# Citizenship and democratization: Perspectives from different gender-theoretical approaches

Edited by
Eva Maria Hinterhuber and Jana Günther

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Citizenship and democratization: Perspectives from different gender-theoretical approaches

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Editorial: Citizenship and democratization: perspectives from different gender-theoretical approaches

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KEYWORDS

citizenship, gender relations, democratization, women's movement, crisis

Editorial on the Research Topic
Citizenship and democratization: perspectives from different gender-theoretical approaches

The year 1918 was significant in many ways, as it marked the end of the First World War. At the same time, the impact, and upheaval of this event enabled civil society activists and politically institutionalized actors in European countries to pick up the threads of democratic social movements and parliamentary aspirations and use "political opportunity structures" (Marx-Ferree and McClurg Mueller, 2006, 39–45) to achieve civil rights for larger sections of the population. In addition to entirely new forms of political participation, new state social laws and the improvement of co-determination rights for larger population groups, peace and more freedom led to (new) social movements and forms of protest. National women's movements in particular were successful before the First World War, were limited in their possibilities during the war and reorganized after the First World War (Offen, 2000, 272–356).

One result of this process—albeit with differences between European states—was that more social groups gained the right to vote, and new social rights and expanded access to education and gainful employment for the working class and women of all classes were achieved; in that regard, the cloud indeed had a silver lining. But still: After the First World War, European countries were plagued by social and political problems. The interwar period was therefore not only a time of opportunity, but also of crisis. The Weimar Republic is a good example of how an open, inclusive, and diverse culture like the "Roaring Twenties" can go hand in hand with increasing political destabilization and social resignation. The year 1923[1] shows how thin the line can be between political and social disruption and actual change. Attacks on gender rights as an sign of violent social conditions (Roth et al., 2022, p. 9) shape state policy and law and thus have a direct impact on gender relations. The ups and downs of the decade "between the wars" are striking: more democratization on the one hand and economic collapse and inflation, growing fascism, and annexation in various parts

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1 In German history, the year 1923 is often referred to as the "year of the Crisis" (Krisenjahr) (Jones, 2022) due to the immense hyperinflation and the Ruhr invasion.

of Europe on the other. All these developments have had an impact on women's and family policies, sometimes in the mode of two steps forward and three steps back. Political and social change affects gender relations, but both are a product of social movements, as other examples around the world show.

In 100 years later, we are facing similar difficulties such as the global financial crisis, the global care crisis, pandemics, new fascist movements and state policies, terrorist threats and ongoing wars, to name but a few of the challenges. Even today, the success of social movements goes hand in hand with counter-movements: Their scope for action is shaped by a re-dichotomization of world relations (Ruppert and Scheiterbauer, 2022) and by powerful discourses—discourses that make authoritarianism acceptable through new far-right parties in European countries, who contribute to the deterioration of democratic gender relations by linking narratives on people, gender, and migration (Wilde, 2022).

The issue "*Citizenship and democratization: perspectives from different gender-theoretical approaches*" focuses on various issues of gender, women's movements, democratization, power relations in times of civic crisis and the potential for change in different areas. In the Research Topic, analyses of historical women's movements at the beginning of the 20th century illustrate the struggle for full citizenship for women. They include the study of outstanding personalities like Louise Otto-Peters in Germany's women's suffrage movement (Schötz) as well as the analysis of how women's suffrage was specifically addressed in an Austrian Social Democratic journal (Bargetz). Others discuss the significance of certain groups as the French Red Cross Ladies in the international exhibitions from 1867 to 1937 (Belliard) or provide international comparisons, here between the historical British and Russian women's movements and their stances to various forms of power (Hinterhuber and Günther). All of the contributions demonstrate the strength of the actors, individually and collectively, in oppressive power relations and in the face of constant devaluation of themselves and their concerns. At the same time, they also draw attention to hierarchies and tensions within women's movements and between movements of that time, thus underlining the relevance of intersectional approaches.

