfare administration to obtain

information as a basis for decisions on eligibility for services and economic support (Ekström et al., 2019). Interview practices have been proven to be crucial to the information the client provides about their situation. Practices beyond the interactions, grounded in institutional routines and regulations, however, has also shown how information from conversations with clients is devalued in relation to, for example, medical reports when the assessments and decisions on eligibility are made without the clients' involvement.

Corresponding combinations of practices within and outside interactions, regulated by institutional routines and laws, also apply to other contexts. CA research on police interviews has shown how power is negotiated and shifts as the interviews unfold. Capacities to act are grounded in pre-inscribed institutional asymmetries in participant roles and resources. Although the interviewee's power is restricted, they mobilize resources and challenge the interviewer's power to direct the conversation (Thornborrow, 2002; Haworth, 2006). The capacities of the police and criminal suspect to make an impact are also related to exogenous practices in the processing of interview data in the wider police investigation and legal process. Importantly, a local challenging of the power of the interviewer, or even recurring actions that undermine the role of the interviewer in these contexts, does not mean that the structural differences in the enduring capacities to act in such institutional interactions would necessarily dissolve.

The question authority of journalism, explored in the context of press conferences and the wider practices of news interviewing, provides a final example of how power in interaction is dependent on transformations of social roles and relations beyond the interaction. The research on press conferences (Clayman et al., 2010; Clayman and Heritage, 2021) has demonstrated how change in cultural and historical developments, and shifts in political regimes, can indeed inform the local design of social actions in interactions. Research has also shown that, in different cultures and political context, press conferences are organized in different ways, with decisive corollaries to interaction and discursive roles (Ekström and Eriksson, 2018). Journalists' opportunities to ask questions are regulated through pre-scheduled allocations of questions. In some institutional contexts, press conferences are strongly politically controlled allowing only a few pre-submitted questions. Moreover, extensive research has documented how the question authority of journalism in news interviews is challenged not only within the context of interviews but also through more general accusations of journalists and mainstream media in public discourse and populist propaganda, in the by-passing of mainstream journalism and the development of alternative contexts for mediated political discourse (Carlson et al., 2022). The multi-layered analysis of question authority thus requires CA research to be combined with other approaches to include exogenous social practices and institutional realities not manifest in interactions. The research has shown examples of how CA is combined with, for example, ethnography, but in the study of power, CA has not yet been applied integrated with other approaches. This is not to suggest an imposition of assumptions about structures on the analysis of the local interaction (Thornborrow, 2002; p. 18), but to account for exogenous social practices that create the structural conditions for journalists' power in and through the interaction.

Discussion

We have now reviewed the contributions of CA to the sociological analysis of social power and—vice versa—the contributions of the sociological analysis of power to CA. We have argued for a concept of power in which the capacities of agents to influence and a make a difference by virtue of their social relations plays a central role. CA has already provided extensive evidence of how actors capacities to accomplish actions (*power-to*) and to govern and control others (*power-over*) are realized and negotiated in practices of talk and interaction. However, the precise role in which a participant's status of power in relation to their co-participant bears on action formation and ascription and the design of action in various activity contexts remains to be studied in the future.

Here, we predict that such effects will be found with reference to all key initiating actions indicative of a power relation (e.g., proposals, instructions, orders, commands, recommendations, requests). Thus, more specific hypotheses to be tested include, for example, that:

- In a speaker-tilted power relationship (i.e., the speaker has power over the recipient), the mere descriptions of past decisions and positive evaluations of currently available options are more likely to be treated as proposals by the recipients than in an equal or in a recipient-tilted power relationship.
- In a speaker-tilted power relationship, the presentation of ideas in the form of modal-conditional declaratives and interrogatives (i.e., archetypical ways of making a proposal) is more likely associated with commanding than in an equal or in a recipient-tilted power relationship.

Responsive actions, then again, may be assumed to vary with respect to the type and amount of resistance and "ownership" displayed in relation to the constraints previously imposed. Here, specific hypotheses to be tested include, for example, that:

- In a recipient-tilted power relationship (i.e., the recipient has power over the first speaker), vary passive forms of recipient resistance (e.g., silence) are more likely to lead the first speaker to account for their prior actions, compared to how such resistance would be treated in an equal or in a speaker-tilted power relationship.
- In a speaker-tilted power relationship, the recipients are more likely to try to "own" the decisions (e.g., complying while presenting independent reasons for the compliance) that the first speakers have unjustifiably imposed on them than the recipients in an equal or in a recipient-tilted power relationship would do.

Inasmuch as precise claims about the ways in which power is part of action formation and ascription can be made, the clearer becomes its role in the understanding of the sequential organization of action in interaction—a key topic of CA.

In this paper, we have suggested that CA's empirical focus on participants' observable actions in interactions does not need

to assume a concept of power that is confined merely to actual behaviors and the outcomes of situated negotiations. On the contrary, our examples have shown how CA can contribute to an understanding of the multi-layered nature of the social relations by virtue of which actors have capacities to direct, govern, and control social interactions. Most crucially, we have argued for the sociological analyses of power that recognize the different realities of structures and agency and the emergent temporal dimensions of the structure/agency interdependency. While this notion constitutes a departure from the traditional idea of CA as a corrective alternative to sociological theorizing, we believe that the actual research within CA illustrates the importance of finding ways to move beyond the local negotiations of power toward a more encompassing view on the topic.

As sociologists we consider it important that also CA can engage in social and societal critique, and as the notion of power is an important tool to do so, we finally point to the options that a CA researcher, in our view, has in this respect. While power is obviously not always bad and destructive to those subject to and governed by it, power also creates inequalities, dominance, and oppression, which reduces the capacities and wellbeing of specific individuals and groups in society. To identify how power works, and what needs to change to counteract the negative forms of power, the sociological analysis of power, including CA, must focus on both the structural and institutional conditions of interaction and on what is going on locally in it. The analysis of power as an *antecedent* of social action, which can be observed in participants' orientations to their own and each other's accountabilities in various fields of action, allows us to identify, explore, and account for the enduring social realities that create inequal conditions for people. Likewise, the analysis of power as a *descendent* of interaction can shed light on the malleable and socially constructed nature of social reality and encourage the imagination of alternative futures with less inequalities and negative forms of power. In both ways, CA can be part of making the world into a better place.

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ME and MS have contributed to the same extent in all parts of the work behind this article. Both authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

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Accountability and interactional inequality: the management of problems of interaction as a matter of cultural ideals and ideologies

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In the existing sociological literature, the notion of accountability is seen both as a tool of sense-making (intelligibility side of accountability) and as a way of maintaining larger social order (normativity side of accountability). This paper points to drastically different ways of treating an interactional violation, depending on the precise framework within which the accountabilities associated with the violation are interpreted. The normative side of accountability involves the idea of interactional inequality—that is, the notion that people are not equally held accountable for their interactional violations. I suggest that such inequalities are strengthened by the prevailing cultural ideals and ideologies of interaction according to which a competent participant can solve interactional problems as they emerge. Problems of interaction are therefore commonly let pass, and if addressed, likely to be interpreted within the framework of intelligibility. This means that the violators are likely to get away from being held accountable in the normative sense of the term. As a result, I argue, many interactional problems are commonly beyond effective intervention. In its focus on the intelligibility side of accountability CA has, not only trouble addressing interactional inequalities, but it may also inherently undermine the severity of the inequalities to be addressed. A more critical, socially and societally relevant CA would thus benefit from a more explicit engagement with the normative side of the notion.

KEYWORDS

conversation analysis, accountability, interactional violations, problems of interaction, interactional inequality

Introduction

Conversation analysis (CA) is specialized in the analysis of how people use turns at talk and other behaviors to implement social actions (e.g., requests, proposals, and invitations) and how these actions are organized within and across interactional encounters (e.g., Heritage, 1984). This includes the consideration of how social actions are designed to be intelligible and how that intelligibility is maintained in sequences of initiating and responsive actions.

Whereas a focus on the intelligibility of action fits well with the ethnomethodological policy of indifference, it is not enough for a social scientist seeking to exercise social and societal critique. Thus, to make a positive change in the world, a CA researcher faces the need to incorporate normative notions into their inquiry. In this paper, I explore the notion of *accountability* in this regard, pointing to drastically different ways of treating an interactional violation, depending on the precise framework within which the accountabilities associated with the violation are interpreted.

In the two main sections below, I will first discuss the notion of accountability in interaction, which is followed by the consideration of people's ways of managing problems of interaction. In both sections, I will argue for the existence of what may be termed *interactional inequality*, which is suggested to be reinforced by the existing cultural ideals and ideologies regarding the management of problems of interaction. Finally, I will reflect on the position of CA in this broad field of cultural meaning-making, also considering the possibilities of a CA researcher to address interactional inequality.

Accountability in interaction

In the existing sociological literature, accountability has been seen both as a tool of sense-making (*intelligibility* side of accountability) and as a way of maintaining social order (*normativity* side of accountability).

The intelligibility side of accountability has constituted a central focus of CA. According to Garfinkel (1967), "the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those settings 'accountable'" (p. 1). Accountability is thus seen both as a starting premise and a core principle of inquiry (Koschmann, 2019). It means that social actions are already by virtue of their mere occurrence rendered intelligible—that is, mutually observable, describable, and explicable. In CA, such intelligibility is considered to emerge through a "sequential architecture of intersubjectivity" (Heritage, 1984), which relies on participants being able to orchestrate specific interactional practices to make their actions intelligible (or "account-able")—that is, recognizable and understandable as, say, requests, proposals, offers, or complaints (Schegloff, 1995; Levinson, 2013).

However, the status of an utterance or other behavior as a specific action is never more than one "possible" action among multiple possibilities. Whenever participants are challenged for their actions by their co-participants, they may deny having intended their conduct to be interpreted in that specific way. This holds even to most conventional practices to implement specific actions (Robinson, 2016, p. 9–11). According to Garfinkel (1967), a specific action, such as "an agreement, as of any particular moment, can be retrospectively reread to find out in light of present practical circumstances what the agreement 'really' consisted of" (p. 74). In other words, participants can always *post hoc* manipulate the status of their prior actions in line with their current goals and aims.

The production of intelligible courses of interaction has a normative dimension to it. Prior actions impose variably rigid normative constraints for actions to come, while a failure to produce what is normatively expected is a violation to be treated as accountable (Heritage, 1984, p. 245–253)—that is, the violator may need to provide an account for their failure. The accounts serve the maintenance of the normative organization of interaction in that they present the violations as "exceptions that prove the rule" (Heritage, 1988, p. 140). Essentially, however, it is the expectations of future accountability that guide participants' behavioral choices in the present. As pointed out by Hollander (2018), "only when people's behavior deviates significantly from what is expected are they actually called to account for it; most of the time, they discipline themselves through the anticipation of potential consequences" (p. 177).

Importantly, the normative side of accountability is not only about risking a misunderstanding or casting doubt on a person's status as a competent communicator. In addition, it encompasses people's claims of rights and obligations (e.g., Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2014), which, in turn, are linked to social identity categories (West and Zimmerman, 1987, p. 135–136). Thus, for example, when a boy is teased by being called a "sissy", this labeling triggers an "accountability ritual" (Cook, 2006), in which the boy must provide evidence that he indeed belongs in the social category of a "male"—or be excluded from social acceptability (Hollander, 2018, p. 178). The interactional endorsement of the identity claims is thus highly consequential for the participants in a long run (Schwalbe, 2008; Hollander, 2018).

The normative side of accountability is thus intertwined with power (Scott and Lyman, 1968; Cook, 2006). The powerful are shielded from accountability demands, while they can hold others accountable for their actions (West and Fenstermaker, 2002, p. 541; Hollander, 2018, p. 178). From this perspective, accountability is also a locus of, and a mechanism that serves to maintain, inequality—as famously clarified by Schwalbe (2008) in his introduction of the notion of "nets of accountability". Sometimes people may be caught in several conflicting accountability structures, such "labyrinths of accountability" supporting dominant ideologies of social hierarchy (Cottingham et al., 2016).

Managing problems of interaction

Accountability in interaction becomes apparent when problems occur. The CA notion of "repair organization" refers to the routine ways in which participants deal with problems of speaking, hearing, and understanding (Schegloff et al., 1977; Robinson, 2006; Dingemanse et al., 2015). While most trouble is resolved within the same turn of talk by the same participant whose talk embodies the trouble (Schegloff et al., 1977), co-participants may also initiate repair through various practices, such as open requests (e.g., *Huh?*), more restricted repair initiations (e.g., *Who?*), and offers of candidate understanding (e.g., *She had a boy?*).

People may, however, also choose *not* to address the problem in any way. As pointed out by Schegloff (2000), people let the problem pass in hope that "things said subsequently will clarify the problem and avoid the need to initiate repair, and if they don't, then you can ask later on when it's next relevant" (p. 116). The let-it-pass strategy serves to maintain *progressivity*. Schegloff (2007) suggested that any element that intervenes between some element and what it projects "will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk and will be examined for its import" (p. 15). Although progressivity is by far not the only concern that participants orient to, it has often been observed to take priority over other concerns, such as intersubjectivity and mutual understanding. This has been found to be the case, for example, when referring to persons or places (Heritage, 2007) or when communicating with participants with interactional deficits, such as autism (Sterponi and Fasulo, 2010) or aphasia (Perkins, 2003). Furthermore, in multi-party interaction participants have been observed to orient to questions as needing a prompt answer, even if the production of the answer would

```
183 E: yes this kind of stuff but that (.) yes (.) I've just
184    thought like that (.) .hh that just for that
185    it is kind of an occasional excess so (.) I won't start
186    like to (.) grab from the lapels like what did you
187    mean the[re or anything becau]se I've thought
188 S:          [oh no:o:,          ]
189 E: that .hh let that dust? settle in peace
190    that one should? just try to hang in there here?
```

FIGURE 1
C65_36:23 (drawn from Stevanovic et al., forthcoming).

override the right of the selected next speaker to provide it (Stivers and Robinson, 2006).

If participants tend to use the let-it-pass strategy to manage problems of speaking, hearing, and understanding, this is even more so when the problems have to do with the implicit claims of—and the co-participant's lack of endorsing—rights and obligations associated with the participant's identity. Such problems of interaction have been found to often take the form of such subtle violations of expectations that they practically circumvent any explicit accountability demands (e.g., Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2014; Stevanovic, 2018, 2021). In addition to the inherently intangible nature of these types of violations, the possibilities to address them are specifically difficult for those who suffer the most from these violations. In their theory of interactional disruption, Tavory and Fine (2020) suggested the capacities of participants to disrupt interaction are distributed unequally, following the social distribution of power and authority. The unequal distribution of the power to disrupt can, for example, clarify the structures of conversational interruption (Zimmerman and West, 1975), school bullying (Evans and Eder, 1993) and sexual harassment (McLaughlin et al., 2012). What is essential is the ability of the powerful to break the ritual expectations with respect to an interactional encounter with relative impunity, while the powerless simply let it pass (Tavory and Fine, 2020, p. 380–381).

If interactional violations are difficult to address immediately in the primary encounter, there is still the theoretical possibility for the participants to account for the problematic interactional experience in retrospect. Indeed, the production of such accounts to third parties is elementary for others to be able to evaluate the problematic situation and intervene if needed. However, the production of such accounts is a complex endeavor. The interactional violations may be generally difficult to "document" in a credible way (Acker, 2006, p. 451). Single incidents may come across as too trivial to raise (Valian, 1999; Krefting, 2003) but complaining about a common occurrence may highlight the complainer's inability to accept just how things are (Gill et al., 2017, p. 1). Furthermore, the management of interactional problems is a matter of cultural ideals and ideologies, which postulate that *whenever an interactional problem arises, a competent participant can intervene immediately*. If a participant has failed to do so and now seeks to address the problem in retrospect, they orient to a need to account for their failure of not addressing the problem immediately, as exemplified in the data extract above (see Figure 1), in which a female employee has previously reported an experience of gendered dismissal to her supervisor but now undermines the organizational relevance of her problem.

It is this mechanism—I argue—that explains the difficulties of the powerless to address interactional violations. I suggest that the mechanism works in the following way—each of the three points below constituting a hypothesis that may be subjected to empirical testing:

1. While the general preference for progressivity in interaction discourages any person to address their problematic interactional experiences, it is the powerful who control the interactional agenda and have the primary rights to disrupt the anticipated structure of the encounter. This means that, in the here and now of the interaction, the powerless are likely to let the violations pass.
2. If the violation *does* get addressed in the local context of the encounter, the violation is likely to be interpreted within the framework of intelligibility—that is, the violation can be clarified with reference to a misunderstanding and/or a problem in the given participant's communicative competence (i.e., communication skills). This means that the violator is likely to get away from being held accountable in the normative sense of the term.
3. The retrospective accounts of problematic experiences get compromised if the tellers orient to a need to present themselves as having been able to address the problem in the primary interactional event but—for some reason—chosen not to do so. Interactional inequalities are thus beyond effective intervention—not only because such problems would be difficult to address—but also because the victims of the violation themselves end up undermining the need for external intervention.

Conclusions: addressing interactional inequality

The normative notion of interactional inequality involves the idea that not all participants in interaction are similarly held accountable for their interactional violations. I suggested that such inequalities are strengthened by the prevailing cultural ideals and ideologies of interaction, which postulate that interactional problems should be addressed as soon as they occur. I argued that inequalities are maintained through a self-reinforcing cycle in which the powerless are told to account for their problematic interactional experiences *in situ*, while their failing to do so also compromises their capacities to account for these experiences in

retrospect. In this way, interactional inequalities lead to ever greater inequalities, while the powerful are increasingly shielded from accountability demands.

How can interactional inequality then be addressed—if not by the participants themselves, then at least in and through research? I maintain that such efforts necessitate a better understanding of the cultural ideals and ideologies of interaction that shape people's ideas of what a competent person should (be able to) do when interacting with others—as it were, independent of their social identity positions. A focus on communication skills training as a solution to interactional problems obscures the power-related nature of those interactional violations that certain identity populations encounter daily, while a person's inability to fill the expectations of a competent person may cause an aggregate burden, which only adds to the primary disempowering experience. Addressing interactional inequality would thus first necessitate that these mechanisms be elucidated.

Given its focus on the intelligibility side of the notion of accountability, CA has difficulties addressing interactional inequalities—a weakness that has been pointed out already in the 1990's (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999a,b). Even more, there is a risk that an (over)emphasis of the intelligibility side of the notion already itself contributes to the maintenance of interactional inequalities by inherently undermining the severity of the inequalities to be addressed through the prioritization of a power-neutral grasp of the problems. Thus, a more critical, socially and societally relevant CA would benefit from a more explicit engagement with the normative side of the notion of accountability. Such an engagement calls for complementing CA's primary empirical analysis of interactional phenomena with analysis of secondary data sets (e.g., retrospective accounts of interaction) and with extensive theorizing of the normative aspects of interaction.

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Civil inattention—On the sources of relational segregation

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The article employs ethnomethodological conversation analysis (CA) and experimental video analysis to scrutinize the gaze behavior of urban passersby. We operationalize Goffman's concept of civil inattention to make it an empirical research object with defined boundaries. Video analysis enabled measurement of gaze lengths to establish measures for "normal" gazes within civil inattention and to account for their breaches. We also studied the dependence of gazing behavior on the recipient's social appearance by comparing the unmarked condition, the experimenter wearing casual, indistinctive clothes, to marked conditions, the experimenter wearing either a distinct sunhat or an abaya and niqab. The breaches of civil inattention toward marked gaze recipients were 10-fold compared to unmarked recipients. Furthermore, the analysis points out the commonality of hitherto unknown micro gazes and multiple gazes. Together the findings suggest the existence of subconscious monitoring beneath the public social order, which pre-structures interaction order, and indicates that stigmatization is a source for relational segregation.

KEYWORDS

civil inattention, conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, gaze behavior, interaction order, relational segregation

Introduction

The idea for this study originated when Ilkka was walking with a friend who has a medical condition that causes sensitivity to direct sunlight. During summer she has to cover herself with sun protection clothes, none of which are convenient, and all look alienating. Besides clinical sun protection clothes, she has used an abaya and niqab.[1] When I was walking with her in the city center of [city] and she was wearing a niqab, I felt that she (or we) attracted some exceptional gazes, including half-hidden looks toward her/us. As vivid as the experience was, I was not certain to what degree I just made it up. An idea for a study started to evolve from that moment on.

Goffman (1963a, 1967, 1971) spent much of his career developing a new field of microsociology that explores the behavioral patterns through which the social order is created and maintained in everyday engagements. In line with then-evolving ethnomethodology, Goffman pursued a paradigm shift according to which human behavior in everyday life is not random but an orderly product. Social activities do not evolve from stochastic processes but are achievements based on actors' orientation. A key for order in public places is the distinction between "engagements" and unfocused, unratified, anonymous public behavior (Goffman, 1963a); for Goffman, what he calls "civil inattention" is a socially organized boundary mechanism through which regard without interest is allocated to unacquainted persons without sharing an invitation to become involved in engagement. Incessant maintenance of a distinction between those ratified to receive focused attention and others makes civil inattention both central to public order and enormously

1 Together the abaya and niqab comprise what is commonly known as the burkha.

common. According to Goffman (1963a, p. 101), civil inattention is the most frequent interpersonal ritual.

The introduction of a new research object, orderliness of public behavior, was in part coined with the help of a subtle concept of civil inattention that refers to a dual-edged ritual through which appreciation is granted to a recipient without allowing recognition (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84). In that way, a civil, auspicious order is maintained among non-ratified anonymous parties in the public order without giving reasons for engagement. Civil inattention is thus a delicate, artful practice, which refers to a behavioral pattern of giving a brief, unnoticeable glimpse during encounters: "In performing this courtesy the eyes of the looker may pass over the eyes of the other, but no 'recognition' is typically allowed" (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84). Goffman explains, for "persons passing on the street, civil inattention may take the special form of eyeing the other up to ~8 feet [about 2.4 m], during which time sides of the street are apportioned by gesture, and then casting the eyes down as the other passes—a kind of dimming of lights" (Goffman, 1963a).

Returning to the ethnographic epiphany, the auspicious, anonymous order seemed fragile and vulnerable to breaches. This was already noted by Goffman, who did pay attention to breaches of order, including "stares" among the unacquainted and even "hate stares" (p. 83), or failures to reciprocate friendly gazes, called "cuts" (p. 115). Referring to J. H. Griffin, Goffman (1963a) considered hate stares as akin to what "a Southern white sometimes gratuitously gives to Negroes walking past him[2]". In 1971, Goffman articulated a wider framework of primatology for gaze behavior, including dominance hierarchies, "character contests" (p. 16), and an extension to remedial exchanges. Systematic studies of gaze behavior in public places have remained relatively rare, yet some examples are discussed in the next section. Nor has there been a solid development of studies on the relationship of public behavior and relational segregation discussed by Gardner (1980), Collins (1981), Goffman (1983), or Giddens (1990, p. 81–82).

Accordingly, we designed a field experiment to test the gaze behavior of urban passersby between varying social group members in the [city] cityscape. The experiment involves several elements and aims. First, we wanted to empirically explore whether civil inattention is observable between unacquainted passersby. Second, we aim at making the lengths of gazes measurable to establish measures of "normal" gazes within civil inattention and breaches from that. Finally, following the ethnographic epiphany we include a comparative dimension to see whether civil inattention is dependent on the social category of the person viewed. To operationalize the social category, we dressed up the experimenter (always the same person) with three different sets of clothes: casual "unnoticeable" western clothing, a distinctive sun hat that covered the face, and an abaya and niqab. A pedestrian with casual western clothes indexed an ordinary passerby; a pedestrian with a distinctive sun hat[3] indexed a deviance from normal appearances without any explicit symbolic content; and a pedestrian with abaya and niqab indexed a tie to an identifiable social group with a symbolic religious value (Tarlo, 2010; Almila, 2016). The pedestrian with casual clothes could be used to establish the standards of gaze behavior among unmarked pedestrians in the [city] cityscape. With the help of marked choices of clothes, the dependence of civil inattention on social category was explored. In the data and methods section, we discuss the details of the experiment and the technologies utilized both in the experiment and in the analysis.

We will next examine the salience of gaze behavior for public order, and some attempts to empirically address the alleged phenomenon of civil inattention. We will then open the data and methods of our experimental research design, as well as its ethics. Our analysis concerns the measurability of public gaze behavior, empirical measures for the gaze in civil inattention and the types of breaches of normality. In the second part of the analysis, comparative measurements are utilized to determine the category boundedness of gaze behavior toward members of different social categories. In the discussion, we elaborate the empirical findings on the existence of civil inattention and the social determinants of breaches of civility. We close the discussion by expounding on civil inattention as a boundary mechanism that to some extent grants exclusive auspicious public order; passersby who deviate from normal appearances may not be granted the same level of approval and civility in public areas as those whose appearance confirms the local cultural norms. The analysis shows that the amount of uncivil attention follows categoric identification; the consequent relational segregation may form a basis for recognition disparity that hinders the participation of stigmatized groups to civic sphere.

Civil inattention

Erving Goffman's studies of behavior in public places (Goffman, 1963a, 1967, 1971) addressed the patterns through which parties expressed respect to each other's need for personal space in otherwise crowded surroundings. In a modern cityscape, every individual daily passes a countless number of others, and sharing attention with everyone is simply impossible. Consequently, the passing of two individuals in the street should remain unfocused so that both parties maximally glance each other briefly while passing in and then out of view (Goffman, 1963a, p. 83–88).

In practice, a passerby walking down the street is constantly "scanning" an oval-shaped area ahead them, longer in the front and narrower on their sides, and briefly checking the individuals who are entering this area to avoid collision. If nothing alarming is detected, both interactants may feel at ease and turn their attention elsewhere (Goffman, 1971, p. 11–13). Inasmuch as the civil inattention thus formed may just be a conventional, routinized ritual, its breaches might be considered alarming (Goffman, 1971, p. 246–247). The closer one gets to the passerby, the more important the maintenance of civil inattention becomes. At a close distance, the exposure to possible staring grows (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84–85). As a ritual designed to maintain each other's personal space, civil inattention is a moral obligation between respectful individuals (Goffman, 1967).

Unfocused interaction, even a brief passing, also conveys information; individual appearances and gestures are modes of

2 We apologize for the inappropriate language. Notably, J. H. Griffin was a citizen rights activist and critical toward all racial discrimination.

3 The sun hat was from a global online store, and it did not represent any known ethnic or religious group, either for us or in its marketing.

communication (Goffman, 1963a, p. 33–34). Goffman (1963a, p. 84) defines the function of civil inattention as follows: "one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present … while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from him so as to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design." As civil inattention signals mutual respect and acceptance, it forms an implicit social contract between passersby and gains a normative weight. It is the key for mutual facework; each individual projects claims of self-approval and confirms the claims of others (Goffman, 1967, p. 105–106). It expresses acknowledgment of the other's presence and the absence of any fear, hostility, or avoidance toward the other (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84–85). Therefore, any breach of civil inattention—both by not looking or by staring openly—challenges the norms of public behavior. By neglecting patterns of respectful behavior, the individual withdraws from giving others signals of acceptance.

Soon after Goffman, Cary (1978) conducted experiments to see whether civil inattention as defined exists. The first two studies included the use of a hidden camera, which captured pictures of passings at a university campus. The results showed no distinct head movements that would support the existence of civil inattention; however, compared to present technology, the recording methods were insufficient. After Cary, more recent studies have supported the existence of civil inattention. Zuckerman et al. (1983) discovered that in elevators, most passengers looked at the experimenter once or twice, while the gazes remained relatively brief (median 0.35 s). Moreover, civil inattention was rated as the politest form of behavior. Hirschauer (2005) further confirmed the salience of civil inattention in elevators. Furthermore, Haddington (2012) showed how civil inattention is maintained even in exceptional situations, establishing a rule of the maintenance of polite distance on all occasions.

De Stefani and Mondada's (2018) video recordings of public encounters show how the transition from unfocused to focused interaction between unacquainted individuals is accomplished by adjusting both the trajectory and the bodily orientation toward the target individual. However, the shift away from civil inattention requires a verbal account, such as for example, asking directions (De Stefani and Mondada, 2018). Also, additional attention without entitlement is considered rude. Horgan (2020) examined breaches of civil inattention, which he coined "uncivil." According to Horgan's interviews, uncivil encounters are not rare: over a quarter of the participants reported experiencing uncivility from an unacquainted person during the past week, and over a half during the past month. However, Horgan (2020) did not focus on gaze behavior: instead, his interest lays in more direct rude behavior, such as street remarks, bumping into someone without apologizing, cutting in line, or even threats of violence. We might expect that uncivil gaze behavior exists as well.

The concept of normality is a key for civil inattention; according to Goffman (1963a), an open stare is a signal that exposes undesirable attributes of the receiver, implying that they lack the right to receive civil inattention. In brief encounters between passersby, this evaluation is based on first impressions, the importance of which Goffman (1959, p. 22–24) highlights. Based on his studies, Goffman (1963a, p. 11) suggests that "fitting in" (i.e., following the behavioral patterns of the common public) seems to be primordial for any situation. Being "inappropriate" may lead to the individual being stared at, or alternatively neglected, or treated as a non-person. Both excessive attention and withholding of attention may be used as negative social sanctions. A similar duality is also found in extended gazes, which may signal positive attention, admiration, and interest (Mason et al., 2005). An experiment conducted by Patterson et al. (2010) shows how passersby display significantly more glances if gazed at first, and even more so if smiled at.

Civil inattention is maintained until something begs for extra attention, be it positive or negative. According to Goffman (1971, p. 239–247), normal appearances signal stability, giving the individual a chance to continue their own business without concern. But normality is also a moral requirement. When an individual breaks the limits of standard behavior, one may receive an "overlong look," which suggests that corrective behavior is required. As for personal appearances, it "is usually the case that normal appearances, typical appearances, and proper appearances are much the same" (Goffman, 1971, p. 240). The visual presentation, then, affects how random passersby interpret each other merely by gazing. In addition to personal features, prejudices toward certain cultural or racialized appearances affect this treatment. It is possible that the performance of civil inattention varies, not only between different cultures (Watson, 1970; Rossano, 2013) but also depending on the expected social status of the receiver (Gobel et al., 2015). Gardner (1980) emphasizes that the norm of civil inattention differs significantly, depending on the gender of the other party: just like children or racialized persons, women are easy targets for both positive and negative attention. Patterson's (2005) empirical study of passings between unacquainted on a college campus concluded that female confederates received four times more gazes than males. Regardless of the reasons for the gaze, the target typically recognizes the extra attention and may aim at disguising themself to ensure the other that nothing untoward is taking place. As a result, self-aware normality will be performed (Goffman, 1971, p. 256–273).

First impressions, clothing, and veiling

Human visual sensory mechanisms operate at an astonishing speed. According to Thorpe et al. (1996), it takes only 20 ms to pass a go/no-go categorization test (e.g., whether there is an animal in the picture) with 94% accuracy. Further, categorization of an object takes barely more time than detection; as soon as we notice something, we perceive what it is (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher, 2005). Willis and Todorov (2006) present evidence for rapid first impressions between persons. While 100 ms is sufficient for forming a first impression of a person, one additional second of evaluation time does not essentially change it. In more complex visual social clues combining gaze direction, pointing gesture, and emotion, all these signals are fully integrated at 200 ms (Conty et al., 2012). Behind all this is a human interaction engine; the average time lapse between turns in conversation is around 0–200 ms, with visual communication cues further speeding the processing of language

(Hömke et al., 2017; Holler and Levinson, 2019; Levinson, 2020).

As a form of collecting information and organizing interaction accordingly (Rossano et al., 2009), gaze is also an important dimension of personal space. Due to the rapid visual system, ordinary encounters proceed smoothly without extended gazes. An impression that indexes a breach of normality calls for making a prolonged gaze, with the help of which abnormality is categorized and made manageable (Garland-Thompson, 2006). Impressions are holistic; they merge outlook, behavior, and visual characteristics, such as attire, into a categorical whole. Clothing works as an important type of non-verbal communication in conveying the social characteristics of passersby. Therefore, clothing may affect the gaze behavior between passers-by. Furthermore, the types of outfits worn may invoke related types of gaze behavior. El-Geledi and Bourhis (2012) found that students in Quebec assessed a person with Western clothes more positively than a person wearing a Muslim hijab, while a person with a niqab (face veil) scored even more negatively. Equally, Muslim women's veiling with either a hijab or a niqab was assessed negatively by British students (Everett et al., 2014). In Western media representations, burqas and other types of Muslim veiling are presented as oppressive (Rantanen, 2005). For the Dutch, face veils tend to evoke feelings of anxiety, fear, and even hate (Moors, 2009). In Finland, and presumably in many other Western countries, face veils paradoxically make women more visible, and they symbolize difference; veiled women get labeled Muslim above anything else (Karhunen, 2022). Finnish Muslims report themselves to be distinct from the Finnish majority and find it difficult to be both Muslim and Finnish (Pauha, 2018). Muslim veiling is also a way to strengthen one's identity category, although it may result in harmful miscategorizations by others (Hopkins and Greenwood, 2013). This is especially true for face-veiling. Almila (2016) describes wearing face-veiling in Finland as a form of resistance against prevailing social norms; however, it puts the person in a vulnerable position, being judged by the non-Muslim majority and assessed by other Muslims.

Although Muslim veiling has raised political debates in Western countries (Moors, 2009; Shirazi and Mishra, 2010), people who wear face veils are a small minority. For example, the estimate of the Finnish Muslim population was 120,000–130,000[4] in 2022. Although percentages are growing in many countries, only a minority of Muslims wear traditional clothes, at least in Finland. Konttori (2022) estimated that only some hundreds of Muslim women in Finland wear niqabs.[5] Also, the attitudes toward Muslim veiling have predominantly been negative in Finland. About 37% of Finns had a negative or very negative attitude toward a hijab, and 72% toward a niqab (Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2012, p. 51). Overall, Finns have rather negative attitudes toward Islam, also more negative than many other European countries (Martikainen, 2020; Karhunen, 2022).

In Western countries, one of the main public concerns regarding women wearing niqabs is the lack of emotional signals and facial recognition due to the lower part of the face being covered. Fischer et al. (2011) found that a viewer tends to interpret more negative emotions from a partly covered face, both in niqab and computer-altered control-case conditions. The negative interpretations then affect one's attitudes toward covering the face, which are also potentially strengthened by existing stereotypes. Tarlo (2010) has witnessed excessive staring toward women in niqabs, which is explained, for instance, by the "need to look harder to reassure yourself that there is a person under there" (Tarlo, 2010, p. 134). Moreover, according to Moors (2009), one of the reasons behind the discomfort caused by interacting with a person wearing a face-veil is the fact that "the face-veil itself enables them to see without being seen." Based on these findings, a niqab not only reveals the affiliation but also disguises the gaze; in addition to negative stereotypes the lack of visible cues and interaction may cause discomfort.

Data and methods

We conducted a field experiment to test the gaze behavior of urban passersby between members of varying social groups in the [city] cityscape. The data was collected during six 90-min afternoon sessions in late August and early September 2017. We used a hidden GoPro 5 video camera, which was attached to the experimenter's chest, to record and analyze the gaze behavior of random passersby. All the sessions took place in central [city] within a preplanned walking route. During these sessions, the experimenter wore three different outfits: (1) a regular Western outfit, (2) a face-covering sun hat paired with dark sunglasses, and (3) an abaya with a niqab. Of these three outfits, the regular Western outfit worked as a baseline of gaze behavior. The experimenter was instructed to behave "normally," that is, not to intentionally avoid gaze contact but not to seek it either. Consequently, data cannot answer questions of reciprocity (i.e., whether extended gazes or an avoidance of gazes could be invoked). On the other hand, the data reflects uninvited departures from "normal" gazes. The recordings in total produced ∼3 h of video data for each of the three different outfits. In addition, we had an assistant following and observing the situations during the recording sessions. This observation produced some notes, which were used to complement and assess our video data during the initial analysis.

Figure 1 presents each of the outfits. On the left, the experimenter is wearing her regular clothing, which does not stand out from the crowd in [city]. In the middle, she has the same outfit but combined with a face-covering sun hat and a pair of dark sunglasses (the anonymization by a negative picture may exaggerate the peculiarity of the sun hat). On the right, she is wearing a completely black outfit, an abaya with a niqab. The video camera is slightly visible in the last photo: an observable reader might detect a small square (the lens of the camera) on the experimenter's chest. In brief passings, it is unlikely that the camera could be detected. In both the sun hat and niqab outfits, the experimenter's face is

4 The total population in Finland is above 5.5 million. There is no official number of Muslims, because the majority of Finnish Muslims do not belong to a registered religious community.

5 Konttori's observation of the rarity of niqabs is certainly true in the city center of [city]. In certain districts, Muslim population percentages are relatively high, and traditional Muslim attires are not uncommon there.



FIGURE 1
Experimenter with three different outfits.

covered, and even more so in the sun hat since the dark sunglasses hide the experimenter's gaze completely. However, unlike the niqab, the sun hat is not a symbol of any religious or ethnic affiliation.

Our research design is a mixed-methods study combining ethnomethodological conversation analysis (CA) and experimental video analysis. Ethnomethodology refers to the study of the ways in which people build meanings together. Following Goffman (1963a, 1967, 1971) work, we approach gaze behavior as meaningful interaction between the participants. Based on the ethnomethodological standards of analysis, we do not attempt to interpret the hidden intentions of the passersby. Rather, we focus our attention on the observable gaze behavior, also excluding facial or bodily gestures, which would only become relevant if the ecological huddle, ratified encounter, has been established. The gaze contact precedes the formation of the encounter, then allowing a wider variety of semiotic resources. Although there is no verbal interaction in our data, the interactions are multimodal: the gaze is a means of embodied interaction, as is the physical movement of the passersby in the surrounding environment. For the purposes of this study, the precise temporal organization of gazing is especially important. This embodied multimodality is accounted for in our transcripts, inspired by Mondada (2018) multimodal conversation analytical transcriptions.

Experimental video analysis allowed a quantitative approach. The quantity of all potential cases (i.e., direct passings between the experimenter and other pedestrians) was estimated to be around 700 per outfit. In addition, the data contains about as many non-valid cases, due to backlit or shaky footage, too-crowded places, passersby wearing dark sunglasses, children, and smartphone users; these were all excluded. After excluding the non-valid cases, 100 cases were randomly selected for each type of outfit (50 cases from each of the six sessions), with the total N being 300. Although the amount of included data is limited, it permits some statistical findings and is still analyzable qualitatively. The GoPro camera cut each recording into 10 clips, which we used as a loose structure for our sampling. As a result, the guideline was to pick cases as symmetrically as possible throughout the data (only excluding technically or otherwise non-valid cases). The selected cases include both single passersby and pairs or groups of people as well as people of varying age, gender, and ethnicity.

These selected cases were analyzed first by simply watching them multiple times. At this stage, we focused on general impressions, such as possible gazing and its duration. More detailed analysis was accomplished by utilizing the video analysis program Adobe Premier Pro, by means of which the exact duration of the gazes could be calculated with 0.01-s accuracy. The program allowed examination of cases as series of individual frames, thereby creating precise timelines for each clip. With maximum frame-per-second settings and an effective zooming tool, it is possible to define the exact starting and ending points of the gazes and gestures. Moreover, this method allowed us to detect subtle gazes from a further distance which exceeded the limits of ethnographic observation. We focused on finding out: whether the passerby gazes at the experimenter and, if so, how long, and whether there are multiple gazes during the passing. Distinctive head movements were also considered. Finally, the comparison between the gaze behavior for the three different outfits is based on statistical analysis.

The research practices follow the guidelines of the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity. Although consent to participate was not requested in advance, the research is justified and could not have been carried out if the participants were asked for their consent to participate in the research. Data collection did not cause damage or harm to the participants. An ethical approval

statement can be given by the review board. Ethically, this is a unique situation since we collected video recordings of a large number of passersby who did not know that they were being filmed. Finnish law allows filming in public places without asking consent from the persons visible in the recordings. The research ethics are maintained by preserving the anonymity of each subject of our data and by focusing solely on the larger patterns of gaze behavior instead of the personal traits of identifiable passersby. We also excluded children from our data. The usage of a hidden camera method is justified by the unique data it offers; we were able to gather a large data set of natural social behavior in high detail and quality. This would not have been possible had the participants been aware of the filming. In addition, video analysis is very useful for studying aspects of micro interactions that tend to be taken for granted as the subjects are most likely not completely self-conscious therefore it may reveal aspects of behavior with potential causal relations more accurately than more conventional methods, such as interviews or researcher observation.

We begin our analysis by examining possible classes of gaze behavior; initially looking at brief gazes that may represent civil inattention, and then narrowing down the empirical limits of observable civil inattention to a class in between non-gazes and extended gazes. After accounting for the varieties of gaze behavior, we continue by quantifying the initially qualitative data; we then aim to operationalize possible classes of gaze behavior, starting from zero cases where there is no gazing during the encounter to extended gazing that exceeds civil inattention. Finally, the quantitative measurements enable comparisons between the different data sets and thereby estimate the causal relations between the visual appearance of the experimenter and the gazes she received (Arminen, 2009).

Analysis

We start our analysis with a qualitative assessment of public gaze behavior and try to specify Goffman's notion of civil inattention. We begin with very brief gazes and explicate their variations. Continuing from these, we try to explicate what other types of gazing behavior exist in the streets. Among these, we discuss passings without gazing and then move on to more distinct types of gazes that could be considered breaches of civil inattention. Throughout this section, we utilize multimodal transcriptions with some anonymized stills. Here, our aim is to introduce the reader to various types of gaze behavior in practice. After the qualitative findings, we present the counts of gaze behavior types as an aggregated quantitative result of public gaze behavior.

Civil gazes

As discussed above, according to Goffman (1963a), civil inattention is the prevailing ritual between unacquainted individuals passing each other in urban public places. Notably, Goffman (1983, p. 6) focuses on persons as vehicular entities, that is, human ambulatory units, thereby suggesting that gazes are environmentally coupled with embodied mobile activity, as Goffman's follower Goodwin (2007) might have put it. Perhaps the most detailed explication of civil inattention characterizes it as a brief glance during passing, given around eight feet and then ended as the eyes are cast down as the other passes (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84). Given that in passing both parties are moving in direction toward the other, the characterization allows to operationalize the duration of civil inattention as a movement (see also Patterson, 2005). The brevity of gaze seems to be set around two steps or less, as with two steps of both parties passing have progressed to proximity that would strengthen the intensity of the gaze maintained to the degree that it would no longer be felt as "civil" but as an intense glance that would transfer the parties beyond disengagement. Indeed, in our material we do have several cases of that type, which we will discuss later.

In the following example, a case of civil inattention between passersby is shown.[6] The passerby casts a brief gaze at the experimenter after crossing the street and noticing the upcoming passing. The gaze remains brief, just about one step long, as can be seen from stills.[7]

Excerpt 1



¤ Frame 1: a brief gaze

Frame 2: the gaze ends

1 The passerby	>> walks (2.0s)
2	>> ¤ gazes at the experimenter, walks (0.14s)
3	>> # gazes down, walks (1.51s)

The passerby in this case approaches on a quiet street where both parties have visual access to the upcoming passing. In frame 1, the subject gazes briefly toward the experimenter. The duration of the gaze is very short. In frame 2, the passerby has already turned their gaze down. The precise distance between the passerby and the experimenter is hard to gauge, but the brief glance may have been initiated at a distance of roughly 2.5–3 m. The gazing takes place during a single step: in frame 1, the subject's front foot is taking a step, and in frame 2, the front foot has landed, and the back foot is starting to take another step as the gaze ends. This seems to be an archetypal case of civil inattention that matches well with Goffman (1963a, p. 84–85) characterization: it demonstrates that

6 The transcript begins from the precise moment when the passerby becomes visible in the video recording and ends at their disappearance after passing. Here the total length of the episode is 3.65 s.

7 The anonymized stills with a limited number of pixels do not really enable access to the gaze direction of subtle, brief gazes where the head is not visibly rotated. Due to the procedure where consent could not be requested in advance or where contacting more than 2,000 passersby afterwards would have not been feasible, anonymization remains a necessity. In any case, the embodied aspects of alleged gazes can be shown with anonymized stills.

the passersby are scanning the surroundings as they proceed further and, as nothing causes alarm, the gaze is swiftly aimed down again. Anyhow, with the brief glance the passerby has communicated acknowledgment of the other, and by a rapid turning away of the gaze, the other's social space is recognized and intrusion into it is sanctioned by avoidance.

As noted also in the transcript above, our procedure allowed timing of gaze, which here is 0.14 s. According to Goffman (1963a, p. 84), "one gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present," which would minimally require the other to be peripherally aware of the gaze behavior. Following Goffman (1981), Heath and Luff (1992), and vom Lehn et al. (2001) have explored peripheral awareness, that is, people's ability to process and utilize information of phenomena that are not in the focus but the periphery of attention. Very brief glances, or civil inattention, may allow a viewed person to be peripherally aware of the appreciation received, without having focused attention to the appreciation given. It may well be that 140 ms is not long enough for a focused mutual gaze contact, where a person had noticed another having noticed one's gaze, but it may be long enough to get a peripheral sense of a noticing, that is, someone having given a glance. In that way, brief glances may also establish the ritual nature of civil inattention, as Goffman suggested.

Although video analysis supports the existence of civil inattention, it also provides the basis for detailing, specifying, and elaborating it. First, the coupling of gait and gaze allowed us to consider a simple matrix of operationalization. Accordingly, at its shortest a brief glance of a pedestrian lasts less than a step. Indeed, the median length of our civil inattention cases is 60 ms, about half of the length of example (1), in which the gaze lasted almost a full step. In standard CA terminology (Sidnell and Stivers, 2012), cases that are shorter than a mini pause do not allow establishment of a mutual focused gaze exchange but may enable peripheral awareness. Two-step-long gazes (at a "normal" pace) can last up to 500 ms. They may be long enough for the other to notice another's noticing but still short enough to not yet to comprise a noticeable stare. Indeed, these longer glances may still be civil in the sense that the onlooker may have turned their gaze away after noticing that they were noticed.[8] Therefore, the boundary of civil inattention might benefit from a closer look.[9] Finally, it seems that gazing-aways after the "civil inattention" glance can vary. Goffman suggested that a gaze is closed by turning eyes down "a kind of dimming of lights" (Goffman, 1963a, p. 84). Empirically, an equally common pattern is to turn the gaze straight forward or completely away. Though Goffman's ethnographic insight and precision is admirable, ethnography has its limitations.

Modifications of civil inattention

A closer analysis of videotaped passings also revealed some aspects of civil inattention not discussed by Goffman. In many cases there are more than one gaze. Most likely, multiple gazes are not uncommon, and their detection depends on the observation methods used. If gazes are very short, <100 ms, they practically evade focused ethnographic observation; an ethnographer may become peripherally aware of them but remain unable to provide focused accounts of them. Very brief cases or series of them are not accountable; hence, Goffman did not discuss them. With the help of technical analysis, by exploring videos composed of series of individual frames, an analyst can pay attention to the minutiae of gazes that escape ethnography. In (2), the passerby gives two brief gazes, both of which are very short. On line 2, the passerby gives a gaze which lasts only 0.06 s. The gaze is barely noticeable, given the distance before passing. After the initial gaze, the passerby gazes away for almost a second, and then gazes again. The second gaze (line 4) is even briefer than the first one and could be characterized as a glimpse. During the actual passing, the passerby does not gaze at the experimenter.

Excerpt 2

1 The passerby	>> walks (1.57s)
2	>> gazes at the experimenter, walks (0.06s)
3	>> gazes away, walks (0.89s)
4	>> gazes at the experimenter, walks (0.05s)
5	>> gazes away, walks (1.42s)

Both gazes in (2) are very brief and subtle, almost unnoticeable, and do not break the norm of polite distance. As (2) shows, both gazes are made from a distance with respect to the personal space of the experimenter; even after the second gaze, it still takes the passerby 1.42 s to pass the experimenter. The passing takes place on a relatively empty street, which makes the experimenter visually accessible already at a distance.

Although image identification can be reached as fast as 20 ms, more complex information-processing, combining aspects of an image, can easily take 200 ms (Conty et al., 2012). This would suggest that these very brief gazes, micro gazes as we would call them, are so short that the gaze does not seem to have stopped for a longer period; the image glanced appears not to have invoked a task of a more thorough exploration of the gaze object. These micro gazes may have been just a part of a pedestrian's routine scanning of the social scene, and they do not display greater involvement or interest. However, as with civil inattention more generally, these multiple gazes vary in length. Glances of up to half a second are different from micro gazes. Even when none of the multiple gazes are above 500 ms, the accumulation of more than one gaze may indicate more involvement than gazing once. If none of the gazes are no longer than 500 ms, the on-looker refrains from breaching civil inattention but commits themself to a particular gaze behavior. Gazing twice allows the passerby to gather more visual information than just one gaze, while not becoming openly impolite. We argue that the cases with two short gazes can be labeled as a subcategory of civil inattention; they are distinct from singular gazes but do not become engrossed in or seek engagement, and they maintain the spirit of civil inattention. Multiple gazes also stress the need for further studies, as the boundary between civil inattention and its breaches does not appear clean-cut.

8 Our procedure does not allow us to explore reciprocity of gaze. Basically, we posit that a half-second gaze is long enough to be noticed but not yet a stare.

9 We aim to develop the analysis further by comparing brief and longer cases of "civil inattention," but more on that in another publication.

Passing without gazing

Civil inattention arises out of an ecology of involvements. It is a behavioral ritual to maintain auspicious public order without posing obligations to become engaged in interactions with unacqainted (Goffman, 1963a). The ecology of involvement includes structured practices of how involvements are allocated. In as much as a cityscape is composed of mobile individuals, there may happen millions of passings a day within an urban area (Giddens, 1990, p. 81). Moreover, mobility is a part of the ecology of involvements as it is itself a kind of involvement: mobile individuals are involved in getting somewhere, or away from somewhere. Of course, immobile pedestrians are also occupied with something. They may seem not to be doing anything, which may stand for doing as waiting; that is, they are occupied by their expectation of something (Ayass, 2020). Also, loitering can itself become an occupation, at least for street-corner gang members (Whyte, 2012). All involvements around which activities may become organized establish engagements that cut the parties away from the disengaged public order between detached individuals. Mobile pedestrians may have constraining involvements, too. Not untypically, people may be shielded by their engagement with smartphones (Ayass, 2014), but we excluded these cases of screen engagement from the data. Sometimes groups, or pairs, can be exclusively oriented to their conversations.[10] Goffman (1963a) also discusses "aways" and occult involvements, when people are, so to speak, gazing inwards: passersby simply gaze down or keep the gaze seemingly unfocused, apparently lost in their own thoughts. Thus, involvements other than gazing passersby may become exclusive. Finally, there is also an economy of gazes. Gazes, like turns at talk (Sacks et al., 1974), are a sparse resource. A focused gaze somewhere means that it is away from elsewhere as a figure/ground distinction is made (Goodwin, 1994), and the ground is left with only peripheral attention. A busy cityscape poses a challenge to the economy of gaze, as it would be laborious to cast an equal gaze at every single passerby individually. Instead, peripheral attention may be the solution for the challenge of gaze resource limitations, and it provides one occasioned reason for a lack of gazes.

As civil inattention is based on peripheral awareness, and its civility, unobtrusiveness, makes its unaccountable, passings without gazes do not challenge the auspicious public order. All in all, it is not uncommon to pass passersby who do not cast the slightest gaze, even though they do not seem to be occupied with anything particular—or at least not in the way that would be decipherable from the recordings. During passing, a passerby may gaze straight ahead or slightly down, or alternatively focus their gaze elsewhere. In Excerpt 3, the passerby would have had plenty of time to gaze at the experimenter, but they look straight past her during the whole 3.63-s passing in a quiet street.

Excerpt 3

1 The passerby	>> walks toward, gazes straight ahead (3.63s)
	>> passes

As such, passing without gazing is not accountable or noticeable. As an ethnographic note, neither the experimenter nor the assistant paid any extra attention to these passings; not receiving gazes from passersby feels perfectly normal. Not gazing seems to be taken for granted and is not taken to be accountable; it forms a part of the normal anonymous urban scene. It is also important to note that although the passerby is not gazing directly at the experimenter, their peripheral vision most likely captures her presence, allowing the passerby to adjust to the upcoming passing and navigate movements in a manner that displays recognition of personal space.

Not gazing is different from a concerted display of avoiding gazing. Goffman (1963a, p. 83) discusses non-person treatment, referring to practices that somebody is "not worthy of a glance," meaning a civil gaze. Both hate stares (already discussed) and ways of treating others as if they were not there can be non-person treatments. Here, Goffman is exceptionally vacuous. The groups of people he mentions—children, servants, Negros and mental patients—categorically belong to varying social situations where "non-person treatments" rely on different interactional practices and vary in their consequences.[11] More importantly, most of the "non-person treatments" take place in focused interactions. Some practices, such as avoiding gazing beggars (Lankenau, 1999), are done to maintain anonymous order by resisting attempts to breach it. Our interest only includes practices that take place in unfocused public space. These may involve "hate stares," but it is not yet clear if they encompass practices of "not looking." Goffman does discuss the right, or entitlement, to civil inattention, and suggests that uncivil behavior, such as staring at others, may weaken the expectation of civil treatment. Here also, Goffman does not go all the way; he suggests that there are a set of systematic practices to deprive personhood in unfocused interactions, apart from hate stares. Displays of not seeing could work that way, and would be based on the observability of gazing (Kidwell and Reynolds, 2022). In our material, there is one case (out of about 2,000 passings) in which a person builds a dramaturgic performance of not gazing the passerby. This performance would be of interest as such, but it is not included in the set of analyzed cases of this article. All in all, not gazing as such does not seem to constitute "non-person treatment," which fits well with the nature of civil inattention and auspicious public order being based on peripheral awareness.

Breaches of civil inattention

So far, we have dealt with unobtrusive gaze behaviors in public space. There are also types of gaze behavior that go beyond that,

10 Our data sample includes 13 passersby who were conversing. The engagement in the conversation does not as such exclude the possibility of monitoring the environment. Some parties in the conversation do gaze at the experimenter. Such cases are excluded from the data only when visibility of their eyes was hindered by others (i.e., a crowd or a group ahead of the passerby).

11 Among others, we could differentiate the attention deficit toward the assisting staff, how "adult talk" is established by not attending children, how institutional care is organized, etc. Many of these are based on institutionalized arrangements that presuppose engagement. Expressions of hate are an exception to that.

breaches of civil inattention. In some instances, the passerby invests some additional attention in the object of the gaze during the passing. These cases vary in the intensity of involvement and can be discussed as separate gaze types. We will present three types of gazes in a hierarchical order, starting from "smallish" extensions and moving toward more overt breaches of civility. Throughout the section, we will try to show how the norms of civil public behavior are broken.

Intensified gazes

The boundary between civil and uncivil attention is not clear-cut. Goffman notes that the closer the participants of gazing are, the more the intensity of gaze grows. In cases when the gaze continues just a bit longer, it becomes noticeable, even if did not establish a proper stare. Intensified gazes form a border zone between civil inattention and marked gaze contacts. The intensity of gaze is largely brought through proximity to the gaze target. The gaze may be maintained just a fraction of a second longer, so that it still prevails at a close distance; the head may also be rotated noticeably just before passing. The gaze itself may remain relatively brief. What makes intensified gazes distinct from civil inattention is the unavoidable involvement: the receiver will always be able to detect the gaze, and the illusion of privacy will be shattered as a result. In (4), the passerby gazes briefly from a further distance but then gazes again right before passing. This latter gaze gets the emphasis of the rotating head, which turns toward the experimenter, allowing direct and undisguised observation at a close distance.

Excerpt 4



¤ Frame 1: no gaze # Frame 2: direct gaze in close proximity

1 The passerby	>> walks (0.80s)
2	>> gazes at the experimenter, walks (0.05s)
3	>> gazes away, walks (0.40s) ¤ (0.10s)
4	>> gazes at the experimenter, axis toward (0.40s) # (0.20s)
5	>> gazes away, walks (0.48s)

On line 2, the subject casts a micro gaze from a further distance, and then the gaze is quickly dropped (frame 1). This very brief gazing does not invite gaze contact. In contrast, the gaze right before the passing (line 4, frame 2) is direct and noticeable, although relatively brief (0.6 s). Intensity is stressed also by the proximity: the gaze is from a closer distance than the gazes in civil inattention examples. The subject is positioned right in front of the experimenter, about to pass her on the left. During the gaze, the subject's head turns slightly toward the experimenter, which adds more emphasis to the gaze. As a result, the gaze seems very direct and open. Although the gaze is not very long, the proximity and the head movement make it intense, differentiating it from civil inattention. This type of gaze is always observable by the receiver.

Extended side gazes

Extended gazes are a type of more prominent breaches of civil inattention. In these cases, the passerby does not retract the gaze after a brief scanning but casts a longish look on a person. An extended gaze signals increased interest toward the target individual; as discussed above, extended maintaining of visual contact does something other than granting personal space. Operationalizing Goffman, we suggest that gazes closer to a second are long enough that the onlooker appears to be engaged in a focused gaze that may continue despite being (potentially) noticed.[12] Thus, we suggest that about a second is a justifiable lower limit for an "overlong" look, something that could be called a stare that clearly breaches civility. As a further qualification, the gaze length is only an aspect that impacts its intensity and noticeability. Goffman (1963a) notes that if you are far enough away, you may "safely" look longer than civility allows at a closer proximity. The head pose further impacts how observable the gazes are; the subject may gaze either indirectly (i.e., performing a sidelong gaze from the corner of their eye) or gaze overtly with a rotation of the head toward the target. For these reasons, extended gazes are variable also in terms of their proximity and openness; hence, we cannot establish context-free absolute, precise limits for them.

Excerpt 5 is an example of an extended side gaze. The passerby approaches the experimenter on an empty street with no visual obstacles, gazes from a further distance and keeps gazing all the way until passing the experimenter completely. However, although this gaze is very long in duration, the subject maintains some level of discretion by gazing sidelong.

Excerpt 5



¤ Frame 1: start of the gaze # Frame 2: the gaze continues during the passing

1 The passerby	>>walks (1.51s)
2	>> ¤ gazes at the experimenter, axis forward, walks (1.70) # (0.20s)

12 The counter argument is that the gaze became extended, as the experimenter had withheld attention from the passerby. Our limitation is that we do not have data of the experimenter's gaze movements. We just assume that the experimenter has scanned the passersby around within a second. Reciprocity of gazes would benefit from further research.

Here a gaze duration is 1.90 s, during a 3.41-s passing. Frames 1 and 2 present this long gaze in a comprehensive way. The beginning of the gaze is shown in frame 1, in which the passerby is about 5 m away from the experimenter and continues until the subject exits the screen. The mere duration of the gaze clearly oversteps the limits of civil inattention: maintaining a gaze without withdrawal for almost 2 s is rare and marked in a passing between two unacquainted passersby.

However, the gaze is set sideways, without rotating the head, which makes it partly disguised. Though discreet, the gaze is noticeable by the receiver, and far too long to be considered as civil between unacquainted persons in a public place. Moreover, it is further away from civil inattention than the intensified gaze in Example 4: both gazes continue in proximity, but the extended duration also significantly increases the intensity of involvement. This gaze is almost three times longer than the previous intensified gaze.

Extended direct gazes

The most prominent gazes are both long in duration and emphasized further by a rotation of the head toward the experimenter. These gazes stretch far from the average gaze behavior and are clearly marked. In Excerpt 6, we present one case of an extended direct gaze. Again, the passing takes place on a relatively empty street, where the subject has clear visual access to the experimenter. While approaching the experimenter, the subject rotates the head toward her, prolonging the already prominent gaze contact.

Excerpt 6



¤ Frame 1: start of the gaze # Frame 2: the passerby rotates head during passing

1 The passerby	>>walks--->> (2.51s)
2	>> ¤ gazes at the experimenter, axis toward, walks (1.03) # (0.09)

In frame 1, the gaze starts. The passerby is still relatively far away from the experimenter. In frame 2, the subject is about to pass the experimenter. The subject is turning the head quite clearly, and the position stands out even more clearly during the passing. This gaze is direct and overt, lasting for ∼3 m or 1.12 s. The head rotation toward the experimenter takes place during the last 0.62 s of the gaze and remains turned during the passing. The turned head makes the gaze striking, giving the receiver a sensation of being stared at. The passerby does not disguise the gaze but stares openly.

In our categorization, an extended direct gaze is the clearest breach of civil inattention. While collecting data, the experimenter mentioned that occasionally she felt uncomfortable, and that she was able to tell that some passersby were staring at her. This type of gazing corroborates (Goffman, 1971) observations of corrective gaze behavior (i.e., sanctioning appearances that stand out from the crowd). The receiver is left wondering what provoked the stare, and what has made her accountable, which may be felt stigmatizing (Goffman, 1963b; Lamont, 2018). On the other hand, an extended gaze does not reveal the valence anchored to other features, such as facial expression and gestures. As in (6), if the passerby remains po-faced and does not engage in expressive behavior, it remains opaque whether an extended gaze demonstrates positive attention or admiration, a negative attitude or even hatred. This expressive neutrality can still separate such cases from overt uncivility, or "hate stares."

Summary of qualitative findings

Our data supports the claim that it is not uncommon for passersby to gaze at the recipient briefly, withdrawing the gaze before passing. The detailed video analysis allowed us to also refine the phenomenon of civil inattention. First, there appears to exist a great variation in the ways that civil inattention is performed: the duration of the gaze varies from a micro glance (0.02–0.1 s) to potentially noticeable glances (0.5 s). Also, passings without any gazing seem to be very common in an urban cityscape. Given that civil inattention is based on peripheral attention, non-gazing does not challenge it. Moreover, passersby may gaze at the recipient twice; as the second gaze is unnecessary for the navigation of the upcoming passing, it is a sign of additional interest. There are also breaches of civil inattention in the material. Gazes that are maintained just a fraction of a second longer make them intensified and noticeable, as the gaze still prevails at a closer proximity; rotation of the head may add further intensity. When a gaze lasts up to a second, it becomes clearly noticeable. Also, long stares are variable. They can be done from the corner of the eye or emphasized by gazing overtly and then rotating the head during passing, making the gazing even more noticeable. Such breaches of civil inattention break the auspicious anonymous public order.

Causal conditions for gazing

In this section, we will present our quantitative analysis of gaze types. Through quantification we aim at building a scale for the intensity of gazes, which allows us to provide a quantitative account of gaze behavior. We then compare the gaze behavior toward recipients belonging to different social categories, operationalized with their outfits: regular Western attire, the sun hat, and the niqab. The outfits are then a causal condition for the related gaze behavior. Methodologically, we move from ethnomethodological video analysis to statistical analysis.

Gaze scale

Our sample consists of 300 passings, 100 for each outfit and 50 for each data collection session. We will first open the

TABLE 1 Gaze scale.

1.	No gaze	The intensity of involvement increases
2.1	Civil inattention	
2.2	Civil inattention, two brief gazes	
3.1	Intensified gaze: short extension in length or at close range	
3.2	Extended side gaze	
3.3	Extended direct gaze	

TABLE 2 Duration of gaze in each category.

		Scale (s)	Median (s)	Std. deviation	*N*
1.	No gaze	-	-	-	95
2.1	Civil inattention	0.02–0.56	0.06	0.187	93
2.2	Two short gazes	0.07–1.05	0.56	0.340	22
3.1	Intensified gaze	0.39–1.52	0.71	0.325	25
3.2	Extended side gaze	1.01–2.96	1.92	0.519	30
3.3	Extended direct gaze	1.02–3.40	1.94	0.647	35

Duration of gazes is combined in cases with more than one gaze.

quantification process before discussing the distributions of the typified gaze behavior. Initially, each individual gaze (or lack of gaze) underwent detailed scrutiny in multiple data sessions,[13] during which we organized and reorganized the cases into separate categories. In some sense, we were trying to find a way to account the gazes for intersubjectively available actions, which would also allow their representation as distinct action types (Sacks, 1989). The procedure also ensured an inter-rater reliability of our analysis. Initially, we labeled the cases simply with the number 1, 2, or 3. Number 1 stood for "no gaze," number 2 for "civil inattention," and number 3 for any "breach of civil inattention." This quickly proved insufficient. First, the cases with more than one gaze led to a new category. We then noticed inconsistency within this category, which was consequently split into two: (1) two brief gazes within the limits of civil inattention, and (2) two gazes, at least one of which included a breach of civil inattention. Later, the latter was dissolved and merged into the other "breach" categories. We noticed a pattern that there was a brief, less intense gaze from a distance and subsequently a new gaze at closer proximity. The second gaze could be either a brief, civil one or an extended, intense one. Interestingly, we found no pattern in which a lengthy gaze from a distance would be followed by a brief glance at proximity. Thus, it became possible to classify the gazes according to the type of the second gaze. As a result, we were able to propose a hierarchical scale of gazes, according to their intensity of engagement. The scale is presented in Table 1. As discussed in the qualitative analysis section above, it extends from the least to the most intense involvement: no gaze (1), civil inattention (2.1), civil inattention with two brief gazes (2.2), intensified gaze (3.1), extended side gaze (3.2), and extended direct gaze (3.3).

During the video analysis, the maximum duration of civil inattention (2.1) was operationalized to two steps. Counting the steps was proven to be a decent way to measure the duration of the gazes; it provides a relatively objective measurement, as the duration of steps does not vary too much between individuals. Category (2.2) for two short gazes is a subcategory of civil inattention, and therefore the criterion is similar. The intensified gaze (3.1) extends to the closer proximity of a recipient but lasts <3 steps. The intensified gaze category was initially formed as a "leftover" between civil and uncivil gazes, and it might still benefit from qualitative elaboration. The extended gaze (categories 3.2 and 3.3) is consequently three steps or more in duration. Extended gazes, moreover, are split into two separate categories based on the directness of the gaze: if the passerby turns their head to prolong the gaze, the gaze becomes visibly more noticeable and marked, compared to indirect gazing. Apart from proximity, axis (directness of facing) is a central aspect of human proxemic behavior (Watson, 1970; Conty et al., 2012). As noticed by the assistant during the experiment, some of the most direct gazes continued after the passing of our experimenter (though not captured by the video). This type of an overt—and, in a way, challenging—gaze expresses the strongest engagement. In comparison, a side gaze is less direct and does not invite involvement as clearly, even if the duration remains the same, and it does not project an extension after the pass.

Our next step consisted of refining the gaze-type categories by counting their duration. Through this we aimed at verifying the upper and lower length limits for the gaze types to prepare the data for statistical analysis. We used the Adobe Premier Pro program for all 300 cases to measure the duration of gazes with 0.01-s accuracy. The program allows examination of clips as series of frames, thereby creating a timestamp for each frame. With the maximum frame-per-second settings and an effective zooming tool, it is possible to define the exact starting and end points of gazes and gestures. Then the whole data was coded into SPSS, which allowed checking of the whole material. After a few corrections, we defined duration-based upper and lower limits for each gaze type.

Table 2 presents the numerical values for the length of gaze types. The civil inattention category (2.1) includes gazes that vary between 0.02 and 0.56 s in duration. Although all these gazes are brief, it is obvious that there is a significant difference between a 0.02-s gaze and a 0.56-s gaze. A more detailed exploration of the variation of civil inattention remains for further research. At the other end of the scale, extended gazes vary from >1.0 to 3.40 s. One second is a neat lower limit; besides being a nice, even number, the cases are clearly gathered at over 1 s or below. For the extended gaze categories, no upper limit was needed. The longest gaze is 3.40 s, which is already very prominent and stands out from the standard gaze behavior. The intensified gaze category was created by a combination of length, proximity, and head pose; therefore, its length includes variation. Moreover, in both the two brief gazes and

13 Authors were regularly present at data sessions, accompanied occasionally by a prospective research student who had done a master's thesis on gaze behavior. In the sessions, we discussed how we saw the gazes in the video data. All parties in the sessions were under the confidentiality clause.

TABLE 3 Standard gaze behavior (%).

No gaze	49
Civil inattention	46
Two short gazes	2
Intensified gaze	2
Extended gaze	1
Total	100

intensified gaze categories, there are cases with more than one gaze, and the table presents the combined duration of these multiple gazes. These cases have been analyzed individually to make sure that each gaze in these categories is within the previously defined duration limits, even if the combined duration exceeds them.

These are the categories that we will utilize in the comparative analysis. In the next two sections, we will first account for the standard gaze behavior and then proceed to the comparisons of the gaze behavior toward different social category incumbents based on their outfits.

Standard gaze behavior

For the standard gaze behavior, we will use the condition "regular Western outfit" as our baseline. We assume that the experimenter who does not stand out from the crowd in this outfit would receive the average number and type of gazes from passersby, although individual variations in features such as age, gender, and height might also matter. As the experimenter remained the same during each session, this individual variation does not affect the comparative results between outfits.

As presented in Table 3, the standard gaze behavior consists of minimal involvement with passersby in the cityscape. Our analysis supports Goffman's view on the salience of civil inattention in public: it forms 46% of the cases. These gazes are typically very brief and seem to appreciate the other's privacy. As a novelty, we discovered civil inattention with two short gazes, though not commonly (in total, 2% of the passings); these are still within the limits of civil inattention but form a recognizable gaze type. However, not gazing is even more common than brief gazes (49%). As discussed, it is not a sign of rudeness or avoidance but a regular type of behavior, which may indicate the relevance of peripheral attention in a cityscape, enabling passings without any gazing. No gazing does not seem to pose any social sanctioning. Peripheral vision without a focused gaze captures enough information to socially navigate and maintain a sufficient space from passersby.

While most of the passings do not breach civil inattention, some do. Intensified gaze and extended gaze are types of gaze behavior that demonstrate an investment of additional attention. In our data, three cases out of a 100 exceeded civil inattention in some way, and only one included an extended gaze, in which the passerby gazed at the experimenter for longer than a second. Intensified gazes appear slightly more common, but still rare. It can be concluded that breaches of civil inattention take place during everyday interactions between passersby, but sparsely. An emphasized gaze may signal interest, an attempted approach, or a condemnation, but the intention of a gaze without any clear facial expression may remain undecipherable.

TABLE 4 Distribution of gazes according to social appearance.

	(%)			
	Regular	Sun hat	Niqab	Total
1. No gaze	49	28	18	31.7
2.1. Civil inattention	46	18	26	30.0
2.2. Two short gazes	2	9	8	6.3
3.1. Intensified gaze	2	14	15	10.3
3.2. Extended side gaze	0	17	13	10.0
3.3. Extended direct gaze	1	14	20	11.7
Total	100	100	100	100.0
				$N = 300$

Variation of gazes according to the recipient's social appearance

Our comparative study was based on gathering similar sets of data with all three outfit conditions: unnoticeable, regular clothes; regular clothes with a remarkable sun hat and sunglasses, and a niqab with an abaya. This study design enabled comparisons of gaze behavior depending on the social appearance of the gaze receiver. In the experiment, the datasets of different conditions were collected at the same time of day, at the same location, and with the same experimenter within a 2-week period. The weather conditions were relatively standardized by not filming on rainy days. The only difference between three datasets is the visual appearance of the experimenter. Thus, the data allows a study of correlations between the visual appearance and the received gaze behavior. All in all, we chose a sample of 100 cases of each condition, making altogether 300 cases. The distribution of gazes toward social category incumbents in different conditions is shown in Table 4.

In Table 4, the column "regular" consists of the data collected with the experimenter's own casual clothing. As presented in the previous section, practically half of the passersby did not gaze at her at all. Only 3% of the gazes broke civil inattention; all other followed the civil inattention protocol. This supports the hypothesis that minimal involvement is the standard during passings between two unacquainted passersby, either in the form of civil inattention or non-gazing. The distribution of gazing, however, differs significantly in two other conditions: when the experimenter was wearing a sun hat or a niqab with an abaya.

In the sun hat condition, most of the passersby (55%) either did not gaze at the experimenter at all or maintained civil inattention: 28% of the passings took place without any gazing and 27% involved civil inattention, including cases with two short glances. Nevertheless, the sun hat drew considerably more attention than the regular Western outfit. In total, the gazing is both more numerous and more prominent: 14% of the cases include an intensified gaze, 17% an extended side gaze, and 14% an extended direct gaze. The extended side gaze (i.e., gazing indirectly for more than 1 s) is especially prominent with the sun hat condition. It might indicate that the hat arouses curiosity, but the passersby partly disguise it by avoiding overt gazing. The relatively large amount of two short gazes (9%) supports this interpretation: this gaze type is still within the limits of civil inattention, but the passersby tend to gaze again after the first brief gaze. The sun hat

may act as a novel stimulus, encouraging the passerby to pay more attention than they normally would.

The experimenter dressed in the niqab also clearly attracted more gazes than the regularly dressed gaze recipient. Only 18% of passersby gave no gaze at all. The proportion of civil inattention, however, remains significant and is slightly higher than with the sun hat condition (34%, including two short glances). Wearing a niqab, the experimenter received gazes that can be considered, on average, more open: while the amount of intensified gazing remains roughly the same (15%), the most remarkable feature in this sample is the large amount of extended direct gazes (20%). This is a high number for such an overt type of gazing: practically every fifth passerby gazed at the experimenter in a noticeable way.

We may conclude that both the niqab and the sun hat condition differ clearly from the regular Western outfit condition. The difference between the niqab and the sun hat condition is finer and does not appear to be statistically significant in our data. Since both gaze and the appearance conditions are categorical variables, we tested the significance of differences with chi-square. Both the sun hat and the niqab condition received significantly different distributions of gazes ($p < 0.001$) compared to the regular Western outfit. This verifies the hypothesis that the appearance of the experimenter did affect the gaze behavior of the passersby. However, the difference between the sun hat and the niqab is not statistically significant. Instead, it appears that any noticeable deviance from a standard appearance may draw additional attention in the form of gazing that extends beyond civil inattention, but the gazing in our sample does not appear to be motivated by ethnic or religious grounds but as recognition of a deviance from normal appearance.

Discussion

Video analysis confirms that in public places, gaze behavior between unacquainted passersby commonly consists of brief gazing well before passing. Empirically the study supports Goffman's concept of civil inattention as the prevailing urban ritual. The extreme brevity of most civil gazes suggests that they are not open for focused mutual gaze contact, as it might not be possible within this time scale (Thorpe et al., 1996; Willis and Todorov, 2006; Conty et al., 2012). This means that civil inattention is not a reciprocal practice, as it is sometimes carelessly described (Giddens, 1990, p. 81). Instead, the rarity of focused mutual gaze contacts within civil inattention stresses the role of peripheral awareness for mobile social navigation in urban surroundings (Heath and Luff, 1992; vom Lehn et al., 2001). Peripheral awareness enables individuals to pass each other with minimal gazing or no gazing at all. Consequently, passings without gazing are not a curiosity, and they do not challenge the auspicious public order, where others do not pose an immediate threat.

As farsighted as Goffman's writings are, detailed video analysis allows us to move beyond the limitations of ethnography. First, civil inattention may be more multifaceted than suggested. Gazes that are short enough to be considered civil include a huge variation, from micro glances of 20 ms to potentially noticeable 500-ms gazes. Also, multiple gazes by passersby are common. Together these findings suggest that there may be differences in the investment of attention in the recipient already within the bounds of civil inattention. Further, moving out of a civil gaze may also be more variable than proposed. All this suggests that there may be layers of monitoring involved in the maintenance of civil public behavior that have not hitherto been sufficiently dealt with. Civil inattention may be just a gloss for a complex architecture through which agents maintain the distinction between engagements and anonymous public order.

Comparative analysis of gaze behavior toward different social category incumbents shows that there is a clear variation of gaze behavior according to the gaze recipient's appearance. The auspicious civil public order appears to be, at least to some extent, exclusive; passersby who deviate from normal appearances may not be granted the same level of civility in public areas as those who conform to the local cultural norms. The difference of gaze distribution toward "normal appearance" and "marked appearances" is statistically significant. In fact, the amount of uncivil extended gazes toward atypical appearances is 10-fold compared to normal appearances. This is a striking increase of interest. Saliently, there was no statistically significant difference between sunhat (culturally unmarked) and niqab (culturally marked) conditions. Our study shows that gaze behavior is somewhat equally attuned toward all normatively deviant atypical appearances but is not intrinsically culturally prejudiced. The lack of facial visibility may be a common element, as a cause of discomfort and additional attention, as Moors (2009) and Tarlo (2010) have proposed. We did organize an additional experiment where the comparison was made between the experimenter with or without gaze-hiding sunglasses, and the result was that the sunglasses did not affect the recipients' gaze behavior. The visibility of gaze as such does not appear to be critical for recipients; therefore, cultural factors may in any case be more salient than behavioral features of face visibility. Indeed, the niqab condition attracted the greatest amount of extended direct gazes that can be considered undisguised. These kinds of gazes may impose a threat of privacy and personal space in public, and they may be felt to be stigmatizing. Further, publicly announced negative attitudes toward minorities may open them to unhindered stance displays and result a recognition gap for them (Lamont, 2018). This said, our data did not involve any clear facial expressions of strong negative emotions (e.g., hate), and in that respect all interactions included at least an aspect of civility. We would need a more detailed analysis of intrusive gazes to unpack their socio-semiotic mechanisms to identify "hate stares" (Timmermans and Tavory, 2020). The semiotic properties of extended gazes could be explored in terms of whether the gazer's emotional state can be recognized with any intersubjective reliability, and whether the type of gazes concentrate to a certain categoric recipient, i.e., do categoric identities evoke negative emotional states, that is, hate.

The finding of the selectivity of civility in public behavior seems to have a relation to unconscious stereotypical biases. Our study seems to provide support for Implicit Association Tests (IAT), suggesting that gaze behavior is affected by unconscious biases (Banaji and Greenwald, 2013). However, it has been noted that although people almost automatically respond to stereotypes, the valence of their response may vary according to their group-based values (Arminen and Heino, 2022). It is apparent that civil inattention as a boundary mechanism that keeps engaged interactions between ratified participants and public order apart is far richer and more complex than initially perceived. It may well

be that there are layers of monitoring that sweep public space as an enabling practice, the consequence of which is "civil inattention." This opens civil inattention itself to a reverse engineering. Rather than assuming its existence, a finer granularity of analysis could reduce it to its elements. The monitoring of social space with a sweep of ultra-brief gazes may be the elementary layer of public order, invoking a variety of possible courses of action, including second gazes. The reciprocities of gaze behavior during interaction are one aspect influencing the outcome of the next actions. Whether peripheral awareness is preceding all this adds still another layer. Multilayered monitoring of social space makes the selective nature of civil inattention more understandable. This preconscious monitoring may be the selection mechanism through which the amount of invested attention is chosen. If that were the case, then there appears to exist a mechanism below conscious decisions that influences the amount of attention directed toward recipients, thereby initiating categorization of recipients (c.f. Cerulo, 2018). In that way, the social world appears to be structured at the outset rather than being a level playing field (Fiel, 2021). This formative mechanism that amounts to relational segregation may enforce anti-civil forces into the social system by imposing a set of asymmetric relations between social categories. In that way a source of anti-civil forces do not come from the outside, from the non-civil institutions, but through the boundary mechanisms that are the structuring precondition of social interaction (c.f. Alexander, 2006).

Civil inattention is a paradoxical ritual action that precludes the establishment of an engagement. It does not invite a response; only extensions of attention would invite a response, either a counter or a withdrawal (more typically). Hence, civil inattention precedes structured engaged interactions as a taken-for-granted structuring precondition of an interaction order (Brekhus, 1998). As a miniscule ritual grounding of interaction order, civil inattention forms a repetitious, mass-scale structure, which works as a boundary mechanism between focused and unfocused interactions. Paraphrasing Collins (1981), civil inattention initiates the microscopic sources for streams forming via recurring typifications relational categories providing basis for coalitions. But as civil inattention is largely based on peripheral attention, it precedes the level of events normally attended in micro sociology, a kind of neurological foundations of sociology (Cerulo, 2010). The gaze behavior in public may have an initial imprint on relational segregation, the structural effects are the aggregate outcome of gaze behavior. The granular analysis of gazing behavior may allow us to discover how the valencies of relationship are formed in face-to-face. The exploration of aggregated distribution of categorically distinct recipients may allow us to distill how categorical differences in practice build boundaries on those differences that may form relational segregation bound to lead to segmented networks as a societal effect (Fiel, 2021, p. 157). This may also be a mundane source for the persistence of social inequalities (O'Connor, 2019). Notably, gender, age-grade and race are visually easily perceptible statuses, which makes them omnirelevant categoric identifications that precede engaged interactions (Goffman, 1983). As all categoric identifications are contingent, cognitive and historically varying that would make comparative analysis of gazing behavior and the ensuing public social order salient to explore potential variation in the types and degrees of relational segregation.

Data availability statement

The datasets presented in this article are not readily available because, restricted to use of the authors only. Requests to access the datasets should be directed to ilkka.arminen@helsinki.fi.

Ethics statement

The research practices follow the guidelines of the Finnish National Board on Research Integrity. Although consent to participate was not requested in advance, the research is justified and could not have been carried out if the participants were asked for their consent to participate in the research. Data collection did not cause damage or harm to the participants. An ethical approval statement can be given by the review board. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent for participation was not required from the participants or the participants' legal guardians/next of kin in accordance with the national legislation and institutional requirements.

Author contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual contribution to the work and approved it for publication.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Ethnomethodological conversation analysis and the study of assemblages

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The material turn has challenged traditional social scientific and humanistic research approaches. Both individual and community are rejected as a starting point for theorizing what is going on in societies and cultures. In fact, all dichotomies are deemed suspect, and the research focus draws heavily on actual practices. The concept *heterogeneous assemblage* is used in at least two strands of the material turn with slightly different takes on the entangled nature of practices. These are actor-network theory, ANT (*cf.* STS, e.g., Callon, Latour, Law) and new materialism(s) (*cf.* process philosophy, e.g., Deleuze, Guattari). Both can be placed under the umbrella term sociomaterialism. In their analysis of concrete phenomena, Deleuzian assemblages tend to focus on embodied sensations (affect) that have rhizomatic threads of connection, whereas ANT's assemblages include how heterogeneous entities (actants) stabilize certain practices. With a revised understanding of how the world works (ontology), the usefulness of traditional research methods (epistemology) to study concrete phenomena has also been questioned. Margaret Wetherell has suggested that affect assemblages can be analyzed as observable social practices, giving an EMCA-based study as an illustrative example. The question is whether both new materialist intensities (*cf.* certain approaches in psychology) and ANT's connections to other people, places, and practices (e.g., in organization studies) could be analyzed with an EMCA approach. This paper acknowledges the existing possibilities EMCA offers to analyze heterogeneous assemblages as situated interactional and material entanglements and enlarges the repertoire by focusing on 1) how the material specifics can make the EMCA "why that now" analysis connect to larger assemblages than the local accomplishment of action, and 2) how observable orientations to phenomena outside of the situation can be treated as an assemblic activity. It will do this with 1) Goodwin's concept *lamination* that enlarges the strictly situation-bound contextual configuration analysis to the cultural-historical formations through the use of material tools, and with 2) mentionings that combine Membership Categorization Analysis and Cooren's interest in non-human (material) actors. In other words, the well-known sociomaterial concept *material-discursive* is translated into two analytical possibilities to study sociomaterial heterogeneous assemblages. An empirical study illustrates the tools in practice.

KEYWORDS

EMCA, heterogeneous assemblages, method, sociomaterialism, complexity, complicatedness

1. Introduction

Oxford Dictionary of English (Stevenson, 2015) defines the word "assemblage" as follows:

assemblage.

▶ *noun* a collection or gathering of things or people: *a loose assemblage of diverse groups.*

- a machine or object made of pieces fitted together: *some vast assemblage of gears and cogs.*
- a work of art made by grouping together found or unrelated objects.
- [mass noun] the action of gathering or fitting things together: the assemblage of electronic image and text databases.

While dictionaries concentrate on the original meaning of collection or gathering, researchers contributing to Wikipedia's definition of the various forms of assemblic (an adjective not in the Oxford English Dictionary) thinking state: "Its central thesis is that people do not act exclusively by themselves, and instead human action requires complex socio-material interdependencies." In other words, assemblic thinking concerns heterogeneous assemblages. The concept regards influences of various origins and types that are at play in any given situation or phenomenon, and the effects that emanate from it. The learning researcher Fenwick chooses the concept *sociomaterial* to cover various strands of assemblic thinking that "focus on materials as dynamic, and enmeshed with human activity in everyday practices" (Fenwick, 2015, p. 85). Assemblage is a concept used both in Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005) and the process philosophical new materialism(s) with a strong Deleuzian influence. Both focus on the actual going-ons in the world and how non-present forces play a role in them.

Everyday practices are at the very heart of studies in Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis (EMCA), too. Garfinkel's ethnomethodology insists that we stay close to the actual practices instead of considering them as realizations of abstract theoretical concepts. In fact, Garfinkel also approached the widely appreciated social scientific methods as studiable practices. In a similar though more abstract fashion, Fox and Alldred (2017) go through from a sociomaterialist (new materialism) perspective the typical social scientific methods ("research assemblages") regarding everyday practices ("event assemblages"), to show "what research actually does" when the two assemblages entangle (p. 175). The vigilant researcher can then combine the existing methods as they deem best. Fox and Alldred see a tendency among sociomaterialist researchers to use qualitative methods, which is understandable considering that sociomaterialist theory focuses on the embodiment of participants, the different modes of language use, or what a material setting affords or connects to. However, EMCA is not listed as one of the qualitative methods; only Garfinkel's (1984) "experiments with trust" is mentioned to find out how small changes can affect order production. There is certainly an analytic gap to be filled, especially because traditional sociological studies lack close analysis of the effect of materiality in ongoing practices.

Whether the existing methods are enough to answer the theoretical focus of sociomaterialist studies can also be approached from the perspective of how sociomaterialism (new materialism, posthumanism) has disturbed (inter- and trans) disciplinary thinking. For instance, Pennycook (2018) considers applied linguistics as an *epistemic assemblage* that gains from broader epistemic shifts in research interests rather than disciplinary categories. For Pennycook, sociomaterialism as the latest episteme means a totally new way of understanding and researching language use: "By stepping out of the humanist constructs of culture and nature, the individual and the social, and looking instead at the notion of distributed language and spatial repertoires, we can come to a new understanding of the materiality of language and social action" (p. 121). In environmental education research, Gough (2016) regards *postparadigmatic materialisms* as a necessary next step if the material place and its objects are the focus of empirical research. Both examples concern what two feminist science and technology studies scholars, Barad and Haraway, call diffraction: how phenomena arise and what they impact goes across disciplinary boundaries.

Charles Goodwin, a member of the EMCA community, could certainly be categorized as a researcher with a postparadigmatic and postdisciplinary take. In Goodwin's last major publication, Co-operative Action (2018), the impact from various disciplines on his anthropological background becomes clear. He has, among others, several references to Latour and Ingold, the latter a fellow anthropologist for whom Deleuze's process philosophy has been an important source. From early on in his career Goodwin challenged the strict division into linguistic, material, and visual anthropologies (e.g., Goodwin, 2000) which explains his awareness of various sociomaterialist researchers (e.g., Goodwin, 1994, 1995), even if he seldom referred to them as major influencers of his thinking (e.g., Goodwin and Salomon, 2019). However, his studies of how the material environment forms interactions (e.g., Goodwin, 2002) could be regarded as assemblage analysis. That is, in sociomaterial terms, they show how material things are performative (Fenwick, 2015). Goodwin's analytical orientation to the material world, along with the sociomaterialist theorizing, has been a big inspiration for my own research (e.g., Raudaskoski, 2010, 2020, 2021a).

Goodwin founded a multimodal version of EMCA as a robust method to analyze what takes place in what Fox and Alldred call event assemblages. EMCA has also had its epistemic shifts to study how things get done in practice from language-based (with all the semantic and prosodic nuances) production of social order to how embodiment and other materialities shape that order. EMCA has recently become interested in touch (Cekaite and Mondada, 2020) and taste (Mondada, 2021) as publicly observable parts of the complex event assemblage-in-progress. The broadening of analytical interests has without a doubt coincided with the development of the data collection technologies as part of the research assemblage (see Erickson, 2004 for a historical account; McIlvenny and Davidsen, 2017 for a big video manifesto, and Raudaskoski, 2024, for what team camera work means for the transparency of data (collection) in empirical study). In the 1990s, Charles and Marjorie H. Goodwin were part of the Xerox Parc workplace studies where complex airport control room work practices with technological artifacts were studied closely. In other words, they studied how the materials were "enmeshed with human activity in everyday practices." Lucy Suchman, an anthropologist and science and technology studies (STS) scholar, was the leader of the project. She has from early on combined the ethnomethodological approach with feminist sociomaterialist studies, which shows, for example, in references to the central feminist science studies scholars Barad and

Haraway (e.g., Suchman, 2005). Another STS scholar with ethnomethodological background is Lynch (2015) who has become a regular contributor to practice theory publications that have a holistic and practice-based take on culture and society (*cf.* Reckwitz). In sum, sociomaterialist ideas have been incorporated in some EMCA research, but an equal awareness of the recent, multimodal versions of EMCA as method seems to be lacking in sociomaterialist studies.

2. Sociomateriality: the world and its research as assemblic entanglements

In the following, two major strands of sociomateriality, namely new materialism and actor-network theory, are given a short introduction. They are by no means monolithic approaches. Both shift the focus away from individual actors as the primary entity to study social scientific issues and both regard the material world as an agentive force. Therefore, these approaches are sometimes also labeled posthuman. Figure 1 depicts some of the core issues in the two approaches where heterogeneous assemblages are a central premise, both as regards to people and practices.

These approaches have different purposes, and neither has a strictly defined methodology. New materialism(s) grew out of the process philosophical thinking of, for instance, Bergson (1911), Deleuze and Guattari (1987), and James (1909/1996). New materialists focus on the often hard to explain situated embodied experiences that relate to ongoing phenomena in which different types of sensory experiences take place with connections to past experiences. Rhizome is used as a conceptual metaphor to highlight the possibility of having many types of varying linkages. The focus is on the ever-changing flow of lived life. Affect does not refer only to emotions, but to all sorts of intensities and movements. So, the left-hand side of the figure concerns individuals' embodied experiences as assemblic entities: their life histories that invoke memories, their embodied sensations, their learnt ways of doing and saying in different activity types, and so on. In other words, the focus moves away from the individual as a separate entity to the individual as a heterogeneous assemblage of influences.

Actor-network theory (ANT) grew out of science and technology studies (STS) by researchers Callon (1991), Law (1991), and Latour (2005). They highlighted the ultimate interconnectedness of any phenomenon with its network of actants (people, objects, places, ways of doing things, etc.) to other practices, places, and people that have affect each other, that is heterogeneous assemblages. The role of nonhuman things became pivotal as they often are results of translating human practices to actants that also (like humans) make various types of actions and practices possible (or not). The main interest was to detect the development of stable positions in a network; how doing things in a certain way are treated as normal or even inevitable. Agency refers to the interest in the effects that actants have in different constellations. Also, Latour's interobjectivity (Latour, 1996) considers the material environment as "timeshifting" to other places, practices, and participants through the history of making objects and placing them in the setting. Again, interobjectivity does not highlight just humans, but all forces that influence a situation.

Next, I go through Karen Barad's (they, them, their) approach to materiality in more detail, as they have shown how the very basic ideas we have about materiality, gained through scientific evidence, depend on material arrangements. This is why I referred to them as a central theorist in my assemblic analysis (Raudaskoski, 2021b) of an experimental interdisciplinary workshop about the concept of abduction arranged in a Viking museum. Their *agential realism* treats matter as one of the aspects of the world that is in continuous becoming through various "practices of knowing": "knowing is a matter of part of the world making itself intelligible to another part" (Barad, 2007, p. 185). Agential realism originates from Barad's background in quantum physics and especially from Niels Bohr's insights about nuclear science: The results about the material world depend on the material apparatuses that are used to measure phenomena. Therefore, instead of just measuring, these scientific apparatuses produce certain material realities (e.g., whether light is composed of particles or waves depends on the material measuring



FIGURE 1
Two sociomaterial approaches to heterogeneous assemblages.

setup). Barad expanded the contextual impact to the larger institutional and political setting, showing the complexity of what influences the outcomes and impacts of any type of science. Situated emergencies link through entanglements to other complex circumstances. It is easy to see a connection to assemblic thinking: Agential cuts concern both local and larger assemblages. Agential realism connects phenomena in laboratories or other (research) sites to a myriad of entanglements (*cf.* Latour, 1983). It is understandable why Barad is also popular among practice theorists who write about *practice bundles* (*cf.* Schatzki, 2019), how practices connect to other practices, and how flat ontology therefore works. In other words, 'micro' and 'macro' are seen as useless vertical categories, in the same way as for Latour, who considered horizontal associations stabilizing as practices that connect to each other. For Deleuzian process philosophy, the flat ontology is locally constituted which shows in the rhizome metaphor (in contrast to a vertical tree). Hence, Barad's materialist approach is among those that theorize how ordinary practices are constituted and the way they are involved in constituting larger issues.

