Affective polarization has become a central concern in the study of contemporary democracy because political disagreement increasingly extends into social and emotional relations. Yet polarization is neither a unitary phenomenon nor an automatically anti-democratic one. Strong identities can mobilize participation and clarify political alternatives, while hostility can also erode tolerance, trust, and acceptance of political opponents. The Research Topic Investigating Affective Polarization: Implications for Political Behavior and Democratic Institutions therefore aimed to move beyond the simple question of whether societies are polarized and examine how polarization is produced, measured, communicated, and translated into political and institutional consequences.The Topic was deliberately broad in both substantive and methodological terms. It invited work on trust and democratic institutions, media and information environments, comparative patterns across established and emerging democracies, and the conceptual challenges of measuring affective polarization. The contributions answer these questions through large-scale social-media data, repeated survey evidence, longitudinal digital traces, cross-national survey analysis, qualitative comparative research, and political theory. Their common value lies in showing that polarization operates at several levels at once: as a perception of political groups, an emotional relation to opponents, a pattern of selective communication and exposure, and a condition embedded in institutional and historical structures. This variety allows the collection to identify not only where polarization appears, but also the mechanisms that connect political identities to behavior and democratic consequences.The six contributions show the value of this multidimensional approach. Brandt and Pfeffer ( 2026) analyze 833,410 TikTok comments directed at 442 German political accounts and use Sahra Wagenknecht's unusual ideological position to test whether engagement follows policy proximity or populist affinity. Users associated with the AfD are especially likely to engage with Wagenknecht and frequently do so positively, suggesting that populist identity and political persona can create affinities that cross conventional partisan boundaries.Orr and Huber (2026) examine perceived polarization in the United States using survey data collected around the 2020 and 2024 elections. They find that citizens' perceptions of in-party and out-party loyalty are strikingly similar and that affective polarization is not associated with systematically stronger stereotyping of the out-party. Respondents also recognize several changes in party-level policy support over time. Their findings caution against treating uniquely distorted perceptions of political opponents as the principal explanation for partisan animosity or assuming that correcting out-party stereotypes alone will substantially reduce it.The digital information environment is addressed by Kmetty et al. (2026), who use five years of datadonated browsing histories from Hungary. Ideological segregation increases when users move from general news to explicitly political news, but the effect is bounded. High-salience events increase political information seeking without systematically deepening aggregate audience segregation, and the long-term pattern fluctuates around a relatively stable equilibrium rather than showing a continuous spiral toward closed echo chambers. The study therefore underlines the importance of longitudinal behavioral data and cautions against technological determinism.Zavarce Velasquez (2026) extends the collection to the Global South through a comparison of Venezuela and Thailand. Both cases display severe and sustained elite and mass polarization, yet their political trajectories differ: Venezuela shows greater continuity of the governing coalition, whereas Thailand has experienced recurrent alternation and military intervention. The comparison identifies civilmilitary relations, business-sector positioning, institutional design, relations with the United States, and regional governance as conditioning factors. Polarization, in this account, interacts with institutions rather than mechanically determining political outcomes.Measurement and democratic consequences are examined directly by Bernaerts (2026). Using survey data from Belgium and the United Kingdom and studying horizontal polarization around 'wokeness,' the article distinguishes dislike, social distance, and intense negative emotions. Political intolerance is associated more strongly with social distance than with dislike, while support for violence operates predominantly through hate, anger, and frustration. The findings demonstrate that different dimensions of affective polarization carry different democratic risks and help explain why research relying on different operationalizations can reach divergent conclusions.Finally, Hu and Bai (forthcoming) broaden the Topic's emotional horizon by asking whether love can become a political force. Drawing on Hegelian dialectics, Marxist historical materialism, and praxis, they conceptualize love not as private sentiment but as objective, relational activity. Through analyses of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement and the South African anti-apartheid struggle, they argue that solidarity can reshape material connections, transform individualized care into collective political energy, and sustain self-transcendence. Importantly, love is presented as politically enabling but insufficient on its own: structural transformation and organizational mediation remain necessary.Taken together, the contributions advance three conclusions. First, affective polarization should not be reduced to partisan dislike: perceptions, issue identities, social distance, emotional intensity, media behavior, and institutional conflict are analytically distinct. Second, its mechanisms are conditional. Digital platforms do not inevitably create echo chambers, misperceptions do not uniquely target outgroups, and severe polarization does not produce identical institutional outcomes. Third, the democratic challenge concerns the quality as well as the quantity of political affect. The transition from disagreement to avoidance, hatred, or exclusion may be more consequential than generalized dislike, while solidarity and mutual recognition remain possible resources for democratic resilience. Future research should therefore combine conceptual precision, longitudinal and behavioral evidence, and wider comparative coverage. The central question is not simply whether citizens are polarized, but how they are polarized, around which boundaries, through which mechanisms, and with what consequences for political behavior and democratic institutions.
Editorial10 November 2026
Editorial: Investigating affective polarization: implications for political behavior and democratic institutionsIntroductionThis paper challenges the dismissal of love as a private emotion by redefining it as a practical and political force. It asks how love, although materially constrained, can become a revolutionary force.MethodsThe study develops a tripartite framework combining Hegelian negative dialectics, Marxist historical materialism, and the theory of practice. Structurally inspired by the Phenomenology of Spirit, it traces love’s conceptual unfolding from abstract immediacy to concrete universality through internal contradictions and sublation. This dialectical movement is grounded in historical materialism, analyzing love as structurally determined by modes of production and class antagonisms.ResultsLove is redefined as an objective activity (gegenständliche Tätigkeit) that transforms social relations. Its political potential stems from its capacity to reshape material connections and transform individualized care into collective political energy. Using the Soul Force of the Civil Rights Movement and the South African anti-apartheid movement as historical manifestations, the paper clarifies a triple mechanism of political transformation.DiscussionLove remains materially constrained and therefore is not enough by itself, yet it remains possible as a revolutionary force. When solidarity—understood as the collective political form of love—is directed toward a total critique of structural oppression, it becomes the sensuous expression of the real movement toward universal human emancipation.
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
5 August 2026
Carlos David Zavarce Velasquez
IntroductionPolarization has increased in recent decades, and Global South countries are no exception. Venezuela and Thailand represent two prominent cases of severe and sustained polarization in the 21st century. In Venezuela, polarization advanced after the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, evolving into a broader societal divide between Chavismo (civil-military coalition) and opposition partisans. Following Chávez’s death in 2013, polarization reached unprecedented levels, marked by escalating conflict between political blocs, increasing authoritarian practices by Nicolás Maduro’s government, and a profound economic crisis influencing the largest migration outflows in a country not engaged in armed conflict. In Thailand, polarization can be traced back as early as 2001, when Thaksin Shinawatra assumed office, causing tensions between the Red Shirts (Thaksin’s supporters, including peasants and workers in rural regions) and the Yellow Shirts (royalists, urban middle and upper classes). While Venezuela experienced democratic backsliding, Thailand faced recurring military coups and instability, leading to a military-led government in 2014 and subsequent military intervention in national politics.MethodsThis paper employs a qualitative comparative case study approach based on primary and secondary sources to examine how polarization at the elite and mass levels has shaped the political systems of Venezuela and Thailand in the 21st century.ResultsThe findings show that although both countries have experienced severe and sustained polarization, their political dynamics followed different paths, influenced by divergent domestic and international factors.DiscussionAt the domestic level, these factors include differences in civil–military relations, business-sector positioning, and institutional design. At the international level, they include bilateral relations with the United States and regional governance.