Other contributions deal with the ongoing struggle for gender equality in the context of the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1993). In Poland, for example, in the mid-90s the struggle over "Polish" gender regimes gained an international dimension at the 4th UN World Conference on Women in Bejing (Ramme). In Chile, the analysis reveals that, with regard to gender relations, in transition to democracy authoritarian continuities persisted (Graf). And, for post-conflict Kosovo, the strategies of the women's movement in reaching gender-responsive governance are analyzed (Holzner). Altogether, the contributions show in all clarity that democratization does not automatically go hand in hand with the democratization of gender relations.

In addition, what has been achieved once, does not remain achieved forever. Counter-movements have been gaining momentum since 2010 at the latest. For the present, the articles shed light on threats to democracy and the egalitarian welfare state,

to anti-democratic claims to citizenship and gender relations—last but not least with the rise of the far-right in the Scandinavian context (Finnsdottir and Hallgrimsdottir). In other cases, such as in Russia, democratization has meanwhile given way to an authoritarian system; the article focuses on motherhood penalty, identifying the connection between a gender-specific division of labor and its impact on mothers' pensions and poverty in old age (Kingsbury).

The necessity of an intersectional approach already visible in the historical examples is emphasized again for the present, in the light of an evaluation of representation and responsiveness of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, revealing that it does not sufficiently include the diverse women populations worldwide (Rincker et al.).

In times of polycrisis, the rise of authoritarianism, economic upheavals, wars and the increasingly evident climate crisis cast long shadows. Democratization processes are not irreversible, they prove to be never-ending processes. Gender policy achievements and ideals in particular are becoming the focus of conflict, and their rejection is seen as the "symbolic glue" (Petö, 2015, p. 126) that holds opposing anti-democratic forces together. This poses major challenges for women's and gender policy movements. At the same time, they are acknowledged as crucial actors and potentially countervailing powers to anti-democratic and anti-gender backlashes, holding the chance that every cloud does indeed have a silver lining.

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Welfare State Chauvinists? Gender, Citizenship, and Anti-democratic Politics in the Welfare State Paradise

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The rise of the far-right poses a pressing challenge to democratic politics and the democratization of political participation in Western Europe. This paper addresses this issue in the Scandinavian context, examining the importance of welfare chauvinism and gendered citizenship claims in the political rhetoric of the far-right. In so doing, we contribute to a need to examine closely the interplay between gender, citizenship, and welfare politics and the rise of exclusionary and anti-democratic politics. The paper draws on an examination of the party platforms of the three principle far-right-wing parties currently active in Scandinavia: the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats as well as descriptive statistics on ethnonationalist tendencies among the Scandinavian populations in recent years, retrieved from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) 2013 survey on nationalism. We conclude that the far-right in Scandinavia uses gender and ethno-nationalist claims to simultaneously valorize and challenge egalitarianism in the welfare state while also shoring up exclusionary and anti-democratic claims to citizenship and belonging in the Nordic welfare state.

Keywords: right-wing activism, welfare state, scandinavia, gender, citizenship

INTRODUCTION

The rise of the far-right poses a pressing challenge to democratic politics and the democratization of political participation in Western Europe. This paper addresses this issue in the Scandinavian context, examining the importance of welfare chauvinism and gendered citizenship claims in driving support for the far-right. In this we contribute to a need to examine closely the interplay between gender, citizenship, and welfare politics and the rise of exclusionary and anti-democratic politics.

There are many recent signs pointing to a resurgence of far-right nationalist politics in Europe (Roodujin, 2015). Far-right parties have had a strong showing in recent elections all across Europe, including in Hungary, Germany, Greece, and France (New York Times, 2016; Kirk and Scott, 2017). This trend is also apparent in the Nordic countries: in the recent Swedish elections, the far-right Sweden Democrats won 17.6% of the vote, up from 12.9% in 2014. The failure of the incumbent Red-Green coalition (the Greens, Social Democrats, and the Left party) to secure a majority, combined with poor showing from the other moderate parties, means that the Sweden Democrats will likely play a disproportionate role in the formation of the new government (Mudde, 2018). Sweden is not unique among the Nordic welfare states in having a strong far-right presence; both the Norwegian Progress Party and Danish People's Party are well-established in their respective political systems, and have significant parliamentary representation (Coman, 2015).