One of the aspects that has been claimed as a crucial difference between the two sociomaterial approaches (Figure 1) is whether assembling focuses on the actual (longitudinal) processes of how things connect (new materialism) or on the nodes in the network: what is connected, and which translations have taken place (ANT)? Therefore, any concrete situation can be understood as a result of various types of emergencies (during the event or longer histories of the relevant entities) or a collection of nodes that relate to each other. In the following section, I discuss, among others, how these differences relate to EMCA studies and Wetherell's solution to Deleuzian assemblage analysis.

3. EMCA for assemblage analysis

According to Barad, how evidence is achieved in empirical research is not just an analytical question, but a theoretical one as well. Social scientists and humanistic scholars are highly aware that research results depend on the chosen methodology. It is possible that the EMCA scholars have not considered the material tools, even though the measuring devices – that is, data collection technologies (from audio to video recordings) – have clearly contributed to our understanding of how "conversation" works as a materially situated, embodied phenomenon. Barad's agential realism and an EMCA approach come close in their claim that phenomena (for ethnomethodology it is social order) are in the making all the time, and that we produce a variety of entities through material-discursive agential cuts where certain things are included while others are excluded. Barad emphasizes this by calling what is going on as intra-actions instead of interactions (which assume predefined entities). The fundamental idea in CA and ethnomethodology is similar: Practices constitute situations, identities, and so on. Furthermore, the ethnomethodological principle of approximation, that none of these have predefined, fixed, meanings, fits well with Barad's theoretical concept of indeterminacy (vs. uncertainty) that gets resolved temporarily in practical action (*cf.* sequential turn-taking in EMCA). In my analysis of a phone call about a child-in-referral in a documentary on transnational adoption (Raudaskoski, 2010), I explored the methodological possibility to analyze Baradian intra-actions with multimodal EMCA as method. The analysis depicted how an identity translation of the future family members gets constituted through the use of embodied, material communicative resources and affect displays. The event involved various types of material-discursive inclusions and exclusions that also related to past private (e.g., through memory work) and institutional (e.g., through the official documents about the baby) circumstances. The paper also discusses the status of documentary as data that is a result of media professionals' work practices, where their cut of the phone call was a result of a complex entanglement of both media production and societal concerns.

EMCA has shown its strength as a tool for empirically analyzing social practices as co-operative accomplishments from the perspective of communicative resources of participants. When talk-in-interaction is researched, participants' past histories are indirectly present, though an EMCA analysis only deals with publicly available orientations to them. The growing awareness of the importance of embodiment and other types of materiality (of language, body, and the material surroundings; *cf.* Charles Goodwin's contextual configuration) has resulted in "conversation" being replaced by "multimodal interaction" in certain versions of EMCA. Embodied participation reveals some of the learned ways of attending a situation, and the material setting on its part connects to past practices. Participants have changed from talk-based interactional partners to embodied (material) beings. Therefore, reflexivity does not only concern turn-by-turn production of meaning and, with that, intersubjectivity, but embodied other(s) and objects also participate in the reflective constitution of what is going on. In that way, Barad's coinciding of relational ontology and epistemological processes, onto-epistemology, can be studied with multimodal interaction analysis: "Practices of knowing and being are not isolable; they are mutually implicated" (Barad, 2007, p. 185).

EMCA started with the analysis of talk as a way to achieve intersubjectivity and to get things done. With multimodal interaction analysis, not only embodiment but also Latour's interobjectivity is as important. For example, we should ask what emerges out of the encounters with the nonhuman, sometimes language using, objects (*cf.* Raudaskoski, 2003)? Intersubjectivity in EMCA works through indexicality, the ongoing sense-making exercise that human members participate in in event assemblages. The ethnomethodologist Goode (1994, p. 102) expands the notion of membership to be that of the wider world and with that the notion of intersubjectivity. For Goode (2006, p. 90), intersubjectivity is not just based on language or culturally accepted behavior, but on sensual intersubjectivity, which includes all forms of living creatures. His approach comes closer to posthumanist theorizing. However, it is important to remember that sociomaterialism does not refute human agency, but asks us to take seriously, both in theory and in practice, how other materialities affect what is going on in the world. It could be claimed that the recent developments in multimodal interaction analysis provide a robust method to analyze event assemblages in their *in situ* heterogeneous becoming from the perspective of the forces (the affordances of humans included) that inhabit them.

In a multimodal EMCA analysis, collections and connections are in focus from the point of view of interactions. Linguistically oriented CA research is based on collections, that is, on how certain language forms function in talk-in-interaction and what their effects are in turn taking. Those results are valuable because they present a reliable

analysis of what is going on moment-for-moment in the longer stretches of talk and other actions where the focus is on the effects of longer-term sequences, and how they affect or connect in a local sequence. Recently, there has been a growing interest in *longitudinal* CA studies (e.g., Pekarek Doehler et al., 2018; Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler, 2021) where the focus is on how the way of constituting the "same" interactional phenomena changes over time, rather than finding instances of similar shape. In their special issue Depperman and Pekarek Doehler give an overview of past longitudinal CA studies and divide them into development (child, learning), historical (ways of speaking over time) and joint interactional histories (families, organizations). The main focus is still on repeatedness, which leads them to study collections of how action formats change over time. The researcher's work is to detect when a different looking realization of a phenomenon does the same work as a prior typical format of the phenomenon:

> "It requires what Koschmann (2013, p. 1039) refers to as "same-but-different" analysis: To count as evidence for change over time, the phenomenon under scrutiny has to be different at time t2 from t1, yet similar enough to be interpretable as an occurrence of the same phenomenon—a token of the same type." (Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler, 2021, p. 128).

However, assemblic analysis differs from such longitudinal studies because questions of (dis)similarity are not in focus. Instead, practices and participants' experiences become central in trying to detect when (and not just how), from an assemblic perspective, actions connect. In other words, how does a phenomenon at time t1 relate to what is going on at t2. For instance, a prospective adoptive mother at t1 tearfully states that she is unhappy she cannot carry a child. At t2, when the couple hears over phone about the pregnancy of the biological mother of their future son, the husband glances at her and she silently cries. A statement produced in interview talk (t1) and embodied reactions during a phone call (t2) can be treated as connected, dealing with the couple's life history about trying to have a child and (the husband's awareness of) her pain for not experiencing pregnancy. This example deals with affect as assemblage. In Raudaskoski (2010) I referred to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) *mot d'ordre* as an explanation for the affective force of the word "pregnancy."

In psychology, Wetherell has criticized how the Deleuzian inspired approach to assemblages has been adopted in certain strands of psychology in relation to affect. Figure 2 describes the main differences between those, based on how Blackman and Venn (2010) and Wetherell (2015) approach affect. Wetherell's interpretation of any social practice as a here-and-now assemblage that draws on past assemblages and has an impact on what happens next is similar to how multimodal EMCA analyzes actions in progress. In her earlier paper on the same topic, Wetherell (2013) used Marjorie Harness Goodwin's analysis of girls playing hopscotch (Goodwin, 2006) as an example of how affect works as other-oriented social practice.

Charles Goodwin's (2013) lamination depicts how the co-operative aspect of participation is always built on interactional or material substrate, adding thus to the local sense-making activity the aspect of sociocultural passing on of practices and the material tools involved in them. A material setting connects to the complex assemblage of knowledge, practical skills and actions needed to produce it, but also to occasions of participation in it and about it. This is why lamination, realized through contextual configuration, makes it possible to link to each other within one event the here-and-now continuously forming assemblages. The Goodwins and Wetherell were major inspirations in Raudaskoski and Klemmensen (2019) affect analysis of the participatory possibilities of a care home resident during an occupational therapy session: "With assemblage, the nature of affect as a complex relational phenomenon is accentuated, as it includes a multitude of effects of past assemblages. With emergence, the processual aspect of the ongoing situation as an assemblage drawing on past assemblages is foregrounded (*cf.* Wetherell, 2015)" (p. 161).

To sum up, multimodal interaction analysis, especially Goodwin's contextual configuration, which orients to how participants use the material-semiotic resources in their action, is a robust analytical tool. It can be used to analyze Baradian intra-actions and affective assemblages because contextual configuration deals with the concreteness of attentive practice (participation frameworks). It can analyze what participants orient to moment-by-moment using language, body, and the material environment. However, the sociomaterialist approach connects the local sayings and doings in material environments to other places, people and practices, and regards these invisible participants as constitutive elements of any action, too. In Latour's words:

> "In most situations, actions will already be interfered with by heterogeneous entities that do not have the same local presence, do not come from the same time, are not visible at once, and do not press upon them with the same weight. The word "interaction" was not badly chosen; only the number and type of "actions" and the span of their "inter" relations has been vastly underestimated. Stretch any given inter-action and, sure enough, it becomes an actor-network." (Latour, 2005, p. 202).

If "interaction" for Barad was not good enough because the concept assumes the interacting local entities beforehand, then for Latour it was not sufficient due to its narrow idea about what was impacting the ongoing situation. Above, I have tried to show how EMCA can be used to analyze intra-actions. In the following two sections I discuss two ways of dealing with larger entanglements.

3.1. Contextual configuration and lamination

With the larger assemblages, an important question is can we still do EMCA/multimodal interaction analysis or are we stretching the method to a breaking point? Goodwin's assemblic lamination (how participants build on the other participants' action – through contextual configurations) has a sharp focus on how participants co-operatively produce new knowledge through simultaneous and sequential action when they embodiedly laminate in concert with each other various means to constitute meaningful action with the help of the available material-discursive resources. He contends that:

> "Complementary semiotic fields include 1) the mutual orientation of the participants' bodies toward both each other, and the materials they are working with, which creates a public focus of attention and a locus for shared work; 2) language, including



FIGURE 2
Two different takes on assemblages in psychology.

> relevant deictic terms, organized within sequences of action within human interaction; 3) hands making environmentally coupled gestures (Goodwin, 2007a); 4) consequential phenomena in the surround that is being intensely scrutinized by the participants as part of the work they are doing together" (Goodwin, 2013, p. 16).

Lamination adds a historical aspect to local contextual configurations:

> "Human beings build action by combining diverse resources (e.g., language structure, categories, prosody, postural configurations, the embodied displays of a hearer, tools, etc.) to perform both simultaneous and sequential transformative operations on a local, public semiotic substrate brought into existence by processes on many different time scales (from the immediately prior utterance to the progressive sedimentation of structure in tools, languages and settings)" (Goodwin, 2013, p. 41).

Thus, laminations are also larger assemblages in the sense that the semiotic substrate is not just local, but a result of various timescales. They are not directly visible in the local constitution of intelligibility and meaning, even if they can, in Latour's words, be "interfered with by heterogeneous entities" (Latour, 2005, p. 202). Therefore, it is possible to claim that past places, practices, and participants are "present" when intelligibility is achieved (or not) in action in a co-operative setting. The most immediate and acceptable stretching of the EMCA/multimodal interaction analysis as assemblic method would be to (ethnographically) trace the participants. In an article about imagination, I traced relevant parts from a documentary that followed a couple in their adoption process (Raudaskoski, 2021a). Within a shorter timeframe (but with more complex data), I analyzed the doings of two participants during a nature hike, made possible by data from a camera team that used 360-degree cameras (Raudaskoski, 2023). As mentioned earlier, these types of longitudinal analysis would not focus on collections that would help understand how certain forms of language, gestures etc. are typically used, but how different types of participation support the analysis of encounters by the same participants, how they rhizomatically connect (*cf.* also Raudaskoski and Klemmensen, 2019). However, as I discuss below, the use of (especially human-produced) material things can be analyzed as connecting to the heterogeneous assemblages, even if the details of their production would not be available.

3.2. Mentionings: membership categorization analysis and Latourian organization studies

Another method many in the field of EMCA use is Membership Categorization Analysis, MCA (Jayyusi, 1984; Eglin and Hester, 1992; Silverman, 1998) which has been able to contribute to some aspects of the intelligibility, the situated concreteness and the ethnomethodological "why that now" of said or done as connected to large collectivities. For instance, what obligations and rights is a certain category expected to have. MCA starts with the implications of membership categories, where the analytical logic is different from EMCA's focus on sequential interpretation and next turn proof procedure. However, identity analyses have been especially able to combine the sequential and turn-internal analyses to strengthen their points (*cf.* Stokoe, 2010). Thus, MCA adds to the analysis of the situated simultaneous embodied going-ons (*cf.* Goodwins' research) the more general cultural and societal understandings of categories. I have used MCA to analyze, for instance, how a certain type of introduction to a white member sitting next to a transnational adoptee in a two-person jury in the final episode of a Danish version of the reality program Robinson from 2000 contributed to an amplification of attitudes:

> "The growing methodological interest on how a real-life event can be linked to the cultural-historical spacetime (Agha 2007). It has been an attempt to dig into the possible formation of attitudes toward others outside of the realm of political (media) discussions" (Raudaskoski, 2011, p. 637).

Yet another way of doing assemblic analysis is to consider situated mentionings as participants' orientations to other place/people/practices. This is what Francois Cooren, an organization theorist who combines Latour and Garfinkel in his analyses, has suggested: "interactions are never purely local, but dislocal, that is, they

constantly mobilize figures (collectives, principles, values, emotions, etc.) that incarnate themselves in people's discussions" (Cooren, 2010, description). Cooren regards Membership Categorization Analysis doing similar work, but he focuses more on the agency of the nonhuman assemblages than might be normally done in our MCA analyzes.

While Cooren combined EMCA and Latour's actant analysis, Charles Goodwin had more subtle connections to Latour's ideas. When analyzing the practical work of archeologists (e.g., Goodwin, 2010), he referred to Latour's (1995) article on an interdisciplinary researcher group's (him included) research field trip to Amazonas. Both Goodwin and Latour analyze how the scientists used the Munsell chart. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Goodwin appeared to be increasingly interested in the anthropologist Tim Ingold's approach to anthropology (e.g., Goodwin, 2007b). Ingold has widened his references toward new materialist research (e.g., Ingold, 2013).

There are some theoretical interests shared between (multimodal) EMCA and the two approaches of heterogeneous assemblages. EMCA/multimodal interaction analysis can offer tools to study both local and larger heterogeneous assemblages and of both sociomaterial types depicted in Figure 1, a challenge that, for instance, Müller (2015) has discussed. In the following, I revisit the analytical practice with a data extract from a nature hike to showcase how to analyze both types of heterogeneous assemblages in an activity by combining Goodwin's lamination (that enlarges the strictly situation-bound contextual configuration analysis to the cultural-historical formations through the use of material tools) with mentionings that combine MCA and Cooren's interest in non-human (material) actors, and what can be inferred from these. The combination does not reveal all the possible assemblages that a situation has to outside of it (*cf.* Clarke's (2005) mapping exercise to try and decipher heterogeneous connections), staying thus in the realm of human-centered agency and the intelligibility of indexical action that it is based on.

4. Danish nature days: why conservation?

The data extract under scrutiny below comes from a hike called "Why Conservation" that was arranged during the very first (2016) Danish annual Nature Days public event. One aspect of the hike that got my analytical interest was why the participants seemed to be totally disinterested in an app that a guide introduced, even if they were in the nature where the app was meant to be used. The Danish Society for Nature Conservation (DSNC) had developed the app for nature goers to report on sightings. On the website of the (Google) app, they introduced the app as follows (see Figure 3): "NaturTjek [NatureCheck] is for you who wants to help study how the biological variation (biodiversity) is doing in Denmark, to learn about nature and to have fun while you are doing it."

The app was part of a citizen science project run by Copenhagen University in cooperation with DSNC. By the time a guide introduced the app to the nature hike participants the group had acquainted with the swamp area they started the hike from, they had inspected some of the plants in that area and walked a bit further to the site where they were met by a pack of six horses. In the following, I examine the ethnomethodological *just thisness* that led to the introduction of the app to the group, how the group members react to that introduction, and what kinds of entanglements or assemblages may be discovered. In Figure 4 I have also marked who the guides are and a group member (Purple) who took up the topic in the first place (the hike was documented by a traditional 2D-camera, three chest-mounted GoPros, and two 360-degree cameras on poles out of which one made it possible to get a close-up near the ground (see the participant-researcher in blue) and the other from above the group, from which the shot in Figure 4 comes from).

The transcription of how the introduction was set to proceed is a type of cartoon transcript (Laurier, 2014) with a Jeffersonian transcription of both the original Danish and the English translation. The stills show what is going on during the transcribed talk under them. We start with the group gathering to stop around the two guides. Purple has just arrived at the spot and reports having seen an interesting plant earlier (see Figure 5). Purple (P), Guide 2 (G2) and Guide 1 (G1) are marked again in the first pseudonymized frame. The white arrows depict the (sometimes mutual) gaze directions.

With Cooren we could call this mentioning of the plant *incarnation* (Cooren, 2010, p. 6), assembling the past observation of an object to the present situation. Purple is looking at Guide 2 while talking, constituting her as the primary recipient and, therefore, expert in the issue of the local plants. The other members of the group become overhearers. Purple must keep her distance from Guide 2 who is preparing to talk about the plants in front of her; she laminates her appreciative feedback to Purple with her primary situated task. When purple explains that the plant "just was down there," her gaze shifts down, with her right hand in a loosely downward pointing fist. The incarnation becomes even stronger with the use of 'Deixis am Phantasma' (deixis in the imagination) (Stukenbrock, 2014). The last frame in Figure 5 shows Guide 2 having shifted her gaze from Purple to the plants in front of her (maybe because Purple still is orienting to the imaginary plant), and Purple's head back from the body torque to look to the direction of her body posture.

After this (Figure 6), instead of walking ahead, Purple shifts her gaze back to Guide 2 and the focus of talk from the plant to registering the sighting to the NatureCheck app:

By calling it "my" app, Purple implies that she has been using the app regularly. Guide 2 acknowledges her expressed intention ("yes"), followed by a little inbreath that marks her readiness to start introducing the plants in front of her. However, Purple continues her turn, teasing the guide about her not doing it for her. This suggests she is familiar with the guide and her likely reluctance to use the app. Guide 2 agrees, shifting the responsibility to Purple (stress on "you"). Guide 2 does this with laughing tokens, concluding her turn with laughter particles. Purple joins her laughter while producing a mock request ("you have to"). In this brief exchange Purple has connected the app with the local plant, the latter of which is most probably of interest to Guide 2 as well. By engaging Guide 2 to the registration of the plant, Purple manages to link the app to the guide's (lacking) user skills, a locally invoked assemblage again, but this time to the guide's (in)competencies.

In MCA terminology, the teasing of Guide 2 could also be heard as invoking certain obligations for a nature guide: They should use this citizen science app and introduce it to others. Purple's and Guide 2's interaction intertwine epistemic and deontic authority (*cf.* Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012) from shared knowledge of the plant to a humorous exchange where both parties express the right to decide who should



FIGURE 3
Three screens from the Danish "NatureCheck" app.

FIGURE 4
A group of nature hikers.

register the sighting. Meanwhile, Guide 2 has been waiting for a chance to start talking about the plants in front of her, so her situated responsibility is connected to that, instead. That ongoing obligation could be part of the reason for Purple's statement ("you will not do that I suppose") which gets a laughter-filled answer from Guide 2 ("no you can do that"), the line (Goffman, 1967) of which Purple continues in her mock direct order laminating it through format tying to Guide 2's turn ("you have to do that"). Even if it can be heard as teasing or general verbal play, it still is a reminder of the duty that a nature guide should have: doing being an example of a good nature protector.

By the time the short dialogue about the plant and its registration to app was over, Purple had turned her gaze to the male guide in front of her. Already Purple's first mention of the app (Figure 6) had occasioned Guide 1 to take out his smartphone from the left front trouser pocket. He starts the introduction to the app after Purple turns to face him (Figure 7).

Guide 1 starts his introductory talk to the app by verbalizing the obliged nature ("I have to remember") of the "advertising." This incarnation of a previous plan or agreement is different from how he would start talking about the features of the immediate setting, that is, reoriented to a specific feature of it (*cf.* De Stefani and Mondada, 2014). In overlap with Guide 1's lengthened "remember" Guide 2, still laughing while talking and gazing down at the plants in front of her, acknowledges Purple's demand for her to use the app. By then Purple has already turned to Guide 1 who has the phone in his hand. Purple now addresses him with the same tone and with a stress on "you." In other words, Purple now turns to him as a nature protection hike guide with the membership obligation to register biodiversity. This is at a large assemblic scale, whereas Guide 2 is doing a very local type of nature protection: She stops people from stepping on the rare plants in front of her ("OOPS, OOPSOOPSOOPS").

Figure 8 shows the English translation of the rest of Guide 2's long introduction to the app. The guide starts from the history of how the app came about and the purpose of it, which is to register the state of biodiversity in Denmark.

The Guide names the same NGO that has arranged the hike as the instigator of the project, thereby laminating the purpose of the app to the situation at hand. The "good researchers" are clearly concrete people with names that Guide 1 as one of the "we" knows, but they are incarnated to the description as an anonymous group. While the guide is speaking, the participants exhibit little visible interest in the app introduction (*cf.* Figure 4 which shows the moment

PURPLE: =ja men den var ikke i blomst=den var ned der bare
=yes but it wasn't blooming=it just was down there

PURPLE: [men men jeg er jeg er sikker på [(det var t[jærenke)
[but but I am I am sure [(it was plant [name]
GUIDE 2: [nåh, [jah, [jah, GUIDE 2: ja, det var den nok
[I see, [yeh, [yeh, yes, it must have been that

FIGURE 5
Reporting on a plant noticed earlier.

when the guide says "overall study"). Purple is the only one who is actively involved by correcting the guide about the number of sightings she can see from the app on the smartphone. The other participants gaze around, pet and chuckle at the horses who come to them for attention, chat about them, and so on. The practical explanation might be that the participants are unable to see what the guide sees on the screen, a condition that Raudaskoski et al. (2019) call bystander ignorance; they are not invited to look at the app in Guide 1's hand. They might also see the app presentation as an interruption to Guide 2's already started orientation to the plants in front of her. Towards the end of his presentation, Guide 1 glances twice at Purple, indicating that she is the "reason for" the advertisement.

Guide 1 finishes up (not in transcript) by turning to Guide 2 and repeating how he started the introduction: It was good to get the advert of the day done, and his colleague agrees. By calling his presentation an advert again, the guide constitutes it as something he 'had to' remember to do. The uninterested audience might be a reason for packaging the presentation as an aside, even if he tried to make the actual use of the app sound more interesting ("fun"). Guide 2 commences talking about the plants in front of her, showing her main focus in the situation. Purple then uses a horse approaching her (phone) to connect to the guide's "advert" in a humorous way, claiming that the horse wants to register as an app user.

5. Discussion of the app introduction

The assemblage for now is the local accomplishment of action through talk, embodiment, and use of the material environment and that achievement draws on past assemblages: the participants' past experiences, the type of situation they are in and the material setting with its discourses. So, when Guide 1 turns, thanks to Purple's occasioned reminder (via Guide 2), to the app on his phone, he turns to the distant DSNC and Copenhagen University and to the local Danish nature around them, together with the nature lovers that have come to the nature hike, and the team of video researchers who were recording the event.

Thus, when the two "infrastructures" – that of a nature hike and a scientific citizen project about the same plants, animals and sites – meet, there are only two participants (Guide 1 and Purple) that have opened the app, connecting to the many assemblages with that action. The aim of the app is to produce epistemic representations, "big data" (tokens of types), it is working for a center of calculation (Latour, 1987). Its goal is to engage citizens in biodiversity research through participation. Participants in a nature walk, on the other hand, have come to experience the immediate nature *via* their senses and to learn more about it personally; it is secondary to report on it; potential images are taken for private use. They also have two sorts of materiality as affordances for involvement in the situation: broad open nature to explore *via* embodiment and a little gadget with several stages to learn how to utilize. We could claim that Purple is trying to combine the experiences and their representations through connecting to the here-and-now noticings and interpretations of a (by now invisible) plant and an inquisitive animal in the environment. She is accomplishing the connection to the app through humor that makes use of the alternative focus that many of the participants oriented to while Guide 1 was talking, namely horses. We witness an attempt to enhance rationality (participation in citizen science) through affective activity.

PURPLE: så nu vil jeg lave en indberetning til min naturtjek=det [gør du ikke vel?
so now I will make a report to my nature check= =that [you won't do that I suppose
GUIDE 2: [ja, .h
[yes, .h

GUIDE 2: n(h)ej d(h)et kan du j[(h)ah HA HA HA
n(h)o y(h)ou can do that j[(h)eh HA HA HA
PURPLE: [de(h)t s(h)kal d(h)u ha ha ha
[y(h)ou ha(h)ve to do tha(h)t ha ha ha

FIGURE 6
Topicalizing NatureCheck app.

A close analysis of how the app was introduced can thus tell us about the local effects of assemblages, how they affect our experiences and actions in our world. As De Stefani and Mondada remind us: "even stationary interactional spaces are dynamically assembled and constantly reassembled" (De Stefani and Mondada, 2014, p. 173). There can be complex assemblages that come into play in the situation. This makes the questions of epistemology and ontology blurred. How does getting to know nature while in it and a scientific citizen project about it come together or clash in the concrete situation? Maybe it has something to do with the different ontologies: while using the app could be categorized as a synthetic situation of use (Knorr-Cetina, 2009) with its dynamic figures, what makes encountering plants and animals in a nature hike persuasive is that they are ontologically stable entities. However, if the participants are interested in the topic of the hike, nature conservation (*cf.* ethico-onto-epistem-ology, Barad, 2007), should they then feel responsibility to register what they observe to a biodiversity project run by the same NGO? This question hints at flat ontology at work: interest in nature conservation is done by attending a hike arranged by the national society that has cooperated with a university to study the existing state of biodiversity, all of these aspects of the here-and-now and the larger issue of Danish nature conservation coming together in the app that is open in two smartphones. In this case, the local practice bundle did not connect so well, but it is only through somebody being in nature and reporting it through the app that the assemblage university-DSNC would be successful. Will non-attendance to the presentation protect them from feeling obliged to use the app for the rest of the hike and thus free them to enjoy the nature firsthand without having a smartphone in the hand to make a representation of the seen, heard, smelled, tasted, and felt? The guide is careful not to claim the right to request that the participants should download the app. He finishes his presentation after highlighting the ease of use of the app and the quick download time with a directive "so do that" but adding immediately the mitigating "I mean if you want to participate." In other words, he does not claim any type of deontic authority over the participants.

The analysis presents an example of the intricacies of how an app is introduced (remembering to advertise), the materiality of the smart phone (hard to share/see), and the contextual configuration of the group (attending to rare plants in a circle; having a pack of horses to orient to) were some detectable reasons for why the nature around the participants won their interest over the nature app on a smartphone in the hand of a guide. However, the app was directly connected to the assumed interests of the group members: protecting the Danish nature. Therefore, the situation was also connected to a larger assemblage that entangled the participants in an

GUIDE1: øhm jeg skal huske[: ø at
erm I have to remembe[:r er to
GUIDE2: [ja(h)men det er r(h)igtigt,
[w(h)ell that's r(h)ight,
PURPLE: [det skal du g(h)øre
[that you have to d(h)o

GUIDE1: [gøre reklame for
[advertise
GUIDE2: [UPS, UPSUPSUPS,
[OOPS, OOPSOOPSOOPS,

PURPLE: j(h)a,
y(h)es
GUIDE1: den moderne teknologi øh:m det er nemlig sådan at øhm ( ) Naturfredsningforeningens
the modern technology er:m it is namely so that erm ( ) the Danish society for nature conservation's

FIGURE 7
Start of longer app introduction.

ethico-onto-epistem-ological dilemma of participating citizens that did not want to become citizen science participants.

6. Conclusion: EMCA and assemblage analysis

The paper has explored the heterogeneous assemblage as a concept that is welcomed both in new materialist (psychological) research and in STS and organizational studies. EMCA/multimodal interaction analysis can give analytical tools for empirical studies from both perspectives, even though the first focuses on the inner experiences of participants and the latter on the describable relationships between components. In addition to the EMCA/multimodal interaction analyses, with touch and other sensory experiences included, that can benefit the study of complex situated assemblages, two possibilities for including the larger temporal or geographical sphere in the analysis of local phenomena were discussed in detail: 1) Goodwin's lamination that enlarges the strictly situation-bound contextual configuration analysis to the cultural-historical formations through the use of material tools with 2) mentionings that combine MCA and Cooren's interest in non-human (material) actors. In other words, the well-known sociomaterial concept of material-discursive is translated into two analytical possibilities. The analysis of a nature hike illustrates both: 1) How the app was, with all its connections and implications, laminated to the situation at hand; and 2) how a previously detected plant was incarnated by a hike participant to introduce the app as a topic. While the app was not of interest to the group, the reasons for the guide to introduce it and the way the lack of interest was exhibited could be connected to certain obligations as participants in a conservation nature hike.

The theoretical attraction, yet analytical difficulty, of assemblages is that they are heterogeneous, they cover diverse phenomena when analyzing situated practices from participants' experiences and memory to institutional (family and others) histories to the material environment as complicatedness (Latour, 1996) that implies other places, participants, and practices. In their special issue introduction, Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler (2021) bring into focus the prior actions of social interaction that their different scenarios exemplify. Also, they all seem to point to socio-cultural/−historical approaches, something that for instance Charles Goodwin was very aware of. Latour (1996) contrasted complicatedness to complexity in order to highlight how the material aspect of the complexity of any ongoing event assemblage is connected to how those materials got to be in the situation in the first place. However, ANT has been accused of not concentrating on the practices that make the connections between the actants in the network. From an EMCA perspective, to better understand the connections, it would require longitudinal ethnographic studies where practices are followed closely (*cf.* sociocultural studies). If this is not possible, the multimodal interaction analysis toolbox could make use of the two suggestions for how to use lamination and MCA for assemblage analysis. Fenwick (2015) has criticized sociocultural participation approaches for their lack of taking the agentive role of materials seriously. Therefore, this paper hopes to add a link between EMCA

GUIDE 1: cooperation with [foundation] and various others Copenhagen university they run a large-scale project er where we try to involve as many people as possible to register what there is out in the nature and that you do with the help of such an app one downloads to one's smartphone (.) and the thing is that we have gotten some (.) good researchers to er: (.) present some criteria for what it is we have to look after (.) if we want to say something about how the biodiversity has it in Denmark, it is actually the case that there does not exist any overall study about .h: how the state of things is definitively. er::hm we have a lot of information about it that it is usually disseminated according to municipalities or nature types or such kind of things .h so we make such a (people) science project (.) where er: (.) where the object is to register (.) it is some specific kinds of plants some specific kinds of animals some specific kinds of nature (sort of) very simple you can see it and you can press .h: (an) then er: it will be automatically uploaded to a database together with g p- the g p s, (.) position so it is possible to see where it is and when it was and so on and- .h so will it all be put together (1) can see we are here up to- we have just rounded the first hundred thousand .h reports [.h so we-

PURPLE: [(do you know what)

GUIDE1: so we [can remem-

PURPLE: [two hundred

GUIDE1: is it [two: two hundred? (.)

PURPLE: [((two nods))

yes

GUIDE1: [really?

PURPLE: [((nod))

( ) two hundred six thousand- [hundred thousand ( )

GUIDE1: [good grief (well that's bloody) hundred thousands [okay

PURPLE: [yesyes

GUIDE1: the idea is that we should get up to a half million

PURPLE: yes

GUIDE1: er:::m observations (.) and when we have it (.) so these researchers we cooperate with think (.) that er: then they can on the basis of those data (.) say pretty much about what the state of biodiversity is (.) in the kingdom here. .h and it is a bit exciting I m(h)can b(h)ecause it is equally sort of a trial to involve a lot of (.) regular people that do not have anything to do with research and where we then work together with some .h some researchers .h you can find this app i this naturcheck .h it is in googleplay and in appstore and uh now those places are called there ok so it is .h: it takes two minutes to download it and so is one actually in it and there are pictures to it all .h so it is very very easy to use uh you don't need even know how to read almost .h you can just look at the pictures .h: ((clears throat)) (.) so do that I mean if you want to participate (.) it is: it is actually f- fun to be involved

FIGURE 8
Guide 1 introducing the app.

and a multiplicity of sociomaterial and with that participant-oriented assemblage approaches.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Ethics statement

Written informed consent was not obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article because the images are pseudonymized. The participants were offered to undersign a written consent where pseudonymization was stated, but they refused the possibility and expressed clearly to the camera that they are happy with the collection of video data as long as it is used for research purposes only.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication. Part of the analysis was based on a paper presented in International Pragmatics Conference, Belfast, 2017 by PR and Paul McIlvenny.

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Conflict of interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Respecifying social change: the obsolescence of practices and the transience of technology

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This article proposes that social change, a fundamental topic in sociological theory, can be productively revisited by attending to studies in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (EM/CA). We argue that the corpus of EM/CA research, from the 1960s until the present day, provides details of the constitutive and identifying aspects of practices and activities that gradually transform into descriptions of *obsolescent* practices and activities, and that this corpus can be revisited to learn about the ways people used to do things. Taking landline and mobile telephony as a case in point, we show that the subtle details of conversational practices are anchored in the technology used as part of the contemporary lifeworld, and that they stand for the particularities of routine social structures of their time period. We also discuss the temporal aspects of the competences required on the part of members and analysts to make sense of encountered practices in terms of their ordinary recognizability and interactional consequentiality, pointing to the anchoring of social life in its historical time. Finally, we conclude by considering different ways of respecifying social change by attending to various kinds of historicity and obsolescence of social praxis.

KEYWORDS

ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, history, social change, sociology, temporality, technology, landline and mobile telephony

1. Introduction

In a 2005 paper on "maps and journeys," Brown and Laurier offer a detailed description of travelers' work with a paper map as part of a car journey. Among other aspects of the activity, the authors take into account the positioning of the map as a material object incorporated in the social activities: "When closed, it lies on Jane's lap, and although she opens up the map and makes it available to Fay (who uses it to point at), she does not move the map to the middle between them. … Confirmations of what they are seeing in common are marked by gestures: they point at features, bring out routes, and are otherwise immersed in the tangle of marked roads on the map, with points and sustained followings of their fingers. Because they are doing this naming and pointing together, should Jane make a mistake, Fay can correct her, and vice versa" (Brown and Laurier, 2005, p. 27). Although the analytic account is poignant and careful, the described activity might strike a current reader (i.e., in 2023) as somewhat dated, given the transition from paper maps to digital navigation devices. This becomes apparent when one compares Brown and Laurier's analysis with a more recent description of "navigating with digital maps" provided 15 years later by Smith et al. (2020, p. 229): "During Bryn's questions, Aled

glances at the screen of his mobile device, maintaining the relevance of the WWR app[1] as the basis for restating his proposal, 'I think we (.) carry on' […] when Aled pauses […] he raises a pointing finger to the device's screen and, at the same time, rotates it towards Bryn and steps slightly backwards as Bryn closes in. His adjustment of the device angle enables both of them to see their current location on the app and the suggested routes to the Roman camp. This deft set of movements supports co-viewing of the smartphone's screen, while simultaneously making it relevant to the current navigational trouble." Although the participants in both instances are involved in a similar mundane activity of wayfinding with a map, their social practices, material tools, and routine ways of working—preserved and represented in the quoted descriptions and in the remainder of the two papers—are significantly different. Such noticeable transformations in everyday and professional activities over time provide grounds for the main arguments of the present paper.

Social change is one of the central and perennial topics of sociology and the social sciences (Sztompka, 2000; McLeod and Thomson, 2009). The very foundations of the discipline rest on the recognition of profound transformations in the established common ways of life, experienced from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the onset of industrialization, urbanization, and the related emergence of "modernity" (Ballard and Barnett, 2023). Narrative conceptualizations of history emerged in Europe around the same time (White, 1973; Koselleck, 2004), since a reflexive historicity is a cornerstone of modern society that—as a "self-describing object" (Luhmann, 1992)—also produces accounts of itself with regard to collective pasts and futures. Such reflections of social change are often connected to its assessment, applying and variously favoring conceptions of progress, decline, or continuity (Weeks, 2007). May (2011, p. 367) points out that "a focus on the everyday allows us to view social change not simply as a top-down process generated by 'extraordinary' events but as something that also results from our mundane 'ordinary' activities." Aligning with her suggestion, this article extends an invitation to scholars in the social sciences to consider research in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (henceforth EM/CA)[2] as offering a distinct and valuable historical perspective, although the studies are rarely conceived or conducted as investigation of history or social change as such (Lynch, 2009; Pekarek Doehler et al., 2018).

Our aim is twofold: first, to outline a praxiological respecification of "social change" as a focal topic of the social sciences, and, second, to offer a novel look at the corpus of studies of practical action and practical reasoning collected within EM/CA. These studies address the lived interactional present and the endogenous time of locally organized social settings, explicating the ways in which recognizable scenes of everyday life are produced. We argue that in doing so, EM/CA research also inevitably and unavoidably—though mostly inadvertently—provides accounts of practices that are reflexively entrenched in the exogenous time of social processes. *First*, with regard to the respecification of social change, we develop EM's central strategy: "while taking up recognizable topics in philosophy and social theory, ethnomethodology makes a deflationary move to respecify them praxiologically" (Lynch, 2022). As Button points out, EM (and CA) is interested in foundational sociological matters in an alternate way: "it wished to make them investigatable, available for enquiry. In holding them up for scrutiny, and in working through the implications of that enquiry, ethnomethodology came to respecify foundational matters" (Button, 1991, p. 5). We argue that research in EM/CA, viewed in retrospect, makes social change as a foundational matter of social science visible and investigable. Therefore, we aim at articulating some blind spots of theories of social change (e.g., Eisenstadt, 1964), and provide a distinct perspective *vis-à-vis* more recent mid-level conceptions on technology-related social change in Science and Technology Studies (e.g., Sørensen, 2006; Wyatt, 2008). Relatedly, regarding our *second* aim, we propose that the corpus of EM/CA studies can be conceived as offering a distinct historical perspective on society. From EM/CA's corpus of empirical studies, gathered over more than 60 years, we learn not only about "how people actually do things" (Livingston, 2008, p. 842) but also how people *used to* actually do things, as practices that were once unproblematic and taken for granted gradually become outdated.

Commenting on an assignment he gave to his students in 1960s on observing people as they are "exchanging glances," Harvey Sacks (1992, Vol. I, p. 94, emphasis added) also contemplated the historical dimension of everyday life: "I know that people can do this, I've watched it many times, and I take it that you have seen it also. … [But] it could have been the case that everybody came back and said 'No, I never saw that happen.' And that's possible. It might be *something that's dying out*. *A thing that our forefathers had.* Like God." To grasp this inherently and inevitably transient character of social praxis in current societies, this article introduces, lays out, and illustrates the notion of *obsolescence*. Findings of EM/CA become obsolescent in the sense that they capture particulars of social practices in terms of their constitutive and identifying details, but at the same time these described particulars always consist of things of the past, and they might comprise former ways of life that are no longer to be found in the world. Once social practices are encountered—documented *in vivo* or in published literature—as obsolete, one encounters social change as an aspect of everyday life, ingrained in its details.

Reflections of social change in scientific and everyday discourses are often tied to technological development (White, 1962; Bittner, 1983; Button, 1993), and sociology considers technology both as "an agent and an object of social change" (Kinsley, 2023, p. 250). In this paper, we also approach the theme of social change through a focus on how technological objects are "made at home in the world that has whatever organization it already has" (Sacks, 1992, Vol. II, p. 549). In resonance with the proposition of Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler (2021, p. 131), our case here is telephony: the first machine-mediated synchronous interpersonal exchanges, which are themselves a novelty

1 WWR stands for *Walking with Romans*, a digital "guide app … developed to facilitate physical and historical access to a little-visited site" (Smith et al., 2020, p. 226).

2 EM and CA are approaches that have developed in sociology of the 1950s and 1960s, mainly in the work of Garfinkel and Sacks (Sacks, 1963, 1972, 1992; Garfinkel, 1967, 2002, 2022; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). The aim of EM/CA is to describe and explicate the systematic ways by which people produce orderly events and actions in social interaction. It takes as its distinctive phenomenon members' methods of practical reasoning and practical action in everyday and specialized social settings (Livingston, 1987; Lynch, 1993), and the organization of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 2007). For more recent developments, see, e.g., Button et al., 2022; Maynard and Heritage, 2022; Haddington et al., 2023; Sormani and vom Lehn, 2023.

in human history. Through secondary analysis of materials from CA studies on landline and mobile phones, in the following two sections we provide grounds for the introduction and explication of the notion of obsolescence. Subsequently, in the remainder of the text, we conceptually respecify this notion from an EM perspective, reflecting on how such empirical materials can be "made sense of" as documents of the past by both members and analysts.

2. Mobile and landline telephony: emerging obsolescence

Modern telephony was born and subsequently evolved quickly in the latter part of the nineteenth century through a series of innovations that led to telephone calls being transmitted with lines, thereby earning them the name "landline telephone," which continued as the reigning form of telephony for the next 100 years. Though within "landline telephony" there were several steps of development, such as the automation of switchboards (which made the "central ladies" redundant), telephone etiquettes evolved and were standardized in a step-by-step manner in varying national and linguistic contexts. One aspect of the evolving telephone etiquette was how to answer and open the conversation (Hopper, 1992). Following Schegloff (1968), there emerged within CA a tradition of telephone conversation opening studies, which demonstrated the local patterns and regularities of openings in a number of countries and languages (e.g., Houtkoop-Steenstra, 1991; Hakulinen, 1993; Lindström, 1994). It appears that in the course of the development of telephony, call openings had been conventionalized and highly standardized, involving strong regularities but also a linguistic and cultural sensitivity (Arminen and Leinonen, 2006).

For instance, the Finnish opening pattern of landline calls had become robustly canonized. It can be estimated that well over 90% of calls had the same pattern (Arminen and Leinonen, 2006). Finnish calls were opened with a self-identification that was an answer to a summons, which in landline telephony was a telephone ring summoning hearers to respond by picking up the receiver. Canonically, the answerer's first turn received a reciprocal self-identification from the caller, which followed a greeting. After the return of the greeting, the call was ripe for the initiation of the topic of the call. Excerpt 1 below presents a case in point (C = caller; R = answerer; transcription conventions are explained in the appendix; data is from the Finnish Department Data archive, University of Helsinki, Finland).

1 R: (0.5) Mäki:>sellä< ((the ending is said quickly))
(0.5) at Mäki:>nen< ((at + family name))

2 C: n:o: M:irja tässä hei. .hh[hh .hh
[ ] Mi:rja here hi:. .hh[hh .hh

3 R: [no $he:ih$=
[[] $hi::h$=

4 C: =#e# no ku- #ö# kuule tuota: mmh ö m- meinasin
=#e# [] li- #uh# listen e:rm mmh uh m- I meant

5 kyssyy paria asiaa ku taas >neuvoa tartte:
to ask couple of things as again >I nee:d advice

EXCERPT 1
(Arminen and Leinonen, 2006, p. 342).

For our purposes, the first line is the crux of the matter. First of all, there is a pause in the beginning, and an inpatient reader might doubt the accuracy of the notation. Notably, though, the landline calls were opened when the call recipient picked up the telephone receiver (though there was some variation in the design of telephone apparatuses). As the recordings of calls were set to capture the whole call from the opening of the line to its closing, there tended to be a brief moment—not really a silence, but a low noise marking the connection made on the line, presumably standing for the moment when the answerer had picked up the receiver, opening the line. In the landline call opening, the line-opening sound[3] was part of the opening, indicating that the receiver had been picked up and the answerer was about to speak; in this way, the initial pause belongs to the answerer, as transcribed here. It also stands for the technical possibilities and limitations of landline telephony.

The linguistic content of the rest of the first line includes a self-identification that can notably vary. Here, the answerer utters a family name and a case marking that indicates location. The opening thus displays the call to have reached a certain family at their location. In that way, this opening line, which is not atypical, is also in this part indexical to the type of technology used; that is, the landline calls were connected between points in the telephone network, and here the speaker vocalizes their spatial point in the network. Furthermore, the use of family name indicates that the telephone belonged to the family. It also opened varying trajectories for the call, depending on who would turn out to be the intended recipient. Hence, the opening was indexical both to the particularity of technology in its time and to the particularities of social formation, revealing that the technology use was not individual but based on units that shared a telephone, such as families or offices.[4] Thirdly, the answerer's first line did not show orientation to the caller's identity. That is, the analogue telephone ring—the summons—did not carry information of who the caller was. Given the anonymity of the summons, the answerer had to respond without knowing who the caller was or what the reason of the call was. This lack of knowledge was imprinted in the analogue landline call openings, irrespective of whether they were based on self-identification, as in numerous countries in Europe, or included a voice sample, as in Anglo Saxon countries (Arminen, 2005). The lack of knowledge of the caller and of the call topic is hugely salient in that it shows that the parties on the phone lacked a connection and awareness of those who were outside of the proximity of their own location. Though this may not appear much of an observation, it pinpoints a significant aspect of the lived life of its time.

It is also notable that in the era of landline telephony there appeared aspirations to reach beyond the limits of the horizon of the moment. Garfinkel reflected on these aspirations through a tutorial on

3 In spy movies, or when a Westerner was staying in an Eastern-bloc hotel, one would listen immediately if the line-opening sound was accompanied with a silent click.

4 Over the course of the history of telephony, the network grew denser as the number of points increased. Praxiologically, were we to explore this aspect of archived recordings, this would also have a correlate in telephone communication practices.

telephone summons, where he asked his students to tape record a phone ringing that is audibly summoning them, or someone else, or nobody in particular, etc. (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992).[5] Schegloff (1986) also paid attention to the answerer's potential orientation to knowing who is calling. Mostly, answerers gave a voice sample "hello?," which did not display knowledge of the caller's identity; the answerers could also greet the caller with "hi," displaying their "super-confidence" (Schegloff's term) in who was calling.[6] In this way, the explication of the lived practice of the time discloses correlations with socio-technical historical moments. Notably, both Garfinkel and Schegloff in their studies on telephone summons traded on the technology of its time and exposed the technology users' taken-for-granted assumptions of that world. Bjelić (2019) even suggests that call recipients demonstrated a particular capability to orient a telephone ring to be from a particular caller, which stands for the lifeworld of landline call recipients. Following Sacks, we may say that here the EM/CA studies have articulated a historical moment of the way how preceding generations have acted (up to the 1980s).

3. The vanishing lifeworld of landline telephony

Landline telephony stood for the lived world where remote communication took place between designated fixed points. This required practices that parties used for communication between the points when telephony was not available. As a case in point, a childhood recollection of one of the authors (JM) captures the life lived in-between the telephone network points:

> *Growing up in Central Europe in the early 1990s, I remember that we spent a lot of time playing outside with other kids from the neighborhood, in the concrete streets of the housing development. While spending an afternoon with friends away from home, kids usually had the duty of "reporting themselves," for the parents to know that their child is all right. I remember that we did this by ringing the doorbell and saying through the speaker something along the lines of "I am just reporting myself," and the parent usually specified that you had to come back at a certain time, typically for dinner, or maybe come home immediately and do your homework. This practice was, as I remember it, common and mundane. Most of us did it and we gave it no second thought as we often accompanied each other for such a quick "reporting" at home.*

All these practices underwent profound changes when mobile telephony emerged.[7] Wireless technologies started to quickly evolve in the 1970s and 1980s, and their standardized forms diffused at a record-fast speed in the 1990s, largely replacing landline telephony. Mobile telephony led to numerous changes in phone calls that could be traced already in the openings (Weilenmann and Leuchovius, 2004; Arminen and Leinonen, 2006; Laursen and Szymanski, 2013). Mobile call openings typically resemble what Schegloff (1986) called super-confident landline call openings. Most mobile phones, being based on digitized telephone systems, allow the receiver to gain access to the caller's number so that the answerer may know who is calling before answering the call. If the caller's number is listed on the answerer's mobile phone contacts list, then the caller's name may appear or a personalized ringtone may sound. Consequently, the answerer—for a good reason—can be super-confident about who is calling (though only if the call comes from the listed number). The answerer thus may tailor their answer accordingly, as seen in the excerpt below (T = caller; S = answerer; data archived, IA, University of Helsinki, Finland) (Excerpt 2).

1 S: no moi,
prt. [greeting]
[] hi

2 (0.3)

3 T: no mo:i,
prt. [greeting]
[] hi:,

4 (.)

5 T: ooks sää lähössä,
are you((informal)) about-to-go ((idiom))
are you leavin,

6 (.)

7 S: e,
neg.
no,

EXCERPT 2
(Arminen, 2005, p. 651).

In comparison to a landline call opening, we can notice several distinctive features here. First, the ubiquitous mobile technology is individualized, compared to landline telephones that were shared with

5 In classic comedy films, there are several scenes of a call recipient believing they know who is calling already on the basis of the summons, leading to numerous comical developments due to a presupposed caller identification.

6 Were we to critically study classic comedies (note 5 above), we might note that some of the types of confusion would not have happened had the receiver opened the line with the super-confident style, revealing that they had presumed to know who had called. Alternatively, the receiver may have intentionally hidden their presupposition of the callers' identity. This scenario would set up these comedy scenes for "strategic interaction," where the actors' try to hide aspects of their knowledge due to strategic reasons (Goffman, 1969). A wider point here is that historically varying epistemic ecosystems open up different action possibilities, including for "strategic" actions.

7 In an ideal world, we could next show how "reporting" has become reconfigured with mobile technologies. Indeed, reporting practices are common in mobile telephony: people both "report" their whereabouts and are also held responsible for that over the phone (Arminen, 2006; Arminen and Leinonen, 2006). In a way, Excerpt 2 also develops that direction. We do not really dwell on that aspect. In reality, we have a limited number of pre-teenagers' calls that offered relevant material for a strict comparison of the reporting practices in question. We must return to the emerging reporting practices on another occasion.

others. In Finnish mobile calls, it is not uncommon to start the answer to the summons with a speech particle "no." Basically, the Finnish "no" is untranslatable, at least into English,[8] but it is a speech particle that is both backward- and forward-looking. In other words, through "no" the answerer gives the answer as having been responsive to a recognized action and also initiates a transition to a new stage in the conversation. A reader may pay attention to the fact that in the landline call the same particle was initially used by the caller notifying the answer and initiating the next move [see (1) line 2]. It appears that this shift is a systematic change toward a novel social practice (Arminen, 2005; Arminen and Leinonen, 2006). In this way, in mobile calls the answer to the summons that allows the recipient to get to know who is calling is designed as a move for an already ongoing interaction. Unlike landline calls, the recipient design of the call begins already in the answer to the summons, which makes a recipient-designed response relevant. Reciprocally, the caller may also assume who is likely to answer, as mobile phones are personal, unlike collective landline phones. Consequently, the greeting exchange happens between parties who know each other, and there is no need for identification work, voice samples, or self-identifications. After the exchange of greetings, the anchor position for the reason for the call is established (line 5). The opening is thus systematically truncated in comparison to analogue landline openings.

Nevertheless, as with landline telephony, the subtle details of the conversational practice correlate to the technology used; in that way, they also stand for the particularities of the routine social structures of their time. Mobile telephones are wireless and miniaturized, allowing ubiquitous communication. Already in the opening sequence, the participants display their reciprocal identification of each other and the immediate readiness to move to discuss their current activities, arrangements, and locations. That is, the epistemic ecosystem of telephones has undergone a profound change, from analogue landlines to digital mobiles. The resulting outcome could be called the lifeworld of "connected presence" (Licoppe, 2004). Ubiquitous communication technologies enable social exchanges between people beyond the bounds of time and location; no less importantly, they merge mediated and co-present relations, forming a presence that is connected to online realms beyond the immediate moment. Compared to the lifeworld of landline telephony, the pervasive communicative access between individuals incorporates offline and online environments, making contact potentially ceaseless and all-encompassing and also transforming family practices from the previous era of communication between the points (Lahikainen and Arminen, 2017).

4. The analytic relevance of obsolescence

The analytic relevance of obsolescence can be demonstrated with the help of a case in which it has been missed. That is, EM/CA studies do not automatically guarantee a sensitivity to historical changes, for to be alert to emerging obsolescence requires scholarly expertise. Empirically, analysis must be rigorous and strict to reveal the changes in interactional practices that have made some aspects of the former practice obsolete. Without sufficient understanding of the former interactional practice, the analyst may not be able to apprehend the relevancy of details that have replaced some of its aspects. The changes in interactional practices are also related to and comprise a consequential part of the historical alteration of lifeworlds.

In their comparison of landline and mobile call openings, Hutchby and Barnett (2005, p. 147) stated that "far from revolutionizing the organization of telephone conversation, mobile phone talk retains many of the norms associated with landline phone talk." Using our terminology, for these authors the landline calls, their associated norms, and the lifeworld based on communications between the network points had not become obsolete. To make their point, they demonstrate the structure of mobile call openings, starting from the extract below (Excerpt 3). In line 3, the answerer responds to the summons (lines 1–2) and receives "how are you" (line 3), after which the answerer makes the first initiation for the topical talk (line 4; SB = answerer, Irene = caller).

1		((summons))
2	SB:	Hello
3	Irene:	Hiya: ba::by
4	SB:	You a'right what's hap'ning
5	Irene:	↑What's going on
6	SB:	°Nut'en man
7	Irene:	How was ya day::

EXCERPT 3
(Hutchby and Barnett, 2005).

To defend the all-encompassing power of the landline calls and their lifeworld, Hutchby and Barnett (2005, p. 157) state that in the mobile call openings there appears to be nothing "mobile"; if there are changes to landline call openings, these changes are not pervasive, but just "subtle details of the organization of interaction." There appears to be at least six subtle details in these openings that stand apart from the landline call openings (Arminen, 2005): These include: (1) Answering a mobile phone summons differs prosodically from the answers to summons of landline telephones. The Anglo Saxon landline answers to the summons "H'llo?" were typically produced with a rising intonation (marked with '?'), which Schegloff (1968) calls a voice signature. In Hutchby and Barnett's data (or any other mobile phone data), there is no trace of voice signature prosody. (2) In landline calls, the answer to the summons is not a greeting, and the greeting exchange follows it, but that is not the case in mobile call openings. (3) In landline calls, either the answerer has to identify the caller or the caller has to identify themself. In mobile calls, the conversational identification work has largely become obsolete for the caller, as the digital mobile system provides caller identification. There is a conversational work of recognition, but no work of identification (see also Button et al., 2022, p. 88).[9] (4) In landline calls,

8 Arminen and Leinonen (2006) have extended the discussion of "no" and its untranslatability; see, in particular, note 5. Other studies of "no" include Sorjonen and Vepsäläinen (2016) and Vepsäläinen (2019).

9 Similarly to how self-driving cars are capable of traveling without human activity, digital telephone systems identify the caller without human input. While self-driving cars are still in a test phase, digital telephone systems have been in operation for some time.

the answerer and caller display a reciprocal recognition before the topic initiation. In mobile calls, this recognition work is found already in the call opening. The flat "hello" works as a greeting and is responded to with a greeting conveying the recognition of the caller, both in English (Excerpt 3) and Finnish (Excerpt 2) examples. (5) The landline calls were made between the spatial points of the network, which made it relevant for the caller to disambiguate whether the right person in the network had been reached. Parties in ubiquitous individualized mobile telephony are relieved from the disambiguation task. (6) Due to all the aspects above, the opening sequences of mobile calls became systematically radically reduced compared to landline telephone opening sequences. This does not mean that there was no perseverance of interactional practices between landline and mobile call openings. Exchanges of greetings (both in Finnish and English data) and how-are-yous (in English data, as previously) do take place, but technologically afforded identification and ubiquity of calls have enabled the emergence of a set of new practices, as listed above, amounting to the obsolescence of a lifeworld of communication between network points.

At this point we can formulate some preliminary conclusions. First, the "subtle details of call openings" are part of the complex orchestration of intersubjectivity. If we fail to pay attention to these, we risk also missing the achieved sense of action in interaction, and we may not grasp the relevance and consequentiality of the action. Second, the analysts' action ascriptions are consequential. If we state that there is no salient difference between landline and mobile telephony, we also claim that no significant social change has happened. When there is no social change, there is also no obsolescence. The world in which there is no history—or social change, or differences between historically altered social practices—is a world where all cats are grey. Researchers need to carefully attend to elaborate details of practical action, while articulating the lifeworld contextures of the described practices and their inevitable embeddedness in sociohistorical environments.

5. Grasping the past: historical unique adequacy

Our comparison of routine practices in landline and mobile telephony has shown that a social change can be made visible as a contrast between the past and the present. If a researcher is interested in social change, then the focus will be on novelties in social conduct, though continuities may also exist. It is the intertwining of familiar and strange, the tension between the surprising and the well known, which provides for the visibility of social change in everyday praxis. The ability to see a practice as *obsolescent* (or, conversely, as *contemporary*) opens a possibility to grasp its historicity, but that is not a taken-for-granted competence. When a person encounters something that one has never seen happening (e.g., in an old movie) and is unable to understand what is going on, the experience as such does not open a vision of history and social change. One needs to have sufficient practical or theoretical expertise to recognize a practice for what it is, and only afterwards is one able to articulate and disambiguate the embeddedness of the practice to its sociohistorical environments, beginning to see a society with a history.

Encountering empirical materials from former times, such as writings, photos, audio, or video recordings, requires an ability to grasp and understand the social practices that are captured in these materials. Phenomenal features of social activities can be *preserved* for recognition and analysis (Mondada, 2006), but it is always necessary for the analyst to be able to make sense of them. Essentially, the analyst is dealing with the problem of retrospective sense-making in terms of "actors" that are divided from them by the passage of time. A certain bit of conduct that was a recognizable social practice in the past may lose this recognizability, and just how it is consequential in a particular moment of interaction becomes lost. This raises interesting questions about the possibility of "intersubjective understanding" across extended periods of time, and about building coordinated social action with materials provided by temporally distant actors as predecessors (see Schutz, 1967; Goodwin, 2018). The concept of the past depends on the relevance of the past for the present "here and now." A praxiological respecification of this central element of social change is related to a consideration of the historical dimension of *the unique adequacy requirement of methods*.

In ethnomethodology, the unique adequacy requirement of methods refers to the routine recognition and production of local orders of social activities. As Garfinkel and Wieder (1992), (p. 184, our emphasis) put it, "ethnomethodology is concerned to locate and examine the concerted vulgar *uniquely adequate competencies* of order* production."[10] The enactment of methods of order production, or social practices, is uniquely adequate when the courses of action are recognizable for members and can be "taken seriously" by them (Garfinkel, 2022, p. 28)—or, as Hofstetter (2022) explains, "unique adequacy means being situated as some plausible local member." It is a prerequisite for adequate analysis done by analysts both *lay and professional* (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992, p. 183)—that is, not only by professional researchers (e.g., sociologists, ethnographers, or conversation analysts) but also by practitioners themselves in the studied settings, as they participate in concerted activities. Our earlier excursion into the development of telephony illustrates that as a competence in routine recognition and production of local order, unique adequacy has a historical dimension. For instance, what counts as adequate in landline telephony might not be adequate in mobile telephony. The skills for mundanely competent use of a technology, or *production* of social practice, may become obsolete, but they are still required for a *recognition* of that social practice in empirical materials from a former world, even if these practices are encountered as things of the past. Button et al. (2022, p. 75) point out that the methodological requirement of unique adequacy is "far from unique" to EM, being also incorporated in other disciplines, including the study of history (see, e.g., Simmel, 1907/1977; Kluback, 1956; Schwartz, 2017). Our proposal in this article moves toward a respecification of historical understanding as a practical recognition and production of potentially obsolescent practices, topicalizing "members' reportable-observable production of the work itself" (Button et al., 2022, p. 75).

In preliminary studies of an early "chatbot" LYRIC in the late 1960s (see Eisenmann et al., forthcoming), working with printouts of interactions between the user and the machine, Garfinkel (1969, p. 3) noted "the difference between availability of 'docile texts' and texts

10 Regarding "order" spelled with an asterisk, an endnote explains: "Spelled with an asterisk, order* is a collector and a proxy for any and every topic of logic, meaning, method, reason, and order. It stands in for any and all the marvelous topics that are available in received lingoes and received topics in intellectual history. Of course these include the lingoes and studies in the endless arts and sciences of practical action" (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992, p. 202).

available as a 'first linear time through' as contrasting phenomenal features of 'conversing' in man–machine conversations." We understand this remark as proposing a distinction between lived sense-making work, embedded in a lifeworld, that goes on "in real time" and "*in situ*" when interacting with such a program (as "first linear time through"), and—on the other hand—the retrospective sense-making work involved in reading the transcript of user/machine interaction without a lifeworld correlate (as "docile texts"). This insight, highlighting the difference between the retrospective reading of a transcript and the lived experience of the situation, is also inspiring for considering EM/CA materials more broadly in the respecification of social change. Eventually, the recordings of practical actions and practical reasoning provided as EM/CA's "data," which made possible the transcripts with regard to landline and mobile telephony, can be read as texts that capture practices that are currently present or represent documents of a social history. Transcripts can be read as docile texts without a lifeworld correlate, or they can be explored as subtle details of lived historical practices by opening up the social embeddedness of interactional practices.

Our own analytical commentary above has been written in a way that highlights the historicity of practices, with the very comparison of telephone practices becoming the topic. Describing social activities, such as talking on the phone, requires a grasp of the sociomaterial reality in which they are done. Our analysis above supplies and enables such a grasp for a contemporary reader by providing contextual information that would not be necessary for an observer with a routine competence in the production of the described activities. Historically embedded practices are therefore made recognizable as meaningful actions for the readers, but the description alone does not allow for a proper reenactment (Sormani, 2016) of the interactional work. Sufficiently explained practices can make sense to observers, analysts, and readers of analytic accounts, even when these practices are not available anymore as something that they could themselves enact. Going through EM/CA's corpus of studies, the historicity of members' uniquely adequate competence is available as the encountered strangeness of everyday practices that are no longer accessible in their full, lived presence; these are practices that used to be taken for granted (e.g., opening a landline phone call) but have become obsolete and outdated, even while still being recognizable as meaningful for enactment of that practice. In the case of an obsolete practice, "mis-reading" the EM/CA descriptions as instructions (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 149) would be part of creating a member in a world of everyday praxis that no longer exists. Such considerations lead us to various possibilities for a respecification of social change as visible in captured details of routine practical action.

6. Multiple paths in the respecification of social change

EM/CA undertakes "a detailed study of social practices as a solution to the great theoretical problems of meaning and order" (Rawls, 2002, p. 3), which also include the classical theme of time and temporality (Rawls, 2005). So far, we have focused in this paper on arguing that EM/CA studies can be seen as a form of unintended, inadvertent, yet unavoidable social history. As a by-product of describing the here and now of a lived world, accounts of social praxis become historical accounts as the world they describe goes by. The intrinsic value of these analytic accounts rests in the fact that they describe social praxis ahistorically (i.e., without *a priori* consideration of historical development as part of the "context" in which it happens). We propose that this constitutes a first path for respecifying social change by a retrospective consideration of the corpus of EM/CA's detailed studies of social activities as a resource to learn about obsolescent practices, such as the practices related to landline telephony, wayfinding with paper maps, or writing with a typewriter. This is related to focus on how "history gets done" in the temporality, sequentiality, and local historicity of social activities and their accumulative dimension (see Meyer and Schüttpelz, 2018, p. 196, in their discussion of Goodwin, 2018).

Moreover, in recent years, the historicity of social practices has been systematically examined in "longitudinal studies" in CA (Pekarek Doehler et al., 2018; Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler, 2021). In their introduction to the first edited collection of this line of research, Wagner et al. (2018) discuss two "pioneering studies on change over time": Wootton's work on the development of a child's requests, and Clayman and Heritage's research on changes in the organization of journalists' questioning in presidential news conferences (see, e.g., Wootton, 1997; Clayman and Heritage, 2023). Our discussion of historical unique adequacy and practical obsolescence may bring further insights into this domain of study. We highlight the issue of recognizability (i.e., the routine visibility of the practice under consideration as a practice that is doing a particular action, such as *requesting* or *asking a question*), and the visibility of a practice as obsolescent. A practice is recognizable as achieving an action in a particular sociohistorical setting, and the routine recognizability of a practice in turn contributes to the constitution of just that "sociohistorical setting." This is tied to the issue of comparability, and above all what constitutes a warrant for a "vertical comparison" (i.e., studying the development of practices; see Zimmermann, 1999). As proposed by Holland (1993/1978), p. 192, "We detect the sameness by seeing what persists within the constant change of our lives. We detect the difference by seeing what has changed against the background of sameness." The practical ability to see social change in the details of everyday life is interwoven with the ability to see what remains unchanged, and to presuppose social structures such as individuals (e.g., who acquire conversational skills such as requesting) and institutions (e.g., within which speakers ask questions). Watson (2008, p. 210) points out that before being employed in professional analysis, comparison and contrasting are already members' methods: "we can see ordinary interlocutors as 'practical comparative sociologists', making comparisons of categories or activities and working up contrasts on those bases." This also leads to our final point.

In order to identify and locate moments when the obsolescence of social practices becomes demonstrably consequential for the participants, one may also look at how members themselves orient to potentially obsolescent practices. This would allow us to investigate *emergent obsolescence* and capture the moments when previously commonplace practices are becoming obsolete, questionable, or disconnected from their sociohistorical environment. An example of the visible obsolescence of everyday practical knowledge could be a Twitter post by a mother who was (in the early 2020s) watching the TV series *Friends* (shot in the 1990s) with her daughter and had to explain many things that were taken for granted by the series creators but are not taken for granted any longer, including "what pagers were, and how they worked," or "why secretaries answer office phones."[11] Many replies to the original post provide further material. Figure 1 is an illustrative instance.

11 Available online at: https://twitter.com/rebeccamakkai/status/1515467051959304193 (accessed 10. 8. 2023).

An investigation of similar exchanges and accounts can provide an opportunity for a careful study of social change in the minutiae of everyday life, where new practices are discovered, invented, and sometimes praised, while old practices may be abandoned, problematized, and even ridiculed. EM/CA's programmatic attention to detail (Garfinkel, 2022; Macbeth, 2022) may allow us to account *just how* these processes of social change occur in the lived interactional time of our everyday lives, while not being explicitly approached as "history" in the classical sense of a meaningful series of events and their disciplined study.

"History" in this classical sense can also become a subject of EM/CA's deliberate focus, though it still holds true that "ethnomethodologists do not seem at home working on history" (Leudar and Nekvapil, 2011, p. 69). The major work on the local production of history remains Lynch and Bogen's (1996) book on the Iran-Contra hearings, which shows how people establish, maintain, and contest "the past" in courtroom interactions. Following Lynch's later suggestion to focus on "the practical and interactional production, reading, and establishment of documentary details" (2009, p. 98), Whittle and Wilson (2015, p. 58) turned their attention to the work of people tasked with "making history," concluding that EM should aim at "explicating the practical actions (ethnomethods) through which versions of past events are worked up, worked on, and eventually 'settled.'" Using CA, Burdelski (2016) analyzed stories of personal experiences of World War II in guided tours at a Japanese-American museum with regard to the narrators' positioning as individuals and as collectivity members. He found that stories of personal experience told by docents are used as devices for identity construction, which encourages participation from visitors and helps achieve the educational goals of the visit. In these studies, history as a professional discipline becomes a topic of research, which is a related but tangential perspective *vis-à-vis* our aims in this article, where we instead emphasize the inherent historicity of all social life, and the possibility of its perhaps unexpected discovery in EM/CA studies that are radically focused on the here and now.

7. Concluding discussion

A text on "an archeology of the office" published by *The Economist* in October 2022 concludes: "Real archeologists need tools and time to do their painstaking work: paint brushes, trowels, sieves and picks. Corporate archeology is easier: you just need eyes and a memory of how things used to be. But you also need to be quick. As more and more workplaces are revamped for the hybrid era, now is the time to take a careful look around the office. You may see something that will soon seem as dated as pneumatic tubes, typewriters and fax machines." Indeed, social practices that are technically mediated or augmented furnish us with highly illuminating topics, as they tend to undergo the most notable transformations, which occasionally can be swift and radical. In this article, we have suggested that as an aid for our "eyes and a memory of how things used to be," one can revisit studies that were written as minute descriptions of an everyday world once present and taken for granted. Exploring the boundaries of sociological theory and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis (EM/CA), this invitation includes a shift in perspective by looking at EM/CA studies as a peculiar version of social history, in addition to their significance as studies of the structures of lived experience. Such a shift in perspective can be illuminating and worthwhile for scholars in social sciences more generally, as well as for researchers who conduct EM/CA inquiries themselves.

FIGURE 1
A comment on a Twitter post about the TV show Friends and some of the obsolescent practices it captures.

When we look at the wide spectrum of existing EM/CA studies, we can get a sense of the potential of EM/CA as a discipline dealing with history and social change. There has been a lively tradition of studies on "institutional interaction," which will soon reveal many ways of how things were once done (Arminen, 2017). There is a long list of institutions that have undergone profound changes in past decades, from control rooms to police work, and from offices to classrooms. Numerous institutional practices have been captured and analyzed by EM/CA researchers. The circumstantial lived detail of social activities examined in EM/CA is undergoing rapid transformations—when offices become paperless, police officers carry cameras, control and technical support rooms are transported to other continents, and students are provided with digital tools. As an outcome of such processes of social change—more or less technologized—we have a plethora of thorough and systematic studies of practices that are no longer practiced. Inadvertently, EM/CA studies also capture cultural changes: past civil politeness toward politicians, explicit assumptions of gender roles occupied by husbands and wives, or AIDS therapy from a time when there was not yet HIV.[12] Finally, recent EM/CA studies of new practices established during the COVID-19 pandemic have also captured a historical reality, as many of these practices (e.g., greeting with elbow bumps; see Mondada et al., 2020) may have already become a thing of the past, since the lifeworld in which these practices were meaningful is no longer there.

In this context, our paper has considered the notion of obsolescence of social practices as a way to gain access to the inherent historicity of social life, while at the same time praxiologically respecifying the fundamental sociological topic of social change. Further work in this direction could investigate whether there are different kinds of obsolescence, as one could expect that the obsolescence of a social practice might range from marginalization and disappearance to total incomprehensibility. One may see a particular action (e.g., a greeting or a request) done in an obsolescent fashion while still recognizing it as that action, or one may see past conduct that is void of any meaning, having become completely obsolete. As a whole, were EM/CA able to articulate a path from the emergence of new social practices to their routinization and habituation, it would capture glimpses of the

12 The notion of HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) was formulated later than AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome). Therefore, there was "AIDS" before "HIV" was discovered.

historicity of human agency, which is beautifully propounded by Ernaux (2008/2022), p. 205: "The questions that arose with the appearance of new technologies were canceled out as their use became second nature, and required no thought. People who did not know how to use a computer or a Discman would become obsolete, like those who could not use a phone or washing machine." The skilled ability to use a technological object in a routine, mundane, unremarkable way is related to the uniquely adequate competences that comprise the practical accomplishment of professional and everyday activities, such as talking on the phone, following a map, or doing laundry. As we discussed above, the unique adequacy requirement of methods has a historical dimension that must be considered in specifying the complex relations between members' practical knowledge and the possibility of its recovery from analytical accounts and descriptions.

The historical perspective that accentuates social change poses certain challenges for EM/CA studies. As mentioned, much of the EM/CA research concerns history and social change only inadvertently and under a particular reading. Researchers may have a fine-grained sophisticated grasp of the subtle nuances of interactional practices but possess only limited resources to reflect the linkage of social interaction to the passage of sociohistorical "Big Time" (Button, 1990). The notion of obsolescence may provide solutions and insights related to some general challenges in "longitudinal CA" (Pekarek Doehler et al., 2018; Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler, 2021), such as the partial nature of the data, the comparability of phenomena across collections from different time periods, and issues in documenting and explaining change in social practices. Taking into account the obsolescence of practices as a members' phenomenon repositions these methodological issues as topics grounded in the historical particularity of the examined social activities, putting forward the encounters with social change and "vertical comparison" as something that participants themselves deal with. Ultimately, respecifying social change means that we also must respecify what we consider to be "history," or historically relevant, or historically constituted. When we return to Sacks (1992, Vol. I, p. 94) contemplation of the historicity of practices—"A thing that our forefathers had. Like God"—we may also read it as related to the familiar sociological thesis of secularization. Were we to recover and respecify the sense of history and social change available or assumed in the studies that have already been done in EM/CA, we would not run out of work too soon.

The classical sociological tradition of studying social change was burdened with troubles. Although it was able to portray nuanced degrees of social evolution, "the concrete contours" and "crystallizations" of change remained undetermined, and scholars were restricted to "indicate ranges of possibilities" (Eisenstadt, 1964, p. 386). Later, narrower meso-level approaches, such as domestication of media and technologies (e.g., Sørensen, 2006), enabled a finer grasp of emerging social practices. As Sørensen (2006, p. 55) summarizes "the impact of mobile telephony": "What is new is that one should be accessible everywhere and at all times." Domestication is a metaphor of taming the beast, making it known, familiar, stable, and docile. As such, the perspective catches the meso-level social change, but it risks losing the radical aspects of change. When people appropriate new practices, they do not just tame artifacts and technologies, but also make previous practices and identities obsolete. EM/CA may retain sensitivity to emerging new practices as it studies the ways in which people make relevant objects and artifacts for their actions, which may, however, appear as if the technologies themselves (e.g., landline and mobile phone) featuring in the formation of action had vanished (see Button, 1993). Technical features tend to become oriented to by the participants only when there is a problem, when something fails to work, and parties reorient to find out what to do next, or reason about the nature of the problem to get around it or repair it (Kosurko et al., 2023; Mlynář et al., 2023; Tiilikainen et al., 2023). And even when there is a technical problem, it is not self-evident that interactants treat the problem as a problem, as they may make use of it, and utilize the "problem" for their own purposes (Rintel, 2013). Therefore, the monocausal versions of technological determinism seem to fail (see Ogburn, 1947; Wyatt, 2008).

The inevitable counterpart of obsolescence is persistence, offering a complementary perspective of focusing on the emergence of new practices. As soon as EM/CA findings are somehow connected to sociohistorical reality, the analyst is bound to take stances; if the analysis is completely detached from the sociohistorical world, it remains purely technical. By looking at telephony, and technologized interaction more generally, we have intentionally prioritized change over stability for the purposes of illustration. Indeed, many social practices—if they ever become truly obsolete—remain remarkably stable over time. To stress the salience of "obsolescence," we have not yet discussed variabilities of "obsolescences" or their degrees, not to mention the closely related topics of perseverance of social practices, or the appearance of novel and innovative ones. Throughout, nevertheless, we have argued that such questions should, first and foremost, be answered empirically. If our paper provides inspiration for a further respecification of social change in the sense discussed above, then its purpose has been fulfilled.

Ethics statement

Ethical approval was not required for the study involving human data in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent was not required for participation in the study or for the publication of potentially identifiable data in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements. The social media data was accessed and analyzed in accordance with the platform's terms of use.

Author contributions

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Appendix

Transcription conventions (based on Jefferson, 2004).

[]	Overlapping talk.
(.)	Micro-pause.
(2.2)	Pause in seconds.
.	Final intonation.
>yes<	Notably faster talk.
	Notably slower talk.
(but)	Estimated hearing.
()	Inaudible segment.
a::	Vocal prolongation.
Re-	Cut-off.
↑	Higher pitch.
=	Rapid continuation (latching).
.hh/hh	Inhalation and exhalation.
n(h)o	Laughter particle within word.
THAT	Louder volume.
<u>that</u>	Hearable emphasis.

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Conversation analysis, institutions, and rituals

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By relating conversation analysis (CA), in particular CA research on institutional interaction to such research traditions as sociological institutionalism, new materialism, and ritual theory, the article illustrates how CA scholarship can contribute to macrosociological theorizing. This argument is illustrated by how national parliaments are organized as institutions. The main point made in the article is that occasions of what CA calls institutional interaction should be considered as rituals. Although those occasions are scripted ceremonial performances wherein social pressure, material conditions, or avoidance of punishment make actors conform, they still play a role in constituting social order by making participants honor the rules and principles codified in an organization's frontstage events. The article also underlines that organizational arrangements do not determine what actors can say or do, but they impose limits and conditions on people's conduct. Finally, the paper suggests that it is through such arrangements of institutional interaction that social structure is created, maintained, and naturalized.

KEYWORDS

conversation analysis, new institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, new materialism, ritual theory

Introduction

Because of its roots in ethnomethodology, conversation analysts have avoided building macrosociological theories. Using concepts that define society or its constitutive elements would violate the principle that an ethnomethodologist should analyze the methods and concepts members of a community use to produce social order in and through social interaction (Garfinkel, 1964; Garfinkel, 1967). However, conversation analysis (CA) has not entirely succeeded in staying clear of all references to society at large. After all, a considerable and most intriguing part of CA research is called research on institutional interaction, which implicitly acknowledges that there are objects called institutions out there. I suggest that, when related to other research on institutions, the insights gained from this scholarship can bridge the gap between CA and macrosociological theory. In this paper I suggest how that can be done, and hence contribute to the discussion on how conversation analysis could extend its scope toward addressing macrosociological questions.

CA's interest in institutions is a good starting point, because institution is one of the conceptual tools by which social theorists have tried to answer a fundamental question of sociology: how is social order possible? CA suggests that the basic answer is the interaction order: rather than members of society observing pregiven, internalized norms or meanings, social order is always negotiated in interaction situations. What CA calls institutional interaction is an extension to the basic answer: in institutional settings participants negotiate social order under special conditions and restrictions in comparison to the features of ordinary conversation between peers. This has been shown by studying interaction in, for instance, courtrooms, classrooms, interviews, therapeutic sessions, and different technical settings (e.g., Drew and

Heritage, 1992; Arminen, 2005; Arminen et al., 2010; Ekstrom, 2012; Ilomäki and Ruusuvuori, 2022).

This raises the question, how do those institutional settings come about? It would be far too voluntaristic to claim that interactants create those settings on the spot by deciding to assume roles such as judge, prosecutor, and defendant. Since institutions are not God-given but instead designed by people, clearly their constitution and proliferation are another element in the creation and maintenance of social order. Therefore, in this article I aim to show that it is fruitful to complement CA with institutional theory, which primarily focuses on studying how various organizations—private companies, state bureaucracies, and non-profit organizations—structure and manage the social world. Although neoinstitutional scholarship studies various organizations and identifies their specific features, it shares with CA the view that there is something generic about all institutional interaction—or I could phrase it organizational behavior—regardless of what organizations we are talking about. By utilizing the neoinstitutionalist insights about organizations and organizational behavior, CA scholarship can make itself relevant at a macrosociological level.

What I mean by the neoinstitutionalist insights is that organizations are what I would call designed institutions. That is, in their conduct actors are expected to observe inscribed rules and principles, which often leads into ceremonial behavior (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and to a division between frontstage and backstage settings (see, e.g., Goffman, 1955, 1956). In many instances this appears to suggest that ceremony has little impact on people's lives: on formal occasions actors pay lip service to high principles but act according to informal rules to get things done in practice. Yet I suggest that formal occasions are also important for social order: they are rituals that still honor and contribute to sanctifying the rules and principles in question. From this perspective, organizations and organizational behavior are key to the creation and maintenance of social order.

To elaborate on what I mean by that, I will lead you through a discussion of how CA research on institutional interaction relates to sociological institutionalism, new materialism, and ritual theory. To illustrate the points made, I discuss the way parliamentary politics is organized throughout the world.

CA, institutions, and organizations

In his article on conversation analysis as social theory, Heritage (2009) concludes that CA's main input to social theory is in pointing out how the interaction order—that is, ordinary conversation—is managed as an institution in its own right. But what other institutions are there? Sociology textbooks include longer or shorter lists of other institutions, but—perhaps except for language in the sense that humans can create shared sign systems—I suggest there is a difference between ordinary conversation and other institutions. To put it shortly, conversation is a universal institution, but others are culture-specific, historical formations.

To elaborate on that point, it is certainly possible to study conversation as an institution from a historical perspective and, respectively, to try and find universal features in, say, all religions of the world as Durkheim (1995) did. In that respect, CA scholars' long-term program to identify and describe the basic organizational principles found in all conversations is a choice of perspective. CA researchers consider universal the patterns or basic elements of the interaction order, termed by concepts such as adjacency pairs. They have indeed shown convincingly that the basic sequence organization of ordinary conversation is followed everywhere in the world regardless of local language and culture.

What about the others? Social and cultural theorists have argued that, for example, religion is an institution that can be found in all human societies. However, I tend to agree with the scholars who claim that the unifying features of present-day established religions are due to religious organizations copying models from one another, and that the whole concept of religion that lumps them together is problematic (Taira, 2010; Taira, 2022). The same goes for other candidates in the lists of social institutions: family, law, education, economy, etc. Functionalist theories of society have tried to define a list of key institutions that any society has to have to function and further develop (see, e.g., Parsons, 1951, 1964, 1966), but this line of thought can be challenged by the so-called Galton's problem, according to which such similarities between societies as similar organizational structures, policies, and socioeconomic development can be result of diffusion or borrowing among them (Ross and Homer, 1976; Braun and Gilardi, 2006). There is, indeed, plenty of evidence of worldwide emulation between organizations, both within particular categories of organizational activities such as lawmaking (Watson, 1974; Twining, 2004) and across the entire field of all kinds of organizations (Meyer and Bromley, 2013; Bromley and Meyer, 2015).

CA scholarship shares the scepticism or cautiousness of new institutionalism in listing universal institutions, although within CA research there is plenty of research on interaction in different institutional contexts. Following the methodological principle of using the concepts "members" use to refer to social phenomena only as a topic, not as a resource (Garfinkel, 1964; Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970), CA researchers have not referred to these contexts as separate institutions. Instead, they have avoided the question by lumping all these settings studied under the term "institutional interaction."[1]

What CA scholars imply by talking about interaction in "institutional settings" is that in other than ordinary conversations participants are expected or in varying ways forced to follow rules that put constraints on the forms and content of their interaction. To phrase this by using Franco Ferraris' concept, participants follow inscribed rules, "characterized by being written on a piece of paper, a computer file, or at least in the heads of the people involved" (Ferraris, 2013: 4). As a small correction to Ferraris' definition: the rules observed are not necessarily known to all participants: "clients" entering a professional's appointment, a courtroom or, say, a computerized online service platform, do not necessarily know how they are expected to behave. They are directed or punished if they violate the rules or deviating from their expected role is made technically impossible.

By talking about inscribed rules and instructions guiding actors' conduct, I underline the point that in these contexts, people's

1 By the way, since CA considers the interaction order as an institution in its own right, drawing a distinction between "ordinary conversation" and "institutional interaction" is a problematic solution: by definition, ordinary conversations are also an example of institutional interaction.

behavior, social and spatial positions, and mutual interaction are consciously designed and organized by inscribed regulations or norms, often also by material structures such as the built environment. They are designed institutions. Latour's (1994) discussion of speed bumps as actors guiding traffic behavior is a fine reminder; the ways our activities are channeled in the online systems is another one. When we think about contemporary society at large, this is it: we live amid a massive, carefully designed and built configuration of institutional arrangements that guide our conduct and constitute reality for us.

The point that institutions are designed by humans does not mean that written regulations aimed at steering people's behavior come first. Rather, technical inventions often open new possibilities for people's activities, which then give rise to regulations. In this respect, the invention of money in the modern sense somewhere around 7th century BC (Weatherford, 1997) is the starting point for and a connecting link between various present-day institutions. When we think about institutions such as doctor-patient interaction and various other encounters involving monetary transaction between buyer and seller of products or services, they are constituted by money as the medium. Monetary economy then enables the formation of various occupations and professions and creates need for laws and regulations.

Clearly, then, talk about institutions leads to a discussion about the entire modern society and world system which, from this perspective, is composed of various interlaced, historically evolved institutions. There is cultural uniqueness and variation in the functioning of various institutions in different parts of the world, but structural isomorphism (that is, you find the same organizations such as a government, ministries, and universities with similar features and sub-structures in each national state as a component part of world society) is amazingly big, considering the vast differences in material resources between countries (Meyer et al., 1997). Monetary economy of course ties the world into a single place, but the political organization wherein the entire globe is composed of formally sovereign nation-states also contributes to considerable likeness.

Sociological institutionalism and organizational behavior

While CA research on institutional interaction has paid attention to the procedural rules and limitations that impose formal constraints on people's talk and behavior, neoinstitutionalist scholarship has also underlined actors' ceremonial behavior in organizations. The perspective is, however, quite different, because scholars in this field focus not only on face-to-face interaction but on how organizations are managed, what structures and substructures are instituted, and how the organization presents itself to its peers and to the outside world. According to the seminal article by Meyer and Rowan (1977), ceremonial behavior stems from the fact that an organization needs to adopt all kinds of standards and practices instituted in the organizational field where it is situated, but conformity to institutionalized rules often conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria. Paradoxically, such externally legitimated standards are promoted and justified by rationality and efficiency. To maintain ceremonial conformity, organizations tend to buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical activities by becoming loosely coupled. Therefore, gaps emerge between their formal structures and actual work activities.

> A sick worker must be treated by a doctor using accepted medical procedures; whether the worker is treated effectively is less important. A bus company must service required routes whether or not there are many passengers. A university must maintain appropriate departments independently of the departments' enrollments. Activity, that is, has ritual significance: it maintains appearances and validates an organization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 355).

In addition to decoupling between formal structures or mission statements and actual practices, reflected in ceremonial behavior and hypocrisy, Meyer and Rowan point out that conformism results in growing isomorphism: organizations imitate one another within and between different organizational fields. To list examples given by Meyer and Bromley (2013: 367), hospitals and medical practices, religious congregations, recreational programs, traditional charities (now "nonprofit organizations"), and universities around the world become similarly managed organizational actors. Simultaneously state bureaucracies are pressed by policy advice organizations to become accountable, purposive, decision-making organizations.

Applying the same basic ideas to the entire global system, neoinstitutionalist world society scholarship shows that the entire world system is composed of isomorphic building blocks such as national states and organizations, built by applying the same worldwide models. These models "define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in virtually all of the domains of rationalized social life—business, politics, education, medicine, science, even the family and religion" (1997: 145).

Construction of the social world

To fully realize what all this conformism and resultant isomorphism means, we need to think about it from a sociology of knowledge perspective. It is the structural isomorphism between organizations that makes it possible for us to identify and categorize different kinds of organizations: schools, religious congregations, private enterprises, state bureaucracies. It is easy to take it for granted that such organizational types resemble one another because of the functions they serve in society. Organizations can be likened to different plants growing in the nature, which assume their shape and special properties through natural selection as adaptations to their ecological niche: climate, soil, and competitors. But organizations do not evolve through a natural, evolutionary process because they are designed institutions, in each case established and modified by people, whose beliefs about efficient and well-managed organizations their formal rules and structures reflect. The creators may be intelligent, but not in the sense that proponents of intelligent design have in mind: organizations are made by humans.

This brings to the fore the point that ideas matter in erecting organizations. They are never built from scratch but instead, when people establish a new business, association or, say, a religious congregation, they study how others have done it and how successful they have been. Besides, for us to establish an organization belonging

to a particular category, we already need to have a general idea of what that means. Furthermore, there are laws, regulations, and recommendations about how an organization should or must be established and managed.

Consider the Finnish Associations Act. It states that an association may be founded for the common realization of a non-profit purpose, which may not be contrary to law or proper behavior. Section 7 states:

> A charter shall be drawn up on the founding of an association and the rules of the association shall be annexed thereto. The charter shall be dated and be signed by three or more persons joining the association. A natural person as a founder shall be 15 years of age or over (Finnish Patent and Registration Office, 2022).

The law text then goes on determining how joining, resigning, and expulsion from an association is done, how decisions are made, meetings organized, and matters to be decided in meetings. Because of such rules, it is no wonder that there is structural isomorphism between associations.

These provisions are stated in the Finnish law, but even if a national law does not regulate life in associations so meticulously, there are national and international recommendations and standards that promote good practices. Consider the way formal meetings are organized. In the United States and other English-speaking countries, actors observe Robert's Rules of Order, a manual of parliamentary procedure by U.S. Army officer Henry Martyn Robert, first published in 1876 as an adaptation of the rules and practice of the United States Congress to the needs of non-legislative societies. Very similar manuals about the rules observed in formal meetings in *ad hoc* instances, associations, legislatures, and business organizations can be found throughout the world.

One might argue that democratic organizations are similar throughout the world because people like Henry Martyn Robert have taken the effort to analyze and crystallize the rules people intuitively follow in democratic meetings. Therefore, such work could be likened to linguists writing the grammar of a language: in doing that linguists do not order how people should talk correctly, they only record the logic of that language. But regardless of the historical origins of the first rules of order for democratic meetings, present-day organizations have copied them from codified rules.

For ideas to effectively spread from one organization to others, people need to describe and define them at a more general level. In that sense, what Strang and Meyer (1993) call "theorization" is a key institutional condition for diffusion. That is, for a practice such as Japanese "quality circles" adopted in several factories to spread effectively to different countries, it needs to be formulated at a rather general level as a universal model, detached from contexts in which it is first employed, or which serve as food for thought in creating the model. Therefore, Strang and Meyer note, scientists and policy experts serve a role in constructing models that are assumed to be universally applicable.

Empirical research on the formation and spread of worldwide models shows that the processes are quite complex. Policies are not packages that fly around and stick to organizations. Instead, following Latour's (1986) suggestion (see also Callon, 1986), Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) prefer to talk about a process of translation, in which humans have an active role in circulating and shaping ideas. Adopting an exogenous model in an organization typically triggers a process of domestication, which results in adapting the model to the local conditions (Alasuutari and Qadir, 2014). Furthermore, rather than being first formulated and then spread, models are formed in parallel with their diffusion, and naming them is a key part of the practices through which they are promoted (Syväterä and Qadir, 2015). Typically, once there is a handful of organizations that have instituted a similar practice or organ, the representatives of the new institutions form an international organization that starts to brand and codify the model and recommend it to the rest of the world (Alasuutari, 2016).

This means that designing organizational practices and theorizing about them plays a central part in constructing the social world. Legislators, lawyers, economists, and social scientists design institutions, collect information about the existing ones, theorize about their functioning, and problems therein. Consequently, society with its various institutions presents itself to us in terms of ready-made concepts such as association or religion.

Ritual practices

As discussed above, behavior in formal institutions is often ceremonial. Because of externally imposed regulations or recommendations, participants follow procedures that have no other meaning than fulfilling the law or keeping up appearances (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). For example, in Finland parents and kindergarten teachers are expected to prepare and sign an individual early childhood education and care plan for each child every year, although those plans are rarely looked at during the year, and the expectation that each child in a group could follow their individual education plan is unrealistic (Alasuutari and Alasuutari, 2012; Alasuutari et al., 2014, 2020). From this perspective, ceremonial aspects of interaction in formal institutions are consequence of the need or willingness to copy exogenous models that remain mere formalities, meaningless or harmful for actual business. But organizational practices assume formal, invariant patterns also for other reasons. Some events are designed to be ceremonial in the first place. Rather than hollow formalities that endanger the legitimacy of the institution, rituals organized in an institution are meant to grant it extra legitimacy and sacredness.

Interestingly, to create the feeling of a special, emotionally touching event, designers of rituals resort to similar techniques that characterize interaction in institutional settings. CA scholars note that institutional contexts are manifested in, and in turn shape, the actions of both professional and lay participants, whose speaker roles and forms of talk may be carefully defined (Drew and Heritage, 1992; Arminen, 2005). Rituals are characterized similarly. According to Bloch (1989), ritual is an occasion where syntactic and other linguistic freedoms are reduced because ritual makes special uses of language: it is characteristically stylized speech and singing. This affects the contents of talk in rituals.

> The formalization of speech therefore dramatically restricts what can be said, so the speech acts are either all alike or all of a kind and thus if this mode of communication is adopted there is hardly any choice of what can be said. Although the restrictions are seen usually as restrictions of form rather than of content, they are a far more effective way of restricting content than would be possible if content were attacked directly. Formalization therefore goes

> right through the linguistic range. It leads to a specially stylized form of communication: polite, respectful, holy, but from the point of view of the creativity potential of language, impoverished (Bloch, 1989: 27).

In similar vein, Bell (2009) defines rituals as occasions in which action is *formalized*, *rule-governed* and *invariant*. Furthermore, rituals are often meant as *performances*: spectacular, public events. Many rituals are also *traditionalistic* in that they reference an old tradition. They may celebrate a special occasion or mark a transition in members' status. Rites of passage (van Gennep, 1960) such as graduations ceremonies, weddings and funerals are good examples (Meyers, 2016; Ozbolat, 2019).

Originators typically copy rituals or their elements from elsewhere. For example, the Soviet Union's establishment created rituals for the same occasions as in other countries: birth, coming of age, wedding, funeral, and initiation into working life positions (Lane, 1981). In inventing rituals, designers are also eclectic: they copy elements and symbols that have been found impressive and sanctified in other rituals. Consider taking an oath in a court of law or in a parliament as a new member. Typically, the individual is expected to put their left hand on a Bible or some other book that the people in question consider sacred.

Rituals are an important aspect of actions in formal institutions because through them beliefs, emotions, and identities can be formed and changed, as Islam and Zyphur (2009: 114) note. Like the bulk of research and theorizing on ritual, they emphasize its symbolic character, which not only affects individuals but plays an important role in maintaining and reinforcing social structures and incorporating individuals into a larger social entity.

I would also emphasize the bodily and material aspects of rituals. In them, everything participants do may be carefully designed: whether they sit or stand; where different actor groups are situated; how and when they move; what and how each actor speaks or sings; and whether they eat, drink or smoke something during the ritual. The setting may also be specifically designed for the occasion. For example, the space may be heated, as is the case with the sweat lodge ceremony initially created by some of the indigenous peoples of the Americas (Wikipedia, 2022). It is also common that the room places leading actors to sit or stand higher up than the rest of the participants. The distances between different actor groups may also be determined by the architecture: for example, how the chairs for the audience are situated and in what rows different audience groups are placed. Furthermore, the space may be decorated by different items such as drawings, texts, emblems, flags, carpets, and other textiles.

The bodily, material, and symbolic aspects of rituals are naturally enmeshed. When people's behavior is stylized, it can carry special meaning beyond the exact words spoken or the mundane significance of acting in peculiar ways like sitting, standing, kneeling, or making signs with one's hands. The bodily engagement makes rituals holistic, also emotionally felt experiences, which helps creating associations between acts, their symbolic meaning, and the community in question.

There are rooms or entire buildings designed with the needs of rituals in mind only for institutions that are considered especially important: temples, parliament buildings, and courts of law are obvious examples. However, most ritual practices occur in ordinary built or natural environments. In most countries a priest or civil servant can officiate a wedding anywhere. Official statements, requests, agreements, and other inscribed acts typically require specified formulations, increasingly often enforced through a ready-made template or online form to be filled out. Such regulations make the acts official, legally binding, or otherwise acknowledged by a community or organization, but they also contribute to guiding the interaction and the discourses used in it to forms that differ from ordinary conversation between peers.

If not spectacular ritual performances, some activities in designed institutions can be considered rituals in that they comprise invariant practices: things must be done in particular ways to be considered legitimate, for the organization in question to accomplish its tasks. The material organization and the rules governing behavior are expected to ensure that the institution works efficiently toward its goals. How that is supposed to happen varies depending on the type of organization. It is assumed that in business companies and armies, every member works for the same goal, whereas it is thought that deliberative decision-making institutions such as legislatures and judiciaries work best when they can ensure free and open exchange of views that results in optimal choices.

But regardless of such differences, actors' activities in institutional contexts cannot be deduced directly from organizations' stated goals or organizational charts. At some level, many organizations have internal discussion, disagreements or even disputes about their aims and means, and members may compete with one another about their power positions and career development. From this viewpoint, the settings and regulations created for an organization can be likened to the rules of a game (North, 1990). Once the conditions for activity within an organization have been defined, actors start inventing strategies by which to play the game to advance their goals. The formal rules are also complemented by principles honored in society at large. Therefore, an informal organization emerges as a refracted reflection of the official picture, supplementing, modifying, or challenging the formal rules. I suggest it is the interplay between formal and informal organization that constitutes an institution that we routinely refer to by its name. The way in which national legislatures function in the modern world is a prime example.

Institutional construction of parliamentary politics

While social constructionism and sociological institutionalism want to unpack social orders, showing how they are historical formations, functionalist and rational-choice approaches consider many modern formal organizations as outcomes of an inevitable process of modernization, determined by pure reason. This is especially the case with such highly valued institutions as parliamentary democracy. The way national policy decisions have been prepared and made particularly in the British Parliament and other Western democracies has been hailed as an arrangement that is closest to a universal ideal of communicative action or deliberative rationality in which the best argument eventually wins (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1984). For example, Palonen (2019) builds an ideal type of deliberative parliamentary practice with Westminster as its historical approximation. In this respect he agrees with Jeremy Bentham, who already in the early 19th century was amazed at the realization that when he took as his task to define the rules that are necessary to every

assembly, they turned out to be those very rules actually observed in both assemblies of the British Legislature (Bentham, 1843).

Yet, when we scrutinize the shaping of the modern notion of politics with the national parliament as its core institution, we can note that it evolved through emulation, coupled with an interplay between rules and tactics. Since several countries in Europe and later in other parts of the world had imitated one another in establishing national legislatures, tactics by which played the game also traveled between the parliaments. That way, the vocabulary, discourses, and procedures associated with what we understand by politics spread worldwide.

The systematic use of legislative obstruction tactics, first introduced in the British House of Commons in the latter half of the 19th century (Vieira, 2015: 84–123) is an example of how the rules of the game interact with the evolving tactics. To delay the legislative process, oppositional forces began posing questions to the Minister or giving lengthy speeches which were largely irrelevant to the topic at hand. This, in turn, led to the Parliament enacting new Standing Orders that limited opportunities for obstruction. And when there was growing dissatisfaction in the British Parliament in the latter half of the 19th century regarding the inefficiency with which the House of Commons passed laws, the same discourse spread throughout the British World and led to procedural reforms that mimicked those made in Westminster (Vieira, 2015: 124–173). And news about legislative obstruction in the Westminster also spread outside the English-speaking world. In Finland, Finnish-speaking nationalists in the estate Diet and socialists in the early unicameral parliament, Eduskunta, used the concept of parliamentary delay to accuse the old political elites of obstructing necessary reforms (Pekonen, 2017).

The rules observed in different institutional settings of the national parliament and how these settings relate to each other are another fine example. Since politicians' work is to negotiate majority agreements about how a country is governed, one could well assume that the interests of different electorate groups and other stakeholders would be publicly discussed in the floor debates. That is not the case. Instead, the institutional settings wherein parliamentarians negotiate about decisions to be taken are divided into two contexts of interaction and bargaining, the public and the confidential. Goffman (1974) refers to a similar division into two institutional settings by the distinction between frontstage and backstage behavior. The floor sessions are public performances and legislatures also keep public record of their contents, whereas backstage bargaining is an only partially visible part of the work through which politicians negotiate public policy.

Formally, parliamentarians are independent actors invested with the power to represent their electorate and, as a collective actor, the sovereign nation, but behind the scenes they need to manage various kinds of interdependencies. The confidential contexts entail informal discussions and lobbying, negotiations in which actors are engaged, and the deals they make to form majority vote. The public contexts contain all the policy documents and floor debates in which proposals are promoted and decisions justified.

These two parts are in constant tension with each other. Speakers make references to the unscrupulous reality of politics happening behind the curtains where people seek their personal gain or group interest but present their own proposals as pure reason serving the whole nation or humankind. Yet public parliamentary discourse does not consist of mere rhetorical tricks by which politicians seeking partial interests make their aspirations and goals seem altruistic. In aspiring to persuade others, actors appeal to values and moral principles that not only guide and inform the views and identifications of their audience but also their own worldview. In any case, this tension between the two parts of legislative business shapes the forms of argumentation evident in national parliaments.

Talking about the backstage of policymaking does not mean that parliamentarians or the public are entirely unaware of agreements made behind the scenes. There are constant references to the background bargaining made within and between parties. For example, politicians are aware when members of a party in the government must vote for a decision against their "conscience" because of party discipline. In such cases, they are accused of compromising their personal integrity. Yet, because it reveals the government's internal tensions, the opposition expects to see the government party or parties to agree on an issue amongst themselves and then stand behind a bill unanimously. Similarly, if it is well known that a legislature must take a decision because of external pressure, for instance to fulfill the criteria for getting a loan from the World Bank, parliamentarians consider it preferable that the negotiations are held behind closed doors. Making such coercion public in floor debates damages the public image of the national parliament as a sovereign institution.

The division into frontstage and backstage parts of legislative business is indeed evident in parliamentary practices and discourses in many ways. The fact that politics and politicians are often used as derogatory terms in the very institution dedicated to it stems from this same phenomenon. In the public, politicians aspire to defend their views as only informed by scientific evidence and by their altruistic goal to serve the nation, not the interests of any subgroup. In this discourse, others can be accused of "politicizing" an issue—that is, advancing their own interests. Referencing someone as a politician can in that sense be used as a derogatory term (Palonen, 2022).

Conclusion

The task I set myself for this article was to point out how CA could extend its scope toward addressing macrosociological questions. To show CA's relevance and links to some other schools of thought, I complemented CA research with institutional theory, especially sociological institutionalism, new materialism, and scholarship on ritual. Although I avoided unnecessary name dropping, it is obvious that the approach and lines of thought presented here also agree with, say, Berger and Luckmannn's (1967) social constructionism and Bourdieu's (1977, 1995) analyses of practices.

The main point I wanted to make was that occasions of what CA calls institutional interaction should be considered as rituals. Although those occasions are scripted ceremonial performances wherein social pressure, material conditions, or avoidance of punishment make actors conform, they still play a role in constituting social order by making participants honor the rules and principles codified in an organization's frontstage events.

National parliament is a good example. Not to even mention authoritarian regimes, in many countries actual decisions are taken well before they are introduced and debated in plenary sessions. Yet in all legislatures of the world, in the frontstage occasions policies are justified (and criticized if that is allowed in a regime) by appealing to morally valid principles such as parliamentarians' independence, national sovereignty, and the interest of the nation. Egotistic motives

and deals between different groupings are not publicly disclosed. This could be seen as proof that frontstage rituals do not have any significance, but the point is that organizations such as national parliaments even in autocratic regimes still bother to put on the show. In other words, the social order is legitimated by the moral principles as conceptions of appropriateness.

Another point I wanted to make is that rituals are not so empty and meaningless as they may seem. They keep alive the values and principles that are honored and sanctified by them. In addition to moral principles, occasions of institutional interaction also construct and sanctify social positions, and hence the social order, in a very concrete manner. The arrangements of encounters in a designed institution place actors in positions that determine how must or can behave, for instance what options for tactics and resistance they have. Participants are made acutely aware of rituals as special occasions in a holistic manner that also entails their bodies, which strengthens the mental association between an occasion and what it stands for. For example, leaders are often placed higher up in the space, so that others must look up to them.

Third, the example of national parliament as a designed institution also illustrates the point that organizational arrangements do not determine what actors can say or do, but they impose limits and conditions on their conduct. Behavior is channeled to the possible modes, and to advance their views and objectives, people create various tactics by which to make use of or bend the rules of the game. When new tactics are invented, they spread to other similar organizations, which may create need for the organizations to renew their rules.

Finally, I suggest it is through such arrangements of institutional interaction—that is, ritual conduct—that what we call social structure is created, maintained, and naturalized. We are born to a world that presents itself through self-evident concepts, the built environment and artifacts, practices, conceptions of proper conduct, and identifications with various communities. As invariant performances and practices rituals also speak to our bodies and emotions, making us feel that, say, some things, principles, positions or persons are particularly important or even sacred.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

Conflict of interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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The emergence of social order in everyday interacting: re-conceptualizing a venerable sociological concept in light of conversation analysis

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For more than a century social theorists have asked how order at the macro-social level is related to human activity at the micro-social level. Among their answers are accounts of macro-level social order as emerging in micro-level relations among individuals. Sawyer's account of macro-level emergence in micro-level interaction rests on the individual's understandings of interactional frames. However, Rawls draws on Garfinkel and Sacks to argue that sociologist's accounts of the macro-level interaction order need to be grounded in observable, micro-level social practices, instead of using conceptual abstractions like frames. Arundale's Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating is grounded in research on observable social practices in Conversation Analysis, and offers an account of the emergence, in particular episodes of everyday interacting, of properties that define micro-level social systems. That account provides the basis for an account of the emergence, in recurrent micro-level interacting over time and space, of properties that define macro-level social systems. The basic idea is not new: what is new is accounting for the emergence of macro-level social order in terms of the recurrent emergence of micro-level social order as participants engage observable social practices in everyday interacting. Re-conceptualizing the emergence of macro-social order addresses sociology's longstanding puzzlement regarding the macro–micro link, and points to needed research.

KEYWORDS

emergence, social order, interaction, conversation analysis, communication, sociology

1 Introduction

Since the early years of sociology as an independent discipline, social theorists have been beset with the question "What is the relationship between what is social and what is individual in human life?" or alternatively, "How is order at the macro social level related to order at the micro individual level?" Durkheim argued that "There can be no sociology unless societies exist, and … societies cannot exist if there are only individuals (Durkheim, [1897]1951, p. 38), adding that if only individuals exist, then "[s]ociological laws can be only a corollary of the more general laws of psychology; the ultimate explanation of collective life will consist in showing how it emanates from human nature in general" (Durkheim, [1895]1964, p. 98). Social theorists generally agree that both societies and individuals are real phenomena with empirical manifestations, and they have forwarded varied accounts of the relationship between them, ranging from conceptualizing them as a dichotomy in which underlying institutional structures shape the social actions of individuals,

through conceptualizing social institutions as reducible to processes or states defined on individuals, to understanding the social order as emerging in on-going interacting among individuals.[1]

This chapter focuses on theories in the third category: those that seek to account for how, in Durkheim's terms, collective social phenomena "emanate" from the general activities of individuals. Section 2 characterizes Sawyer's (2005) examination of the history of sociological theorizing regarding emergence, in light of which he develops his account of emergence in everyday interaction: as individuals interact with one another, they construct and engage "interactional frames" that are emergent outcomes with causal power in shaping the direction of subsequent interaction. Section 3 examines Rawls (1987) argument, following Goffman's lead, that the "interaction order" needs to be conceptualized as a social order *sui generis*, distinct both from institutional orders and from individual processes. But Rawls (1989, 2003) also argues that Goffman's (1974) frame-based account of the interaction order is problematic because a "frame" is a theorist's conceptual abstraction presumed to account for participant behavior, whereas drawing on Garfinkel's (1967) and Sacks (1992) understandings of human interaction as rooted in participant's concrete social practices would generate a more productive account of the interaction order. Sawyer's (2005) frame-based account of social emergence is likewise problematic. Section 4 draws on research in Conversation Analysis, based in Garfinkel's and in Sacks' work, to develop an alternative account of the process by which interpretings of action and meaning evolve in everyday interacting among two or a few individuals: an account based directly in participant's use of concrete social practices in everyday talk and conduct. This account is also an account of the emergence of properties that define two or a few participants as a micro-level complex system. That account serves in turn as the basis for re-conceptualizing macro-level social order as emerging as participants recurrently constitute actions and meanings across multiple episodes of everyday micro-level interacting, spread over time and across space. Section 5 returns to the opening questions regarding the emergence of social order in the activities of individuals.[2]

2 Sawyer's theory of social emergence

In a series of publications beginning in Sawyer (2001, 2002a,b, 2003a,b,c, 2004) and culminating in Sawyer (2005), *Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems*, Sawyer develops his model of emergence against the background of what is arguably the most inclusive and careful examination of the convoluted history of sociological theorizing regarding the emergence of social order. Of special importance in this history is Durkheim's early search for an explanation of how collective life emanates from the activities of individuals. A number of commentaries have found Durkheim's approach wanting, especially as developed in Durkheim ([1895]1964) *The Rules of Sociological Method*, but Sawyer (2002a, 2005, Chap. 6) argues that revisiting Durkheim in view of late 20th century thinking on emergence makes apparent that he can be understood as an emergence theorist. Sawyer (2002a, p. 232) notes that "Durkheim never used the term 'emergence'; rather, his phrase *sui generis* was used in a sense synonymous with contemporary uses of the term 'emergent,'" and that "following common usage in the nineteenth century" he used "the terms 'synthesis' and 'association' when referring to emergent systemic phenomena that resulted from nonadditive combinations of elements." Sawyer (2002a, pp. 244–5, 2005, p. 123) identifies a number of issues that Durkheim failed to resolve that prevented him from developing his "perspective into a full-fledged processual-dynamic view of social emergence" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 115), but adds that "[o]ne can hardly fault Durkheim for failing to resolve this complex and challenging issue, for it remains unresolved" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 116).

For Sawyer (2005, p. 6), a full-fledged, processual-dynamic account of emergence would be an account of "the nature of society as a complex system" that reveals the process and mechanism through which individuals in their relations with other individuals form "macro social phenomena, such as markets, the educational system, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices (e.g., politeness and power dynamics)." In developing his own account of social emergence, Sawyer utilizes research beginning in the 1990s on both complex systems and computer simulations of social institutions. *Complex systems* are physical and biological systems that are not just complicated, but that also exhibit not only properties that are non-linear, i.e., not predictable from initial conditions, but also properties that are non-additive. i.e., not the sum of a property of each of the system's parts, but instead properties of the whole that are not exhibited by the parts of the system in isolation from one another. These non-linear, non-additive properties are the "emergent properties" that define the interconnected parts as a complex system. Living biological systems are not only complicated, multi-part, autonomous systems, but also complex systems exhibiting the key emergent property of life itself. A major disruption to almost any part of a living system, or of the connections between its parts, is very likely to terminate that key emergent property. In examining research on complex systems in general, and particularly research involving computer simulation of social emergence in artificial societies, Sawyer (2005, p. 166) argues that although "the question remains to what extent these models can be considered accurate representations of true human societies," they nevertheless provide one means for addressing the question of how "macro-social phenomena emerge from individual action and

1 Two notes regarding terms in the title. First, I use the progressive "interacting," rather than "interaction," both in the title and elsewhere, following Pollner's (1979, p. 253n11) observation that, "[t]o attend to the –ing of things involves a radical modification of the attitude of daily life, for it requires attending to the processes of constituting in lieu of the product thus constituted." I will later use "communicating" rather than "communication" for the same reason. Second, I identify "emergence" as a "vernerable sociological concept" in the same sense Corning (2002) adopts in his article "The Re-emergence of 'Emergence': A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory." Corning traces the history of accounts of emergence in research on evolution in biology, dating back to Mill, ([1843]1872) with roots in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Corning's study of emergence and his alternative approach are highly informative, and although not directly relevant to the argument here, make apparent that "emergence" is a well-worn concept in biology, just as in sociology.

2 The terms "micro" and "macro" have numerous definitions in the sociological literature (e.g., Münch and Smelser, 1987). In what follows, these terms are understood in their concrete sense, with "micro-level" referring to encounters and interaction among two or a few human individuals (*cf.* Verhoeven, 1985, p. 87), whether face-to-face or mediated, and "macro-level" referring to larger, multi-individual groups, organizations, institutions, and cultures distributed over both time and space.

then in turn constrain or otherwise influence future action?" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 162).[3]

Within this conceptual framework Sawyer provides a model of the process and mechanism of social emergence in human interaction that he labels the "Emergence Paradigm." In his words:

> In any social situation, there is a continuing dialectic: social emergence, where individuals are co-creating and co-maintaining ephemeral and stable emergents, and downward causation from those emergents. … During conversational encounters, interactional frames emerge, and these are collective social facts that can be characterized independently of individuals' interpretations of them. Once a frame has emerged, it constrains the possibilities for action (Sawyer, 2005, p. 210). [E]ach action contributes to a continuing process of collaborative emergence at the same time that it is constrained by the shared emergent frame that exists at that moment. The emergent frame is a dynamic structure that changes with each action. No one can stop the encounter at any one point and identify with certainty what the frame's structure is (Sawyer, 2005, 213).

For Sawyer (2005, pp. 214–5), then, "interactional frames" are central in explaining emergence in human interaction. More than 30 years earlier in *Frame Analysis* Goffman (1974, pp. 10–11) drew on Bateson's (1972) concept of "frame" in noting that "I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame." Sawyer (2003b, 2005) does not explicitly define his concept of "frame," nor does he cite Goffman's detailed examination for purposes of comparison, further development, or critique. Sawyer (2003b) does provide examples of frames drawn from his extensive experience with improvisational (i.e., *sans* scripts or plots) theatre performances, but in the absence of explicit commentary, I find no indication that Sawyer defines "frame" in a way that differs from Goffman's definition (cf. Verhoeven, 1985, p. 83).

For Sawyer, interactional frames include both ephemeral emergents and stable emergents. *Ephemeral emergents* are those that occur within a single encounter in the form of implicit (i.e., out of conscious awareness) metapragmatic features of language used by speakers "to reflexively communicate about the emergent process and flow of the encounter" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 182). In the context of improvisational theatre, interactional frames are what provides an actor with his or her definition of the situation at a given moment in the dialogue, or more colloquially, his or her sense of "what's going on" and of his or her possible involvement in the activity. More specifically, the metapragmatic "interactional frame includes all of the pragmatic elements of a small-group encounter: the socially recognized roles and practices enacted by each participant, the publically shared and perceived motives of those individuals, the relationship among them, and the collective definition of the joint activity they are engaged in. The frame is constructed turn by turn: one person proposes a new development for the frame, and others respond by modifying or embellishing the proposal" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 182). *Stable emergents*, in contrast, are those that last across more than one encounter, examples being languages, trends and tastes, and private jokes and stories. They "are symbolic phenomena that have a degree of intersubjective sharing among some (more or less) stable group of individuals" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 216).

Sawyer emphasizes that "the causal power of emergents cannot be explained solely in terms of individual's representations of them, their demonstrated orientations to them, or their subjective interpretations of them" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 213), adding subsequently that "[a]s levels of reality, stable and ephemeral emergents have an independent, ontological status, and they have causal powers" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 216). Despite having repeatedly emphasized the causal power of emergents, however, Sawyer observes that "the strategic options that the ephemeral frame makes available are limited, and the limiting of the selection set is a form of constraint, although not a strictly deterministic one" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 217). In adding this qualification, Sawyer reinterprets his references to the "causal powers" of emergents in the much more limited terms of top-down constraint, not in terms of deterministic causation as understood in Newtonian mechanics (Sawyer, 2005, pp. 70–2; cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 217–9).

Although I agree with Sawyer's argument that drawing on both complex systems theory and computer simulation of artificial societies is one approach among others to studying the emergence of macro-social order in interaction among individuals, conceptualizing the process of social emergence in terms of the mechanism of interactional frames will not prove productive in such research. In considering why that is the case, I turn to another sociologist's arguments regarding both the place of human interaction in understanding the micro–macro link, and the problematic status of frames in sociological research.

3 Rawls on the interaction order, social practices, and conceptual typification

Over three articles Rawls (1987, 1989, 2003) first examines Goffman's argument that the human interaction order is distinct both from the macro institutional order, and from the micro order of human agency, second critiques Goffman's frame-based account of interaction, and third provides a basis for an alternative account of the interaction order that draws on Durkheim's ([1893]1933) recognition of the importance of studying participant's social practices. Unlike Sawyer, Rawls (1987, 168n9) is not directly concerned with the processes or mechanisms through which emergent properties arise in interaction.

3 Sawyer's references to "complex systems," "complex systems theory," and "societies as complex systems" bear no relationship to the various conceptualizations of or to the body of research on "language as a complex adaptive system" (Bechner et al., 2009). "Languaging," understood as language use in interacting, clearly occurs within complex systems, but Sawyer focuses on the emergence of macro social order, not on language or language use. Similarly, this chapter's re-conceptualizing of emergence in complex systems has only tenuous links with research in the broad "enactive approach" to understanding "mind and language in social interaction" (DiPaolo et al., 2018), although DeJaegher et al. (2016) argue for bridging the current, rather considerable divide between the understandings of interaction in the enaction approach and in Conversation Analysis.

Rawls (1987) argues that "Goffman's contribution to social theory consists in the idea of an interaction order sui generis which derives its order from constraints imposed by the needs of a presentational self rather than by social structure" (Rawls, 1987, p. 136). More specifically, Goffman argued that the social self is continually achieved in interaction with others, and that the on-going achieving of this presentational self places constraints on the interaction order. Those constraints define the interaction order, "conceived of as a production order wherein a commitment to that order generates meaning. In other words, actions have meaning with respect to the production order rather than in relation to institutionally specifiable ends" (Rawls, 1987, pp. 136–7). Rawls (1987, 146) identifies the interaction order as a social order, *sui generis*, because for Goffman it is "a self-ordered and separate domain, depending upon mutual commitment between actors, which while certainly impinging on macro orders can neither be reduced to, nor entirely explain, aggregate and institutional/structural phenomena." Rawls (1989) argues that Goffman's treatment of the interaction order is quite restricted because his "idea of an emergent, constitutive order is worked out around his idea that the self must continually be constituted and reaffirmed in interaction…. This focus on self distinguishes Goffman's view of the interaction order from the view, held by Garfinkel and Sacks, of a local production order based not on the constitutive achievement of self but, rather, on the constitutive achievement of intelligibility or meaning" (Rawls, 1989, p. 152). Rawls finds both conflicts and confusions across Goffman's work that she argues can be traced to an understanding of language use in interaction that is "much less original and less interactionally based than his view of self" (Rawls, 1989, p. 153). To address this critique, Rawls turns to Sacks (1992) use of Garfinkel's (1967) "classical" ethnomethodology (Heritage, 1984; Wilson, 2012; cf. Clayman et al., 2022) in developing an understanding of language use in interacting that is compatible with "the insight concerning a locally produced interaction order and the needs of self that appears in Goffman's earlier work. Taken together, [Garfinkel's and Sacks'] work allows for the formulation of a more inclusive and systematic theoretical position with regard to the idea of an interaction order" (Rawls, 1989, p. 153).

In her 2003 article examining constitutive orders of interaction (i.e., orders generated in interacting), Rawls returns to an argument in Durkheim ([1893]1933) that modern social institutions are not organized around the shared beliefs and ritual knowledge of individuals, but are instead organized as groups of persons continually enact distinct sets of situated social practices with one another. One implication of Durkheim's position is that understanding modern social institutions requires researchers to examine the social practices that persons enact, as opposed to formulating abstractions like beliefs and rituals and attributing these to individuals as the drivers of social behavior (Rawls, 2003, pp. 219–21; cf. Garfinkel, 2007). Rawls finds that because sociologists have not heeded to Durkheim's argument for attending to situated social practices, the "treatment of practices as ideas, motives, goals, values, beliefs, and the reduction of all those to concepts in the individual mind have become a basic sociological creed" (Rawls, 2003, p. 224), a creed perhaps most clearly represented in Parsons (1937) work, but apparent as well in Goffman's later work on frames. More specifically, even though Goffman's (1959) early work did examine some social practices through which individuals accomplished their presentational selves, he "nevertheless continued to ground this process in concepts and typifications to a significant extent" (Rawls, 2003, p. 224). Verhoeven (1985, p. 83) makes the same observation in his examination of Goffman's work on frames. Rawls (2003, p. 224) continues: "His later attempt to establish a systematic sociology of situations, in *Frame Analysis* (1974) and *Forms of Talk* (1981), became even more conceptual in orientation…. Goffman tended to look only for those details in roles and actions that could be reduced to conceptual types. It is a weakness in Goffman's position that he tended not to look for social order in the details of practices in their own right" (cf. 232, 234–5, 245–6 and 1987, 146n16, 147).

Goffman is not alone in focusing on "concepts and typifications" rather than on social practices. Collins (1981) points to Garfinkel's (1967) "radical microsociology" as advancing sociological inquiry by "making it possible to study real-life interaction in second-by-second detail" (Collins, 1981, p. 984), arguing that such study will reveal both "the empirical realities of social structures as patterns of repetitive micro-interaction" (Collins, 1981, p. 985), and that social institutions are only observer's abstractions that "do not do anything; if they seem to indicate a continuous reality it is because the individuals that make them up repeat their microbehaviors many times, and if the 'structures' change it is because the individuals who enact them change their microbehaviors" (Collins, 1981, p. 989, cf. 996). Such observer's abstractions "can be made fully empirical only by grounding them in a sample of the typical micro-events that make them up" (Collins, 1981, p. 988). Against this background Collins asks what motivates people to repeat such microbehaviors many times, and proposes that they are led to do so by an "underlying emotional dynamics" that "centers of feelings of membership in coalitions" (Collins, 1981, p. 997). These emotions originate in a person's past participation in chains of interactional rituals—his or her "interaction ritual chains." More specifically, "[a]n individual who is successfully accepted into an interaction acquires an increment of positive emotional energy. … Acquiring this in one situation, an individual has more emotional resources for successfully negotiating solidarity in the next interaction. Such chains, both positive and negative extend throughout every person's lifetime" (Collins, 1981, pp. 1001–2). Collins' account of social structures as patterns of repetitive microbehaviors rests on his identification of interactional ritual chains, emotional energy, and feelings of membership, all of which are abstractions he has formulated and attributed to participants in explaining their behavior. As for Goffman, it is a weakness in Collins' position that he does not look for social structures in the details of social practices, as both Durkheim and Garfinkel argued.

A clarification is in order here. Rawls is not arguing that concepts have no place in accounting for the interaction order: they cannot be avoided. Instead, Rawls, (2003), p. 224) is arguing that the achieving of action and meaning in interaction "is a process that cannot be accomplished through conceptual typification or theorized accounts. What is required to deal satisfactorily with interaction orders is a notion of practice as concrete and not conceptual." What Rawls and Garfinkel find problematic are abstract concepts or conceptual types that identify a property that a researcher first formulates so as to gloss the details and contingencies of particular situated activities in order to make the conceptual type widely applicable, and then attributes to participants as the internalized source or driver for their behavior in interaction. For Rawls (2006, p. 6) and Garfinkel it is essential to "see social orders *in* their details as

they are achieved in real time *by* persons *through* the enactment *of* those details, instead of through conceptual glosses on these details after the fact." More specifically, concrete social "[p]ractices are what we can see and hear one another doing. As such, they can be studied directly. Concepts can only be inferred" Rawls, (2003, p. 242). Rawls, (2003, p. 246) adds that "[r]endering practices empirically rather conceptually does not mean that concepts are not used. It means two things: (1) that concepts are not used to *replace* empirically witnessable practices and (2) that social order is not created through the interpretive acts of actors. That is, social actors are not making social order by *using* concepts to *interpret* action." It follows that like Goffman's concept of frames, both Sawyer's (2005) concept of interactional frames, and Collin's concept of interaction ritual chains are problematic because they treat the achieving of action and meaning, and hence the emergence of social order in everyday social interaction, as accomplished through what I will identify as "conceptual typifications," rather than as accomplished as participants engage concrete social practices. What is less clear in Rawls (2003) arguments, however, and for the most part in Garfinkel's (1967), is what comprises these concrete social practices.

Rawls (2003, p. 227) indicates that achieving action and meaning in social interaction requires that participants "construct their social sounds and movements in such a way that they recognizably reproduce courses of practice that are seen by, and expected by, others to mean something particular in the situational context and sequence of events in which they are produced…. What Garfinkel has consistently shown is that this is done through *methods*." The current understanding of such methods derives largely from Conversation Analysis (CA), as initially developed by Sacks (1992) together with a small group of colleagues and students (Clayman et al., 2022). Conversation analysts have examined a wide range of social practices that include, but are not limited to grammar, phonetics, turn-taking, person reference, membership categorization, nonvocal behavior, sequence organization, overall structural organization, repair, and the relative epistemic, deontic, emotional, and benefactive standings of the participants (Robinson, 2016, p. 6). Conversation analysts have devoted particular attention to four of these domains of practice because they are foundational to all human interaction: practices for turn-taking so that in general only one person talks at a time (e.g., Clayman, 2013; Drew, 2013), practices for forming conversational actions like requesting and granting or asking and responding to questions (e.g., Schegloff, 2007b; Deppermann and Haugh, 2022), practices for repairing problems arising in interaction like mishearings or misunderstandings (e.g., Schegloff, 1987, 1992; Kitzinger, 2013), and practices for the overall structural organization evident in telling a story or in closing a telephone call (e.g., Robinson, 2013). All of these interactional practices are readily observable in talk and conduct, they have been carefully described, and they are repeatedly and reliably employed and recognized by participants across the full range of situations and contingencies they encounter in everyday interacting. These social practices are the methods by which participants both produce and understand talk and conduct in interacting, the methods for production being the same at those for understanding. They comprise the grounds on which participants hold one another accountable/responsible for the actions and meanings that arise in their interacting. And there is now solid cross-language and cross-cultural evidence that the practices of turn-taking (Stivers et al., 2009), action formation (Floyd et al., 2014; Kendrick et al., 2020), and repair (Dingemanse et al., 2015) are universals of human interaction.[4] As Beach (2022, p. 41) observes, 50 plus years of CA research has revealed "'the social DNA' of recorded, transcribed, and translated naturally occurring interactions."

Sawyer (2005, p. 185) indicates that he employed conversation analytic methods in developing his model of emergence, and he indeed "analyzed conversations" in improvisational theatre (Sawyer, 2003b), but he did not engage CA as exemplified in *The Handbook of Conversation Analysis* (Sidnell and Stivers, 2013) or in CA textbooks. CA is distinct from other methodologies for examining talk and conduct in that the evidence analysts use to ground their understandings of how participants achieve actions and meanings in interacting is exactly the same publically observable evidence that the participants themselves use in understanding one another: the interpretings of prior utterances that they continually display to one another as they place new utterances next adjacent to prior utterances (Arundale, 2020, pp. 223–6; Maynard and Heritage, 2022, p. 19). Conversation analysts use that evidence with the strict admonition to avoid inferences regarding participant interpretings that cannot be directly warranted by the interpretings participants display in their uptake to prior utterances. It is participants who employ social practices in achieving action and meaning in everyday interacting, hence it is their use of practices in achieving their actions and meanings for which analysts need to account. Why not ground those accounts in the very same empirical evidence that the participants themselves employ?

Recall then Rawls' argument that in developing his account of the presentational self, Goffman identified everyday interaction as an order *sui generis*, distinct from both the micro and macro social orders. Rather than account for the micro order in terms of concrete social practices, however, Goffman adhered to the "basic sociological creed" of accounting for the interaction order using conceptual typifications: "frames" in his case, but "motives, goals, values, beliefs" for other theorists (Rawls, 2003, p. 224). Sawyer (2005, p. 6), seeks an account of emergence that reveals the process and mechanism through which individuals in everyday interaction give rise to macro-level complex systems, but in accounting for that interaction, he too employs a conceptual typification: metapragmatic interactional frames. Collins (1981, pp. 984–5) credits Garfinkel with enabling sociologists to study the specific details of everyday interaction, but in developing his account of the macro order he overlooks Garfinkel and also employs conceptual typification: the emotional energy participants acquire in prior interaction ritual chains (Collins, 1981, pp. 1001–2). Goffman, Sawyer, and Collins are at odds, not only with Durkheim's ([1893]1933) argument that modern social institutions arise and are maintained as persons continually enact sets of situated social practices with another, but also with Garfinkel's (1967) position that a satisfactory account of the process of achieving action and meaning in interaction requires examining concrete social practices. Social practices can be studied directly because they are observable,

4 The practices of overall structural organization are also widespread, although studies of practices like opening telephone conversations, for example, show cultural variation (Hopper, 1992). Human beings have employed practices for opening and closing face-to-face conversations for millennia, and have adapted these practices to address new the contingencies that have arisen, for example, with the invention of the telephone, and much more recently with the development of cell phone technology.

```
1   Sissy:  What do you mean by tha:t?
2   Gramma: We:ll Sissy. (0.8) let's face it no:w - yo:u kno:w
3           that ch'u are so: e::ager: - to be thin: (0.2)
4           that you sometimes go in the bathroom (0.2) and
5           throw up your food.  I kno:w it's tr[ue!]
6   Sissy:                                      [ GR]AMMA YOU ARE
7           SO:: FULL OF SHIT! I am so: su:r[e.]
8   Gramma:                                 [ S]i::ssy stop
9           saying such a thing as tha[t.]
```

FIGURE 1
SDCL: Gramma/Sissy (Beach, 1996, p. 116).

and hence both learnable by observation and instructable (cf. Goodwin, 2018), whereas Sawyer's interactional frames, Collins' ritual chains and emotional energies, and other such social cognitive states (Levinson, 2005) that have been posited as intervening between the micro and macro orders are questionably so. Why not avoid introducing conceptual typifications such as these, and instead, following Rawls' critique, account for the macro-social order as emerging as participants engage observable, concrete social practices in everyday interaction? Section 4 outlines such an account.

4 Re-conceptualizing emergence in light of conversation analysis

In view of both Sawyer's theory of social emergence and Rawl's critique of accounts based in conceptual typifications, Section 4 offers an account of the emergence of social order in macro-level social systems in terms of the recurrent emergence of social order in micro-level social systems as participants engage observable social practices in everyday talk and conduct. Developing this account involves four steps. In Section 4.1 I examine a transcript of actual talk, first introducing an essential distinction between "operative" and "provisional" interpretings, and then applying that distinction in outlining the Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating: a new model fully grounded in research in CA. In Section 4.2 I use that model in arguing that the social actions and meanings that participants form as they engage in everyday talk and conduct exhibit emergent (non-linear, non-additive) properties that define those participants as a complex social system at the micro-level of two or a few persons. In Section 4.3 I examine why and how the recurrent forming of social actions and meanings in everyday talk and conduct among participants in micro-level social systems, over time and space, offers an account of the formation of emergent properties that define complex social systems at the macro-level of institutions and cultures. In section 4.4 I consider the research needed to further explore this account and to provide empirical evidence.

4.1 The conjoint co-constituting model of communicating

Sawyer observes that a "theory of social emergence requires an explicit theorization of symbolic communication and dynamic processes" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 187), but that such a theory is missing both in sociological theorizing on the micro–macro link, and in applying complex system theory in studying it (Sawyer, 2005, pp. 25–6). More specifically, he argues that the accounts of communication employed in computer simulations of social phenomena are too simplistic, or are informed by speech act theory, which he critiques (Sawyer, 2003a). Sawyer does not, however, provide the "explicit theorization" he requires, either of communication, or of the processes involved in his account of an actor's use of implicit metapragmatic strategies to create frames that have causal effects on subsequent interaction (cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 189–90). Research in CA provides not only the conceptual framework, but also the empirical grounding for an explicit theorization of human communicating in everyday interacting that takes the form of a sequential/procedural model specifying the process and mechanism of the emergence, in interacting among two or a few participants, of properties that define those participants as a complex system.

Outlining that model of human communicating in this section involves examining an excerpt from everyday interacting, and in doing so introducing two concepts that are essential to tracing in detail how the participants engage social practices to conjointly co-constitute action and meaning in a particular sequence of talk. In Figure 1, a university-aged granddaughter (Sissy) is talking with her grandmother (Gramma), who is a nurse. In his book length analysis of this 13-min. conversation, Beach (1996) argues that over the two and a half minutes that precede Figure 1, Sissy becomes aware that their conversation centers around a problem in her behavior regarding food, although Gramma does not explicitly identify that behavior, and Sissy does not explicitly deny having the problem. The conversation begins with talk about Sissy's work hours and exercise needs, then shifts to comments by Gramma about Sissy's thinness and weight loss. This leads to a discussion of Sissy's eating habits at a recent meal they shared, and of her appearance in preparation for her upcoming wedding. Sissy states that she is not going to lose any more weight and assures Gramma that "I'll eat just fine." Gramma agrees that Sissy always eats well, but asks "What happens to the food that you eat?" and adds that "You're not getting any bigger." Sissy then poses the question in line 1 of Figure 1. Both women overlap one another (marked by vertically aligned brackets) and stretch out certain sounds (marked by ":"), and Gramma pauses briefly in line 2

(0.8 s). Returning repeatedly this excerpt will prove essential in following the discussion.[5]

As its speaker, Sissy creates an interpreting of her first position utterance in line 1 as she designs and produces it for Gramma. As recipient of her first position utterance, Gramma also creates an interpreting in listening to it. Sissy and Gramma are cognitively (and emotionally) autonomous from one another, just as are all participants in interaction, hence they have no direct access to one another's interpreting of any utterance. Like all utterances and visible conduct in interacting, Sissy's first position utterance enables a small range of potential interpretings, but does not limit those interpretings to a single definitive understanding. There is always some openness in how an utterance might be interpreted, as for example in the different possible referents of the word "that." At the moment she is designing and producing her first position utterance, Sissy has no knowledge regarding the particular interpreting Gramma is constructing and can only presume that Gramma will interpret her utterance as she has designed it to be interpreted. As she listens, Gramma likewise has no knowledge regarding Sissy's particular interpreting of her first position utterance and can only presume that Sissy interprets it as she does. Evidence regarding how another person has interpreted one's utterance becomes available only in the subsequent unfolding of the particular sequence of utterances they co-constitute.

There is a long tradition of conceptualizing Sissy's and Gramma's interpretings of Sissy's first position utterance solely as cognitive phenomena that arise in their individual processing of any given utterance. The Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating or CCMC (Arundale, 2020, Chap. 3) outlined in this section breaks from that tradition in understanding their interpretings not only as cognitive phenomena, but also as social phenomena that arise in interacting with one another. From this distinct perspective, it is apparent both that each participant's initial cognitive interpreting of a given utterance in interacting is always a *provisional* interpreting, and that it remains provisional until that participant has gained some knowledge of the particular interpreting accorded to that utterance by another participant. Apart from such knowledge, an initial interpreting is either a speaker's projection of the interpreting a recipient will create for the speaker's utterance, or a recipient's initial interpreting of a speaker's utterance. A provisional interpreting becomes an *operative* interpreting at the point a speaker gains knowledge regarding how his or her own utterance has been interpreted by a recipient, or a recipient gains knowledge about how the speaker had interpreted his or her own utterance. An operative interpreting is one that is functional or useable for carrying on in an evolving sequence of utterances because it takes into account the interpreting that another participant has evidently accorded to it. At a later point in the same conversation, or in a different conversation, the operative interpreting of any specific utterance may well be different in view of subsequent evidence regarding the interpreting accorded to it.

The distinction between provisional and operative interpretings is original to the CCMC, and essential in enabling one to trace in detail the moment-by-moment, sequential evolution of each of the participant's interpretings of the action and meaning of a given utterance, as the participants place each new utterance next adjacent to the prior utterance in a sequence of utterances. In other words, distinguishing between provisional and operative interpretings enables one to examine in detail the procedural development of Gramma's and of Sissy's interpretings of each utterance, both as a cognitive process and as a social process, as they alternate in adding each new next adjacent utterance. It is the CCMC's account of the procedural development of participant's operative interpretings that provides the basis for the procedural account offered in this chapter of the emergence of social order.

As participants engage one another in interacting, they constitute the shape and sequence of their turns, the conversational actions their utterances are taken as accomplishing, and what those utterances are taken to mean, all at the same time. It will simplify things to focus on Sissy and Gramma's mutual constituting of just the action and the meaning of Sissy's first position utterance in line 1 in Figure 1. Sissy designs her first position "What do you mean by that?" as a *wh*-question that implements the social practice of requesting and granting/denying, from among the broader set of practices for recruiting assistance (Kendrick and Drew, 2016). In designing the first pair part of an adjacency pair as a potential request, she projects that Gramma will provide a granting as the second pair part in which Gramma makes explicit what she had meant in asking "What happens to the food you eat?" followed by "You're not getting any bigger." Sissy's interpreting of her own utterance is at this moment provisional because while she may be quite sure she is requesting an explication, she as yet has no knowledge of how Gramma will understand the utterance. Gramma's interpreting of Sissy's utterance, as Sissy vocalizes it, is likewise provisional because she as yet has no knowledge of how Sissy has interpreted her own utterance. Figure 2 presents both women's interpretings of this first position utterance (P1) in schematic form: "$sI1_{PRO}$" represents Sissy's provisional interpreting of utterance 1, where "*s*" denotes the utterance's speaker, "*I1*" denotes her interpreting of the first position utterance, and both the subscript "$_{PRO}$" and italics identify that interpreting as provisional. Similarly, "$rI1_{PRO}$" represents Gramma's provisional interpreting of the first position utterance as its recipient, denoted as "*r*."

Gramma designs her next adjacent second position uptake in lines 2 to 5 of Figure 1 by drawing on the same social practice of requesting and granting/denying that Sissy utilized for utterance 1, projecting that in being very explicit about what she had meant, Sissy will understand her as granting the potential request. Gramma's opening "Well" draws on the practices of well-prefacing of utterances (Schegloff and Lerner, 2009), in this case alerting Sissy that this second position uptake to the request requires Sissy's special attention. Gramma then attributes to Sissy knowledge both of her own motivation for and of her own behavior in throwing up her food, and adds an assertion that this attribution is true. Together these projections for interpretings of action and of meaning comprise Gramma's provisional speaker

5 This excerpt is a slightly simplified version of part of a longer conversation presented in Beach (1996, pp. 114-25). The conversation was audio-recorded only, so that details such as body posture and gaze are not available. The audio recording may be obtained for teaching and research purposes only by contacting the current author. Dr. Beach's generosity in making the recording available for these purposes is gratefully acknowledged. His extended analysis rewards a careful reading.

FIGURE 2
One first position utterance.



FIGURE 3
Two next adjacent utterances.

interpreting of her own second position uptake, represented schematically in Figure 3 as Gramma's "$sI2_{PRO}$."

Gramma's second position utterance is central in conjointly co-constituting action and meaning because it provides Sissy with evidence of how Gramma has interpreted Sissy's first position utterance. As its recipient, Sissy gauges whether Gamma's second position utterance falls within the range of relevant next actions in view of the social practice of requesting and granting/denying. In this case it does, and it provides Sissy with confirmation that Gramma has taken the first position utterance as an action of "doing requesting," and more specifically to have been a request to be explicit about what Gramma had meant: Gramma perceives her as being bulimic. As Gramma completes the second position utterance, Sissy's prior provisional interpreting of her first position utterance becomes an operative interpreting because she now has evidence of how Gramma has interpreted it at this point, within the specific circumstances of their conversation. This newly formed operative interpreting is represented schematically in Figure 3 as Sissy's "$\mathbf{sI1}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$" (highlighted in blue) where both the subscript "$_{\mathbf{OPR}}$" and bold face designate it as an operative interpreting, and where the vertical arrow below it (↑) indicates that her newly formed operative interpreting arises directly from and is dependent upon her interpreting of Gramma's second position utterance (i.e., Sissy's "$rI2_{PRO}$"). Note very importantly that at this point Gramma's interpreting of Sissy's first position utterance remains provisional because Gramma as yet has no evidence of how Sissy had interpreted her first position utterance.

Sissy designs her next adjacent third position utterance, "Gramma you are so full of shit! I am so sure" (lines 6–7) projecting that Gramma will interpret it as a next action relevant to Gramma's second position utterance. Following Beach's (1996) analysis, Sissy's third position utterance is an outright discounting of what Gramma has just attributed to her, that discounting accomplished first by drawing on the social practices of denigrating others, in this case by characterizing Gramma as "full of shit," and second by insisting that that is the case. By implication, Gramma's attribution has no viable basis, although Sissy has stopped short of directly denying what Gramma has alleged.

Sissy's third position utterance is equally central in conjoint co-constituting in that it provides Gramma with evidence of how Sissy has interpreted Gramma's second position utterance. Gramma now draws on the same social practices of denigrating to gauge whether Sissy's third position utterance is a responsive next action. In this case it is, and it provides Gramma with clear evidence that Sissy has interpreted Gramma's second position granting as an explicit attribution that she is bulimic, and that Sissy utterly rejects that attribution. At this point Gramma's provisional interpreting of her own second position uptake becomes operative in that she now knows how Sissy has taken it. As in Figure 4, Gramma's newly formed operative interpreting is denoted as "$\mathbf{sI2}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$" (highlighted in yellow), and it is dependent upon Gramma's interpreting of Sissy's third position utterance (Gramma's "$rI3_{PRO}$," also highlighted in yellow).

But Figure 4 indicates that much more is happening as Sissy places her third position utterance next adjacent to Gramma's second position utterance. Because Gramma now knows that Sissy has interpreted Gramma's second position utterance as granting Sissy's request to be explicit, Gramma also has confirmation that Sissy's first position utterance was indeed a question requesting an explication of meaning. As in Figure 4, Gramma's newly formed operative interpreting of her second position utterance (her "$\mathbf{sI2}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$") enables her to form an operative interpreting of Sissy's first position utterance (her "$\mathbf{rI1}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$"), this latter interpreting having remained provisional until this point. The double vertical arrow (⇑) below this newly formed operative interpreting of Sissy's first position utterance denotes that it arises as Gramma makes an inference based on her newly formed $\mathbf{sI2}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$, which in turn is directly dependent on upon her $rI3_{PRO}$, which she has just now formed in interpreting of Sissy's third position utterance (Arundale, 2020, pp. 80–2).

At the point Sissy's third position utterance is complete, then, both Sissy and Gramma have formed operative interpretings of Sissy's first position utterance, the double-headed arrow (⇔) between Sissy's "$\mathbf{sI1}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$" and Gramma's "$\mathbf{rI1}_{\mathbf{OPR}}$" (highlighted in green) denoting that their respective interpretings of Sissy's first position utterance are interdependent (i.e., reciprocally dependent) because both women's



FIGURE 4
Three next adjacent utterances.



FIGURE 5
Four next adjacent utterances.

operative interpretings of the first position utterance derive from or are conditional upon their interpretings of the *same two next adjacent utterances*. Following the understanding of human communicating employed here (Arundale, 2020, Part 1), Gramma and Sissy have *conjointly co-constituted* their respective interpretings of the conversational action and meaning of Sissy's first position utterance "What do you mean by that?" Note the asymmetry involved in this triad of next adjacent utterances: As *speaker* of the first position utterance, Sissy needs only Gramma's second position utterance to provide the evidence needed for her to confirm (or modify) her provisional interpreting of her first position utterance so that it becomes operative. But as *recipient* of Sissy's first position utterance, Gramma must await Sissy's third position utterance to obtain the evidence she needs to confirm (or modify) her provisional interpretings not only of her own second position utterance, but also in turn of Sissy's first position utterance.

In the Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating, *"communicating" is the process through which both the speaker and the recipient(s) create operative interpretings of a given first position utterance, those operative interpretings arising only at the point the participants have designed and delivered two further next adjacent utterances in a triadic sequence.* The CCMC directly reflects Garfinkel's early recognition of the importance of third position utterances in human communication, as in Rawls (2006, pp. 29–33, 184), Arundale (2020, pp. 89–93), and Heritage (2018, pp. 30–1). As used here, the term "co-constituting" refers to the unique processes engaged when one individual forms perceptions and interpretations of the activities of another human being: processes that are not engaged for non-human entities (Arundale, 2020, pp. 53–54; 409–12). The term "conjoint" points to the non-linear, non-additive, sequential entwining of two or a few individual's processes of co-constituting in interacting (Arundale, 2020, pp. 53–6), as distinct from additive "joint" activity.

Looking beyond this first triad of utterances, as in Figure 5, Gramma's fourth position reprimand of Sissy (lines 8–9 in Figure 1) completes a new, overlapping triad of next adjacent utterances that provides the evidence Sissy needs to create an operative interpreting of her own third position utterance (her "**sI3**$_{\mathbf{OPR}}$," highlighted in red). That operative interpreting in turn provides the Sissy with the basis for forming an operative interpreting of Gramma's second position utterance (Sissy's "**rI2**$_{\mathbf{OPR}}$"), at which point Sissy and Gramma have conjointly co-constituted their respective operative interpretings (highlighted in magenta) of the conversational action and meaning of Gramma's second position utterance across this second, overlapping triad of next adjacent utterances. Both women now have evidence that Gramma's second position utterance identifies Sissy as bulimic.

I examine this conversation in more detail, particularly with regard to its implications for Gramma and Sissy's relationship, in Arundale (2020, pp. 8–12, 170–76, 190–6, 339–48). Gramma and Sissy do achieve some degree of overlap in interpreting with regard to conversational action, but same operative interpretings for a given utterance are not a necessary outcome of conjoint co-constituting (Arundale, 2020, pp. 96–102). Both complementarity and difference

in participant operative interpretings are also normal, everyday outcomes of conjoint co-constituting. For example, although both women interpret Gramma's second position utterance as identifying Sissy as bulimic, they differ markedly with regard to whether that attribution is correct. The processes of conjoint co-constituting provide participants with evidence of how their own utterances are being interpreted, and of how another's utterances are to be interpreted. That evidence may lead the participants to bring different interpretings into overlap, to recognize that their interpretings remain distinct, or to assume overlap when there is difference, or difference when there is overlap. As a model of human communicating, the CCMC is a substantial departure from commonly held understandings of communication in terms of the transmission of information or of the encoding and decoding of meanings, both of these models presuming that the outcome of communication is identity between speaker and recipient meanings (Arundale, 2020, pp. 237–8).

In the most general terms, then, the Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating offers an account of how participants conjointly co-constitute operative interpretings of any given utterance over triads of utterances in next adjacent positions, those triads successively overlapping prior triads of utterances as each new next adjacent utterance is added in sequence. Conjointly co-constituting operative interpretings provides a speaker with evidence of how a recipient has interpreted the speaker's first position utterance, and a recipient with evidence of how a speaker had projected the first position utterance would be interpreted. Operative interpretings are central to the progressivity of everyday interacting when a recipient's operative interpreting corresponds with a speaker's projection, but that centrality is even more apparent when a recipient's operative interpreting departs from a speaker's projection, as in Arundale (2020, pp. 79–88). I examine the CCMC in depth, and its grounding in research in CA, in Part 1 of *Communicating & Relating* (Arundale, 2020, 2021), with a visual representation in Appendix 2. Six further observations about the model are important before examining it with regard to micro-level emergence in section 4.2.

First, the terms "participant," "utterance" and "position" have specific definitions as they are employed in the CCMC. A *participant* is a person who engages both in interpreting another's utterances in sequential interacting, and in designing and delivering utterances for another person to interpret. As he or she delivers an utterance for another person to interpret, and therein becomes accountable/responsible for the interpretings of that utterance, a participant becomes an *agent*, and exhibits his or her *agency* (Arundale, 2020, p. 187). All accounts of human communication are formulated by *observers*, but following the practice in research in CA, the CCMC is an observer account formulated from the perspective of the participants/agents engaged in everyday interacting (Arundale, 2020, pp. 223–6).

Second, although an "utterance" is often understood as a turn at talk, or perhaps as a turn constructional unit, Schegloff (2007b, p. 15) points to other elements of talk like words, syllables, and sounds at a finer level of granularity in the sequential organization of interacting. Research has extended this list to include not only elements such as aspirations, laughter, false starts, silent receipts, and continuers like "uh huh," but also and very importantly, the whole range of nonvocal elements of gesture, gaze, and bodily movement and position. These nonvocal elements may stand apart as distinct elements in a sequence, or may co-occur with vocal elements without interfering with them. Both prior and current research make clear that all of these elements are fully consequential in everyday interacting (cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 143–53, 330–9; e.g., Deppermann and Streeck, 2018; Goodwin, 2018). In short, an element like an aspiration, a silent receipt, a headshake, or a hand movement may well be an utterance occupying a position in a sequence of interaction. Within the CCMC, then, an *utterance* is defined as *a vocal or nonvocal activity by one participant in sequential interacting, or the occasioned absence of such an activity, that may but need not overlap another participant's activity* (Arundale, 2020, pp. 50–1).

Third, a "position" in interaction is the location in a sequence at which an element appears, but what comprises a position depends on the term's use with regard to a particular normative order of interaction such as turn-taking, action formation, or repair. With regard to turn-taking, next adjacent turns are in next adjacent positions; with regard to action formation, the first and second pair parts are often in next adjacent positions, but those positions may become separated by intervening utterances; and with regard to repair, the four-position "repair initiation opportunity space" (Schegloff, 1992) identifies the locations at which a participant might initiate repair on a problematic aspect he or she identifies in a given first position utterance. Within the CCMC, then, a *position* in a triad of utterances is defined as *(a) an utterance, as above, (b) that is recognizable and in most cases interpretable in terms of a normative order of organization, and (c) organized as any given first utterance and the two next adjacent utterances following it, (d) where any two next adjacent utterances of the three utterances are produced by different participants.* In Gramma and Sissy's interacting, the utterances comprising the three-position triads correspond with three next adjacent turns at talk, but that need not be the case if one participant produces two or more successive turns, or produces a headshake or a nod in overlap with another participant's verbalization (e.g., Arundale, 2020, pp. 143–53, 330–9).

Fourth, as outlined above, the CCMC describes the time-ordered process by which two or a few participants establish their respective interpretings of action and meaning, or in other words, their respective senses of the state of the talk as each new utterance appears in sequence. The organizing framework basic to triadic conjoint co-constituting is the fundamental "default principle" of nextness, adjacency, and progressivity in sequential interacting: the principle that each element added to a sequence "should come next after the prior," and be "hearable [and/or seeable] as a/the next one due" (Schegloff, 2007b, pp. 14–5; cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 48–50). As Schegloff (2007b, p. 15) elaborates, "[s]hould something intervene between some element and what is hearable as a/the next one due … it will heard as qualifying the progressivity of talk and will be examined … to find how it reaffirms the understanding-so-far of what has preceded, or favors one or more of several such understandings that are being entertained, or how it requires reconfiguration of that understanding." Unlike the normative organizations of turn-taking, action sequencing, and repair initiation, the organizing principle of adjacency, nextness, and progressivity is always in play as each new element, at whatever level of granularity, is added next adjacent to a prior element in an evolving sequence of elements. It follows that triadic conjoint co-constituting is continually occurring as new utterances appear in next adjacent positions (Arundale, 2020, pp. 52–3, 72–86). In other words, as long as two or more participants

continue to provide uptake to one another's utterances, there is "no time out" from communicating.[6]

Fifth, one implication of Schegloff's default principle of nextness, adjacency, and progressivity is that at all levels of granularity, sequences in human interacting are designed and interpreted on a moment-by-moment basis as participants place utterances next adjacent to the utterances of other participants. One's designing of a new utterance to be placed in sequence next adjacent to another's prior utterance involves *projecting* how that new utterance is likely to be interpreted in relation to the prior utterance (Deppermann and Streeck, 2018, p. 6), and one's interpreting of a new utterance placed next adjacent to a prior utterance involves *assessing* how that new utterance is related to that prior utterance. Projecting and assessing happen in the moment of interacting, as each new element is added, the final form of any added element being unknown until that element is complete. In projecting and assessing the "nextness" of each new adjacently placed utterance, participants draw directly on the concrete social practices for interacting that they presume they share. At any moment multiple practices may be play, and if so they may or may not be consistent with one another. A core set of these practices are universals of interaction, as in Section 3, with others having the status of normative social practices in cultural or language groups that allow persons to interact productively with persons in the group they have never before encountered (Arundale, 2020, p. 49). Participants like Gramma and Sissy draw on their knowledge of social practices in incrementally ordering their particular sequence of interaction, each person's new, next adjacent utterance moving the sequence along, and providing the bases both for conjointly co-constituting operative interpretings of prior utterances, as well as for designing subsequent utterances. Those operative interpretings often reaffirm interpretings-so-far, but as Schegloff (2007b, p. 15) notes, they may just as well refine, redirect, or reconfigure those interpretings, or at times terminate the interpreting-so-far.[7] Very importantly, even though Gramma and Sissy both directly affect the unfolding of their conjoint co-constituting, neither of them controls that unfolding because the incremental ordering of their sequence of interaction could have taken a very different direction had one of them provided a different next adjacent utterance at any point.

Sixth, considering the participant's use of social practices in the moment-by-moment incremental ordering of a sequence serves to clarify what Rawls (2003, p. 227, cf. Krippendorff, 1970) contends in noting that "[f]rom Garfinkel's perspective, interactional practices do not *constrain* action, or practice, in any case. They *order* it, make it recognizable and thereby intelligible." Taking the organization of conversational action (Schegloff, 2007b) as a case in point, a first participant who designs what he or she provisionally interprets as a request draws on the social practice of requesting and granting/denying to project that the next adjacent utterance of the addressed participant will be a granting or a denying of that request. Participants can reliably anticipate that others in their community of language users know this social practice, among the many others across the domains noted in Section 3, hence it might appear that the social practice constrains the addressed participant to constructing that next adjacent utterance as a granting or a denying. But understood in terms of the CCMC, a first participant's drawing on this social practice in designing an utterance does no more than enable his or her projection of the next adjacent utterance as a grant or denial. There is nothing in the first participant's provisional interpreting or in the composition of his or her utterance that determines how the action-in-progress will eventually be realized. It is entirely possible that as the first participant draws on his or her provisional projection in assessing whether or not the addressed participant's next adjacent utterance is a grant or denial, he or she will find the interpreting-so-far reconfigured as something other than a request, or perhaps find that action terminated altogether. In Figure 1, Sissy's first position *wh*-question potentially implements the social practice of requesting followed by granting/denying, but in second position Gramma could well have responded to the *wh*-question in a manner that continued her practice of not explicitly identifying what she sees as Sissy's bulimia, just as she had done over the prior 2 min. of their conversation (cf. Fox and Thompson, 2010). Were Gramma to have done so, Sissy's operative interpreting of her own first position utterance would be as a *wh*-question, not as a request, and would provide a very different basis for designing her next adjacent third position utterance.

It is in this sense that social practices *order* or open possibilities for sequences of conversational action in interacting. A participant's projection does not *constrain* or determine the type of action implemented by the next adjacent utterance because the projected action can be realized, modified, or obviated only in view of the actual utterance another participant provides in the next adjacent position (cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 217–9). The principle applies not just to action formation, but to all domains of social practice, including that of overall structural organization (Robinson, 2013), which might appear to involve some type of script, ritual, frame, or similar sequential formula understood account for overall sequences of utterances in interacting. As in Section 3 with regard to "frames," such sequential formulae are an observers' conceptual typification of a sequence of interactional practices that participants are presumed to follow in a lock step manner upon identifying the type of situation in which they are involved. Participants in everyday interacting do not passively follow such sequential formulae, but instead engage actively in conjointly co-constituting every sequence of utterances anew, moment-by-moment, in light of the contingencies that pertain to that

6 Lerner and Raymond (2021) provide an alternative to Schegloff's characterization of the default organizing principle that is more readily applicable in examining elements at finer levels of granularity. They argue that the structural projectability of action and its progressive realization are conjoined and interdependent operations: "First, as actions are launched in their sequential environment, they can be recognized as a possible particular action-in-progress and thus project what more there is to come as the action develops. Then as the action progresses, its further development is inspected to see if it is the progressive realization of the projected action, a change in that action, or its abandonment. Finally, this progressive realization of the action-so-far informs its further projection (as continuing the action or not)" (2021, 279–80). Lerner and Raymond provide evidence for the structural projectability/progressive realization of action at the level of micro-momentary hand movements that interfere with evolving manual action in everyday interacting.

7 As they conjointly co-constitute a sequence of interaction, participants face difficulties in forming interpretings if they do not share one or more of the social practices being presumed, most obviously those in the domain of language structure, but those in other domains as well. In these cases the participants many find recourse in the universal practices of conversational repair.

specific situation. That is the case even if they are once again co-constituting the "same" overall sequence they have constituted before (Arundale, 2020, pp. 231–3).

4.2 The emergence of micro-level order in everyday interacting

The term "emergence" is most commonly used in the sense of a phenomenon coming into being over time in some activity. In this sense, the Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating is an account of the emergence, across triads of next adjacent utterances, of two or a few participant's operative interpretings of any given first position utterance (Arundale, 2020, pp. 85–6). Yet "emergence" is also used, and will be used herein, in the additional, technical sense of the coming into being over time of properties that define complex social systems. In this Section I argue that *the CCMC's account of the emergence of participant operative interpretings across three position triads is also an account, in the additional, technical sense, of the emergence of key, non-linear, non-additive properties that define two or a few participants as a micro-level, complex social system*. This account of emergence at the micro-social level provides the basis for the account in Section 4.3 of the emergence of social order at the macro-social level. Examining emergence in interacting at the micro-level involves two steps. First, I consider four emergent properties of complex systems in general that distinguish them from additive collectivities, and indicate how each property is apparent in Gramma and Sissy's conjoint co-constituting of operative interpretings, thereby defining them as a micro-level, complex social system. Second, I identify four additional, more specific emergent properties of everyday interacting likewise apparent as participants form operative interpretings across triads of next adjacent utterances. I draw on Sawyer's (2005, pp. 94–7) discussion of the four general properties as representative of many similar overviews (e.g., Clark, 1997, pp. 103–13): non-aggregativity, non-decomposibility, non-localizabilty, and complexity.

Non-aggregativity in a complex system refers to the inability to substitute the parts of a system for one another, to add or remove parts from the system, or to rearrange the parts without changing the system's overall properties, as well as the presence of facilitative or inhibitory interactions among a system's parts such that a change in one part affects the system as a whole. In the social systems that emerge as two or a few participants place utterances next adjacent to those of other participants, the "parts" of the system are the individual participants and the particular utterances each designs and delivers for others to interpret, these person/utterance parts being directly observable. In Figure 1, Gramma is one unique person/utterance part and Sissy is the other, neither of which can be substituted for the other. Removing one of them from the dyad would obviously destroy the dyadic system, but just as clearly adding a new person/utterance part to a dyad, or removing one person/utterance part from a conversation among three or more participants, would change the operative interpretings that would evolve as each next adjacent utterance is added. Rearranging the sequencing would have a similar effect. Examining the evolution of Gramma and Sissy's provisional and operative interpretings of action and meaning across successive triads of utterances makes apparent that each person/utterance part confirms (facilitates) or alters (inhibits) the other part's interpreting of prior utterances. Non-aggregativity is one characteristic of two or a few participant's operative interpretings of the action and meaning of any given first position utterance that defines the participants as a micro-level, complex social system.

Non-decomposability of a complex system is present where the "overall system organization is a significant influence on the function of any component" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 96), where the parts of the system are interdependent, or where the behaviors or states of one part are reciprocally conditional on the behaviors or states of other parts. Returning to Gramma's and Sissy's conversation and the evolution of their respective operative interpretings of Sissy's first position "What do you mean by that?" (line 1 in Figure 1), Sissy's operative interpreting is conditional on Gramma's second position uptake, whereas Gramma's operative interpretings, not only of her own second position uptake, but also of Sissy's first position utterance, are conditional on Sissy's third position uptake. At the point the first triad of utterances is complete, Gramma's and Sissy's operative interpretings are not only mutually or unilaterally conditional on one another's subsequent utterances, but also and more specifically, they are reciprocally conditional on the same set of subsequent utterances (Arundale, 2020, pp. 78–84). The triadic sequential organization of Figure 1 is both the central factor in forming the interdependency of Gramma and Sissy's respective operative interpretings of action and meaning for the first position utterance, and an example of the spontaneous self-organization in complex social systems that generates both order and interdependency. Krippendorff (1984, p. 29; 2009, p. 43, cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 29–32) defines "communication" as "that observer-defined relational construction which explains what makes a system defy its decomposition (without loss of understanding) into independent parts." Non-decomposability is a second characteristic of two or a few participant's operative interpretings of action and meaning that defines the participants as a micro-level, complex social system.

Non-localizability in a complex system in present where there are properties of the system that cannot be identified with or localizable within particular parts of the system. Clearly Gramma's and Sissy's interpretings, whether provisional or operative, are their own cognitive/emotional property as individual persons. However, unlike their provisional interpretings, their operative interpretings of action and meaning for any given utterance are also properties that are not localizable solely within the individual persons involved because those interpretings evolve only as they interpret the utterance the other person places next adjacent to that given utterance. A different next adjacent utterance would lead to a different operative interpreting. Non-localizability is a third characteristic of two or a few participant's operative interpretings of action and meaning that defines the participants as a micro-level, complex social system.

Complexity is apparent where the rules of interacting among the parts are multiple and complicated, one key index of complexity being the non-linearity in the processes of interacting that is evident, for example, where the outcomes of those processes are not predictable from the initial states of the process, or where different outcomes result from essentially the same initial states (cf. Sawyer, 2005, p. 97; Clark, 1997, p. 236). Clearly the "rules" of human languages and of the social practices of engaging them in interacting are multiple and complicated. Schegloff (1981, p. 89) argues that any sequence of utterances the participants actually create is one among a number of "contingent alternatives" they could have created, making it essential for analysts to retain "a sense of the actual as an achievement from among possibilities." As noted above, the sequence of operative interpretings of action and meaning that Gramma and Sissy conjointly

co-constitute could have evolved in many different directions following line 1 in Figure 1 had either of them delivered a different next adjacent utterance at any position (Heritage, 1984, p. 263). Their sequence is not predictable because it is the outcome of the non-linear process of conjointly co-constituting operative interpretings. Again, starting from ostensibly the same initial utterance, "What do you mean by that?" designed in view of a widely recognized social practice for making requests, provides no guarantee that the next adjacent utterance will be a grant or a denial. Complexity, understood as non-linearity in the processes of interacting, is a fourth characteristic of participant's operative interpretings of the action and meaning of a given utterance that defines two or a few participants in everyday interacting as a micro-level, complex social system.

Examining how these four generic emergent properties of complex systems are evident in everyday interacting among two or a few participants makes apparent that *the participant's operative interpretings of the action and meaning of any given first position utterance that evolve across triads of next adjacent utterances are the central emergent property of everyday interacting that defines those participants as a complex system*. Yet beyond these four abstract properties of all complex systems are number of other emergent properties specific to the micro-level systems that participants form as they engage in everyday interacting. Brief descriptions of four such properties must suffice, as detailed examinations lie well beyond the scope of this chapter:

1. Concomitant with emergent operative interpretings of action and meaning in micro-level systems are emergent *operative interpretings of relationship,* or more precisely of "relating," as an on-going, dynamic process of both connecting with and separating from one another, separating being the dominant pole for Gramma and Sissy in Figure 1 (Arundale, 2020, Chaps. 7–9).
2. The emergent creating, sustaining, and changing of *individuality*, or in other words, the emergence in interacting with other persons of the complex systems that are individual human vis-a-vis other human selves (e.g., Arundale, 2020, pp. 202–6; Rawls, 2006, pp. 21–4, 110–4). Eleven utterances beyond Sissy's third position denial in Figure 1, Gramma and Sissy conjointly co-constitute Sissy's highly qualified admission that she is bulimic (Arundale, 2020, pp. 339–48).
3. The emergent *sequential ordering of utterances in interacting*, as examined in Section 3 (Rawls, 2003, p. 227), or in other words, the emergent progressivity of talk and conduct (Schegloff, 2007b, p. 15) in everyday interacting.
4. The emergent *commonality* in social practices and in meanings among participants in micro-level (and macro-level) complex systems (Arundale, 2020, pp. 176–82). This property is important in Section 4.3 and warrants further consideration.

What I identify as "commonality" in social practices and in meanings is fundamental in enabling participants, as they design or interpret utterances in interacting, to reliably assume that other participants know the social practices and meanings regularly employed in their community of language users, whether small or large. More specifically, commonality is not what is generally known as common ground or mutual knowledge, nor is it some type of core or literal meaning, nor is it "intersubjectivity" in the sense of "treatably same interpretings" (Arundale, 2020, pp. 95–102). Commonality in social practices and in meanings is an emergent property of everyday interacting that arises over time among participants as they recurrently engage social practices in conjointly co-constituting operative interpretings of action and meaning. Gramma and Sissy's conversation reveals that they have some degree of commonality in their meanings for persons who are typical of those with bulimia (Beach, 1996, p. 46), but because they acquired their respective meanings in quite different communities of language users, the extent of overlap in their meanings is likely very limited. Their conversation also reveals a high degree of commonality in their understandings of the social practices involved in formulating and granting/denying requests. Participants routinely presume commonality in social practices and in meanings as they design and interpret utterances in everyday interacting, but its presence or absence can be established only as those participants conjointly co-constitute interpretings of a given utterance at a given moment in interacting (Arundale, 2020, pp. 176–82). If commonality is not present the participants will likely engage the practices of repair, and the operative interpretings that the participants form in the course of doing so may well be instrumental in establishing commonality for subsequent interpreting. Deppermann and Schmidt (2021) use CA in examining the evolution over 20 theatre rehearsals of what I identify as "commonality" in meaning among a small group of actors for the Japanese esthetic concept *wabi sabi*, beginning with the director's initial introduction of this previously unknown term. Deppermann and Schmidt employ the term "common ground," but provide an extended critique of that concept and eventually adopt the term "commonality" in its place.

Each of the emergent properties sketched above originates and is organized in the interacting among two or a few participants, defining them as a complex, micro-level social system. None of these properties belongs to or is defined solely upon the participants as individuals. Each property is a different facet of *the emergence of micro-level social order in everyday interacting*. Because this micro-level social order defines two or a few participants as a complex system, and because that micro-level order emerges *only* as those participants interact with one another, it follows that when the participant's interacting terminates, their system *qua* system ceases to exist. Provided however that the participants have established commonality in the social practices and meanings they have engaged in past interacting, they can re-create and thus sustain that system by resuming interacting and re-engaging the same social practices and meanings. Social systems of two or a few participants are therefore episodic, and sustained only in recurrent episodes of interacting among the participants. Absent a lens suitable for looking for it, we have not noticed micro-level social order continually emerging around us in everyday face-to-face interacting. Sawyer (2005) and Collins (1981) both look at face-to-face interacting in their search for accounts of macro-level emergence, but their lenses are not focused on the observable social practices that enable participants to interact every day.

4.3 The emergence of macro-level social order in light of conversation analysis

Building directly on the above account of the emergence in everyday interacting of a range of properties that define micro-level complex social systems of two or a few individuals, I argue in this section that *the CCMC's micro-level account of emergence provides the basis for an account of the emergence, in recurrent talk and conduct over*

time and space, of properties that define the macro-level social systems that are social institutions and cultural groups. Again, the basic idea is simple: a micro-level complex system emerges as two or a few individuals conjointly co-constitute actions and meanings in an episode of interacting at some particular time and place, and a macro-level complex system emerges as a larger number of individuals recurrently conjointly co-constitute actions and meanings across multiple episodes of interacting occurring over time and space. Also again, the basic idea is not new: Collins (1981, p. 985), for example, draws on Garfinkel in arguing that social institutions rest on "patterns of repetitive micro-interaction." What is new in the re-conceptualization offered in this Section is accounting for the emergence of macro-level social order in terms of the recurrent emergence of micro-level social order as participants engage observable social practices.

More specifically, a macro-level social system is created, sustained, and changed as persons in a larger community recurrently engage social practices and meanings associated with that macro-level social system, and for which they have previously established commonality, across multiple episodes of micro-level interacting distributed over time and over space, the scope of that commonality establishing the scope of the macro-level social system (Arundale, 2020, p. 177). Like micro-level systems, then, macro-level systems are episodic in that for the participants in a given micro-level system, the macro-level social system *qua* system ceases to exist when their interacting terminates, or when they cease engaging the social practices and meanings associated with that macro-level system. Presuming they have established commonality in past interacting in the social practices and meanings associated with the macro-level system, however, the participants in a given micro-level system can, at any particular time and place, re-create the macro-level system by resuming interacting and re-engaging the associated social practices and meanings. As participants within the larger community engage these social practices and meanings in micro-level complex systems, and do so recurrently, the macro-level complex system is sustained over time and space. Like micro-level social systems, then, macro-level social systems are continually re-emerging across multiple episodes of interacting. Like micro-level systems, macro-level social systems are organized from within, in interacting. They are, in short, continually being "interactively organized" (Arundale, 2020, pp. 26–8, 183, 190–6).

Heritage (2008, p. 312) provides another perspective in arguing that everyday micro-level interacting is itself the primary social institution, given that the core, and very likely universal social practices of turn-taking, of action formation, and of repair are fundamental to all human interacting. Clearly the primary social institution of everyday interacting is sustained across time and space only in the recurrent engaging of the full range of social practices and meanings that characterize everyday interacting, which entails that macro-level social institutions of all other kinds and sizes must likewise be sustained in the recurrent engaging of the social practices and meanings associated with those institutions: a position fully in keeping with Schegloff's (2006, p. 70) argument that everyday interacting is "the infrastructure for social institutions, the natural ecological niche for language, and the arena in which culture is enacted."

Yet this re-conceptualization of the emergence of macro-level social systems raises an important question: if macro-level complex systems are interactively organized in recurrent interacting among participants in micro-level complex systems, are the emergent properties of macro-level systems thereby reduced to the emergent properties of micro-level systems? Levinson (2005) argues that "interactional reductionism" is a problematic conceptualization of language and culture. Sawyer (2005, pp. 201–5) argues similarly with regard to social institutions in general, and is more specific in noting that a methodological individualist who attempted to reduce "emergent group properties to the time-course sequence of successive individual acts … would necessarily require a sophisticated interaction analysis of the symbolic meanings of each act; their successive coherence and relevance; and how they are interpreted and taken up by other participants" (Sawyer, 2012, p. 273). As is apparent in the prior two sections, the CCMC, grounded as it is in CA, offers precisely that "sophisticated interaction analysis" of the "time-course sequence of successive individual acts" in everyday human communicating, and in so doing reveals the emergent properties that define micro-level complex social systems. If it were the case that the emergent properties of macro-level complex systems were identical to the emergent properties of micro-level complex systems, then indeed the account of macro-level systems offered here would amount to interactional reductionism. One need ask, then, if there are emergent properties of the macro-level complex systems that are social institutions which are distinct from the emergent properties that define micro-level complex systems?

The answer is clearly "Yes." Sawyer's (2005) careful review of the literature on social emergence makes evident that sociologists have always argued that macro-level social institutions exhibit order and characteristics not observed in individuals, or in micro-level groups. Sawyer (2005, pp. 94–7) indicates as well that since the advent of general systems concepts in the mid 20th century, sociologists have observed that macro-level social institutions exhibit all four generic emergent properties that distinguish complex systems from additive collectivities: non-aggregativity, non-decomposibility, non-localizabilty, and complexity.

From the perspective of the re-conceptualization offered here, *the central emergent properties defining a macro-level social institution are the operative interpretings of action and meaning formed in micro-level interacting, together with the commonality both in those interpretings and in the social practices, that the participants associate with that macro-level system, and that they maintain in recurrent everyday micro-level interacting over time and space.* CA research across a range of institutions makes apparent that although participants orient to differences between everyday interacting and institutional interacting, there is little evidence that particular institutions have unique social practices. Instead, interaction in institutions is characterized not only by particular social actions and meanings, but also by particular subsets of the broad range of social practices engaged in everyday interacting, and in some cases by particular variations of those social practices, as for example in teacher questioning in educational institutions (Heritage and Clayman, 2010, p. 17). As in Section 4.2, commonality across participants both in their interpretings of the social actions and meanings, and in the social practices associated with a particular social institution, must also emerge if that social institution is to be sustained over time and space.

Beyond these central emergent properties are several others specific to the macro-level systems that participants form as they engage in everyday interacting. Again, brief descriptions of four such properties must suffice.

1. As one aspect of relating, *operative interpretings of membership categorization* emerge regularly in everyday interacting (Pomerantz and Mandelbaum, 2005; Schegloff, 2007a), but are a particularly important property of macro-level social institutions. As participants engage practices in the domain of membership categorization in designing and interpreting utterances, in conjointly co-constituting operative interpretings of action and meaning in micro-level interacting, they position themselves as professionals and clients, or as service providers and customers, for example. A macro-level social system defined in part by such categories emerges across time and space in multiple episodes of such positioning in micro-level interacting.
2. The emergent creating, sustaining, and changing of *sociality*, understood here as participation in a macro-level system like a team, institution, or cultural group (cf. Arundale, 2020, p. 203). Participation in a particular macro-level social system requires being able to engage those social practices and meanings for which the participants have already established commonality. As participants recurrently engage or refrain from engaging these particular practices and meanings in micro-level interacting, or conjointly co-constitute operative interpretings that are consistent or inconsistent with their projections, they identify who is and who is not a participant in that system, and in so doing create, sustain, or change the boundaries of the macro-level social system (Arundale, 2020, p. 195; Krippendorff, 2009, pp. 226–7).
3. The emergent *diversity within macro-level systems*. Within larger macro-level social systems there may well be temporal, spatial, and/or energy limits on the ability of participants to interact with others, leading to more frequent recurrent conjoint co-constituting within smaller local groupings of participants, and potentially to differences in social practices and meanings between those local groupings (cf. Goodwin, 2018, pp. 455, 475). Such diversity is commonly observed in studies of complex systems, as for example in the emergence over time of sub-cultural groups (Arundale, 2020, p. 197–8).
4. The emergent *stability of macro-level systems*. As participants interactively organize macro-level systems they create what Krippendorff (2009, Chap. 18) identifies as temporal, associative, and structural "social memory," commonality being one example of structural social memory. All three forms of social memory are emergent and distributed across the participants in a macro-level system in their recurrent conjoint co-constituting, not lodged in the participant's personal memories. Social memory is a key component of the emergent stability of an institution or cultural group, together with the array of social practices through which participants acknowledge departures from a social practice in ways that nevertheless sustain that practice (Arundale, 2020, pp. 199–202, 227).

Each of these specific emergent properties serves to define a larger community of participants as complex, macro-level social system. None of these are properties of the participants as individuals. All of these properties are created, sustained, and changed only in interacting. All are interactively organized, and comprise different facets of *the emergence of macro-level social order in recurrent everyday micro-level interacting.* As Gibbs and Van Orden (2010, p. 162, cf. Craig and Tracy, 2021, p. 160) argue, the structure of a complex system is "not imposed from outside forces or from internal blueprints." A system's emergent properties are "temporary, or 'soft-assembled,' because they go away when a dynamic linkage changes sufficiently; they have no separate off-line or dormant status in the components of a system." From the perspective of the re-conceptualization offered here, the macro-level complex systems that are social institutions and cultural groups are characterized by emergent properties that are distinct from the emergent properties of the micro-level complex systems that are essential to creating, sustaining, and changing micro-level systems. Accordingly, the CCMC offers what I identify as a "non-reductive interactionist" account of the emergence of social order at both the micro- and macro-level in everyday interacting (Arundale, 2020, pp. 209–15), not an interactional reductionist, nor a methodological individualist account.

One added observation is in order regarding this re-conceptualization of the emergence of macro-level social order. Because the accounts offered here, both of micro-level order and in turn of macro-level order, rest on participant's use of social practices in interacting, they may appear to be restricted to everyday face-to-face situations, ignoring situations in which participants use artifacts like ATMs for banking or laptops for grocery shopping. Human beings have constructed a wide array material and energetic artifacts that they engage in everyday interacting, and that according to some accounts (e.g., LaTour, 2005; Cooren, 2010) exhibit agency just as do human beings. In view of the assumptive commitments that underlie the CCMC, however, the phenomena that such accounts treat as agency are manifest only as human agents, defined as in Section 4.1, engage social practices in interacting that employ or involve such artifacts (Arundale, 2020, pp. 230–1). Goodwin (2018), Nevile et al. (2015), and Suchman (2007) all provide penetrating accounts, informed by CA and by ethnomethodology, of how human agents engage artifacts in their everyday and professional interacting.

4.4 Researching the emergence of macro-level social order in everyday interacting

The re-conceptualization of the emergence of macro-level social order offered in Section 4.3 begs further exploration, as well as empirical evidence, and providing both presents researchers with unique challenges. Research in CA has already provided important insights into how communicating among two or a few participants is fundamental in the emergence of the properties that define larger, complex social systems like organizations (e.g., Boden, 1994; Heritage, 2005; Heritage and Clayman, 2010), markets (Heath, 2013), professions (Goodwin, 2018, Part V), and more (Arundale, 2020, p. 220). But because the properties of the macro-level social order that emerge in recurrent interacting are conjointly co-constituted across both time and space, it is likely that research methods in addition to CA will be necessary in exploring and grounding the re-conceptualization. Recent research in what has become known as longitudinal CA has begun to reveal how social practices and meanings emerge and come into use as groups of individuals interact over time in extended families (Beach, 2009) and in theatre ensembles (Deppermann and Schmidt, 2021; Schmidt and Deppermann, 2023). Deppermann and Streeck's (2018), Pekarek Doehler and Deppermann's (2021), and Pekarek Doehler et al.'s (2018)

edited collections include a wide range of longitudinal studies employing CA. Studies such as these indicate that larger social systems are realized episodically over time, and offer important insights into the emergent properties that define such systems, although they were not designed specifically to examine such properties. In commenting on the importance of longitudinal CA, Deppermann and Pekarek Doehler (2021, p. 138) argue that the "detailed analysis of the microlevel organization of social interaction, which is the hallmark of CA … can also send light on larger scale social orders," and they provide a broad, "integrative picture" of how such orders emerge over time in recurrent interaction among individuals—a picture entirely consistent with the re-conceptualization of the emergence of social order offered here.

Research informed by CA methods such as that sketched above will remain particularly important, but other methods may be useful as well, if like CA they are capable of providing evidence of emergent properties. In general terms, exploring the re-conceptualization and providing empirical evidence will require new research and new research methods that directly address the question: How do the properties that define macro-level social systems emerge over time and space in recurrent interacting in micro-level social systems? More specifically, because the re-conceptualization of macro-level emergence rests on the conceptual framework of the CCMC, new research and new research methods must provide evidence of the conjoint co-constituting of operative interpretings in everyday interacting. Krippendorff (1970) argues that a researcher's conceptualization of the phenomenon under study provides the framework for all procedures in the conduct of inquiry: (a) making observations, (b) generating data, (c) analyzing those data to produce evidence, and (d) using the evidence in interpreting the outcomes with respect to the conceptualization. These four procedures are tightly linked, such that producing evidence capable of warranting emergent properties places clear demands on the nature of the data a researcher must generate. I examine the requirements for all four procedures in research that engages the CCMC (Arundale, 2020, pp. 362–71), leading to a set of seven requirements that need to be met if a given method is to provide the necessary evidence of emergence in conjointly co-constituting interpretings.

Research using CA methods, as examined in the contributions to Sidnell and Stivers' (2013) *Handbook*, and as described in textbooks on CA, meets all seven requirements, with longitudinal CA being especially relevant. Space allows only brief indications of seven other methods that may be useful as well in research seeking to probe and ground this re-conceptualization of the emergence of macro-level properties. Edwards (2005) indicates that research in *discursive psychology* has drawn increasingly on CA, and where it does so the methods engaged address the seven requirements. When employed in a manner consistent with CA, as in Fitzgerald (2015) and Schegloff (2007a), *membership categorization analysis* should also meet the requirements. Research informed by *ethnography of communication* (Carbaugh, 2005), and by Craig and Tracy's (2021) *grounded practical theory*, may draw on CA, discursive psychology, and/or membership categorization analysis, and again, where they do so they may address several of the requirements, though may fall short of providing the needed evidence of participant operative interpretings. Tracy (2010), for example, employs grounded practical theory in a longitudinal study of school board meetings, identifying key social practices that characterize "ordinary democracy." Two recent arguments that *CA-informed formal coding* (Stivers, 2015) and *experimental and laboratory methods* (Kendrick, 2017) both have been, and will remain useful in addressing issues in CA research, will very likely spur the development of these methodologies, as well as of new combinations of methods for studying everyday interacting. In all cases the extent to which a study addresses the seven requirements for evidence of emergence of macro-level properties can be only assessed by examining its particular research design.

Lastly, while *agent-based modeling* can potentially address most of the seven requirements for methods, and can model large numbers of agents interacting with one another over time, there are challenges in using it in studying the emergent properties of the macro-level social systems formed and maintained in everyday interacting. In closing his book, Sawyer (2005, p. 230) argues that the best way to examine how the properties of macro-level social systems emerge "is to combine the empirical study of socially embedded communication with richly constructed artificial society models." CA provides the "empirical study of embedded of socially embedded communication" as the first element in this research program, and agent-based modeling (ABM) provides the basis for developing "richly constructed artificial society models" as the second element (cf. Arundale, 2020, pp. 183–90). ABM is one instance of a relatively new research methodology that Poole et al. (2002, p. 31) identify as "modeling inquiry" in which the normally separate procedures of theorizing and generating data for analysis are merged into the single process: the procedural implementation of a theory or model in the simulation generates the data to be analyzed in refining or testing the theory or model.

Very briefly, ABM requires a researcher to model (1) a set of autonomous agents (e.g., persons) with particular attributes and behaviors, (2) a set of procedures that define how and with whom these agents may connect, and (3) potentially an environment with which the agents may interface (Macal and North, 2010, p. 152). Once a researcher has specified protocols for the agents and for their connecting, together with an environment, he or she implements a simulation, often as a computer program, in which each agent connects with another agent, carries out its connecting protocol, processes what it receives, changes its states accordingly, and generates outputs for other agents. Agent-based simulation proceeds episodically: once one episode of connection terminates, the agent begins a new episode by establishing a new connection with another agent: there would be no system whatsoever apart from agents connecting with other agents. Central to research using ABM is observing the changes in the states of the agents and of the system as a whole as the simulation progresses in time, and it is these data that enable the researcher to identify emergent properties that appear as the simulation progresses. Gilbert (2020), Macal and North (2010), and Sawyer (2005) review a wide range of agent-based simulations that exhibit emergent properties such as diversity and stability (Arundale, 2020, p. 187).[8] Again

8 In Arundale (2020) I introduce agent-based modeling of complex systems following a brief sketch of social network analysis (2020, pp. 184–6), which has uniformly treated social networks as additive collectivities, not as non-additive, complex systems. As a matter of clarification, then, the re-conceptualization of emergence in macro-level complex social systems that I offer here bears no relationship either to social network analysis in general, or to LaTour's (2005) Actor-Network Theory in particular.

Sawyer (2005, pp. 22–3, 187) notes that one challenge in employing ABM in studying emergence in macro-level social systems is the absence of a "sophisticated" account of human communication that specifies how one agent connects with another agent—a challenge addressed directly by the CCMC (Arundale, 2020, pp. 381–2; Appendix 2 and 3). A far more important challenge, is formulating viable proxies in a computer simulation for human interpretings of action and meaning. ABM will not replace research methods informed by CA, but it is a relevant method given its potential in discovering new emergent properties and in providing evidence of identified emergent properties of the macro-level social systems that participants create and maintain in recurrent conjoint co-constituting in large communities of human agents.

Employing any of these research methods in studying human interacting is subject to all of the ethical concerns surrounding inquiry regarding human beings. Drawing on Krippendorff's (2009, Chaps. 1, 6) insightful analyses, I examine the ethical issues involved in modeling, theorizing, comparing conceptual frameworks, and conducting inquiry employing the CCMC (Arundale, 2020, pp. 233–7, 371–60), as well as the CCMC's implications for ethical personal conduct in interacting (Arundale, 2020, p. 350–3). These ethical issues must be addressed because communicating is central to who we are as persons and as communities. How we come to understand communicating in our theorizing, how we carry out our research on it, and how we engage in everyday interacting in light of those understandings will come to touch the persons we theorize about, the persons who participate in our research, and the persons around us, inclusive of the theorist, the researcher, and ourselves.

5 Discussion: re-conceptualizing a venerable sociological concept

Social theorists have long puzzled over how macro-level social order is linked to the micro-level activities of individuals, and in addressing that puzzlement have offered various accounts of how social institutions arise in everyday relations among individuals. This chapter continues in that tradition, acknowledging Sawyer's (2005) account in terms of interactional frames, but acknowledging as well Rawl's and Garfinkel's arguments that accounts of the interaction order in terms of concrete social practices are more productive than accounts in terms of conceptual typifications like frames. The Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communicating offers an account of how participants use social practices in forming operative interpretings of meaning and social action across triadic sequences of utterances in everyday talk and conduct. Operative interpretings of meaning and social action are emergent (non-linear, non-additive) properties that define micro-level complex systems of two or a few persons. Persons are able to form operative interpretings of action and meaning in everyday interacting with multiple other persons in larger communities because in using the social practices needed to form operative interpretings, in recurrent micro-level interacting over time and across space, they maintain commonality in those practices with those other persons, and so maintain the community. If the social practices are within the domains of epistemics, or of deontics, for example (Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2014), then the community is engaging and maintaining its normative social order for the distribution of knowledge, or of power, among its members. If the social practices are the universal practices of turn-taking, action formation, and repair, then the community is what Heritage (2008) identifies as the "primary social institution" of everyday interacting. If the social practices and meanings are those associated with money, or instruction, for example, then the community is a financial or an education institution. If the social practices and meanings are those for concatenating vocalizations into words and words into utterances, then the community is a language group. And if the social practices and meanings are those associated with beliefs or kinship relations, for example, then the community is a cultural group. Again, the central emergent properties defining a macro-level social institution are the operative interpretings of action and meaning formed in micro-level interacting, together with the commonality both in those interpretings and in the social practices, that the participants associate with that macro-level system, and that they maintain in recurrent everyday micro-level interacting over time and space.

Re-conceptualizing the emergence of macro-level social order in view of a new conceptualization of the emergence of micro-level social order not only offers the "full-fledged, processual-dynamic view of social emergence" that Sawyer (2005, p. 115–6) finds missing in Durkheim and subsequent theorists, but also addresses sociology's persistent questions regarding "How is order at the macro social level related to order at the micro individual level?" or "What is the relationship between what is social and what is individual in human life?" Given that everyday interacting among individuals is a universal social phenomenon, altogether fundamental to our nature as human beings, it follows that the account offered here of the emergence of micro-level social order, and in turn of the emergence of macro-level social order in everyday interacting, is an account responsive to Durkheim's ([1895]1964, p. 98) quest for an explanation of how "collective life … emanates from human nature in general."