The rise of the far-right in Scandinavia represents a conundrum for scholars examining the resurgence of xenophobia and nationalism in Europe. Despite the rich literature produced on the subject, there is little consensus on what allows for far-right parties to take root and thrive in any particular political and socio-economic context. Scholarship on continental Europe has mainly focused on Western Europe, where far-right political parties have had an established foothold in politics for some time (Betz, 1994; Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001; Mudde, 2007) and are thought to be rooted in the interaction between higher levels of unemployment and high levels of immigration, particularly immigration of unskilled workers from the Global South (Golder, 2003). In Southern Europe, the recent success of the Golden Dawn in Greece as well as the Northern League in Italy has led scholars to examine the links between recessions, austerity policies, and the rise of anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic parties (Ellinas, 2013; Vieten and Poynting, 2016). In this, in spite of different histories and different contexts, researchers have identified common threads of ethnonationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism running through the European far-right (Rydgren, 2007; Moffitt, 2015; Vieten and Poynting, 2016).

How do these explanations play out in understanding movements like the Sweden Democrats, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish People's Party? Scandinavia, with its low unemployment and moderate levels of immigration, seems to lack the structural conditions that support the growth of the far-right in other parts of Europe. In addition, with the exception of Iceland, Scandinavia emerged relatively unscathed from the 2008 global recession in terms of its social welfare system and social programs, suggesting also that arguments around social polarization and austerity require some nuance (Einhorn and Logue, 2010; Finseraas and Vernby, 2011). Clearly, economistic and structural explanations are not adequate for understanding why far-right movements gain foothold in the Nordic welfare state.

In this paper, we argue that understanding the rise of the far-right in the Nordic welfare states requires attention to the interplay of gender with ethnonationalist politics within the specific context of a cradle-to-grave welfare state. In particular, we point to the gendered dynamics and subtexts of right-wing politics and claimsmaking, as well as to conceptions of citizenship. Among other things, these conceptions position the Scandinavian welfare state as a zero-sum social good that cannot be shared with outsiders, while at the same time framing outsiders as risks to the social contract that has created the welfare state. In this we contribute to a small literature outlining the importance of examining the gendered dimensions of far-right politics in Europe (Vieten, 2016). In addition, this paper contributes to understanding the complex pathways through which right-wing politics can take hold by examining how a strong *inclusionary* welfare state can provide the context for the emergence of *exclusionary* politics.

As we argue below, gender is inextricable from these processes. Gendered politics signal the difference between insiders and outsiders (i.e., the gender egalitarianism of the Nordic welfare state that needs to be safeguarded against the influence of immigrants); in other words, gendered politics and gendered

meanings provide resonance and content for nativist framings of belonging in Scandinavia (Siim and Meret, 2016). In particular, gendered citizenship—drawing on notions of egalitarianism, social support for families, and high economic participation of women—becomes inflected with ethno-nationalism in the perpetuation of a kind of welfare state chauvinism (Siim, 2008; Lister, 2009). We begin with an overview of our key concepts: gendered citizenship and welfare state chauvinism. We then move on to a discussion of the far-right in Scandinavia, and the prevalence of ethnonationalist tendencies among the Scandinavian populations. We finish with an analysis of the party platforms of the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats, and a discussion of how these parties are working to rewrite citizen subjectivities within the welfare state.

DATA AND METHODS

The data in this paper are drawn from an examination of the party platforms of the three principle far-right-wing parties currently active in Scandinavia: the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats. The websites for these three parties were reviewed in detail in order to gather an overall understanding of their various social and fiscal policy positions. All three parties post platform information on their website in English, and in their respective languages; analysis of material in both languages was included. An understanding of texts as discourse moves us past a reading of the texts as existing in a vacuum and allows for situating the texts within their social and political contexts, granting insight into both the language and the meaning of the text. In this way, discourse analysis allows for the study of both the underlying structures and ideologies of the text (Dijk, 2006). Understanding the ideologies underlying party platforms is of key importance, especially given the role played by ideologies in shaping shared social representations of a group, and, as such, their positions and actions (Dijk, 2006). To this end, we conducted a discourse analysis of party materials, working both to decipher the meanings within those texts, and to situate them within the larger political projects being undertaken by these parties.

Besides these qualitative data, we also present some descriptive statistics on ethnonationalist tendencies among the Scandinavian populations in recent years. These data were retrieved from the International Social Survey Programme's (ISSP) 2013 survey on nationalism (ISSP Research Group, 2015). The surveys gather information from a nationally representative sample on respondents' understandings of national identity (Brien and Beck, 2015). Respondents were asked how important certain characteristics were for being truly [nationality], including speaking the dominant language, having that country's ethnic ancestry, having citizenship, and following the dominant religion, and being born in the country. Descriptive statistics for these five questions are presented below. Sample sizes from the 2013 ISSP surveys were 1,315 from Denmark, 1,585 from Norway, and 1,090 from Sweden (Brien and Beck, 2015).

WELFARE STATE CHAUVINISM

Nationalism is a part of the process of constructing a social-political entity: the creation of a collective identity from which a society can be constructed (Breton, 1988). Breton (1988) identifies four basic components of nationalism as an ideology: the principles of inclusion or exclusion; a conception of the "national interest;"comparisons with other groups; and specific views as to the ways in which the social environment can threaten or support the group. Scholars draw a distinction between civic nationalism and ethnonationalism based on modes of inclusion and exclusion to the national identity category (Fozdar and Low, 2015). Ethnically based conceptions of nationalism arise when the society and the institutions that are constructed are based on cultural unity, and the basis for exclusion or inclusion within that society is ethnic (Breton, 1988; Fozdar and Low, 2015). Conversely, civic nationalism ties individuals together through an ideological commitment to civic institutions and government (Fozdar and Low, 2015). That said, civic nationalism is not necessarily more inclusive of diversity than ethnonationalism; rather frameworks can vary in the restrictiveness of their criteria for membership in a collective identity (Fozdar and Low, 2015).

Given that civic nationalism is not inherently more inclusive than ethnic nationalism, the discursive framing of "the Other" plays a significant role in determining the inclusiveness of national identity, whether determined civically or ethnically (Fozdar and Low, 2015). Political parties take part in this discursive work; in order to succeed in the polls and the legislature, parties must convince voters of their ideology. For this to be successful, their frameworks must resonate with the population—discursive work is necessary to ensure that their frames align with individual understandings and values (Snow et al., 1986). With ethnonationalism playing such a prominent role in shaping far-right ideology, one significant task faced by the far right is to marry nationality and ethnicity in the minds of the population. Then, "the Other," or the "outsider," becomes defined both ethnically and nationally. That is to say, far-right parties work both to frame the insider/outsider division as ethnically based, and to define the national membership criteria as ethnic. Other scholars studying this issue have drawn connections between citizenship strategies and conceptions of citizenship and belonging; in particular, those nations with closed citizenship regimes tend to conceive of citizenship in ethnic terms, meaning that these ethnic conceptions of belonging can have significant legal ramifications (Wodak, 2013).

One way in which the understanding of outsiders as threats to the well-being of the nation state is practiced is through welfare chauvinism—"a system of collective social protection that is restricted to those belonging to the ethnically defined community who has contributed to it" (Careja et al., 2016, p. 436). One of the key functions of the state is the demarcation of "the people." That is, the state is integral in determining who belongs within its protective borders, and who does not: only citizens that are recognized by the state are placed within its care (Mann, 1999; Revi, 2012). Welfare states, in particular, draw clear boundaries between citizens and non-citizens because of the wealth of resources being distributed, and the widespread

reach of the state into everyday life. Welfare chauvinism, then, occurs when outsiders are understood as threats to the well-being of the people of a welfare state by taking too much of the state resources—specifically, within this framework of anti-immigrant sentiment, they are seen as taking more from the state than they rightfully deserve (Hjorth, 2016). In a context where ethnic criteria are used to determine national belonging, conceptions of "ethnic group outsider" and "non-citizen" converge, so that the rights of citizenship become contingent on ethnonationalist conceptions of belonging.