Ethics statement

Ethical approval was not required for the study involving humans in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent to participate in this study was not required from the participants or the participants' legal guardians/next of kin in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

Conflict of interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Actualizing societal membership in imaginary interaction: The "real construction of society" in the opening of current affairs TV discussion

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The wonder of modern mass-scale society has preoccupied sociological theorists for centuries. How does the whole live on and function? At the extreme of strong empirical traditions, conversation analysis focuses on studying the interactional organization of ongoing action and identities. My article puts these two inquiries together to explore the broader relevancies of situated talk and evidence the skillfulness of social actors in managing multi-scaled cultural memberships simultaneously. Approaching society as a processual accomplishment, this article investigates the instantiation of "societal membership" in a mundane institutional setting of broadcast television. The aim of the article is to experiment with how classical theoretical conceptualization can feed into methodological insight and how detailed empirical scrutiny can enrich our theoretical understanding of the mysteries of modern co-existence. This entails casting an analytic eye on the duality of structure and action. The article re-examines the structural scope of on-site interactional achievements. From an opposite angle, it highlights how integrative societal structures are made real and maintained in the art of interactional encounters. This two-way dynamic is exemplified by scrutinizing a fragment of a televised current affairs program. A set of theoretical key concepts is introduced to shed light on the societal orientations of participants in the opening talk of the program. The opening talk addresses an imaginary audience directly via the camera. It provides a view of the interactional methods used by journalists to invoke relevant identifications for the anticipated recipient at a distance. The encounter is imagined, yet instead of imagining a community in the reception, the analytic focus of the article is on actualizing society in the production of the talk. The spatially and temporally organized societal membership materializes in social relations and interdependencies, which are constituted through intersubjective interpretations, normative positionings, and interactional choices by intentional and knowledgeable actors in the routines of everyday life. The article reverse-engineers the relational framework of the deliberative public sphere enacted in mediated interaction as a collaborative scene of the democratic system. This is achieved by explicating the contextually embedded acts of societization taking place in a journalistically regulated field of participation by means of quasi-interactive public speech.

KEYWORDS

cultural membership categorization, opening, public sphere, recipient design, societization, structuration, television discussion

Introduction

> "The theoretical origins of this enterprise [ethnomethodology] are founded on a basic, indeed classical, sociological question: namely, how can we account for the existence of that thing we call 'society', defined (in some views) as a systematic, and even functional, organization, which reproduces itself over time? The ethnomethodological 'take' on this question is that social order can be understood from the point of view of the member of a society, the social 'actor'." (Tolson, 2006, p. 25)

What is "society", the *membership* of which this passage refers to? How do we access this body of membership empirically? How does such membership materialize in the case of a current affairs discussion program?

Individualization, interdependence, and the major extension of collectives are defining features of modern society (Tönnies, 1887). These circumstances have created a form of social co-existence, the on-site molecular maintenance of which this article explores. In the modern mass-scale condition, imagining unknown others is an integral prerequisite of collective existence, wherein the rise of mass media has served as an important intermediator (Thompson, 1995). Andersson (1991) is known for his ideas about the centrality of imagination at the birth of the modern nation-state, describing how the sense of unity with distant others was facilitated by the spread of literacy and print media. Subsequently, the development of communication media has transformed the spatial and temporal constitution of social life, giving birth to new forms of mediated action and interaction (Thompson, 1995, p. 84–85).

Radio and television engendered a social form of "despatialized simultaneity" and brought about a domain of mediated historicity for people to construct their sense of self, history, and belonging (Thompson, 1995, p. 32–34). The new publicness increased the access and inclusion of the audience yet lacked an opportunity for dialogue. This is not to imply passivity in the uptake, however. Instead, media reception is to be seen as an active, situated, everyday practice coming together as a skilled accomplishment (Thompson, 1995, p. 39–40). Scannell (1989) has also highlighted the "communicative ethos" of broadcasting. It is actively building a communicative relationship with the audience, instilling a sense of familiarity, inclusivity, and sociability in the routines of everyday life (Scannell, 1996; see also Hutchby, 2006). Broadcasting talks to its recipients in conversational ways, inviting their responses and causing individual audience members to assume a group identity in this process (Tolson, 2006, p. 15). Instead of approaching the mass media as a public arena taking place in modern society, this article aligns with the view that it is rather modern society that is taking place and emerging in the communicative practices of this extensive arena (Pietilä, 1999, p. 9). How is one to study this dynamic empirically?

Symbolic forms circulating in the media have the following two cultural characteristics: (1) they are meaningful and (2) they are socially contextualized (Thompson, 1995, p. 10). Either of these angles can be selected to study the relationship between the media and society. The research tradition focusing on the "social construction of reality" is closer to the former. It approaches society as a stock of cultural knowledge that cultivates social roles and world views and thus institutionalizes behavior (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The research field of social constructionism continued from there and emphasized the relevance of linguistically mediated parallel meaning systems in the constitution and contestation of social realities (Burr, 1995). In this article, I intend to zoom in on the second quality and explore the socially contextualized practices of media communication. In other words, approaching society as a form of action, *societization*, I am interested in the "real construction of society" in broadcast talk (Pietilä, 2011, p. 66). This entails outlining the broader relevancies of talk-in-interaction: to locate, observe, and describe the senses of wider social structure and processes within situated action (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 60; see also Lindegaard, 2014). In pursuing the question about the ontology of society, Giddens (1984) called this duality of structure and action *structuration*. In the same vein, the seminal work of Zimmerman and Boden (1991, p. 4) described structures as "something people do". They state that social structure is not to be seen as something exogenous out there independent of members' activities: it is a practical observable accomplishment of *members of society* (Zimmerman and Boden, 1991, p. 19).

Unraveling the instantiation of society in the media is impossible without acknowledging the relevance of structures. To clarify my analytic angle, the concept of structure can be approached in various ways. In the big picture of sociology, it often refers to social hierarchies, such as the cultural orders around age, race, class, and gender (Zimmerman and Boden, 1991, p. 5). Taking one step further back, it is possible to approach research theories as structures for empirical observations (McHoul, 1994). Even under the umbrella of everyday language use, the word structure has been associated with a variety of things: (1) the organization of talk itself, (2) professional institutions, (3) practical action and reasoning, (4) categorical units, and (5) the just whatness of activities (Psathas, 1995, p. 151–152). My approach in this research comes closest to analyzing how parties in interaction acquire positions as incumbents of broader categorical units. That is to say, I approach cultural structuration from the perspective of *identifications*. In particular, I am interested in the constitution of *societal membership*. "Members of society" are often mentioned in the research literature on social interaction; yet, the body of this membership, society, is seldom subjected to analytic inspection. My article explores the ways in which the current conditions of social co-existence are talked into being in a mundane scene of situated action for participants to engage in.

Live socio-political television discussions represent an enduring program format on Finnish TV. The format dates back to the, 1960s, and over the decades, it has established a lasting position among current affairs programming in the arena of legacy media, most prominently in the supply of the Finnish Public Service Broadcasting Company, YLE. Socio-political television discussions are rooted in the ideals of public service broadcasting, aspiring to support democratic processes and political equality, secure access for all, cultivate cultural diversity, develop domestic culture, and advance enlightenment and education (Hujanen, 2002). I have studied the interactional organization and characteristic features of the program format elsewhere (Rautajoki, 2009, 2012, 2014). My studies have focused on the formation of a "participation framework" (Goffman, 1981; Goodwin, 1987) in a set of programs after the news event of 9/11. I have been mostly fascinated by the role casting of the audience in the programs. The recipient of the talk needs to be imagined in this setting (Goffman, 1981, p. 138).

The audience is physically absent yet communicatively co-present. The ways of addressing the audience in media talk ascribe identities to it (Fairclough, 1995, p. 12). Moreover, the normative framework of identifications accomplished in this imaginary encounter is interrelational: the identities of journalists, studio guests, and audience constitute each other in a triangular fashion (Rautajoki, 2009). My research task in this article is to pay attention to the structural implications of these identifications.

I look more closely at the scene of program openings, in which the journalist moderating the discussion speaks to the camera and addresses the audience directly to introduce the topic of the discussion. Opening talk sets the scene for the detailed design of utterances that anticipate and identify the recipients of the program (Sacks et al., 1974), the relevancies of which fall out of scope without the interpretative spotlight of sociological theory. This is to argue that we cannot grasp the full spectrum of multifold memberships enacted and accomplished in the opening lines by confining analytic attention solely to the organization of the on-site interaction and identities. The incentive is to stop and ponder what is, in fact, the gathering imagined and implicated in the design of the talk. To get a better grasp of this relational dynamic, I complement CA and MCA with sociological theories on social action, modern society, and public political discussion. The analytic aim of the article is 2-fold: first, to explicate the detailed organization of address in the opening talk, and second, to deploy theoretical conceptualizations to illustrate the broader relevancies actors orient to and accomplish through their interactional design.

Theorizing social action on the site of public political arena

Structural theories have dubious connotations in ethnomethodological studies of social interaction. Yet, not all theories are about *a priori* explanations of behavior. Etymologically, derived from the Greek, the word *theori* refers to sight, spectacle, and viewing. A theory is something that enables us to see demonstrable events in social reality in a particular light. In my research, theories are not additional material superimposed on interaction. Instead, I approach theories as spotlights that illuminate participants' observable orientations. They illuminate our view of situated activities. As such, structural theories should not be considered to be alien to CA. Theoretical conceptualizations help us observe cultural recognizabilities. They assist in explicating what exactly is accomplished through the anticipations embedded in the opening address.

The analytic interest of this article lies in the imagined recipients of socio-political discussion programs. Exactly who or what is being addressed in the introductory talk? I aim to delve into the structural premises of societal co-existence and action in modern society. My earlier studies on the program openings aroused my interest in the ontology of society, featuring questions ranging from the lowest common denominator of society to more particular sites of societal action. This article is a theoretical inquiry into concepts to elucidate the scene of concrete intersubjective processes and sites of membership through which the thing we call society emerges and lives on (summarized in Figure 1).

Societal process—structuration of action

One crucial perspective motivating the need to complement conversation analytic scrutiny with the spotlight of sociological theory is provided by structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). It addresses the question of social ontology through the structural parameters of human action. Structuration theory, interested in the processual constitution of society, aspires to bridge the divide between action and structure in social scientific inquiry and approaches them as a duality. At the core of this duality are spatio-temporal relations (Giddens, 1984, xx–xxi). The structural qualities of any social system only exist if and when the respective forms of social action are chronologically renewed through space and time. This perspective gives primacy to neither the structural determination nor the innate situatedness of action. Instead, structure and action inevitably constitute each other. Accordingly, social institutions evolve in the process of extending particular social activities across broader spans of time and space. A key figure carrying out this "on-site extension" of structural parameters is an active, knowledgeable human actor. The reflexive capabilities of the human actor are an integral part of the recurrent stream of enduring practices pervading everyday life (Giddens, 1984, p. xxii–xxiii). Social actors do not create social practices anew; instead, they continue reinstituting them in the unfolding of action by operating as an actor on that scene. That is, through action, social actors renew the structural conditions that make these activities possible (Giddens, 1984, p. 2).

This idea comes close to the ethnomethodological notion of recognizability (Garfinkel, 1967). The underlying assumption in conversation analysis is that cultural recognizability intermediates intersubjective exchange in social interaction. The empirical focus is on the situated accomplishment of mutual understanding. Yet, to operate on recognizability in social interaction necessitates enduring structures against which an item is recognized and processed as recognizable. Reflexive processing presupposes shared material to be processed. This way, larger frameworks are inevitably present in the situated acts of interaction. The same goes for situated identifications. Structuration theory states that structure is the "virtual order of relationships outside time and place" (Giddens, 1984, p. 304). The stock of cultural recognizability includes actor categories that can be mobilized for identification in situated action. Here again, structures exist only through being actualized by knowledgeable human actors. Actors process and renew enduring identity parameters on-site in particular spatio-temporal locations.

To operationalize the quest into a research setting, the prominence of enduring structures in the constitution of social interaction does not, of course, resolve the dilemma of empirical access in the analysis. The intersective extension of parameters across time and space is difficult to grasp in a situated timeframe. Sacks (1984) concluded in his article "Notes on methodology" that from everything that may have been going on in the interactional setting, the recorded and transcribed talk-in-interaction is something that at least demonstrably took place in the encounter. This does not have to mean disregarding the idea of enduring structures or broader frameworks of action altogether, but it does encourage the analyst to focus on what is available for scrutiny in the intersubjective realm of participants. For the



FIGURE 1
Theoretical cornerstones of the research setting.

sake of epistemological grounding, the route to exploring the structuration of society in interaction entails tracing observable signs of reflexive knowledgeability surfacing in the orientations of actors. Actualization guides toward relevance here. Any structural parameter, which is to be relevant to the situation at hand, needs to be "procedurally consequential" for the organization of interaction and identifications being actualized on site (Schegloff, 1991). Let us next turn to the question of who exactly is the "we" acting at this actualization in television discussion openings.

Societal form—practicing societization

Discussion programs are organized around a distributed participation framework, thus involving a distributed constellation of participants (Hutchby, 2006, p. 14). They instantiate a mass-mediated public arena whereby talk is primarily targeted at an imaginary group of individuals. I want to approach the question of an anticipated recipient of the discussion programs from the angle Garfinkel provided in his posthumously published doctoral dissertation (Garfinkel, 2006). He states that a social group, like any social formation, does not consist of persons; it consists of "actors" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 193). As such, a group should not be approached as an empirical reality. A group does not exist. It is "meant", that is, made meaningful by the participants to the action. For Garfinkel, a group is "a designator of certain interpretative rules of procedure" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 199). A functioning group is an aggregate of communicative styles (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 189). Again, its operations are based on cultural recognizability. An effective group occurs with sufficient regularity and summarizes a "designation of social relationship" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 203). Connecting this to the framework of structuration theory discussed above, to instantiate a group entails enacting the "virtual order of relationships" in ongoing action. To obtain data on group structure, Garfinkel encourages us to "look into the premises of action" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 198).

To trace the world of premises in interaction, let us next consult ideas evinced by Georg Simmel. Simmel studied the ontology of the phenomenon called "society" (Simmel, 1908). He wanted to extract the defining features of society as a collective constellation, separate from notions like state or nation. Simmel criticized the tendency to treat society as a vessel within which other forms of engagement reside. For Simmel, the broadest idea of society is equivalent to any setting in which people enter into interaction with each other (Simmel, 1999, p. 20–21). All those forms of engagement are what constitutes society: remove them, and no society is left. This perspective treats society as a process that takes place in and becomes real through action. Simmel called this act of engaging with other people "societization". Furthermore, he differentiated between the form and content of societization. For him, sociology was to concentrate on investigating the pure form of society in the making. Instead of equating society with massive structural entities, he encouraged investigating smaller trivial instances of human relationships and encounters, which flourish endlessly in between large social formations. These microscopic molecular processes of human material represent the actual emergence of society, which is connected and materializes into macroscopic units and formations (Simmel, 1999, p. 37–38).

Diversity and pluralism are core qualities of a human collective in modern society (Tönnies, 1887, p. 29). Unity is not guaranteed by the homogeneity of its components, which means that mutual understanding requires processing. Garfinkel called this continuous effort to work on intersubjective understanding "civil morality". For Garfinkel, "public civil and secular morality emerges from the collective need to be mutually engaged in practices" (Garfinkel, 2006, p. 9). It is not motivated by anything more than the mutual interest in producing those recognizable orders of practice on which intelligible social life depends (Garfinkel, 2006). This effort at the core of modern societization also underlies the exchanges in television discussions. However, to grasp the specific goals, ideals, and aspirations of the public political debate, one must turn an analytic gaze to the exact *content of societization*.

Societal content—the premises of a political system as members' accomplishment

For Simmel, the concept of society is both prescriptive and descriptive (Simmel, 1999, p. 27). It means that a group of individuals can function as a society to a lesser or greater extent. The intensity of shared unity and sense of co-determinacy varies. Estimating the degree of awareness and attendance to joint action, the activity framework of current affairs discussion programs appears to implement an enhanced version of societization, in which the intensity of interrelational ties is strongly actualized. The more precise cartography of this intensive coordination is provided by the aims, ideals, and activity roles of the specific situated practice in focus. Reading the orientations of the situation through the lens of structuration theory is to state that, in addition to representing an encounter of institutional interaction in the arena of journalistic practices (here and now in the studio), the talk in television discussion is connected to the structural assumptions about the surrounding political system (out there behind the cameras).

The concept of the public sphere was coined by Habermas (1991) to refer to the historically evolving structural quality of modern representative democracy. The original ideal Habermas describes is based on free and equal individuals gathering at physical locations to hold a critical and rational deliberative discussion on current societal topics, to produce argumentatively achieved, unanimous public opinions, and thus, to intermediate the relationship between the state and civil society. Later research has criticized this conceptualization for its unrealistic, over-idealized, and unequal features (e.g., Calhoun, 1992; Frazer, 1992; Dahlgren, 1995; Thompson, 1995). Habermas (1991) himself was critical of mass media and saw it as deteriorating the public sphere in the direction of institutionally regulated entertainmentization and shallow marketization of democracy focused on vote-catching (Habermas, 1991, p. 163–165). Overlooking the evaluative aspects of this debate, what is more interesting for the purposes of this article is to take distance from the structural idea of the public sphere in the first place and go on to investigate the existence and social constitution of that idea in everyday practices. In theorizing deliberative democracy, Habermas also stated that, even though the pure version of the ideal public sphere may be hard to detect in contemporary society, the institution of public discussion plays a crucial role in bringing about the ideal of *popular sovereignty*, that is, the sufficient inclusion of citizens in the processes of political decision-making and opinion formation, ultimately ensuring the legitimacy of the political system as a whole (Habermas, 1996, p. 299–300).

In his book Modern Social Imaginaries, Taylor (2004) listed *the public sphere* as one of the core ideas to imagine social co-existence in modern society. For Charles Taylor, the concept of modern social imaginary refers to practices and expectations to imagine the interdependencies between separate individuals and the practices to manage that relationship. This specifically concerns a shared understanding of society as a whole, which conditions shared practices and a shared sense of legitimacy (Taylor, 2004, p. 23). The imagination of a broad public following argumentation from a distance and relating it to an extended arena of discussion is one of the particularities of modern society. The peculiarity of that social imaginary is based on the notion of an indefinite space shared by unknown strangers, which covers issues of common concern and yet is set apart from the organs of state politics. The opinion formation taking place in this space serves to regulate, guide, and legitimize political governance (Taylor, 2004, p. 85–87). This imagery of the public sphere has grown to become self-evident to the citizens of today. Yet, in historical view, it has established a new form of collective action and sense of belonging which materializes in radical secular horizontality, detached from religious or other transcendental frameworks, in the worldly time frame, as a result of joint action by principally equal individuals. It is a space that includes all members of society and is also directly accessible to all members without discrimination (Taylor, 2004, p. 157–159).

The public sphere is a good example of a structural entity which does not exist anywhere unless actualized in the "structuration" of situated action. However, it is something that supposedly endures across spatio-temporal locations. I intend to approach this core piece of cultural imaginary suggested in the earlier literature through the lens of scrutinizing "culture in action" (Hester and Eglin, 1997). Again, for the structure to be relevant to the participants, it needs to be procedurally consequential for organizing activities (Schegloff, 1991). Given that the constitution of structural entities is a multi-directional process of emergence, it is important to acknowledge the involvement of simultaneous various orientations. Structural ideas do not reside in spatially nested layers, whereby society provides the largest frame, within which the mass media are located, within which one can find the execution of the idea about a public sphere. Instead, the scaffolding of situated action comprises the relational coordination of parallel cultural assumptions and expectations. To explore the processual formation of structural parameters, it does not suffice to conclude that a mass-mediated program takes place within society. Rather, society, as a process with particular form and content, takes place in the execution of the mass-mediated program and in the unfolding of a concrete interactional encounter (Pietilä, 2011). In this line of thought, my study approaches the society, democratic system, and public sphere as an interactional accomplishment, actualized in particular "discursive spaces, moments and sedimentations" (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 189). The object of analysis is then, with the tapestry of cultural imagination in mind, to put it aside for now and trace the markers of cultural sense-making in the concrete details of participants' activities and orientations.

Research questions

My research task in this article is to analyze the processual structuration of multilayered societal membership. I study the details of interaction in a specific site of societization, namely in the opening lines of Finnish current affairs discussion programs. Viewing the senses of relational unity and mutual co-determinacy in the interactional encounter as an intensifying marker for the societal *form* of co-existence, I relate the *content* of the ongoing societal action (the specific aspirations, aims, and orientations of participants) to the normative cartography of public political discussion embedded in the setting of a journalistically mass mediated program product. The study aims to shed light on the structural relevancies of situated action and identifications

by blending the conceptual spotlight of sociological theories with the analytic gaze of conversation analysis and membership categorizations. My study asks:

> What kind of momentum in a particular spatio-temporal sphere of action emerges in the formulations of the opening address?
> How is the constellation accomplished in the details of interaction?
> What kind of identities and expectations are ascribed to the participants in the encounter?

Materials and methods

The empirical data set of this article consists of three Finnish TV discussion programs broadcast by the Finnish public service broadcasting company, YLE. Briefly, the format of socio-political television discussion is centered around a current topic, which is discussed for between 1 and 2 h from different angles in a live multiparty setting among various studio guests and moderated by one or two journalists. The number of discussants varies from 5 to 23, comprising a combination of experts, politicians, and laypersons. There is no studio audience present. The institutional goal to stage public opinion formation becomes evident in the all-inclusive questions and concluding remarks at the end of the discussion (Rautajoki, 2009). The three current affairs discussion programs all address the same news topic: the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Four passenger planes were hijacked that day and flown up against buildings, two into the World Trade Center twin towers in New York and one into the Pentagon, the US defense headquarters in Washington DC. One plane crashed, thanks to the actions of the passengers, before reaching the fourth target, the White House in Washington, DC. The terrorist attacks killed close to 3,000 people and shook the world as news of the disaster spread across the globe and the news agencies ended up mediating the scene of the crashing twin towers in real time to people all over the world.

The programs were all broadcast within 3 weeks of the event. In the trajectory of news reporting, they are located in a similar phase: the United States had declared war on terrorism, but there had not yet been any counterstrike on the part of the Americans. The title of the discussion in each program refers to metaphoric war scenarios in the aftermath of the attacks, either the war against terrorism or a religious war between worlds. All the discussions were broadcast live and led by two journalists, one male and one female. The programs all represent the same program format, but the discussions differ in their angle and the combination of guests. For this article, the most interesting aspect is the apparent similarities in the program openings. I will set my analytic eye on the opening lines of the program and view them in the light of the perspectives provided by the sociological theories introduced. The discussions were transcribed and translated into English.

I analyze the data ethnomethodologically, paying attention to the observable details of intersubjective sense-making practices by the participants in social interaction (Garfinkel, 1967). I use methodological tools from both conversation analysis (Sacks et al., 1974) and membership categorization analysis (Sacks, 1972), placing my analytic interest is in the formation of a participation framework, that is, the management and coordination of participant roles in regard to the production as well as the reception of talk (Goffman, 1981; Goodwin, 1987). In mediated interaction, the participation format is distributed and adjusts to the communicative affordances of the medium (Hutchby, 2006, 2014). I am interested in the participatory role of the *audience at a distance*. All talk on TV is primarily targeted at the overhearing audience (Heritage, 1985). However, I will focus on the opening talk of the program, which is specifically addressed to and directed at the audience. I apply the concept of recipient design, incorporating the idea that talk is always designed and structured to target its primary recipient (Sacks et al., 1974). A target of talk who is physically absent must be anticipated, addressed, and invoked in an imaginary encounter. At a distance, the mere involvement of viewers as co-participants in the interaction requires extra effort (Frobenius, 2014). I dig deeper to explore the cultural identities ascribed to the audience in the addresses of the opening talk. A public address, along with its identifications, reaches beyond the interactional organization of activities unfolding in the studio, which accounts for the extended vision provided by the conceptual lenses introduced earlier.

Any opening plays an important role in framing the social encounter at hand (Goffman, 1974, p. 254–255). In television discussions, the opening builds a quasi-interactive relationship with the audience in the form of a monologic speech that unites innumerable people across time and space (Thompson, 1995, p. 84–85). Communicatively, these monologic turns produce "invitations" or first pair parts in the setting of quasi-interactional exchange. Analytically, a monolog lacks the interpretative "next-turn-proof procedure" of the second turn (cf. Sacks et al., 1974), yet the design of these turns can still be analyzed from the perspective of sequential location, organization, and role assignation between parties (Arminen, 2005, p. 118). Interaction in discussion programs is institutional (Drew and Heritage, 1992). It is organized to accomplish specific institutional goals, identities, and inferences (Arminen, 2005, p. 27). However, my primary interest is not in the accomplishment of institutional orders. Instead, I want to highlight the multi-scaled structural relevancies materializing in the orientations of the talk. Just to emphasize, the task is not about discovering a connection between structure and local activities; it is to explicate the methods through which participants manage this structuration. One discursive asset here is the "moral casting" of actors, the skillful regulation of normative frameworks associated with cultural membership categories (Rautajoki, 2012).

I will pursue the identification of the anticipated audience in the programs with a reconsidered model of membership categorization analysis (MCA) (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002). This is not to fully lose sight of the sequential organization of the action or the emphasis on participants' orientations, the premises guiding CA analysis, but it is to focus analytic attention on the broader relevancies of interactional encounters, following the claim that the wider social structure and its extended processes can also be located, observed, and described within situated action (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 60). The pioneer of MCA, Sacks (1972), approached cultural membership categorization as a means for the members of the culture to understand, recognize, and use social actor categories. For him, it was a vital mechanism to produce social orders: he viewed membership categories as cultural "inference-making machines" that are combined with typical features,

activities, normative expectations, and interrelations (Sacks, 1995). The interpretative recognizability works both ways here. As a membership category connects to particular "category-bound activities", an obliging activity orientation can be launched to invoke "activity-bound identifications" (Rautajoki, 2009). Cultural expectations and identities take shape through working on norms in action (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2009; Smith, 2017).

The moral orders and interrelations of categorization provide an important angle for explicating identifications and evaluations in talk (Jayyusi, 1984). However, in my research, I approach the methodical mobilization of normative frameworks slightly differently from Lena Jayyusi, who studied the infusion of description and moral judgment in interpretative activities (Jayyusi, 1984, p. 5–7). Instead of a retrospective evaluative ordering of events and activities, I study the projective use of categorization in forwarded acts of talk-in-interaction intended to address, identify, and engage a recipient (Rautajoki, 2022; Rautajoki and Fitzgerald, 2022). These "normative calls" draw on obliging relationality in the unfolding of action: in the case of this article, involving the audience in the casting of actors, addressing, identifying, and obliging it, and thus coordinating the senses of the social scene.

Another important aspect in managing the participation framework is the prior knowledge of recipients (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1990). The degrees of knowing are one key means of regulating duties, privileges, and hierarchies in interaction (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). These epistemic relations coordinated by participants on site are interconnected with the identities of relevance in the setting (Raymond and Heritage, 2006). The point of departure in my analysis is that the mobilization of cultural membership does not necessitate an appearance of a verbal category; categorical identifications can instead be enacted through action orientations, responsibility calls, and epistemic positionings.

Mass-mediated discourse produces loci of identification for the audience (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 198). The conversational qualities of broadcast talk address the co-present audience, eliciting responses from it and suggesting collective identities for it (Tolson, 2006, p. 15–16). The task of empirical analysis is then to ascertain by which means mediated talk relates to its audience inclusively and co-operatively (Hutchby, 2006, p. 11). I will next focus on investigating how the interactional structuration of the broader frameworks of modern co-existence is brought about in the organization of the talk. How do epistemic relations, interrelational membership categorizations and obliging activity orientations turn into "molecular objectives" to explicate a scene of societization?

Acts of societization in the program openings

The data examples below introduce the opening talk of three multiparty TV discussion programs broadcast live by the Finnish public service company, YLE. These excerpts provide brief glimpses of a mundane media setting, which serves well to highlight the degree of multi-scale structuration taking place in a fleeting turn of talk. All the programs deal with the news topic of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Even though the setup for the three discussions varies in tone, angle, and composition of guests, there are notable similarities transcending the differences in the programs (see also Rautajoki, 2009). I have analyzed the "contextual configuration" (Goodwin, 2000) and the multimodal recipient design of these openings elsewhere (Rautajoki, 2014). For the purposes of this article, I direct my analytic attention to the structural implications of the opening talk with regard to the concepts of structuration, societization, and the public sphere introduced earlier. I will first concentrate on describing what takes place in the opening and then move on to investigate how the organization of talk and interactional choices are indicative of the multilayered structural orientations of the participants? The first of the programs was aired only 6 days after the attacks. J1 and J2 refer to the journalists moderating the discussion.

DATA EXAMPLE 1
TERVO & PÄIVÄRINTA/"TO WAR AGAINST TERRORISM?" 17.9.2001

1 **(1.0) ((J1 in close-up lifts up his gaze from the papers))**
2 **(0.5) ((staring at the camera for a while with a serious face))**
3 J1: **wanted (.) dead or alive, ((said in English originally))**
wanted (.) dead or alive,
4 **(.) wanted (.) alive or dead, ((the phrase translated into Finnish))**
(.) halutaan (.) elävänä tai kuolleena,
5 **.hh ↑this is what they used to say (.)**
.hh ↑näin oli tapana sanoa (.)
6 **in the Wild West of the United States once upon a time,**
Yhdysvaltain villissä lännessä aikanaan, (.)
7 (.)
8 **this is what the President of the United States says**
näin sanoo Yhdysvaltain Presidentti
9 **today.**
tänään.
10 **(0.5) ((intensive indignant look to camera))**

The journalist (J1) makes a strong gesture to gain the viewer's attention. He raises his eyes dramatically from the papers he is holding in his hand (lines 1–2). Directing the gaze is a common way to point to the addressee of the talk (Goodwin, 1979). For the organization of interaction, gazing has a reciprocal quality. The enacted gaze of the speaker is expected to be returned by the gaze of the recipient to ensure an appropriate state of mutual orientation (Goodwin, 1984). At the start of the talk, the gaze can function as a "summons" to the other party to engage in interaction (Schegloff, 2007). In the program, this serves as a move to establish a quasi-interactional connection with the viewer (see also Frobenius, 2014). The gesture works as the first pair part of the adjacency pair (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) "gaze–return gaze" and leaves it to the audience to respond accordingly.

The talk itself begins with a dramatic cinematic quotation, first in English and then translated into Finnish (lines 3–4). There is no kind of contextualization for the topic. The assumption is that everybody knows about the news event and recognizes what the journalist is referring to with the quotation, thereby accrediting all viewers with self-evident epistemic competence. Cutting straight to the chase is a powerful way of signaling that this discussion is part of a wider debate extending the boundaries of the immediate interactional encounter. Only one actor category is verbalized in the talk: the President of the United States. The words of the President are delivered in the temporal moment of "now" and equated with the moral anarchy of the Wild West, implying a moral contradiction between that time in history and the proper behavior of a contemporary head of state (lines 6–8). The Wild West is itself an intertextual cultural reference that the recipients are expected to interpret in a similar fashion. The contradiction embedded in the reference sets a worrisome scene with uncertain consequences to be tackled in the program.

The choice of a key actor category in the talk, being the President, the leader of the state-level response to the attacks, is no coincidence. It allows other parties to take their positions in relation to this leader, providing the journalist with an opportunity to exercise the journalistic ideal of critically surveilling the power holders. For the audience, the President is presented as a figure who plays the leading role in determining the fate of the Western world. Even though the President represents another nation, the concern is introduced as shared. The facial expression and intense look of J1 to the camera at the end, together with an arresting tone of voice, indicate moral indignation (line 10). The relatively long duration of the look directed straight to the camera makes it appear as another example of the first pair part in which the indignation is provided for the viewer as a gesture to be responded to Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori (2012). The recipient is invited to take a stance on the matter.

DATA EXAMPLE 2
A-TALK/"TO WAR AGAINST TERRORISM" 19.9.2001

1 **((journalists stand behind a table the camera is sliding toward))**
2 J1: **.hhh good (.) Wednesday evening, (0.2). thhh now one can perhaps say that**
.hhh hyvää (.) keskiviikkoiltaa (0.2) .thhh nyt voi kai sanoa että
3 **(.) the world is holding its breath..hh the United States (.) is preparing**
(.) hh maailma pidättää hengitystään. hh Yhdysvallat (.) valmistelee
4 **(.) a counter attack, (.).thh and now people are waiting (.) where (.)**
(.) vastaiskua, (.).thh ja (.) nyt odotetaan hh minne hh (.) milloin
5 **when and (.) how..thh (.) but (.) >at the same time< (.) there have**
ja (.) miten..thh (.) mutta (.) >sama an aikaan< (.) maailmalla on
6 **also (.) been questions raised in the world (0.2) on (0.2).thh where the**
myös (.) noussut kysymyksiä (0.2) sii tä (0.2).thh missä
7 **evidence is against Bin Laden, (.).thh and (.) on (0.2) whether this**
ovat todisteet Bin Ladenia vastaan, (.).thh ja (.) siitä (0.2) johtaako
8 **all (.) will lead into (.) a circle of revenge.**
tämä (.) kaikki (.) koston kierteeseen.
9 J2: **.hh this has also preoccupied Western European <countries> who have promised**
.hh se askarruttaa myös Länsi-Euroopan <maita> jotka ovat antaneet täyden
10 **full (.) political support (0.2) for the United States, =>and are now**
(.) poliittisen tukensa (0.2) Yhdysv alloille, =>ja miettivät nyt<
11 **wondering<.hhh what kind of a war against terror ism they are (.) committing**
.hhh minkälaiseen sotaan terrorismia h vastaan ne ovat (.)
12 **themselves to, (0.5).hhh Chirac (.) of France just visited Washington**
sitoutumassa, (0.5).hhh Ranskan (.) Chirac kävi juuri Washingtonissa
13 **hhhh Blair of Britain is about to travel there, (0.8) here come (0.2)**
hhhh Britannian (.) Blair on sinne menossa, (0.8) tässä (0.2)
14 **our correspondents' (.) reports on, (0.5) what the attitudes look like**
kirjeenvaihtajiemme (.) raportit siitä, (0.5) minkälaisia

15 **in the three biggest (.) Western European countries.**
ovat asenteet kolmessa tärkeimmässä (.) länsieuroopan maassa.
16 **(1.2) ((journalists looking to camera seriously))**

The second of the programs was broadcast 8 days after the attacks. It is slightly less confrontational in its introduction to the topic of the day. The two journalists stand still behind a table as the camera slowly approaches them, while one of them begins to speak. The opening starts with a greeting (line 2). This instantly implies that the broadcast is live and the audience is facing the journalist in real time. This empty first pair part, a greeting with no opportunity to respond to it properly, is a familiar practice in news broadcasts. The preference structure (Pomerantz, 1978) of greetings invites the viewer to engage in interaction even if no overt response is feasible (Tolson, 2006, p. 27). A temporally marked greeting is one way of accomplishing a quasi-interactional relationship and connection to the viewer.

The verbal formulation of the opening starts with the word "now" (line 2), emphasizing the acuteness of the topic. The "world holding its breath" signals the dramatic nature of the scene confronting the world, even though the expression is markedly mitigated. The world shares a fate and is waiting in anticipation. The opening sums up the phase of the news situation but provides no contextual information on the news event. It is assumed to be self-evidentially familiar to all and anyone watching the program. Again, the shared epistemic competence assigned to all the participants postulates an extended arena of discussion, of which the program is only a part. It also assumes that viewers share a commitment to get concerned. The situation is characterized as incomplete; there are activities going on even as they speak. Several open questions are listed (lines 5–8). The questions are posed by the "people", and they have been wondered about "in the world". The generalized collective origin of the questions paves the way for the viewer to relate to them. The questions communicate reservations regarding possible reprisals. Weak evidence and risk scenarios are played out in pondering about the decision.

The Western European countries are paraded as a "reference group" for the country of Finland to observe and identify with (Hyman, 1942; Pi Ferrer et al., 2019). There is a person reference to the leaders of these countries who are "one the move". The reference is made rather loosely on a surname basis only, assuming that the audience knows who Chirac of France and Blair of Britain are (lines 12–13). Toward the end, the journalists lead the way to video inserts from "their correspondents" (line 14) to sum up the attitudes in the most important countries. Again, being alert and following the actions of the leaders exercises journalistic ideals. Another layer of appropriate journalistic response is to provide citizens with information from the wider world first hand, through their own correspondents, afforded by YLE as a big news house. However, the phrase "attitudes in the countries" does not contemplate the thoughts of the leaders. The generalized angle of the "country as a whole" can be interpreted as an inclusive invitation for viewers of the country being addressed to engage in deliberation on open questions and uncertainties.

DATA EXAMPLE 3
AJANKOHTAINEN KAKKONEN/"WAR BETWEEN WORLDS" 2.10.2001

1 **(7.0) ((journalist walk up to the arena discussants are gathered to))**
2 J1: **the whole (.) world is holding its breath and waiting** for the United States'
koko (.) maailma pidättää henkeään ja odottaa Yhdysvaltain
3 **revenge on the >terrorist< attack three weeks ago, .hhh now people have**
kostoa kolmen viikon takaiseen >terrori<-iskuun,.hhh nyt on jo
4 **already started wondering, (.) why the counter-strike is delayed.**
alettu ihmetellä, (.) miksi isku viipyy.
5 J2: **the war against terrorism has already (.) started, there has evolved**
mt' sota terrorismia vastaan on jo (.) käynnistynyt, Yhdysvaltain
6 **an <unholy> union around the United States where (.) one (.)**
ympärille on syntynyt <epäpyhä> liitto jossa (.) yhtenä (.)
7 **supporting pillar is the EU and (.) along with it Finland.**
tukipylväänä on EU ja (.) sen mukana suomi.
8 J1: **when Finland is involved (.) in the battle against terrorism.hh then (.)**
kun (.) suomi on mukana (.) terrorismin vastaisessa taistelussa.hh niin
9 **what exactly (.) is Finland fighting for. (0.5) is (.) hatred and (.)**
(.) minkä puolesta (.) suomi taistelee. (0.5) onko (.) viha ja (.)
10 **revenge justified, (.) is a circle of revenge (.) necessary.**
kosto oikeutettua, (.).h onko ↑koston kierre (.) välttämätön.
11 J2: **is there emerging a new >*frontline*< Christians against (.) Muslims,**
onko nyt yy syntymässä uusi >rintama< kristityt vastaan (.) muslimit,
12 **.hhh what says Christianity, (.) what says (.) Islam about killing,**
.hhh mitä sanoo kristinusko, (.) mitä sanoo (.) islam tappamisesta,

13 **.hh discussing tonight (.) Muslims and Christians, (.)**
.hh keskustelijoina tänä iltana (.) muslimeja <ja> kristittyjä, (.)
14 **parties of concern and (.) parties with expertise.**
asian>osaisia< ja (.) asiantuntijoita.
15 **(0.5) ((journalists smiling to camera))**

The third of the programs was broadcast 3 weeks after the terrorist attacks, which accounts for the sense of crisis having slightly subsided in the tone of the opening. The physical set-up of the studio forms an arena of discussants sitting in the studio in concentric circles, into the middle of which the journalists walk to deliver their opening words. Before the entrance walk, the camera angle leads the viewer into the studio by sliding over the circle of discussants from the corner of the backstage furniture as if walking into the studio by the same route as the studio guests took some minutes before. The word focalization is used in narratology to study the perspective of narrative (Genette, 1979). Its further elaboration has included the aspects of vision and perception in focalization, considering it as an angle of perception that postulates the point of origin, the one who sees (Jahn, 1996). The circuitous camera angle running through the backstage sets the viewer alongside the other discussants waiting in the studio. The two journalists walk-in only after the viewer has arrived in the arena. The entrance is not as interactive as in the first two programs. However, it appears to pursue active involvement and inclusion of the audience.

The talk directed straight at the camera repeats the phrase "the world holding its breath and waiting in anticipation" upfront (line 2). There is no contextualization for the news event except for the intervening period of 3 weeks. Everybody is supposed to know the background. Again, there is the generalized collective "people" (lines 3–4) wondering about the progress of ongoing events, which makes it easier for the audience to join in and identify with. This is further strengthened by casting Finland in the role of a moral actor on the scene of uncertain and open events (lines 8–10). Finland is referred to as a metonymic whole, and again, open questions are used rhetorically and inclusively to activate alertness in the viewers facing alternative pathways. The talk presents the appropriateness of Finland to be on the line, which enhances the collective pressure to take a stance. It concludes by speculating about a confrontation between Muslims and Christians, which makes an intertextual cultural reference to the famous work by Samuel Huntington on the clash of civilizations. The reference is dramatized and leans on familiarity. It is referred to as an angle everybody knows without further explanation. The institutional principle guiding this set-up for the discussion resonates with the journalistic ideal to facilitate open debate and dialogue: a mixed group of people, both the aforementioned parties included, have been invited into the studio to discuss. This anticipates disagreement in an institutionally buffered setting (Greatbatch, 1992). The concluding look to the camera is friendly and smiling as if welcoming and implying a safe and encouraging environment for the debate, thus allaying the contradictions verbalized in the talk.

Summary of the analytic observations

The entrance to the studio space exhibits several purposeful acts to involve the audience in the duties of ongoing action. It addresses the viewers inclusively and invites the audience to *engage in interaction* with the speakers on the screen. This is accomplished by means of gaze, greeting, and visual focalization. The opening talk draws on the *epistemic competence* of the recipients by operationalizing a shared knowledge base which locates participants on a spatio-temporal continuum of events extending the immediate studio space. External events are ongoing and incomplete as the discussion unfolds in the studio. A shared arena of recognition is postulated through assumed knowledge about the news event: the familiarity with the main events and key actors on the scene. The site of ongoing public discussion is approached as an entity that involves participants in a timeline, and prior items in that timeline provide a self-evident basis on which to continue the conversation. Shared cultural knowledge is also employed to enhance mutual familiarity and make sense of the news event in the form of intertextual cultural references (the Wild West, the clash of civilizations etc.).

The *activity orientation* in the opening talks aims to address contradictory, uncertain, and unresolved issues in the progress of events. The consequentiality of these decisions is marked as a shared concern, where all those present need to stop and ponder. The audience is addressed as being self-evidently interested and committed to the task. Openness in the face of alternative problematic options instantiates a political scene of action. The act of "politicization" is to open something as political as playable in decision-making (Palonen, 2003). In their opening talk, the journalists raise unresolved questions of shared concern. They organize this task along the lines of institutional appropriateness. Critical alertness, information delivery, and dialogue facilitation are all journalistic virtues through which journalists can perform their institutional tasks. In combination, the acts of inclusive interaction, epistemic positioning, and obliging activity orientation are intended to instantiate and engage an actor category. The invitation to deliberate and take a stance is presented to the viewer through embodied emotional signals and by verbalizing the agency of a generalized collective (such as the country, people, and Finland). These *responsibility calls* invite viewers to become collectively involved in societization and form an opinion on a public matter, invoking the category of modern citizen in the sense-making framework of deliberative democracy (summarized in Figure 2).

Discussion

Garfinkel (2006) suggested that to find out about the identity of the group, one must explore how the group is "meant" and made meaningful by participants in interaction. This entails investigating the premises of action in the business of coordinating reciprocal recognizabilities through intersubjective activities and orientations. In the spotlight of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), instances of interaction are always accompanied by structures. The orientations of the journalists in the program



FIGURE 2
Summary of interactional orientations.

anticipate the structural knowledgeability of recipients. These aspects of structuration are evident in the way the opening talk instantiates an extended arena of attention and shared concern, thus enacting a collective and locating the debate in the spatio-temporal continuum of ongoing public discussion on a broader scale. Structural orientations of knowledgeable actors are multilayered. Whereas, conversation analytic interest in the interactional orientations of participants is also interpretative—and for a substantial part based on the cultural competence of the analyst—it is typically targeted at making observations within the boundaries of micro-reality. This article has explored how theoretical conceptualizations can be harnessed to broaden the view, highlight relevancies, and steer analytic attention toward a set of multi-scale recognizabilities on the meso and macro levels of societal activities and orientations as well. The analytic task has nonetheless been to trace the observable markers of sense-making in the concrete details of participants' activities.

Orientations and expectations invoked in the opening address of television discussion draw on the affordances of the technologically mass-mediated broadcast arena. The formation of the participation framework, the management and coordination of participant roles is a combination of technologically facilitated communicative reach, technical means, topics, and forms of address (Hutchby, 2014). The analysis above identified several interactional features that turn the opening talk into an inclusive, audience-involving invitation to get along and "act on society". The societal membership enacted in the opening infuses several multi-scale structural frames of action. It is not just a channel that reaches far but an arena which invites countless groups of unknown strangers into the interaction, calling for a response and anticipating agency in the system. The talk covers a news item, yet rather than delivering knowledge, it is about allocating epistemic competence in despatialized simultaneity, anticipating a shared base and the endurance of the relationship. Rather than reporting about the openness of events, the talk encourages the recipient to consider the options and take responsibility in deliberating solutions to matters of shared concern.

Nested frames of modern co-existence, democratic political system and public service media format are structured by means of relevant activity orientations, epistemic positionings, and collective responsibility calls in the broadcast opening talk. Thus, alongside addressing broader commitments to mutual interconnections and legitimating work through public deliberation, the opening manifests institutional relevancies structuring the immediate site of interaction. The journalists moderating the debate make sure to convey that their response to the topic of talk adheres to the normative expectations embedded in their institutional role. In the piece of opening talk, journalists play the key role, but they do not stand alone. The role enacted by the journalist is interrelational and connected to other identifications in the program (Rautajoki, 2009). The way journalists position themselves in interaction is by projecting positionings in despatialized simultaneity to other parties of the encounter. Thus, the tasks and responsibilities of the audience are projected in the reciprocal dynamic of opening identifications. To follow Garfinkel, identities acquire meaning in specific locations of action through orderly produced recognizability, in which "by your actions you tell me who I am, and by my actions I tell your who you are" (Rawls, 2006, p. 77).

The findings of this research do not say that acts of societization happen exclusively, primarily, or specifically in the arena of television discussions or by deploying these interactional means only. Instead, the findings demonstrate how the realization of societal membership in modern mass-scale society recurs unnoticeably in the routines of everyday life and how this task is managed in the activity context of discussion programs. Society is not only a location or a world of meaning. The concept of societization brings to light that society is also about activities: reproduction and maintenance by doing. The members of society make it real in the routinized practices of everyday life, willingly and skillfully. These situated acts of accomplishing society are

so routinized that they easily go unnoticed. In the punctuated practices of daily life, one may sit down on the sofa and turn on a current affairs TV program, expecting to hear news *about* society and carrying on these activities *within* society, while paying no attention to the fact that in these fleeting moments, one actually takes part in instantiating and reproducing the thing called society. The set of orientations and activities observed in the opening talk cultivates a sense of collective and includes anonymous individual recipients, which serves integrative functions. The combination of theoretical perspectives and micro-analytic tools has been useful in explicating the crucial function of interactional methods in exercising mass-scale societization in broadcast talk.

Broadcast research has underlined the potential of broadcast talk to build communicative relationships (Scannell, 1989). Who is saying what to whom about whom is often as interesting in media discourse as what is said (Fairclough, 1995). Viewing identifications from the broader angle of distributed participation prompts the question about their extended implications. Detailed analysis of the relationships mobilized in media talk opens up a view into the manifestation of power (Hutchby, 2006). It is a scenery that takes us back to wonder what exactly is accomplished by the relational constellation of the opening talk. From the perspective of relational power (Foucault, 1980), the multilayered relevancies participants orient to in the program openings intersect with power practices. It is to approach power processually from a "transactional perspective" (Selg, 2018), according to which power appears in interaction in the form of functional effects traveling through the acts of participation in the collaborative efforts to bring about intelligible actions. In this view, situated action transports power relations manifested in identifications. Actor identities are constituted in the interplay of situated and enduring elements, drawing on structural recognizabilities, actualizing in cooperation and resulting in a set of social orders. At the interface of action and structure, a "cultural apparatus of effective relationships" to make sense of and move in social situations (Deleuze, 1992) is not that far from the principle of approaching "cultural categorizations as an inference-making machine" (Sacks, 1995). This cultural set-up is not tantamount to pre-determination but leaves room to maneuver. The associative fabric of inferences and normative expectations connected to membership categorizations is what makes them so resourceful in obliging address and persuasion. It makes it possible to scaffold claims and make normative calls and argumentative moves on relational premises (Rautajoki, 2022).

Talking modern society *into being* is interrelational and rooted in particular collaborative materializations of normative cartographies at specific points in time. The focus of this article has been on the arena of television discussions. It has been proposed in earlier research to call journalists "practitioners of society" to facilitate interaction between subgroups in society (Pietilä, 2011). Journalism is about practicing societization, no doubt; yet, the wording seems ignorant of the relational set-up journalists convey while channeling social co-existence and political opinion formation. The arena of television discussions instigates public deliberation, while it also stands to strengthen the status and prominence of public service journalism at the center of modern mass-scale democracy. In good and in bad, it facilitates societization in and through a specific relational format, advancing political agency and integration yet channeling these activities in the landscape and on the terms of a given institutional entity. All in all, rather than talk about a framework, the dynamic of participation in this arena might be more aptly described as a *participation field* activated for the participants to take action in. This field of action is actualized through the interactional orchestration of multilayered structural orientations, instantiating multiple memberships and respective category-bound responses. Participants are invited to navigate multi-scale normative frameworks and positionings in their acts of societization: to engage in quasi-interactional connection, get involved in the activity of public opinion formation and act out the actor categories of a public service journalist and an alert citizen. For participants in social interaction, this comes naturally. Micro-analytic tools have been valuable in highlighting the detailed means through which this complexity is managed.

To conclude, why does it matter to see society as an intentional achievement rather than a pre-existing spatial frame for action? Because it points to the ultimate contingency and also to the vulnerability of societal membership. Practices that have become self-evident should not be taken for granted. The "functioning we" can be populated with various imageries, intentions, and principles (Rautajoki and Fitzgerald, 2022). Unfortunately, impersonalized intersubjective intent to *reach across differences* is not the only possible way to organize interchange among collectives. More and more public address is "opting out" of these principles, for example, in the antagonism of right-wing populist rhetoric. It is worth contemplating what is at stake when compromising the premises of modern pluralistic society. Analyzing the accomplishment of mass scale "we" enhances understanding of who "we" involves in talk and how it emerges through various forms of address. It foregrounds the question of how severely the current trends in public discourse are undermining the orders of societal membership. And what is to follow from their success? One is left wondering how detrimentally one-eyed antagonism is now talking a form of collective co-existence *out of being*.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Ethics statement

Ethical approval was not required for the study involving human data in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent was not required for participation in the study or for the publication of directly/indirectly identifiable data.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Conversation Analysis and genre theory

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Since its genesis in the 1960s, Conversation Analysis (CA) has noticeably developed further in terms of its subjects and methods. Its analyses, today, not only focus on conversations in the original sense, but also on visual elements such as gazes in interactions and the role of bodies. However, it also analyzes especially larger communicative units, e.g., in institutionalized settings and it addresses larger sequences of action. One of these approaches is the theory and analysis of *communicative genres*. Communicative genres are to be understood as consolidated forms of communication. The theory of communicative genres understands these forms as solutions to communicative problems. Genre analysis is methodologically grounded in CA; however, it exceeds it conceptually and theoretically, thus anchoring its questions clearly within sociology. The paper starts out by outlining the concepts and theory of communicative genres. The article discusses the empirical contribution of genre analysis using the example of three so-called "families of genres" families. The examples discussed are reconstructive genres (speaking about the past), genres of moral communication (speaking about other people's behavior), and projective genres (speaking about the future). Using examples from empirical research, it is shown which communicative problems these genres solve. The paper finally considers the insights to be gained from genre analysis for sociology and CA.

KEYWORDS

genre theory, sociology, Conversation Analysis, social theory, communicative genres

1 Introduction

Since Conversation Analysis (CA) turned to recording *natural* conversations in the 1960s and thus focused on the real procedure of everyday interactions, there has been a noticeable sophistication of the approach.[1] This has taken place in several areas. (1) Firstly, CA, as a method, has become largely independent from sociology, from which it originally emerged, and has established itself as a method in other disciplines. CA has been used with major results in psychology, anthropology and linguistics, where it has resulted in a shift in understanding spoken language. (2) Secondly, CA, in many ways, is no longer an 'analysis of conversations' (if it ever was). Thanks primarily to the possibility of gathering visual data provided by the availability of video recording, it turned to analytical elements beyond 'conversation' in the original sense, i.e., the gaze behavior of interactants, the handling of artifacts in interaction, the orientation of bodies in relation to each other and their positioning in space, and a number of other features. (3) Finally, CA, which originally focused on a turn as a construction unit and the

1 Parts of this paper are based on (Ayaß 2011, 2021, 2024). I am, again, deeply indebted to Ruben Bieker, Wetzlar, Germany, for his accurate translation.

transition of these turns in interactive exchanges, has taken larger units of analysis into view. This applies, for instance, to settings in which complex units of action can be found, e.g., courts of justice (cf. for example Atkinson and Drew, 1979), but also to the connection of CA proper with cultural practices and thus with ethnographic questions (cf. especially Moerman, 1988).

The analysis of communicative genres is a part of these approaches which address larger units of communication. It emerged in the German-language sociology of the 1980s and essentially originated with Thomas Luckmann and Jörg Bergmann. While CA seems to be mostly interested in micro-scale forms of interaction – recall essay on "Some uses of 'uh huh' and other things that come between sentences" (Schegloff, 1982) or the analysis "What's in a 'nyem'?" (Jefferson, 1978) – the analysis of communicative genres, from the beginning, has been concerned with larger-scale communicative forms and addresses complex communicative problems, e.g., speaking about the past, moralizing about other people and their (good or bad) behavior, or planning one's future.

The theory and analysis of communicative genres is an approach which aims to provide a theoretically well-founded empirical analysis of consolidated structures in everyday communication (Luckmann, 1986, 1989; Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995). The term 'communicative genre' refers to a theoretical concept rooted in the sociology of knowledge. Communicative genres are thus *consolidated forms of communication on which interactants can rely for reciprocal orientation*. These forms are stored in the subjective stock of knowledge and can thus be retrieved from this stock, can be updated and are familiar to the speakers.

Genre analysis is the *empirical* analysis of these communicative forms. From the beginning, the concept has been understood as a guiding question for empirical research. Genre analysis is concerned with questions such as: How do these forms take place in terms of their sequential structure? How do they begin and how do they end? Who participates in them and in which context do they occur? What are the constitutive elements for the implementation of a genre? What are the optional ones? Which outer and inner forms do genres take? Crucially, genre analysis is not restricted to linguistic analyses of these communicative forms. Instead, genre analysis seeks to understand the social function of the forms as well as the question of their sociological classification. Genres are characterized by a relative rigidity, which differentiates them from the rather 'spontaneous' communicative acts. Spontaneous forms and genres together make up the communicative budget of a society. To describe this "communicative budget" (Luckmann, 1986, 206; Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995, 300) is the aim of genre analysis.

Genre analysis takes CA as a methodological starting point, however exceeds it in several respects. The present paper seeks to demonstrate which insights both sociology and CA can draw from genre analysis. It will first outline the theory of communicative genres, explaining the theoretical background and central concepts (section 2). Section 3 is then dedicated to a detailed description of the empirical objects of the approach. The analysis is based on the examples of three "families of genres," i.e., reconstructive genres, genres of moral communication, and projective genres. For these families of genres, empirical examples of individual genres are provided, e.g., gossip as an example of reconstructive genres. The fourth and final section will discuss the status of genre analysis with respect to sociology. It shows how genre analysis can open a pathway to sociological theories and especially social theories.

2 The theory of communicative genres

2.1 Emergence of the approach

For the development of the approach, dialogues with linguistics, anthropology, literary studies, ethnology and ethnography (of speaking) played an important role. From these disciplines, the theory of communicative genres received essential impulses; at the same time, it delimits itself from them and exceeds them. The concept of genre emerges, for instance, in narrative analysis in linguistics (e.g., Labov and Waletzky, 1967) and its studies of the structure of oral narratives. Based on this, the analysis of communicative genres was concerned with the situative embedment of the communicative forms as well as the interactive generation of genres. Another discipline which genre research draws on is linguistic anthropology, notably ethnography of speaking. Ethnography of speaking was explicitly concerned with empirical forms of oral communication in non-western cultures. Hymes coined the term *speech event* for this, a term not unlike that of genre. Oral ethnography has produced a large number of studies describing speech events of this type [the empirical studies in Gumperz and Hymes (1972) and Bauman and Sherzer (1974)]. Hymes, too, in his distinction between "means of speaking" and "speech economy" sought to establish a theoretical framework for analyzing the communicative repertoire of various individual local societies (Hymes, 1974).

Another impulse comes from the work of the Russian literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin. The significance of his work on "speech genres" stems from the fact that – aside from discussing works of literary fiction such as Dostoevsky and Rabelais – he engaged with genres of oral communication already in the 1950s.

> "Speech genres organize our speech in almost the same way as grammatical (syntactical) forms do. We learn to cast our speech in generic forms and, when hearing others' speech, we guess its genre from the very first words; we predict a certain length […] and a certain compositional structure; we foresee the end; that is, from the very beginning we have a sense of the speech whole […]." (Bakhtin, 1986, 78/79)

Unlike Bakhtin (1986, 78) however, genre analysis in sociology does *not* make the assumption that all speaking takes place in communicative genres. Classical philology and comparative literary studies have also played a role in the genesis of genre as a concept: These disciplines studied the oral tradition of the past already in the 1920s, e.g., in Milman Parry's analyses of the formulaic structures of Homerian metrics (Parry, 1971) or Albert B. Lord's analysis of the epic structures of the songs in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (Lord, 1960).

The analysis of communicative genres is rooted in all these approaches, and yet it develops the concept of genre further. The original understanding of communicative genres is that they are fixed forms of oral communication. It is the aim of this approach to describe genres empirically – in terms of their internal features, their constitutive and variable elements, their sequential procedure, their

(external) features, e.g., structure of participants, their situative integration in the interactive context.

2.2 Communicative genres as solutions to communicative problems

What do communicative genres accomplish in everyday life? What function do they serve? Wherever humans carry out certain activities regularly – be it voluntary or out of necessity – they do not come up with new means to achieve their goals each time; instead, they rely on fixed forms or patterns which have proved useful. Such patterns have several advantages: On the one hand, they provide a solution for whatever needs to be accomplished that has proved to be successful at least once; in other words, they offer a realistic possibility that what is to be accomplished is actually feasible. On the other hand, such recurring patterns give stability to social situations: One does not have to go through the trouble of thinking things through from the beginning and decide what to do; one can simply rely on the established pattern. Patterns relieve actors of the decision-making burden. However, it can also be said of the other participants in the interaction that they can let themselves be guided by what is well-tested and thus know what to expect. Reliance on patterns provides actors with behavioral security. Such fixed forms are found in all societies at all times. They structure social life, and they are the basis for processes of institutionalization (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 47–92 for details). This can be illustrated with a simple and 'small' example from ritual communication: Interactants know what a greeting is, they also know when it is carried out, when it is expected, and who should be greeted. They also know that a greeting requires a certain reaction, even though they may not be familiar with the concept of reciprocity. And they know that failure to greet or ignoring a greeting is seen as bad manners and can be interpreted as arrogant or impolite demeanor. Greetings are a striking example in the context of and in comparison with communicative genres because of their high degree of consolidation as rituals of interaction, which exceeds that of genres (see Goffman, 1967). Patterns and fixed forms come in different degrees of bindingness, and they can pertain to different areas of social life. They are mostly described as routines, rules or rituals. Genres, in comparison, leave interactants more options for modification. It is against this background that the function of communicative genres becomes clear: Communicative genres are consolidated forms of communicative action on which interactants can rely on in managing recurrent social situations. Thus, communicative genres have a double impact on interaction: On the one hand, they create an obligation; on the other hand, they reduce the burden on interactants (Luckmann, 1986, 204). Another aspect which shows the sociological impetus is Luckmann's comparison between genres and institutions:

> "In certain aspects communicative genres resemble social institutions. But social institutions are routinized, more or less obligatory solutions to *elementary* problems of social life. They regulate functionally very clearly definable kinds of social interactions such as production, reproduction, the organization of power, etc. Communicative genres, on the other hand, offer solutions to specifically *communicative* problems." (Luckmann, 1992, 227)

Genres, that is, are consolidated solutions to recurrent communicative problems. Luckmann's writings repeatedly show that the concept of the communicative genre raises questions pertaining to the *sociology of knowledge*. It acts upon the "general structure of communicative processes (…) in which stocks of knowledge of varying levels of explicitness are transferred" (Luckmann, 1986, 194, our translation). The analogy with institutions as well as the observation that communicative genres are anchored in the stocks of knowledge of the actors shows that genre analysis seeks to achieve more than a description and analysis of the linguistic and communicative elements of genres. The goal is to utilize the analysis of genres as a gateway to statements about society. The comparison with institutions, here, is seen as an *analogy*. With this analogy in mind, communicative genres can be understood as "'institutions' of *communicating* about life, including social life, within social life" (Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995, 290).

However, just as the concept of the communicative genre has a fixed sequential structure and a specific constellation of participants, it also inherently provides a solution to a *particular problem*. Greetings, for instance, on the one hand generate and show mutual perception, and on the other hand help re-establish and affirm the social relation between the interactants for each other. We greet our manager in a different way than we greet the mailman at our door, but we also greet someone in our family differently depending on whether we see them at the regular family supper or whether a year has passed since the last encounter or one of us has been on a dangerous journey. Who greets whom and when is part of the knowledge of everyday practices which interactants possess. It is stored in the stock of knowledge of interactants in everyday life.

> "In every society there is the elementary problem of the way in which events, issues, knowledge, and experiences can be thematized, arranged, managed, and handed down in an intersubjectively binding way and under different criteria of meaning. For these problems – just as for the elementary problems of securing subsistence, preservation of the species, socialization, conflict regulation or the formation of structures of domination (*Herrschaftsbildung*), there must be organized, that is nonaccidental, solutions." (Bergmann, 1993, 29)

Genres provide such established communicative solutions to communicative problems on the level of everyday interaction.

2.3 Concepts and method in genre analysis

The *method* used here is CA, which also has its origin in sociology, more specifically in ethnomethodology. This methodological orientation places the focus on the sequential structure of communicative genres and on their concrete situational forms of realization. For genres are constituted interactively, and CA provides the means to analyze the intersubjective dimension of interaction.

For the empirical procedure of genre analysis, two levels of analysis are relevant: The *internal* and the *external* structure (Luckmann, 1986, 203ff.; Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995, 291ff.). The internal structure consists of the communicative elements used by the interactants for the concrete realization of the genre: Rhetorical and stylistic devices, rhythms, phonetic melodies and other prosodic elements, semantics,

lists, registers, etc. The internal structure, in some sense, provides the material for communicative genres. Genres also differ in the elements of internal structure that can be used (or at times must be used), how binding they are, and the position they take in the procedure of the genre. The internal structure is constituted by a range of elements whose level of obligation is determined by the genre. For instance, it is part of the reconstructive genre of gossip that the one gossiped about is mocked in the reconstruction of dialogs (see section 3.1); for genres of moral interaction, it is mostly elements of indirectness that have proven relevant (section 3.2); for projective genres the role of modal verbs (can, must, should) becomes salient (section 3.3).

Just as there is an internal structure, there is an external structure. The external structure comprises all the elements which determine the genre from the outside: The social situation, the social roles, the constellation of participants, and the communicative *milieu*. The external structure is the level through which features of the social structure of a society impact communicative genres. In this way, the external structure mirrors the socio-structural framework society sets for genres. The external structure is the level at which and through which society influences communicative genres: Through the social relations of the actors, through gender, social roles, age, status, etc. As a level of analysis, the external structure is relevant for the *sociological* basis of genre analysis: If genre analysis limits itself to the analysis of internal structure, it hardly goes beyond a linguistic analysis. So, both levels together determine the structure of a communicative genre. Günthner and Knoblauch (1995) have added a third layer aside from internal and external structure, thereby also highlighting the relevance of CA: The situative level. This *intermediary* layer consists of the concrete sequential, and situative patterns of a genre (the organization of turns, participation framework, etc.), i.e., all the interactive formats that are subject to studies in CA. In genre analysis, CA is the method *par excellence* for a sequential analysis of genres and thus an identification of the communicative problem solved by the genre.

Genres can be relatively independent and stand for themselves. Frequently (but by no means always), they are part of a *social occasion* which they belong to and which in turn frames additional genres. Genres, in such cases, can also be found in a foreseeable order. Answering the question of the typical contexts in which genres can be found ultimately involves describing the social occasion to which they possibly belong. Social occasions are understood as communicative units with relatively clearly defined spatial and temporal boundaries and typical participants' roles. They contain more or less firmly structured action sequences which themselves at times can have various degrees of consolidation or institutionalization. An example of a social occasion is a conversation over a meal, a sales conversation, a party, a barbecue, a baptism or a funeral. In social occasions, specific genres now have a fixed place (a greeting, small talk, a prayer, a joke, etc.). It is not necessarily the case, however, that such social occasions are a fixed sequence of genres (even though some social occasions do have such a sequence; a prayer, for instance takes place at the beginning of a meal, but usually at the end of a service). Certain genres are part of certain social occasions, but at the same time, they are communicatively produced and framed *in* and *through* them. The term "social occasion" is also used by Goffman (1981, 165ff), in quite a similar sense (although of course Goffman does not provide a genre analysis in Luckmann's sense). In describing the structure of lectures, Goffman repeatedly emphasizes how lectures are nested within the social situation and how the social situation, in turn, impacts the communicative form.

As Bergmann emphasizes, it was the "declared goal" of genre analysis from the very beginning "to elaborate a draft for a typology of communicative genres" (Bergmann, 2018, 290; our translation). This means that the analysis of communicative genres is also aimed at studying not individual genres, but various genres in relation to each other. This relation can take two different forms (on the following ideas, cf. Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995 and Bergmann, 2018).

(1) On the one hand, genres empirically present themselves in specific sequences and thus in their social contexts group into *clusters of genres*. In table talk, for example, different genres are produced in sequence and together constitute the *procedure* of table talk as a social occasion. The analysis of such clusters of genres is concerned with the 'positioning' of genres in their context: Which genres typically follow each other? Which do not and exclude a neighboring relation? For instance, making plans for something (say, a vacation) can transition into making plans for something else (say, the son's sports activities) and finally into making meal plans together (see section 3.3). Such clusters can also be found in moral communication; for instance, when a gossiping conversation 'is done' with one victim, and it is now someone else's 'turn' (see section 3.2). When interactants have successfully carried out a communicative activity, they carry on with it for some while. One is, so to speak, in planning mode (or in banter, gossiping, or joking mode) and maintains this until it is thematically or situatively exhausted. However, it is also possible for *different* genres to occur in a cluster. For instance, certain social occasions (e.g., a telephone conversation, a meeting, a lunch) often close not only with goodbyes but also with arrangements for the next meeting. Genres occur in a sequential organization, and their procedure is predictable for interactants.

(2) On the other hand, communicative genres can also be described systematically in terms of the *work* they complete and in terms of the problems they solve. Such resembling forms can be called *families of genres*. Several research projects concerned with different families of genres managed to demonstrate how different genres differ from one another, what they have in common, and what practical actions can be accomplished through them. (Section 3 discusses some of these families of genres in greater detail).

The entirety of these communicative forms which have consolidated into genres, together with the rather free forms of spontaneous communication, makes the "communicative budget" of a society (Luckmann, 1986).

> "It should be obvious that under some circumstances almost any communicative process may have a bearing upon the maintenance – and transformation – of a society, but it is also clear that, in fact, some communicative processes are more important than others." (Bergmann and Luckmann, 1995, 301)

Which processes those are cannot be determined *a priori*, but must be demonstrated by empirical work. Communicative budgets differ from society to society. This specificity of communicative budgets with regard to cultures or periods can be demonstrated through historical analyses and cultural comparisons. Valuable contributions in this respect are primarily the studies in ethnography of communication, which show what specific speech events look like in other cultures. In comparisons with the communicative budgets of other societies or the communicative budgets of other historical periods of our own society, it would thus be possible to show how these differ from each other, i.e., how they are communicatively 'composed' with regard to their genres. The analysis of the communicative budget is the ultimate goal of such endeavors.

3 On the analysis of communicative genres

It thus becomes apparent that communicative genres *by definition* have a common feature: They provide members of a society with patterns for solving communicative problems. Communicative genres, then, also differ from each other in what specific problem they act on (by representing a solution to it). In order to better describe the communicative function of specific genres and to determine which specific problem they solve, it is helpful to concentrate not exclusively on individual genres, but to study genres in the context of their families. What families of genres exist, how many members they have, and how they relate to each other are questions that can only be answered empirically. Focusing on *families of genres* in empirical research is a promising approach because, if nothing else, it provides a possibility for parallel analysis of communicative forms completing similar tasks. Raising such types of questions reveals the spectrum of communicative genres on which interactants can rely on in accomplishing their communicative tasks (for instance, an aggressive reproach instead of a teasing joke). It is plausible, in this respect, to assume that certain families of genres in one way or another occur in all societies – because they accomplish central tasks which are equally relevant in all societies. For Luckmann, reconstruction, moralizing and planning, among others, are examples of this type of families of genres (Luckmann, 2012, 35).[2]

On these three families of genres, there are empirical studies from various research projects which in the following sections will be introduced in more detail and placed in relation to each other. Each section is concerned with a specific family of genre – reconstruction (3.1), moral communication (3.2) and projection (3.3). The discussion is based on the theoretical and empirical results of three different projects funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft DFG (German Science Foundation) which have analyzed communicative genres with a different main focus each.[3]

3.1 The communicative representation of the past: reconstructive genres

Remembering the past takes place on a number of levels in society, and it is often clearly visible in myths, tales, epics and histories of creation. However, reconstructions also take place in everyday life when people remember their own past and thus make it present communicatively through reconstructive genres. Reconstructive genres are the place where *past* experiences and events are worked upon. How societies represent the past, how they reprocess it, how they pass it on communicatively are essential questions for sociology. It refers not only to forms of remembrance practiced by countries, religions or organizations, but also to the practices of representing the past in everyday communication. In everyday communication, this happens for example in such diverse communicative forms as examples, media constructions, conversion narratives, or gossip. These (and other) reconstructive genres create reconstructions of past events and actions, and by extension almost always also of past *communicative* processes.

Using *gossip* as a case in point, form and function of reconstructive genres can be illustrated (for the following thoughts cf. Bergmann, 1993). In gossip, as is the case in other communicative genres, there is a transfer of *knowledge*. In the case of gossip, such knowledge consists of news about private affairs of someone who is known to the interactants. This knowledge must have novelty, and it is most suitable when it is in some way delicate, juicy, or indecent. This also means that one cannot get straight to the point. Bergmann provides an elaborate demonstration of how the subject of the gossip is established (carefully, because the recipient's readiness to engage in gossip about the specific person must first be probed), and how the gossiping sequence then unfolds and is finally closed. It is especially this genre that is often found in sequences of genres: A story about the upstairs neighbor flows into another story about the same neighbor until the repertoire of news about this person is exhausted and one can turn to a new person (e.g., the downstairs neighbor). The communicative genre of gossip is characterized by a specific repertoire in its internal structure. Among those are hyperboles, which make the story entertaining and thus mark that which is told as worthy of being told by highlighting the ways in which the event was remarkable. Another constitutive element is the reproduction of speech, which is found in almost all reconstructive genres. Quoting or acting out entire dialogs add to the entertainment value and are often acknowledged with laughter. Most importantly, however, they allow the producer of gossip to mock the subject of gossip and use drastic wordings which are put in their mouth (pushing the responsibility for the choice of words on them).

However, which problem does this genre solve? The example of the reconstructive genre of gossip shows that the analysis of communicative genres is not restricted to the analysis of sequences or to the description of linguistic means. These are analytical steps *also* carried out by the analysis of communicative genres; however, it always poses the question as to which *problem* the specific genre solves. A constituent of gossip is the way in which its actors are placed in social relation. In gossip, one can immediately notice the participation structure taking the form of a "triad of gossip" (Bergmann, 1993): The social situation requires at least two interactants – one cannot gossip alone. And yet, there is inevitably a third person who plays a role: The subject of gossip, who is absent, but part of the triad. One can also not gossip about someone who is *present*. It is this absent subject of gossip – known to both interactants

2 This is neither a claim that these are the only families of genres, nor that they are the only central ones. Luckmann also counts genres of upbringing (Luckmann, 2012, 35) among those that are probably of relevance for all societies.

3 The specific research projects are: (1) DFG project "Strukturen und Funktionen von rekonstruktiven Gattungen der alltäglichen Kommunikation" (Structures and functions of reconstructive genres of everyday communication). Supervisors: Jörg Bergmann, Thomas Luckmann, University of Konstanz, 1984–1989. Research staff members: Angela Keppler, Hubert Knoblauch, and Bernd Ulmer. (2) DFG project "Formen der kommunikativen Konstruktion von Moral. Gattungsfamilien der moralischen Kommunikation in informellen, institutionellen und massenmedialen Kontexten" (Forms of the communicative construction of morality: families of genre of moral communication in informal, institutional and mass-media contexts). Supervisor: Jörg Bergmann, Thomas Luckmann, Universities of Gießen and Konstanz, 1992–1997. Research staff: Ruth Ayaß, Verena Blöcher, Gabriela B. Christmann, Michaela Goll, Susanne Günthner, and Kirsten Nazarkiewicz. (3) DFG project "Planning-in-Action: Die kommunikative Verfertigung von Zukunft in projektiven Gattungen" (Planning in Action: the communicative construction of the future in projective genres). Supervisor: Ruth Ayaß, University of Bielefeld, 2021–2024. Research staff: Sarah Hitzler, Jonas Kramer, and Ajit Singh.

– about whom the producer of gossip now shares details they have somehow come across (but the recipient has not). Aside from this characteristic participation structure (i.e., the external structure) Bergmann also describes the typical features of gossip conversations: The subject of gossip generally must be introduced carefully and established as a topic of mutual interest. This mostly happens by bringing up innocuous details ("The- the Theissens moved out, huh?"; see Bergmann, 1993, 85 for this example). The gossiping actors rely on a typical inventory (i.e., a typical internal structure) which is required in reconstruction. Part of this inventory, for instance, is the reproduction of entire dialogs in which the questionable behavior of the subject of gossip is portrayed and judged. It is *also* part of this inventory, however, that participants portray themselves as 'innocent' witnesses who learned the details they are sharing without any action on their part. ("And Sunday morning I'm sitting on the toilet. Suddenly, I hear her again upstairs…"; see Bergmann, 1993, 126 for this example). In gossip, the participants solve the communicative problem of indiscretion. After all, there is a risk to talking badly about an absent person who is actually part of the social circle and whom one might meet again the next day.

Gossip is just *one* member of the family of genres of reconstruction. Many more communicative genres of everyday communication are part of it. Some are quite similar to gossip, some clearly differ from it. An example of another form of reconstruction is looking at photos together and reminiscing about the past (Keppler, 1994 on looking at family photographs together). Through the photographs, the shared family history is remembered, and events, names, and details are told and re-told, thus socializing new members into the family. In these reconstructive genres, the past is represented through communication and reprocessed for the present. And at the same time, gossip is a good example of how some communicative genres (but not all) can be members of more than one genre family. Gossip is not only a genre of reconstruction, but also a genre of moral communication.

3.2 Communicating respect and disrespect: genres of moral communication

Another family of genres are genres of *moral* communication. Moral communication is understood as forms of communication in which interactants speak about missteps and negotiate right and wrong behavior. The project studied the communicative means with which interactants communicate approval and respect (or disapproval and disrespect). The forms and genres used to express respect or disrespect vary greatly. They include compliments, reproaches, proverbs, complaints and stories of complaints, outrages, communication of stereotypes and lamentations (and, again, gossip) (see the contributions in Bergmann and Luckmann, 1999). What could be shown was that forms of moral communication are neither rare nor restricted to specific social occasions.

> "Obviously, morality is omnipresent in everyday life; it is so deeply intertwined with everyday discourse that the interlocutors hardly ever recognize their doings as moral business." (Bergmann, 1998, 281)

The ubiquity of moral communication shows that questions of right and wrong behavior can be articulated and communicated *situatively* by interactants, and that it is *through* and via this continual moral communication that interactants negotiate what should be seen as right and wrong behavior. What was found was that there is a preference for *negative* moral communication in our society, i.e., forms of disrespect and disapproval. Empirically, they can be found as reproaches and outrages, in mocking and lamenting and many other forms. A much rarer sight are forms of *positive* moral communication (compliments, excitement, etc.). Forms of speaking positively about others are far less frequent as well as far less sophisticated. In comparison with the many forms of negative moral communication, the few positive forms seemed either outdated (e.g., proverbs) or formalized (e.g., laudations) or, as was seen for instance in compliments, they were objectified beyond recognition ("Nice shoes!"). Modern societies are characterized by a decline of traditional values and living conditions and by processes of privatization, pluralization and individualization. These processes have also caused a "pluralization of morals" (cf. Bergmann, 1998, 290–292 for details). Thus, interactants cannot depend on *one* universal moral code, and instead must produce it interactively. What is right and wrong evidently cannot be taken as given. It is thus easier for interactants to communicate situatively and selectively about what is *not* acceptable than about what is acceptable. In sum, this means that interactants engage more with what they disapprove of – what they judge, see as wrong, and reject. Thus, the data material was fraught with reproaches, indignations, rants and other forms of moral communication.

There is, to be sure, a difference depending on whether the person being moralized is present or not. Moral communication can target absent people: For gossiping, ranting, etc. it is necessary that the person being talked about is absent. Moral communication, however, can certainly also address *present* people, e.g., by teasing, being indignant or in making accusations. The distinction between the *moral addressee* and the *communicative addressee* has proven crucial in the analysis of moral communication. This is especially the case when the communication is about someone who is *absent*. For instance, when re-enacting someone else's indignation, when reporting about reproaches or when complaining about someone, interactants bring up someone's wrongdoings in the present situation to another person, i.e., the communicative addressee. Interactants are communicatively skilled at portraying themselves, for instance, as calm, reasonable, and judicious, while the person whose indignation or reproaches are imitated is presented as arrogant, presumptuous or near hysterical (cf. Bergmann and Luckmann, 1999 for the empirical analysis).

The absence of a universal moral code on which interactants can depend is also visible in another phenomenon: Moral communication in our society is generally guided by the principle of *indirectness*. Respect and withdrawal thereof tend not to take place directly in our society, but rather indirectly, in subtle hints or mediated through others.

> "Whether moralization takes place overtly or covertly seems to be essentially determined by the risk calculation of the actor. It is generally the case for moral communication that it is frequently characterized by a high degree of *indirectness*, i.e. only hints at the moral verdict and 'sugarcoats' it or passes it on by a detour through others." (Bergmann and Luckmann, 1999, 31, our translation)

Interactants create this caution and indirectness in a variety of ways, for instance by asking seemingly innocuous questions ("The-the Theissens moved out, huh?"; cf. Bergmann, 1993, 85 for this example). A very effective means for creating indirectness are subtle hints and euphemisms. In an analysis of institutional communication (interviews for admission to psychiatric care), Bergmann showed how criticism can be softened: "Doctor Hollman told me something like you were running across the street not so completely dressed or something like that." In this utterance from a psychiatrist addressing a patient, the directness of the remark is mitigated by several means and indirectness is created. Not only are there mitigators ("something like," used twice); the utterance is also ascribed to another, absent, person ("Doctor Hollmann"). The one responsible for the claim is thus not the psychiatrist as a speaker, but another doctor. Most importantly, though, the litotes "not so completely dressed" serves to mitigate the face-threatening situation. Such use of litotes *avoids* drastic expressions by negating the opposite (the potentially face-threatening adjective 'naked' becomes 'not so completely dressed') (for analyses of this and other examples, cf. Bergmann, 1992, 143 ff.).

The avoidance of face-threatening actions is a central argument for Goffman's analyses of face-to-face interactions. In moral communication there is an inherent threat to the face in Goffman (1967) sense. It is thus delicate ground to tread on for both parties, requiring them to use moral communication with caution. For this, indirectness can be created with a variety of linguistic means. Günthner shows that moral communication is often accompanied by expressions of affect. The affective charge can be visible in choice of words, but an important role is also played by *prosody*. Günthner (1996) discusses reproaches as an example. In the data, there is a remarkable number of reproaches taking the form of questions, often introduced with 'why'. Günthner showed how the seemingly innocuous question, "Why did you say Konstanz?" through its prosodic realization becomes a reproach: "WARUM=*SA:↑↓ GEN=SIE=DANN=KONSTANZ." This why-question does not simply request a reason for the behavior; it represents the behavior displayed as inappropriate (the addressee of the reproach had mixed up two places). As Günthner (1996) shows through this and other examples, it is especially the prosody which turns this utterance into a reproach (thus also leading to an apology from the addressee). Günthner identifies these features (among others) which turn a question into a reproach: "global increase of loudness, high global pitch, a rise-fall on the accentuated syllable and verum focus" (Günthner, 1996, 281). Modal particles and specific lexical elements (not used in the above example) can play a role in revealing the reproach. The recognizability of the reproach *as* a reproach, in this and other examples, is carried almost exclusively by the affective charge of the prosody – the 'bare' question would not make the utterance a reproach; in fact, the 'bare' question sounds as though the speaker was making an innocent inquiry about the reason. However, the realization of the reproach in the form of a why-question also allows the addressee of the reproach to ignore the affective charge and simply treat the reproach as a 'question' to which a factual 'answer' can be given ("Because …"). For the originator of the reproach, the question format provides a way to retreat to the question character if necessary. In the case of counter-reproach, they can insist on just having asked a question ("I was just asking").

It thus turns out that moral communication is certainly a dangerous business for interactants. This is because when speaking negatively about others, they inevitably put their own moral integrity at risk in that they may appear presumptuous, crass, condescending, etc. They also risk becoming themselves an addressee of moral communication, for instance by provoking a counter-reproach from the other person. The strategy of indirectness solves the problem of the inherent risk for interactants in moral communication; they also protect the actor from 'counter-moralizing'.

3.3 Talking about the future: projective genres

Projective genres are understood as consolidated forms of communication targeted at the *future* – in other words, forms of speaking about what is to come (Ayaß, 2021, 2024). This can be the near future (in a moment, very soon, this evening), in the foreseeable future (tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, this summer) or in the distant future (some way down the road, in 10 years, one day). Projective genres include a wide range of communicative forms. What unites projective genres as a family is that they provide a solution to the common communicative problem of *engaging with the future*. In a broader sense, projective genres as a family of genres thus include all forms in which people plan the future and prepare action to execute this future – this may be a dinner being prepared, a vacation that should be planned and booked, or the building of a home that must be financed and projected. Projective genres are thus genres which envision a future. They refer to the anticipation, the planning, and creation of events to come.[4] The nearer the goal of the plan comes, the more binding arrangements and promises become. Both minor and major projects will require some form of commitment. Especially a project that is complex and has an obligatory aim (e.g., a family celebration) makes it necessary to turn uncertainty into certainty and what is vague must become concrete in the course of the planning. At the very beginning, a project may still be a vague idea, but it must become incrementally more concrete if it is to be executed. At specific points in the planning process uncertainty must be turned into certainty and what is vague must become concrete.

For projective genres, the typical communicative phenomena are different from those, say, of genres of reconstruction or moral communication. For the projective genres, there appears to be an inventory in the internal structure which is specifically designed to engage with the future. A recurring element of the internal structure of projective genres are, for instance, *if-then* constructions. *If-then* constructions are particularly suitable because they allow distinctions between individual action steps (if A then B; but this also means first A then B), because they can be used to divide the future into phases (there is an A, and then there is a B) and because commitments are made (we will not be able to do B unless we have taken care of A). The grammatical structure chains up two or more actions in close proximity. Most importantly, however, *if-then* constructions create a temporality which places different states into a temporal sequence and

4 In the context of projective genres, this refers to something else than the planning or the (mental) projection of *communication*, as described by Luckmann (1995) as "interaction planning" or by Linell (1998) as "communicative projects."

links them consecutively. In projective genres, *if-then* constructions serve to represent the future. They anticipate and predict what will happen 'then'. They structure the sequence of events in the future. Future goings-on and developments are broken down into individual steps and brought into a linear sequence – in the sense that here, too, one will not take the second before the first step. For actors, *if-then* constructions are a verbal means with which to reduce uncertainty in that they allow the anticipation and structuring of as yet unknown events. Others can then use them for orientation, contradict them, modify them, or simply confirm them. Schutz and Luckmann, in their analysis of projects of action, speak of a "more or less richly branched 'decision tree'" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989, 51) which a project of action can become. If progress is to be made at the 'branches' of a project of action, decisions must be made. *If-then* statements anticipate exactly this situation. They serve to reduce uncertainty and create commitment.

Another recurring element of the internal structure of projective genres and appears to be constitutive are *modal verbs*. Projects of action are connected to intentions, but at the same time subject to uncertainties, and they frequently encounter obstacles and constraints. By means of the modal verbs 'want', 'should', 'can', and 'must', interactants can articulate the room for action and its limitations. In projective genres, modal verbs take a central position within the interactive process. This is because *must's* and *want-to's*, as well as other modal verbs, contain structures of participation, assignments of responsibility, and expectations. They can impose constraints on the addressees or open up room for action. Modal verbs allow interactants to probe their own room for action, obtain permissions and concessions from one another and predict obstacles. For the procedure and the planning of the project of action, such interactive maneuvers are central. There are expectations as to what we can, should, must, and want to do which are distributed differently among the actors and which are articulated in the communication of concrete situations. They can be expressed as demands that somehow have to be met ("You must"); however, there are also options which contain room for action and choice-making ("Do you want to come or do you want to stay here"). In the interactive process of projective genres, modal verbs are also relevant for the progress of the project of action. This is because one person's 'want-to' can become another person's 'must'. Modal verbs provide interactants with a possibility for continual mutual coordination so that the shared plan of action remains a shared one. Moreover, they periodically secure the cooperation. With the help of modal verbs, projective genres can mark different phases of projects of action. There are phases during which a project of action, or parts thereof, are in a *want-to* state (or a wish, an intention, a distant future) and other phases during which specific steps *must* be taken if the plan is to succeed. The more complex a project of action, the more progressive phases it will include, and the more modal verbs 'help' interactants to agree with each other and coordinate the different conditions of *want-to's*, *must's*, and *should's* in which actors find themselves.

3.4 Ongoing and future developments of empirical genre analysis

The three mentioned research projects and the families of genres studied within them show two structural changes in their developments, pointing (a) to methodical/methodological developments and (b) to societal transformations. (a) The methodical/methodological developments that CA has undergone are of relevance also for genre analysis because it is methodologically linked to CA. In more recent projects, there is thus a shift in the data corpus from auditive recordings (used for example at the beginning of genre analysis in the project on reconstructive genres) to audiovisual recordings (used in the project on projective genres). As a consequence, different interactive phenomena come into focus and can be studied at a higher degree of complexity in the video material. Thanks to video recordings, for instance, the project on projective genres also looked at the ways interactants handled calendars, i.e., artifacts which play a major role for planning. Another project with a genre-analytical research question was concerned with representations and renditions of audiovisual presentations such as "Powerpoint" (Knoblauch, 2013) as *performative genres*. It analyzed spatial, physical and visual elements, such as the body of the presenter in the space between the audience and the slides. Thanks to video data, this project primarily demonstrated the role of pointing gestures as a constitutive feature in the internal structure. Video data, in principle, also allow a shift to videographical methods (see Knoblauch and Schnettler, 2012). (b) Connected to this are the transformations which the analyzed fields and their interactions experience chiefly because of the ubiquity of media. Their use is deeply embedded in everyday interactions. The project on projective genres, for example, revealed the enormous role played by social media not only for general everyday interaction, but *primarily* for the communication of plans and for communicating intentions. Such mediated interaction (e.g., writing text messages) can be analyzed empirically within genre analysis. Genre analysis of face-to-face communication especially benefits from analyses that are not restricted to the interaction through the medium, but shed light on their *embeddedness in everyday communication* (see Hitzler and Kramer, 2023 for an example). Genre analyses in the future will almost by necessity make references to the use of media and technical artifacts – simply because of their pervasiveness in everyday communication. The impact of this "everydayification" of media (see Ayaß, 2012) – their ubiquity, their routine use in everyday interaction – on genre analysis is that media become interwoven with everyday interaction. Although genre analysis is primarily concerned with face-to-face communication, the concept can also be applied to mediated communication, such as in social media, especially in situations where actors interact, e.g., by exchanging text messages. However, it should remain clear that the application of genre analysis to written forms of communication has its limits: The philological analysis of genre as known from literary or film studies is not an analysis of communicative genres in the sociological sense. The close connection between genre analysis and CA is no coincidence. The aim of the analysis of communicative genres is to demonstrate the situational realization of these genres and the interactive orientation of those involved in these established solutions to communicative problems. So, for genre analysis, an orientation and alignment with CA is therefore essential.

4 Discussion: Conversation Analysis, genre analysis and sociology

From the above elaborations, it probably has become clear that the aims of genre analysis go beyond questions of CA. Genre analysis is

not merely an analysis of 'large' sequences, but links the empirical analysis of consolidated communicative forms – i.e. the communicative genres – with the question of communicative problems solved by the genres. Genre analysis thus has the potential to make CA attractive for sociology beyond ethnomethodology in the narrower sense. This is relevant in several respects.

(1) The first one is the level of sociological sub-disciplines: It has already been demonstrated that genre analysis is situated in a framework of the sociology of knowledge. Communicative genres allow the transmission of knowledge (about the past, about the future, about what is to be seen as right and wrong, etc.), and they are themselves anchored in the stocks of knowledge of the interactants. Furthermore, the *sociology of language* receives crucial impulses from genre analysis. Thomas Luckmann, already in the 1970s, had turned to the sociology (and the philosophy) of language (e.g., Luckmann, 1973, 1979). These texts testify to Luckmann's great interest in such thinkers as Wilhelm von Humboldt (especially the "Kawi Essay," a work on the Kawi language of the island of Java, published posthumously in 1836), Roman Jacobson, Mikhail M. Bakhtin and Valentin N. Vološinov, and their writings on the connections between language and society. Luckmann was irritated by the fact that linguistics and sociology were all but unaware of each other. In retrospect, he described this relationship as thus: "in fact, it seemed that they existed in separate universes." Especially sociology and the sociology of language were "linguistically naïve to the point of ignorance" (Luckmann, 2013, 42). Genre analysis closes this gap, completing and strengthening the sociology of language. Genre analysis understands itself as a contribution to the connection between language (and interaction) and society. It creates this link explicitly through the nexus of the internal and external structures. Moreover, the analyses of the different families of genres allow connections to other research areas established in sociology. In genres, the social presence is negotiated, the past and the future are discussed. For example, the analysis of reconstructive genres makes a contribution to the analysis of the communicative fabrication, memory and remembrance in everyday communication (Halbwachs); the analysis of the genres of moral communication was able to show how the moral composition of a society is communicated (Durkheim, Goffman); finally, the analysis of projective genres merges with action theory (Schutz, Luckmann) and the sociology of time (Merton, Sorokin). To these and other research areas, genre analysis contributes empirical insights showing how these social phenomena (i.e., memory, time, etc.) are created communicatively and made relevant in everyday situations. Finally, the fact that a specific communicative form is solidified into a genre is an indication of the structure of relevance in society (Schutz, 2011).

(2) Secondly, genre analysis can provide a gateway for CA to sociological theories, especially to the "Social Construction of Reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and the associated approaches. From a sociological perspective, CA is an ethnomethodological undertaking (and will always be). From the outset, however, genre analysis essentially connects (conversation) analysis with a theoretical question. This is coherent in every respect given the origin of genre analysis. A look at the theoretical profiles of the two originators of the analysis of communicative genres shows this very clearly. For Bergmann, the determining element in CA, from the beginning, is the ethnomethodological question about the "ongoing accomplishment" of social reality. In Luckmann, too, there is a conceivable path from his (and Peter Berger's) theoretical considerations in the "Social Construction of Reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) to an interest in the empirical study of interactions from the 1980s. For, even if not all human activity is communicative in a narrow sense, activities are all somehow accompanied by communication. "Human social reality and the world view that motivates and guides interaction is mainly constructed in communicative processes" (Luckmann, 2013, 44). Knoblauch (2020), building on Berger/Luckmann, explicitly speaks of genre analysis as "communicative construction of reality," emphasizing the sequentiality of human action. CA and the typical records it creates now provide the means to analyze meticulously these processes of creation as they unfold situatively. Luckmann shows his interest in the analysis of genres as thus: "I wish to see how social reality is constructed, reconstructed, and how this happens in detail. This is social construction *en detail. En detail*!" (Luckmann, 2012, 30; our translation). The sequential procedure in CA allows for a step-by-step analysis of the interactants' actions, thus exposing, turn by turn, the layers of meaning in its production. CA is the methodical tool *par excellence* to reveal these processes of constructing social reality analytically. And yet, to be precise, CA is (just) the means, not the end in this process. This is because genre analysis is not concerned solely with the interactive structures and the orderliness of social interaction; it is concerned with the communicative procedures in which these interactive structures and this orderliness generate and communicatively mediate reality. Seen in this way, the analysis of communicative genres is an empirical answer to the question of how social reality is constructed.

(3) Finally, genre analysis allows the connection with concepts in social theory as relevant for numerous sociological approaches such as ethnomethodology (Garfinkel) or the "Social Construction of Reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), which draw on Alfred Schutz and his writings on the essential intersubjectivity of the social world. In carrying out communicative genres, interactants rely on shared stocks of knowledge. As demonstrated above, communicative genres are consolidated forms of creating and mediating social reality. For this, genres provide consolidated solutions to problems, which in their consolidation become *manifest*. These processes are observable in their practical execution to actors as completed, objectified reality. Communicative genres stabilize communicative situations in that they create communicative sequences that are predictable for and *jointly* created by interactants reciprocally. Communicative genres are a form of intersubjectively constituting reality whereby interactants reciprocally clarify the character of the current situation. Genres are thus also means for the *creation* of intersubjectivity, which plays a crucial role for interactions in general (Lindström et al., 2021). In the joint realization of genres, interactants signal to each other that they are members of the same social reality which they share and generate together. Genres are determined by social structures which provide the external conditions for language and interaction to articulate themselves in the first place (i.e., the external structure). Conversely, communicative acts and genres (and their internal structure) impact social structures and have the potential to change them. "Languages, social structures and communicative acts continue to

'determine' one another, resulting in new 'syntheses' in the real lives of real people" (Luckmann, 1992, 222).

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A conversation analytic approach to *schizophrenic* interaction: methodological reflections on disruptions of the common-sense world

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Certain schools of phenomenological psychiatry conceive of *schizophrenia* as a pathology of common-sense. Ethnomethodological enquiry, with its roots in Schutzian social phenomenology, takes as its domain, topic, and substance of study the ongoing achievement of a common-sense world between social members. Yet, dialogue between psychiatry and ethnomethodological approaches is thin. In this article, we discuss a conversation analytic approach to *schizophrenic* interaction which has generated and utilized a model of a five-world manifold to frame analyses of talk-in-interaction. 'Worlds' are conceived, after Schutz, as finite domains of meaning, and the model operates as a breach of natural attitude assumptions to examine mechanisms of the constitution of the one-world-in-common of common-sense. It is suggested that certain aspects of *schizophrenic* talk might receive account in terms of a loss of integration between these five domains of meaning. Conversation Analytic methods were applied to transcripts of audio recordings of psychiatric interviews but encountered hurdles that motivated the broadening of methodological scope. Such hurdles included a weakening of the next turn proof procedure, implicit reification of the *schizophrenia* construct, and problems of translation presented by the analyst's normative membership encountering non-normative life-worlds of *schizophrenic* experience. Strategic responses to these hurdles included exploring linkages between phenomenological psychiatry and ethnomethodological approaches, as well as an engagement of ethnomethodological self-reflection and conceptual clarification of the *schizophrenia* construct in line with Garfinkel's unique adequacy requirement. The manifold model is glossed, and interaction between two of its worlds – a world of concrete, situational immediacies and another of abstract organizations – is explored in more detail via analysis of conversational data. It is suggested that the five-world model, along with further micro-analysis of talk-in-interaction, might have implications in psychiatry for topics such as autism, double bookkeeping, concretism, theories of disturbed indexicality, and insight attribution. We conclude that the consideration of atypical interaction obliges the interaction analyst to take account of their own implicit normative world-frames and that the use of domain-specific top-down models in conjunction with the inductive approach of Conversation Analysis may extend the reach of CA to facilitate productive dialogue with other disciplines.

KEYWORDS

schizophrenia, conversation analysis, common-sense, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, talk-in-interaction, multiple realities

1 Introduction

We live in a time of divergent realities. In one version of world events, a heroic mobilization of science appears to have delivered pandemic-stemming vaccines; in other versions, these injections are means to inject computer chips into a docile populous, with, for some, these efforts being driven by shape-shifting reptiles from other dimensions. People who insist upon the latter scenarios, we are told, are not necessarily 'mad', and yet these are precisely the types of stories that people who are diagnosably delusional might tell with a conviction that seems to transcend mere belief.

In this article, we discuss a conversation analytic approach to *schizophrenic*[1] interaction which has generated and utilized a model of a five-world manifold to frame analyses of talk-in-interaction. It is born out of such questions as how it might be that people come to inhabit such differing versions of reality and, to the extent that they do inhabit them, how it is they might keep one foot sufficiently in a common reality to navigate social organizations with radically different underlying world-structure. Perhaps most bafflingly, we have been driven to enquire how it is that some people who perform this feat are deemed diagnosably delusional, while others are not.

We have not, by any stretch of the imagination, answered any of these motivating questions; rather, the process of enquiry has led us, ultimately, to question how 'normal' social members come to inhabit common realities in the first place.

The Oxford neuroscientist Anil Seth (2021) presents one version of this question: Current models of brain function suggest that the fundamental task of the brain is prediction, and the brain does this by generating plausible models that are then measured against external input and tweaked according to this feedback. The predictive models in themselves *are* our experience of the world, progressively shaped by the external input. In effect, our experience of 'reality' is active, projective hallucination. There is no 'light' beneath the skull, no 'sound', no 'touch', only neuro-electric activity. Our experiences of 'light', 'sound', and 'touch' are grounded in, but distinct from, these patterns of neural impulse within the silent darkness of the perpetually solipsistic skull. The world, as we hallucinate it, is an extremely private affair—so how is it that we come to 'share' a world in the first place? How do we come to coordinate and mutually inhabit our world hallucinations so effectively?

Putting the question in this way, of course, puts the riddle of hallucination in *schizophrenia* – most commonly, the hearing of voices that other people *do not* hear – entirely on the other foot. It is suddenly *not* so strange that people hallucinate voices – this is a fundamental mechanism of audition – but now other questions arise, such as: When I (a non-*schizophrenic*) hallucinate the voice of my interlocutor, how can I be confident that another nearby auditor will be hallucinating the same thing?

In the end, our strategic response to such questions has been to say: Ok, rather than bringing *schizophrenia* to account against common-sense world conceptions (to justify it in other words, as words are justified against the straight edge of a page), let us instead adjust our world-conceptions to accommodate reports of *schizophrenic* experience, and accept whatever alienating strangeness that might bring us to.

This brief consideration of hallucination exposes 'common-sense' as having two faces: 'sense-as-perception' (held in common) and 'sense-as-meaning'. Certain approaches to phenomenological psychiatry conceptualize *schizophrenia* as a pathology of common-sense or a disturbance in the ground of 'self' in micro-social intersubjectivity (Blankenburg and Mishara, 2001; Stanghellini, 2004; Phillips, 2019). The motivating question for this study has been whether any such disturbance of common sense organization might be evidenced through analysis of *schizophrenic* talk-in-interaction. The intended audience for the study includes language and interactional researchers, but also, importantly, psychiatric researchers and clinicians, who, while probably unfamiliar with interactional language research, might nonetheless find its methods relevant and hopefully useful within their own fields.

The initial intention to perform simple bottom-up analysis of conversational data, however, hit methodological hurdles that necessitated familiarization with theory, most notably, in an attempt to forge connections between the theoretical frames of Conversation Analysis (CA) and phenomenological psychiatry. It was found that the simplest way to do this was to conceptualize *schizophrenia* as a 'world disturbance' rather than a 'self-disturbance'. In CA terms, this might be seen as a disturbance in the coordination of settings. This generated the model of a world manifold, with the idea of a 'manifold' suggesting independent domains of meaning-organization that coordinate within the common-sense world as a unified domain. The use of such models within Conversation Analysis is, of course, discouraged, yet we suggest it might have implications for psychiatry (or related fields), where understanding the micro-design of talk-in-interaction presents less as an end-in-itself but might nonetheless prove of instrumental interest. Within those interpretive traditions of clinical psychiatry which emphasize 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) over 'explanation' (*Erklären*)[2], for instance, effective interpretive models might help facilitate therapeutic engagement and dialogue with patients. In addition, we suggest that the model might hold implications for studying interaction in other atypical populations.

Based on the methodological hurdles this particular study faced and the responses adopted to overcome them, a more general argument is proposed that a dialectic approach might be recommended between domain-specific processes of model construction and bottom-up processes of observation that would otherwise hope to avoid theoretical incursion.

Data for our study of *schizophrenic* talk-in-interaction were drawn from seven audio recordings (no video) of interviews between two interviewers and three female and four male patients who had received a DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnosis on the *schizophrenia* spectrum (diagnoses ranged across schizophrenia,

1 A word on nomenclature: the term 'schizophrenia' has been problematized here and its italicization is intended to foreground social processes of diagnosis and construct-formation. To pursue this focus, we additionally refrain from talking of interview subjects as 'patients' or 'people with schizophrenia', but instead refer to them as 'diagnosees'. In line with social movements to destigmatize mental health (e.g., "mad pride," see Rashed, 2023), the use of 'mad' is not similarly italicized, with the word intended to describe pre-diagnostic organizations of non-normativity. A more detailed consideration of this usage will be presented in section 4.1.1.

2 The phenomenological psychiatrist Jaspers (1963) positioned psychiatry at the confluence of these two approaches, although famously insisted that core aspects of *schizophrenia* were 'un-understandable', and thus closed to being approached via *verstehen* methods of empathic understanding.

schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and schizotypal personality disorder). These interviews were conducted for an earlier independent study, and the data were made available for the current research. The primary interviewer was a non-treating clinical psychiatrist hoping to pursue language research on *schizophrenia* within a cognitivist frame, and the second interviewer was a psychologist who performed a series of standardized cognitive tests on participants. Interview subjects were recruited from community teams where patients receive treatment under minimal restriction and also from a psychiatric inpatient ward where patient movement is more restricted. All subjects, either in 'recovery' or 'chronic' phase of psychosis, were receiving regular psychiatric treatment and had English as their first language. All were deemed by regular treating clinicians and the principal psychiatric researcher as competent to consent to participation at the time of the interview, and ethics approval was additionally obtained for the current data analysis. Interviews were conducted in private rooms in either the community or inpatient mental health settings. The interview recordings made available for this study ranged between 21 and 62 min and were all transcribed for the current study following Du Bois (2006) transcription conventions, with local additions.[3]

In this article, in addition to outlining the five-world model that allowed us to get a foothold on the data, we describe a process whereby we came to reflect upon the methodological challenges of applying Conversation Analytic methods to these data and the tactical choices that were required to respond to these challenges.

2 Worlds and models

In performing Conversation Analysis, we work a field that was cleared to a significant extent by Harold Garfinkel. But Garfinkel's ethnomethodology owes an intellectual debt to Alfred Schutz (Heritage, 1984), who himself developed his phenomenological sociology in response and as a complement to the early 20th-century work of Edmund Husserl (Schutz, 1962a). Garfinkel rejected any suggestion that ethnomethodology was a phenomenological method (Garfinkel et al., 1977), but we do not have to agree with him on that – and later, it will be explained why. Certainly, the anti-positivist tenor of the ethnomethodological attitude can be at least partly traced back to Husserl's critique of scientific objectivism (Moran, 2012). When we get to methods of Conversation Analysis, the pathway back to Husserlian phenomenology is even more overgrown with weeds, and the Husserlian critique of science that lies in CA's DNA has been largely forgotten.

Husserl provides the first distinction by which we tease apart the different worlds in our model. The broad outlines of his phenomenological method are quite well-known. In daily operations, as well as in most organized practices of science, it is reasonably assumed that the world is simply there, manifestly before us, objectively present. We orient to an external world and not to a world-as-perceived. Husserl describes this underlying assumption as the 'natural attitude'. However, as we have just suggested, our experience of the world is a somewhat more 'internal' affair than this. To avoid what he sees as sterile metaphysical arguments along the lines of a mind/matter divide, Husserl's first move was to 'bracket' questions of 'external' reality – to simply put them out of bounds – and to pursue an enquiry into ways the world is revealed within, before, and *as* consciousness. Because the external world (as well as any natural attitude presumptions) has been bracketed, Husserlian phenomenology continues as (world)-transcendent enquiry. There is an inherent critique of scientific objectivity involved here: in seeing the world as an object, the one thing that science cannot take account of is the eye peering down the microscope and the structures, either of consciousness or of mathematical translation, via which the world is revealed. In contrast to the world-as-object, Husserl foregrounded a world-as-experience(d). One inhabits, lives in, and moves through a world that is not a mere object but is shaded by relevance, value, and meaning, a world inherently organized *as* experience, including primordial experiences such as those of threat or danger, habit, habitat, and home, that blur the edges between 'self' and 'world'. Husserl explores these themes of the experienced-world in terms of a 'life-world', which is never defined but rather presented as the title of a problem to stimulate enquiry (Moran, 2012, 297). It is not completely clear, for instance, to what extent the life-world represents a world of purely individual experience and to what extent life-world(s?) might be shared. In the case of *schizophrenia,* the distinction between a world that is revealed before the scientific gaze and an experience-imbued lifeworld is the difference between seeing a *diagnosee* through a lens of neurophysiological reduction or as the inhabiter of a lived-world of meanings and values.[4] The vague outline of two and possibly three different world conceptions can be seen to be emerging here: A 'world-as-object', (life)-worlds of private experience, and perhaps (life)-worlds of shared experience.

The question that arose earlier in considering Seth's model of predictive processing – how to overcome solipsism to arrive at a shared world-in-common – is the same issue that confronted Husserl's transcendental inquiry. Both models require an account of intersubjectivity. It is at this point that Schutz (1970) diverted his sociological project away from the Husserlian program via an 'epoché of the natural attitude'. Husserl described the transcendent 'bracketing' of the external world as the phenomenological 'epoché' – a form of Cartesian doubt or action-disabling suspension of conviction (Beyer, 2018). Schutz's epoché represents a mirroring complement to Husserl's. In short, if the phenomenological epoché suspends a natural attitude involvement in the world via doubting the world, then the epoché of the natural attitude invokes an *impossibility* of doubting the world, evidenced via in-the-world action. In shared action, participants to the action jointly signal conviction in a shared, undoubtable world, a conviction more foundational than mere belief. It is this grounding investment in a common reality that provides conditions for common-sense coordination of and in a world-in-common.[5]

In the context of this 'grounding reality', Schutz described 'multiple realities', such as dream-worlds, abstractions of science, and worlds of myth and religion that all need to defer ultimately to the one 'common-sense' world of the natural attitude. Schutz called this paramount reality

3 Any non-standard transcription markings can be found in appendix.

4 For a consideration of such a general distinction as frame-conflict in medicine, see Mishler (1984).

5 Note that this is not simply a reinstatement of the object-world, but involves social co-ordination as necessarily constitutive of the world. Schutz describes this by a series of postulates that guarantee a 'reciprocity of perspectives' (1962a, 315–316), whereby actors "maintain the belief that others perceive reality as we do…(such that)… if we were to change places with others our perception of reality would remain the same…" (Stubblefield and Murray, 2002, p. 151).

of the common-sense world 'the world of working' (1962b, 226), but we suggest that it is better understood as the mundane world of coordinated action – sitting in chairs, drinking from coffee cups, catching busses, and giving and receiving objects – the whole gamut of social actions, including those carried out in talk: delivering greetings, offering descriptions, making requests, etc (Schutz, 1962b; Psathas, 2014). Sass (2014a) has suggested that it is the loss of grounding status of this 'paramount reality' that creates the conditions for certain of the phenomena in *schizophrenia*. For instance, it is the loss of a grounding reality that in turn distorts the status of imaginary domains, so that the distinction between the imagined and the real is lost.

Certainly, other writers have discussed different worlds or realities: William James prior to Schutz and Goffman after him (Psathas, 2014); and within the philosophy of science, Popper (1978) and Penrose (2006) have independently developed three-world ontologies that bear some resemblance to certain aspects of our model. We, however, are making no ontological claims, and instead, in accord with Schutz, look to worlds as 'meaning domains' or global settings that social participants might orient toward in interaction. Nonetheless, while our model has its genesis in Schutz's discussion of multiple realities, it ends up diverging considerably in the details.

2.1 A five-world model

Our model then ought to be read as a tool of interpretation – 'worlds' to mean 'modes of world-revealing', with each way-of-revealing sufficiently distinct as to suggest a different world-type. For those wary of introducing an interpretive frame, it ought to be pointed out that it is not so much introducing a frame as supplanting the one-world interpretive frame of common sense – 'breaching', in other words, the analyst's own world-embeddedness of natural attitude investment in mundane reality.

We have given the worlds each a rather simple label to suggest that they lie within daily practices of languaging; their interweaving into a common-sense organization of the 'one reality' is a background, everyday affair, tacitly and socially accomplished. In everyday activity, we tend to jump seamlessly from one world to the next, mostly oblivious to the gulf we have just crossed. We describe them as 'Me-world', 'This-world', 'That-world', 'The-world', and 'Beyond-realms', and will gloss them now each in turn.

2.1.1 Me-world

Me-world refers to the world of private, embodied experience. It is a simultaneous experiential coupling of a world-self relation within the enactivist understanding that 'world' and 'self' are co-arising phenomena, two faces of the one coin (Varela et al., 1991). It is not 'my-world', as the self does not stand constitutively before the experienced-world. If anything, self and world stand in an 'as' relation: self-as-world and world-as-self, both simultaneously constituted in experience, *as* experience. Husserlian phenomenology, as discussed, takes the self-world relation as its starting point for enquiry, and a particularly influential cluster of theoretical frames that posit '*schizophrenic* autism' as a central feature or 'generator' of *schizophrenic* presentation makes this coupling of self and world (Me-world) of particular interest in phenomenological psychiatry (Minkowski, 1987; Parnas et al., 2002, 2005; Sass et al., 2017; De Haan and Gipps, 2018).

2.1.2 This-world

Jakobson (2011), talks of indexical expressions as 'shifters', linguistic units whose meanings refuse definiteness of sense, ever retaining a context-dependent 'pointing' function. Garfinkel considered indexicality an ineluctable feature of social action and the core focus of ethnomethodological concern. The vast majority of sociological theory, in Garfinkel's view, attempts to proceed by first 'remedying' or 'fixing' indexicality by substituting 'objective for indexical expressions' to ensure 'rational accountability' (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, p. 161). He called such approaches 'remedial' and contrasted them with the ethnomethodological intention to allow indexical ambiguity to remain as a key and dynamic feature of social organization.

Ineluctable indexicality is central to the discussion of 'This-world', which describes a world, as experienced, of immediate, indexical *haecceity*, or the irreducible specific 'this-ness' of the local situation in light of a fellow social member interacting with the same world. The local situation is a socially shared immediate context – a shared 'immediacy-of-a-here'. It constitutes a reality insofar as Schutz's epoché dictates that action presupposes solid ground, and it is a *shared* reality in that shared or mutual action demands that the ground of any such action must also be shared. The structure of that common ground however is perennially subject to immediate, microsocial negotiation. Joint attention is one of This-world's key features; situational indexing is another. A successfully negotiated (social) reality of This-world involves members mutually orienting to commonly held formations of things, actions, and settings, which involves dynamic coordinations of 'what-it-is-that-this-thing-is' and 'what-it-is-that-is-happening-here'. This is to say, members orient to the situated present of This-world via organizations of kind and Type[6] that find form in language according to common understandings of relations between things, events, and settings. These collective understandings constitute social and cultural forms of background knowledge, variously called 'common sense', 'mundane reason', or 'tacit knowledge' (Pollner, 1987; Fuchs, 2001).

The 'this-ness' of an (experienced) object foregrounds its concrete and specific individuality above and in excess of its abstract category ascription; even if two people in a shared situation both encounter a creature as 'a cat', there is much in the creature that exceeds its category. The category, 'cat', is an abstraction; the creature before them both (*this* creature, the one that they can both point to) is concrete. 'Selves' are reconfigured as phenomena of intersubjectivity in This-world, and intersubjectivity – a primordial sociality – is explored in formal analyses through various methods of interaction analysis and microsociological microanalysis. If *schizophrenia* is to be conceived as a disturbance of common-sense (Blankenburg and Mishara, 2001) or a disturbance of intersubjective 'between-ness' (Phillips, 2001), then we should look for evidence of any such disturbed coordination in the immediate relations of This-world. Goffman (1983) describes the social dynamic of this shared immediacy as 'The Interaction Order'.

2.1.3 That-world

That-world is most easily discerned as an abstract background to This-world, a global domain of meaning which is non-immediate and non-present. Its defining mode of operation is as a socially coordinated

6 We use 'Type' — and capitalize it – after Schutz (1962c), rather than the more cognitively loaded 'category'. Nonetheless, they perform more or less the same function here.

and culturally shaped version of the real, but standing in contradistinction to the primordial sociality of the immediate present as well as the yet-to-be-discussed final two domains of reality. The attempt to 'stabilize' facticity, clear of subjectivity and indexical indeterminacy, is designed to establish 'world-facts' within social systems, or a 'fact-world' that need not be determinate (which is the key feature of 'The-world'), but needs to be more stable than This-world.

Socially organized value systems and culturally determined hierarchies of relevance and preference play a role in this particular world-domain. If the prototypical operation of language in the mode of This-world negotiation is joint attention facilitated by indexing the immediate environment (e.g., pointing), then explicated symbolic formulations take over this role within That-world meaning-domains. With increased abstraction (which is to say, as we venture away from immediacies and further into the 'That'), the indexical functions of language become text internal, pointing less to commonalities of experience and more to matters within the text itself, to culture, and common forms of life and knowledge. In an influential formulation, Goldstein (1959) described a key feature of *schizophrenia* as a disturbance in the *abstract attitude*, which might be considered, among other things, as discrete moments of disengagement from the concrete concerns of the immediate situation to re-formulate the frames of engagement. We might consider this a complex interplay between abstract and concrete world conceptions. Popper's (1978) description of 'world 3 objects' in his tripartite ontology might also be said to belong to That-world.

2.1.4 The-world

Set against Husserl's conception of the life-world is a particular world conception that appears to eject the very nature of experience from its domain. Husserl attributed a 'scientistic' worldview as a natural consequence of a historical attitude he traced back to Galileo, who, he suggested, 'formalize(d) nature by seeing it in terms of an abstract grid of mathematical quantities', a point of departure that led to an 'abstractive closure' of the natural sciences 'based on abstraction and formalization away from the concrete individual occurrences' (Moran, 2012, p. 69). Such a world conception – i.e., an absolutist abstraction – shares qualities with aspects of described *schizophrenic* world-experience, namely de-animation (Stanghellini, 2004) and loss of dynamicism (Minkowski, 1987).

We can conceive of such a world as a determinate world against which our lived-worlds receive measure. Penrose (2006), in his three-world ontology, suggests that the world of mathematics represents an independent domain whose possibilities exceed the physical world and against only part of which the physical world maps. The deterministic domain of 'The-world' is a world of pure material determination. It constitutes a singular (universe-al) conception of states-of-affairs past, present, and future, held in a deterministic value-free chain of causation. It is world-as-object, the ground of the idea of observer-neutral 'objectivity', and it positions the human world and everyday affairs as being of the same fundamental type of determinate, de-animate phenomena. While The-world conceptions carry an aura of concreteness (they are about what 'indisputably is'), they are actually highly abstract—the conceptual distance between the Big Bang and this-desk-here-before-me-as-I-use-it is categorical. The organization of my body as a concatenation of subatomic particles is inaccessible to my lived experience of the body as *this* body, the body that reaches reflexively for the keys of the computer keyboard, the hand that reaches up to scratch the head, the body that is hungry. The-world presents a cold, clockwork universe stripped of all possibilities of the fundamental feature of animacy. Within its modes of knowledge formation, the other domains of meaning are reduced to mere approximations of its own ways of world-revealing. By its very structure, The-world cannot allow itself to be conceived of as just one world among others.

2.1.5 Beyond-realms

Beyond-realms are, as the term would suggest, set apart from the other four world domains, but with a distinct flavor of reality (they are 'real', but in a different way to the immanent domains). We shall not attempt to define them, except to say that they are referred to in language, and, as later analysis will detail, they need to be managed in language or by means of taboo and ritual to ensure that demarcation is maintained between the beyond and the mundane world. They share properties of transcendence with Me-world, and this has consequences in claims of mystic experience. We allow 'Beyond' as a placeholder for world-domains that might lie outside mundane world reference, in whatever way these might come up in interaction – and in *schizophrenic* interaction, they do so regularly. Rather than predefining them, we treat them as necessary backdrop for certain operations of language.

These five worlds have been delineated through close consideration of *schizophrenic* talk, and the suggestion was that we might account for certain features of *schizophrenic* interaction by positing a weakened sense of obligation to bring the different domains into coherent relation. Indexicality would seem to be the key organizing feature between the worlds, with it being possible to make the argument that the 'view from nowhere' implicit in 'The-world' removes the perspective-providing 'I' from the picture altogether.

3 Problems of naïve empiricism

In our attempt to identify meaningful patterns in the records of interaction, we encountered a series of problems. The most obvious was the danger of simply re-describing diagnostic parameters. *Schizophrenia* diagnosis is enacted, to a large extent, on the grounds of clinical interview, which is to say, upon factors evidenced in an interactional setting. A naïve approach to data analysis risks 'discovering' those very factors that were used to select the interview subjects in the first place. This presents an unhelpful circularity.

In addition, the heterogeneity of symptoms in *schizophrenia* presents a major obstacle when looking for patterns of interactional detail across different subjects or even within a single subject. In a monograph on *schizophrenic speech*, McKenna and Oh (2005) detail *schizophrenia* in terms of three semi-independent symptom clusters, or syndromes, delineated in terms of 'positive' and 'negative' symptoms, and a third factor, 'disorganization'. One of the earlier intimations of this third syndrome referred to it not in terms of (a cognitive) 'disorganization' but rather as 'disorders in relating' (Strauss et al., 1974). This harks back to earlier descriptions by Jaspers and Schneider of a supposed difficulty in forming empathic bonds with *schizophrenia* diagnosees, possibly grounded in an 'autistic'[7] withdrawal from the

7 'Autism', as used here, is different to 'autism' as commonly applied to Autism Spectrum Disorders. The use of the term to describe key features of *schizophrenia* originated with Bleuler (Fusar-Poli and Politi, 2008), predating application of the term to developmental anomalies.

field of relationships that Cameron (1938) claimed can lead ultimately to an encysted experiential bubble (Minkowski, 1987; De Haan and Gipps, 2018). Much language research in schizophrenia tends to focus on this third syndrome, conceptualized as cognitive disorganization or 'Formal Thought Disorder'.

Nancy Andreasen redefined Thought Disorder as a 'Language and Communication' disorder via a scale of 18 descriptors (Andreasen, 1986). To repeat the earlier point: the danger of engaging in naïve interactional analysis without understanding what has already been operationalized as diagnostically significant is that of 'unearthing' exactly such diagnostic descriptors. An illustration might be drawn here with 'clanging', one of the 18 features on Andreasen's scale that she describes as 'A pattern of speech in which sounds rather than meaningful relationships appear to govern word choice... [involving] ...rhyming relationships... [and] ...punning associations' (Andreasen, 1986, p. 478).

There are numerous examples of clanging in our data. One involves the responses of an interviewee, (BF), to a cognitive test run by the second interviewer (I2). The test proceeds by presenting the test subject with a non-sense word and offering a series of progressively more explicit clues, each time asking the interviewee to guess what the non-sense word means. BF is offered the test word 'prither', to which he responds with a confirmation/repair request (1402):

data extract 1, Prither/enton

1A

1401 I2; the next word is prither, ok
1402 BF; privver?
1403 I2; prither. is a made up word. what might prither mean?

Upon further clues being offered, the 'game' of question–response is continually derailed, and at one stage, BF asks to go for a cigarette break but under encouragement decides to continue with the final clue:

1B

1468 I2; let's try the next one
1469 when you prither you put food into your mouth chew and swallow
1470 BF; priveleged
1471 I2; ok.... priveleged? prither means priveleged. is that what you
1472 think?
1473 I1; what- what word fits there
1474 when you something, you put food in your mouth you chew and you
1475 swallow
1476 BF; gum

'Prither' (1401)⟶ 'privver' (1402) ⟶ 'privileged' (1470). The possible mishearing that triggered the repair initiation at 1402 continues to be the locus of orientation for BF, despite the intervening (but here elided) 50 lines of interaction.

To the following test word, '*enton*', in combination with the meaning prompt of '*a form of art*', BF responds '*Arntoine Rafaelo*'.

1C

1478 the next pretend word is enton.
1479 ok what might enton mean=for some to enton is a form of art
1480 BF; *Arntoine Rafaelo%=some artist I can't remember the name of*
1481 I2; ny=ok
1482 I1; °ok°

After this, he gets agitated, unclips the microphone and starts to talk into it in the manner of a sports commentator, describing what the interviewer is wearing. Asked whether he wants to have a break, he clips the microphone back on and asks to continue. The interview continues with the same test item, '*enton*', and further clues elicit '*ten tonne hammer*', '*newton*', and '*per ten t' tain*', which the interviewer interprets as '*to entertain*', and finally a string of music-themed and alliterative words and sonic fragments – '*melody, melodic(s) tones 'n' moes*'.

It is obvious that in these responses, BF is responding more to phonological cues than to semantic associations. But to let the observation rest here would be to simply redescribe Andreasen's diagnostically significant 'clanging'. On the other hand, seen in the context of a progressive deterioration of the 'interview game' and BF's attempts to leave the interview, we might also interpret this gathering swarm of phonological associations as performing work of resisting, avoiding, or otherwise displacing semantic coordination. Which is to say, it is not in itself meaningless.

Harvey Sacks is generally credited as the founder of Conversation Analysis. In an intriguing article based on a talk presented shortly after he died in 1975, Gail Jefferson details 'exploratory' work on poetics that Sacks had been engaged in in the final years of his career. She describes motivation for the talk thus:

> ...the field of Conversation Analysis was coming to be identified almost exclusively by reference to the Sacks et al. paper "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation" published in 1974. As an antidote to that drastically constricted version of the field, I decided to present the wild side... (Jefferson, 1996, p. 2)

She introduces the tentative work on poetics with a consideration of psychotic talk but goes on to detail similar phenomena appearing in 'ordinary' talk. She later notes that there is something 'autistic' about the self-referential nature of some of the sound and categorial associations discussed, in both psychotic and normal talk. However, she cites an early psychiatric researcher to claim that what sets psychotic production apart from 'normal' – what constitutes the pathology, in other words – is not so much the formal feature of textual self-reference as 'the tendency to incorporate such autistic productions without any endeavor to translate them into a form which considers the needs of the listener' (Woods, 1938, p. 302). In Conversation Analytic terms, this attention to the needs of the listener is described as 'recipient design' (Sacks et al., 1974).

What follows in Jefferson's article is a series of descriptions of poetic instances that stand outside the normal constraints of Conversation Analytic methods: observations, hunches, and interpretations that verge on psychological readings. Jefferson is unapologetic, quoting Sacks' response to criticism that such noticings might get 'carried too far' by noting that, first, one needs to raise them as a possibility. The work was exploratory, Jefferson stressed, and so one needed to 'push the stuff, keep pushing at it, see how far it might go, you can always pull back to a more cautious, reasonable, sensible position' (1996, p. 9).

If we look back at the above series of data extracts as a loss of recipient design, a collapse of the relational field into autistic textual self-reference, then we might ask – what use are Conversation Analytical tools here? Jefferson provides a tentative answer: We are exploring the boundaries of the Conversation Analytic method.

Suggesting that there might be another world of significance intruding here – an autistic 'Me-world' – is to peer over the fence-line of Conversation Analytic ('This-world') concern and see what might be pushing back against the fence from the other side.

4 Three methodological hurdles

In a classic article on aphasia, Jakobson (1956) argued that the study of language breakdown in pathology might lead to better understanding of normal language function. However, linguistic interest in the language anomalies of *schizophrenia* has remained slight. In addition, what studies have been carried out have tended to focus on elicited forms of decontextualized production and clinically set forms of talk rather than on natural language interaction. In performing Conversation Analysis on topic management in unstructured talk between diagnosees and close relatives, Riou (2015) was able to demonstrate that the interactive dyad could employ non-canonical strategies to progress a conversation despite 'glitches' in topic transition and suggests that a richer approach to *schizophrenic* talk (and atypical interaction more generally) might involve identifying such idiosyncrasies of interaction as an adjunct to descriptions of dysfunctions of language production. This focus on the interactive dyad rather than the features of the abstracted language of an atomized psyche offers both research and therapeutic potential. McCabe et al. (2004) and McCabe (2009), for example, were able to argue against an influential 'Theory of Mind' account for *schizophrenia* (Frith and Corcoran, 1996) by applying Conversation Analysis to transcripts of diagnosee interaction.

It should be noted, however, that applying the Conversation Analytic method to *schizophrenic* interaction is not without its problems. The first, as discussed in detail by Riou (2015), is the difficulty in accessing conversational data on account of the vulnerable population. A specification of this difficulty is in accessing data that involves interactions with 'normal', non-clinician interlocutors. The data used in the current study falls somewhat short of this ideal of 'natural' conversation. As mentioned, the recorded interactions did not involve clinical settings of examination, diagnosis, or treatment but were introduced to subjects as being for the sake of non-specified 'language research'. Nonetheless, the primary interviewer was a clinical psychiatrist member of the mental health service from which subjects were drawn, and interviews were semi-scripted, employing a combination of open-ended question prompts as recommended by Andreasen (1986) for eliciting language production for diagnostic purposes, as well as a series of more formalized cognitive test procedures introduced by the secondary interviewer. The cognitive framing of the researchers' motivating interests led to efforts to stimulate monologues or extended turns in an attempt to minimize interviewer 'intrusion' into the data, which is not ideal from the perspective of interaction analysis.

In addition to these general concerns, we identified three more specific 'hurdles' of method that needed to be addressed.

4.1 Hurdle 1: weakening of the next turn proof procedure

Schutz (1962a) distinguishes social sciences from the natural sciences by seeing the former as involving the study of human meaning-activity whereas objects of interest for the physical sciences are inanimate. In contrast, objects of social scientific interest involve future-directedness and organizations of relevance and meaning. He describes these meaning-organizations of social scientific interest (the 'objects' of social science) as 'first order' meanings. Because they are grounded in biological activity, these objects of the social sciences are inherently organism-orienting, relevantising, and interpretive. Schutz calls the products of any such enquiry – which is to say, the meanings of a social scientific discourse – as 'second-order' meanings (meaning of meanings). As meaning-activities, these second-order meanings are likewise grounded in biological activity, and so, are likewise inherently organism-orienting, relevantising, and interpretive.

CA method attempts to access first-order meanings of the interactional situation directly, without imposing second-order meanings upon the phenomena through projection of macro-theoretical categories in a manner that Schegloff (1997, p. 167) critiques as 'theoretical imperialism'. It has primarily done this by focusing analytical attention (and, therefore, interpretive machinery) not on the lone utterance but instead by looking for evidence of meaning orientations and displays of understanding in interlocutor responses. The 'next turn proof procedure' recommends understanding the interactional meaning of a particular utterance by looking to see how an actual participant in the interaction interprets it, as shown through the manner in which they formulate their following turn. As Hutchby and Wooffitt (2008, p. 14) state, 'any 'next' turn in a sequence displays its producer's understanding of the 'prior' turn, and if that understanding happens to be incorrect, that in itself can be displayed in the following turn in the sequence'. Nick Enfield has pointed out that the 'proof procedure' is actually a 'disproof procedure', given the opportunity in the third turn to correct a misunderstanding (pc cited in Levinson, 2012, p. 129). This offers an elegant statement of social interaction as a 'mundane' form of social science: coordinated meanings are never settled or positively proven, but always contingent, existing in a dynamic state of provisional acceptance and ongoing negotiation, just as formal scientific hypotheses are.

The "next turn proof procedure" was first described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson–

> … while understandings of other turns' talk are displayed to coparticipants, they are available as well to professional analysts who are thereby afforded a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with... it is the parties' understandings of prior turns' talk... that are wanted for analysis. [this] affords…a proof procedure for professional analysis... (Sacks et al., 1974, pp. 728–729).

Of course, the reading of interlocutor orientations to 'what a turn's talk is occupied with' involves analyst interpretation, but it is an interpretation held in check by reference to the *following* participant turn, and so on, within the ongoing progressivity of talk and within the immediate context of relevance that is itself constantly being created and managed by participants-to-the-interaction within the interactional setting, in which the analyst plays no part.

A corollary of next turn evidencing is that speakers design their turns to fit the preceding turn. This would appear to suggest a 'rule' that, to assure coherence, next turns are to an extent determined by that which preceded them in concert with situational context. In practice, however, 'next turn' productions are potentially infinite

– what provides the guard rails of constraint are situationally specific expectations of accountability within an ongoing collaborative project of context construction and management that is indigenous to the interaction itself (Stokoe et al., 2021). One can say *anything* on a following turn – but if it diverges too far from expectations, one will be held to account for it.

While CA seeks to privilege in its analysis 'the orientations, meanings, interpretations, understandings etc. of the participants' (Schegloff, 1997, p. 166), making analytic judgments as to what participants display as their understanding of a previous turn itself relies on the implicit assumption that analysts share enough of the language and cultural background of the participants to confidently assign meaning to turns. Ethnomethodology makes explicit use of this in its recommendation of 'self-reflection' as a tool to recruit the analyst's own expertise in common-sense understanding as an interpretive resource – specifically, in drawing out webs of assumed-and-taken-for-granted implicature (Francis and Hester, 2004) – however, within the strictures of CA method, this 'mundane expertise' of the analyst remains implicit.

The notion of "normativity" comes into play here: the fact that the analyst is an 'everyday expert' of common-sense organization of talk – the very same expertise that allows participants of everyday talk to order and coordinate their first-order meanings – means that the analyst is equally, as a matter of mundane expertise, able to recognize what is 'non-normative'.

4.1.1 Non-normativity

In the case of delusional discourse in *schizophrenia*, Palmer (2000) has made the point that judgments of psychiatric pathology require an understanding of appropriate context-dependent social norms and that patient actions will be seen to take on symptomatic significance when they are judged as contravening these social norms. Palmer leverages studies by Wooffitt (1992) on 'normative' tellings of 'paranormal' events (experiences of ghosts and such – what we might call 'Beyond' phenomena) to show that it is not so much the content of certain delusional accounts that marks them as pathological as it is their non-normative management in the telling. But the warrant to judge such normative transgression is not limited to psychiatric specialists, and it is a matter of mundane expertise held by all reasonable practitioners of common sense. Smith (1978) describes how friends, family, and associates of a social member ('K') funnel K toward psychiatric services on the basis of pre-diagnostic attributions of acting 'queer', being 'impractical', 'out of touch', and having 'foibles', with the normativity transgression implied by these judgments finally made explicit when her behavior is ultimately described as 'not as it should be' (Smith, 1978, p. 31). Such non-diagnostic recognitions of the non-normativity of certain aspects of talk-in-interaction with *schizophrenia* diagnosees we here refer to as a recognizable 'madness'. Its recognition is a matter of everyday skill for social practitioners whose interactive practices are predicated upon the very normativity that the madness is seen to be in breach of. We make a distinction then between the social organizations of *schizophrenia* that flow from a diagnostic speech act and the non-formalized social organizations of madness.

Considering talk-in-interaction in terms of normativity directs our attention toward various types of non-normative interactions in various atypical populations. Antaki and Wilkinson, in their overview of CA and interactions involving atypical populations (Antaki and Wilkinson, 2012), specifically state that Conversation Analysis might not be able to say as much about atypical interaction as about 'typical' interactions. One reason for this may be, as was found in the current study, a weakening of the next turn proof procedure. Antaki and Wilkinson note that in a study of the interaction between psychiatrists and *schizophrenia* diagnosees by McCabe et al. (2002), 'one pervasive feature... is the doctor's markedly neutral reception of the client's news announcements, when these are hearably '*mad*"(Antaki and Wilkinson, 2012, p. 545). The 'hearable *mad*ness' that Antaki and Wilkinson refer to represents, of course, the imposition of a category ascription by an overhearing analyst. The fact that the analyst orients to normativity's breaching here, but that the clinical interlocutor does not orient to the same breaching, presents something of a problem. The doctor's *lack* of response stands in stark contrast to the findings of Garfinkel's well-known breaching studies (Garfinkel, 1967), where deliberate but relatively minor 'breaches' of normativity by experimental stooges drew extreme reactions from interlocutors, leading Garfinkel to claim that the normativity of the interaction order represents a *moral* order. From this, we might surmise that at a certain 'tipping point' of escalating 'madness', the mechanisms of social accountability start to break down, and interlocutors fail to be held to account, however subtly, for transgressions of social order when they start to be oriented-to as mentally ill. In this failure of accountability, we start to see a weakening of the basis for the next turn proof procedure.

We might see evidence for this weakening of next turn proof in the following extract from our data base:

data extract 2, 'seven universes'

```
51      cause of the you know if you put heart↓beat↑ hearts in a↑ petri
52      dish they all(.) start to beat↑ together or whatever, um so like
53      {th}all the twelfth monkey syndrome² or whatever {##}I jus'
54      believe that everyone knows (1.0) um% the same stuff within
55      their y=know f-f- first source connection to (1.5) ah(Hx)
56      through the sovereign int.egral³ to%(.) god or whatever but um%
57      they're% the universe:=seems to be disappearing in this,
58      →this is↓ not confirmed but it feels true, um
59      (1.5) um er that n=this, thite th's, there's <seven universes↑
60      and not all of them are>  uum humanoid but um, universes I
61      guess, um and um (1.5) and, um {tss} I'm a bit afraid of the
62      animus⁴ and a b/p↓it af:raid of Dell, c'z=a there's a- e:r guy
63      from the labyrinth group⁵..  u:m er=secret organisa%tion(.)
64      called the A-C:-I-O I=um  ACIO⁶↑
65      {um=n} and they're more um (1.0) um intelligent th(a/e)n
66      {their}  <they work with the Corteum an alien race whose> ..
67      whose um: whose planet is got to the point where it um..  <it
68      may not be able to heal> its: um.. um.. er.. oza- like the
69      ozone layer like they've they've not onl- they- maybe I'm not
70      sure if their elec-{##}=electricmagnetic goods or whatever or,
71      (H) <they're probably still there still or whatever I'm not
72      →sure but> (H) um th/yeah there's that and that's wh@y={#} I'm
73      a bit wary about ↓ that comp@uter ↓ I think its Bell not Dell
74      is there Bell computers{#}? (1.0) um⁷
75      (1.1)
76  I;  mm Dell (I think)
```

The interviewer (I) in this extract is noticeable in their lack of co-constructive input. There is no verbal input for 23 lines (we lack information about the non-verbal) until they are asked a direct question by the interviewee – and even then, there is a 1.0-s gap at line 74 followed by a 1.1-s gap at 75 before the interviewer responds at 76 with an epistemically hedged reference to the most mundane aspect

of the interviewee's account, with no orientation toward the bizarre metaphysics – the 'recognizable madness' – that has gone before.

This leaves us little to fall back on in terms of next turn evidencing. We might, however, look to within-turn features for evidence of recipient design (Drew, 2013). In the previously mentioned studies by Wooffitt (1992), it was noted that in telling of 'paranormal' experience, narrators need to establish their credentials as credible members of a common sense community before embarking on their telling of things and happenings that lie beyond the bounds of the mundane world. There is an interactive need, in other words, in the telling of paranormal experience, for the teller to establish themselves as hearably 'not-mad', before embarking on topics that might possibly be perceived as mad, and to bracket out the paranormal (the 'Beyond') from the normal and mundane. Wooffitt identified a mundanity marking structure – '*I was just doing X*' – that provides mundane context for the paranormal event, 'Y', so that the formal structure of such a telling might be seen as: '*I was just doing X, when Y*'. In other words, there is a prior grounding in common-sense, as well as a 'ritualized' demarcation of the paranormal that is necessary to maintain the recognizable mundanity of the mundane world. Palmer (2000) pointed out that it was just such sectioning off of the paranormal from the normal that was lacking in one analyzed extract of diagnostically delusional talk, where the interviewee describes having met a god, who 'calls himself Thor', and Thor is introduced to the telling with much the same matter-of-fact manner as the good, socially accounted, common-sense character not a few lines later of 'Mr Burnett the animal food manufacturer'.

If we return to data extract 2, we find that some of the 'metaphysical' content between lines 59 and 72 has been bookended by two indexical constructions – '*this is not confirmed but it feels true*' (58) and '*there's that and that's why I'm a bit wary about that computer*' (72). The material between these two markers might be considered 'hearably mad', so the speaker might be considered to be performing interactive work attempting to manage this with the indexical marking. This reading receives support when his use of the mundanity marker '*jus*" in line 53 is taken into account, as well as the speaker's efforts to ground his belief in common sense '*everyone knows (1.0) um% the same stuff*', and the epistemic hedging that leads up to the supra-normal account via dysfluencies of pausing, fillers, and false starts (52–57), as well as explicit marking of uncertainty with '*seems*' (57) and '*this is not confirmed but it feels true*'. This epistemic hedging continues with increasing frequency toward the end of the account between lines 68 and 72. In effect, JX can be seen to be going to great lengths to manage the intersubjective contentiousness of his candidate cosmology, and he directs his audience toward those specific epistemic domains that he believes provide evidence for the account: the domain of direct experience where '*it feels true*' and the domain available to everyone of '*first source connection*' where '*everyone knows the same stuff*'. Thus, he is attempting to bolster his metaphysical claims by leveraging them away from the 'merely subjective' to their being epistemically grounded in common sense in an attempt to intersubjectively stabilize the claims, giving them sway over the mutually-revealed interactionally-relevant world of the shared situation.

The effect of all this work is that the speaker appears to be anticipating interlocutor disagreement and pre-emptively managing it, displaying in the process a delicate level of attunement to the interactive space, despite the 'hearably mad' content. There is, however, a similar co-mingling of the 'Beyond' with the mundane, as Palmer noted: stories of the 'Corteum' alien race mingle with mentions of electromagnetic goods and 'Bell' computers with no noticeable shift of story-world or setting. There are resonances here with phenomena that have long been recognized in the psychiatric literature and described in terms of 'double bookkeeping' (Sass, 2014a), where diagnosees appear to maintain two different world accounts concurrently, such that, for instance, a hospital patient who might claim to be the Queen of England will nonetheless line up patiently for dinner with other patients – one foot in the 'delusional' world and the other in a world of shared immediacies.

The argument presented to this point has been that with the loss of the mechanics of accountability for breaches in normativity, the next turn proof procedure is noticeably weakened. This raises the question of how a Conversation Analytic approach to interaction analysis might proceed when its most useful tool has been blunted. The above analysis has used features of turn design (Drew, 2013) to analyze the interactive orientations of an extended turn, but in addition to this, it has also seen the need to enlist analyst sensitivity to breaches of normativity to identify the 'hearably mad' in the absence of interlocutor responses. It has also leaned on the psychiatric attribution of 'delusion' and referred to constructs within psychiatric literature (double book-keeping) to suggest a sense-making frame. Such moves align with Garfinkel's 'unique adequacy' requirement—which stipulates that in order to study specific domains of praxis, it behooves the ethnomethodological analyst to have at least some minimal experience of the domain, of its practices, its language, and its organizational structures. In adopting such tactical responses, the analysis moves away from Conversation Analytic methods toward what Pollner (1974, 1975) describes as an 'ethnomethodological attitude' and also toward dialectic engagement with psychiatric discourses.

4.2 Hurdle 2: unexamined importation of social categories (de-reifying the construct)

It is of central importance that while the analyst, as everyday 'expert' in common sense, might orient to ongoing breaches of normativity as 'hearable madness', it is most often the case that the psychotic speaker themselves will not. This warrants examination in terms of a frame conflict that appears to lie at the heart of certain *schizophrenic* phenomena and is generally referred to as a lack of 'insight'.

Subject selection for the 'analysis' considered here had already been performed, self-evidently, on the basis of psychiatric diagnosis. This preselection represents a social organization – a delineation of person-Type that carries implicitly a background social theory of failed membership (Smith, 1978) as well as implicit attributions of pathological meaning-organization (Von Bertalanffy, 1960). These attributions and pathologies have been ascribed from the outset via the diagnostic speech act to the individual diagnosee as an isolated entity, a dysfunctioning *psyche*. This psychological framing masks the social ordering implicit in the institutionally mandated speech acts of diagnosis and construct delineation. If left unexamined, this ordering of the social field is imported into the analysis at the very outset.

The change in perspective required here is revealed by considering a shift that occurred in the working definitions of 'schizophrenia' during the reported study's development. What was initially conceived, unproblematically, in terms of symptom descriptors, where *schizophrenia* would be described in terms of 'delusion', 'hallucination', and 'disordered thinking' (at various levels of descriptive detail), came

to be reconceptualized as a complex process of category ascription that involved a funneling of various phenomena of social breaching toward mundane ascriptions of social liminality ('madness') and ultimately toward institutionally mandated speech acts of formal diagnosis. To put it very simply, in place of being conceptualized as a list of symptoms, *schizophrenia* came to be seen as something that one socially organized person-Type (psychiatrist-Type-members) does to another socially organized person-Type (*schizophrenia*-Type-members).

It should be noted that such a perspective aligns rather closely with the perspective of diagnosees who are described diagnostically as 'lacking insight', which is to say, who disagree with their diagnosis. While 'lack of insight' is not monolithic and varies both in intensity and form, it is generally attributed to between 50 and 80% of people who receive a diagnosis of *schizophrenia* (Amador and David, 1998). 'Lack of insight' represents a site of frame conflict between institutional psychiatry and diagnosees: the person who might be on the receiving end of an unwanted (and from their perspective unwarranted) diagnosis indeed can perceive 'schizophrenia' as (nothing more than) a social categorization that is performed upon them by institutionally mandated others. Problems in meaning coordination in *schizophrenic* interaction will appear from the clinical perspective as failures in meaning production on behalf of the patient, but from the patient's perspective, these can present as failures of meaning reception on behalf of the clinician (Rochester and Martin, 1979). The interaction analyst who approaches interactional data unreflectively risks importing the psychiatric stance – the 'psychiatric gaze' – at the very ground of the project. Jeff Coulter (1973, 1991) discusses this in terms of a reification of the *schizophrenia* construct, and his recommendations for avoiding it include the analyst engaging in a Wittgensteinian type of 'conceptual clarification'. Attempting to address this problem at its root means taking into consideration the diagnosee's 'lived experience', and in the current project, this has involved a qualified exploration of phenomenological methods, in particular, clarifying what role Husserl's notion of the life-world might play in generating understandings of the interactional data.

4.3 Hurdle 3: phenomenological (life-world) considerations

Hepburn and Potter, in outlining Conversation Analysis as a qualitative method within psychological research, suggest that within the situational specifics of institutional settings, 'it is important to seek insights into the participants and their roles' (Hepburn and Potter, 2021, p. 18). They also note – an important addendum within the psychological context – 'the focus [in CA] is on settings rather than people' (2021, p. 15).

Consider then the following first-person description (translated from the original French) of schizophrenic experience from a well-known published account of a pseudonymous 'Renee':

> For me, madness was definitely not a condition or illness; I did not believe I was ill. It was rather a country, opposed to Reality, where reigned an implacable light, blinding, leaving no place for shadow; an immense space without boundary, limitless, flat; a mineral, lunar country, cold as the wastes of the North Pole. In this stretching emptiness, all is unchangeable, immobile, congealed, crystallized. Objects are stage trappings, placed here and there, geometric cubes without meaning. People turn weirdly about, they make gestures, movements without sense; they are phantoms whirling on an infinite plain, crushed by the pitiless electric light. And I—I am lost in it, isolated, cold, stripped purposeless under the light (Sechehaye, 1968, p. 44).

Renee explicitly addresses the institutional frame of psychiatry: 'madness' for her is not an *illness*. This *for-her* aspect – a 'lived experience' of *schizophrenia* – nudges us toward phenomenological considerations. Within phenomenological psychiatry, *schizophrenia* is often framed as self-disturbance (technically, an 'ipseity'-disturbance, see Sass and Parnas, 2001; Sass, 2014b), but Renee does not describe it in this way. She describes her experience of madness instead as a 'country', inhabited by meaning-depleted 'stage trappings'. She orients to madness, within this description, not in terms of personhood, but in terms of an alteration of settingedness. What is under description here is not a delusion, a hallucination, or even a disturbed sense of self, but rather a particular type of *world*-experience.

In Jefferson's above-mentioned 'wild' foray into poetics, she relegates to an appendix her 'wildest' observation, 'so improbable that presenting it [might] simply impeach anything else I might say' (Jefferson, 1996, p. 49). It concerns two separate attempts in different interactive contexts by the same person, 'Emma' (who, it needs to be noted, is not psychotic), to index a personally significant setting in conversation. In both cases, the conversation circles around television coverage of the assassination of Robert Kennedy when, with little preparatory work, Emma announces that 'that' – meaning the spot where Robert Kennedy's body was loaded onto a plane – was the same spot from which she, Emma, had taken off on a plane for a trip to Honolulu.

data extract 3, 'internal landscape #1', from Jefferson (1996, 53)

Emma: THAT'S WHERE THEY WE TOOK OFF on ar chartered flight that sa:me spot didju see it?
(0.7)
Emma: 'hh when they took him in[to the air]pla:ne,]=
Lottie: n : N o : : .
Lottie: =Hell I wouldn' ev'n wa:tch it.

data extract 4, 'internal landscape #2', from Jefferson (1996, 53)

Emma: 'h Hey that wz the same spot we took off fer Ho:nuhlulu
(0.3)
Emma: where they puut him o:n,
(0.6)
Emma: et that chartered pla:[ce,
Nancy: Oh: ri ↑ lly?

Jefferson makes the following observations–

> Each of the announcements is formed up in the same way. Emma is pointing at something, "that spot," as if she and her recipient were passengers on a bus, and she's noticing a feature of the landscape. And in each case her recipient has difficulty locating what's being pointed to... It may be that Emma is indeed pointing to a feature of the landscape, but a landscape accessible only to her; an internal landscape. And it may be that the feature of the internal landscape that she's pointing to is present in the words that immediately precede each announcement (Jefferson, 1996, pp. 53–54).

Jefferson then searches for cues in the prior text that might have acted as triggers to place Emma in that landscape but which failed to similarly place her interlocutors, something to account for the 'enigmatic pointing to something that just is not there'. At this point, the interlocutors are in two worlds, the world of historical significance (That-world in which Kennedy is assassinated) and the (Me-)world of personal significance, and Emma is attempting to bring them together, to place herself within the historical context and establish her 'brush with history' (Jefferson, 1996, p. 56). Note within this context the 'THEY ⟶WE' pronoun repair in the first line of the first example. That she is unsuccessful in bringing her interlocutor along with her in the first example is sufficient for Jefferson to point out the parallels of this 'enigmatic pointing' with the autism of psychotic talk, which proceeds 'without any endeavor to translate [it] into a form which considers the needs of a listener' (Woods, 1938, p. 302).[8]

Wouter Kusters, a Danish linguist and philosopher who has experienced two episodes of psychosis describes as a metaphor for his experience of psychosis a machine from a science fiction novel – a 'Rhennius machine' – which transforms objects into their mirror image. A left shoe, if placed in the machine, returns as a right shoe (Kusters, 2020). If a person steps into the machine, they, similarly, come out with everything flipped right-to-left, even modes of perception and ways of thinking become 'flipped', and this leads to the interesting point: to a person thus mirror-inverted, it is the whole world that appears to have undergone a transformation – cars drive on the opposite side of the road, doors open contrariwise, etc. Their 'Me-world' has undergone a paradigm shift, while ours will have remained as they were.

The point of Kusters' metaphor is that we can see the situation of the mirror-inverted perceiver by way of two different aspects. One, which presents itself as objective, is the view from the non-mirror world, where we should say that the person has been reversed; the other is from the perspective of the inverted perceiver themselves, who can reasonably claim to have remained the same while the entire world has undergone a mirror inversion. We, as non-participant observers of this fictional world, can perform an 'aspect-switch' from seeing the scenario in one way via a complete and instantaneous reorganization, to seeing it via an alternative aspect. By means of the device, Kusters aims to undermine positivist conceptions of psychosis, which would approach presentations of psychotic phenomena from an ontologically stable frame of reference in the realist tradition. Such an approach fails to take into account the meaning world (the life-world) of the mirror-flipped person. Interaction with a psychotic patient then might be likened to trying to talk to a 'Rhennius machine traveler', while the traveler in talking to us is attempting to make sense with someone who, from their perspective, is in a reversed world. A common language fails because the assumption of grounding reference in a common world has failed.

The thought experiment takes to the extreme the same phenomena of 'internal landscapes' that Jefferson was exploring in the above examples. Paying attention to the possibility of these internal landscapes, we claim, means paying at least some analytical attention to the existence of an experiential life-world of diagnosees, and the work that goes into, or fails to go into, integrating this experiential life-world into a life-world that is shared (and sensed) in common with their interlocutor(s).

What, as analysts of talk-in-interaction, might we take from these considerations in approaching the study of interaction in *schizophrenia*?

Certainly, it is not our task to try to 'get inside' the experience of such a 'world-flipped' person. As Anderson et al. point out, 'capturing and expressing the nature of the individual's experience is not ethnomethodology's topic' (Anderson et al., 1985, p. 244). But it does appear to task us with examining our own ontological assumptions to stop us from projecting them onto the other's experience and meaning formations. Similarly, our task is not to talk to such a person across the difference in world construal (this might be considered a task of clinical psychiatry) but instead to examine how talk proceeds between people who might inhabit different worlds without taking out *a priori* investments in the ontological grounds of either world. Thus, part of our task must involve an investigation of our own world assumptions. This is the task that Coulter identified as 'conceptual clarification', and which Pollner (1974, 1975) has pointed out involves a necessary distancing from common sense and the 'undoubtable' single world of its paramount reality. This is work that the manifold-world model has been proposed to perform. As Garfinkel demonstrated, common sense needs to be 'breached' before it can be seen. This is bound to be unsettling.

5 Proceeding on the basis of a gloss

Abiding by Garfinkel and Sacks' recommendations on 'glossing procedures'(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, pp. 164–165), we are loath to fix by definition the 'worlds' that we have sketched in outline; instead, we would look for examples of occasioned use to unpack their implications. It ought to be clear by this point that This-world is the domain within which microsocial interaction analysis plays. Perhaps less clear is that That-world includes macrosocial and institutional forms of organization. In this section, we will focus on explicating relations and translations between these two worlds.

Eglin (2017) does some of this work for us when he describes Garfinkel's studies into the work of the Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center, where investigators had to establish an account of death, as dealing with the ways that details of the 'thises' were processed into a formally accepted account of death:

> 'A "that" – the social fact of a suicide, for example – is made up of a bunch of thises. The relationship among the thises and the that is not correlational or causal but...involv(es) the mutual determination of meaning as in the documentary method of interpretation' (Eglin, 2017, p. 8).

The documentary method of interpretation, originally attributed to Mannheim (Roth, 2015), consists of treating an actual appearance or phenomenon as a 'document' or instantiation of an underlying regularity or pattern.

> ...the coroner...must make their determinations 'with respect to the 'thises': they have to start with *this* much; *this* sight; *this* note; *this* collection of whatever is at hand (Garfinkel, 1974, p18, as cited in Eglin, 2017).

The interplay between details of the 'this' and socially consolidated details of the 'that', as Eglin describes, is a circular

8 A similar 'enigmatic pointing' can be seen with the indexicals bracketing the 'mad talk' in data extract 1 in lines 58 and 72.

method of mutual interpretation between 'this' of instance and 'that' of underlying pattern–

> ...history itself...has been a bunch of thises and that's. Ethnomethodological studies...[are] irremediably tied to the 'thises' insofar as, through members' methods of sociological enquiry, they ceaselessly transform into "thats," and to the "thats" that give "thises" their meaning (Eglin, 2017, p. 26).

"'Thats" that give 'thises' their meaning" might be understood here to mean that the underlying abstract patterns ('thats') toward which actual concrete events ('thises') point represent Typifications, so that the specificity of any actual event might be characterized in terms of patterns of '*what-it-is-that-is-happening-here*', and its situated elements in terms of '*what-it-is-that-this-thing-is*' – which is to say, in terms of a *Type* of happening or thing.

It bears repeating that formulation of the 'five-world' framework emerged from considering language use of people who had received a diagnosis of *schizophrenia* – which is to say, it was a pattern discerned from a handful of 'thises'. Aspects of *schizophrenic* talk, it was suggested, involved a loss of integration between these five domains of meaning and a subsequent loss of common sense world-organization. The following 'analyses' of interactive data are presented as illustrative of this suggestion.

5.1 What was that knock?

We present these next two extracts between a diagnosee (BF) and the chief interviewer (I1) as examples of similar phenomena, negotiation over elements of the situated setting. The first might be considered a successful negotiation, resulting in participants being able to 'go on' with the business at hand (see Sterponi and Fasulo, 2010), and the second escalated into interactional trouble. In the first, we suggest that the interaction was progressed despite BF displaying an apparent 'role reversal' – reading the situation via a 'That-world' schema that appears contrary to common-sense, but which the interviewer does not orient to as in any way unexpected, actually acceding to the role reversal in terms of epistemic organization. In the second, there is a dispute over the 'That-world' nature of a recording device. Here, the interviewer stands his epistemic ground *as* an interviewer, insisting that the device is to record the conversation and not medical information. BF explicitly states his disagreement in an escalation of conversational trouble.

data extract 5, 'what was that knock?'

62 BF; and so you can understand where a lot of this stupid stuff's
63 coming from
64 I ended up with blood clots like Steve Waugh like DVTs in my
65 calf
66 they were diagnosed as 16 cm above the point to my ankle
67 [that-
68 [((faint background sound))
69 (1.7)
70 ➤ what was that knock ?
71 I1; somebody in the next room I think
72 BF; that's ok.
73 Um and so I've got a very dead sore point in here ok?
74 um so we're trying to get it to re-canalise as possible
75 a lot of veins have been grown around it and we do feel as
76 though it may be re-able to be canalised

BF has been claiming that he is on the ward because of a sports injury that he has been treating with traditional Chinese medicine and Shiatsu massage – an alternative frame, we can safely assume, to the medical account for his psychiatric hospitalization. Between lines 64 and 66, he is orienting to his body as a medicalized (The-world) object with a total lack of epistemic hedging that contrasts the interviewer's hedge ('*I think*') in line 71. He appears to adopt a stance of reversed institutional role, with pedagogical comprehension checks at 62 ('*you can understand*') and 73 ('*ok?*'), and is in the process of providing an account of his self-diagnosis when there is a sound at 68. BF interrupts his account and orients to the sound, asking at 70 after a long pause (1.7 s) what it was. The interviewer suggests a candidate source: '*somebody in the next room I think*'. BF's response at 72, '*that's ok*', rings a little odd to us, although the interviewer did not respond to it as odd. BF then returns to the account of his claimed injuries and self-treatment, self-selecting at line 73 with an indexically signposted ('*here*') Me-world body-account — over which he has sole epistemic authority – in first-person singular ('*I*'), that then transitions back to a medicalized (The-world) account with an accompanying shift to first-person plural pronoun ('*we*').

When BF orients to the strange noise, the interviewer provides an epistemically hedged account, and BF accepts the account (although, as suggested, in a 'hearably odd' manner) and continues with his prior activity, although with a shift in world-domain to Me-world. The mystery element has been integrated into the shared situation in a mutual enough manner in order for the participants to be able to go on with the activity. This is an example of This-world negotiation. Contextual phenomena, which would normally be the background to the business at hand, have intruded into the foreground *as* the business at hand, to be dealt with as an interactional topic before being again relegated back to the tacit background. The sound has been integrated into the situational setting as a mutually acknowledged un-remarkable aspect of that setting. But what has occurred here has been a little wobble in the mutual situational ontology, where all that is solid and unquestionably known about the situation, such as the chairs the situational members are sitting in, the walls of the room, and the understandings of the parts each other plays in the situation – the ground, in other words, that allows the situated business to proceed – recedes, and the unknown (unTypified) element emerges to be dealt with in foreground as something to be mutually agreed upon and Typified from their different perspectives as appearing sufficiently the same to both (as two people seated at opposite sides of a table will see two different aspects of a cup, but agree, for all practical purposes, that it is the same cup). This occurs, but we have suggested that there is an 'oddness' to the response at 72. Here, the interpretive eye of the analyst intrudes: what grounds do we have for claiming oddness?

In their only co-authored article, Garfinkel and Sacks make the case for sociological enquiry based on 'members methods'. The notion of 'member', they claim, is 'the heart of the matter'. They do not use the term to refer to a person, but to 'mastery of natural language', which itself means 'to be engaged in the objective production and objective display of common-sense knowledge of everyday activities as observable and reportable phenomena' (1970, 163).

In saying that something feels 'odd' about the response at line 70, and in the absence of the interviewer having oriented to the response as odd, we do so not as language analysts but as natural language members reflexively 'noticing' a glitch in expectation at the level of first-order meaning activity. In excavating that anomaly – by saying, for instance, that BF appears to exceed his warrants here by 'granting

pass' to the noise – we move to practice second-order meaning-making. This inference is produced upon an imaginative projection of what would *not* have seemed odd here: BF simply ignoring the noise as part of a busy hospital setting, or else accepting at 72 the interviewer's formulation ('*oh, ok*') would not have seemed odd, nor would the interviewer 'granting pass' to the noise as situationally appropriate.

In other words, the interviewer has situated membership roles that grant socially organized warrants to condone the noise as situation-appropriate and within the bounds of mundane occurrence, while BF's warrants, organized relative to the interviewer's, are correspondingly less.

By following chains of inference through and explicating expectations on the grounds of our own membership and our own natural language mastery, we use ethnomethodological self-reflection to demonstrate how the seeming institutional role reversal in the content of BF's productions between lines 62 and 66 and taken up again between lines 73 and 76 is also apparent in the interactional detail of setting management.

5.2 What's this thing you got goin' 'ere?

Now consider the following extract:

data extract 6, 'what's this thing?'

1331 I2; is that the end of the first one?
1332 BF; what's this thing you got goin' 'ere is this just the
1333 recording (.) thing [is it
1334 I1; [yeah it's just to show that it's work[ing
1335 BF; [is
1336 that mapped to a heart rate monitor or some bullshit or not
1337 I1; (no) (1.2) 's just the volume=
1338 BF; =yeah but what maths can you work out from it
1339 I1; n' I dunno
1340 (1.2)
1341 BF; no like if you're graphing it all I wanna know what you can
1342 actually work out from [it]
1343 I1; [oh] I don't use that that's just to
1344 [m-.. make]
1345 BF; [no: you're not-] n(h)o (1.3) n@o@o (mate)
1346 (0.7)
1347 I1; oh- I just use that to make sure the microphone's working
1348 (0.8)
1349 BF; no I don't believe ya
1350 (0.5)

This extract, with the same interlocutors as the last, occurs just before the sequence considered in data extract 1 within the same sequence of cognitive tests conducted by the second interviewer (I2). The interviewee (BF) had expressed reluctance from the start of this activity and appeared to actively subvert testing procedures. At one stage, when requested to answer '*in ordinary language… ordinary speech*' after having used apparently non-sense words, he replied '*what you want me to answer it sensibly…*', suggesting a strategic aspect to his engagement in the interview.

In lines 1332–1333, BF orients to a situational element in This-world mode of apparent negotiation of mutuality via explicit negotiation of *what-is-it-that-this-thing-is?* – offering, in turn, a candidate formulation (that the thing might be a recording device).

The first interviewer, who has had more time interacting with BF up to this point, responds to the problematization of the situational element and confirms the candidate formulation at 1334 with a follow-up elaboration—'*yeah it's just to show that it's working*'. Mutual orientation is not immediately achieved, however, which leads to interactive trouble up to the point where BF rejects the interviewer's situational interpretation at 1345 and then explicitly states at 1349, '*no I do not believe ya*'. As shown in extract 8, this is followed by a 0.5-s gap before I1 initiates what sounds like an abandoned response. Silence and *non-response* [strategies that Goffman (1969, p. 371) described as 'damping'] then seem to be adopted by the interviewer, as the sequence between 1353 and 1361 shows, until the interactive trouble is resolved enough for the institutional business-at-hand to resume, and the second interviewer to return to the testing format:

data extract 7, 'no I don't believe ya'

1350 BF; no I don't believe ya
1351 (0.5)
1352 I1; #((sounds like a truncated 'oh', or an abandoned start))
1353 (1.5)
1354 BF; yeah well of course but-
1355 I1; #-
1356 (0.5)
1357 BF; yeah well: (0.5)fine you're not working out the maths of it
1358 then
1359 I1; no, no
1360 (1.2)
1361 BF; n[o, you're]not allowed to
1362 I2; [the last sentence]
1363 (0.9)
1364 I2; the last sentence ((name))
1365 BF; nnh
1366 I2; is a sev a day keeps the doctor away

An entire situation is structured in myriad ways such that its members respond and orient to it meaningfully as a matter of course and as a matter of coordinated activity. Mostly, this occurs tacitly, as a mode of common-sense orientation to a shared life-world. As mentioned, this includes generic modes of orientation such as orienting to chairs in a room as meaningful organized elements by *acting* toward them as chairs (and sitting in them), to walls of a room *as* walls (demarcating social spaces, organizations, and activities), but this also funnels down to progressively more specialized modes of orientation – orienting to a hospital setting *as* a hospital setting, structured by certain mutual expectations of appropriacy, and not, for instance, orienting to it as a football stadium; and orienting to an interview situation *as* an interview situation, organized into elements, such as situational membership roles, expectation of outcomes (the gathering of records), and certain technical components, such as technologies of record-gathering.

All of these background organizations represent structural world knowledge held in common – 'That-world' knowledge – that informs patterns of relevancy in the immediate interactional situation in the form of membership expectation. In That-world, dogs chase cats; in This-world, we see a cat chase a dog, and the discrepancy registers with a glitch of surprise. In being admitted to a hospital, a patient-member to its institutionally structured situations will have certain expectations in common with other patient-members as to how nurse-members, doctor-members, and administrator-members might act, as well as expectancy sets of appropriate response.

In talking of expectations, Tannen (1993) reminds us that we are talking of frames. We might say that this loose background of progressively nested frames and settings is organized in any given situation into an entire taken-for-granted gestalt even before the business-at-hand is entered into, and at the precise moment of the unfolding of the business-at-hand, it constitutes a perennially up-for-negotiation but nonetheless stable common-world for all parties to the situation.

It is *this* organization that we are talking about as 'This-world'. This-world is an entire gestalt. It is structured, at any given moment, in terms of the organized absences of That-world, organizations of Type, and Typified relations. Disturb just one of these elements, and the edifice is discombobulated. We simply do not see this organization until it is transgressed. This background organization is the massive achievement that BF has already accrued before his foregrounding of the situational element of the recording device as the thread to pick apart, ambiguating the situation. A device for recording information in an interview setting that is itself situated within a hospital setting might flip, in an instantaneous aspect-switch, to seem a medical record-taking device. It is *this* aspect of This-world – the recording device – which has risen up, looming large, derailing the organized activity. In this sense, the recording device stands as a synecdoche to its specific embedding situatedness. If the 'recording device' should fail to hold firm to its function, then the entire situation – the 'interview situation' – is called into question in the same way. The doubt cast upon 'what-it-is-that-this-thing-is' casts into doubt 'what-it-is-that-is-happening-here' – the contract of shared action, grounded in the indubiety of the natural attitude, is disrupted.

The mode of BF's problematizing now becomes of interest: '*what maths can you work out from it*', '*is that mapped to a heart rate monitor*', '*if you are graphing it*', *'I wanna know what you can actually work out from it*'. His concern is about the translation from This-world contingency to more distal modes of account – to consolidation in That-world interpretations (over which he holds no authority), and even, bearing in mind Husserl's critique of the post-Galilean 'mathematization of nature' (Moran, 2012), about the imposition of a The-world totalizing interpretation on his body (or self) as situated object. It is worth bearing in mind here Mishler's (1984) distinction between the 'the world of medicine' and a patient's lifeworld, frames which can come into conflict as a patient resists a reduction of the second to the first.

The irony here is that BF's suspicions had some ground for justification. BF's language *was* being sampled for scientific analysis and his meanings *were* being exported to another world in order to have second-order meanings constructed out of them; and at the time, there was a good chance that quantification of his languaging *would* in fact occur, that the embodied articulations of Me-world and This-world would be passed through the mathematical sieve to be mapped against the grid of The-world reckoning. His meanings, in other words, are taken out of his hands and subject to objectification.

In this context, it ought to be borne in mind that this excerpt occurred in the midst of a series of psychological tests. The critique that Husserl applied to 'scientific psychology' as the ground for the phenomenological epoché – that the objectifying, deanimating gaze of scientistic reckoning, when applied to the human subject, diminishes the valence of the experiential domain – may be relevant here. The totalizing nature of the scientistic world-frame (which permits of only one world) inherently affects the conception of the human dimension. BF is orienting to the '*recording (.) thing*' as a translating device that does not only export his meanings to another (non This-) domain but mathematicises them, and he demands to be given access to these translations – '*I wanna know what you can actually work out from it*'. The interviewer, on the other hand, appeals to a common-sense mundanity of the device with a sequence of '*just*s ('*just to show that it's working*', '*just the volume*', and '*that's just to m-... make*') that function as markers of 'non-remarkability' working to de-thematise the recording device and relegate it to the background, taken-for-granted common world that does not warrant 'tellability' (Ochs and Capps, 2001).

6 Discussion

We began this article by asking how, as interactants, we distinguish between seemingly mad talk by people who are not diagnosed with mental illness and 'hearably mad' talk by people who are so diagnosed. This led to questions about how people come to inhabit a common world in the first place and an investigation into the constitution of the coordinated world of common-sense. It was observed that certain schools of psychiatry posit the root source of the wide range of *schizophrenia* symptoms to lie in a disturbance of common sense, which motivates the broadly ethnomethodological approach taken here. However, attempting to apply Conversation Analytic methods to recorded talk of diagnosees raised questions about the applicability of some of these methods to psychosis, and in addition, after Antaki and Wilkinson (2012), questions about their applicability to atypical populations in general.

An attempt to find common conceptual ground with psychiatric theory directed us to examine the phenomenological roots of ethnomethods in the works of Alfred Schutz and Edmund Husserl, which led to reconceptualizing *schizophrenia* in terms of a 'world disturbance'. It was suggested, after Pollner (1974, 1987), that a study of world constitution in the natural attitude needed to occur from a stance that was itself distanced from the natural attitude, and this provided grounds for proposing the 'manifold-world' model that has been presented here in the manner of 'breaching', for analytic purposes, common-sense world assumptions.

Our conclusion is that consideration of atypical interactions compels us to take account of our own implicit normative world-frames, making clear the need for engaging more complex models of sense-making, such as the one that has been sketched here. We believe that finding ways to integrate such top-down modeling with the bottom-up rigor of traditional CA method might afford CA added explanatory leverage in cross-disciplinary applications.

In terms of implications for Conversation Analytic method, we suggest that the grounds of the second-order meaning-activities of interaction analysis should be recognized as lying in unavoidable biological activities of the analyst: the orienting of attention, the making of relevance judgments, and the interpretative activities of sense-making. Recognizing the biological ground of these second-order meaning-activities would help avoid the mistake of employing a sterilizing 'scientism' that would otherwise deanimate the objects under study by treating them in the manner of objects of natural science. To say this is to recognize that what is occurring in the study of talk-in-interaction is a form of life-world analysis. This point is acutely relevant when it comes to the study of interaction with

schizophrenia diagnosees, as the dominant psychiatric framing of *schizophrenia* as 'brain-disease' risks just such a reduction of first-order meaning activity of diagnosees to (nothing more than) neurochemical imbalance. We would generalize the observation to include the study of all atypical populations.

To recognize the biological ground of meaning-activity is to recognize that any interaction analyst is irreducibly relevance-orienting and account-generating and reads observational data in light of these relevancy fields and reflexively generated organizing accounts. In other words, any attempts at bottom-up processes of observation in interaction analysis will unavoidably meet top-down processes of plausible model generation. We make these claims because the processes under description are inherent to our activities as biological organisms. These observations are consistent with general approaches of enactivism (Varela et al., 1991; Gallagher and Allen, 2018) as well as with recent collaborations between neurophysiology and philosophy, which fall under the broad rubric of 'predictive processing' or 'predictive coding' (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2015; Friston and Frith, 2015; Seth, 2021), where top-down modeling is seen to be ineluctably involved with attentional and relevance processing across all levels of meaning organization.

This brings the analyst once again within the analytic frame. We utilized normative membership reflexes as a potential source of information via ethnomethodological self-reflection and by paying heed to 'hearable madness' as well as 'glitches' in analyst-as-member expectation. Psychiatric readers might recognize such self-reflection as a cousin to counter-transference, and the interested reader is directed to Rumke's (1990) writings on 'praecoxfeeling', where it is argued that *schizophrenia* diagnosis occurs via intersubjective processes, recommending clinician attention be paid to their own internal responses when interacting with a diagnosee in addition to searching for explicit external signs.

In line with Garfinkel's unique adequacy requirement, it was seen necessary to explore the theoretical background of *schizophrenia* research, which included a critical examination of psychiatric constructs, including, most importantly, the *schizophrenia* construct itself. The resultant model we have proposed has implications in psychiatry for theoretical considerations on topics such as *schizophrenic* autism, double bookkeeping, disturbance of abstraction/concretism (Shimkunas et al., 1967), theories of disturbed indexicality (Crow, 2010), and insight attribution.

Exploring psychiatric theory led to an examination of phenomenological approaches to *schizophrenia*. In light of this, Garfinkel's rejection of phenomenological method (Garfinkel et al., 1977) should be qualified as a rejection of Husserlian transcendence, and we suggest the ethnomethodological project be recognized as a methodological unfolding of Schutz's proposal of a complementary (social) form of phenomenological enquiry. Considering this genealogy highlights the theoretically dense lineage that led up to CA's ultimate abjuration of theory to focus on method. We found it both necessary and fruitful to exhume the historical connection and conceptual links between CA and the Husserlian project and suggest that if CA should cut itself off from its theoretical sources, it risks separating itself from a font of renewal, in danger of becoming a technical exercise in cataloging that fails to establish footholds of relevance in other domains.

On this note, we believe that possibilities for dialectic engagement between Conversation Analysis and psychiatry are untapped. In psychiatry, for example, Conversation Analytic methods might prove useful in the training of clinicians to identify structures of intersubjectivity, and in language-in-interaction research, the general topic of interaction with atypical populations remains under-serviced. Institutional psychiatry, which has been dealing with atypical interlocutors since its inception, will likely have developed idiosyncratic norms of interaction which – bearing in mind Jakobson's injunction to study breakdown in order to gain a better understanding of function – might prove of inherent interest to language researchers.

In summary, we present the model of a five-world manifold as a motivated choice that has its ground in various forms of phenomenological and sociological theory. What is being suggested here is that the achievement of the one-world-in-common among and between members of language communities represents an achievement of common sense coordination. It is the *supreme* achievement of common sense and represents a lived commitment to the social world. It is a deeply habituated background assumption of the natural attitude that the language analyst themself is committed to in the mundane common-sense mode of acting and interacting in the world. It represents a *model of reality* that is already in operation as a background assumption behind day-to-day affairs. Introducing a five-world model, or meaning manifold, as has been done here, does not so much represent a theoretical imposition upon a tabula rasa but rather displaces the unconscious model of one-world bearing the load of all concrete linguistic reference that is already in operation within the natural attitude.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by the University of Melbourne Humanities and Applied Sciences Human Ethics Sub-Committee. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent for participation was not required from the participants or the participants' legal guardians/next of kin because data used in this study was collected in a prior, independent study where informed consent was negotiated.

Author contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual contribution to the work and approved it for publication.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Supplementary material

The Supplementary material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1223186/full#supplementary-material

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On the division of labor in the maintenance of intersubjectivity: insights from the study of other-initiated repair in Vietnamese

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Few ideas have figured more centrally in the history of social theory than that of the division of labor. Here we ask whether conversational interaction, like other forms of social activity, exhibits a division of labor and, if so, what functions this serves and how it might be understood in relation to the theories of Marx and Durkheim. We begin by noting that, though conversational participants actively work to achieve and sustain understanding, much of the time this work is invisible and only its products are displayed in the form of sequentially fitted next turns at talk. However, in sequences of other-initiated repair, the work involved in the maintenance of intersubjectivity rises to the surface. On these occasions, we can see and thus describe what participants do to achieve and sustain what they take to be adequate understanding. In our data, which consist of video recordings of casual conversations among Vietnamese same-generation peers, participants continuously display an orientation to relations of relative seniority through the selection of terms used to accomplish interlocutor reference. This pervasive orientation is also reflected in practices of repair initiation. Specifically, seniors regularly initiate repair with so-called "open class" forms such as "huh?" and "ha?" which display a minimal grasp of the talk targeted, require little effort to produce and, at the same time, push responsibility for resolving the problem onto the trouble source speaker (i.e., the junior member of the dyad). In contrast, juniors often initiate repair of a senior participant's talk by displaying a detailed understanding of what has been said, either in the form of a repeat or a reformulation, and inviting the senior to confirm. We suggest then that this asymmetry in the distribution of initiation practices reflects a "division of intersubjective labor". We conclude with some thoughts on the theoretical implications of our findings and relate them not only to the theories of Marx and Durkheim but also to the writings of feminist sociolinguists who sought to describe the way in which women seem to be burdened more than men with what Fishman called "interactional shitwork."

KEYWORDS

division of labor, other-initiated repair, intersubjectivity, conversational analysis, social theories of Marx and Durkheim, Vietnamese

Introduction

Few ideas have figured more centrally in the history of social theory than that of the division of labor (for a recent overview from an anthropological perspective, see Sanchez, 2018). In his early writings, Karl Marx theorized the division of labor in relation to processes of alienation. Specifically, workers, performing specialized, repetitive tasks that figured as isolated steps in a larger productive process, were alienated not only from that which they had a hand in producing but also from the creative activity of production itself and, ultimately, their own "species being" (Marx, 1977[1844]). The later Marx (1992[1867]) emphasized a distinction between the social division of labor and the division of labor in production (Mohun, 1983). The social division of labor consists of the various ways in which labor is distributed within a society between, for instance, men and women, young and old, peasants and feudal landlords, proletariat and bourgeoisie, and so on. The division of labor in production, on the other hand, refers to the ways in which processes of production under capitalism are broken down into component operations, the prototypical example being the assembly line characteristic of factory labor. While ever more minute divisions lead to greater efficiency and increased production, for Marx and Engels this simultaneously encourages the development of social classes whose interests are fundamentally at odds. Moreover, the very conditions of labor (trade and aggregation in towns and cities under feudalism; factories and union organization in the case of industrial capitalism) lead to the development of class consciousness and, eventually, a revolutionary political movement.

In contrast to the critical perspective of Marx and Engels, Durkheim (1933[1893]) emphasized the integrative fuction of the division of labor as the primary mechanism of organic solidarity. Just as the organs of the body have specialized functions, each essential to the welfare of the whole, so too the various groupings within a modern, industrialized society make a distinct and necessary contribution to the larger collective. Buoyed by a shared set of norms, values and beliefs, the organic solidarity which emerges from the division of labor prevents the destructive forces of entropy from taking root. Despite their differences, both Marx and Durkheim believed that all societies, past and present, exhibit some kind of division of labor. In what they saw as the most primitive forms of social arrangement, this was organized along lines defined by age and sex/gender. In the 1970s, a number of Marxist and feminist anthropologists noted the apparently universal association of women with the domestic domain and with the work of social reproduction (see, *inter alia*, Ortner, 1972; Rosaldo, 1974; Godelier, 1986). They also noted an apparently near-universal denigration of this domain in relation to "public spheres that are ostensibly sites of collective dynamism" (Sanchez, 2018).

In our contribution to this special issue of *Frontiers in Sociology*, we ask whether conversational interaction exhibits, like other forms of social activity, a division of labor and, if so, according to what principles it is organized and what functions it serves.[1] This initial statement of our aim requires some explanation and qualification. We may begin, then, by noting that intersubjectivity—shared understanding—requires effort. To put this another way, a conversation's participants actively work to achieve and sustain understanding, despite appearances that this emerges spontaneously in the turn-by-turn unfolding of talk.[2] Much of the time, this work is invisible and only its products are displayed in the form of sequentially fitted and appropriate next turns at talk. However, in sequences of repair, and especially in sequences of other-initiated repair, the work involved in the maintenance of intersubjectivity rises to the surface. On these occasions, we can see and thus describe what participants do to achieve and sustain what they take to be adequate understanding. As such what we will describe here is not so much an "interactional" division or labor, as an intersubjective one. Our claim is that the work of maintaining mutual understanding is unevenly distributed across a conversation's participants, at least in our data.

This study responds, then, to a typically unarticulated assumption of scholarship in conversation analysis and related approaches: the idea that the work required to sustain intersubjectivity is evenly distributed among the participants, each having essentially equivalent responsibility to ensure that they are understood and that they understand others. This conceptualization fits with a pervasive egalitarian ideology that characterizes many of the settings in which talk takes place. However, there are social situations in which assumptions of

Abbreviations: 1S, first person singular; 3, third person; CLF, classifier; COMP, complementizer; EB, elder brother; ES, elder sister; FYB, father's younger brother; GC/N, grandchild or niece/nephew; GF, grandfather; GM, grandmother; NEG, negative; PL, plural; PROX, proximate deictic; PRT, particle; SF, quasi-pronoun meaning "self"; TOP, topicalizer; VOC, vocative; YS, younger sibling.

1 A reviewer of the paper suggests that "in the domain of repair" there have been "clear (if tacit) references to the division of labor" in such notions as "self" and "other" initiation of repair. We would suggest that references to "self" and "other" here and elsewhere in the literature point to an *interactionally* relevant division of responsibilities rooted, primarily though not exclusively, in the organization of turn-taking. This is not a "social" division of labor if "social" is taken in its usual sense, i.e., the meaning it has in the collocation "social theory". When we say "social" division of labor, then, we mean a distribution based on organizational principles that transcend a given occasion, e.g., gender, class, race, ethnicity, age and so on. Of course, we recognize that the founders of conversation analysis (Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson) challenged this dichotomization of the social and the interactional by arguing that the interactional is always social (and perhaps also that the social is always interactional). While we accept and agree with these arguments, in this paper, in the interests of contributing to the theme of the special issue, we take "social" in "social theory" as it was presumably intended by the guest editors to refer to aspects of the organization of social life that are perduring and whose relevance transcends any particular occasion. This seems to be the only way it makes sense to talk about CA and "social theory" since if interaction is already social, CA is already social theory.

2 This sense of the effortlessness of conversational intersubjectivity is presumably a result of the fact that understanding is generated, largely, *en passant* as Heritage (1984) put it. But, while understanding may emerge in the course of accomplishing the official business towards which participants are more explicitly oriented, it is nevertheless the product of a kind of labor or work as we aim to show.

egalitarianism do not hold. In our data, which consist of video recordings of casual conversations between Vietnamese same-generation peers, participants continuously display an orientation to relations of relative seniority through the selection of terms used to accomplish interlocutor reference (i.e., reference to the speaker and addressee of an utterance, see e.g., Luong, 1990; Sidnell and Shohet, 2013; Sidnell, 2019, 2022; Djenar and Sidnell, 2022). This pervasive orientation is also reflected in practices of repair initiation. Specifically, seniors regularly initiate repair with so-called "open class" forms such as "huh?" and "ha?" which display a minimal grasp of the talk targeted, require little effort to produce and, at the same time, push responsibility for resolving the problem onto the trouble source speaker, i.e., the junior member of the dyad (on trouble responsibility, see Robinson, 2006).[3] In contrast, juniors often initiate repair of a senior participant's talk by displaying a detailed understanding of what has been said, in the form of a repeat, and inviting the senior to confirm. Not only do these practices of initiation ask little of the senior participant in terms of response and, as such, have an "assistive" feel to them, they also often mark what has been said as important, as worthy of repetition, as something that others should clearly understand and so on. We suggest then that this asymmetry in the distribution of initiation practices reflects a "division of intersubjective labor."

On the idea of an interactional division of labor

In her 1978 article on differences in the contributions of men and women to everyday interaction, Fishman (1978, see also 1977) concluded:

> It seems that, as with work in its usual sense, there is a division of labor in conversation. The people who do the routine maintenance work, the women, are not the same people who either control or benefit from the process. Women are the "shitworkers" of routine interaction, and the "goods" being made are not only interactions, but, through them, realities.

Fishman's findings were, however, largely impressionistic and the analysis was based on an, at the time, common assumption that the functional value of a conversational "act" or "action" is the same across different sequential contexts. For instance, Fishman quantified the number of questions asked by the male and female participants in 7 h of interaction in a domestic setting. She similarly compared "minimal responses" and "statements" which "display an assumption on the part of the speaker" that they will be understood and of interest, and elicit response from their recipients. Subsequent attempts to replicate Fishman's findings failed (see McMullen et al., 1995) suggesting that, while the initial intuition of a division of interactional labor may be valid, particularly in the setting that Fishman studied, the analytic categories she employed were not sufficiently well-defined to adequately capture it.

Research on the organization of interaction done since the 1970s allows for a refinement and rethinking of Fishman's study (see, *inter alia*, Heritage, 1984; Moerman and Sacks, 1988; Sidnell, 2014). Specifically, we know that the maintenance of shared understanding or intersubjectivity requires effort. Much of the time, the work that participants do to achieve such understanding is invisible to analysts and only its products in the form of appropriately responsive next utterances are available to us. However, when they encounter troubles of understanding, conversationalists routinely employ practices of repair in their attempts to resolve them. This makes the work of maintaining intersubjectivity available for analytic inspection.

In what follows, we explore this work in a study of Vietnamese conversation. More specifically, we examine various practices of repair initiation and track their distribution across senior and junior interlocutors. This is made possible by the fact that Vietnamese conversationalists are pervasively oriented to locally relevant relations of seniority. Their *in-situ* orientation to such relations is displayed, most prominently, in the terms they use for interlocutor reference, that is, reference to speaker and addressee.

Our analysis challenges a basic assumption of work in conversation analysis—that participants in a conversation bear essentially equivalent responsibilities for the work involved in maintaining shared understanding. That assumption may be warranted in many of the settings that conversation analysts have studied—such as interaction among English speaking peers in informal conversation—but does not accurately reflect the socio-cultural realities within which Vietnamese conversation takes place. In this latter setting, relations of seniority and the different expectations in terms of interactional conduct to which they are indelibly linked, shape conversational organization in a range of significant ways.

The results of our study, and the intellectual motivation that animates it, resemble those of Ochs (1982, 1984) who, in research conducted in the early 1980s, compared what she called clarification strategies in White Middle Class American (WMC) and Samoan households. Ochs drew on work by Schegloff and other conversation analysts which seemed to show that (1) repair initiation practices exhibit a "natural ordering" based on their relative power to locate a repairable (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 369) and (2) "speakers show a preference for using the strongest form they can in initiating repair of another's utterance" (Ochs, 1984, p. 331). Ochs found that in the Samoan context,

3 We recognize that responsibility for trouble is structurally tilted towards the speaker of the trouble source by virtue of the organization of turn-taking (see Schegloff et al., 1977; Robinson, 2006). The claim embodied in in our use of "push" here and elsewhere is only that OCRIs like English "what?" and "huh?" (along with their Vietnamese equivalents) do nothing to defease "structural tilt" and indeed make it more explicit. This is, however, largely irrelevant for our argument which concerns a social division of labor ("social" in the usual sense, i.e., pertaining to forms of organization that perdure beyond a given occasion of interaction, for instance groupings of "race", "class", "gender", "age") not one tied to interactionally transitory roles. Notice also that repair and understanding are hardly unique in this respect. Completing the turn-at-talk is the default responsibility of the current speaker, responding to a question is the default responsibility of the primary recipient of that question. What we are documenting thus runs orthogonal to any such a distribution of responsibilities associated with turn-taking. We thank a reviewer for encouraging us to clarify these aspects of our argument.

practices of repair initiation (or what she calls "clarification") are differentially employed depending on the relative rank of the participants:

> In speaking to those of lower rank, higher ranking persons are not expected to do a great deal of perspective-taking to make sense out of their own utterances or to make sense of the utterance of a lower ranking interlocutor. Higher ranking persons, then, are not expected to clarify and simplify for lower ranking persons (…) And exactly the reverse is expected of lower ranking persons. Lower ranking persons take on more of the burden of clarifying their own utterances and the utterances of higher ranking interlocutors.

In the Samoan context, high-ranking conversationalists typically request clarification using a minimal grasp strategy (i.e., open class repair initiators) rather than an expressed guess, as the latter requires one to more obviously take alter's perspective. In what follows we will show that, in Vietnamese conversation, we find a similar pattern in which seniors tend to initiate repair with open class initiators which (1) do not require that the speaker attempt to recover what the other has said, (2) suggest that responsibility for the encountered trouble lies with the trouble source speaker (i.e., the more junior interlocutor), and (3), require little articulatory effort for their production (this itself serving as a sign of the senior participant's low level of involvement in the junior participant's talk). At the same time, we find that junior participants rarely employ such open class repair initiators. Juniors instead show a marked tendency to use a practice of repair initiation that involves repeating a more senior participant's talk with an appended question particle. Even more striking, we find that junior interlocutors engage in an apparently distinctive sequence that involves asking a senior participant a question, receiving an answer and then requesting confirmation of that answer with a repeat appended by a question particle. This practice seems to illustrate the more general tendency of juniors to carefully reconstruct and publicly check their understanding of a senior participant's talk.