The freedom of movement in the EU, and the cross-border welfare rights that follow it, have challenged and redefined the traditional relationship between the state and the citizen (Hjorth, 2016). For one, by decoupling the right to social protection from membership to the national political community, cross-border welfare rights have weakened the binding ties of solidarity within territorial nation states (Hjorth, 2016). This has, in certain cases, triggered concerns about "benefit tourism"—the notion that EU migrants are crossing borders for the sole purpose of accessing social services; however, these concerns tend to be restricted to certain kinds of migrants (Hjorth, 2016). That is, rather than a simple dichotomy between co-nationals and foreigners, individuals draw distinctions between different kinds of migrants, largely relying on stereotypes. In this way, the understandings of who are deserving recipients of social protection, and who are not, inherent in welfare chauvinism are shaped by conceptions of difference. Thus, welfare chauvinism is a logical outcome of ethnonationalism: when legitimate access to the services provided by the state is defined ethnically, those who are understood as outsiders will be seen as accessing state services rightfully belonging to (ethnic) nationals. Furthermore, according to Hjorth (2016), welfare chauvinism tends to be triggered by fears of cultural threat, as well as economic scarcity.

This fear of a cultural threat posed by ethnic outsiders takes on decidedly gendered dimensions in the West. Families in general, and women in particular, are often seen as key institutions in the transmission of culture and tradition. For this reason, socially conservative policies tend to focus on the protection and preservation of the family, to the point of using the welfare state to promote and enshrine the heteronormative family (Sherry and Ornstein, 2014; Hausermann, 2018; Williams, 2018). Thus, (perceived) threats to the welfare state often correspond with (perceived) threats to the family, playing as important a role as it does in socially conservative ideology. Concerns for the preservation of the culture, as articulated by far-right and socially conservative groups, imply a sense of threat from some group too different. In the case where the nation comes to be defined ethnically, so too do these threatening differences. In fact, the concerns about "benefit tourism" common in Western Europe underscore the importance of perceptions of difference in evaluations of deservingness in welfare chauvinist ideologies (Hjorth, 2016). The gendered implications here are clear— given the responsibility placed on women in racial ideologies for the maintenance of the racial identity group, they are particular vulnerable to scrutiny and control. Similarly, families, as key cultural institutions, are privileged within the welfare state.

GENDERED CITIZENSHIP

Building on Marshall's seminal work on citizenship, we understand citizenship to be a complex and multi-layered concept that involves not only the rights that flow from the legally recognized residence within a particular territory, but also identities and statuses that accompany those rights and the processes and actions that realize them (Marshall, 1950, 1964; Turner, 1990; O'Connor, 1993; Somers, 1993; Soysal, 2000; Isin and Turner, 2007; Somers and Roberts, 2008; Isin and Nielsen, 2013). While Marshall cited universalism as a fundamental attribute of citizenship, it is clear that citizenship in practice is both particularistic and differentiated (Soysal, 2000). Birthplace, gender, race and ethnicity, language, legal status all interplay to create hierarchies and inequalities between and amongst citizens. Indeed, citizenship's potential to create inequalities has received much more recent scholarly attention than the reverse; in the European context, inequalities around birthplace, race and ethnicity have been shown to be associated with significant "thinning" of citizenship rights, especially for migrants and immigrants.

That being said, Marshall's fundamental contribution—that citizenship and citizenship rights were layered around three different dimensions of participation and belonging: the political, the civic, and the social, remains the dominant frame through which citizenship is analyzed even today. This is particularly true in terms of scholarship of the Nordic welfare state, which, beginning with Esping-Andersen (1999) has been fundamentally framed around Marshall's interventions. More recent work on the welfare state, developing in large part as a critique to the gender blindness of Esping-Andersen's work, has examined the gendered frames and subjectivities that constitute citizenship in all its dimensions (social, civic, and political) (Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1999; Lister, 2009; Munday, 2009; Kananen, 2016; Siim and Borchorst, 2017).