Data and methods

The data used in this study come from a larger investigation of other initiated repair and intersubjectivity in Vietnamese conversation. The corpus, collected in various coffee shops and restaurants in Hanoi in 2012, consists of approximately 35 hours of video recorded conversation among same-generation peers. For the present study we sampled five of these recordings. We summarize their basic features in Table 1. All instances of other initiated repair were collected from a portion of each recording

TABLE 1 Overview of data sources and cases used in the present study.

	Number of participants[a]	Sex and age of participants (L-R in image)	# of cases of repair
VNR 05 	4	M33, F29, F27, M30	31
VNR 10 	5	F34, F35, F31, F31, F34	22
VNR 12 	3	M25, M30, M30	22

(Continued)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Number of participants[a]	Sex and age of participants (L-R in image)	# of cases of repair
VNR 20 	4	F45, F42, F40, M41	15
VNR 32 	3	F47, F48, M54	6
Totals	19		96

[a]This does not include restaurant servers or researchers.

(VNR 05 and VNR 20/21 = +/−50 min, VNR 10, VNR 12, and VNR 32 = +/−10 min). The result was a collection of 96 instances. The authors of the current report relistened to all these cases and discussed them in some detail. As we did this, we also sorted the examples into sub-collections according to the format used in the initiation of repair (see the next section for an overview). Once all the cases had been sorted, they were retranscribed and checked again, a process that resulted in additional observations.

Overview of repair initiation practices

Episodes of repair are composed of parts. A repair initiation marks a disjunction with the immediately preceding talk while the repair itself constitutes an attempted solution to a problem. That problem, the particular segment of talk to which the repair is addressed, is called the trouble source.[4] Our discussion in what follows focuses on the alternative formats used in the other-initiation of repair and some of the sequential consequences that flow from the selection of one format or another. In their classic paper on the preference for self-correction, Schegloff et al. (1977, p. 367–368) distinguished five common repair initiation formats in English conversation: (1) interjections and questions words such as *huh?* and *what?*[5]; (2) question words such as *who*, *where*, *when*; (3) partial repeats of the trouble-source turn, plus a question word; (4) partial repeats of the trouble-source turn; and, (5) candidate understandings of a prior turn. In an important recent study, Dingemanse et al. (2014, p. 5) find that different languages make available "a wide but remarkably similar range of linguistic resources" for the other initiation of repair. According to these authors, alternative formats can be differentiated along a number of dimensions including the extent to which they characterize the trouble, the way they manage responsibility for the trouble, and what they imply about the relative distribution of knowledge among the co-participants.

Drawing on the distinctions introduced by Schegloff et al. (1977) as well as some terminological and analytic refinements introduced by Dingemanse et al. and others (e.g., Drew, 1997), we were able to sort the Vietnamese cases into five categories as shown in Table 2.[6]

4 The trouble source is to be distinguished from the source or basis of trouble, which can be anything from ambient noise, age-related hearing loss, or an esoteric word choice.

5 In English, intonation distinguishes different types of repair initiation with a question word. Thus, *what?* produced with rising intonation typically serves as an open class repair initiation and treats an entire turn (or turn constructional unit) as the trouble source. In contrast *what.* produced with downward, final intonation serves as a closed class repair initiation by targeting some particular component noun phrase within the previous turn as the trouble source. We found a similar contrast in Vietnamese *cái gì* when used as a repair initiator (see also Ha and Grice, 2017).

6 A reviewer asks how the "type of trouble" is related to the uneven distribution of repair initiation formats in Vietnamese and, more specifically, whether "the type of trouble (partly) explains why some of the repair initiations are unevenly distributed while others are not?" This is an intriguing possibility. A problem, though, lies in the fact that the relation between repair initiation format and trouble type is highly contingent in Vietnamese (as in all languages) and also always a matter of construal (i.e., in producing a repair initiation formatted in a certain way, the initiator thereby proposes a construal of the trouble type at issue). In an analysis of OIR in person reference, Sidnell (2007) suggests that there is a close to one-to-one mapping between a specific initiation format ["Who (is) name(d) so"] and a particular kind of

TABLE 2 Distribution of formats used in the other-initiation of repair.

	Open class	Closed class Q word	Repeat + Closed class Q word	Candidate understanding	Repeat (+ Q particle)	Total[a]
N	20	4	8	25	30	87
%	23	5	9	29	34	100

[a]We also collected nine cases of correction which brought the total to 96 as indicated in Table 1.

Open class and repeat-formatted initiations will be examined in some detail in the discussion that follows. Here we give examples of the other formats for illustrative purposes.

In (1) the participants have been complaining about a rise in the cost of vegetables and about the dismissive attitude of those who sell them in the street markets. In line 79, Phuong, remarks that dill leaf has risen in price to 10,000 dong a bunch.[7] Thanh, apparently unsure of what Phuong is referring to, initiates repair with *cái gì* 'what' thereby targeting a noun phrase in Phuong's previous utterance that refers to something other than a person or a place (see footnote 5). Phuong provides a repair solution in the form of a repeat of the noun phrase (*thì là*).

(1) Closed Class Question Word (VNR05, 28:30)[8]

79 P: *Thì là sắp lên mười nghìn rồi.*
dill about up ten thousand already
Dill is about ten thousand.
(. . .)
82 T: *Cái gì.*
CL Q
What?
83 P: *Thì là.*
dill
Dill.

Below, (2) illustrates the use of a closed class question word appended to a partial repeat of prior talk. Hoàn and Ba, along with Kiên, jointly own and run a computer software and programming company. Where the extract begins, Hoàn is asking about one of several ongoing projects referring to this as, in line 07, *dự án ba* 'project three'. Ba responds with an open class repair initiator which merely indicates a problem with the immediately preceeding turn but does not specify a particular component or aspect of this as the trouble source. Hoàn continues in line 09 apparently assuming that the problem will resolve itself as the talk progresses, but Ba initiates repair again now using a combination of repeat (*dự án* 'project') and question word (*nào* 'which'). Hoàn then provides a repair in line 11 saying, *Dự án đấy. Bank đấy* 'That project. That bank'.

(2) Closed Class Question Word + Repeat (VNR12)

07 H: *Dự án ba thế nào, triển khai đi*
project three what about implement PRT
What about project three, implement it.
08 B: *Ha?*
huh
Huh?
09 H: *Rút ra anh em sang làm*
withdraw EB YS cross work
Take the project out, we will work on it.
10 B: *Dự án nào*
project which
Which project?
11 H: *Dự án đấy. Bank đấy*
project that bank that
That project. That bank.
12 B: *Triển khai đi, để làm nó*
implement PRT let's do 3
Let's implement it, let's do it
13 *chạy ổn định phát là ném lên ap store*
run stable transmit throw up app store
once it runs stably, put it up on the app store.

Finally, in (3) we see the use of a candidate understanding to initiate repair. This is taken from the same recording as example (2). Here Hoàn, Ba and Kiên are discussing how much of the company money is being spent on their various projects. The extract begins with Kiên saying that Ba has recently withdrawn 100 million dong from a company account. Ba initiates repair in line 12 and Kiên repeats in part what he has just said. Ba then responds, suggesting that Kiên has misunderstood, and that he's talking about something else, leading Hoàn to initiate repair with a form which invites Ba to confirm a proposed candidate understanding of his talk. In the first of these candidates, Hoàn proposes *Khoản đấy bỏ ra à* 'You excluded that amount' and in the second, at line 18-19, he

trouble (the initiator believes they know the person being talked about but not by the name which has been used to refer to them). This, however, appears to be the exception rather than the rule and the case discussed involves some rather specific demographic and onomastic conditions which make certain kinds of trouble particularly common.

7 *Đồng* is the national currency of Vietnam. At the time of recording 10,000 dong was the equivalent of about 0.50 USD (50 cents).

8 Transcripts are presented using a version of Jeffersonian conventions modified according to the requirements of comparative linguistic analysis (see Sidnell, 2009). Punctuation in the original Vietnamese language line represents aspects of speech prosody (e.g., a question mark indicates rising intonation, not necessarily that the utterance is a question). Punctuation in the English gloss represents an analysis of utterance meaning (e.g., a question mark indicates that the utterance is interrogative, not necessarily that it is produced with rising intonation).

suggests *Nghĩa là bên kia nó nó đầu tư về à* 'Meaning the other part is what they invested?'

(3) Candidate Understanding (VNR12, 5:40)

11 K: *Vừ- Vừa rồi mới lấy một trăm triệu cơ mà.*
ju- just already take one hundred million PRT PRT
But you just got one hundred million!
12 B: *Hmm*
Hmm?
13 K: *Lấy về một [trăm triệu.*
take about one hundred million
You took about one hundred million.
14 B: *[Không, không nói khoản đấy*
NEG, NEG say amount PRT
No, no, I'm not talking about that.
15 H: *Khoản đấy bỏ ra à*
amount there excluded PRT
You excluded that amount?
16 B: *Mhm, khoản kia là khoản*
yes amount that is amount
Yes, that's the amount
17 *thiết bị máy móc*
equipment machinery
for their equipment.
18 H: *Nghĩa dư vậy là bên kia*
meaning like that is side there
Meaning the other part
19 *nó nó đầu tư về à*
3 3 invest PRT
is what they invested?
20 B: *Hả? Đâu, mình vay*
Q NEG SF borrow
What? No, we borrowed that!

With respect to the initiation formats illustrated by examples (1), (2), and (3), there were no clear distributional differences according to the relative seniority of the participants.[9]

Operationalizing "seniority"

Our analysis focuses on the relation between the practices of other-initiated repair (and in particular on the use of alternative formats for initiation) and the relative seniority of the participants. Initial review of the recordings, along with native-speaker intuition, suggested that interjections (such as *huh?* and *ha?*) were used only when a senior participant initiates repair of a junior participant's talk. In addition, a slightly more sustained examination of the recordings seemed to indicate that repeats were more often used, and used in a particular way, by junior participants to initiate repair of a senior participant's talk.

In order to develop an analysis that might provide empirical grounding for these observations, we needed to operationalize a notion of "seniority." This is an aspect of social organization toward which Vietnamese conversationalists are pervasively oriented since in almost any context a speaker must take such relations into account in designing a situationally appropriate utterance. This is seen most obviously in the terms used for interlocutor reference. As is well-established in the sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological literature, the default means for accomplishing interlocutor reference in Vietnamese across a very wide range of contexts involves the use, not of pronouns, but rather of kin terms.[10]

Moreover, in Vietnamese there are no reciprocally used kin terms and, as such, interlocutor reference by such means results in a continuous display of relative seniority.[11] For instance, a speaker may self-refer using a term such as *anh* 'elder brother' or

9 One reviewer suggests that the use of a candidate understanding - the most specific repair initiation type - would seem to provide a participant with an ideal means for taking up the responsibility of maintaining intersubjectivity. Why, then, the reviewer asks, are "seniors using candidate understandings as much as the juniors"? Our aim in this paper is to show that the work involved in the maintenance of understanding in interaction is socially distributed, with juniors shouldering more responsibility for this than seniors. To that end, we examine those practices which provide the clearest evidence for our claims. In order to make our case, we do not need to examine each and every practice of repair and because we did not find a robust distributional skewing in candidate understandings, we do not attempt to analyze these cases in detail. Notice that whether a given practice is caught up in the social distribution of intersubjective labor cannot be solely an effect of its function (which as the reviewer notes in the case of candidate understandings is to serve as "the most specific type of repair initiation"). For instance, it's possible that candidate understanding repair initiations are not organized by the division of labor that we show skews the distribution of some other formats because participants do not treat them as assistive to the trouble source speaker. Alternatively, or in addition, the production of a candidate understanding - which necessarily involves an at least partial reformulation of the trouble source speaker's talk- is vulnerable to being heard as an assertion of agency (essentially a claim to independent authorship, something discussed in much work on alternate responses to polar questions, see, for instance, Enfield and Sidnell, 2015, 2017). This again may affect the distribution of such practices between seniors and juniors. There is also the issue of "multifunctionality" which we discuss with respect to the [repeat] + question particle format. A given practice of speaking can, of course, be used in more than one way, and this has implications for its distribution. The [repeat] + question particle format, for instance, is routinely used by a junior interlocutor in way which appears assistive, supportive, attentive. However, as we show below, it can *also* be used in a very different way as a practice for something like interrogation, and this has implications for its distribution. Finally, there is the ever-present issue of "collateral effects" which, again, can play a role in shaping distributional patterns (Sidnell and Enfield, 2012; Enfield and Sidnell, 2017). The point, then, is that an analysis of candidate understandings would require a case-by-case consideration. This falls beyond the scope of the present report.

10 To clarify, in Vietnamese and several other languages of the region, kin terms and other noun phrases are used to refer to speaker and addressee and as direct arguments of the verb. They are thus used in syntactic positions otherwise occupied by pronouns in many languages especially those belonging to the Indo-European family. For this reason, some linguists suggest that kin terms are themselves pronouns (see Pham, 2011 for discussion). An alternative approach describes the behavior of kin terms in these languages under the heading of "imposters" (see especially Kaufman, 2014).

chị 'elder sister' while referring to the addressee as *em* 'younger sibling'. These relations of seniority cannot be read directly from the ages of participants for several reasons, some of which are important to the analysis of repair initiation that follows. First, if two persons are born in the same calendar year, they may consider themselves true peers and avoid the use of sibling terms that necessarily convey relative seniority. Second, in some contexts and in some social relations, relative seniority is exaggerated whereas in others it is understated. Specifically, a difference of 5 years may be treated as significant in one dyad but not in another.[12] For these reasons, in order to operationalize seniority, we can't simply correlate some particular aspect of the speech behavior with the relative ages of the participants. Rather, we have to look at the ways in which the participants themselves orient to such relations, for instance in their practices of interlocutor reference, and use these orientations as a guide to understanding other aspects of their conduct.[13]

Open class repair initiation

Our collection included 20 cases of open class repair initiation (see Table 3). In open class repair initiation, a speaker indicates that there is a problem with the immediately preceding turn (or TCU, see Robinson, 2014) but does not locate some particular item or aspect of it as the trouble source. Of these 20 cases, 18 involved the use of an interjection (e.g., *ha?*) while just two involved the use of a question word. In total, 13 of the 18 cases of open class repair initiation with an interjection were addressed by a senior toward a junior co-participant. In two, the relation was reversed and in three cases speaker and recipient treated one another as true peers by avoiding the use of kin terms.[14] It is also worth noting that in two of the recordings sampled there were no instances of this repair initiation format.

TABLE 3 Distribution of two formats for open class repair initiation.

	Senior→ Junior	Junior→ Senior	Not applicable
Interjection	13	2	3
Q word	1	1	0
TOTAL	14	3	3

The example presented as (4) illustrates the use of an interjection to initiate repair. Here (senior, male) Thanh and (junior, female) Phuong have been talking about a time that they went together, along with Giang, to sing karaoke in Ho Chi Minh City. Thanh asks Phuong to guess how much it cost and, after some talk in which Phuong indicates that Thanh already told her how much it was, she produces the turn in line 03-04.

(4) Open Class - Interjection (VNR05, 25:07)

03 P: *Ở đấy tám mươi nghìn*
LOC there eight ten thousand
It is eighty thousand
04 *một tiếng đúng không*
one hour correct Q
per hour there, right?
05 T: *Ha?*
Huh
Huh?
06 P: *Tám mươi nghìn*
eight ten thousand
Eighty thousand
07 *một tiếng đúng không*
one hour correct Q
per hour there, right?
08 T: *Ừ.*
Yes
Yes.

Here then the senior co-participant initiates repair of the junior co-participant's talk using an interjection that does not indicate which aspect or component of the immediately preceding turn is the trouble source. In attempting to resolve the problem, the speaker of the trouble source produces a near-exact repeat of her turn, one that preserves not only the informational content of the prior talk but also its status as a polar interrogative.

The other open class repair initiation format involves the use of the question word *cái gì?*.[15] For instance, in the following case, Hà has been telling the others about an awkward exchange she had with their superior at work. This involved inviting the superior (Hiền) to a party to celebrate Hà's daughter's acceptance to a prestigious

11 Although the semantics of Vietnamese kinship terms suggest that they are never reciprocally usable (e.g., the two members of a dyad cannot both be "elder brother" to the other), Sidnell and Shohet (2013) discuss one exception to the rule.

12 A third way in which relations of seniority do not map directly from relative age is not at issue in our study but should nevertheless be mentioned. In relations between family members, seniority in the ascending (or second ascending) generation is prioritized over seniority in ego's generation such that, for example, the 13 year old son of a younger brother addresses his 11 year old cousin as *anh* "elder brother/cousin."

13 In Vietnamese, at least in the kinds of interactions we are considering here, speakers make relations of relative seniority explicit every time they refer to themselves or to their addressee(s). While there are conditions under which the terms can change over time (e.g., if a person becomes a parent terms of reference may change, if two persons become more intimate, they may change), in all the interactions we consider, they do not do so. This is not, then, a matter of "taking a stance". We use the term "seniority" in its standard sense to refer to positions in an age-based and, in this case, fully-ratified system of social stratification. In sum, seniority is not something which is interactionally negotiated—it is largely a function of age, with some minor qualifications (see footnote 12).

14 Ba and Hoàn in VNR 12 are same age peers and do not use sibling or other kin terms to address one another or to self-refer.

15 Such uses of *cái gì* are distinguishable from closed class uses (illustrated by 1 above) by intonation, by response and, in many cases at least, by sequential position.

college. This was made awkward, in the first place, by the fact that Hiền also has a daughter of the same age, whom, the co-participants surmise, had not been similarly successful with her applications. But the awkwardness was exacerbated when Hiền asked Hà whether she expected the party-goers to pay money, which is to say give a gift of cash to Hà's daughter. Hà's talk about these matters has been directed primarily to Tiến while Mai and Lệ have been occasionally talking between themselves. Here, however, Mai has, at line 06, asked Hà whether Hà told Hiền the reason for the party when she invited her.

(5) Open Class - Question word (VNR20, 23:47)

05 M: *Lúc em mời chị Hiền*
time YS invite ES Hien
When you invited Hien,
06 *em có nói lí do không.*
YS Q say reason Q
did you tell her the reason for the party?
07 H: *Em không nói lí do,*
YS NEG say reason
I didn't tell her the reason,
08 *nhưng chắc chị hiểu ngay,*
but certainly ES understand immediately
but I guess she understood right away,
09 *chị lại bảo chứ,*
ES PRT say PRT
she said,
10 *thế nào*[*::* ( )
how
How
11 M: [*Ngại thế nhỏ*
awkward how
How awkward
12 H: *Ngại thế. Sao em lại thế nhỏ.*
awkward how why YS PRT like that
So awkward! "Why did you do that?
13 *Tiền nong như thế nào đây.*
money insert like that here
Just to talk about money like that!"
14 *Có phải đóng tiền không.*
Q must pay money Q
"Should we pay money?"
15 M: *Ơ.*
Oh
Oh
16 H: *Chị hỏi em câu đấy đấy*
ES ask YS sentence PRT PRT
She asked me that question.
17 M: *Cái gì?*
CL Q
What?
18 H: *Em bảo chị hỏi em*
I say ES ask YS
I said, "You asked me
19 *có phải đóng tiền không,*
Q must pay money Q
'must we pay money?'"
20 *em bảo sao dạo này*
YS said why time this
I said, "why are
21 *chị kém cái độ lãng mạn đi thế.*
ES less CL degree romantic PRT PRT
you being so insensitive these days?"
22 M: *Thật á*
true PRT
Oh really?

Three observations about this case are the following. First, although the turn in line 17 clearly initiates repair, it does this not by means of an interjection but rather with a question word, *cái gì?* 'what?'. Second, this is produced with a marked and exaggerated prosody and in this way not only initiates repair but also conveys Mai's surprise. Third, the repair itself in line 18-19 involves not just repeating the reporting frame but also substituting direct reported speech for the indexical expression used in line 16 (*câu đấy* ➔*có phải đóng tiền không*).

These open class repair initiation formats are equivalent in the sense that they do not locate a particular aspect or component of the prior talk as the source of trouble (see Ochs' "minimal grasp" description). Moreover, by not attempting to fix the problem, the one initiating repair in this way seems to push the responsibility for this on to the trouble source speaker. Indeed, the default assumption appears to be that responsibility for the trouble lies with its speaker and these formats do nothing to defease an inference based on such an assumption.[16]

Beyond these basic similarities, the question-word format requires more articulatory effort than does the interjection (see Dingemanse et al., 2013; Enfield et al., 2013). The interjection consists of a single syllable and is composed of a mid, central vowel and a consonant produced with minimal obstruction of the throat and mouth. Furthermore, the interjection has no stable, context-independent semantic meaning. In comparison, the question-word format is two-syllables and is composed of two lexical segments (*cái* is a general classifer, *gì* is a question word equivalent to English "what").

These two formats thus differ in terms of what Peirce described as the material qualities of the sign. Specifically, production of the question word requires slightly more effort and thus can potentially convey more (other-) attentiveness than the interjection. More importantly, the question word format is more amenable to modulation by intonation allowing for the display of, for instance, "surprise" and "astonishment" (see Ha and Grice, 2017). For these reasons and others, the two formats are not always interchangeable or equivalent. The distributional skewing is apparent only in the interjection-based OCRIs where we find that 13 of 15 (or 86.6%) instances are addressed by a senior toward a junior participant.[17]

We can extend our analysis and provide further evidence for it through consideration of a non-conforming case. In (6), below, the three young men have been talking amongst themselves when the

16 Compare here apology-based formats for open-class repair initiation, discussed by Robinson 2006. See also footnote 2 above.

17 We thank a reviewer for insisting on the importance of this distinction between the two formats.

(female) server sits down, off camera, at a nearby table. Kiên looks over, gazing in her direction for a few seconds before producing the talk in line 01. Taking notice of the server's t-shirt, upon which are pictured two large bird wings, Kiên asks whether, when wearing this shirt, she can fly. The question is based on a noticing of a feature of the setting which has, to this point, not been a focus of attention. Not surprisingly, then, the server, whom Kiên addresses as *em* 'younger sibling', initiates repair. The situation in some sense demands open class repair initiation since what is at issue is the action that Kiên means to be doing, this coming out of "left-field" with little if any common ground having been already established (on this use of open class repair initiators, see Drew, 1997; Sidnell, 2010b, p. 122–124).

(6) Open Class – interjection (VNR12, 2: 15)

01 K: *Mặc áo đấy có bay được không em?*
wear shirt that Q fly achieve Q YS?
Wearing that shirt you can fly?
02 N: *Dạ?*
Yes?
03 K: *Mặc áo đấy có bay được không.*
wear shirt that Q fly achieve Q
Wearing that shirt you can fly?
04 N: *Sắp bay được.=*
about fly achieve
Just about to fly.
05 K: *=Hi-hi-he-hhhh-heh-hehe-hehe*

What we want to notice here is that the server, who is addressed as junior with *em* 'younger sibling', initiates repair not with *ha?* as Thanh did in (4) above, or with *cái gì?* as Mai did in (5) but rather with *dạ?*. In addition to its use as a repair initiator, this form is also used to convey deference to the addressee (i.e., as a "respect particle," see, e.g., Thompson, 1987; Shohet, 2013).[18] Thus, we find that in one of the rare instances that a junior uses an open class format to initiate repair of a senior participant's talk, they do so by means of a particle that is understood to convey deference to the addressee.

Initiating repair with a repeat[19]

An open class repair initiation, whether formed with a question word or an interjection, does not identify a specific aspect or component of the prior turn as the trouble source. Rather, it merely signals a problem and leaves it to the speaker of the trouble source to determine what is required for its resolution. In contrast, a repeat-formatted repair initiation identifies very precisely that part of the prior talk that is being treated as a source of trouble (see, *inter alia*, Jefferson, 1972; Hayashi et al., 2013). Moreover, when a participant initiates repair in this way they take on almost all of the work needed to achieve resolution. The speaker of the trouble source is merely asked to confirm

18 Thompson (1987, p. 260) describes this form as a "polite responsive particle, signalling a courteous reaction to the speech of another speaker." Our analysis is that the speaker attempted to ward off unwanted inferences associated with OCRI by using a word that is prototypically associated with the expression of deference to alter (a good deal of effort is invested in socializing children to its use in speaking to members of ascending generations, see Shohet, 2013).

19 Most of the cases we discuss involve the use of a repeat with an appended question particle. There is one case, 7, in which, however, there is no appended particle. This points to the fact that, under certain conditions, the interrogative character of the repair initiating turn is conveyed by means other than a particle though, in our collection, not by intonation. In 7, the repeat is marked as a confirmation requesting question by a distinctive facial expression and also by momentarily held mutual gaze (in addition to the epistemic asymmetry it presupposes). Reviewers wondered whether the repeat-formatted turns we discuss here are truly initiating repair. We maintain that whether these are characterized as repair initiators or something else makes no difference to our larger argument and indeed amounts to a binning exercise in any case (on binning, see Enfield and Sidnell, 2017). That said, there are good reasons for describing these as repair initiators if we take it that repair, by definition, involves [1] a break in "progressivity" and so a digression away from the main line of action and toward the task of fixing a problem with something already said, [2] an attempt to resolve what is treated as a problem or potential problem of speaking, hearing or understanding (as evidenced by the fact the turn in question elicits a confirming response from the trouble source speaker). Every one of our cases satisfies both these conditions. Indeed, we held the production of a confirmation (whether realized as a vocalization, a head nod or in some other way) as a strict criterion for inclusion in the collection, i.e., we only included cases in which, however obvious the meaning and significance of the trouble source utterance appeared, to us, to be, the participants treated it as, at least momentarily, in question. Finally, we want to register the fact that categorizing a given utterance as the initiation of repair does not preclude the possibility that it might ALSO and SIMULTANEOUSLY be accomplishing a wide range of other conversational "actions" such as marking the previous talk as noteworthy, important, a possible basis for further talk, and so on. Indeed, repair initiation always seems to implicate other actions or functions. Schegloff et al. (1977) and Jefferson (1987 and elsewhere) made this point in their pioneering work on the topic. One reviewer also asks whether these turns might not be analyzed as "newsmarks". These turns do not serve to open up topics for further elaboration as newsmarks typically do. Rather, they mark what is said as potentially important by requesting that the original speaker confirm another participant's "hearing" (and by extension understanding), i.e., the part of the talk that is repeated. Notice that in all our examples, the third position confirmation closes the sequence and the talk either returns to what was being done before repair was initiated or develops in another direction (with 12 as a possible exception, but of a rather special sort). All in all, these are near-standard cases of other-initiated repair. Another reviewer suggests along similar lines that these turns might be analyzed as "acknowledging new information", noting that they often occur in third position after a question-answer sequence and suggesting that this is a "typical location for acknowledging new information, whereas repair initiations are not tied to any sequential position." It is true that the repeat-formatted turn does tend to occur in third position (relative to a preceding question and response/answer). However, there is a crucial difference in the cases we consider which is seen in the fact that they elicit confirmation. Note that "acknowledging new information" is not, in and of itself, interrogative i.e., it does not request confirmation that the information acknowledged was properly understood, heard etc.. The cases we consider do involve something like the "acknowledgement of new information" (we prefer to say that they mark what was said as important, noteworthy etc. since it may not always

or disconfirm.[20] For these reasons, repair initiation in this mode can appear solicitous, even obsequious. Consider the following case (7) in which the participants, all of whom work at the same health insurance company, are talking about a time that Tiến hosted a gathering at his house which is some distance from Hanoi. Mai, the oldest person in the group, is explaining, in line 05, that she was busy that day and so couldn't come. By gazing at Tiến while she says this, Mai indicates that she is addressing him specifically with her talk. However, although Tiến does appear to produce some response (barely audible on the recording), it is Lệ who is most active in taking up Mai's talk. Thus, in overlap with the last word of Mai's turn, but at a point where it is surely projectable, Lệ repeats *Chị không sang được* 'You [elder sister] didn't get to come' (thereby addressing Mai as *chị* 'elder sister'). While produced with no appended particle, the repeat clearly invites confirmation from Mai by virtue of the epistemic asymmetry it indexes. Mai, who is still gazing at Tiến as she completes her turn in line 05, first acknowledges Tiến's contribution with a slight head nod (line 08) and then, shifting her gaze to Lệ, responds to the repeat repair initiation again with a brief responsive and confirming head nod (line 08-09).

(7) Repeat (VNR20, 20:32)

03 T: *Chả muốn sửa*
NEG want fix
I don't want to fix it.
04 M: *Hôm sang nhà Tiến chị bận cái gì này,*
day come house Tiến ES busy CL Q PRT
The day that you had people over,
05 *nên chị không sang* [*được.*
so ES NEG come get
I was busy so didn't get to come
06 T: [( )]
07 L: [*Chị không sang được,*=
ES NEG come get
You didn't get to come
08 M: = *Mhm* = ((M begins while gazing at T, starts to shift gaze toward L, while continuing to nod. M & L achieve momentary mutual gaze.))
09 L: =*Mm* ((L nods - composed of slight upward movement then down toward table, gaze fixes on bowl.))
10 H: *Em mời lần nữa đi*
YS invite time again PRT
Invite us sisters one more time
11 *cho các chị sang,*
give PL ES come
so we can visit,
12 *khổ, chị Dung cũng không được sang*
unfortunately ES Dung also NEG get come
Dung also didn't get to come.

In a case like this, there's little sense of any *actual* problem of hearing or understanding. Rather, the repair initiation seems more "assistive." Mai is making an excuse and Lệ, by initiating repair with a confirmation requesting repeat, appears to support this effort.

Consider also the case presented as (8). Here the student research assistant who filmed the interaction (X) has been adjusting some of the equipment and, at line 57, announces that he will be sitting in the lower area of the restaurant while the video is recording, referring to himself as *anh* 'elder brother' in doing so. After a slight pause the assistant seems ready to continue speaking but Hiền initiates repair by repeating what he has said and appending a question particle (*à*). The assistant confirms with *Ừ*, an affirmative response particle or interjection that is considered appropriate with junior interlocutors.

(8) Repeat (VNR10, 2:12)

56 X: Rồi! mấy chị em cứ ngồi.
there PL ES YS just sit
Ok then! You ladies just sit here.
57 *Anh ngồi dưới tầng một (1.0)* hh
EB sit below floor one
I will sit downstairs.
58 H: *Anh ngồi dưới tầng một à*
EB sit below floor one PRT
You will sit downstairs eh?
59 X: *Ừ*
Yes
Yes.

What we see in these cases then is that, coincident with a displayed orientation to asymmetrical status relations, participants in these conversations routinely use a repeat-formatted repair initiation not to deal with any obvious problem of hearing or understanding (after all they hear/understand well enough to be able to repeat the prior talk essentially verbatim) but rather to support or assist a senior interlocutor. What junior interlocutors do with these repair initiations, it seems, is to show a more senior person that they have been heard and understood. There is no sense, across the various cases collected, that the "sense" or "meaning" of the speaker's repeated words is being questioned or challenged and so on (see Robinson and Kevoe-Feldman, 2010; Sidnell, 2010b; Robinson, 2013). But neither are these repeated bits of talk being merely "registered" (see Persson, 2015).[21]

be "news") but they do this by means of a request for confirmation that this "information" was properly understood etc.. In this they are repair initiations that make a confirming response conditionally relevant (and are unlike other third turn "acknowledgement" responses such as English "oh" which do not, or need not). In sum, "acknowledgement" does not capture the "illocutionary force" of the turns in question which is fundamentally interrogative (as are all other-initiations of repair).

20 Indeed, confirmation is commonly given using an interjection which, like that used to initiate repair, iconically represents the limited effort that went into its production. Taking this observation further, we note that confirmation is often so minimal as to be nearly inaudible and invisible, e.g., just a slight redirection of gaze in case (6) along with an extremely subtle head nod.

21 We did collect several cases in which repeats are used to register and to acknowledge some prior talk. Often this is accompanied by a shift in gaze away from the speaker of the repeated talk (suggesting that no response is expected). Question particles are not appended to such registering repeats.

Even more remarkable are cases involving a specific sequence in which the junior participant asks a question, receives an answer and then initiates repair of the answer-turn by repeating some portion of it and appending a question particle. In doing so, the junior participant treats the senior participant's talk as something important and worthy of extra attention. Consider the following case in which Giang asks Phuong if she is planning to return to her natal village the following day. After the question is asked, there is some intervening talk between Phuong and Hung about another matter and, as such, Phuong's answer to Giang is slightly displaced (and designed in a way sensitive to that displacement). Phuong's eventual answer in line 65 affirms that she will return home tomorrow. Giang then initiates repair by repeating *mai* "tomorrow" and appending the question particle *à*. As the two maintain mutual gaze, Phuong confirms with a subtle head nod.

(9) Repeat (VNR05, 14:40)

62 G: *Mai chị về quê à=*
tomorrow ES return natal village PRT
Going home tomorrow?
62 H: *=Đi từ lúc bầy giờ mà lên Giảng Võ*
go from at that time PRT up Giang Vo
If you were coming up Giảng Võ
63 *Làm gì mà lâu thế.*
make Q PRT long PRT
Why did it take so long?
64 P: *Đi: tắc đường.*
go traffic jam
Traffic
65 P: *Mai chị về*
tomorrow ES return
Going home tomorrow.
66 G: *Mai à*
tomorrow PRT
Tomorrow?
67 (0.6) ((P and G mutual gaze, G nods slightly
then P gives confirmation head nod.))
68 *Hôm nào lên. Chủ nhật hay thứ hai*
day which up Sunday or Monday
When are you coming back? Sunday or Monday?
69 P: *Chủ nhật. À, chắc sáng thứ hai*
Sunday uh probably morning Monday
Sunday. Or probably Monday morning.

So here Giang, the junior participant, asks a question and, after it is answered, seeks confirmation of the answer with a repeat-formatted repair initiation. Formally, then, this is what has been described as a post-expansion repair sequence (see Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell, 2010a). Now we might suppose that in this case the repair sequence is prompted by the intervening talk (which displaces the response in relation to the question it answers) but many of the instances we collected cannot be explained in this way. For example, consider the following in which junior Lệ asks senior Mai what she is having to drink. After Mai answers, Lệ responds by requesting confirmation with a repair initiation that combines repetition with some lexical expansion and a question particle (that is, Mai's *thạch* "jelly" is expanded to *sữa chua thạch* "yogurt with jelly").

(10) Repeat (VNR20, 23:02)

84 L: *Thế cái này là cái gì chị*
so CL PROX is CL Q ES
What is this?
85 M: *Thạch.*
jelly
Jelly.
86 L: *Cà phê thạch à- ah:: sữa chua thạch à*
coffee jelly PRT- ah:: yogurt jelly PRT
Coffee jelly eh? Uh:: yogurt with jelly eh?
87 M: *Ừ*
yes
Yes.

In this case, the junior participant (Lệ) fills out and significantly expands the senior participant's talk.[22] Similarly, in (11), junior participant Liễu is asking senior participant Thanh where she (along with Hiền and Quý, also present) go swimming. Liễu's first attempt to pose the question in line 35 is produced in overlap with talk by Hiền and she reasks the question in line 36 now referring to the addressee and the others as *các chị* "elder sisters." After both Thanh and Hiền respond, Liễu requests confirmation with a repeat-formatted repair initiation in line 39. This is confirmed by Hiền in line 40 (and possibly by Thanh at the same time) and Liễu subsequently acknowledges the confirmation with *ah* in line 41.

(11) Repeat (VNR10, 5:00)

35 H: *Nó bảo tuần sau đi bơi*
3 say week next go swim
He said we'll go swimming next week.
36 L: *Các chị bơi ở đâu.*
PL ES swim where
Where do you all go swimming?
37 T: *Bơi ở Định Công.*
swim at Định Công
We swim at Định Công.
38 H: *Bơi ở định công ấy.*
swim at Định Công PRT
We swim at Định Công.
39 L: *Định công á*
Định Công PRT
Định Công eh?
40 H: *Ừ.* ((head nod))
yes
Yeh.
41 L: *Ah.*
ah
Ah.

A final case, (12), illustrates the different ways in which senior and junior participants manage these interrogative sequences. Here, junior (Hoàng) Anh interrupts senior Dung's talk to ask if she will go on a day-trip that has been planned by their employer for the following day. Orienting to Dung's status as her senior,

22 Although, it should be noted, the talk here does not distinguish this from some other menu item as "jelly" is always served with yoghurt.

Anh asks, *Mai chị có đi không* "Are you (=elder sister) going tomorrow?" Dung answers in the affirmative and Anh then requests confirmation with a repeat-formatted repair initiation in line 33.

(12) Repeat (VNR32, 02:46)

28 D: *Hôm vừa rồi làm thứ bảy*
day recent already work day seven
Recently I worked on a Saturday
29 *là vì tưởng là*
because thought COMP
because I thought that
30 *vớt [vát được một tí*
extra get one little
I could make some extra money.
31 A: [*Mai chị có đi không*
tomorrow ES Q go Q
Are you going tomorrow?
32 D: *Có*
have
yes
33 A: *Mai đi à* ((A nodding))
tomorrow go PRT ((D head nod in TRP))
Tomorrow you're going?
34 D: *Mai Hoàng Anh đi không*
tomorrow Hoàng Anh go Q
Are you going tomorrow?
35 A: *Không. Em không đi.*
NEG. YS NEG go
No. I'm not going.

Notice that at line 34 Dung asks the same question of Anh that Anh asked of her—i.e., whether she is going tomorrow. After Anh answers, in line 35, Dung does not request confirmation of that answer. Rather, there is a slight lull in the talk and then Anh continues by explaining that she has other plans for the day.

In these sequences of talk then, by using a repeat formatted repair initiation to request confirmation of a just given answer, the junior participant treats the senior participant's talk as something of particular importance, something that the junior participant is concerned to get "right." At the same time, all the repeat-formatted repair initiations involve the participant initiating repair taking on more of the work than the participant who produced the trouble source. The senior participant, the trouble source speaker, is required only to confirm, typically with a minimal interjection or in many cases just a slight head nod, that which the junior participant formulates. The relative effort involved here then diagrams their different entitlements and responsibilities—A junior participant is expected to make efforts to support, to anticipate and to do their best to figure out what a senior participant means to say. A senior participant is required only to produce the most minimal kinds of confirming responses (see Wu, 2008 for a partially parallel analysis of Mandarin).[23]

We have observed, in the cases shown above, that the repair initiation seems intended to assist or support the speaker whose talk is being repeated. This appears to be a quite general and pervasive feature of the examples we collected and fits with the broader distributional pattern. In 21 of the 30 cases we collected (or 70%), it was the junior rather than the senior participant who used the repeat-formatted initiation. That said, the distributional pattern for the [repeat] + particle format is significantly more complex than for the open class interjection format we have considered above. This greater complexity is the result of two factors. First, use of an open class repair initiator is significantly constrained by a proscriptive norm which does not apply in the case of repeat-formatted initiations. Specifically, open class repair initiators are considered to be "rude" or "abrupt" and so not appropriately addressed to a recipient who is the speaker's senior. Second, in the case of repeat-formatted initiations, there are several distinct contextual configurations that provide for an appropriate occasion of use or, put another way, there are several distinct uses to which this format can be put. The numerical distribution is skewed (toward a use by juniors toward seniors) because of inferences that *may* rather than *must* accompany its use and because of the kind of interactional work it *can* but *need not* do.

Notice then that in the cases we have so far considered the use of a repeat-formatted initiation implicitly positions alter as an epistemic authority, i.e., as in a position to confirm or disconfirm that which is targeted for repair. In the cases we have examined, this epistemic authority flows, at least in part, from the fact that alter is the author of the talk upon which repair is initiated. But other epistemic considerations can easily override the importance of seniority, resulting in uses of this format by seniors to initiate repair of a junior's talk. For instance, in one case, a senior accountant uses this format to initiate repair of talk by a junior nurse about which exams are required in order to complete a university medical degree. In another case, a senior initiates repair on a junior's talk about the place that the junior's wife is currently working.

More striking are cases in which the format of [repeat] + particle serves quite different interactional ends. Whereas this format often, indeed typically, has an assistive or supportive character to it, in a small number of cases it serves agonistic ends. The fragment shown as (13) below provides an example of this somewhat unusual pattern in which a junior interlocutor is interrogated by a senior one. Here the senior interlocutor (H) is questioning the junior (L) about something construable as behavior expected of a good or pious Vietnamese woman—prayer—and uses the repeat-formatted repair initiation to do this, and specifically the Q-A-RI-C sequence we have described above.

23 A reviewer asks us to clarify what we mean by "interactional effort" and specifically to say what range of phenomena we mean to include under this heading (e.g., "phonetic production", "sequential projection"). We do not know in advance of an empirical investigation what might be included here but it seems obvious that in some basic sense producing two syllables involves more effort than producing one, and producing a repeat-formatted interrogative involves more effort than producing an injection such as *huh*? (and not just in terms of production). For these reasons, we believe that these are two aspects of the same phenomenon—one in which more senior participants are expected to expend less energy than junior participants. This resonates with widely reported cultural patterns across Southeast Asian speech communities in which relative seniority and in some cases power is associated with silence and immobility. For two classic studies that make this point in very different contexts and in different ways, see Anderson (1991) on Java and Rosaldo (1980) on the Ilongot.



FIGURE 1
Two illustrative dyads.

(13) VNR_10_NTT_08_31_12_01A

27 H: *Nhà Liễu có cúng rằm không*
house Liễu Q pray mid-month Q
In your house, do you pray on the full moon?
28 L: *Không.*
NEG
No
29 H: *Không cúng rằm à*
NEG pray mid-month PRT
Don't pray on the full moon eh?
30 (0.2)
31 L: *Không cúng.*
NEG pray
Don't pray.
32 H: *Có cúng không*
Q pray NEG
Do you pray at all?
33 L: ((shakes head, but does not look at H))
34 H: *Không à*
NEG PRT
No, eh?
35 *Thế có ăn không, sinh nhật không*
then Q eat Q, birthday Q
Do you eat? Birthdays?
36 (.) *Rằm không*
full moon Q
Full moon?
36 L: Hi (0.2) *Sinh nhật á. Sinh nhật ai.*
birthday PRT birthday who
Birthday? Whose birthday?

Here then senior H uses this practice to insist upon greater explicitness by L and to treat L's answers as insufficient. Notice that insufficiency of response is conveyed in the repair initiator at line 29 by expanding the answer given, reworking this as a repeat-confirmation rather than an interjection (on the various implications attending these alternate confirmation formats, apparently cross-linguistically, see, inter alia, Heritage and Raymond, 2012; Enfield and Sidnell, 2015). The same can be said of the repair initiation at line 34 which marks the immediately preceding non-verbal response (a lateral head shake, while looking down toward the table rather than at H) as insufficient by "repeating" its propositional meaning as *không* "no" and appending a question particle (and thereby requesting confirmation).

Two illustrative dyads

Our argument about the division of labor in this domain and specifically the expectation that junior participants shoulder more responsibility for the maintenance of intersubjectivity than their senior interlocutors can be further illustrated by a consideration of some exemplary dyads (see Figure 1). For instance, in VNR 05, senior Thanh twice initiates repair of junior Hung's talk using an interjection, whereas Hung never initiates repair of Thanh's talk in this way. At the same time, Hung does initiate repair of Thanh's prior turn with a repeat-formatted initiation, while Thanh does not employ this format with Hung. This asymmetry correlates with a particular pattern of interlocutor reference in which Hung addresses Thanh as *anh* 'elder brother' and self-refers with *em* 'younger sibling' while Thanh addresses Hung as *chú* 'mother's younger brother' and self-refers as *anh*. This use of *chú* involves a shift of the referential *origo* to Thanh's non-existent child and in this way highlights his own seniority vis-à-vis Hung (see Luong, 1984, 1990; Luong and Sidnell, 2020 for further discussion).

In VNR 20 a similar kind of pattern can be observed in the conduct of senior Mai and junior Lệ. Whereas Lệ several times initiates repair of Mai's talk using the repeat-formatted repair initiation in ways that, as noted, seem other-attentive if not slightly obsequious (see examples 6 and 9 and discussion thereof), Mai initiates repair of Lệ's talk with an open class interjection format. This is shown in (14) below:

(14) Open Class—Interjection (VNR20, 28:04)

729 L: *Ơ chị Dung hôm nay được làm muộn một tí à.*
ES Dung today get do late one bit PRT
Dung is allowed to come back a bit later, isn't she?
730 M: *Há* ((Mutual gaze M and L))
Huh?
731 L: °*một giờ hơn rồi.*°
one hour more PRT
After one o'clock

Here then Lệ remarks, somewhat out of the blue, that a co-worker named Dung has been given permission to return late from lunch. Mai initiates repair with an interjection, and Lệ repairs the problem by specifying how much extra time Dung has been given.

What is particularly remarkable about this dyad is that while Lệ addresses Mai as *chị* 'elder sister', Mai addresses Lệ not with *em* 'younger sibling' but with the non-honorific second person singular pronoun, *mày*. While Mai is the oldest of the four co-participants, Lệ is the only one that she addresses in this way.

These two dyads illustrate, at the interactional level, the more general pattern visible in the aggregate. Looking at these particular cases it is possible to see the way that these practices of repair initiation (and repair generally) constitute one part of a larger set of norms that shape interaction according to the relative seniority of the participants.

Conclusion

In a *tour de force* exploration of discursive practice and linguistic meaning in Vietnamese, Hy van Luong suggested that the pragmatic significance of person referring expressions (including kin terms, titles, names and pronouns) can only be understood in relation to competing models of and for reality (Luong, 1984, 1990, the notion of a model "of and for reality" is adapted from Geertz, 1973: 93). The pragmatic significance of kin-terms, in particular, is construable in relation to either of two contradictory models. Luong (1990, p. 50) explains:

> Of the two structurally opposed models in Vietnamese kinship, one is male-oriented, and the other, non-male-oriented. One is based on the rigid separation of the sexes, and the other, on the unity of opposite-sex individuals. One has as its key unit a spatially bound but temporally unbound entity, and the other, a spatially unbound but temporally bound one. One is constructed in terms of the linear conception of time, and the other, a cyclical conception.

Construed in terms of the male-oriented model, *họ* 'last name, family name, family' refers to a "locally based patrilineage." Construed in terms of the non-male-oriented model this same term refers to a "bilateral kindred." Luong further suggests that these alternative kinship-relational models "conjoin at one level and contradict each other at another." As he writes:

> … these models conjoin in that they are constructed out of the same elements (genealogy and behavioral patterns). Second, both are encompassed within an overarching organic unity framework that emphasizes, in the native metapragmatic awareness, solidarity and hierarchy among the members of the same sociocultural unit.

At this level, then, the "organic unity framework" contrasts with another possibility, which Luong refers to, drawing on the work of Turner (1974), as a *communitas* alternative. Thus, construed in relation to the organic unity framework, in either its male-oriented or non-male oriented guises, the use of pronouns *tao* and *mày*, for instance, suggests the absence (or suspension) of a relation based on kinship or any other positively valenced social relation and thus, by implication, contempt or denigration. Construed in relation to the *communitas* alternative, however, these same forms convey solidarity, extreme familiarity and even intimacy (see Zuckerman, 2023 for a similar case from Laos).

In this way, Luong recasts Durkheim's notion of organic solidarity (based on notions of differentiation and specialization within a larger whole, here a family) as a semiotically mediating ideological orientation rather that as the inevitable product of the division of labor characteristic of a particular social formation. We propose that the materials considered above fit well with this conceptualization. Specifically, in the patterns of other initiated repair here documented, we see a pervasive concern among conversationalists with relations of relative seniority and with the duties and entitlements that normatively attach to positions within an asymmetrically organized social arrangement.

Does this suggest a system of exploitation similar to that which Marx found in the division of labor associated with capitalism and which Fishman proposed could also be identified in cross-sex interactions among white middle-class Americans in the 1970s? Two features of the present case speak against this. First, relations of seniority lack the stability of class or gender relations *within a particular encounter*. For instance, a participant may be positioned as junior relative to one co-participant and as senior relative to another. If the analysis proposed here is correct, such a participant will be obligated to support the maintenance of intersubjectivity at one moment and entitled to expect such support from another at the next. Second, the relations of seniority which organize the intersubjective division of labor lack the stability of class or gender relations *across the life course*. Any given individual will find themselves gradually occupying the senior role across more and more interactional encounters as they age. For these reasons, the division of labor we have identified here seems not to be a system of exploitation *per se*, but rather an asymmetrical organization of duties and entitlements.

To conclude, our study suggests that, in Vietnamese conversation, participants are oriented to a normative division of labor which demands junior interlocutors expend more effort than senior ones in the maintenance of intersubjectivity. Specifically, whereas senior interlocutors regularly initiate repair with a form that pushes responsibility for the problem onto another participant, junior interlocutors more often initiate repair in ways that display close attention to, and detailed understanding of, a senior interlocutor's talk. In terms of larger theoretical questions, our study points to some of the complex ways in which the "social" bears on the "interactional." We note that much research in CA that attempts to address the question of when and how perduring social facts bear on the organization

of interaction focuses on participants' invocation of these facts (whether explicitly or implicitly). This approach appears to assume that the social order is brought to bear on interaction when the vernacular categories of everyday or institutional life (such as, e.g., "men" and "women," "queer" and "straight," "old" and "young" etc. for English) are imported into it. We have come at the problem from a different direction, and this has revealed a quite different way in which the social bears on the interactional. Specifically, beginning with participants' displayed orientations to seniority (displayed, that is, in their selection of terms for interlocutor reference), we discovered a robust correlation with the practices involved in the other-initiation of repair. We have proposed that this reflects an unequal distribution of the work involved in the maintenance of intersubjectivity. Notice then that the perduring facts of age are integrated, lockstep, with the organization of interaction. Age is not being "invoked" by the participants as relevant to the organization of interaction. Rather, the practices of interaction are, in part, organized by reference to it. But note also that the social facts (of age) which are built into these sequences are not entirely isomorphic with the vernacular categories of explicit reflection and ratiocination. Rather, "age" is integrated as a wholly indexical variable ("indexical" in the sense of Garfinkel, Sacks, and Schegloff), always calculated in relation to the age of those others with whom a given participant finds themselves interacting. The social is not, as it were, plucked from the sky and made to serve interactional ends. Rather, the social is woven into the warp and weft of interaction as it unfolds moment-by-moment, turn-by-turn.

Data availability statement

The datasets presented in this article are not readily available because of restricted access. Requests to access the datasets should be directed to jack.sidnell@utoronto.ca.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by Research Ethics Review Board, University of Toronto. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study. Written informed consent was obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article.

Author contributions

All authors listed have made a substantial, direct, and intellectual contribution to the work and approved it for publication.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Recognition in interaction: theoretical and empirical observations

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In the current paper we aim to combine the theoretical ideas of recognition theory to conversation analytical, empirical observations. We ask what recognition theories can give to conversation analysis, and vice versa. We operate on a model of recognition that consists of three different modes: respect, esteem, and love/care, and which distinguishes the levels of conversational actions and the attitudes of recognition manifested in such actions. In this study we examine data examples from various conversational settings (institutional, quasi-experimental, family interaction) and activities (decision-making, storytelling), focusing on the more complex cases of (mis)recognition. We show how recognition can appear both explicitly and implicitly in conversational sequences, and demonstrate how the levels of conversational actions and recognition can be either congruent or incongruent with each other. At the end of the article, we discuss the implications of this view for the interface of conversation analysis and sociological theory, arguing that it can inform and promote the development of interactionally based social and societal critique.

KEYWORDS

conversation analysis, recognition, misrecognition, interaction, sociological theory, solidarity, affiliation

1 Introduction

The philosophy of recognition (*Anerkennung*) originates with Fichte and Hegel, who have theorized the social conditions of becoming a person. They claim that to be a self-conscious, free agent, one must be recognized by other self-conscious, free agents. In recognizing someone, a person limits their own activities accordingly: lets the other be free. In contemporary social and sociological theory, a recognition-theoretical approach to human existence has been advanced by, for example, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth. Taylor (1992, p. 26) called recognition a "vital human need" and made a distinction between two forms of recognition: *difference-blind* politics of universality and *difference-sensitive* politics of difference (Taylor, 1995; see Laitinen, 2002). In Honneth's theory (1995) three forms of recognition and self-relation were thematized: (1) respect and self-respect (2) social esteem and self esteem, and (3) love and self-confidence. Honneth chose these three possible modes based on their explanatory and normative relevance in relation to critical social theory (Laitinen, 2002, p. 470). He paid special

attention to the normative expectations of recognition, and the experiences of suffering from misrecognition, insults, and subordination.

In interaction theory, the idea of recognizing each other's selves, while simultaneously letting others be free from imposition, resonates with Brown and Levinson's (1987) concepts of *negative* and *positive politeness.* Brown and Levinson have argued that interactants use various politeness strategies to protect each other's social self-images, which they named as positive and negative *face* (cf. Goffman, 1955). Negative face refers to the human desire to be free from imposition, whereas positive face refers to the human desire to be validated by others. In recognition theoretical terms, negative politeness means freedom from misrecognition/mistreatment, and positive politeness the presence of positive recognition; positive affirmation of one's dignity (respect), merits (esteem), special standing (love/care). Brown and Levinson's framework, however, only operates at the level of the design of individual actions or turns of talk (e.g., linguistic form). Conversation Analysis (CA) has brought the empirical analysis of these human desires to the level of *sequences* of talk (Clayman, 2002, p. 230). Politeness theory has been of relevance, for example, in the sequential analysis of preference structure and the maintenance of *social solidarity* and *affiliation* in and through interaction (Clayman, 2002).

CA is a qualitative methodological program for studying video recordings of interactions with an aim to unravel the reoccurring interactional practices through which social actions are constructed (e.g., Schegloff, 2007; Sidnell and Stivers, 2013). The structural analysis of action in ordinary conversation relies on the notion that social interaction is informed by institutionalized structural organizations of practices to which participants are normatively oriented (Heritage, 2008, p. 303). It is this structural assumption, which is fundamentally associated with Goffman's (1974) 'Interaction Order', that differentiates CA as an approach to the study of social action from, for example, sociolinguistics or the sociology of language (Heritage, 2008, p. 303). CA offers a 'procedural approach' to social action, operating on the level of sequential organization (Clayman, 2002, p. 230). CA is thus its own enterprise, which focuses on talk-in-interaction embedded in sequential context, and the orderliness that participants produce and to which they demonstrate their orientations (Maynard, 2013, p. 28). Initially CA was a radically empirical enterprise (Haakana et al., 2009). A founding principle has been not to impose external ideas or theories on the data but to focus on how the participants themselves orient to interactional phenomena. In our current endeavor, however, we follow the authors such as Linell (2009) and Svennevig (2014), who have argued that many analytically interesting questions "go beyond the members' perspective and call for situation-transcending theories about social interaction" (Svennevig, 2014, p. 306; Linell, 2009; see also Koskinen, 2022).

In the current paper, we combine the theoretical ideas concerning interpersonal recognition to empirical conversation analytic observations. We operate on a model of recognition that consists of two or three different modes of recognition, depending on how fine-grained distinctions are used (*cf.* Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1995; Laitinen, 2002). In this model, recognition is divided into the general dimensions of *respect* (recognition that one is a person, based on universality, and including positive responsiveness to one's dignity and autonomy) and *solidarity* (recognition that one is a particular person, based on difference, and including positive responsiveness to one's contributions, needs, and special relational standing). Solidarity, then, includes two distinct modes of recognition: the first is *esteem,* which can be based on personalized positive qualities (*what kind* of person one is, including one's personal merits and talents) or socially valued roles (e.g., profession). Esteem can also be mediated based on the individual's perceived category. The second is *love/care,* which refers to recognition as a singular, irreplaceable individual (*which* unique person one is). As a result, we may form a triangle of recognition that consists of respect (the dimension of respect), esteem and love/care (the dimension of solidarity) (see Figure 1). This is Axel Honneth's threefold theory of recognition re-interpreted so that both esteem and love/care are central to solidarity, though Honneth links solidarity only to esteem. Here we follow Laitinen (2015). Apart from this conceptualization of solidarity as involving both the dimensions of esteem and love, we do not propose any specific view on the possible tensions, interdependencies, or priorities of the three modes of recognition (respect, esteem, love), and the symbolism of the triangle intends to depict this relative independence. Different theorists may meaningfully disagree, and our view is compatible with all major views that acknowledge these three modes of recognition (see, e.g., Hirvonen and Koskinen, 2022; Ikäheimo, 2022).



FIGURE 1
The 'recognition triangle' depicting the three modes of recognition: respect, esteem, and love/care.

Respect regards persons *qua* persons (independently of what kind of person or which person is at stake). Both Honneth and Taylor see this as an important historical achievement, that equal respect is to granted to everyone universally and in a difference-blind manner: once the idea of equal human rights and the idea of dignity of persons is available, it would be wrong and disrespectful to regard anyone as a second-rate citizen. Seeds for such universalism can be found in Stoicism and many World Religions like Christianity, but both Honneth and Taylor think that only after the French Revolution such exceptionless equal respect has become an organizing principle or ideal in real societies - and remains to be fully realized. Before the modern divergence of universal respect and social esteem, it was

expected that people in different positions of the social hierarchy are to be "honored" differently - second rate citizenship was the standard and so universal respect was not demanded. Nowadays it is an inescapable constitutive element of modern moral horizons (Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1995). The two modes of recognition constitutive of solidarity are then to be distinguished from this general dimension of respect: esteem is sensitive to what kind of person is at stake (while attempting to be indifferent to which person is at stake – and treat like cases alike) and love is sensitive to which irreplaceable person is at stake: thanks to a special relationship, one cannot change the loved one to any other person, even exactly similar person. It is important to note that the use of solidarity here somewhat differs from the idea of social solidarity presented in conversation analytic literature (see, e.g., Heritage, 1984; Clayman, 2002), which originates from the ideas of Émile Durkheim (1933). In CA, conversational structures such as preference organization (Pomerantz, 1984) have been seen to follow the principle of maintaining solidarity between the members of a society. The structures are considered as universal and not difference-based: the principle holds no matter which or what kind of person you are interacting with. In this sense, CA as a theory and method has perhaps been better equipped to focus on the universal aspects of recognition than on the difference-based modes of esteem and love/care. This study aims to fill this research gap.

With all of the above in mind, we can now formulate our three research questions:

> RQ1: How can we grasp recognition as an interactional phenomenon?
>
> RQ2: How do the three modes of recognition (respect, esteem, love/care) show in interaction, either implicitly or explicitly?
>
> RQ3: How do conversational actions operate in relation to the (mis)recognition that they convey?

In the following, we will go through the three modes of recognition in more detail. We will begin each section by describing the mode of recognition in question, and follow the general description with two empirical data examples. We utilize the structural analytical framework of CA to investigate how interpersonal recognition happens in and through sequences of social interaction when one person seeks to attain a status of a ratified interaction partner (respect), seeks acknowledgement for their individualized and/or category-based characteristics, and/or invites, and makes themselves relevant for, others' love and care. A key principle in CA is that various features of the delivery of talk and other bodily conduct are crucial to how interlocutors build specific actions and respond to the actions of others (Hepburn and Bolden, 2013, p. 57). This is why we utilize transcripts that include the details of how something is said, based on the assumption that "no order of detail in interaction can be dismissed *a priori* as disorderly, accidental, or irrelevant" (Heritage, 1984, p. 241). We provide a three-line transcription, where the first line represents the original talk, the second line is a morpheme-by-morpheme English gloss of the original, and the third line is an idiomatic English translation (cf. Hepburn and Bolden, 2013, p. 68–69). The advantage of a three-line transcription is that it allows an understanding of the talk as it temporally unfolds. See Supplementary material for explanations of the transcription symbols and glossing abbreviations.

The data extracts will illuminate how recognition shows in interaction through cases of momentary misrecognition. We use 'misrecognition' as a general term for missing, incomplete and/or wrong kind of recognition. We examine data from various conversational settings (institutional, quasi-experimental, family interaction) and activities (decision-making, storytelling). At the end of the article, we discuss the implications of the presented results for the interface of conversation analysis and sociological theory.

2 Respect

Respect is in principle owed to all persons equally just because they are persons: autonomous, rational, moral agents capable of leading their own lives and taking part in collective decision-making. The mere fact *that* one is a person thus suffices to ground demands of rights to be respected as such. Once these rights are violated, experiences of disrespect are a typical and fitting response. Clearest violations of equal respect may be ones that are encoded in the structures of society: for example a caste society can officially regard some people as superior and others as inferior. In modern societies, the aim (not always successfully realized) is to guarantee everyone an equal position. *Interpersonal* violations of respect show up in acts and attitudes of individuals, and it is those violations that are of interest for researchers of social interaction.

As an attitude, genuine respect is based on the acknowledgment of the equality and dignity of the other. Respect can be characterized by reverence and the maintenance of distance, instead of lovingly rushing to help the other to lead their lives. By contrast, disrespectful treatment can vary from blatant violations of rights to subtle nuances of expressions, say, mere tones of voices, when things that are justifiable as such are said (or done) in disrespectful ways. Anything can be done disrespectfully, if accompanied with disrespectful expressions or attitudes (See, e.g., Thompson, 2006; McBride, 2014; Dillon, 2022; Ikäheimo, 2022; Siep et al., 2022).

Extract 1 shows an example of misrecognition in the sense of respect. The case is drawn from a co-development workshop, in which professionals in a large social and healthcare organization and the so-called experts-by-experience discuss ways in which the delivery of the social and health care services could be improved (see Weiste et al., 2022). In this case, the participants have previously discussed how to collect feedback from the clients. Just previously, one of the professionals has proposed that the feedback be collected via email, which is also referred to by her colleague (P1) at the beginning of the extract (l. 1–4). At this point, one of the experts-by-experience (E1) takes a turn in the discussion, telling a story about the way in which she has previously helped a mother who had felt that his son had been unjustifiably excluded from the services.

Extract 1. Co-development workshop (P1, P2 = professionals; E = expert by experience)

```
01 P1: se  et  mä  laitan sähköpostii ni  ei  ehkä  riitä
       DEM PRT SG1 send-1  email-PAR   PRT NEG maybe be.enough
       that I send an email is maybe not enough

02     mun     täytyy saada  esimies    laittamaan   se  sähköposti
       SG1-GEN must  get-INF supervisor send-INF-ILL DEM email
       I need to get my supervisor to send that email

03     et  kaikki    osallist↑uu niinku että
       PRT everybody participate PRT    PRT
       so that everyone will participate so that

04     näitä      kysymyksii      tässä?=
       DEM-PL-PAR question-PL-PAR here
       these questions here?=

05 E1: =↑no tän       mä  voin  kertoo   kyllä että ↓tää  ei  tullu
         PRT DEM1-GEN SG1 can-1 tell-INF PRT   PRT   DEM1 NEG come-PPC
       =↑well this I can tell so ↓this didn't come

06     suoranaisesti as↑iakkaalt vaikka se  oli    kyllä asiakas mut totanoi
       directly      client-ABL  PRT    DEM be-PST PRT   client  but PRT
       directly from a cl↑ient even though it was a client but well

07     et  eräs äiti   soitti   Kuopiosta    ja mä olin hyvin h(hh)ämmentyny
       PRT one  mother call-PST CityName-ELA and SG1 be-PST-1 very confused
       a mother phoned from Kuopio and I was really confused about

08     täst     tilanteesta   ja  poika oli    käyny     meiän   tota noin
       DEM1-ELA situation-ELA and son   be-PST visit-PPC PL1-GEN PRT  PRT
       this situation and her son had been visiting in our erm

09     (.) (.hhh) vastaanotolla ilman   ajanvarausta ja  hän oli    sitten
                  reception-ADE without appointment  and SG3 be-PST PRT
       (.) (.hhh) walk-in reception and he was then

10     lempattu ulos ja  mä  nyt en    tiedä ↑koko totuutta  ↓ja hän oli
       kick.out-PPPC and SG1 PRT NEG-1 know  whole truth-PAR and SG3 be-PST
       kicked out and well I don't know the ↑whole truth, ↓and she was

11     hyvin hyvin äkäsellä      tuulella ja  jollain ihmeen      konstilla
       very  very  irritated-ADE mood-ADE and by.some miracle-GEN means-ADE
       very very irritated and by some strange means

12     sain      lepytettyy hänet ja  että @ei  anneta periks vaan kerro
       get-PST-1 calm.down  her   and PRT   NEG give.up       PRT  tell-IMP
       I managed to calm her down and @lets not give up just tell

13     pojalles       terveiset ja  ei  anneta periks vaan huomenna aamulla
       son-ALL-2.POSS regard-PL and NEG give.up-PASS  PRT  tomorrow morning-ADE
       regards to your son and lets not give up but tomorrow morning

14     sama juttu ja  käytä hyväks       mun     nimee@.
       same thing and take.advantage-IMP SG1-GEN name-PAR
       do the same thing and take advantage of my name@.

15     (1.9)

16 P1: pitäiskö meiän   lähtee tää  ihan [niinku kohta kohdalta,
       should-Q PL1-GEN go-INF DEM1 PRT   PRT    point point-ABL
       should we strat to go through this just [like point by point,

17 P2:                                  [joo mä  kans mietin.
                                         PRT SG1 also think-PST-1
                                        [yeah I was thinking that too.
```

As a response to the proposal on the feedback collection method, E1 tells about a particular situation in which she received negative feedback and describes how she handled the situation (l. 5–14). During the telling, the other participants produce no response particles (e.g., "okay"), that would encourage E1 to continue her telling or display that they are listening (Sorjonen, 2001). Upon the completion of E1's account, all story-recipients remain silent (l. 15). Next, the professional returns to the workshop agenda and, by referring to the assignment sheet, proposes that the participants begin working through it (l. 16). The other professional agrees, stating that this was something that she was also considering (l. 17). Thus, the story here is 'sequentially deleted'—that is, completely ignored by the professionals (see Weiste et al., 2022, p. 12).

As stated above, respect refers to the universal recognition that one is a person. Persons are those "toward whom other persons take a 'personal stance', or whom others relate to as 'respondents'" (Laitinen, 2002, p. 474). To be an actual person means to be taken by others as having the right to be respected as a person, and, for example, refraining from treating someone as a responsible agent and a communication partner involves a violation of such respect. In our view, Extract 1 depicts a micro-moment of interaction, where the expert-by-experience (E1) is *not* treated as an equal communication partner but someone whose views can be considered as irrelevant and not worthy of even minimal acknowledgment. Hence, the extract depicts a momentary lack of respect in recognition theoretical terms.

Let us consider another example of how respect—as the fundamental category of recognition—can be at stake in social interaction. Extract 2 is drawn from a study by Valkeapää et al. (2019) and represents a situation that is explicitly framed as being about joint decision making. The decision making takes place within a Clubhouse community—a non-profit organization providing mental health rehabilitation based on membership in the community (Raeburn et al., 2013). The Clubhouse members who wish to enter the labor market are supported by the Clubhouse-created transition employment programme, which involves part-time short-term employment at various cooperating companies. The selection of the individuals getting the chance to try transitional employment is managed by the Clubhouse community, not by the employers. Once succeeded in transitional employment the Clubhouse members have better prospects to seek competitive employment (Henry et al., 2001). The decisions about entrance into transitional employment are thus highly consequential to the Clubhouse members, which is why it is explicitly stated that these decisions should be made democratically in the community (Valkeapää et al., 2019). Extract 2 is from such a decision-making situation.

Extract 2. Decision-making in Clubhouse (SW = support worker; Matti, Julia, Paula = Clubhouse members)

```
01 SW:    kenet (.) kenet te  valitsisitte    tästä    porukasta (0.4) jos
          who       who   PL2 choose-COND-PL2 DEM1-ELA group-ELA       if
          who (.) who would you choose from this group (0.4) if

02        sais  valita     jonku       muun     kun itsensä (0.6)
          could choose-INF someone-GEN else-GEN PRT oneself
          you could choose someone else than yourself (0.6)

03        mua     ei  saa valita     eikä Katjaa      tietysti (.) se  on
          SG1-PAR NEG get choose-INF NEG  FemName-PAR of.course    DEM be
          you can't choose me or Katja of course (.) she has

04        tullu just meille töihin ni (.) siihen [(-)
          just started working with us so (.) there (-)

05 Matti:                                        [mä otan Paulan ((osoittaa))
                                                  I'll take Paula ((pointing))

06 SW:    sä  valitsisit    Paulan      ja (0.8) ketäs       Paula
          SG2 choose-COND-2 FemName-GEN and      who-PAR-CLI FemName
          you would choose Paula and (0.8) who would Paula

07        valitsis      jos ei  ketään muu
          choose-COND-2 if  NEG anyone else
          choose if not anyone else

08        ((Paula points at Julia))

09 SW:    Julian
          FemName-GEN
          Julia

10        (0.6)

11 Julia: ja  mä  valitsisin    myös Paul[an hhh
          and SG1 choose-COND-1 also FemName-GEN
          and I would also choose Paula hhh
```

12 SW: [nii sä valitsisit myös Paulan
PRT SG2 choose-COND-2 also FemName-GEN
yeah you would also choose Paula

13 (0.8)

14 SW: kyllä (0.6) jooh
PRT PRT
right (0.6) yeah

15 (5.0)

16 SW: sitte meiän täytyy sitä hommaa tota noi ni miettiä et
PRT PL1-GEN should DEM-PAR stuff-PAR PRT PRT PRT think-INF PRT
then we have to kind of think about that

17 mikä onks joku semmone kriteeri (2.4) mikä on nyt (1.0) ku mä
what be-Q some such criterion what be PRT PRT SG1
what *is there some criterion (2.4) we could use now (1.0) because I*

18 musta tuntuu et te ootte molemmat teil on molemmilla ihan
I.feel PRT PL2 be-PL2 both PL2-ADE be both-ADE PRT
I feel that you are both that you both have exactly

19 samanlaisia noita (0.8) niinkun (2.0) tossa kriteeristöstä
similar-PL-PAR DEM-PL-PAR PRT DEM2-INE criteria-ELA
the same (0.8) like (2.0) there in the criteria

20 mitä aatteli et mistä vois peilata ni teil on
what-PAR think-PST PRT from.where could mirror-INF PRT PL2-ADE be
what one thought could be used so you have

21 tosi paljon niiku samaa (.) siis molemmilla (.) et teil ei
very much PRT same-PAR PRT both-ADE PRT PL2-ADE NEG
very many similarities (.) I mean both (.) so that you don't

22 oikeestaa mitään muuta oo sillai eri (.) eri
actually anything else-PAR be in.such.a.way different different
actually have any other difference (.) differences

23 siinä ku mitä mä niiku aattelen jos mä niiku katon niitä
in.it PRT what-PAR SG1 PRT think-1 if SG1 PRT look-1 DEM-PL-PAR
there than what I like think if I look at the

23 pääjuttuja mitä tuol on ni (.) on se säännöllisyys (.)
main.point-PL-PAR what-PAR there be PRT be DEM regularity
main points there are (.) there is regularity (.)

24 se on varmaa se ainoo missä teil on vähä erilailla
DEM be PRT DEM only where PL2-ADE be a.bit differently
it is probably the only thing where you have it a bit differently

25 (1.0) tällä hetkellä eikö (.) ja sitte se että (2.0) että
at.this.moment PRT and PRT DEM PRT PRT
(1.0) at the moment right (.)and then the thing is that (2.0) that

26 on monipuolisesti kiinnostunu erilaisista tehtävistä ja haluaa
be many-sidedly interested various-PL-PAR task-PL-PAR and want
one has many-sided interests in various tasks and wants to

27 kokeilla kaikenlaista siinä te ootte erilaisia (0.4)
try-INF all.kinds.of-PAR in.it PL2 be-PL2 different-PL-PAR
try out everything there you differ (0.4)

28 mä aattelin Paulaa vaa et sul on aika paljon sitä
SG1 think-PST-1 FemName-PAR PRT PRT SG2-ADE be PRT much DEM-PAR
I was just thinking about Paula that you have pretty much the

```
29          samaa    hommia      mitä     sä  tykkäät tehä (.) eikö
            same-PAR task-PL-PAR what-PAR SG2 like-2  do-INF   NEG-Q
            same tasks that you like to do (.) right

30          (.)

31 SW:      mut [oot  sä  muutaki      tehny
            but  be-2 SG2 else-PAR-CLI do-PPC
            but you have also done other things

32 Paula:        [joo mutta kyllä työelämässä      ni  kyl mä  mielellään ni
                  PRT but   PRT   working.life-INE PRT PRT SG1 gladly     PRT
                  yeah but in working life I really gladly

            kokeilen kaikkii mahdollisii    uusii
            try-1    all-PAR possible-PL-PAR new-PL-PAR
            try out all possible new
```

At the beginning of the extract the support worker (SW) initiates a procedure to get the Clubhouse members vote among themselves the one who they think should get the employment (l. 1–4). The voting procedure results in Paula getting most of the votes (l. 5–14). However, instead of declaring Paula the winner of the vote, a long silence follows (l. 15). Thereafter the support worker announces a next item in the agenda, which is to come up with the decisive criterion for making the decision (l. 16–17). In so doing, the support worker effectively undermines the relevance of the previous voting result. Instead, a much more unilateral way of making a decision is reflected in the support worker's lengthy evaluative account of the qualities of the candidates (l. 16–29). In essence, the support worker introduces 'regularity' and 'versatility' as criteria with reference to which Paula and Julia are said to differ (l. 21–27) and Paula to fall short (l. 28–29). Thereafter, in an attempt to request for Paula's confirmation for his assessment, the support worker uses a turn-final question particle (*eikö* 'right' l. 21). However, most likely in anticipation of an upcoming disagreement, the support worker softens the assessment, while Paula indeed produces a disagreement in overlap with the support worker. In displaying a need to defend herself against the criteria imposed by the support worker (l. 32–33) Paula orients to the possibility that she may still lose the selection, irrespective of her just previously having won the vote. Thereafter the support worker directs the selection process in a way that it really is Julia, and not Paula, who will be selected to get transitional employment.

Hence, the participants in the encounter were given the possibility to express their opinion in the matter that was of great significance to them. Unlike in Extract 1, the participants were explicitly asked about their views and their answers were minimally acknowledged as received. However, acknowledging a person as a conversational participant is not necessarily enough to convey respect. Here, we may observe a lack of respect, which shows in the lack of consequentiality that some participants' interactional contributions have for the overall joint activity. In this case, the consequences were not only about influencing the trajectory of the interaction in the here and now of the encounter, but also about the participants' lives beyond and after the encounter. However, the role of the "responsible agent" (Laitinen, 2002, p. 474) who may participate in decision-making about these consequences was withheld from these participants.

3 Esteem

Esteem as a type of recognition focuses on the person's particular traits, achievements, merits, laudable efforts, talents, contributions, admirable features, and so on, that are different with different people. Yet, esteem is ideally indifferent toward (numerical) identities in the sense that the same praise is adequate for the same efforts, talents, contributions independently of who (say, who's nephew or neighbor) is in question—various norms of impartiality forbidding nepotism are embodied in a number of practices from anonymous peer review to public announcements of conflicts of interest in recruitment.

Esteem comes in different variants. What holds all forms of esteem together is that they are positive feedback on one's qualities or features that are typically different with different people. The most straightforward case of esteem is based on one's achievements or actions: doing one's job well is a basis for positive appraisal by others. On top of the kind of esteem that everyone holding a role of the same kind may share (see below), there is *personalized* esteem that consists in the feedback and attitudes of others concerning how well one is doing one's job. So different teachers are esteemed to different degrees, because of differences in the style and effects of how they live and perform in that role. Personalized esteem is not restricted to how well one performs in such central defining roles as in one's job—one can be held a valuable contributor to social life merely by being a fun person to hang out with. Having valuable personal features from admirable character traits to exceptional talents or to good looks may be a basis of personalized esteem.

In addition to such personalized feedback, the socially recognized *role* one occupies can as such be a source of esteem or esteemworthiness: think of being a teacher, priest, president, garbage collector or professor. Different jobs, offices or roles come with a certain type of social standing in the eyes of others—being a professor comes with some amount of default esteem. That is something that all people in that role share, independently of how well they do that task. Often one's salary is dependent on what the title of one's office or role is (perhaps combined with personalized bonuses dependent on one's actual performance). Typically, recognizing someone's role also shows in being treated as an expert on questions related to that role.

Further, being perceived as belonging to some special categories or groups may lower (or heighten) others' expectations and assessments of one's performance. For example, being diagnosed or perceived with some permanent or temporary condition may be thought to affect one's performance in ways that lower the expectations. When one is known to be sick, one is not expected to carry on with one's tasks as usual. The mere

fact that one has the condition does not lower the expectations, the interaction partners must perceive or assume or know or mistakenly confer such category-membership on the individual (Ásta, 2018). These category-memberships may not as such carry special positive esteem with them - and indeed, expressing lowered expectations may be experienced as disrespectful - but they may nonetheless meaningfully and positively affect how individual achievements are assessed and esteemed: what for many others might seem as average performance, can be an achievement for someone categorized as having extra challenges. Below we call esteem mediated by perceived membership in categories that come with differing expectations *category-mediated esteem*.

Extract 3 shows an example of misrecognition in the sense of esteem. The extract is from a quasi-natural dataset where individuals diagnosed with Asperger syndrome (AS) discuss with neurotypical (i.e., persons without neurological diagnoses; NT) individuals about their personal lives (see Koskinen, 2022). The two male research participants sit in armchairs facing each other perpendicularly. They have been asked to talk about happy events and the losses in their lives in a freely chosen way. In the following extract, the AS-participant (T) tells the NT-recipient (R) about one of his successes in life, which is that he graduated from high school on his very first try.

Extract 3. Success story (T= teller, AS-participant; R= recipient, NT-participant)

```
01 T: yks missä mä  oon  niinku onnistunu   ni  mä  oon (.) esimerkiks  kerralla
      one where SG1 be-1 PRT    succeed-PPC PRT SG1 be-1    for.example time-ADE
      one (thing) where I have like succeeded is that I've (.) for example

02    (.) päässy ylioppilaaks? (.) mikä  on (.) ihan suoranainen ihme
          graduate-PPC             which be     PRT  total       miracle
      (.) graduated on my first try (.) which is (.) totally a miracle

03    koska   mulla   meni   koulu  niinku .h >suunnillee< vasemmalla kädellä,
      because SG1-ADE go-PST school PRT        pretty.much left-ADE   hand-ADE
      because school for me went like .h (.) >pretty much< off-handed,

04 R: ok[↑ei.
      PRT
      ok↑ay.

05 T:   [ja  se  on vieläki >vähän niinku< tavallaa meiän   vakiovitsinä
         and DEM be still    a.bit PRT     in.a.way PL1-GEN standard.joke-ESS
         and it is still >a bit like< kind of our standard joke

06    että et  että @on ↑ihme    että se  pääs@ [ylioppilaaks mut .hh
      PRT  PRT PRT   be  miracle PRT  DEM graduate-PST        but
      that that that @it is a ↑miracle that he@ graduated but .hh

07 R:                                          [€mhe€ €mhe€

08 T: ja  vielä niinku heti        ensiyrittämällä  mutta, (.) se  oli
      and PRT   PRT    immediately on.the.first.try but        DEM be-PST
      and even like on the very first try but, (.) it was

09    sitte (1.1) .mthh sillä   selvä että tosin    se  oli    myönnetään
      PRT               thereby clear PRT  although DEM be-PST admit-PASS
      then (1.1) .mthh  that was it then although it was I have to admit

10    se  oli    aika hilkulla että pääsi.=
      DEM be-PST PRT  tight    PRT  get.in-PST
      it was pretty tight that I made it.=

11 R: =ok↑ei.
      PRT
      =ok↑ay.

12 T: että se  oli    niinku, (0.3) jos ois    ↑yhdenki     pist[een  menny
      PRT  DEM be-PST PRT           if  be-COND one-GEN-CLI point-GEN go-PPC
      that it was like, (0.3) if (I) had lost even one point it wouldn-

13 R:                                                      [€mhe€ €mhe€

14 T: ni eid- eijo- eijois, (0.9) [ei↑jois. (0.7) mm [jos-
      wouldn- wouldn't (0.9) would ↑not. (0.7) mm if-
```

```
15 R:                          [°okei°          [('t)sä  kävit    niinko:
                                                  SG2  go-PST-2 PRT
                               °okay°           (so) you went to like

16     ammattikoulun        ja  kävit    sä ↑sit [lukion          vai]
       vocational.school-GEN and go-PST-2 SG2 PRT  high.school-GEN or
       a vocational school and did you ↑then go to high.school or

17 T:                                          [ndöö öö siis       ]
                                                      PRT
                                                umm well so

18     mä  kävin    ensin lukion?
       SG1 go-PST-1 first upper.secondary.school-GEN
       I went first to the upper secondary school?

19 R:  joo=
       PRT
       yeah=
```

The teller (T) first makes the positive affective stance of the telling (cf. Stivers, 2008) explicit by mentioning that this is a thing where he has succeeded (l. 1). He continues by declaring that he graduated on his first try (l. 1–2). This, however, only elicits a slow, upward nod from R, which leads T to continue "which is totally a miracle because school for me went pretty much off-handed" (l. 2–3). This elaboration elicits a minimal response "okay" from R with a slightly surprised prosody (l. 4). Then T continues by slightly changing the affective stance by making it humorous "and it is still kind of our standard joke" and imitates direct reported speech "it is a miracle that he graduated" (l. 5–6), which receives a small laugh-token from R (l. 7). The lukewarm display of affiliation by R is understandable, as self-deprecating stances can be difficult for recipients to endorse (Pomerantz, 1984). Then T returns to his original stance of success by emphasizing "and even like on the very first try" (l. 8), which does not elicit any reaction R. Then T continues "although I have to admit that it was close" (l. 9–10). This, again, only gets an acknowledgement "okay" from R (l. 11). Then, finally, after T has emphasized again how close his graduation was (l. 12, 14), R responds to the telling with a longer turn: "(so) you went to a vocational school and did you then go to upper secondary school or" (l. 15–16). This question clearly circumvents the stance of success that T has introduced in his telling (cf. Koskinen et al., 2021). After the question, the participants continue to talk about T's school background and neither the feeling of success nor the event of graduating is returned to.

As stated above, esteem is based on the different (positive) qualities, merits, and achievements that individuals have. In Extract 3, the AS-participant does *not* receive this type of recognition for his achievements, even though the telling would have made such recognition relevant. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, however, tellings with self-deprecating stances are difficult to affiliate with. In the same way as story-recipients may sometimes refrain from empathetic turns in order to save face of the teller, it could be considered face-threatening to show enthusiastic affiliation (e.g., "that is amazing") to someone succeeding in a 'standard performance', as graduating from high school could be culturally considered to be. With his question, R reframes the topic under discussion to be a broader one of studies, as opposed to the more specific event of T's graduation, and in this way manages to bypass the possibly face-threatening moment. The other-attentiveness of the question can also work to legitimate the topic shift (*cf.* Jefferson, 1984; Koskinen et al., 2021).

We argue that the recipient here is oriented to personalized positive qualities of the teller in relation to other people, instead of category-mediated esteem. Meaning that R assessed the personal merit of T's graduation in relation to the overall percentage of Finnish high school students who graduate on their first try (which is about 94%). Making this comparison, graduating on the first try could be deemed not-so-impressive, and showing too great appreciation for that achievement could be interpreted as patronizing. However, the other route would have been to assess T's performance in relation to his being an individual on the autism spectrum. One of the hallmarks of Asperger syndrome is the AS-individuals' uneven cognitive profiles (e.g., Attwood, 1998), which can cause their academic success to suffer. Against this backdrop, T's success story would indeed invite strong affiliation from the recipient, which it does not receive. Hence, the extract depicts a momentary lack of (category-mediated) esteem. The recipient had a chance to signal being on the same side, show solidarity, and regard as salient those criteria of esteem that would have allowed the sense in which it was a genuine achievement to show. What was a successful bypassing of a face-threatening moment from one angle, was from another angle a failure to show esteem that would have been appropriate (The phenomenon of describing or redescribing a situation so that the other can appear in positive light is relevant to the ethics of Iris Murdoch, see The Sovereignty of Good (Murdoch, 1970), and is arguably central for standing in relations of solidarity, for "being on someone's side." For an overview on the notion of solidarity, see Sangiovanni and Viehoff, 2023, and for its relationship with recognition, see Laitinen, 2015).

We will now move on to analyze a case in which two components of esteem—the one based on role-specific status and the one based on positive personalized qualities—both serve as possible bases of positive assessment. Extract 4 is drawn from the study by Stevanovic and Peräkylä (2014). Here, a pastor (P) and a cantor (C) discuss the Pentecost mass, and the cantor shows to the pastor a hymn arrangement that he has made for the event (l. 1–2).

Extract 4. Cantor and pastor (C = cantor; P = pastor)

```
01 C:   ni, (0.2) ↑täm  mä piir- ↑mää pistin    niille     huiluille
        PRT        DEM1 SG1       SG1 put-PST-1 DEM-PL-ALL flut-PL-ALL
        so, (0.2) ↑this I dre- ↑I wanted to make those flutes (play)

02      kirjotin    tään     näin.
        write-PST-1 DEM1-GEN PRT
        I wrote this thing here.

03      (.)

04 C:   .h helluntaivirsi,
           Pentecost.hymn
        .h a Pentecostal hymn.

05      (0.5) ((P is looking at the musical arrangement.))

06 P:   dh jaaha?
           PRT
        dh uh huh?

07 C:   #ehtoollise    ajaks    tuo#, (.)
         Eucharist-GEN time-TRA DEM2
        #during the Eucharist that#, (.) ((P starts browsing her Hymnal.)

08      ¯taadiidaadiidaa taadaadaam¯

09      (1.0)

10 P:   joo.
        PRT
        yea. ((P finds the hymn in question.))

11 P:   sataviistoista.
        hundred.fifteen
        one hundred fifteen.

12      (0.3) ((P writes down the number of the hymn.))

13 C:   mm. mä  aattelin    et  pistetään nyt hellu- ↑helluntai.
        PRT SG1 think-PST-1 PRT put-PASS  PRT         Pentecost
        mm. I thought that let's now take a Pente- ↑Pentecostal.

14 P:   joo.
        PRT
        yea.

15 C:   et  se, (0.3) se  on? tää  tommonen, (0.6)
        PRT DEM       DEM be  DEM1 that.kind.of
        cause it, (0.3) it's this that kind of, (0.6)

16      ↑mietiskelevä virsi niin sopii ehto- ehtoolliseen.
        meditating    hymn  PRT  fit         Eucharist-ILL
        a ↑meditating hymn so it fits to the Eu- Eucharist.

17 P:   .hhh laulatteks te  ensik kuitenki sen     rukouksen liekin
             sing-PL2-Q PL2 first PRT       DEM-GEN HymnName
        .hhh will you still sing first that Flame of the Prayer
```

The cantor's utterance is an announcement of a decision, which calls for the pastor's acceptance of it (l. 1–4). However, by showing the arrangement to the pastor, the cantor can also be heard as inviting an assessment by the recipient. The utterance is designed in a way that foregrounds his own role as the creator of the arrangement, which invites the pastor to express her appreciation for the cantor's accomplishment. These two options—a display of acceptance of the cantor's decision and an assessment of the cantor's accomplishment—are thus both potentially relevant ways of responding to the cantor's line of action. The first one would provide recognition of the cantor as one who, by virtue of his professional role, has the "deontic authority" (Stevanovic and Peräkylä, 2012) with reference to the realization of the Eucharist hymn in the upcoming mass. The second one, in contrast, would provide personalized recognition of the cantor as a specific *kind* of representative of his profession—one who has invested an exceptional amount of work in the preparation of the mass and, in so doing, accomplished something extraordinary.

The pastor chooses to pursue the first option: she treats the cantor's utterance as an announcement of a decision. The pastor receives this information first by checking the arrangement (l. 5), then by starting to leaf through her hymnal to find the hymn (l. 7), and, after having found the hymn (l. 10), by writing down its number (l. 12). In and through all this, the pastor displays commitment to treating the cantor's hymn choice as binding. The cantor, however, does not seem to treat the pastor's responses as sufficient. This can be seen in the ways in which the cantor starts to account for his choice of music, explicating the grounds for his decision (l. 13, 15–16). In so doing, the cantor invites the pastor to display appreciation of his choice of music. Importantly, as both participants have displayed an orientation to the decision as established, the cantor is not asking the pastor to participate in the decision-making as such (Stevanovic, 2012). Rather, he invites the pastor to recognize that the cantor has fulfilled her professional role in a specifically applaudable manner. The pastor, however, refrains from providing such personalized recognition. Instead, she asks the cantor about the order of the musical items in the mass (l. 17), thus sticking "strictly to business," which involves recognition of the cantor's role-specific status as the sole decision-maker in the matter at hand. Yet, it constitutes a failure to give personalized feedback for an achievement when it would have been appropriate; a misrecognition in the mode of esteem.

4 Love/care

Love or care is the third main form of recognition. Two ways of distinguishing it from respect or esteem are worth mentioning. The "logic" of love is not difference-blind either in the sense of universal respect of generalized others, or impartial esteem conditional on one's qualities. Love is a way of regarding the significant other as irreplaceable, a special, singled out and unique person. Love need not be deserved, and it is not conditional on achievements like esteem. Further, the "ground" of loving care seems to be something like the vulnerability and neediness of the other, the capacity to feel not only positive emotions but also to suffer, rather than their autonomy, merits, or roles. The variants of human relationships that are constituted by such recognition of vulnerability range from parental and romantic love to friendship, and in wider circles, solidarity. Solidarity can be seen as a combination of mutual esteem and mutual care, where each party is potentially a beneficiary of support from others, and a supporter of others. Love, care, friendship and solidarity show up in ways of treating the other but also in one's own emotional responses regarding the other; and typically third persons can modify their expectations and take into account the parental or romantic or otherwise significant relationships and friendships of others.

Extract 5 shows an example of a misrecognition in the sense of love/care. The extract is from a quasi-natural dataset where individuals with a high level of narcissistic personality traits (N+) discuss with individuals who have low levels of these traits (N-, see Koskinen et al., *in review*). The two female research participants sit in armchairs facing each other perpendicularly. In this segment, they have been instructed to tell about moments where they felt ashamed of themselves. In the following extract, the N- participant (B) tells the N+ participant (A) about an incident with her PhD supervisor that caused her to feel ashamed.

Extract 5. Shameful PhD supervision meeting (B = teller; A = recipient)

```
01 B: .hhh enemmän häpesin          itseäni maanantaina. (.) meill_oli
         more    be-ashamed-PST-1 myself  Monday-ESS       PL1-ADE be-PST
      .hhh I was more ashamed of myself on Monday. (.) we had

02    (0.3) e .hhhh tota (.) ensimmäisen, (.) ohjaajan       kanssa
                     PRT      first-GEN        supervisor-GEN with
      (0.3) umm (.) main (.) e- (.) to (0.3)

03    e (.) to- (0.3) m m pääsiä- (.) pääasiallisen palaveri
                                      main-GEN      meeting
      m- meeting with my main supervisor

04    ja  sit vaan tuli     puhuttua   siitä   et  mitä     tehtiin, .hhh
      and PRT PRT  come-PST speak-PPPC DEM-PAR PRT what-PAR do-PASS
      and we got to talk about what what was done, .hhh

05    mitä     tein     viime viikolla ja  sanoin    että en    nyt hirveesti
      what-PAR do-PST-1 last  week-ADE and say-PST-1 PRT  NEG-1 PRT terribly
      what I did last week and I said that I really didn't
```

06 tehny mitään koska mun piti valmistella tätä mun
do-PPC anything because SG1-GEN should-PST prepare-INF DEM1-PAR SG1-GEN
do much anything because I had to prepare for this

07 esitelmää, .hhhh [mä vihaan n(h)iiden p(h)itämist
presentation-PAR SG1 hate-1 DEM-PL-GEN hold-INF-PAR
presentation, .hhhh I hate giving

08 A: [eh heh

09 B: niin p(h)aljon (0.2) et heh m(h)ä käytin sen
so much PRT SG1 use-PST-1 DEM-GEN
them s(h)o mu(h)ch (0.2) that heh I used the

10 {k(h)oko v(h)iikon v(h)aan n(h)iinku t(h)öiden
entire week-GEN PRT PRT work-PL-GEN
e(h)ntire w(h)eek ju(h)s li(h)ke avoiding
{((A laughs))_____

11 v(h)älttel(h)yyn j(h)a .hhhh €siin_ oli vähän
avoidance-ILL and in.it be-PST a.bit
w(h)ork a(h)nd .hhhh €that was a bit
_____

12 sellane et sit se oli se et} (0.2) niie, heh
such PRT PRT DEM be-PST DEM PRT PRT
like then he was like (0.2) yeah€, heh
_____}

13 €et kannattaa ehkä v(h)ähän (0.2) .hh opet(h)ella
PRT be.worth maybe a-little learn-INF
€maybe you should try to learn (0.2) a li(h)ttle bit-

14 et hyvä että tunnistat ton {mutta€, heh .hhh
PRT good PRT recognize-2 DEM2-GEN but
it's good that you recognize that but€, heh .hhh
{((A laughs_____

15 €kannattaa ehkä vähän harjotella s(h)itä koska
be.worth maybe a.bit practice DEM-PAR because
€maybe it's worth practicing t(h)at a little bit because
_____

16 (0.2) koska ei ne työt tässä tutkijanm(h)aailmassa
because NEG DEM3-PL work-PL here researcher.world-INE
(0.2) because the workload isn't getting any l(h)ess
_____

17 v(h)ähene että, eh heh€ (---) .hhh €olin s(h)illai}
get.less PRT be-PST-1 like
in the res(h)earcher's world so, eh heh€ (---) €I was like
_____}

18 et no, (0.2) ett(h)ä viis päivää käyttäny tähän
PRT PRT PRT five day-PAR use-PPC DEM1-ILL
well, (0.2) s(h)o I spent five days on this here

19 {näin että€, .mffff .mt .hhh (0.2) €ehkä vähän
like.this PRT maybe a.bit
so that€, .mffff .mt .hhh (0.2) €maybe I was a
{((A laughs))_____

20 nolotti oli vähän sellanen fiilis että (0.2)
feel.embarrassed-PASS be-PST a.bit such feeling PRT
bit embarrassed I had a feeling that (0.2)
_____

```
21    ois     siinä varmaa voinu, (0.2) .ts} .hhhh vaikka taas
      be-COND in.it PRT    be.able                PRT    again
      one probably could have, (0.2) .tch .hhhh but then again
      ____________________________________}

22    (0.2) ei m- sen, (0.4) en    nyt täysin käyttäny aikaa
            NEG   DEM-GEN    NEG-1 PRT fully  use-PPC  time-PAR
      (0.2) no b- uhh, (0.4) I didn't fully use time

23    #mut en    kyl saanu   mitään   järkevää#      tehtyy
       PRT NEG-1 PRT get-PPC anything reasonable-PAR do-PPPC
      #but I didn't get anything reasonable# done

24    viime viikolla ni. hhh (0.7) .mt kyl se  ehkä  ihav
      last  week-ADE PRT              PRT DEM maybe PRT
      last week so. hhh (0.7) .mt that I was maybe

25    vähän nolotti.
      a.bit feel.embarrassed-PASS
      a bit embarrassed.

26      (0.5)

27 A: .hh mno (0.5) hm (.) [#m# (.) no (0.2) kyl (.) m
          PRT       PRT      PRT    PRT      PRT     PRT
      .hh well (0.5) hm (.)[#m# (.) well (0.2) I-

28 B:                      [.mt .hhhhhhhhhh

29 A: e- (.) tai >siis< (.) mä  samaistun ihan (0.2) tosi paljon
            or   PRT       SG1 relate-1  PRT        very much
      e- (.) or >I mean< (.) I completely relate to that (0.2) very much

30    just tuohon:, mulla: (.) m (.) kesti    gradun
      PRT  DEM2-ILL SG1-ADE          last-PST master's.thesis-GEN
      to exactly that:, (.) for me: (.) m (.) it took

31    tekeminen ihan sairaan [kauan, .hhh
      do-INF    PRT  sick-GEN long
      a really long time to do my master's thesis, .hhh

32 B:                        [j:o#o::#, eh heh
                              PRT
                             ye:#a::h#; eh heh
```

The teller (B) describes a meeting with her supervisor where she admitted not getting anything done in the previous week (l. 1–25). The story is produced with a humorous, laughing tone, and the recipient (A) produces affiliative feedback (i.e., smiling, laughter) throughout the whole telling (l. 8–21). After B is finished with her story, A displays affiliation with "I completely relate to that, very much to exactly that" (l. 29–30) and produces a short second story (Sacks, 1992) about her own masters thesis that took a long time to do, affiliating with A by conveying to her 'I'm with you' (see Jefferson, 2002).

The recipient here shows recognition toward the teller's emotional experience and responds to the story's evaluative properties in an adequate way. This is not only recognition of B as a person (respect) but also recognition of what kind of person B is (esteem): the recipient is accepting and validating these special features, publicly relating to them. What then could be missing here in terms of recognition? The second component of solidarity (love/care) involves recognizing someone as a singular, irreplaceable individual. When A displays affiliation toward B by sharing the experience and emphasizing the similarity between them, the uniqueness of B and her experience actually gets lost in the process (cf. Heritage, 2011). A could have recognized the 'vulnerability and neediness of the other, the capacity to feel not only positive emotions but also to suffer' (see above). Response of this kind could have, for example, applauded B's courage in giving a presentation, even though she hates them, or admired her honesty and vulnerability in divulging this shameful incident. This level of recognition, however, is most likely less common in conversations between previously unacquainted individuals. It could nonetheless be utilized here, and without the theoretical tools of the three different modes of recognition, this aspect would stay hidden and inaccessible for analysis.

The previous extract was an example of recognition on the level of esteem but not love/care. This final extract is an example of the opposite: recognition on the level of love/care but not esteem. Furthermore, Extract 6 deepens our understanding of the mode of love/care by showing how recognition can operate on a different level and independently from conversational actions. The extract is from the conversation data archive at the Department of Finnish, Finno-Ugric and Scandinavian Studies at

the University of Helsinki (Sg441). The segment is from an naturalistic everyday interaction on a family dinner between Jorma (father), Virpi (mother), Liisa (daughter) and Jarkko (daughter's boyfriend). Here the family members are finishing up their dinner when the mother (Virpi) brings up a plan of painting a box with chalk paint, so that they could write things on the box.

Extract 6. Chalk paint (Virpi = mother; Jorma = father; Liisa = adult daughter; Jarkko = other family member)

```
01 Virpi: >tuo olis    tarko°tu°s< maalata   toi  laatikko
          DEM2 be-COND purpose     paint-INF DEM2 box
          the idea is to paint that box

02        ni  sillä   mustalla  liitumaalilla, =[m'-n    pitäis]
          PRT DEM-ADE black-ADE chalk.paint-ADE  1SG-GEN should
          with the black chalk paint, [I should ]

03 Jorma:                                       [mm. ( - -     ]

04 Virpi: [vetää se.
           smear DEM3
          [apply it.

05 Jorma: [(--)

06 Virpi: ↑meil   on sitä    liitumaalia.    =sit siihen   voi kato
          PL1-ADE be DEM-PAR chalk.paint-PAR  PRT DEM3-ILL can PRT
          ↑we have that chalk paint =then you see (you) can

07        vaikka      kirjottaa jotai     jos °ha[luaa°.
          for.example write-INF something if   want
          for example write something on it if (you) °want.°

08 Jorma:                                         [sen     voi tota nii,
                                                   DEM-GEN can PRT  PRT
                                                  [it can be uhh,

09        (eikös)    spreillä  sais     paljo paremmin.
           NEG-Q-CLI spray-ADE get-COND much  better
          (wouldn't) with spray (you) would get much better

10        (0.6)

11 Virpi: ei↓ku   mä  haluun ↑sen     ↑si-llä ↑liitu#maali-lla.#
          NEG+PRT SG1 want-1  DEM-GEN DEM-ADE  chalk.paint-ADE
          no I want to have ↑it with the ↑chalk #paint.#

12 Jorma: juu juu ju- mutta jos liitumaalilla   ensi  ja  pe-
          PRT PRT     but   if  chalk.paint-ADE first and
          yes yes ye- but if with the chalk paint first and

13        spreimaali-lla sitte, (.)
          spray.paint-ADE PRT
          with the spray paint then.

14 Liisa: >mut eihän   siin [oo mitään järkee.<
           but NEG-CLI in.it be any    sense.PAR
          >but it doesn't [make any sense<

15 Virpi:                 [↑eihän   siin     oo mitään
                            NEG-CLI DEM3-INE be any
                           [↑there isn't any

16        ideaa    eihän   siihen  jää  se  liitupinta    sitte
          idea-PAR NEG-CLI into.it stay DEM chalk.surface then
          idea there won't be a chalk surface then
```

17 pääl[le,
top-ALL
on top,

18 Liisa: [€ni(h)i€.
PRT
[€exactly€.

19 Virpi: ↑>ku mä haluun et se on< <liitupin[ta.>
PRT SG1 want-1SG PRT DEM be chalk.surface
↑>because I want it to be< <a chalk surface.>

20 Jorma: [no se: että
PRT DEM PRT
[well it that

21 se on paljo- paljon siistimmän näkönen
DEM be much much neat.COMP-GEN looking
it looks much- much neater

22 ku s- vetää sprei°(maa[li-lla.° --)
PRT smear spray.paint-ADE
when you smear it with spray °paint.°

23 Liisa: [↑>nii mut ei siihen
PRT but NEG into.it
[yes but

24 tar[tu se< ↓liitu sillo ymmärräksä.
stick DEM chalk then understand-Q-2+SG2
the chalk won't stick to it then do you understand.

25 Virpi: [.mt ahhh

26 Jorma: no ↑ei tartukkaan °[(mut jos).°
PRT NEG stick-CLI but if
well ↑no it won't stick °[(but if).°

27 Liisa: [>nii mut eiks sen
PRT but NEG-Q-CLI DEM-GEN
[>yes but can't (you) rather (do) it

28 voi mielummin just< toisin päin et jos se
can rather PRT the.other.way.around PRT if DEM
the other way round that if (you)

29 pohjamaalaa [semmose-lla jollai ja sit
prime such-ADE something.ADE and PRT
prime it with [something like that and then

30 Jorma: [(no joo >mutta< no)
PRT PRT but PRT
[(well yes >but< well)

31 Liisa: ve[tää liitumaalilla.
smear chalk.paint-ADE
smear with chalk paint.

32 Jorma: [nii no pitääkö se liitu jäädä siihe.
PRT PRT must-Q DEM chalk stay into.it
[yes well must the chalk stay there.

33 (0.6)

34 Liisa: no se oli €just se idea(h)a ↑haloo(h)o
PRT DEM be-PST very DEM idea hello
well it was €the very idea ↑hello

```
35          .(h)h (h)e(h)e[(h)e?€

36 Jarkko:                [mm,

37 Liisa: €.(h)h (.) h(h)a(h)a(h) .hh krh iskä ei  oo
                                        dad  NEG be
          €.(h)h (.) h(h)a(h)a(h)  .hh krh dad really isn't

38          todellakaan   aina   ni(h)in°k(h)u° i(h)an
            certainly-CLI always PRT           PRT
            always exactly

39          kart(h)al(h)a.£
            map-ADE
            on the same page.€
```

Virpi makes the announcement to the other family members that her idea is to paint the box with black chalk paint (l. 1–2). Jorma's response is quiet and indeterminable (l. 3, 5), and Virpi continues by clarifying that they already have the paint available (l. 6) and explains how they could then write something on the box (l. 6–7). Jorma questions this plan and asks if spray paint would be better (l. 8–9). Virpi responds with a sing-song voice "no I want to have it with the chalk paint" (l. 11). To this Jorma suggests a compromise that they would use the chalk paint first and then spray paint over it. (l. 12–13). At this point the daughter Liisa joins the discussion to point out that this would not make any sense (l. 14), and Virpi seconds her by explicating that then the chalk surface would not be there (l. 15–17). Once more Jorma suggests that the spray paint would look better (l. 20–22), after which Liisa repeats their reasoning that then the chalk would not stick to the paint and adds "do you understand" (l. 24), emphasizing the miscommunication about the matter. They continue the discussion.

until finally Jorma asks "yes well must the chalk stay there?" (l. 32). This receives open mocking "hello" and laughter from Liisa while Virpi rolls her eyes and head (l. 34–37). Liisa concludes with a general assessment concerning Jorma: "dad really is not always exactly on the same page" (l. 37–39), to which Jorma responds quietly "what" (l. 40).

This is a case of overt disagreement and misalignment, and perhaps even misunderstanding between the family members, specifically Jorma and the others. In the mode of esteem, Jorma does not receive much accolade. He does not receive recognition for his merits, accomplishments, or characteristics. Inasmuch as action in social interaction is organized to minimize overt disagreement and misalignment and thus to promote mutual solidarity (e.g., Clayman, 2002), the family members' actions could be seen to constitute a threat to it. From the perspective of the recognition theory, the situation looks quite different. In the mode of love/care, Jorma seems to receive special standing. The openness and directness of Liisa's displays of disagreement, for example, can be seen as constructing their relationship as very close, since she is able to express herself in such a straightforward manner. Liisa's laughter (l. 35, 37, 41) is not produced with a malicious tone but in a warm, teasing manner consistent with close family interactions. Liisa's concluding assessment ("dad really is not always exactly on the same page," l. 37–39), explicitly brings Jorma's identity and membership category as the 'out-of-touch dad' of the family, as well as their long relationship history, to the surface of interaction. Jorma also embraces this identity and enacts it by mumbling "what" (l. 40). In our view, all this results in recognition of Jorma as a singular, irreplaceable individual with a special standing. This example thus brings to light how solidarity in the levels of action and recognition can be incongruent with each other, since here it is the dispreferred conversational actions that in effect are in service of recognition in the mode of love.

See Table 1 for a summary of our findings on how the different modes of recognition were implicated in the presented interactions.

5 Discussion

Above we demonstrated how the three different modes of recognition can be at stake in face-to-face social interaction. Now we discuss our findings in relation to the specific research hypotheses presented at the beginning of this paper. In response to RQ1 (*How can we grasp recognition as an interactional phenomenon?*), we argue that recognition is actually implemented in and through social interaction. Our analysis considers recognition as a *momentary* phenomenon, which can vary from moment to moment. The small micro-moments of misrecognition can accumulate and create stronger and more severe processes of neglect or discrimination. At the same time, basic recognitive attitudes can be seen as more lasting dispositions of respect, love/care and esteem, which merely manifest themselves in situation-specific responses. For example loving someone can call for a response of joy when the loved one is doing well or being silly, and sadness and anguish when the loved one is suffering or in trouble. Behind the variety of situation-specific responses can be a lasting stance of recognizing the other. The basic relation between interaction and recognition is that interaction expresses, makes manifest as well as constitutes recognition. Interaction is the main way in which one can get experiences of being recognized.

In response to RQ2 (*How do the three modes of recognition show in interaction, either implicitly or explicitly?*), we have hopefully demonstrated through our examples how recognition is implicitly part of many different types of conversational activities and situations. In fact, we consider recognition to be part of *all* human interactions. Most often the business of recognition stays in the background, especially if due recognition is received, but sometimes it can rise to the surface-level of interaction. Even then, however, the demand for recognition is done in indirect ways, such as pursuing adequate recognition by repeating and recycling the same topical items (cf. Jefferson, 1978; see also ex. 3. and 4 in the current paper). The six examples we discussed show how respect (ex.1 and 2), esteem (ex. 3 and 4) and love/care (ex. 5 and 6) show up in interaction. It is important to note, however, that when we examine cases

TABLE 1 Organization of the analyzed data extracts in relation to the modes of recognition and their presence (present X; not present —).

Extract no.	Respect	Personalized esteem	Role-based/ Category-mediated esteem	Love/care	Notes on (mis) recognition in the extract
Extract 1. Co-development workshop	—	—	—	—	Sequential deletion, non-ratification of participation
Extract 2. Decision-making in clubhouse	—	—	—	—	Minimal acknowledgement, denying status of "responsible agent"
Extract 3. Success story	X	X	—	—	Orientation to face-saving/ personalized esteem
Extract 4. Cantor and pastor	X	—	X	—	Orientation to collegial relationship/role-based esteem
Extract 5. Shameful PhD supervision meeting	X	X	—	—	Orientation to interpersonal affiliation
Extract 6. Chalk paint	X	—	—	X	Orientation to irreplaceable individual

through a theoretical lens, such as recognition, and talk about potential but unrealized scenarios, there is a lot of room for differences in interpretation based on the analysts' own life experiences and background. Still, we argue, recognition theory can sensitize the analyst to the different but relevant aspects that are not found in the participants' talk. In this way, it is possible to refine the description of what the actual, realized scenario/conversational turn ultimately is doing.

In RQ3 we asked, how do conversational actions operate in relation to the recognition that they convey. As pointed out above, based on the CA theorizing on the social motives underlying the sequential organization of action, one would assume that the "solidarity-promoting" patterns of conversational actions would work in congruence with recognition, i.e., displays of affiliation and agreement would convey recognition and displays of disaffiliation and disagreement would convey misrecognition. However, as presented above, this is not the case. Firstly, even in moments of overt disagreement, the speaker is showing the co-participant respect—they are at least worthy of acknowledgement as communication partners. And as Extracts 5, 6 showed, sometimes displays of disagreement and actions that misalign with the co-participants project can be seen to convey a high level of recognition in the mode of love, even if not in the mode of esteem—or in the mode of esteem, even if not in the mode of love. And sometimes, the selection of criteria of esteem (when rival ones are available) can partly express solidarity or affiliation (ex.3).

The idea of distinguishing between the action level and recognition level of social interaction has an important implication for research. It is well known that conversation analysis shares the methodological commitment of social constructionism to "ontological muteness" (Nightingale and Cromby, 2002) regarding those aspects of social reality that go beyond the publicly observable features of interaction. The analysis should focus solely on how the participants *themselves* interpret each other's behaviors as "morally accountable" (Garfinkel, 1967) actions, and the researcher is not supposed to produce any ontological claims detached from the participants' own interpretations. However, the possibility of distinguishing recognition level from the level of action allows us to *theorize* also about those socially relevant interactional phenomena that go beyond the mechanisms of conditional relevance and the accountability of a next item upon the occurrence of a prior. This is important, as the sequential organization of interaction is intertwined with power relations that affect what different people can do in their interactions with others, how they can legitimately treat their interaction partners, and whether and when they can hold each other accountable for the deviations from the normative, expected or projected trajectory of interaction (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999; Burr, 2015, p. 5). Indeed, we suggest that it is especially the violations at the recognition level of interaction that are particularly difficult—if not impossible—to raise to explicit reflective metalevel discussion, as this would necessitate the topicalization of social relations in a way that might become costly for the initiator of the discussion. In addition to this general difficulty, violations of recognition may be even more difficult to address by those individuals who have just previously been withheld recognition as fully legitimate participants and responsible agents in the encounter. Hence, to be able to also examine these critical phenomena we need to complement our empirical analysis with theorizing—and the recognition theory provides us with tools to do so.

If and when there is independent support for the central claims of recognition theory, and for seeing respect, esteem and love/care as central modes of recognition, it is possible to approach interaction sequences with the question of how is recognition manifested and constituted and renegotiated in the sequences of interaction. At the same time, a theorist of recognition can gain fresh insights from the cases. Example 3 concerned an achievement for an individual that typically might not count as much of an achievement. While both assessments are as such correct, the solidary thing to do is to choose the one that the achiever identifies with, or the one that allows the achiever to be seen in the good light, worthy of esteem. From the theorist's armchair it might be difficult to anticipate such situations in which esteem and the selection of criteria of esteem make solidarity or lack of solidarity visible; even when solidarity is taken to cover both esteem and love/care. CA can thus bring the abstract ideas of recognition to life in concrete social situations and under detailed empirical analysis. Furthermore, CA can inform and promote the development of interactionally based social and societal critique by making visible some of the very subtle but significant moments of misrecognition involving, for example, ableism, sexism, or racism, and

thus aid recognition theory in retaining its plausibility as a critical social theory (cf. Hirvonen and Koskinen, 2022). A more systematic study targeting ableism, sexism, or racism could try to detect recurrent patterns of interaction, with the hypothesis that such -isms lead to veridical experiences of misrecognition. In this article our aim has been to show that interaction and recognition are indeed deeply intertwined.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author/s.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by different Finnish institutional ethics review boards. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

EK, AL, and MS all contributed to conception of the study and wrote sections of the manuscript. All authors contributed to manuscript revision, read, and approved the submitted version.

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Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Supplementary material

The Supplementary material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1223203/full#supplementary-material

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Moral landscapes and morally meaningful encounters: how interaction ritual connects conversation analysis and cultural sociology

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This article presents a theoretical argument for examining the previously unexamined interface between the strong program in cultural sociology ethnomethodology/conversation analysis (EMCA). While these two approaches have radically different theoretical and empirical commitments, they nonetheless share a common root in Durkheim's sociology, specifically with regard to the centrality of solidarity, ritual, and morality to collective life. Similarly rooted in Durkheim, Goffman's theory of interaction ritual provides an analytic pivot between EMCA and the strong program. The broader theoretical argument is illustrated using data from interviews with adults about their most recent encounter with a rude strangers in public space, which are here treated a breaches of the interaction ritual of civil inattention. Members readily draw on the specifics of a particular stranger interaction gone awry to reflect on the nature of life in public and to expound on their understandings of the ethics of face-to-face interaction and everyday morality more generally. Where EMCA focuses on the discoverability of the organizational features of everyday interaction, the position developed here is concerned with the organization of members' interpretations of everyday interaction. While centered on specific kinds of interactional breaches, by finding common ground between EMCA and cultural sociology, the argument advances a potentially more broadly applicable approach that treats everyday encounters as morally meaningful and everyday lifeworlds as moral landscapes. Developing a comprehensive understanding of copresent interaction as a basic building block of society requires attention to both the organizational dynamics of copresent encounters and to the interpretive resources that ordinary members use to account for and justify their own and others' conduct.

KEYWORDS

interaction ritual, civil inattention, cultural sociology, moral landscapes, Durkheim, Goffman, public space

Introduction

'I'm always friendly to strangers. Everyone should be. Until they give a reason not to be.'
-Julia, white female, early 20s.

Encounters between strangers are rarely fatal, but often fateful. As spaces populated predominantly by people unknown to one another, the dominant interactional form in public

space is between strangers. That order is produced and maintained in public spaces makes them sociologically generative. Where only the most basic common ground is shared, interactions between strangers generally proceed unproblematically. The urban interaction order is a moral order, and this is highlighted when stranger interactions go awry.

Building on the ethnomethodological-conversation analytic tradition of treating breaches as analytically generative, this article treats rude encounters between strangers in public space as breaching a specific interaction ritual: civil inattention (Goffman, 1963). While inspired and informed by the spirit of EMCA, to be clear from the outset, this article does not 'do' EMCA. Where EMCA focuses on the discoverability of the *organizational features* of everyday interaction (Maynard and Clayman, 1991), here my argument centers on the *organization of members' interpretations* of everyday interaction. Where EMCA approaches focus on the "structural organization of social interaction" (Stivers, 2015, p. 1), to make a theoretical argument, I draw on a major movement in contemporary sociological theory—the 'strong program in cultural sociology' (Alexander and Smith, 2001)—to show how members' own reported *post hoc* interpretations of encounters gone awry give us new theoretical purchase on the moral meanings that members attach to everyday interactions.

While the argument is primarily theoretical, to provide some empirical footing I draw on a database of interviews about encounters with 'rude' or 'uncivil' strangers in public space, looking in particular at how participants justify incivility. In discussing incivilities, interview participants treat encounters with strangers in public space as morally meaningful. These meanings are malleable, but nonetheless, structured. Drawing on the specifics of stranger encounters gone awry, participants reflect on collective life in public space, expounding their understandings of the ethics of face-to-face interaction and everyday morality. Treating everyday lifeworlds as moral landscapes advances a perspective that probes common ground between EMCA and cultural sociology, though with potentially broader applicability than either approach. All encounters may be morally meaningful, but some bear greater moral density, and for members, are readily tethered to deep structures of meaning. What, then, do we learn not just from stranger encounters gone awry, but from members' accounts of such blips and bumps in the urban interaction order? It is my contention here that to develop comprehensive understanding of copresent interaction as a basic building block of society, we must attend both to the organizational dynamics of copresent encounters *and* to the interpretive resources that ordinary members use to account for and justify their own and others' conduct. This is a relatively delicate theoretical point and requires attention to both EMCA and cultural sociology.

Never the twain? EMCA and cultural sociology

"A multitude of myopias limit the glimpse we get of our subject matter" (Goffman, 1983, p. 2).

To set the scene for the theoretical argument we can ask: what happens when we bring similarly rooted but widely divergent perspectives together? Informed by both EMCA and the strong program, I nudge both approaches out of their respective wheelhouses to take a new tack on previously analyzed phenomena. Where building barricades and defending turf limits disciplinary innovation, cross-fertilization can advance our common enterprise. Probing points of overlap between EMCA and cultural sociology means identifying not only shared elements of each approach, but also areas of productive tension: 'normal science' (Kuhn, 1962) this is not. For Garfinkel, "a consistent application of ethnomethodology rejects all forms of sociological generalization" (Tavory, 2022, p. 42), but if we wish to find ways to reconnect EMCA and sociological theory, possibilities for generalization should remain on the table.

EMCA is conceptually grounded in Durkheim's sociological theory (Garfinkel, 2002; Rawls, 2012, 2022). It is informed by a Durkheimian conception of social order, centered in part on ritual, morality, and the sacred status of both persons and the collective as anchors for social solidarity. While Durkheim identified and analyzed the moral order, "the exteriority and constraint of a given moral order did not await his writing for its appreciation or characterization by those subject to its influence" (Wilson and Zimmerman, 1979, p. 55). Informed by Durkheim's late work (in particular, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*), cultural sociology has blossomed over the last quarter century. Despite many surface differences, resonance—and dissonance—between EMCA and the strong program in cultural sociology are legion. Significantly, both approaches are centrally concerned with solidarity. EMCA treats the collaborative production of locally situated social order as an intersubjectively upheld moral order (Schegloff, 1992; Rawls, 2010). The 'strong program' treats ritual, morality, and the symbolic codes of sacred and profane as constitutive features of social solidarity. Examining resonances between these approaches is part of a broader project probing ways that analyses of interaction and of symbolic dimensions of collective life might learn from, enhance, and mutually reinforce one another [see Horgan (2019, 2020, 2021, Forthcoming)].

In the quote that opens this section Goffman does not claim to have the corrective analytic lens for our 'myopias.' He suggests that focusing exclusively on the interaction order is one way to develop sociological insight. Goffman centers analytic attention on the endogenous organization of social order among copresent persons. EMCA practitioners have productively plowed this terrain for over a half century, all the while distinguishing their approach from Goffman's. While "relations between EMCA and Goffman have been complicated during Goffman's life and in the later reception of his work" (Mondada and Peräkylä, 2024, p. 2) and "relations between Goffman and ethnomethodology are complex" (Inglis and Thorpe, 2023, p. 6), the theoretical argument here uses Goffman's work to open up dialog between EMCA and sociological theory. Centering Durkheimian elements in Goffman's (1963, 1967, 1971) sociology—interaction ritual in particular—provides an analytic pivot point.

Sociologies of ritual and morality are inextricably linked. "Goffman, Garfinkel, and Schegloff treat the grounding of interaction as essential to the sociology of morality" (Tavory and Fine, 2020, p. 369) and through the work of Durkheim and Goffman "the sociology of morals, was realized in the form of a sociology of rituals" (Bergmann, 1998, p. 282). For Smith G. (2022, p. 49), Goffman's interaction ritual opens up "the sociologically unexamined moral weight of our words, glances and gestures," making it a useful bridge between EMCA and cultural sociology.

For Wuthnow (1989, p. 101), Goffmanian ritual is not "a type of social activity that can be set off from the rest of the world for special investigation. It is a dimension of all social activity. The study of ritual, therefore, is not distinguished by its concern with certain types of activity, but by the perspective it brings to bear on all activity, namely, emphasis on the symbolic or expressive dimension of behavior." This approach understands interaction's ritual dimensions as holding specifiable expressive potential and qualities. This differs from a more strictly EMCA approach that sidesteps "*ritual* constraints on interaction…. and focuses more on *system* constraints" [Maynard, 2012, p. 17, emphases in original; see also Mondada and Peräkylä (2024)]. Nonetheless, Alasuutari (2023, p. 1) suggests "what CA calls institutional interaction should be considered as rituals." Although EMCA has tended to avoid ritual language or framing, rituals both constitute and express norms, and reinvigorate and manipulate shared symbols. Centering everyday ritual then is one way—though the only one—to get at everyday morality. Ritual provides a dramatic structure for interaction (Burke, 1969; Turner, 1995; Tavory and Fine, 2020). Centering ritual dimensions of interaction permits attention both to the internal organization of the interaction order and the strong program in cultural sociology's more macro-oriented proclivities.

While discoveries by EMCA practitioners exploring the endogenous organization of the interaction order over the last half century have been remarkable, less progress has been made in understanding the "loose coupling" (Goffman, 1983, p. 11) between what happens within the interaction order and broader structures of meaning that persons draw upon, enliven, and deploy in their experiences and interpretations of everyday interaction. EMCA helps in understanding the exclusively interactional end of this loose coupling. To connect to broader structures of meaning we need a wider lens. Where EMCA examines in ever more empirical detail the inner space of the interaction order, my argument is more theoretical in nature, suggesting that the endogenous organization of the interaction order while important, needs also to be understood in terms of how members' interpretations of that organization are tethered to and hang upon more generally available and intelligible structures of interpretation, what we might call, moral narratives. Such narratives posit ideals of conduct with high symbolic charge.

My tack on the loose coupling, then, is to connect the interaction order to the cultural structures that both infuse this order and animate its' broader conditioning environments. Sociologically, my reasoning for this is; (1) everyday interaction is largely overlooked in strong program cultural sociology, and (2) EMCA has yet to develop a satisfactory theory of culture.[1] The next section elaborates on these absences by first outlining weaknesses in the strong program in cultural sociology (Alexander and Smith, 2001) vis-à-vis the interaction order, before turning to select EMCA work explicitly addressed to culture. Following this, I highlight research suggesting possibilities for mutual reinforcement between cultural sociology and EMCA.

Cultural sociology absent the interaction order

The strong program in cultural sociology has emerged over the last quarter-century as a conceptually-driven, theoretically generative, hermeneutically-nuanced approach. Specifically, by giving "relative autonomy" to culture, the strong program investigates how culture shapes "actions and institutions, providing inputs every bit as vital as more material or instrumental force" (Alexander and Smith, 2001). Drawing directly on Durkheim, culture is granted *causal power* in social life, specifically Durkheim's clarification of what he takes to be the core subject matter of sociology—*conscience collective* and collective representations—the objects toward which a science of society should be addressed: "collective representations convey…the way in which the group conceives itself in its relations to objects which affect it" (Durkheim, 1964, p. 49). Drawing this insight together with Durkheim's (1995) later elaborations, (Alexander and Smith, 2005; Smith, 2020), the strong program examines how *conscience collective*, the binding force of collective morality and solidarity, operates through binary structured discourse. Refining this further, Alexander (2006) shows how actors mobilize the "binary discourse of civil society" to evaluate motives, actions, and institutions. While specific mobilizations of these discourses vary contextually, because of its relative autonomy, the structure of the discourse itself—its' symbolic power—is stable. The task for cultural sociologists, then, is to show what these symbolically-laden discourses do, how they are invoked and mobilized in expanding, contracting, or shifting solidarities. In short, how they interpretively consolidate or re-align affiliation and disaffiliation.

Anchored in a core strategy of granting analytic autonomy to culture, on this view, culture is instantiated within the interaction order, but retains a relatively stable structure independent of its' iteration in any given interaction order. Consequently, the approach remains relatively undergrounded in terms of taking seriously everyday lifeworlds and the quotidian interaction order. Instead, cultural sociologists tend to concentrate on crises, societal tensions, scandals, largescale social movements, or rapid and radical social transformation. Rather than taking the interaction order as an internally structured, endogenously organized reality, it is treated as a mere settings where symbolic codes—sacred/profane, pure/impure, for example—manifest. Thus, cultural sociology remains largely silent on how codes are invoked, reinforced, and constituted in and through the mundane interaction order as a lived embodied copresent reality. While EMCA scholars do not need to be reminded of the significance of mundane interaction, sometimes cultural sociologists do. Where cultural sociology treats *culture* as analytically autonomous, EMCA treats the *interaction order* as analytically autonomous.

Cultural internalism: EMCA's interactionally grounded and bounded theory of culture

Within EMCA, the constant refinement of analysis and ongoing discovery of ever more themes and variations within the basic universal structure of turn-taking, sequencing, and repair are and will continue to generate significant insights. That said, read alongside advances in cultural sociology, EMCA conceptualizations of culture are relatively underdeveloped. For Schegloff (2006, p. 70), social interaction is "the

1 Moreover, save for a few exceptions [on EMCA, see Smith et al. (2023); on cultural sociology, see Horgan (Forthcoming)], neither approach sustains focus on stranger interactions in public space.

arena in which culture is enacted," but this enactment is restricted. If the interaction order is wholly autonomous, then culture is only empirically available within the operations of the bounded interaction order. While deriving analytic power from unwavering commitment to analyses of naturally occurring interaction, the view of culture while interactionally grounded, is also interactionally bounded.

Nonetheless, intimations of connections to cultural sociology exist within EMCA scholarship. To understand the diagnostic encounter between doctor and patient, Bergmann draws on and extends analysis beyond a strictly EMCA frame, toward the broader ideological context that grants power to psychiatry. This provides a cultural diagnosis of psychiatry itself.[2] Building on Sacks' membership categorization analysis, Hester argues that there is little support for a culturalist view of category use, particularly in institutional talk [see Francis and Hester (2017)]. The main objection here is the decontextualization of interactional practices by imposing a "'stable' cultural framework" (Francis and Hester, 2017, p. 58) on data. This aligns with a deeper issue with how 'culture' is conceptualized in EMCA primarily in the traditional anthropological sense of language and ways of life shared by bounded wholes. For example, studying American and Thai conversational practices, Moerman (1988, p. 4) uses cross-cultural materials to propose that "sequential organization be used to locate, describe, and provide a metric for cultural variation".[3] Generally then, EMCA's theory of culture tends to either (i) note 'cultural variation' across different linguistic contexts and institutional settings or (ii) seek universals across cultures (Levinson, 2006; Stivers et al., 2009; Dingemanse et al., 2015).

Granting analytic autonomy to the interaction order is endlessly generative: it carves off methodologically digestible chunks of intersubjectively produced social reality for scrutiny. Problems with EMCA conceptions of culture derive from slippage between EMCA's epistemology—the *analytic* autonomy of the interaction order—and its' broader social ontology—treating the interaction order as wholly *empirically* autonomous. On this view, the interaction order is not just a slice of social reality to be carved off for analysis, elevated instead to the sole constitutive feature of social life, and thus the sole object worthy of sociological scrutiny (Rawls, 2009). Taking this analytic strategy as the totality of social reality both limits the range of available conceptual resources and methodologies, and prevents potentially relevant phenomena from surfacing. Thus, EMCA's cultural internalism is both a core analytic strength and, read through a cultural sociological lens, a significant lacuna. While highly refined internally, EMCA is also characterized by rigid boundary maintenance limiting its engagement with social theory more generally. The theoretical argument here takes an openly skeptical stance toward what Kendon (1990) calls the "natural history" tradition of interaction studies.

Earlier, Sacks (1995, p. 226) intimated possibilities for a somewhat more expansive conceptualization of culture: "a culture is an apparatus for generating recognizable actions." From this, one area of focus in EMCA is on the production of such recognizability within the interaction order. While 'apparatus' may connote a mechanistic model, we can posit that if culture is the apparatus, then *interpretation* is the activity that generates recognizability. The production of recognizability necessitates that members draw upon readily available and intelligible structures of meaning and interpretation. An interpretation that is intelligible *within* a particular interaction order must also be at least partially intelligible *outside* that specific context of interaction. My approach suggests one way to move between this inside and outside. EMCA helps us with the inside, and, in the spirit of this special issue's theme, for the outside, reconnecting EMCA to sociological theory is germane.

Overall, both EMCA and cultural sociology, use homologous analytic strategies: treating their objects—for EMCA, the interaction order; for cultural sociology, symbolically coded cultural structures—as analytically independent entities. For both, 'independence' means autonomy from other spheres of collective life, for example politics, or the economy. While these other spheres are, of course, also where the interaction order figures as a constitutive feature and is imbued with symbolic codes, both cultural sociologists and EMCA practitioners necessarily focus analytic attention on specific slices carved off from the whole of social reality. Undoubtedly, deep analytic tensions exist between a perspective centered exclusively on copresent persons' interactional practices, and one that views social life as organized around relatively stable symbolic codes unbounded by any specific scene of copresent interaction. Treating these tensions as productive, by examining common occurrences in everyday life—mundane breaches, those "petty annoyances" (Smith et al., 2010) of rudeness or incivility between strangers, to which we will soon turn—we can look to how EMCA and cultural sociology might inform one another in analyzing collective life's specifically moral dimensions.

Thinking at the intersections of cultural sociology and EMCA means brushing against a range of adjacent literatures. Next, I briefly survey literatures intimating connections between cultural sociology and EMCA, before turning to a discussion of the place of ritual in the argument and illustration that follows.

Building bridges

While cultural sociologists tend to focus on collective representations, media discourses, and political performances, there are some strands of cultural sociological scholarship that engage with mundane interaction. Similarly, despite the critiques of EMCA outlined above, there are some promising tendencies in broadly adjacent work. Below I quickly review work that, to various degrees, resonates with both EMCA and cultural sociology. This work can be characterized as culturally-attuned qualitative research connecting interactional practices and structures of meaning.

There are a variety of tendencies here, with much research focusing on interaction in institutions—for example, schools, workplaces, and the domestic sphere (Willis, 1981; Blair-Loy, 2009; Lareau, 2011)—with a view to understanding the role played by cultural ideals in social reproduction in general, and inequality in particular (Schwalbe et al., 2000; Valentino and Vaisey, 2022). Others examine how cultural representations intervene at the scene of interaction, for example, how pervasive images of the 'iconic ghetto' shape interracial encounter in the US (Anderson, 2023), or how public health concerns around HIV/AIDS and condom use appear in intimate encounters (Tavory and Swidler,

2 Interestingly, earlier (non-EMCA) work on patient-psychiatrist interaction posits that it is the very ritual structure of the diagnostic encounter that provides opportunities for its' breach (Laing, 1966).

3 Moerman's culturally contexted conversation analysis' provides another potential route for connecting EMCA and cultural sociology by way of ethnography.

2009). Rapprochement between interaction-focused approaches and cultural sociology also advance understanding of the multiple drivers of political polarization at the level of personal relations (Revers, 2023). In other ethnographically-grounded approaches, work on "culture in interaction" looks at "how groups put culture to use in everyday life" (Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003, p. 735), with a view to understanding possibilities for "civic action" (Lichterman and Eliasoph, 2014; Lichterman, 2020).

Also relevant are studies of patterns of interaction in group life, some EMCA-adjacent and some closer to culturally-attuned sociological social psychology. Broadly conceived, these approaches reach toward more general social theory. Informed by EMCA, DeLand (2021) incorporates analysis of character and biography into ethnographies of group activity. Work in interactional pragmatics and the broader multimodal turn advances understandings of the local accomplishment of intercultural communication and competency in public settings and in periods of crisis (Mondada, 2009; Mondada et al., 2020). Similarly, recent work unpacks relationships between interaction troubles and the broader structures of meaning that members draw upon in their accounts (Stevanovic et al., 2023). Further, studies of idioculture, group life, and local action are closely aligned with elements of cultural sociology, while attending closely to copresent interaction (Fine and Fields, 2008; Fine, 2010, 2012; Corte et al., 2019; Rawls and Turowetz, 2021). Save for two exceptions (Anderson, Mondada), one key difference between these studies and the present argument is that most attempts to connect the interaction order and structures of meaning center on pre-existing groups, where persons are already connected in some way, for example, in schools, workplaces or households. EMCA has not dealt extensively with stranger interactions.[4] For example, while Bergmann's (1993) work on gossip does attend to culture, gossip is an interactional practice that depends on existing relations and sedimented interactions between people known to one another. When it comes to interactions between strangers in public space, no pre-existing groupedness can be assumed.

Interaction: ritual and breach

Goffman's (1963, 1971) sustained analysis of interaction in public spaces connects clearly to a central concern of social theory: how is social order accomplished where persons are unknown to one another? While the production and reproduction of social order occurs *in* interaction, it depends too on generalizable principles operating across situations and contexts. For both Durkheim and Goffman, *ritual* is the vital social modality through which the sacred is given form: ritual constitutes, expresses, and renews the sacred. While conceptions of *what* is sacred vary, *how* that sacred is produced is consistent. Ritual provides a shared focus that creates and renews group members' binds to a collective (Durkheim, 1995). This finds its apex in the fleeting production of collective effervescence: ritual and solidarity are inseparable.

While Goffman's (1963, 1967, 1971) interaction ritual hews close to Durkheim, it goes beyond formal ritual: Goffman's innovation brings Durkheimian ritual to everyday life.[5] For Durkheim, a core mechanism in the production of solidarity involves "micro-level ritualized encounters in which members plunge themselves in the 'waters' of the group and renew their commitment…. These mechanisms serve two purposes: to ensure the reproduction of social life, supplying individuals with meaning and purpose and collectives with motivated actors and second, as protective forces against acute blows to the collective, whether endogenous or exogenous" (Abrutyn, 2022). Where, for Durkheim, ritual marked special occasions and moments of heightened group solidarity, Goffman treats ritual as a core feature of everyday interaction. Interaction between copresent persons display ritual elements through which the sacred status of persons and of the collective can be confirmed or disconfirmed. Thus viewed, ritual is intrinsic to everyday life. Wuthnow (1989, p. 109) defines ritual as "*a symbolic-expressive aspect of behavior that communicates something about social relations, often in a relatively dramatic or formal manner*." (emphasis in original). In discussing Goffman's work on ritual, Wuthnow proposes that we take ritual as a *dimension* of all social activity, where "[t]he regulation of daily life...depends on ritual and, for this reason, is imbued constantly with the ritual dramatization of symbolic meanings" (102). Ritual structures interpersonal encounter: members are charged with conducting themselves in contextually appropriate ways. Interaction ritual, though, cannot be reduced to mere rules of conduct, instead it provides a "guide for actions, recommended not because it is pleasant, cheap, or effective, but because it is suitable or just" (Goffman, 1956, p. 473). Thus, for Goffman, ritual elements organize the accomplishment of social order, with the internal organization of any given interaction order partly dependent on members sharing a general understanding and ritual commitment. Examples are myriad throughout his oeuvre; in 'Deference and Demeanor' Goffman (1967, p. 47) shows the interactional work required to attend to externally granted but internally active status characteristics and status differences among interactants. Notably, this essay opens by discussing Durkheim's sociology, and observes that "the rites performed to representations of the social collectivity will sometimes be performed to the individual himself [*sic*]."

Ritual, then, is instrumental in the sense that it permits the everyday business of interaction to proceed in relatively conventionalized and mutually intelligible ways (Terkourafi and Kádár, 2017). More importantly for the present argument, ritual *communicates*: it is expressive. Precisely *what* ritual expresses is—in the spirit of Durkheim's social pathology, Garfinkel's breaches, and Goffman's situational improprieties—best accessed through its rupture. Inspired by this foundational approach in EMCA, I treat breaches as instructive not only regarding the local accomplishment of social order, but also as objects that members readily connect to broader questions of morality and solidarity.

Strangers and public space: civil inattention as ritual, incivility as breach

With global mobility and intense urbanization bringing more and more strangers into ever closer proximity, interactions between strangers are the most ubiquitous form of interaction on earth [see Arminen and Heino (2023)]. While large in number, strangers' public

4 Though, public places where strangers interact are a 'category rich arena' [Jayyusi, 2014, p. 265; see also Smith R. J. (2022)].

5 To date, cultural sociologists have tended to focus on largescale ritual (Schwartz, 1991; Xu, 2009).

interactions differ qualitatively from interactions in other settings, from interactions between persons known to one another, and between persons in defined roles. In the absence of more specific common ground, stranger encounters lean heavily on ritualized interaction (Ickes, 2009). Goffman (1963) develops the concept of civil inattention as "the slightest of interpersonal rituals" essential to the accomplishment of order in public interactions among strangers. Drawing on Durkheim's (1995) distinction between positive and negative rites, Goffman (1967, p. 73) differentiates presentational rituals and avoidance rituals in interaction. As negative rites, avoidance rituals are about what a person must *not* do in order to respect the rights of another. In the Goffmanian idiom then, civil inattention is an avoidance ritual.

Our interest is in breaches of this specific ritual. First though, it is important to note that my treatment of breaches aligns less with Garfinkel's (1967) storied experiments than it does with Durkheim and Goffman. For Garfinkel, by querying common sense understanding and expectancies around the reciprocity of perspectives, breaches highlight how sense-making and intelligibility unfold in locally situated interaction. In contrast, I treat breaches as ruptures in interactional norms that draw attention to the more broadscale production of social order, and that members do not orient to as exclusively locally situated products of interaction.[6]

Civil inattention raises analytic questions for both EMCA and cultural sociology. It is one among many of the "norms of co-mingling" (Goffman, 1971, p. 9), but as an interaction ritual, it is also something more. The common ground shared by copresent strangers is of the most general kind: being in the same place at the same time (Goffman, 1963; Simmel, 1971; Lofland, 1973, 1998; Smith R. J., 2022). In analyzing densely populated settings shared by copresent persons where civil inattention prevails, we cannot assume the groupedness of such aggregations of persons. Conduct in public spaces is different from other contexts. Distinct, for example, from the private realm of intimacy or workplaces, where shared orientation, existing mutual knowledge, institutional context, and role-definition give shape to interaction. Simmel's deceptively simple definition of the stranger as one who is physically proximate but socially distant is instructive here, as is his analysis of the place of mutual indifference in interactions between stranger in cities [Simmel, 1971; see also, Horgan (2012, 2017) and Marotta (2000, 2012)]. For Simmel, strangers are those who share only the most general characteristics, and broadly differentiated only according to membership of general, visually available categories. This observation from Simmel is later more formalized by both Goffman (1983) and Lofland (1973) who note that public space is a distinct realm of interaction where the interaction therein has a peculiar character: it is exclusively based on categorical rather than individual or biographical knowledge.[7] Consequently, stranger interactions in public space are highly ritualized.

Civil conduct in interaction with strangers is not simply functional. Like all rituals, civil inattention upholds demonstrable membership in a collective, but unlike many other rituals, conditions for inclusion are minimal. In their ideal form, public spaces shared by strangers are broadly egalitarian and freely accessible (Young, 1990). In practice, few public spaces match this ideal. Indeed, decades of research shows the unequal application of civil inattention, with those in structurally vulnerable positions more subject to ritual breaches (Gardner, 1989, 1995; Duneier and Molotch, 1999; Anderson, 2011, 2023). Civil attention is a ritual means for demonstrating a form of inclusion that is intersubjectively rather than legally upheld (Horgan, 2019). In this sense, it is "one of the ways in which we communicate respect for others and generate habits of moral equality" in everyday life (Boyd, 2006, p. 863). Uncivil acts, then, are not simply failures to abide by rules of conduct. They connect to inequality, exclusion, and marginalization. Theoretically, examining accounts of such ritual breaches can build upon and draw together insights from both EMCA and cultural sociology.

Doing things with accounts of ritual breaches in public space

Breaches are not only naturally occurring phenomena of use to analysts. The stable structure that ritual provides means that any deviation from the ritual form, any failure to uphold its basic structure may become a topic and resource for lay analysis: ritual breach is a locus for lay interpretation. Thus, accounts of ritual breaches provide a switching point between an EMCA focus on the interaction order and a cultural sociological focus on structures of meaning and interpretation. Where EMCA centers members' attempts at correction *in* interaction, the illustrative data below centers on the organization of interpretive resources members use *about* interaction. When civil inattention—"the slightest of interpersonal rituals…that constantly regulates the social intercourse of persons" (Goffman, 1963, p. 84)—is breached, members have things to say.

To illustrate, we now turn to some illustrative data from interviews with adults in Canada about their 'most recent encounter with a rude stranger in public space.' These semi-structured interviews ($n = 326$)[8] were conducted in-person by the author and student researchers in locations of participants' choosing. To systematically solicit accounts of uncivil encounters, interviews began by gathering a range of demographic information. Instead of survey-style box-ticking, gender, age, race and ethnicity (and, where participants deemed them relevant, sexuality, religion, and nationality) were recorded in participants' own words. Probes invited participants to elaborate on their accounts in very fine detail (e.g., spatio-temporal setting, their emotional state, stranger's appearance and demeanour, phases of the encounter). Having solicited detailed accounts of encounters,

6 In this sense, where Garfinkel's conceptual touchstone is Schutzian, mine is Durkheimian. For more on the intelligibility/normativity distinction (though with regard to 'accountability'), see Stevanovic (2023). Thanks to a reviewer and Melisa Stevanovic for helping me to clarify the distinction between my use of breaches and Garfinkel's.

7 Smith R. J. (2022, pp. 99–101) discusses the category 'stranger' in both Goffman and EMCA.

8 Data gathering was formally approved by the University of Guelph Research Ethics Board as part of the Researching Incivilities in Everyday Life (RIEL) project and the Sociable Cities Project both funded by Insight Grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council (Canada). Transcriptions generated a corpus in excess of 500,000 words. See Horgan (2020) for further details and analysis of the dataset.

interviews then invited participants to reflect on these encounters and on possible justifications for uncivil conduct.

While the specifics of each breach provide accounts' substance, breaches also provide hooks on which to hang moral interpretations. As Rawls notes, "situated interactional requirements are moral obligations, commitment to which constitutes an implicit social contract with moral implications" (Rawls, 2022, p. 32). Interviews made explicit what is otherwise implicit. Uncivil conduct invites interpretation in a moral register; it induces moral judgment. How, then, do members interpret apparent absence of "mutual commitment to enacted practice" (Rawls, 1996, p. 479) in public space? How do members understand breaches of the ritual of civil inattention, read here as failures to uphold such mutual commitment?

Where EMCA works to specify the patterned sequences of action essential to the achievement of order (Turowetz and Maynard, 2010), my argument concerns how participants interpret and make sense of breaches of the moral order of everyday urban life. Thus, I focus less on the dynamics of the breach itself and the interactional moves involved in repairing and restoring order, instead attending to how participants make sense of these encounters. First, I suggest that participants' stated understandings of civil conduct position it as a moral imperative oscillating between universal application and individual exception. A universalist moral orientation—kindness—forms the basis for the second theme. Here, participants describe how kindness toward a rude stranger can be invoked to turn encounters into *teachable moments*. Then, picking up on the way that participants' accounts reach beyond the rude encounter itself, I discuss a cluster of themes centered on treating uncivil encounters as opportunities for three forms of what I call *moral messaging*. While not mutually exclusive—many interviews contain more than one theme—here, they are separated for the purpose of illustration. Taken together, they demonstrate how participants interpret uncivil encounters as morally meaningful.

Everyday morality between universal application and individual exception

"I do not think it's OK to be rude ever, um, but of course there's a thin line between, there's right and wrong. There's a morality issue" (Lisa, woman, white, early 20s).[9]

Across accounts, participants orient to conduct in public as being about basic respect, specifically, the rights of all to use public space without being intervened upon unnecessarily. John, a white man in his early twenties: "rudeness is uncalled for, I do not think there's ever a reason why people should be rude…especially in public spaces, that should be a place where people can be themselves and they should be, you know, not interrogated by other people." For Erik, another white man in his early twenties: "if you want to be a better person and make an impact on the earth, not like Nobel Prize impact, but just morally be a good person and know that you did well in your life then you have to strive to not be rude to anybody." Sofia, a young white woman also foregrounded this universal orientation: "if you are true to your morals…you should treat everyone the way you should, you want to be treated and I think that I would like to be treated with respect."

This universally applied everyday morality appeared across interviews, with many participants making strong claims about the generalized applicability of rules around public conduct. Mo, an Asian man is his early twenties: "I do not think it [incivility] should be justified because everyone has their own agenda. Everyone's in a hurry. Everyone has things they need to do. What makes my time more important than theirs?." Similarly, Kaya, a young white woman reflecting on a rude encounter with another young white woman in a crowded public space: "There should not be any reason to treat anyone disrespectfully and there's obviously better ways to handle situations than being rude to people…it would never be okay to be rude to a stranger. You should always be treating everyone with respect."

While most participants made universal claims around conduct, many tempered these claims by referencing how personal circumstance may impact conduct. For example, Kate, a middle-aged white woman reflects on a rude encounter with a middle-aged white man: "people should always think through what they say because you do not know who you are talking to and what they are going through." In a similar vein, but drawing on personal context as providing partial justification, Marie, a young white woman reflecting on a rude encounter with a middle-aged white man, says: "everyone has their own thing going on, their own story, and their own lives…I think if it's warranting rudeness, then it must be more important than holding a door for me." Simon, an Asian man in his 20s, notes: "I truly believe everybody deserves respect and kindness…but sometimes it's just difficult when I'm impatient or I'm going through personal things, and I do not think of anyone else around me, except my own…um…my own agenda and my own self and it becomes that much more difficult to recognize and be sensitive to being nice to other people."

Universal moral claims, then, can be attenuated by considering an individual's personal context. 'Having a bad day' figured both in excusing incivility, and in participants themselves holding back in being rude to a stranger. Thus, while participants invoked basic universal moral principles in the abstract, they were also willing to understand how the context of actually experienced everyday interaction meant that strict adherence to universal morality may loosen in light of personal circumstance. That said, even if the loosening of strict moral principles was possible, participants were nonetheless clear that the existence of such principles was unquestionable.

'Killing with kindness': uncivil encounters as teachable moments

In addition to universal moral claims around respect, many participants subscribed to a doctrine of universal kindness. While kindness may be functional in living among others, most participants described it as a moral necessity. Reflecting on a rude encounter with a young Asian man, Zola, a middle-aged African-Canadian woman says: "I do not believe that if one is conscious of a situation there's ever a reason for [being rude]…I do not think so. I think that being mindful of other people…the better route to take is always kindness."

When universally applied kindness extended beyond deservingness. The term 'killing with kindness' appears regularly in

9 Names have been changed and any potentially identifying removed to protect the anonymity of interview participants. Demographic information is as self-reported by interview participants.

interviews. Here, the uncivil encounter provides an opportunity for members to engage in a *teachable moment*: "I know people who would say if somebody's rude to you, like I'm going to be rude back to them…I would say that if somebody is rude to you, like, you should just be even nicer to them, so that, like, you are basically killing them with kindness, right?" (Sarah, woman, white, 50s). Asked if rudeness is *ever* justified, Leslie, a woman who had encountered a rude stranger taking up too much space and blocking a door to public transit, says: "even if they are rude to you…fight it with kindness." More pointedly, Tess, a middle-aged woman who was confronted by a stranger about her dog, offers: "if someone is rude to me…I'll usually just tell them to have a nice day…'coz I want them to think of their own behavior." Here the breach of civil inattention wedges open opportunities to instruct violators about conduct in public by leading with example. This repeats throughout interviews:

"I believe in the philosophy of killing people with kindness so I am just going to be nice to these people and if they are still rude to you it just kind of looks worse on them than the effort will on you…I just think you should be as polite as possible and then if they are still going to be rude to you then it just shows their character not yours."

"if someone has been rude to you, sure I understand retaliating, but at the end of the day I do not think that rudeness solves anything. I think that you should kill them with kindness."

As a generalized strategy then, 'killing with kindness' allows members to posit themselves as exemplars of moral purity amidst the potential pollution of everyday interaction in public space. The next section shows the depth of the moral vein that runs through accounts.

Moral messaging: standing up, calling out, and interactional Robin Hoods

Where 'killing with kindness' allows participants to position themselves as moral actors, many went further, describing and interpreting uncivil encounters as opportunities to defend collective ideals around the sanctity of persons and of social bonds. Across many interviews, participants drew on uncivil encounters as opportunities for *moral messaging*, especially when asked "is it *ever* justified to be rude to a stranger in public space?"

Here, participants articulated the need to intervene in rude encounters as a form of repair work connected to the protection of sacred ideals, specifically the sacred qualities of persons and of social order. These took three main forms; (i) *standing up* in defense of the sanctity of the self; (ii) *calling out* in defense of the sanctity of others, and (iii) *being an interactional Robin Hood* in defense the sanctity of social order. Where *standing up* and *calling out* concern affronts to personhood, *being an interactional Robin Hood* is concerned with affronts to the moral order of everyday public interaction, and aim at restoring that order.

'Standing up': defending the sanctity of self

In discussing encounters involving personal affronts, some participants readily sought to defend themselves. In such cases they justified their own uncivil conduct as standing up for the sanctity of their personhood. Rob, a young white man discussing the conduct of a middle-aged male stranger who approached him in an aggressive manner, says: "if someone were to approach you aggressively or harassed you in anyway, I believe that everyone has the right to defend themselves, but if the stranger is doing nothing wrong then you should not be rude." Meeting rudeness with rudeness is here justified in defense of self.

This theme of standing up for oneself repeated in many interviews. For example, Fred, a young Asian man recounts a rude encounter with a young white woman, and when asked about justifying uncivil conduct, says: "where someone was demeaning me as a person or my character or was like being threatening in some way, or in my face, you know, just being very aggressive in the way they were speaking to me…I think in that situation, I do not know if I would say being rude was appropriate or being aggressive, but I guess standing up for yourself...like 'this is not okay, I'm not going to sit here and let you treat me like shit basically'." In another case, Chad, a white man in his thirties says: "there's situations where I feel you do not have to be polite, but it's generally in response to rudeness…if someone does something, there are people out there that you know, they'll do things in public and you know you should not have to stand for you should not allow people to do sort of whatever they want…if they are impeding you or they are lashing out at you or anything like that I think you have the right to respond how you choose you do not have to be polite. I mean if it's not your job to take their shit then why would you?"

Meeting like-with-like in defense of one's personhood was a persistent justification participants offered to rationalize their own rude conduct. Ali, a young south Asian man says: "There might have been times where I was rude to a point that I would stand up for myself if someone is being pushy with me and causes me to be rude to stand up for myself then I might react but I have never been rude to a stranger without a reason. If I've ever been rude there must be a reason that caused me in being and acting rude toward a stranger."

In another account, Case, a young gay man encountered a stranger on a university campus who offered unsolicited commentary on his sexuality: "even though I was hurt by the comments because I am a part of the LGBTQ…community, I still think that um, that I should like leave my emotions aside, and kind of be a role model by not responding to him and you know, maybe by even educating him or people who display other forms of like aggression to other people, whether that be racism, homophobia, or any other um, you know, form of discrimination…think people should maybe educate others, or just not engage with them…those are probably the most appropriate and mature responses." Here, Case provides multiple anchoring points for justifying rudeness, incorporating both defense of self and others.

'Calling out': defending the sanctity of others

"When people are being really rude to me. Or, if say I'm, I'm in a line up and there are people who are being rude to the cashier, I will become very aggressive to protect the underdog" (Jim, middle-aged white man).

Where 'standing up' is a form of moral messaging concerned with defending oneself, participants also discussed defending others, or what I refer to here as "calling out." Patty, a middle-aged white woman says: "unless I'd seen them do something unjust to somebody else but then I think I'd call them out on it, I would not be rude necessarily….if there's an elderly person standing on the bus and there's…a bunch of young people or able bodied people

sitting down and…able to stand and…nobody offers a seat, then I would probably say something."

Some participants, though, did express concern that 'calling out' may be aimed only at a potentially inauthentic moral performance: "I think with like social media and stuff, I think it's easy for people to feel more obligated to stand up now, because they want that 5 min of fame of like all the likes on Facebook or like the video views of them standing up to someone being rude."

Despite concerns around inauthenticity, where uncivil conduct addressed particular categories of persons many participants reported feeling compelled to call rude strangers out. Here, calling out aims at protecting potentially vulnerable persons. Examples offered included defense of women, elderly persons, disabled persons, and members of visible or sexual minorities. Carlos, a middle-aged Latino-Canadian man says: "if someone's being racist or unjust in any way…sometimes you need to speak up, sometimes you are in a situation where you cannot just walk away and you need, you need to…maybe we can all find ways of speaking up without being rude. You know, no name calling, or you know other rude things." Kendra, a white woman in her early twenties: "The only time you are allowed to be rude to someone is if, you see them doing something, hateful…like, let us say there's like a couple fighting and the girl is trying to get away from the guy, and he keeps grabbing her and you are like 'hey buddy, back off' and you need to like, get in the middle of them, and get her away and be like…'what you are doing is wrong'." Similarly, Parv, a south Asian woman in her early 20s says: "if you saw someone...someone who did not have a handicap parking pass parking in a handicap spot, I think it would be appropriate to say 'what are you doing? Why are you doing that? That's not appropriate'...other than that, no." 'Calling out' was readily invoked when uncivil conduct connected to membership of particular categories.

In some accounts 'calling out' simply defended individuals in particular situations, in others, it was about defending particular categories of persons whose personhood was being demeaned. Still others more readily connected justification for rudeness as moral messaging centered on defending social order more generally. Marl, a young white woman in reflecting on her own conduct in encounters with rude strangers, offered the following bringing together multiple dimensions of moral messaging:

"I have been border on rude to people who have made homophobic comments to me or have insulted people with mental illness…Rudeness in the face of any sort of homophobia, sexism, racism, any of those types of things, or any injustice, I'm okay with that. I'm okay with being called rude for reacting that way because it's just not okay…any time when, like if you are watching or see someone being assaulted in any way, that is perfectly fine to be rude to that stranger who's doing the assaulting. If you are in conversations with people and they are just blatantly being completely disrespectful to another human being or to you based on your gender, your sexuality, your race, anything – yes, it is okay to be rude to that person. That's completely justified, does not matter if they are working in service, does not matter what they are doing. You have every right to defend yourself in that situation."

Here two forms of moral messaging—'standing up' to defend the sanctity of self, and 'calling out' in defense of others—dovetail with one another. This brings us to another form of moral messaging: in defense of social order, or what I call *being an interactional Robin Hood*.

Interactional Robin Hoods: defending the sanctity of social order

As we have seen so far, reflecting on uncivil encounters provides opportunities for members to justify their own uncivil conduct in defense of the sanctity of personhood, both self and other. A third form involves participants treating uncivil encounters as interactional resources upon which to hang moral claims around the sanctity of the social bond more generally (Horgan, 2020).

Being an interactional Robin Hood figured most prominently in denser settings, popping up regularly in cases of queue jumping where rude strangers breach the basic rules of distributional justice (Schwartz, 1975). For example, Paul, a young white man spoke about an encounter with another young white man who pushes in front of him at a busy bar. He confronts the queue-jumper, saying: "We're university students…we are civilized, I get it…it's a bar, I get it…some people are intoxicated, but we are all civilized enough to know that you stand in line, you wait in line, like you have done it a million times before I'm sure, it's just common sense…you wait in line." Lin, a white woman in her 40s confronts a man in a busy parking lot who sped in front of her to take a parking spot: "It unfolded with me getting out of my car in the middle of the parking lot and going and standing at his door before he could get out of the car to tell him that he had taken my parking and how disrespectful and rude it essentially was. And explaining to him that…it's a little bit concerning for me as an older person to know that this is Canada's future that's going to be running the country, people with these norms and morals or lack thereof." Lin treats the infraction as a signal or symptom of moral decline, to be put right by defending not just herself or another, but the form of distributional justice that pertains in the mundane moral order of a parking lot.

This kind of concern about distributional justice appeared again and again. Anna, a young white woman boards a busy bus and notes a "younger white guy" with headphones on who leaves his bag on the empty seat next to him while many people on the bus are standing: "I approach him and tell him about it and just say that it's rude, you know, like, our parents like to bring us up in a certain way, you know and follow certain rules, or moral guidelines I guess you could say." Simon, an Asian man in his 20s recounts the following experience at a busy highway coffee stop with a long lineup, where a white man in his 30s arrives and steps to the top of the line:

"I say 'I'm telling you right now, that you will not get served here by standing there'. I'm three or four back—but you will not get your coffee before me. And so he went on with some vulgar language, and the 'person in front of him moved and he orders his coffee. And I said excuse me ma'am, if you serve him a coffee, I'm going to ask everybody' in this restaurant to leave. This is wrong. He is not next in line…he said something to the tone of 'I could buy this place if I wanted to'. And he looked at me and pointed his finger, and he said, 'you are making all this trouble…I could have had my coffee and could have been gone by now'. I say 'that's true, and the people in front of me could say the same thing, if you had not been rude and butted in'."

Across accounts then, participants spoke of the need to intervene to protect the sacred character of collective life. The justifications provided are forms of *moral messaging*. In the case of *standing up*, participants defend the sanctity of their personhood. With *calling out* moral messaging defends the sanctity of another's personhood. And by *being an interactional* Robin Hood, moral messaging is in service of sacred social order.

Everyday lifeworlds as moral landscapes

Across the range of themes identified above—universally applied moral principles and their situational attenuation, members' use of uncivil encounters with strangers in public space as teachable moments and opportunities for moral messaging—we see how ordinary members orient to the everyday lifeworlds of urban public space as deeply moral landscapes. *Landscape* here is explicitly points to co-existence of multiple, potentially contradictory, moral justifications. Like physical landscapes, particular elements are foregrounded or backgrounded (Zerubavel, 2015). Landscapes are available to be interpreted by all who engage them. A moral landscape can contain multiple meanings. Moral landscape highlights not only this polysemy, but also members' interpretive capacities in foregrounding and backgrounding different kinds of moral justifications, and the interpretive work necessary to make them morally intelligible. While members foreground or background different meanings, a moral landscape is irreducible to those populating it: it has an existence over and above interactions occurring within it. The intelligibility of accounts is oriented to but not wholly organized by the interaction being recounted. Rather, to make accounts intelligible, members seek to provide moral clarity. This necessarily involves foregrounding and backgrounding different elements of the moral landscape of everyday urban lifeworlds.

EMCA attunes us to the eternally ongoing work of intersubjectively negotiating the doing *of* interaction *in* interaction. Members practically accomplish this as a matter of course in everyday life. Members do not treat the ritual structure of stranger interaction as simply functional. Rather, as their accounts of breaches of the everyday stranger interaction ritual of civil inattention suggest, members treat encounters as morally meaningful. While action at the scene of interaction is a kind of 'doing' in the ethnomethodological sense of practical accomplishment, *tellings* too are doings. Members' accounts and justifications mean providing interpretations that are recognizable. By offering accounts in a moral register, participants' make them more generally intelligible beyond the specifics of any particular encounter. Where EMCA examines accountability and tellability, this has focused on how these are put together *in* interaction. In the case of the second-order accounts *about* interaction gone awry discussed here, I suggest that moral intelligibility draws on a discursive structure aligned with the binary discourse of civil society (Alexander, 2006). Grounded in Durkheim's basic binary division of the social world, echoing through Goffman, and organized around what people deem to be morally good or bad, this structure provides interpretive resources for understanding infraction *qua* infraction, and for positioning it within a broader moral landscape. As shown in many of the quotes above, the conduct of others is subject to forms of judgment that are not sourced exclusively within the interaction order. Rather, a deeper binary structure provides consistent interpretive resources—sacred/profane, good/bad, care/indifference, kindness/malice—for members to draw upon in making sense of and accounting for encounters in everyday life.

With this basic binary comes a cultural structure readily referencing moral ideals. Such ideals though cannot be reduced to raw empirical fact or generalized to some nebulous abstraction. Rather, they are drawn upon and borne out of reflection on lifeworld experiences: embodied experience provides the tangible reality where moral ideals manifest. As I have suggested, it is, in part, ritual elements of mundane social life that foreground interaction's moral dimensions, such that breaches may elicit immediate responses in defense of that order at the scene of interaction, and *post hoc* interpretations centering collective life's moral underpinnings [see also Horgan (2019)]. It is not only in ritualized encounters themselves or in their breaches, but also in reflections upon such encounters that we get some purchase on how everyday life and the broader moral worldviews that swirl around it connect.

The theoretical approach advanced and illustrated here brings fresh eyes to the analytic utility of interactional breaches in EMCA, in social theory, and in sociology more generally. EMCA takes up the Durkheimian tradition of centering social pathologies—interactional breaches—to analyze the production of social order, though it does so to highlight sense-making procedures in everyday life. While few cultural sociologists have taken mundane interactional breaches seriously, they do recognize that breaches can also bring deeper structures of meaning to the surface. As Alexander notes, in "periods of significant social tension and conflict, deeper structures come into play and people draw upon them to experience and transform fundamental meanings of social life. So we can see that underlying sacred structures weave in and out of mundane life" [quoted in Lynch and Sheldon (2013)]. The scene of mundane interaction is one place where social tensions surface, and it may just be that while the kinds of tensions that cultural sociologists take seriously have tended to be more largescale societal ones, this approach brings cultural sociological attention to the more everyday kinds of goings-on of interest in EMCA.

Conclusion: ties and tensions between EMCA and cultural sociology

At the scene of interaction, ritual is solidarizing, ritual breach, potentially desolidarizing. Interviews consistently illustrate how interaction ritual structure provides opportunity for affiliative or disaffiliative responses, a structure for participants to offer or withdraw solidarity, however minimal or fleeting. Consequently, participants treat breaches as morally meaningful where departures from interactional norms—breaches of the interaction ritual of civil inattention—are taken as *expressive*. For many, such acts reach beyond the immediate act and scene of interaction, while remaining interpretively tethered to it. For members, any given scene of interaction is enmeshed in a wider world. In this sense, ritual is Janus-faced, providing analytic inputs in two directions: facing interactional practices *and* structures of meaning. Similarly, while implicit rules of conduct may be broadly agreed upon, any participant's interpretation of an encounter cannot be wholly determined by those rules.[10] The meanings of what happens within the interaction order are not always immediately clear, and this ambiguity can both thicken and lift in breaches of the ritual order of copresent interaction. Interviews suggest that members establish clarity by giving a moral anchoring to their interpretations: interpretations are made intelligible by treating everyday lifeworlds as moral landscapes.

In the foregoing, everyday uncivil encounters provide access to ordinary morality. This is a meeting point of sorts where the spirit of a variety of sociologies springing from Durkheim's work intersect.

10 As Cicourel (1980, p. 18) notes "the status of normative rules during social interaction still remains unclear in social interaction."

Over a century ago, Durkheim noted that when he set out to study society what he uncovered was morality. This fundamental insight is shared by both EMCA and cultural sociological approaches. For the former, morality is made evident at the scene of interaction in the local production of social order as a moral order (Rawls, 2010). For the latter, culturally structured collective representations have some autonomy from any particular interaction order and provide interpretive resources to understand everyday life. While both approaches operate broadly within interpretive traditions distinguishable from sociology's more critical and straightforwardly positivist traditions, EMCA proceeds through rigorous commitment to empirics, cultural sociologists through a postpositivist approach (Alexander, 1990). EMCA brings close analytic attention to everyday life as a moral order by detailing the practical accomplishment of order in everyday life. These insights are foundational and continue to resonate in EMCA, both conceptually and empirically (Garfinkel, 1967; Rawls, 2010; Jayyusi, 2014). In a similar spirit, centered on interactional practices in everyday life, when we attend to members' reflections on breaches, we open up new insights. Interview participants readily seek to connect relatively minor infractions in everyday life to bigger, deeper moral issues. While seeding connections, however tenuous, between EMCA and cultural sociology, the present argument also affirms and further nuances EMCA's foundational tenet: everyday interaction is a moral order that members interpret and defend as such.

Even with shared Durkheimian roots, fundamental tensions remain between an approach that sees the social world as organized at the level of interactional practices and one that posits the existence of broad cultural structures providing interpretive resources for actors to make sense of the world. That these structures are largely implicit does not mean that members are incapable of discerning them. Rather, they are available to be deployed in ways that members find useful in interpreting everyday interaction. What I have sought to demonstrate here is that, for all their oppositions and tensions, commensurabilities between EMCA and, as a major movement in contemporary social theory, the strong program cultural sociology, are worth investigating. While differing on the analytic status of meaning, both approaches place meaning—its' production, accomplishment, variety, and malleability—at the center of their methods of theorizing.

To close, I offer a programmatic note. First, in terms of connecting EMCA and sociological theory, continuing to probe the various points of resonance and dissonance between EMCA and cultural sociology will bear analytic fruit. Complementarities merit further exploration, especially in attuning cultural sociologists to the interaction order, and further refining EMCA conceptualizations of culture. Furthermore, in cultural sociology Alexander (2006) seeks to understand how solidarity extends to previously excluded groups through a cultural process of 'civil repair'.[11] Second, understanding the interactional dynamics and achievement of solidarity between copresent strangers in cities is essential, not only as a theoretical problem of interest to social scientists, but also in the context of continually increasing global urban population.

Interaction alone cannot be fully understood independently of the interpretive resources that ordinary members use to interpret, understand, explain, and respond to the conduct of others, both in the flow of situated interaction, and in their *post hoc* interpretations, explanations, and justifications for their own conduct and that of others. Opening up dialog between EMCA and cultural sociology is a worthy enterprise. As Roy Turner notes "does not the constancy of social change – you cannot step into the same society twice – ensure that there will always need to be a sociological conversation, without closure?" [quoted in Eglin (2018)]. Here, I have barely scratched the surface. It is precisely because members infuse everyday encounters with meaning that they can situate themselves as moral actors within the moral landscapes of everyday lifeworlds. By treating public spaces as sites for morally meaningful encounters between strangers, and by highlighting some interpretive resources that members use to understand such encounters, we can continue to address some of the myopias identified by Goffman at the very outset, and in so doing, renew and thicken connections between EMCA and sociological theory.

Data availability statement

The datasets presented in this article are not readily available because permission to share was not granted by the REB. Requests to access the datasets should be directed to mhorgan@uoguelph.ca.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by University of Guelph Research Ethics Board. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

11 While this term refers to the macro-level dynamics through which historical wrongs may be amended, the term itself borrows from the EMCA idea of 'repair after next turn' (Schegloff, 1992). Alexander (2006) indicates that his concept of 'civil repair' grew out of engagement with Schegloff while both were faculty at UCLA (Alexander, personal communication).

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Robots as addressable non-persons: an analysis of categorial work at the boundaries of the social world

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Prompted by the material turn in the social sciences and the development of novel interaction technologies, lively debates in social theory have arisen regarding the agency of non-human entities. While these debates primarily involve exchanging theoretical arguments against the background of different theoretical positions, ethnomethodological membership categorization analysis (MCA) provides an empirical approach to questions of non-human agency. The article discusses the debate on non-human agency, demonstrates how MCA can be used to investigate categorial work at the boundaries of the social, and presents the example of an encounter between two museum visitors and a humanoid robot to show how the robot is categorized in a specific way as an 'addressable non-person.' In this way, it becomes clear that social-theoretical debates and empirically oriented MCA can mutually inspire each other and how the 'basic categorization apparatus' addresses new alterities.

KEYWORDS

social theory, membership categorization analysis, non-human agency, communicative AI, humanoid robots

1 Introduction

Ethnomethodology (EM) has always had a complicated relationship with sociological theory. EM's founders developed it as a strictly empirical approach 'that rejects top-down theories to understand social structures' (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2022, p. 261). Ethnomethodologists attempt to gain insights 'from the data themselves' (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, p. 291). They claim to resist so-called 'academic and theoretical imperialism' (Schegloff, 1997, p. 165), which does not seriously consider people's everyday life problems and competencies but rather imposes its own theoretical descriptions, evaluations and categorizations on them. In sociological theory, such a radical empirical approach to social reality was strictly rejected for a long time because it was regarded as 'aggressively and programmatically devoid of theoretical content of sociological relevance' (Coser, 1975, p. 696).[1] Not surprisingly, it has long been difficult for ethnomethodologically oriented researchers to publish their work in sociological journals (Heritage, 2009, p. 300).

1 Conversely, EM was not trying to criticize sociology. Instead, most EM-oriented scholars were indifferent toward sociology's concerns and interests (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970).

Over time, however, EM has gained acceptance in mainstream sociology, establishing itself as a distinct sociological approach that highlights how social order is reproduced as a practical accomplishment within everyday interactions. Simultaneously, EM-oriented researchers have—in a respecified way (Button, 1991)—turned their attention to phenomena that are the focus of classical sociology. EM-oriented research today is not only concerned with 'ordinary' everyday life, but also with institutional interaction or the interactional relevance of identity categories such as race, class, and gender (Psathas, 2006). Such categories, however, are not analytic categories from an ethnomethodological point of view but rather 'categories-in-action' (Schegloff, 2007b). Interactants use these categories to produce and reproduce social order. Accordingly, social roles in institutional settings and categories of identity are viewed 'as members', rather than analysts', categories' (Stokoe, 2012, p. 278). In other words, EM-oriented researchers are concerned with tracing the extent to which corresponding categories are made relevant by actors themselves and applied to (re-)produce social order and social differentiations. Membership categorization analysis (MCA) has established a distinct approach for the investigation of corresponding categorial issues (Hester and Eglin, 1997; Schegloff, 2007a; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2009; Stokoe, 2012). This approach was introduced in the early work of Harvey Sacks (1972). However, its role was initially minimal in the EM community, in which conversation analysis (CA) became the most prominent empirical approach (Stokoe, 2012).[2]

In this paper, I resume this line of research to address a topic that has recently gained relevance in contemporary social theoretical discussions, namely non-human agency. In general, I will address the boundaries of the social world and the possibilities and limits of sociality with non-humans, and in particular, I will focus on machines as new alterities. Up to now, existing academic discussions about this topic have primarily been theoretical and often highly normative (Luckmann, 1970; Latour, 2005; Lindemann, 2005, 2021; Knoblauch, 2020). In addition, they had limited connection with existing empirical research. Against this backdrop, I aim to demonstrate that an empirical approach like MCA can promote insight into how the boundaries of the social are drawn in everyday conduct. Hence, MCA can connect existing social-theoretical debates with empirical investigations into the boundaries of the social and thus enrich theoretical discussions. Moreover, the subject area of the hitherto human-centered empirical approach of MCA can be expanded, making it apparent how theoretical considerations and empirical analyses can benefit from each other.

In what follows, I will present a 'single case analysis' (Schegloff, 1987) of an encounter between two humans and a robot in a museum. The analysis exemplifies how the boundaries of the social world are (re-)produced *in situ*. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the 'basic categorization "apparatus"' (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 8) addresses new alterities and how the robot is categorized in a specific way as an 'addressable non-person', which appears as a new 'membership category' at the boundaries of the social world (section 4). To provide background for the analysis, I will first briefly introduce the social-theoretical discussion regarding the boundaries of the social and its background (section 2). Next, I will present the empirical approach of MCA and its capability for analyzing practices of differentiation between social and non-social entities (section 3). This section will be followed by the single case analysis (section 4) and a short conclusion (section 5).

2 Social-theoretical debates about the boundaries of the social world

In modern (Western) societies, 'common sense permits no doubt that social reality is composed of human affairs' (Luckmann, 1970, p. 73). That is, modern societies distinguish between a social world of humans and a non-social world, which consists of other entities like machines, animals, and plants. Since sociology is a 'child' of modern society, it is not surprising that sociologists normally also 'equate the social world with the world of living humans' (Lindemann, 2005, p. 69). Accordingly, they traditionally study only *human* beings who mutually coordinate their actions with those of others, while they are not interested, for example, in the interactions of great apes.[3] As social theorist Gesa Lindemann puts it,

> the field of sociological research is restricted, for example, to the social systems constituted by social actions of living human beings (Parsons), to the symbols developed in human interactions (Mead), or to the actions within human social relationships, which constitute social forms (Weber). (2005, p. 69).

In recent years, however, researchers have questioned this self-limitation of the scope of sociological research. The 'material turn' in the social sciences and the emergence of new types of communication technology have challenged the restriction of the realm of the social to humans (Lindemann, 2021, p. 13). In particular, so-called 'communicative AI' (Guzman and Lewis, 2020) technologies like 'social robots', 'embodied conversational agents' (ECAs), and 'smart speakers' call the traditional human-centered perspective of sociology into question (Zhao, 2006; Muhle, 2017).[4] Such technologies are intended to simulate human behavior and may become actors in a way that is traditionally reserved for human beings. Cynthia L. Breazeal, one of the pioneers of social robotics, describes her understanding of social robots as follows:

> For me, a sociable robot is able to communicate and interact with us, understand and even relate to us, in a personal way. It should be able to understand us and itself in social terms. We, in turn, should be able to understand it in the same social terms—to be able to relate to it and to empathize with it. […] In short, a sociable robot is socially intelligent in a human-like way, and interacting with it is like interacting with another person. At the

2 In addition to CA and MCA, there are also other empirical lines of research within EM, such as workplace studies or praxeological studies.

3 For an exception, however (see Servais, 2013).

4 In addition, ethnological and anthropological work shows that not all societies have historically limited the realm of the social to human entities (Luckmann, 1970; Lindemann, 2021).

> pinnacle of achievement, they could befriend us, as we could them. (2002, 1)

Breazeal's description of social robots emphasizes that the established separation of a social world of humans and a technical world of machines has become blurred with the advent of communicative AI. Consequently, new alterities like humanoid machines have become a relevant subject for sociological inquiry (van Oost and Reed, 2011; Böhle and Pfadenhauer, 2014; Meister, 2014; Mlynář et al., 2018), challenging basic assumptions of sociology. Consequently, new debates have emerged about granting the status of social actors to non-human technical entities, in which traditional 'humanist' and new 'post-humanist' approaches oppose each other (Muhle, 2018).

In these debates, traditional theoretical approaches still promote a human-centered perspective and deny non-human social agency. Robots and other technical entities are considered tools or 'objectivations' of human social activities. In this perspective, represented for example by social constructivists Pfadenhauer and Dukat (2015), communicative AI systems do not engage in social relations with humans. Instead, they remain artifacts that allow for (indirect) relations between humans, namely designers or developers and users (Pfadenhauer and Dukat, 2015). In this line of thinking, machines cannot become social actors and do not have agency. Their activities are pre-programmed and hence were inscribed into the machines by programmers or designers. Even if users grant communicative AI (or other) technologies the status of actors, this status is treated as a 'projection', not a social fact (Pfadenhauer, 2015; Knoblauch, 2020, p. 113).

Against this backdrop, post-humanist accounts emphasize the social agency of technical artifacts (and other non-human entities). In this context, actor-network theory (ANT) has become especially influential. ANT explicitly rejects the idea that social relations are restricted to human beings (Latour, 1996; Latour, 2005). On the contrary, proponents of ANT claim that social relations can emerge between all kinds of entities and accordingly 'extends the word actor—or actant—to non-human, non-individual entities' (Latour, 1996, p. 369). Following a semiotic definition of 'actant', an actor is just 'something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general' (Latour, 1996, p. 373).[5] Based on this weak actor concept, even a scallop or a door-closer may become an actor in the same way a fisherman or a scientist does (Callon, 1986; Johnson, 1988). Proponents of ANT not only claim that scallops or door-closers *can* become social actors, but that they *should* be treated as social actors in the same way as human beings. According to ANT's methodological principle of 'generalized symmetry' (Callon, 1986), scientific observers *have to* describe the actions of a scallop or door-closer in the same way as the actions of a human being. Callon and Latour express this concept as follows: 'Whatever term is used for humans, we will use for non-humans as well' (Callon and Latour, 1992, p. 353).

From an EM-oriented analytical perspective, humanist as well as post-humanist approaches, appear problematic. They both place greater emphasis on the theorist's analytical perspective than on the differences and similarities between social and non-social entities as they are made relevant by people in everyday social situations. Hence, in terms of Schegloff (1997, p. 167), both humanist and post-humanist social-theoretical approaches reiterate 'a kind of theoretical imperialism […], a kind of hegemony of the intellectuals, of the literati, the academics, of the critics whose theoretical apparatus gets to stipulate the terms by reference to which the world is to be understood'.[6] Therefore, from an EM-oriented perspective, another methodical approach is needed—one which allows researchers to investigate the boundaries of the social world and the agency of humans and non-humans as an ongoing interactional accomplishment (Krummheuer, 2015; Pelikan et al., 2022). Such an approach must be sensitive to possible extensions of the realm of the social to non-humans, as well as to the possible differences and asymmetries between entities and their agency that reveal themselves through ongoing conduct (see Suchman, 2007, p. 268–271; Muhle, 2017).

Within the recent social-theoretical debates, Gesa Lindemann advocates for such an approach. Referring to existing anthropological research, she states that the boundaries of the social are (historically) changeable and that 'in some societies only humans are social actors in their own right, in other societies animals, gods, the deceased, plants, or other things can occupy the status of an actor as well' (2005, p. 70). The boundaries therefore seem fundamentally contingent on which entities can obtain the status of social actors, an observation that challenges how the boundaries of the social are drawn and how they may change.

Lindemann assumes that whether an entity is considered a social being and, therefore, a potential interaction partner is dependent on a 'foundational interpretation' (2005, p. 73). This interpretation is 'based upon an implicit interpretation that distinguishes those entities whose physical appearance can be seen as an indication of the existence of an entity with which Ego can exist in a [social] relationship' (Lindemann, 2005, p. 73). In other words, before people enter into a social interaction with another entity, they must recognize whether or not this entity is a social being. Depending on the result of a respective categorization practice, subsequent actions with regard to the other entity will differ. This basic idea is already reflected in Parsons and Shils (1951) concept of double contingency (see also FN 8), which allows for distinguishing

> between objects which interact with the interacting subject and those objects which do not. These interacting objects are themselves actors or egos […]. A potential food object […] is not an alter because it does not respond to ego's expectations and because it has no expectations of ego's action; another person, a

5 Similarly, Karen Barad, a proponent of feminist new materialism writes that 'in traditional humanist accounts, intelligibility requires an intellective agent (that to which something is intelligible), and intellection is framed as a specifically human capacity. But in my agential realist account, intelligibility is an ontological performance of the world in its ongoing articulation. It is not a human-dependent characteristic but a feature of the world in its differential becoming' (Barad, 2007, p. 149).

6 Ironically, the proponents of ANT emphasize that it is important 'to follow the actors themselves' (Latour, 2005, p. 12) and their interpretations of the world, similar to the EM approach. However, the principle of generalized symmetry systematically obstructs this attempt.

> mother or a friend, would be an alter to ego. The treatment of another actor, an alter, as an interacting object has very great consequences for the development and organization of the system of action (pp. 14–15).

Both Lindemann and Parsons and Shils assume that people decide whether they are addressing a social actor based on the physical appearance of their counterpart. However, this method of differentiation of objects can only be implemented if the categorized entities are known and can be directly classified accordingly. Such classification is difficult with new alterities like communicative AI systems, as these are still unfamiliar artifacts for which an appropriate classification is not yet clear. Distinction practices cannot, therefore, simply be based on the physical form, but instead depend on observing the activities and characteristics of the new artifacts. Christian Meyer shares this consideration when he states that people who are confronted with new kinds of alterities apply a basic ethnomethod, which he calls 'minimal sympathy' (Meyer, 2016). According to Meyer (2016, p. 93), this ethnomethod implicitly and continuously tests the alterity of the interactional counterpart and uses it to permanently calibrate the ongoing interaction. This can include, for instance, 'affiliation smiles' (Martin et al., 2017), tests of language skills and emotions, or tests of the presence of a social 'face' (Meyer, 2016).

Without referring to minimal sympathy by that name, some ethnomethodologically oriented studies have already identified corresponding practices in human–machine interaction. Alač (2016), Pelikan et al. (2022), and Rudaz et al. (2023) demonstrate that social robots are sometimes treated as things and sometimes as social actors in human–robot encounters. Similarly, Krummheuer (2008) finds that people often tease their artificial interlocutors in order to explore their communicative capabilities. Therefore, some research in the field of EM already discusses 'minimal sympathy' between humans and machines and explores categorization practices in human–machine encounters. However, studies that apply MCA in this research field remain rare,[7] despite the method's explicit dedication to the analysis of categorial work in interactions. MCA provides analytical tools for investigating how distinctions 'between objects which interact with the interacting subject and those objects which do not' (Parsons and Shils, 1951, p. 14) are drawn *in situ*. In the section that follows, I will further illuminate how MCA can be applied for respective analyses at the boundaries of the social world.

3 Membership categorization analysis and the boundaries of the social world

As the term suggests, the main emphasis of MCA involves analyzing the use of membership categorizations during interactions. Such 'membership categories […] are classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons' (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 3). They are indispensable 'resources that participants use in interaction with other participants' (Gafaranga, 2001, p. 1913) in order to develop expectations of their characteristics and predict their next actions, enabling them to mutually coordinate their activities. MCA scholars assume that participants in interactions must categorize their counterparts in order create expectations of their activities, motives, and characteristics. In doing so, people apply and situationally adapt their 'basic categorization "apparatus"' (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 8), which includes their 'common-sense knowledge about the world and how social categories are expected or assumed to act in general and in particular situations' (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 8).

This basic apparatus can be understood as a cultural system in operation. It enables people to intuitively categorize their counterparts according to their existing knowledge of the world and treat them accordingly. In particular, this practice facilitates encounters between people who do not know each other and hence require cues to coordinate their actions. In these situations, people start 'doing everyday sociology' (Leudar et al., 2004, p. 245) and draw upon their knowledge of the social world. Basically, this means that 'any person who is a case of a category is seen as a member of a category, and what's known about that category is known about them, and the fate of each is bound up in the fate of the other' (Sacks, 1979, p. 13). In this way, people not only show their capability for basic sociological theorizing (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 4) but also competently (inter)act and coordinate their behavior in uncertain or rather unfamiliar situations.[8] Without such a capacity for 'folk sociology', people would be unable to engage in interaction and (re)produce society. The task for MCA researchers, then, is to analyze how membership categorization works in practice, in order to build (or rather, reconstruct) the apparatus that makes the observable categorial work possible (Schegloff, 2007a,b, p. 466).

However, it is important to note that categories, which people attribute to each other, are not stable or fixed. Rather, membership categorizations create 'identities-for-interaction' (Stokoe, 2012, p. 278). These identities emerge during the course of the interaction and are used *in situ* as resources that allow participants to develop expectations and interpret one another's actions. Practices of categorization are an essential part of the human 'interaction engine' (Levinson, 2020), which organizes interactions in chains and sequences on the basis of expectations (Schegloff, 1968, 2020; Levinson, 2020, p. 45). Therefore, MCA does not treat existing social categories as starting points or explanatory 'resources' for social phenomena but as 'turn generated categories' (Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002, p. 581). These categories emerge over the course of an interaction, based on the observation and interpretation of observable and interpretable previous actions of the interlocutors. Consequently, membership categories can change during interaction processes. Say, for example, that a person is treated as a 'punk' at the beginning of a conversation due to his or her fashion style but then demonstrates knowledge about composers of early 19th-century classical European music. In this case, the same person might be categorized as a 'Beethoven expert' in the further course of the interaction. Interaction participants constantly monitor one another's actions in order to

7 Exceptions are Krummheuer (2016) and Muhle (2017).

8 From a social theoretical perspective, the use of membership categories can be interpreted as a members' method for confronting the fundamental social problem of double contingency (Parsons and Shils, 1951; Luhmann, 1995) Double contingency means that in social interactions, both interlocutors experience that the behavior of the alter ego is unpredictable and capable of variation. Each is a 'black box' for each other.

categorize these actions and develop expectations on this basis, which allows for continuing the interaction.

When investigating everyday categorization practices, several analytical concepts are key: (1) membership categories, (2) membership categorization devices (MCDs), (3) category-bound activities, and (4) category-tied predicates. As previously mentioned, membership categories 'are classifications or social types that may be used to describe persons' (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 3). Membership categories may include 'sister', 'husband', 'colleague', 'boss', 'scientist', 'football player' or 'musician'. Different kinds of categories trigger particular expectations regarding the properties, typical activities, and expectations of the categorized persons. When talking to a sister, one might expect an informal, warm greeting and her willingness to listen to one's personal problems. However, at least in Western cultures, one would not expect the same from colleagues or a boss. This example demonstrates how membership categories structure expectations and the course of interactions. Building on the concept of membership categories, the notion of MCDs underscores that certain categories may be linked to form classes or collections. This idea

> refers to the fact that, in the locally occasioned settings of their occurrence, some membership categories can be used and heard commonsensically as 'going together', whilst others cannot be so used and heard, For example, the collection or MCD 'family' may be so heard to include such membership categories as 'mother', 'father', 'son', 'daughter', 'uncle', 'aunt', etc., and to exclude 'trumpet player', 'dog,' 'marxist feminist' and 'Caucasian' (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 4).

As indicated above, membership categories are inseparable from expectations regarding the particular activities and characteristics of the people who are thought to belong to them. Most people expect a sister to listen to their personal problems, but they do not expect her to apply for the same job as they do. With colleagues, it is probably the other way around. In this context, Harvey Sacks introduced the term 'category-bound activities', 'which are those activities that are expectably and properly done by persons who are the incumbents of particular categories' (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 5). In addition, category-tied predicates consist of 'attributes, rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, and knowledges that are viewed as "properly" linked to a category' (Fox et al., 2023, p. 581). With these four analytical concepts in mind, a researcher's task is to analyze everyday categorial practices in order to expand knowledge about the underlying categorization apparatus.

Up to now, MCA has been restricted to the analysis of *human* interactions since membership categories are clearly defined as categorical ways of describing or characterizing *persons* (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 3; Psathas, 1999, p. 143; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2015, p. 8). Animals, plants, robots, or other kinds of new alterities are not part of this focus. Even though 'non-personal objects' (Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 66) are sometimes considered by MCA scholars, they are only of interest as objects to which humans refer in their interactions. Brooks and Rawls, for instance, write that objects 'can be oriented toward as stable objects (even though they are constituted), thereby supporting the characterization of object-oriented category membership within human interactional communication' (Brooks and Rawls, 2012, p. 409). For instance, Housley and Fitzgerald (2002, p. 76) analyze a case in which particular furniture in the context of removal is treated by interactants as belonging to the MCD 'objects to be moved'.

However, with the advent of communicative AI, the simple ontological distinction between persons and non-personal objects seems to have begun blurring: activities and characteristics that were previously bound to human social actors can potentially also be attributed to machines (see section 2). Hence, it seems sensible to adjust the human-centered perspective of MCA and open its analytical toolbox for open-ended empirical analyses. It has become necessary to consider that machines may be categorized in a similar way as human beings. In order to conduct these analyses, it is essential to recognize that membership categories are not essential properties of the persons being categorized. Hence, membership categories and their connection to particular activities and characteristics are always contingent and undetermined. As Sally and Stephen Hester put it, 'categories are always "categories in context," and this means that the task for MCA is to discover how collections, categories and predicates are used on the occasions of their occurrence rather than presuming their stable cultural meanings' (Hester and Hester, 2012, p. 566). Thus, membership categories are products of everyday interaction processes, not stable properties of humans or other entities.

It therefore follows that categorizations, category-bound activities, and category-tied predicates belonging to particular membership categories or MCDs always underlie transformations that depend on the situated contexts of their use (Hester and Hester, 2012). This observation allows for relaxing the restrictive equation of 'social actor = human being' and re-evaluating the distinction between humans and other entities with regard to their belonging to the realm of the social as a (historically instituted) distinction. After all, this distinction may change with the increased occurrence of communicative AI. Seen this way, the established categorical separation of humans and machines in modern (Western) societies can be interpreted as a distinction between two different kinds of MCD, which collect different membership categories along with particular characteristics (predicates) and activities bound to them. In present society, robots, smart speakers, and computers are commonly understood as belonging to the non-social device 'machines', a category which is itself part of the collection of 'non-social entities'. Children, adults, technicians, scientists, and so on belong to the device called 'humans', which is used synonymously with the collection called 'social entities'.

Along with the various MCD affiliations come different expectations regarding the typical activities and attributes of humans, machines, and other entities. For example, if asked, many people would classify humans as living beings who relate to each other, have feelings, and express their emotions. In contrast, they expect machines to function, and assume that machines are not alive and hence do not have feelings that can be hurt or which must be recognized (Edwards, 2018; Fritz, 2018; Guzman, 2020). In line with these 'ontological' assumptions about the characteristic predicates and activities of humans and machines, people interpret humans as belonging to the MCD of 'social entities', while this is not the case for machines.

However, there is no reason this categorization should not change if machines attain the capability to 'interact meaningfully with humans' (Morie et al. 2012, p. 100), as their developers intend (see section 2). Typical activities that are currently limited to human beings may then be performed by robots and other communicative AI

technologies. There is already evidence that the fundamentally different categorization of humans and machines is beginning to falter. For example, people are beginning to ascribe emotions to communicative AI systems (Pelikan et al., 2020). As communication scholar Andrea L. Guzman puts it,

> many of the ontological boundaries […] remain lines of delineation between people and computers from the perspective of the public. Some of these divides, however, are no longer as clear as they once were or are becoming even more complex. Most people consider emotion to be a key boundary, but some people's interactions with communicative technologies designed to emulate human emotions, such as Apple's Siri, have caused them to reassess the degree to which emotion remains a human trait (Guzman, 2020, p. 50).

It is precisely this situation, in which the boundaries between man and machine have become blurred, that renders the ethnomethod called 'minimal sympathy' (see section 2) significant. 'Minimal sympathy' enables people to make sense of an artificial counterpart's actions and develop expectations that help to structure unfamiliar encounters with new alterities. Accordingly, 'minimal sympathy' functions as a basic method of the categorization apparatus that aims to categorize new alterities based on tests of their predicates and activities. Against this backdrop, it appears plausible to open the analytic toolbox of MCA for analyses that explore the everyday (re)production of the boundaries of the social world, in order to expand knowledge about the categorization apparatus and members' methods for addressing new alterities like communicative AI systems.

For this analysis, it is sufficient to follow the sequential course of boundary situations and explore whether (and if so, how) participants determine different kinds of categorizations step-by-step as 'turn-generated categories'. In this way, it is possible to 'reconstruct the ways in which a social position is introduced, maintained, and eventually suspended turn-by-turn' (Hausendorf and Bora, 2006, p. 88) and, hence, to study the working of the categorization apparatus in encounters with new alterities. The leading empirical question is, therefore, how participants in concrete encounters with new alterities categorize each other and whether the alterities are granted predicates that, up to now, have been reserved for humans. If machines (or other non-humans) are attributed behaviors and characteristics typically associated with social beings, significant transformations regarding the realm of the social are potentially occurring; in this case, the ontological human/machine difference as one of the demarcation lines between social and non-social actors (see sections 1 and 2) becomes fragile.

The next section addresses how analyses of categorial work at the boundaries of the social world can be conducted and what insights they might reveal. It presents a single case analysis of the beginning of an encounter between two humans and a humanoid robot in a computer museum. The analysis provides detailed insights into the sequential unfolding of members' 'categorical ordering work' (Hester and Eglin, 1997, p. 3) at the boundaries of the social world.[9]

4 Single case study: the sequential unfolding of categorizations in an encounter with the humanoid robot 'Nadine'

The data that serve as a basis for the following analysis stem from the research project 'Communication at the Boundaries of the Social World', which explored the possibilities and limits of the social agency of new interaction technologies.[10] In the context of the project, several encounters between museum visitors and different communicative AI systems were videotaped, transcribed, and analyzed. One of the technical systems under investigation, which is also the subject of the following single case analysis, is the humanoid robot 'Nadine'. The robot looks like its/her[11] developer, Nadia Magnenat Thalmann, and has a remarkable human resemblance. Nadine is a 'sitting pose robot' (Magnenat-Thalmann and Zhang, 2014, p. 4) that can move its upper body, arms, and head (see Figures 1, 2). Additionally, the robot performs rudimentary facial expressions and gestures. It/she is able to recognize people (faces as well as some gestures) and provides a voice user interface.

According to its developers, Nadine, like other social robots, is meant to serve as a companion with whom one can communicate in an intuitive and natural manner (Magnenat-Thalmann and Zhang, 2014). In the museum, the robot is placed on a small pedestal, in a sitting position, behind a desk with a laptop on it. On the wall behind Nadine are two information boards. On one board, Nadine is introduced as a 'robot clone', and its/her mode of operation is explained. Among other things, its/her ability to move and its/her modes of propulsion (electric and pneumatic) are described, as well as its/her 'perception apparatus', which consists of a Kinect camera system, a microphone, and a loudspeakers and enables her to talk with people in a technically mediated way. On the other information board, museum visitors find general information about the history and subject of research on humanoid robots. In addition, on the desk in front of Nadine, a small sign states, 'Talk to me!' and informs the reader that Nadine understands and can speak both German and English. On the floor of the pedestal, there is another sign with the request 'Please do not touch'. Nadine is thus presented on the one hand as a human-like robot that can engage in conversations with visitors via a technical interface, but on the other hand, as an exhibit that is the object of reception that—unlike typical interactive exhibition objects (Heath and vom Lehn, 2008)—may not be touched.

In its/her 'basic posture', the robot sits slightly slumped in the chair with its/her gaze directed at the computer. The arms are bent in front of the body as if the robot were typing (see Figure 1). The camera system that serves as 'eyes' is mounted in the background above Nadine's head, and the microphone that allows museum visitors to make auditory contact is located in front of the desk. As soon as the

9 The analysis will show, if and in which sense not only the humans but also the robot can also be understood as 'member'. This would be the case, if the robot is attributed behaviors and characteristics typically associated with social beings (see above), and hence it/she would be treated as a social entity that is able to participate in social interaction.

10 The project was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and led by the author from 2016 to 2021.

11 Since the categorial status of the robot is ambiguous, I refer in my analysis to the robot as it/she. I owe this idea to a reviewer of the article, whom I would like to thank.

FIGURE 1
The robot in its/her basic posture.

camera system registers movement in Nadine's environment, the robot raises its/her upper body and head and directs its/her gaze in the direction of identified possible interaction partners. After successful identification, Nadine usually greets these partners in a nonverbal way, by waving, and Nadine assumes its/her 'interaction posture' (see Figure 2).

The museum visitors almost inevitably encounter Nadine when they enter the exhibition space. Thus, they are normally registered by Nadine's sensors and subsequently confronted with the robot's attempt to make contact. Occasionally, the visitors ignore the attempt and continue to the next exhibit. Most visitors, however, are at least interested enough in Nadine's movements to approach the robot, stop in front of the desk, and engage in interaction with it/her. Only 19 out of 203 recorded encounters did not result in a verbal exchange. This means that in more than 90% of cases, users made an attempt to engage in interaction.[12] This was the case in the situation that will be analyzed in this paper. The following analysis demonstrates the peculiarities of categorial work in encounters with the humanoid robot.



FIGURE 2
The robot in its/her interaction posture.

12 What happens next varies. In some cases, the visitors do not interact with Nadine but simply look at her as they look at other objects in the exhibition. Nadine is thus not categorized as a person, and the robot remains socially excluded as a non-personal object, which may become topic of conversations between visitors. In many cases, however, attempts to reciprocate the contact begin. As a rule, however, this proceeds differently than in comparable interpersonal interactions.

Extract 1: Couple meets Nadine: 'Distance salutation'

	0 0 . 0 [1]	0 0 . 1 [2]	0 0 . 4 [3]	0 0 . 6 [4]	0 0 . 9 [5]
robot_gaze	*computer on the desk*			*slightly to the right*	
robot_gest	in basic posture	lifts upper body and head			raises right hand and moves it back and forth
man_gaze	*to the left towards another exhibit*		*Nadine*		
man_move	enters the room from the right in the background and moves slowly towards Nadine				

Video still [1]

The encounter was recorded with two video cameras and transcribed multimodally using the computer program ELAN, which was developed by the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen. Since 'actions [and therefore also categorization practices; F.M.] constituting sequences are not exclusively performed through practices of speaking, but can also be accomplished via embodied practices' (Evans and Fitzgerald, 2017, p. 82), in addition to the spoken word, gaze direction, facial expressions, gestures, and movements are transcribed as well (see also Mondada, 2007, 2014; Goodwin, 2010, 2018). In order to consider these modalities in both their simultaneous and sequential production, the transcript follows a partiture representation in the form of a table. The simultaneously produced activities of the respective participants are noted on separate lines. For enhanced clarity, the lines assigned to the participants are highlighted in the same shade of gray. Gaze directions appear in italics, while gestures and facial expressions are noted in regular text. The verbal exchange is transcribed according to the conventions of the GAT2 transcription system (Selting et al., 2009).

The sequential nature of the multimodal events becomes clear when the tables are read from left to right. The first line shows the time stamps at which the various activities begin. In addition, the columns in the first line are numbered so it is possible to refer by number to the activity beginning at the specific point in time. The duration of activities can be recognized by the length of the cells in which they are noted. Every table is supplemented by a still from the video recording so it is possible for the reader to visualize the situation.

The encounter under investigation lasts just under 2.5 min. The analysis, however, covers only the first 33 s. Nevertheless, this time frame is sufficient for gaining detailed insights into the ongoing categorization processes, which is unsurprising since the (re)constitution of the relationship between the participants is a key task in conversation openings (Schegloff, 1986).[13] That is, members start to categorize each other immediately, in terms of being able to relate to each other and developing expectations. I will analyze the sequential unfolding of the situation in nine steps.

As extract 1 reveals, the situation begins in a similar manner to typical human encounters in public (Kendon, 1990). Immediately after a man enters the exhibit room [1], Nadine raises its/her head and upper body [2] and starts to wave its/her hand [5]. That is, the robot leaves its/her basic posture and moves into the interaction posture. This activity indicates that Nadine has recognized movements in its/her environment and thus shows characteristics (category-bound predicates) of a living being that can recognize its environment and

13 Without referring to membership categorization practices, Pitsch et al. (2009) argue that in human–robot encounters, the opening phase is key for establishing and maintaining user engagement.

Extract 2: Couple meets Nadine: 'A provisional confirmation'

	0 1 . 4 [6]	0 1 . 7 [7]	0 2 . 1 [8]	0 2 . 6 [9]
robot_gaze	*steady slightly to the right in the direction from which the man is approaching*			
robot_gest	lowers its arm and remains sitting upright with arms bent in front of the body, holding them over the computer keyboard on the desk			
man_gaze	*Nadine*			
man_face		smiles		
man_gest			nods	
man_move	walks towards Nadine and finally comes to a halt in front of her table			

Video still [7]

react accordingly. In addition, the hand movement can be interpreted as a 'distance salutation' (Kendon, 1990, p. 159) in the context of the 'pre-beginning' (Schegloff, 1979) of an interaction. In this sense, in terms of MCA, the robot's embodied activities can be interpreted as a social action (i.e., an activity bound to the MCD 'social entities'). Simultaneously, the robot's gesture indicates that the man is treated as belonging to the MCD 'social entity' as well. Otherwise, it would not make sense to provide a distance salutation. Accordingly, Nadine's hand movement can be understood as an offer to enter a social interaction between two entities that belong to the MCD 'social entities', which can engage in social interaction.

However, membership categorization is a sequential process in which membership categories are not merely introduced. They must be maintained and can also be rejected and transformed; this categorization requires confirmation in the next step. As extract 2 demonstrates, this confirmation seems to occur.

As the man's behavior in extract 2 shows, the robot's categorial offer seems to be accepted. After having recognized Nadine [3, extract 1] and established mutual recognition, the man walks toward the robot [6], begins to smile [7], and nods briefly [8]. In performing respective activities, the man, like the robot, not only shows typical predicates of a living being (being able to recognize other entities) but also performs reciprocal actions typical for the beginning of interactions (Schegloff, 1968; Kendon, 1990). In doing so, he indicates both his capability and willingness to engage in interaction and confirms the robot's offer to treat both as belonging to the MCD 'social entities'. Simultaneously, however, the man's smile can, according to the considerations on the ethnomethod of 'minimal sympathy' above (sections 2 and 3), also be interpreted as a test of the social capabilities of the robot to find out how to adequately categorize it. That is, the smile at the given sequential position potentially only indicates a provisional confirmation of the robot's categorization as a social entity, which could be challenged and possibly changed in the following turns.

If the participants subsequently act in accordance with expectable activities of social entities in the context of an interaction opening, they may next exchange 'close salutations' and then enter a focused interaction (*cf.* Kendon, 1990: 191ff). If they do so, they confirm their attributed categorial status. If they act differently, however, the categorization apparatus must adapt to this situation and apply

Extract 3: Couple meets Nadine: 'Examining an exhibit'

	[03.9] [10]	[05.2] [11]	[06.3] [12]	[07.3] [13]
robot_gaze	*unchanged, slightly to the right, but thus also past the man, who is now standing in front of her head-on*			
robot_gest	unchanged			
man_gaze	*small sign on the desk*			*Nadine*
man_face		closes mouth and adopts a neutral facial expression		
woman_gaze			*Nadine*	
woman_move			joins the man from the background and stands very close to his left as seen by him	

Video still [12]

categorizations that might fit better to make sense of what happens next.

As extract 3 reveals, neither a close salutation nor any kind of verbal exchange takes place. That is, the situation does not proceed in accordance with common expectations in the context of a 'normal' interaction opening (Schegloff, 1968; Kendon, 1990). Regarding the robot's activities, it is striking that both gaze and gesture remain unchanged [10]. The robot's movements freeze, so to speak. As a consequence, Nadine no longer looks at the man but past him, as he has moved to the desk in the meantime rather than remain where he was initially perceived. This means that the robot's perception stops, and its/her activities no longer appear to be coordinated with those of the man. The 'freezing' of the activities also means that the impression of liveliness becomes lost. Instead, the robot assumes the attributes of an inanimate object, jeopardizing the previously offered predicate of a living being capable of perception.

In light of the conspicuous 'absent activities' (Stokoe, 2012, p. 281) on the part of the machine, it is not surprising that the man's activities, for their part, are no longer interpretable within the context of an interaction opening. Simultaneously with the freezing of the robot's activities, the man redirects his gaze and looks at the small sign on the desk instead of at the robot. Shortly afterwards, he also stops smiling and closes his mouth [11] before directing his gaze back at the robot—but now with a neutral facial expression [13]. In performing embodied activities, the man—in contrast to the robot—still acts as a 'social entity'. However, he no longer acts as a potential 'interaction partner' of the robot, but rather as an incumbent of the membership category 'museum visitor' who engages in activities typical for the examination of exhibits (Heath and vom Lehn, 2004; vom Lehn, 2006). His activities indicate that he is now attempting to make sense of the exhibit by using additional 'semiotic resources' (Goodwin, 2000), such as by reading the information signs associated with the object and looking closer at the robot, which/who is now observably viewed as a 'watchable' museum object.

In the meantime, a woman enters the scene, looking at the robot as well [12]. By positioning herself very close to the man and thus entering his 'personal space,' she indicates that they belong together and are visiting the museum together.[14] This action changes the

14 Otherwise, she would have kept some distance.

Extract 4: Couple meets Nadine: 'Joint examination of the exhibit'

	[07.9] [14]	[08.1] [15]	[08.7] [16]	[10.4] [17]	[11.8] [18]	[13.7] [19]
Robot_gaze	*unchanged*					
robot_gest	unchanged					
man_talk				((clears his throat))		
man_gaze	*woman*		*small sign on the desk*			
woman_gaze	*Nadine*	*small sign on the desk*				*information board behind Nadine*

Video still [14]

situation, as the arrival of the woman now creates space for interaction between the two humans, and the man is no longer alone with the robot.

The man's gaze in the woman's direction indicates that he recognizes her [14]. By not stepping aside, he confirms that they belong together; she is not invading his personal space but is allowed to enter it. Like the man did before, the woman directs her gaze to the sign on the desk [15] and then to the information board behind Nadine [19]. As the man's gaze follows the woman's gaze to the sign on the desk [16], some kind of synchronization of their activities becomes visible. This behavior confirms that they act together in a typical manner as joint museum visitors, engaging with a watchable museum object and information that is provided about the exhibit (Heath and vom Lehn, 2004; vom Lehn, 2006). Accordingly, in this sequential position, Nadine is no longer categorized as a potential interaction partner but as a watchable museum object. Since the robot itself/herself remains passive and thus displays predicates of an inanimate object [14], this categorization is confirmed in this moment of the encounter.

While examining the exhibit, the man clears his throat [17]. According to Schegloff (1996), this kind of activity can be characterized as a typical 'pre-beginning element', which could project 'the beginning of a (next) TCU or a turn' (Schegloff, 1996, p. 92) but is not yet a proper beginning[15]. This sound might indicate that he starts to provide a turn, which will be directed toward the woman as part of their common museum visit (Heath and vom Lehn, 2004, pp. 49ff). Presumably, he will thematize the robot as a museum exhibit. As the next extract shows, this expectation was partially fulfilled.

First, the woman and the man proceed to visually examine the robot and its/her environment [20–22] and, thus, they continue activities bound to the membership category 'museum visitor'. Then, about 4.5 s after clearing his throat, the man starts a turn, which is directed to the woman. He says quietly to her that he does not know what to ask [23]. In doing so, he talks *about the robot* while also indicating that he is willing to talk *with the robot* but has no clue for how to start. This means that the man is facing a fundamental problem in terms of conversation opening, since 'if there is to be a conversation it must be about something' (Schegloff, 1968, p. 1092). Not knowing what to ask means that he finds himself in a 'completely indeterminate situation' (Vanderstraeten, 2002, p. 84), and, hence, in a 'pure' double contingency (Luhmann, 1995, 103ff) that makes it impossible for him

15 TCU is an abbreviation for 'turn construction unit'.

Extract 5: Couple meets Nadine: 'Don't know what to ask'

	15.0 [20]	15.9 [21]	16.1 [22]	16.4 [23]	17.0 [24]
robot_gaze	*unchanged*				
robot_gest	unchanged				
man_talk				<<quietly to the woman>i don't know what to ask;>	
man_gaze	*small sign on the desk*	*Nadine*			*small sign on the desk*
woman_gaze	*sensor above the robot's head*		*desk*		

Video still [23]

to address a question toward Nadine and enter a focused interaction with the robot.

By disclosing this challenge to his companion, the man observably proceeds to act as an incumbent of the membership category 'museum visitor', who now talks with his companion about the examined exhibit and thereby engages in shared object reception. The content of his utterance, however, suggests that simultaneously, he remains oriented to the possibility of engaging in interaction with the robot but is not able to solve the problem of how to begin this interaction. In this way, the sequence, in which he (together with the woman) examines the exhibit and searches for additional 'semiotic resources' in its surroundings, can be regarded as an insertion that interrupts the opening of a focused interaction with the robot. He seeks clues to a possible topic of conversation between two entities who are 'maximal strangers' (Anton and Schetsche, 2023, p. 12) to each other. Meeting such a maximal stranger means that the man is—at this moment—unable to categorize his counterpart more precisely and develop assumptions about the typical characteristics, activities, or attributes of Nadine that could help him to find a possible common topic. Regarding predicates that he attributes to Nadine, this means that, on the one hand, he assumes the robot, in principle, is capable of understanding and answering questions and hence is a potential interaction partner. On the other hand, however, this potential interaction partner seems so strange that it appears too difficult at this moment to experiment with any kind of question to determine what can happen next.

In the second after the man's utterance, both humans continue to visually examine the robot and its/her environment. Immediately after discovering the microphone in front of the desk [27], the woman steps closer to it and leans over it [28]. In doing so, she indicates that she is now willing to talk to the robot, while the man follows her movements and looks at the microphone after the woman leans over it [29]. She takes over the role of participant in the human–robot encounter and visibly prepares a first verbal utterance, which will be directed toward the robot. In performing these actions, she confirms the categorization of the robot as a possible interaction partner and marks the beginning of the attempt to enter into a focused interaction. This supposition is supported by the fact that the woman also directs her gaze toward Nadine and thus addresses it/her visually [30]. In response, the robot begins moving again for

Extract 6: Couple meets Nadine: 'Woman discovers microphone – Part 1'

	17.4 [25]	17.7 [26]	18.3 [27]	18.5 [28]	19.1 [29]	19.2 [30]	19.4 [31]
robot_gaze	*unchanged*						*woman at the microphone*
robot_gest	unchanged						lowers head slightly
man_gaze	*sign on the desk*	*Nadine*			*microphone*		
woman_gaze	*Nadine*		*microphone*			*Nadine*	
woman_move				takes a step closer to the microphone and leans over it			

Video still [30]

the first time after a period of inactivity. It/she is observed returning the woman's gaze, which once again creates the impression of mutual perception [31]. Consequently, the requirements for beginning a focused interaction appear fulfilled.

The woman assumes the task at which the man previously failed. She asks the robot a question [32]. Then, the woman returns to her previous upright position [35] while smiling at the robot and thus signaling it/her to take the next turn [36]. The woman's initiative is affirmed by the man, who signals his approval with a smile [33].

By asking a question, the woman explicitly confirms the assumption that the ability to interact and respond is a predicate of the robot. However, compared to typical beginnings in ordinary human interactions, her utterance is striking in two respects. First, it is noticeable that the woman refrains from expressing a close salutation, which would be expected as part of the pre-beginning of typical social encounters (Kendon, 1990, 191ff)[16]. Second, the choice of topic is unusual. Under normal circumstances, beginning an interaction with a question about age risks violating the 'face' (Goffman, 1967) of the counterpart and thus would be experienced as a 'face-threatening act' (Brown and Levinson, 1987, 65ff). Even in a conversation with a child, to whom questions about his or her age are in principle legitimate and quite common, such a question would hardly be expected without a preceding salutation and establishment of some kind of mutual relationship. The chosen beginning is thus atypical and violates basic norms of politeness that apply in ordinary conversations. It conveys 'that the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants, etc.' (Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 66).

In line with Krummheuer's (2008) finding that in human–machine encounters, people often tease their artificial interlocutors in order to explore their communicative capabilities, the question can be understood as an application of the 'minimal sympathy' ethnomethod, through which predicates of the robot are being tested[17]. Failing to treat Nadine as an Alter Ego with feelings that can

16 In our data collection, visitors refrained from a salutation in about 40% of the cases. This indicates that greeting a robot is regarded as possible but not obligatory.

17 In our data collection, however, this occurred in less than 20% of the cases. In these cases, Nadine was often asked about her age. Additionally, she was

Extract 7: Couple meets Nadine: 'How old are you'

	19,5 [32]	19,6 [33]	19,8 [34]	20,7 [35]	20,9 [36]
robot_gaze	*woman at the microphone*				
man_gaze			*Nadine*		
man_face		smiles			
woman_talk	<<slowly and clearly>how OLD are you.>				
woman_gaze	*Nadine*				
woman_face					smiles
woman_move				back to upright position	

Video still [36]

Extract 8: Couple meets Nadine: 'I look like being thirty'

	23,4 [37]	23,9 [38]	24,2 [39]	24,7 [40]
robot_talk		I look like thirty, but I was made in the year two thousand and fifteen;		
robot_gaze			*man*	
man_talk	((laughs))			
woman_gest				nods

Video still [39]

Extract 9: Couple meets Nadine: 'You look like fifty'

	30,3 [41]	30,4 [42]	31,3 [43]	32,6 [44]	32,8 [45]
man_talk			honestly, you look like FIFTY.		
man_gaze	*microphone*				*Nadine*
man_move		leans over the micro-phone			

Video still [43]

be hurt, is, in this sense, a test of whether the robot accepts this treatment; thus, the woman's utterance confirms the absence of 'face'. At the same time, however, the woman treats the robot as an entity that can participate in interaction and understand its normative implications. Asking a question makes an answer conditionally relevant (Schegloff, 1968, 1083ff), implicitly expressing the assumption that the addressee is familiar with normative rules of everyday interaction and is capable and willing to act according to these rules.

In a typical interaction between incumbents of the MCD 'social entities', one would expect Nadine to defend its/her moral status and in doing so, to threaten the others' faces (Brown and Levinson, 1987). If she did so, she would resist the membership categorization as an addressable entity without feelings and face, instead insisting on an identity as a social entity with respective predicates. As the next extract shows, this is not the case.

First, the man affirms the proposed categorization of the robot. He is not ashamed or indignant in his reaction but instead laughs after the woman has asked her question [37]. This behavior indicates his agreement with treating the robot as an addressable non-person. Then, Nadine responds without expressing offense [38]. Instead, the response turns out to be humorous, since the robot states that it/she appears to be age 30, although it/she is modeled after computer scientist Nadia Magnenat Thalmann, who was older than 60 at the time of Nadine's development. At the same time, Nadine does not hide its/her robot status, since it/she reveals that it/she was manufactured in 2015. The robot thus presents itself/herself as a technical being that is able to participate in communication and can even show a human—namely humorous—side. Nevertheless, Nadine does not claim to be categorized as a person with feelings—as anticipated by the woman's question. By answering this prompt, the robot reacts in accordance with the normative expectations of everyday conversations, which make an answer to the preceding question conditionally relevant. However, the content of the question is not regarded as a face-threatening act, which means that Nadine is not insisting on having face but rather accepting the way the woman treats it/her. In this way, the robot confirms its/her categorization. This gives the encounter a strong asymmetry. It prompts a categorization of the participants according to which only the woman possesses the category-tied predicate 'face', which needs to be respected. Meanwhile, the robot is lacking face and hence is categorized as a particular kind of 'non-person' that is physically present but lacking personhood (Goffman, 2022 [1953], to indicate that the book originally was written in 1953 p. 84). Therefore, no expectations or demands on the side of the robot must be taken into account.

Nadine's response is acknowledged by the woman, who nods, while Nadine is finishing its/her utterance [40]. Consequently, two membership categories have been established, which can serve as a basis for the subsequent interaction between social persons on the one hand and a robot that can communicate without being a person on the other hand.

In what follows, the man builds upon this established structure and takes the floor to produce his first utterance, which is directed to the robot. With his response—'Honestly, you look like fifty' [43]—he comments on Nadine's preceding answer in a way that—like the woman's earlier question—would be considered a face-threatening act in typical conversations between incumbents of the category 'person'. In giving this response, he confirms the categorization of the robot as an *addressable non-person*. Hence, he contributes to the reproduction of the established membership categories and their predicates.

My analysis ends here, as no significant new insights regarding the categorization of the participants emerge in the further course of the encounter. Humans and robots exchange a few more questions (e.g., about their names, their birthplace, and their favorite films), in the course of which the museum visitors make some remarks that would be considered condescending toward incumbents of the category 'person'. These remarks, however, are again not problematized by the robot, and finally the two visitors leave the scene without saying goodbye.

sometimes insulted or asked for a date.

5 Conclusion

In this single case analysis, it is evident that during the encounter, the robot Nadine is assigned a specific membership category, which I have termed 'addressable non-person' in reference to Goffman (2022[1953])'. This new membership category at the boundaries of the social world, however, must be distinguished from the non-persons Goffman described. He assigned foreign travelers, who did not understand the language of the locals and could therefore be treated as absent despite their physical presence, to this category. However, the robot's situation is different. The humanoid robot Nadine, as a new kind of artifact, understands the language of the 'natives' but is not a human being. As an artificial interaction partner, the robot is ascribed the ability to participate in interaction in a basic and sometimes even creative—namely humorous—way. A typical activity in this context involves answering questions from human conversation partners. It is expected that the robot can understand these questions and answer them appropriately, and it/she does so. Accordingly, the robot is expected to act according to basic norms of interpersonal interaction. Conversely, this response is not obligatory for humans in relation to the robot. They do not have to consider possible emotions or 'face' on the part of the robot. Such qualities are therefore not attributed as predicates of the membership category 'addressable non-person'. That is, Nadine obviously does not possess the same rights—and thus, the category-tied predicates—that are usually accorded to human beings who are treated as persons.

The empirical analysis demonstrates that the advent of new alterities leads to new forms of categorizations that are not absorbed into established subject/object distinctions. In the case studied, the humanoid robot Nadine is categorized neither as a person nor as a stable and passive object in a classical sense. Instead, the robot is assigned characteristics that stem from both worlds. By taking into account theoretical debates on non-human agency (see section 2), it was possible to explore this categorization and demonstrate how the empirical view can contribute to questioning established dichotomies. While partly irreconcilable basic positions and assumptions clash in the theoretical discourse, technology users must address the question of how to interact with non-humans when they encounter social robots and other forms of communicative AI in practice. As the analysis has shown, their 'folk sociology' leads to more diverse results than the specialist sociological debate. The human participants in the encounter do not attempt to fundamentally clarify the robot's identity once and for all. Instead, in each ensuing moment, they have the opportunity to reconsider and reproduce the situation in its constitutive details, and thus to refine the robot's categorization. It is therefore appropriate for sociological theorists to orient their theoretical apparatus, to a greater degree, toward the basic categorization apparatus of the social practice and sharpen it accordingly.

MCA can serve as a productive tool in this endeavor, as it aims to systematically reconstruct this apparatus with precision. In the empirical analysis (section 4), the viability of the 'minimal sympathy' (section 2) ethnomethod became evident as a means of testing characteristics of new alterities and categorizing them adequately. Further research must investigate and incorporate this method further and render it visible as an elementary component of the basic categorization apparatus in all its manifestations. Undoubtedly, this method's relevance will increase as new alterities emerge.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Author contributions

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Conflict of interest

The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Context-sensitivity and context-productivity: notions of "practice" and "practicality" in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis

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The text reconstructs the concepts of practice and practicality used in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis and examines their internal similarities and differences as well as similarities and differences to other practice theories. After a description of the characteristics of practice theories, the ethnomethodological perspective on practice and practicality is presented. Then, the use of the terms in conversation analysis is examined. Ethnomethodology uses the notions of "practice" and "practicality" to outline a non-metaphysical theory of social order in which the sharedness of rules or meanings is not presupposed. "Practical" here means that social action, and social order more generally, are practically grounded as well as temporally and situationally constrained. The fact that practical action is fundamentally situated and can only be understood "from within" establishes an essentially indexical character of practical action. In conversation analysis, "practices" are viewed as "context-free" but "context-sensitive" components that constitute action and as such become the objects of investigation. While some have diagnosed a departure of conversation analysis from its ethnomethodological roots, I argue that "context-freeness" and "context-sensitivity" should be complemented by "context-productivity" by reference to Garfinkel's interpretation of Aron Gurwitsch's gestalt phenomenology in order to formulate a more encompassing concept of practice.

KEYWORDS

social theory, practice theory, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, practice, practicality

Introduction

The noun "practice" and the adjective "practical" are frequently used in theoretical and empirical texts situated within the conceptual framework of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (henceforth CA). However, the terms usually remain theoretically unexplained and their use is inconsistent. Given the ubiquity of the terms within ethnomethodology since the 1960s, ethnomethodology is sometimes counted among the sociological "practice theories" that have experienced a resurgence in the 21st century under new theoretical auspices (see, e.g., some of the chapters in Knorr-Cetina et al., 2001). In these papers, those variants of practice theory that distance themselves from Marx and turn instead to Wittgenstein, pragmatism, and phenomenology as theoretical resources have been seen in

particular as possible cognates of conceptions of "practice" and "practicality" in ethnomethodology and CA (see, e.g., all other chapters in Knorr-Cetina et al., 2001). However, since the use of these terms in ethnomethodology and CA remains mostly unexplained and inconsistent, these texts have a rather programmatic status. In my text, in contrast, I will analyze key publications in ethnomethodology and CA in order to reconstruct salient aspects of the meaning of "practice" and "practicality." In particular, I will suggest a possible reading of the terms in light of recent findings on the influence of Aron Gurwitsch's gestalt phenomenology on Garfinkel, reconciling possible divergences between ethnomethodology and CA.

In what follows, I will first provide some brief introductory observations about the variety of uses of the terms "practice" and "practical" in ethnomethodology and CA (Section I). I will then present key arguments of philosophical and sociological conceptualizations of "practice" (Section II). Section II is necessarily compressed, as these conceptualizations are far too multi-layered and complex for a brief presentation, but it will fulfill its purpose to serve as a historical and systematic foil for the discussion of the specifics of the uses of the terms in ethnomethodology and CA. After that I turn to conceptualizations of practice and practicality in ethnomethodology (Section III) and CA (Section IV). The two sections will give a sense of the concept of practice both in its value for social theory and as an essential object of study.

Some uses of "practice" and "practical" in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis

In his *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, Harold Garfinkel uses the term "practice" and "practical" frequently. In his preface, he says:

> Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e., "accountable," as organizations of commonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of common sense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning (…). Their study is directed to the tasks of (…) discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions, "from within" actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. vii-viii).

In the quote, Garfinkel speaks of the relevance of the intelligibility of activities for practical purposes. He also mentions the practical modality of actions, circumstances and (sociological) thinking and states formal characteristics of practical actions of common sense. Garfinkel speaks not only of the practical modality of different kinds of social phenomena, but also of practices. In his view, however, these are never stable, but are always in a process of ongoing accomplishment:

> Practices consist of an endless, ongoing, contingent accomplishment (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 1).

In his definition of "ethnomethodology," he uses both terms and speaks of both "practices" and the "practical modality" of actions. He explains:

> I use the term "ethnomethodology" to refer to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of organized artful practices of everyday life (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 11).

Together with Harvey Sacks, Garfinkel reflected on the status of practical modality using the example of practices of natural language use, which they defined at the time as "conversation" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). These reflections were part of the development of the theoretical position of the emerging field of CA. A conversation, they say, like any other social phenomenon, has two "formal properties" (hence the title of their text), as it must fulfill two requirements: (1) it must be realized in an orchestrated way through the use of practical procedures and is necessarily embedded in practical circumstances, and (2) it must be in some way recognizable as a conversation (rather than something else) to those who realize it. To capture this dual character, Garfinkel and Sacks have proposed that, for methodological reasons, any sociological description of a social phenomenon (as realized through practical action) be preceded by the prefix "doing." This emphasizes not only the practical accomplishment of a phenomenon, but also its recognizability ("accountability"), which is actively achieved by those involved in its practical accomplishment. In the following quotation, they replace the social phenomenon to be described with the symbol "[]."

> The expression, [], is prefaced with "doing" in order to emphasize that accountable-conversation-as-a-practical-accomplishment consists only and entirely in and of its work (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, pp. 352).

The practical embeddedness of any social activity creates an inescapable "indexicality." A conversation, for example, is situated in, productive of, and sensitive to, the here-and-now of the conversational situation, and any attempt to remove this indexicality results in a new situation with its own indexicalities. As a co-product of the practical realization of the action, the activity must therefore simultaneously be made recognizable by and for the co-participants as an activity of a certain type. In their text, Garfinkel and Sacks assume a "machinery" that constitutes the practices of "doing" and simultaneously lends each practical doing a moment of intersubjective intelligibility and recognizability without, however, carrying an explicit formulation of it.

> What kind of "machinery" makes up the practices of doing [accountably rational conversation]? Are there practices for doing and recognizing [the fact that our activities are accountably rational] without, for example, making a formulation of the setting that the practices are "contexted" in? (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, pp. 355).

From this perspective, practices are seen as an intrinsic feature of the procedural accomplishment of social phenomena as meaningful objects. Due to their dual property of being practical and recognizable at the same time, they are not seen as situated in a stably given external context, but rather as themselves creating the setting, or context, that makes them understandable.

CA has taken the concept of "practice" further in its analytic effort to identify the implicit organization of social phenomena: How are they procedurally accomplished and made recognizable in detail by

and for co-participants? The empirical program of CA, as advanced by Emanuel Schegloff, proceeded to examine the details of all kinds of conversational practices, thus identifying, step by step, individual pieces of the mosaic that might eventually yield a complete picture of human sociality. This complete picture sheds light on how sociality functions as an implicit organization of the social in general. As Schegloff says, a "web of practices" constitutes the infrastructure of social life, and practices, as distinct entities, are the smallest units of investigation. He asks:

> What is this web of practices that serves as the infrastructure of social institutions in the same way that a system of transportation serves as the infrastructure for an economy, that is so transparent that it is opaque, whose omnipresence and centrality make it a-if not the-core root of sociality itself? (Schegloff, 2007, pp. xiii).

Schegloff's research program of studying practices as the smallest units of sociality is prominent in current CA. But does this almost reifying conceptualization represent a fundamental shift in the understanding of "practice" and "practical" from ethnomethodology to CA? This will be discussed in the further course of this text, which begins with a look at the history of the concept of practice.

History and variation of conceptualizations of "practice"

In the first theoretical discussions in Antiquity, the noun "practice" was used to emphasize the central ambiguity of human action that, on the one hand, is based on freedom of choice, but, on the other hand, takes place in concrete situations conditioned by external constraints of the real world-social, temporal and material. Aristotle (2004, pp. 3–4, 104–106) contrasts "practice" by two other modes of action: *theory* and *poiesis*. *Theory* deals with the unchangeable and necessary, while *practice* and *poiesis* shape the changeable and contingent. *Poiesis* is a means to an end that leads to an object distinct from the activity, but *practice* is an end in itself. According to Nussbaum (2001, pp. 302–306), Aristotle claims that human beings respond through practical wisdom to practical situations, which is characterized by three features:

1. Mutability: Practice is historically rooted and not supported by nothing more permanent than the ongoing world of human social practice. Since practices change over time, they are capable of surprise. Therefore, the practical actor must always use reason in improvisational and conjectural ways.
2. Indeterminacy: Practice is complex and contextually diverse. Practices must be applicable to a variety of contexts, and this requires the situationality of appropriate choices. The practical actors are obliged to adapt their choices to the complex requirements of specific situations, taking into account all contextual features.
3. Particularity: In every situation, the practical actor has to deal anew with the occurrence of features that are repeatable in themselves in an infinite number of combinations, but which make the complex overall situation a non-repeatable particularity. Particularity emphasizes the unrepeatability of the situation.

In Aristotle's conception practical wisdom refers to given resources (such as rules) only as rough guides, since the main characteristic of practical wisdom is to be responsive, flexible, ready for surprises, and inventive in improvisation. Central to practical wisdom is the ability to recognize and respond to salient features of a complex situation creatively. This aspect of freedom in praxis is also present in other philosophies such as, prominently, Kant.

Beginning with Hegel, practice was reconceptualized as being carried out in a non-representational, immersionist way. This aspect of an absorbed coping was expanded by Heidegger, who presents the "practical" concern as the original mode of being (Heidegger, 1996, pp. 327). Theory, as *absence* of praxis, is therefore in constant danger of being deficient.[1] In view of Heidegger (1987, pp. 86; translation modified), "praxis does not mean mere activity and actualization; rather, such activity is grounded in the accomplishment of life itself." Therefore, practice is crucial for the living being: the accomplishment of existential stability (Heidegger, 1987, pp. 86–87). Embedded in, and related to, the environment that it co-constitutes, practice takes place within, and constantly shapes, a horizon of looking through and looking ahead (Heidegger, 1987, pp. 87). Heidegger combines the anti-representationalist idea that actors are immersed in their doing, involving body and mind, with the importance of temporality, especially anticipation and continuous adaptation to ever-changing material circumstances. For him, the essential function of practice is stabilization.[2]

Marx applied the notion of practice to society in a more encompassing way, which, he says, emerges in long-term historical processes of aggregated individual practice. In this way, "real, corporeal man" creates "an *objective world* by his practical activity" (Marx and Engels, 1988, 153, pp. 76–77).

The different philosophical approaches have thus understood the practical conditionality of human social life in different ways. Aristotle asserts that the instance mediating between the two poles of freedom and constraint is practical wisdom. Since practice is constantly confronted with mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity, it responds on the basis of situation-sensitive practical wisdom that is informed by individual experience and cannot be captured in universal terms. Hegel and Heidegger advocate an anti-representationalist conception of praxis that assumes only a loose coupling between intentional choices and realized actions. They view practical actors as immersed in their practice. In Heidegger's existential perspective, praxis is seen as the accomplishment of life and as securing its stability. Marx emphasized the historical and social dimensions of practice. For him, humans as species-beings create and recreate a constantly changing objective world through their embodied practical activity. Together with the idea of an only loose coupling of intention and action and the emphasis on temporal and material constraints, the conceptualization of practice as social and permanently reshaping the objective world lays the foundation for

1 As Garfinkel (2002, pp. 264-267) says, (formal sociological) theorizing is therefore in constant danger of "losing its phenomenon" as it moves away from both the observed practices and the practices used to obtain the data.

2 While Heidegger sees practice as stabilizing human existence in general, it can also be understood in an ethnomethodological sense as stabilizing social order and social reality more specifically.

later ideas of indeterminate practical self-organization in the sociological theory of the 20th and 21st centuries. Here, the idea of practice filled a theoretical gap insofar as established sociological theories usually assume that either transcendental structures that lie beyond the horizon of the individual (e.g., Blau, 1977) or universally rational considerations and intentions (e.g., Coleman, 1990) determine social action. In contrast, practice theory claims the primordiality of practice over both structure and intention (e.g., Marx, 1970, pp. 122; Schatzki, 2001, pp. 9), thus avoiding to implicitly presuppose the orders whose emergence they want to describe. Practice theory holds that individuals and their intentions as well as structures and institutions are products rather than causes of practice. From this perspective, there is nothing social "beneath," "above," or "behind" practices: No structure or system assembles or determines practices. What there is in social life takes place exclusively in practices. The resulting question for this non- or post-metaphysical approach is how practices themselves are stabilized so that they do not arise entirely by chance.

The different versions of sociological practice theory that circulate today explain the sources that provide for the continuity of social order differently: In Bourdieu (1990, pp. 53–55), the habitus as a socialized system of dispositions embodied by human actors feeds into practice and serves as a hinge between the past-history objectified in institutions-and the present-social action. In relation to the latter as being both free and constrained, practical logic is anchored in the dialectic of individual action dispositions and instituted means of action. For Bourdieu (1990, pp. 18), practical logic is embodied in "motor schemes and bodily automatisms" of the habituated body as practical sense (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 69). The practical sense serves as durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations and reactivates the sense objectified in institutions. In the model of Bourdieu (1990, pp. 57), the "intentionless invention of regulated improvisation" of practice solves the problem raised by Aristotle that each new situation has unrepeatable particularities.

Giddens (1979) views rules and resources as factors that inform and stabilize practice. When engaging in practices, actors refer, on the one hand, to shared knowledge about rules and conventions. On the other hand, the body and its capabilities serve as resources in which the ways of doing things are stored in the form of "memory traces" (Giddens, 1979, pp. 64). Taken together, they ensure that practices develop into forms of "routine action" that reduce cognitive effort and anxiety, because, as Giddens (1979, pp. 218) says, they are "strongly saturated by the 'taken for granted'." An example of this is ethno-methods, which are latently accepted by the parties "however much they involve a labor of reflexive attention" (Giddens, 1979, pp. 218). The solution of Giddens (1979, pp. 18) for the problem of the non-repeatable particularities of ever-new situations is "rule-governed creativity," which, however, consists in the application of fixed, given rules and "is at the same time the medium whereby those rules are reproduced and hence in principle modified." The reason of Giddens (1979, pp. 57–73) for the relative persistence of the taken-for-granted is that in his view practice is informed by practical consciousness, i.e., tacit knowledge embodied in what actors "know how to do" that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively. Though Giddens (1979, pp. 25) insists that "the *reflexive monitoring of conduct* (…) is central to human activity," he sees the "basic significance of practical consciousness in social reproduction" (Giddens, 1979, pp. 256).

Thus, from both Giddens' and Bourdieu's perspective, unlike Aristotle's, it is not stability and continuity but social change that needs to be explained, since both the habitus and practical consciousness tend to reproduce social structure. Both advocate an anti-representationalist approach to practice that emphasizes its habituated, routine-like, and non-intentional character. Both also downplay the role of intentions in favor of routine practices, thus advocating a notion of socio-practical self-organization.

Other, more recent practice theories present similar types of explanation: In Shove's approach (Shove et al., 2012), persisting sets of materials, meanings, and competences steady the social. For Latour (2005), network-like assemblages of hybrid entities that generate action can be reconstructed in a flat ontology that does not discriminate between reflexive and non-reflexive participants. And in Schatzki (2002), practices are organized by common understandings, teleo-affectivities (ends, tasks, and emotions), and rules. Thus, these new approaches also assume a tacit reproduction of the existing through practices informed by rules and bodies of knowledge, and neglect the relevance of practical wisdom that responds competently and knowledgeably to the inevitable mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity of the new.

These newer conceptions also differ in their estimation about the "size" of practices, whether they refer to larger historical processes, as in Marx, or to small units constituting actions, as in CA. For Schatzki (2002, pp. 245), practices are larger "bundles of doings and sayings," while Nicolini (2013, pp. 2) considers them as "vast arrays or assemblages of performances (…) knotted together in such a way that the result of one performance becomes the resource for another." Society here appears as a kind of perpetuum mobile.

Although practice theories aim to demonstrate the primacy of practice over structure and intention, the approaches discussed here conceptualize rules and embodied knowledge as structural givens that determine practice because they are seen as shared by actors in identical way from the outset. In particular, the questions of where the commonality and identity as well as the recognizability of these different resources and guidelines come from, how they are permanently reproduced, and how they are implemented homogeneously remain open. These are questions that ethnomethodology dealt with from the very beginning.

Concepts of "practice" in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis

As has been shown, Aristotle poses the problem of social order in a radical way. For him, social situations are always new, so that social actors are always confronted with the question of how to act under the given circumstances. From his perspective, experienced actors act with the help of practical wisdom that allows them to deal competently with the mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity of ever-new situations. Practice here means the self-organization and openness to future action. The scholars following this discussion emphasize that practice is an anti-representational mode of activity, and in which the actors are immersed in their actions (e.g., Hegel and Heidegger). In sociology, theories of practice that emphasize the routine character of action (e.g., Giddens) follow on from this: for them, the problem of

the permanent novelty of social situations does not arise; rather, social situations are understood as recurring and repetitive. Other approaches (e.g., Marx and Bourdieu) emphasize the historical growth and tradition of social forms of activity and see their stability and continuity in this. These approaches also emphasize the sharedness and thus recognizability of practical forms as resources for intersubjectivity, social coordination and order. Aristotle's original problem was thus increasingly solved by assumptions about given structural conditions that guide and inform practice. However, ethnomethodology and CA take different position.

Ethnomethodology: the practical character of sociality

Garfinkel's notions of "practice" and the "practical" were influenced by different authors including Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gurwitsch, and Schütz. A surprising early reference of Garfinkel (1956) is to the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbinski,[3] who was influenced not only by Marx, but also by Ludwig von Mises' economic praxeology. Garfinkel had even considered using the term "neo-praxeology" as alternative for "ethnomethodology" (Garfinkel in Hill and Crittenden, 1968, pp. 10). He recommended a text on Kotarbinski, from which the following quote is taken.

> The main task of [Kotarbinski's] praxeology is the search for similarities of successful methods in many different domains of action. For example, the method of delaying an attack is not specific for military strategy or for games. We apply it with success in oral disputes, and in art when a composer puts his most striking effect at the end of his composition as did Beethoven in the Ninth Symphony. To say for example that a scientist improves on his chance of a success by keeping in mind the principle of changing the plan of his work during the course of the work in view of results already obtained is to say a truth. Praxeology does not attempt to teach anything new about these materials. It rather records the methods applied by workers (…). It merely records, systematizes, and analyzes the existing techniques. The practical gain from praxeology is (…) in making explicit the methods already in use. Practical values are different from ethical values (…). There are cases when more than one person is the agent, as when two persons play a four-hand piano piece, or when one person prepares the material to the further work of another person. There are also cases when no single one of the collaborating persons can rightly be considered a perpetrator of the product, e.g., when several persons are pushing a car (Hiz, 1954, pp. 239).

In Kotarbinski's conceptualization, praxeology records and makes explicit successful practical methods applied by practical experts in various fields of action. These practical methods can be performed by individual actors or by more than one person, and even if no individual person can be considered the actor. One practical method Kotarbinski mentions is "delaying." It is used in many different fields, one of which is well-known to scholars in CA: preference organization, where delay occurs when, for example, invitees decline an invitation. Kotarbinski was also interested in popular practical knowledge, as expressed in proverbs and rules of thumb, among which Garfinkel includes practices of "ad hocing" such as "*et cetera*," "let it pass," "unless," or "factum valet" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 20–21).

Other important theoretical dimensions of Garfinkel's concept of practice are known:

1. Natural Attitude: In our "attitude of daily life," as Garfinkel says, echoing the "natural attitude" of Husserl and Schütz, we are interested in getting things done and not in the ontologies of those things or the epistemology of our knowledge about them. The "natural attitude" of everyday life, according to Schütz, is a pragmatic stance oriented toward practical purposes and relevancies, suspending doubt. This includes the assumption that the world is from the outset an intersubjective world, "common to all of us" (Schütz, 1945, pp. 534). In ethnomethodological texts, the term "practical" is used in this sense when speaking of conditions that constrain the realization of actions in everyday situations. Garfinkel (1967, pp. 7) speaks of actors' reflection on these conditions in terms of non-theoretical principles such as "for practical purposes," "in light of this situation," or "given the nature of actual circumstances" that guide practical action. In one of the rare instances in which Garfinkel cites his sources, he refers to Schütz in regard to his notion of practice and the practical (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, 341–342).
2. Temporality: The "aphorism" of ethnomethodology is to not treat social phenomena as objective facts, as "things," like Durkheim, but as practical productions, as achievements, as ongoing accomplishments of the members. Garfinkel (1967, pp. 182) is interested in the details of "the steps whereby the society hides from its members its activities of organization and thus leads them to see its features as determinate and independent objects." Social reality does not exist independently of the practical activities from which it emerges. "Practice" refers to the procedural accomplishment and achievement of situation-specific social particularities of interaction. Each realization of an action represents a selection from other possibilities of action. While social actors are engaged in practice, time moves on incessantly and relentlessly; and they cannot step out of this clockwork: there is "no time out," "no possibility of evasion," and "no hiding" (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 118). The time a member has to weigh up different alternatives is limited and usually extremely short (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 118). The actors and their situational perspective experience a constant pressure to make choices in regard to further actions. Garfinkel (1967, pp. 12) calls this problem "the practical question *par excellence*: 'What to do next?'" Although no references to Aristotle are made, his treatment of practice resonates in Garfinkel's words, especially the ideas of openness to the future (indeterminacy) and constant change (mutability). Garfinkel (1967, pp. 11–18) is also interested in understanding how actors make choices in the here-and-now of their practical situation.

3 There is a manuscript of 225 pages on Kotarbinski and 'practical' actions by Garfinkel in the Garfinkel Archive in Newburyport that still awaits evaluation.

3. Within-ness and indexicality: Garfinkel was dissatisfied with contemporary approaches to rationality (e.g., from the emerging rational choice theories) that defined criteria of rational action as absolute and universal and not, as Garfinkel intended, from *within* the situation and the perspective of the actors. Since actors are inevitably part of their situation and act from within it, Garfinkel called them "members." Members of a society have an interpretative competence that enables them to practically reason about the particularities of their situation as a practical basis for their decisions. People in everyday life act as "practical methodologists" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 180) who solve decision-making issues with the help of everyday knowledge and "practical reasoning" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 11–31). This idea resonates with Aristotle's concept of practical wisdom. Because they are situated in a specific here-and-now, practical activities are *indexical*: They refer to, and thus constitute as relevant, contextual elements of the particular situation (think of Aristotle's notion of particularity). Indexical elements have a practical *in situ* meaning and rationality.
4. Accountability: Since nothing external determines the practical situation of here-and-now such as causal forces or an external context, Garfinkel argues that external variables are only relevant for the situation when members "discover" them in their situation and make them relevant and accountable. When members do something, they, identically with, and simultaneously to, their doing, produce, evoke and thus accomplish the contexts and "practical circumstances" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 172–185) that make their doing understandable. Thereby, "phenomena of order [that appear external and objective] are identical with procedures for their endogenous production and accountability," he says (2002, 72). This implies that natural language is intrinsically embedded in practical action; the latter is never an outer addition to an otherwise silent, or tacit phenomenon. Instead, when we accomplish recursive activities such as repairs, glossings, or formulations, they occur *within* the temporal process and *within* the situational indexicalities and evoked contexts. In practice, things explain themselves practically.

As we see, Garfinkel's concept of practice differs from the sociological theories of practice mentioned above in several respects. On the one hand, Garfinkel rejects the idea of an anti-representationalist immersion in practice, but also does not commit himself to intentionalist notions of always rational choice, as advocated in rational choice programs or in Schütz's egology. Accordingly, neither theories of routine (Giddens) nor of action projection, controlled by the ego (Schütz), are capable of explanation for him. Rather, Garfinkel maintains the Aristotelian thought of praxis as field of freedom that is conditioned by social, material, and temporal constraints, but which cannot be explained by universally valid rules. According to Garfinkel, universal rules cannot explain practical action, as they cannot anticipate and regulate their application under all conceivable conditions. They therefore present the actors with the constant problem of interpreting the concrete situation of rule application in terms of which possible rules apply to them and how these are to be applied. The application of the rule itself cannot be part of the set of rules, as this would lead to an infinite regress. Rule following is therefore always provisional and constantly adaptable and changeable. In most cases, rules are only "discovered" after action has been taken, when they need to be explained and justified, for example in the event of disruptions. In his interpretation of rule following, Garfinkel is close to Wittgenstein. It also becomes clear why he had sympathies for Kotarbinski.

By practice, Garfinkel particularly addresses the ongoing accomplishment, indexical here-and-nowness, and situational contingency of human action, as did Aristotle. He also doubts that the assumption of other shared resources (especially knowledge) can explain the social character and intersubjective validity of practice. Rather, his attempt is to also theorize the sharedness of resources praxeologically, i.e., as an effect not a cause of practices. Like Marx and Bourdieu, Garfinkel abandons entirely the idea that practices principally originate in individuals. But if practice is fundamental even to the sharedness of resources, and social actors as individuals or groups or as members of collectives or cultures are also theorized as produced by practices (*cf.* Lynch, 2012), then the question arises what it is that stabilizes and continues the social.

The problem of connecting the primordiality of practice with the *a priori* of intersubjectivity can be understood by referring to the gestalt phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch, which had an enormous influence on Garfinkel (2002, 2007, 2021). Especially in his texts published in the 2000s, Garfinkel repeatedly used cryptic phrases about the practical accomplishment of social activities. Social activities, he says, are "composed endogenously, in-and-as-of-their-lived-temporal-in-course sequentiality" and achieved in "'strings' of coherent contextural constituents of lived orderlinesses in practices of ordinary society" (Garfinkel, 2007, pp. 42). Expressions like these become understandable only in the light of Gurwitsch's Gestalt phenomenology. For Gurwitsch, people are absorbed in constant configurations and reconfigurations of situations that they at the same time perceive and co-produce. In this perspective, practice originates in situations that provide affordances and opportunities for members to participate while these members themselves produce these situations. This is the essential departure from an individualistic perspective of practice, which nevertheless recognizes the mutability, indeterminacy and particularity of practice in the sense of "self-organization" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 33).

The background to this conception is that Gurwitsch, in contrast to Schütz, advocates a "non-egological conception of consciousness." He claims that the recognition of perceptual objects is not actively controlled and rationally penetrated by the ego, but is stimulated by the phenomenon as it appears to consciousness. Gurwitsch illustrates this idea with reversible figures such as the Necker cube (Figure 1).



FIGURE 1
Necker cube.

Gurwitsch notes that this figure defies our voluntary focus of attention. When we actively try to see, for example, the bottom left corner of the cube as the back or front, we are often disappointed because we cannot fully control our perception. Only rarely do these figures appear as an active achievement of our voluntary mental perceptual action. Much more frequently, they change their configuration without our intention and will. The coherence of the perceptual elements as parts of a coherent whole is not actively organized by us as perceivers. This is why Gurwitsch calls their organization *autochthonous*: Perception is self-organizing. Gurwitsch emphasizes the autonomy and self-regulation of meaning structures and meaning processes as they appear to consciousness in general (*cf.* Meyer, 2022).

Rather than using Gurwitsch's term "autochthonous" to refer to the property of perceptual qualities being independent of the perceiving ego and their relevancies, Garfinkel uses the term "endogenous" (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 176). In contrast to the anti-representationalist immersionism of some of the theorists presented above, Gurwitsch and Garfinkel emphasize conscious action and perception, which they consider to bei neither routine nor completely under the control of the ego.

In Gurwitsch's theory, gestalt contexture encompasses three parts, metaphorized by a circle, two of which are interesting for us here: The theme occupies the center of this circle, it stands in the thematic-field, which forms the area of the circle. The *theme* is organized by "a group of data" (Gurwitsch, 2010b, pp. 29), creating an internal *gestalt coherence*, in which each component is related to all other components and has a "functional significance" for the whole. Below is a typical figure that Gurwitsch uses to illustrate his ideas on gestalt perception:

FIGURE 2
Three pairs of dots.

A pair of dots that are in a reciprocal relationship of left or right, above or below, far or near (Figure 2).

We see three pairs of dots arranged at different distances from one another. The pair at the top right is the closest, the pair at the top left is the furthest apart. Gurwitsch says, "the indexical terms 'neighborhood,' 'relative proximity,' 'moderate proximity,' 'immediate surroundings,' 'wider surroundings,' 'close by,' 'next to,' and others designate phenomenological qualities and not distances in a merely quantitative sense" (Gurwitsch, 2010a, pp. 218–219) (Figure 3).

Each of the pairs has a left and a right member. However, the left member is only to the left within the constellation of the pair itself, not in absolute terms. Similarly, the right member is only to the right of the left pair member of the pair. If we were to add a dot to one of these pairs, e.g., to the left, the dot that is currently to the left would become a middle dot of a triple, and the whole gestalt would re-configure itself. It is no coincidence that Garfinkel uses the term member in this double sense-even members of society can be seen as members of ever-changing gestalt contextures that only have meaning as wholes and whose members only have meaning relative to the gestalt whole and to other members.

According to Gurwitsch, it is therefore an indexing structure, in which the individual dots do not possess an intrinsic, but a context-dependent, functional significance. They produce a positional index that only applies to the internal gestalt structure of the pair. It has an indexical structure "from within." It is the internal *constellation*, the gestalt contexture that creates meaning, not the aggregation of individual elements that are meaningful in themselves. Philosophically, both Gurwitsch and Garfinkel (together with Wittgenstein and others) advocate a radical semantic holism. Each dot simultaneously "incarnates" and "reflects" its role within the gestalt (here: the pair) (*cf.* Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 1). The adoption of semantic holism involves the "abandonment of the constancy hypothesis" (Garfinkel, 2021, pp. 20), which assumes stable functional significances and meanings of elements of gestalt contextures as well as variables of social situations (e.g., members, procedures, resources, and rules), conceptualizing them instead as entirely contextually determined.

We have said that the individual dots do not have an intrinsic meaning, but a context-dependent, functional meaning. However, the context on which the functional meaning of each individual dot depends-the pair-is not external to the individual dots, but is generated by these dots themselves (Gurwitsch, 2010b, pp. 331). Details, totality, and context thus constitute one another. Since details



FIGURE 3
Three pairs of dots explained.

are context constituting, context cannot be viewed as external container. The context that only acquires unity through its *relevancy* for the theme is called *thematic field* by Gurwitsch.

According to Gurwitsch, each element has a "positional index" that establishes a particular thematic field as its context that makes it understandable. Garfinkel (2021, pp. 25) re-terms "functional significance" as "organizational" or "figurative details." These details, according to Garfinkel (1967, pp. 40), mutually point to, and elaborate, one another, creating the "essential indexicality" (e.g., Garfinkel, 2007, pp. 43ff) of such phenomena.

However, Gurwitsch did not only develop his theory of "gestalt contexture" using the example of visual forms, but also situated it in time. His example is music, in which we can observe a dynamic, ever-changing gestalt contexture that reconstitutes in our experience each moment anew. As with the examples of dots, its individual sense-data do not have stable core meanings, but interact with their immediate, self-generated context. This context is sequential, and tones are parts of melodies that form a whole. When the context changes, the meaning of the individual sense-data also changes. This means that we can only participate in a meaningful practice *from within*.

Although Gurwitsch's model is not itself practice-theoretical, it emphasizes the temporal process of ongoing interaction between perception and perceived objects. It shows how phenomena self-organize sequentially in time by indexing and appresenting absent or imminent elements that complete the perception. Objects of perception are therefore meaningful from within, because they constantly self-constitute and self-supplement based on past experiences.

Garfinkel transferred this line of thought to the social sphere, which cannot be viewed from the outside like Gurwitsch's gestalt contextures. Rather, both sociologists and laypeople, are members of these gestalt contextures in a double sense: they are active participants and constitutive parts. Garfinkel and Livingston (2003, pp. 26) agree that in social life "contexturally coherent Things are massively prevalent, recurrent, each in coherent witnessed details that are seen but unnoticed." In the realm of the social, contexturally coherent things are far more complex than in the gestalt experiments on which Gurwitsch relied. For in the case of social phenomena, the "produced coherence of organizational objects" (Garfinkel, 2021, pp. 30) is *interactionally* and *practically* "achieved." The objects of sociology are constituted through constantly changing "actions and practices" (Garfinkel, 2021, pp. 21). The most important feature of social objects is therefore that they are not only perceived, but also, and often simultaneously, produced. Moreover, they are produced in interaction to be witnessable, observable-reportable, practically and in an embodied, "incarnate" and "reflexive" manner (Garfinkel, 1967, pp.1), which Garfinkel famously called "accountable." For the "gestalt contextures" in the realm of the social, this implies that they are necessarily dynamic, temporal, and unfolding, and therefore always transient and mutable, they can never be returned to Garfinkel (2021, pp. 26–27).

As initially quoted, Garfinkel (1967, pp. vii-viii) argues that social activities are reflexively accomplished within a field consisting of practical actions, practical circumstances, common sense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning. Since members are constantly engaged in practical reasoning, the gestalt contextures they perceive are organized not only in temporal sequences but also in hermeneutic cycles or documentary manner. This is the case when, as Garfinkel (1967, pp. 78) puts it,

> "an actual appearance" is treated "as 'the document of', as 'pointing to,' as 'standing on behalf of' a presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, but also the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other."

Or, to put in Gurwitsch's words: There is a constant switching between themes and thematic fields, since themes indexically refer to thematic fields as their contexts, and thematic fields refer to themes as their typical details. Since gestalt contextures operate in time, they appresent possible, expectable nexts. Each of these indexical references are essentially *haecceitic*, i.e., unique and specific, says Garfinkel (2002). For the concept of practice, this implies that through a systematic perspective on social phenomena "from within" these haecceitic indexicalities must be recognized as particularities (see Meyer, 2022, pp. 133–138).

Garfinkel has shown in various case studies of staff at a Suicide Prevention Center, staff using files from psychiatric hospitals, graduate student coding psychiatric records, jurors in court, a transgender person managing gender reassignment surgery, and professional sociological researchers, that they are all constantly engaged in "practical sociological reasoning" as members. Practical sociological reasoning means that when dealing with everyday sociological matters (such as determining guilt or suicide), choices and selections are made by relying on commonsense knowledge of social structure as thematic field, while the members' "concerns are for what is decidable 'for practical purposes,' 'in light of this situation,' 'given the nature of actual circumstances'" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 7), thus specifying the details of the theme. This is also where Kotarbinski's practical knowledge, as expressed in proverbs and rules of thumb, comes into play. Practical reasoning therefore involves reasoning about the general properties of indexical expressions and other practical actions and their respective uses in the here-and-now (1967: 4, 11). It can be understood as Aristotle's practical wisdom in action.

Together with "practical action" and "practical circumstances," "practical reasoning" is part of a "triangle" of practical activities with which Garfinkel answers the question of how social order is practically accomplished and how stability and rationality are maintained, although their accomplishment remains undetermined by external variables.

Practical circumstances refer to "organizationally important and serious matters" such as constraints, resources, goals, excuses, opportunities, or tasks. They relate to the "texture of relevances" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 174), the thematic field as it exists in the situation. As Garfinkel has shown, the transgender person Agnes has learned to manipulate the practical circumstances so that she as part of them appears as naturally female, thus exploiting the "préjugé du monde" that circumstances are external, objective structures. This is because, as Garfinkel (1967, pp. 8) says using the example of the staff of the Suicide Prevention Center he studied, members are interested in assuring "the unequivocal recognition of 'what really happened'." They are "'not interested' in studying practical actions and practical sociological reasoning" as a topic. Rather, "members take for granted that a member must at the outset 'know' the settings in which he is to

operate" if his (or her) practices are to address the particular features of these settings. They do not take into account the fact that their practices are constituent features of the circumstances they are part of.

As a result, their findings are only seemingly discovered, while they have in fact practically constituted their discoverability in the first place (1967, pp. 9). This is why Garfinkel (1967, pp. 115) concludes in his study on jurors "persons, *in the course of a career of actions,* discover the nature of the situations in which they are acting, and (.) the actor's own actions are first order determinants of the sense that situations have, in which, literally speaking, actors *find* themselves" (orig. emph.). Practical reasoning can therefore be understood as a procedure of discovery "from within" the indexical situation. Accordingly, any presupposed consensus (belief, norm, value, and rule) of a particular moment can be "retrospectively reread to find out in light of present practical circumstances" what it "'really' consisted of 'in the first place' and 'all along'" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 74).

As for their function for society, Garfinkel (1967, pp. 182) considers practices as methods "whereby the society hides from its members its activities of organization and thus leads them to see its features as determinate and independent objects." In other words, practices usually remain implicit, because they thereby maintain the "préjugé du monde" of their members that society and its instances (conversations, institutions, and institutional orders) are external, objective and "immortal" (Garfinkel, 2002). This paradoxical situation, in which actors actually practically accomplish the phenomena of order that they, in their natural attitude, experience as external and objective, is the reason why Garfinkel speaks of the "discovery" of these phenomena of order:

> "Persons, *in the course of a career of actions,* discover the nature of the situations in which they are acting, and (.) the actor's own actions are first order determinants of the sense that situations have, in which, literally speaking, actors *find* themselves" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 115, orig. emph.).

It is thus in the nature of practices that they discover what they themselves produce as orienting circumstances.

Gurwitsch has posited the same concept of discoverability against anti-representationalist and routine-related conceptions of practice in relation to material objects. He says that "practical reckoning" and our "specific practical experience" must be distinguished from routine and habituation, because new situations can only be mastered on their basis (Gurwitsch, 1977, pp. 65). In practical action, he says (Gurwitsch, 1977, pp. 79), I constantly look at and find manifold references in my environment. "I thus 'discover' them while placing myself at their disposal and following them." Thus, "when I gear into the situation and comport myself according to the ways prescribed by it, the indexical contexture and situation become visible" to me (Gurwitsch, 1977, pp. 79). Through my actions, the surrounding world, as indexical contexture, is indicated as discoverable (Gurwitsch, 1977, pp. 73). Therefore, according to Gurwitsch, all "'seeing', 'perceiving', 'noticing', 'knowing'" are "in service of 'being in the situation'" and "are themselves but moments of it" (Gurwitsch, 1977, pp. 85).

In contrast to practice theories that base their argumentation on strong notions of routine and non-representationalist immersion in the situation, Garfinkel emphasizes the importance of the aspect of freedom by including concepts of situation-sensitivity as well as creativity ("artfulness") with this triangle of "practical action," "practical reasoning," and "practical circumstances." This comes close to Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom. For Garfinkel does not abandon the idea of the reflecting actor in favor of practical immersion and absorption, but connects rational action to haecceitic situational affordances and reasons. To put it with Heritage (1988, pp. 128): "Garfinkel concluded that shared methods of reasoning generate continuously updated implicit understandings of what is happening in social contexts-a 'running index', as it were, of what is happening in a social event." However, Garfinkel never saw the sharedness of resources as solution to the question of the "how" of practices and social order. In his view, the sharedness of the methods is rather a result of the practical accomplishment of the social, and a constant problem to be tried out, examined, reflected upon and discovered by members who only emerge relative to other members and to the whole.

Ambiguous meanings of "practice" in conversation analysis

In ethnomethodology, the term "practice" serves to conceptualize the social in a non-deterministic way: as an ongoing accomplishment of social objects, which is characterized by situational contingency and an indexical here-and-nowness. In this process, variables or semantic details are seen not as stably shared, but as fluid and constantly reorganizing over time. They include all relevant factors present in the social situation: Members, procedures, resources, and rules.

Conversation analysis relies heavily on this orientation and is interested in how social phenomena-such as "a conversation"-despite their mutability, indeterminacy and particularity, can be organized *in situ* by the participants and at the same time made recognizable to them, and this in the course of the action itself, in which this organization rarely becomes thematic, but remains implicit. The aim is to explain this without recourse to variables such as structural determination, routine or rational decision. However, as I will argue, by adopting theoretical concepts that presuppose stable variables (specifically a context-free apparatus that encompasses rules and resources) CA also departs from ethnomethodology and develops an inconsistent concept of practice.

For example, Schegloff says on the one hand, that "sequence organization" is a "practice, rather than [a] fixed structure" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 201) and that sequences themselves must be seen as practices (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 231–250). From this perspective, conversations do not consist in the expression of intentions or desires, but in "sequential practices and structurings of an interactional project" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 63). In this usage, practice appears in an ethnomethodological sense as organizational principle and essential character of human interaction and social life in general.

On the other hand, however, Schegloff (2007, pp. 71) says in the same text-to quote some of his formulations-that sequences, such as adjacency pairs, are "built," "implemented" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 81) or "produced" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 162) by "diverse practices" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 161) that stem from a "range of practices on which (…) speakers may draw" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 164). His idea is that there is an "underlying range of orderly structures and a set of practices for suiting those structures to the particulars of the moment in which the participants are acting" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 220), and that furthermore a "range of practices and resources [is] brought to

bear in [interactional] trajectories," occasioned by specific interactional developments (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 193). Practices use and rely on "structural and normative resources" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 203), of which sequences are one. Thus, for Schegloff (2007, pp. 220), "sequence structure (…) has considerable scope and robustness." It "should be understood as an organizational resource-a kind of convergently oriented-to set of possible routes-which the participants draw on in charting and incrementally building a joint course of action" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 220). This is achieved through the use of individually definable practices. Practices are understood here as distinctive means of production, implementation tools or building blocks that are used for the specific design of otherwise generally robust sequential structures. In this perspective, practices seem to have a relatively stable identity as individual entities, and sequences a relatively stable ("robust") structure.

Thus, while in some places Schegloff (2007) understands sequences themselves as practice or ongoing practical accomplishment, in other places practices are seen as individually selected and clearly definable entities that construct and at the same time draw on sequences as relatively robust underlying structures, which appear external to them. It is this second conceptual orientation that visibly deviates from the previously identified ethnomethodological view of practices. In my view, this inconsistent meaning of the term "practice", which-as I will show below-is widespread in CA, can be interpreted partly as a consequence of theoretical decisions made in the most cited text of CA authored by Sacks et al. (1974) (henceforth: SSJ). In this text, the authors argue that conversation can best be explained by assuming a "formal apparatus" that consists of "context-free resources," a "context-free structure" or a "context-free organization" and their "context-sensitive" application (1974, pp. 699, 699 n. 8). With this model, the authors hope to explain why "conversation can accommodate" such a "wide range of situations" as it does empirically, why "it can be sensitive to the various combinations" and why it is even "capable of dealing with a change of situation within a situation" (SSJ, pp. 699). As their wording indicates, the authors were inspired by, but also reframed, Chomsky's (1965, pp. 17, 63 et seq) notion of "transformational apparatus" as well as "context-free" and "context-sensitive" grammars: Unlike Chomsky they do not see "context-free" and "context-sensitive" as mutually exclusive, but as related, and their formal apparatus is not cognitive but social-procedural. The idea of a formal apparatus, at least for Sacks,[4] also solves what Chomsky (1986, 51–204) has called "Plato's problem": Why is it that

> "members of the culture, encountering from their infancy a very small portion of it, and a random portion in a way (the parents they happen to have, the experiences they happen to have, the vocabulary that happens to be thrown at them in whatever utterances they happen to encounter), would come out in many ways much like everybody else and able to deal with just about anyone else. (…) Tap into whomsoever, wheresoever, and we get much the same things" (Sacks, 1984, pp. 22).

Sacks' answer is that "culture is an apparatus for generating recognizable actions; [and] the same procedures are used for generating as for detecting" (Sacks, 1995, pp. 226).

Sacks here follows Garfinkel's famous "identity theorem": Practices that constitute meaning and practices that interpret meaning are identical (Garfinkel, 2002, pp. 72). However, as we have seen above, the idea that the formal apparatus necessarily needs to encompass a context-free core, is not supported by Garfinkel (1967, pp. 40), who thinks that contexts and their details mutually elaborate one another and that practices, therefore, are "context-producing." Just as there are no practice-free contexts (since contexts are produced by practices), there are also no context-free practices (since the meaning of practices is produced by contexts that are produced by practices).

SSJ focus on turn-taking as example of the implicit constitution of social order in the course of the social activity itself, which is accomplished through the sequential concatenation of practices that implicitly shape social life. Although there are no predetermined structure and no explicit rules of everyday conversations with regard to the choice of topic and the change of speaker, and no one knows in advance what each of the interlocutors will say, how long they will speak or who will speak next, the participants nevertheless create a comprehensible development of topics and an orderly and recognizable sequencing of the conversation through, in the course of, and identical with, their actions. In order for this to be achievable, SSJ claim that "major aspects" of its organization, "are insensitive to such parameters of context [as places, times, and identities], and are, in that sense, 'context-free'" (SSJ, pp. 699 n. 8). However, they also point out that the apparatus must be "sensitive to" the local circumstances and "exhibit its sensitivity" to them (SSJ, pp. 699). The context-free resources are "employed" or "disposed in ways fitted to particulars of context." But the context-free structure defines "how and where context-sensitivity can be displayed" and "the particularities of context are exhibited in systematically organized ways and places" that are also "shaped by the context-free organization" (SSJ, 699 n. 8). This position is close to the second meaning of "practice" in Schegloff (2007), as analyzed above. Context here appears precisely as an external container, independent from the particular practices that are assumed to occur *within* it.

Not long before the publication of SSJ's argument, Garfinkel and Sacks (1970, pp. 355) had developed a different argument that is more akin to the first meaning of "practice" present in Schegloff (2007), as analyzed above. Here, an "action" is an "accomplishment" or "work" that is achieved as assemblage of practices (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, pp. 342). In their text, Garfinkel and Sacks also discuss the distinction between context-sensitive and context-free expressions in conversation. They argue that in science there is often an attempt to replace context-dependent, "indexical" expressions, which can only be understood from the immediate circumstances, with objective expressions whose meaning is supposedly

4 Although Harvey Sacks, who worked with Garfinkel for many years, was a prominent figure in the development of CA, I will not deal with his specific line of thought here in entirety. The reason for this is that Sacks only openly used the concept of practice in collaboration with Garfinkel, but not in the context of the emerging CA. Although some of his theoretical concepts could possibly be characterized as practice theoretical, for example the notion of "machinery" (*cf.* Meyer, 2018, pp. 68–69), his approach has also been portrayed as inspired by structuralist ideas (Schegloff, 1992, pp. xxi, xxxvi) or even as "primitive natural science" (Lynch and Bogen, 1994). Since Sacks rarely uses the terms "practice" or "practical," it would require a larger hermeneutic exercise of characterizing Sacks as practice theoretical or not than is possible here. In general, as Schegloff (1992, pp. xi) emphasizes, Sacks was more interested in larger orders of conversational organization, than in particular practices, and in organizationally characterized forms of interactional work, than in individual outcomes.

context-free. However, this leads to an endless regress, because all expressions depend on an order that binds them to the situation of their use (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, pp. 360–361). Often, however, social actors are themselves engaged in decoupling expressions from the immediate circumstances and generalizing them, e.g., when they produce "formulations" or "glossings." Instead of assuming a hidden apparatus that is only accessible to researchers, they propose to use these actor concepts empirically to determine what members themselves (situation-specifically) consider context-free. Their approach thus represents a significant difference to the SSJ model of 4 years later.

The fact that "practice" is used simultaneously for the context-free resources as entities and for the idea of the ongoing accomplishment, particularity and contingency of all resources has led to an undecided position of CA in regard to this term as visible in Schegloff (2007).

The first explicit use of the concept of "a practice" as an entity probably comes from Schegloff (1972). Schegloff's (1972, 115) outline still echoes the ethnomethodological approach, when he proposes a talk-intrinsic sense of context saying that the "*participants* analyze context and use the product of their analysis in producing their interaction." However, he also reifies the notion of practice, saying that the production of "a world of specific scenes," i.e., social reality, is achieved and exhibited through "a set of general formal practices" (Schegloff, 1972, pp. 117). Practices "accomplish and exhibit the particularities of an interaction (…) through general, formal structures" (Schegloff, 1972, pp. 115). These "general, formal structures" form the context-free core of practices and are used to represent the context of the interaction as understood by the co-participants (Schegloff, 1972, pp. 115). From this perspective, he asks programmatically for CA in general (Schegloff, 1972, pp. 115–116): What are the practices that allow conversation "to operate within very tight constraints" *in situ*, while themselves being "the outcome of a general practice and part of a general structure"? What conversational practices are "subject to similar usage," what are their "kinds of organization," and how are they "fitted to one another"?

On the one hand, CA insists that interaction partners accomplish social reality practically by continuously observing each other's actions and utterances in terms of "why that now?" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 245) and thus adheres to the principle of practical reasoning. On the other hand, CA is particularly interested in the *general* resources with which the actors constitute their actions. In this relation, Schegloff's "set of general formal practices" is available to the actors as context-free resources and thus as stable units. Theoretically, the assumption of an intrinsic meaning of stable core units is in line with the position of semantic atomism as advanced by Katz and Fodor (1963) following Chomsky in the 1960s. Garfinkel in contrast, advocates a radical semantic holism following Gurwitsch and Wittgenstein that claims the essential indexicality, situatedness, and haecceity of meaning and rejects ideas of context-free core meanings, defining stability as achieved stability.

More recently, Heritage and Stivers (2013, pp. 665) define a practice in the atomistic, reifying way as an empirical token that "(a) has a distinctive character, (b) has a specific location within a turn or sequence, and (c) is distinctive in its consequences for the nature or meaning of the action in which it is implemented" (drawing on Heritage, 2011, pp. 212). Practices are viewed as units that are positively identifiable and distinguishable-much like distinctive features as opposed to meaningful constituents in linguistics. Such units are sequentially placed in a particular location and adopt a specific role for the "nature or meaning" (Heritage and Stivers, 2013, pp. 665) or "function or meaning" (Sidnell, 2013, pp. 94) of the action they constitute. Comparably, for Schegloff (1993, pp. 121), practices are embodied in elements of conduct that ordinarily derive their "sense and import" for social action from their position and composition in the interactional event. For all three authors, practices have (or contribute to) a "meaning" (or sense) as well as a nature, function and import.

Turn-taking, for example, includes "core practices through which actions are designed, sequences are organized, and activities are accomplished in interaction" (Heritage, 1999, pp. 69). The interest of CA is to identify individual practices as units and their functions as well as sets of practices (Kitzinger, 2013, pp. 229). Because they are organized as interconnected totalities, sets of practice can accomplish institutional contexts that influence how particular interactional practices are understood by the actors (Mandelbaum, 2013, pp. 506). The reification of practices as independent units is a central difference between ethnomethodology and CA. This results in a further difference, which is that in CA texts it remains unclear who is considered to be the bearer of practices: individuals who insert practices as units into sequences and thus form utterances, or groups who share and understand them? Or are individuals and groups possibly produced by practices in the first place? While Garfinkel's position is the latter, the CA literature is less clear in this regard.

Another theoretical consequence of the idea that practices are individual entities with an intrinsic meaning is that the scale of practices becomes relevant. Heritage and Stivers (2013, pp. 665) say that in constituting recognizable social actions, practices can operate at different levels ranging from prosody to word choice to turn organization and action construction. Larger and smaller practices are assumed, with the former sometimes encompassing the latter.

Therefore, Schegloff (as reported by Heritage, 1995, pp. 394, n.8, and Mandelbaum, 1990/1991, pp. 347) proposes a distinction between "practices of" and "practices in" ordinary conversation. "Practices of" conversation refer to the underlying organizational properties of social activities, i.e., the "mechanical features of talk" (Mandelbaum, 1990/1991, pp. 347) and the constitutive functions of practices. "Practices in" conversation, in comparison, refer to the activities, which participants perform in and through these mechanical features and for, with or on each other. "Most of these [latter] activities are vernacularly nameable-for example, questioning, complaining, challenging etc.-but not exclusively so. The term can also be employed characterize such activities as referring, listing or inviting recognition" (Heritage, 1995, pp. 394, n.8).

Comparably, Robinson (2007, pp. 68, n.2) distinguishes *practices* and *practices of action*. According to Sidnell's interpretation, practices can constitute not only actions, but also practices of action, which are larger activities, but do not themselves yet belong to everyday action categories: "the former are conceptualized as constituting the latter. So, for instance, practices of turn design (i.e., interrogative format), lexical choice, intonation and gaze direction can all be combined in a single turn (…), in a context-sensitive way, to bring off the practice of action of selecting a next speaker" (Sidnell, 2013, pp. 98, n.2).

CA has reached an enormous level of granularity, identifying components that escape the attention of co-interactants because they are ephemeral and remain unnoticed. Some of the constitutive tasks of practices and building blocks of action can now only be named in specialized language that describes their function for the overall conversational organization (e.g., "other-initiated repair,"

"projectability of turn-completion," and "transitional overlap"), while others are still recognizable in members' terms ("telling a joke," "complaining," and "interrupting"). The path from the meaning of practices to their function is sometimes short.

An interest in these "seen but unnoticed" (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 36) background features of sociality is one of the motivations for using the concept of practice in CA. This interest is double-edged as, on the one hand, from the ethnomethodological perspective, it cannot be assumed that these background features are familiar for everybody. Rather, they are procedurally accomplished and thus respond to change, difference and disruption within the action itself. On the other hand, as Heritage and Stivers (2013, pp. 665) say, "the concept of practice describes characteristics of action that are independent of participants' individual, personal or psychological characteristics." CA understands practices as general or, as Maynard (2013, pp. 27) puts it, "generic and universal." In recent years, CA increasingly used this type of universalist, anthropological language. Schegloff (2006, pp. 71), for example, declares a universal social "infrastructure" consisting of "half a dozen generic organizations of practice." The reason of its existence is that "the organization of interaction needs to be-and is-robust enough, flexible enough, and sufficiently self-maintaining to sustain social order at family dinners and in coal mining pits, around the surgical operating table and on skid row, in New York City and Montenegro and Rossel Island, and so forth, in every nook and cranny where human life is to be found" (Schegloff, 2006, pp. 71). Sidnell (2007, pp. 241) explains that since "participation in conversation poses similar tasks and problems everywhere quite independently of the particular language used or the particular sociocultural setting in which the interaction takes place," a "robust base of apparently generic interactional organization" reflecting "the specifically human 'form of life'" is needed. Therefore, conversational turn-taking must be viewed as a function of the human species: "an adaptation to the contingencies of interaction between sighted, language-using bipeds" (Sidnell, 2001, pp. 1,265).

As we have seen, the term "practice" is used inconsistently in CA. Sometimes "practice" refers to a repertoire of tools that individuals use to perform actions, sometimes it relates to a (self-organized) interactional dynamic that draws members (not least morally) into producing a recognizable social phenomenon that appears external and objective. Sometimes "practices" appear like positively identifiable tokens that are used to build sequences (independent from them) to achieve local specifics of an interaction, sometimes they appear like tools used to accomplish the sequential organization of the interaction itself. Sometimes practices are universal, sometimes they are specific.

Returning to Garfinkel's adoption of Gurwitsch's concept of gestalt contexture discussed above, I suggest to complement essential criteria of practice in CA (specifically "context-sensitivity") by "context-productivity." To reflect the theoretical import of the concept of practice for CA more clearly I will draw on the example of the adjacency pair. Although the "core practices" in turn-taking are often located in the activities of individuals (e.g., "anticipatory completion," "jump-start," "rush-through" at transition relevance places), an impressive example of practices that powerfully produce co-participation, binding individuals together in a practice, are adjacency pairs and their "conditional relevance" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 20). Examples are: greeting-greeting, question-answer, or offer-accept/decline. The components of adjacency pairs are typologized into first and second pair parts (what Gurwitsch calls "themes" and Garfinkel calls "details" or "indexical particulars") that relate to the pair types which they compose (what Gurwitsch calls "thematic field" and Garfinkel calls "context"). A first pair part "projects a prospective relevance," and makes relevant "a limited set of possible second pair parts, and thereby sets some of the terms by which a next turn will be understood" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 16). Each item suggests a *next*. "Nextness" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 14) along with "conditional relevance" is produced by the expectability of an adequate second pair part after a first pair part was provided. When a first pair part has been provided and a second pair part is being withheld, however, it becomes "noticeably absent" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 20). The lack of an accomplished gestalt contexture ("good continuation") entails considerable social consequences such as possible conflicts and reconfigurations of social relations. The "relationship of adjacency or 'nextness' between turns is central to the ways in which talk-in-interaction is organized and understood. Next turns are understood by co-participants to display their speaker's understanding of the just-prior turn and to embody an action responsive to the just-prior turn so understood (unless the turn has been marked as addressing something other than just-prior turn)" (Schegloff, 2007, pp. 15). Thus, the procedural organization of intersubjectivity and social order here becomes dependent upon the practical, sequential organization of gestalt contextures by parties in a setting.

Schegloff has repeatedly pointed out that preceding utterances and actions sequentially form the context for ongoing utterances and actions. The adjacency pair example demonstrates this: it is not their intrinsic (context-free) meaning, but the sequential context that provides ongoing practices with meaning and makes them understandable-such as a brief delay after an invitation.

If we understand such conversational practices as the adjacency pair by reference to Gurwitsch as the continuous production of a contexture that conditions, or even compels, the provision of functionally indexed nexts by the co-interactant, we get a vision of conversational practice that unites context-sensitivity and context-productivity (and is maybe less interested in context-freeness). Since practices cannot be understood as context-free resources, but themselves, once past, form the context for their own continuation, adjacency pairs, as a practice, can be seen as a model for the joint formation of *in situ* self-organizing and self-constraining social objects that reflects the mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity of the social. The adjacency pair produces the context to which second pair parts are then sensitive.

This example shows a possible specification of the CA concept of practice: First, practices are not only sensitive to, but also productive of, the context, since they ongoingly establish it as gestalt contexture. Practices therefore can be seen as ongoingly producing those contexts as practical circumstances, which subsequent practices then continue context-sensitively by practical reasoning. Secondly, both meaning and function of practices are genuinely relational. The principle of gestalt contexture states that each *next* refers to a *before*, and there is no intrinsic meaning or function of the individual item. The idea that practices as resources have a general context-free core, which is then context-sensitively varied and adapted to local circumstances, can therefore be abandoned. Thirdly, practices are not individual but mutually complementary and continuous, accomplished by relationally emerging "members" in the double sense.

Returning to examples such as the adjacency pair could thus contribute to clarify the undecided position of CA with regard to the practical character of talk-in-interaction. They help avoiding anti-representationalist and routine-centered as well as structuralist models of practice that regard historically evolved commonalities as guarantees

of social order and thus correspond to Aristotle's original insight into the ongoing mutability, indeterminacy, and particularity of the social.

Conclusion

As reconstructed in this text, Garfinkel presents an elaborate and consistent social-theoretical conceptualization of the terms "practice" and "practicality." CA builds on this, even if it is theoretically less consistent, which is due to the tension between the notion of context freeness (with simultaneous context sensitivity) of the SSJ model and the idea of context productivity (with simultaneous context dependence) in the ethnomethodological model proper. While there are some differences, in particular the reifying use of the concept of practice (i.e., as "things," ironically) and the assumption of the (shared) semantic stability of its units by CA scholars, these can be rethought with reference to the concept of "context-productivity." The narrative sometimes put forward that CA has abandoned its theoretical foundations in ethnomethodology therefore does not entirely seem plausible. If one refers to Gurwitsch's non-egological theory and not to Schütz's egology, then even "practices" conceived as distinct units no longer appear as tools that actors voluntarily take from a toolbox and consciously use, but as situationally appropriate and promising components that constitute quasi-objective contexts of action. They produce and continue practical dynamics into which members of society are persistently drawn, as it is suggested by the notion of "machinery" prominent in ethnomethodology and CA.

From this perspective, both ethnomethodology and CA consistently adhere to the principle of the primordiality of practice and avoid that structural or intentionalist elements come back in through the backdoor, as is the case with some practice theories cited above. In this way, they do justice to the Aristotelian questions about the stability and continuity of the social in the face of the permanent mutability, fundamental indeterminacy and situational particularity of practical existence. Ethnomethodology and CA thus present a version of practice theory that avoids theoretical problems of the others, including the long-standing dualisms of agency versus structure or of routine versus rationality.

Ethnomethodology and CA do not subscribe to the idea that practice is primarily characterized by anti-representationalist immersion and absorbed coping. By adopting Gurwitsch's critique on Heidegger, Garfinkel (1967, pp. 32–34) succeeds in maintaining the image of "serious," "planful" actors as rationally reflecting upon and creatively operating in their situation. Members are viewed as constantly accomplishing in concert with others those features of social reality that they, as Merleau-Pontian "préjugé du monde," attribute to the external, objective social world of Durkheimian things (Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 182). Other established approaches (Bourdieu, Giddens) do not completely exclude practical wisdom with their notions of "practical logic" and "practical consciousness," but they place far more emphasis on routine and continuity than on reasoning and contingency than do Garfinkel and CA.

In this way, Garfinkel avoids explaining practice with the pre-existing sharedness of meanings or rules. While they are taken for granted in other practice theories, for Garfinkel they are in need of explanation. With his conception of the triangle of practical action, practical reasoning and practical circumstances, interactional practice appears as an ongoing mutual accomplishment of shared goals, means and processes, each reflected in the light of the other. Garfinkel argues that members constantly make social order discoverable for each other through the ongoing accomplishment of practices. This guarantees the continuity of the social. By assuming that members endlessly switch between theme and thematic field, no extrinsic factors are admitted theoretically as determining practice, or, sociologically speaking, no independent variables are accepted as valid explanations for social phenomena. CA could return to this position by adopting a third concept along with "context-freeness" and "context-sensitivity": "context-productivity." This allows for a more consistent formulation of practice that avoids the problems of other theories of practice.

Furthermore, in sociology, there is sometimes an image of ethnomethodology and CA as being overly detail-oriented and thus irrelevant to broader social analysis. That this judgment is based on an assumption that the social world is simply there rather than being constantly produced and continued in interaction, and that shared rules and meanings are predetermined rather than explained by concrete analyses of members' practices, is shown by the ethnomethodological theoretical orientation. However, if one follows their concept of practice, it becomes clear why the emphasis on details is so important, because it is the details of the practices through which the supposedly objective world is produced in the first place.

For this reason, Garfinkel (2002, pp. 92, n.1) says that social order is *immortal*, for to speak of the immortality of ordinary society is "to speak of human jobs as of which local members, being in the midst of organizational *things,* know, of just *these* organizational things they are in the midst of, that it preceded them and will be there after they leave it." Therefore, rather than to speak of "bundles of sayings and doings" or "webs of practices," Garfinkel (2002, pp. 92, n.1) advises us to keep in mind that "the great recurrencies of ordinary society" present themselves in practical form, as "assemblages of haecceities," which are co-constituted by reasoning members who are engaged in practical action within the particularity of situational circumstances.

Author contributions

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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

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