Citizenship in the Nordic countries in this literature is characterized by an assumed embrace of key progressive values, such as equality, solidarity, and universalism, and of equal and inclusionary citizenship (Lister, 2009). According to Lister (2009), this emphasis on equality and solidarity translates into a model of citizenship that is more focused on the bonds between citizens than on the bonds between the citizen and the state: in general terms, the welfare state is viewed positively, and seen to be an integral part of citizenship. From a gendered citizenship perspective, the Nordic welfare states have taken different paths than other nations (notably corporate welfare-states like France and Germany, or liberal states like the United Kingdom) in particular through an emphasis on using policy instruments to support the economic participation of women in the workforce as well as creating other conditions for gender equality. More recently, scholars have commented on the apparent move of the Scandinavian welfare states away from a "universal breadwinner model" to a "universal care-giver model;" that is, rather than emphasizing the importance of working for women, state policies work to support both men and women as "citizen-earner/carers" (Lister, 2009, p. 249). One example of this tendency are the "use it or lose it" paternal leave policies common in Scandinavia.

Recently, scholarly attention to the outcomes of these policy interventions for gender equality has focused on the resistance of "glass ceilings" (in terms of career progressions), as well as income differences and occupational gender segregation to change. This work has identified persistent inequalities according to gender as well as family status even in countries that have an explicit policy emphasis on correcting gender inequality (Siim and Borchorst, 2017). While recent scholarship has called for an increased attention to the intersectionalities that might underlie here, there has been comparatively less attention however to the role of race relations, and in particular, nativism and constructions of whiteness, to the politics of citizenship and inclusion in the Nordic states (Siim and Meret, 2016).

Our interest below is in particular on the interplay of race, especially whiteness, with gender, in the construction of citizenship identities within radical right wing parties in Scandinavia. As (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014), p. 20) point out, gender provides a rich resource through which to mobilize ethno-nationalist capital. Research on the creation of racial identities—white racial identities included—has pointed to the key role assigned to women. As (potential) mothers, women are made to bear responsibility for the continuation of the racial/ethnic group, so that their bodies are placed under significant control and scrutiny (Bonnett, 1998). This point is particularly salient in the Nordic countries, where Nordic identity has become so enmeshed with a white racial identity so as to be almost synonymous (Lundström and Teitelbaum, 2017). The hyper-whiteness embodied by Nordic women has produced a specific white femininity, one characterized by norms of respectability, morality, and beauty (Lundström, 2017). In this vein, the conflation of whiteness, Europeanness, and Christianity in the process of creating white, European racial identities imparted a higher moral position to whiteness (Bonnett, 1998). That said, these white racial identities are always in crisis, as they depend primarily upon the differentiation of white from non-white (Bonnett, 1998). This means that significant work must go into the maintenance of white racial identities, both at the individual and the societal level.

THE EUROPEAN FAR-RIGHT

In keeping with the post-materialist thesis—where generational changes in material security have led to a shift in values—new political parties have sprung up across the political spectrum (Inglehart and Rabier, 1986). On the right, this has meant the emergence of new far-right parties, primarily focused on the perceived threats of immigration, unemployment, and crime (Veugelers, 2000). This demand for new far-right parties is further evidenced by a rise in general political apathy and distrust of institutions. Younger voters, in particular, are less likely today to be invested in liberal ideals of democracy than in prior cohorts (Foa and Mounk, 2016). Furthermore, the rise in anti-democratic sentiment has been especially marked among the wealthiest citizens of liberal democracies, indicating that the support for

illiberal politics is being led by the young and wealthy, not only the disempowered and disenfranchised (Foa and Mounk, 2016). Given the wide variety of ideologies and party positions held by Western far-right parties, we will be relying on the general definition offered by Rydgren (2007): far-right parties are generally characterized by xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-elitist populism, and their platforms tend to be embedded in a kind of sociocultural authoritarianism that stresses the importance of putting the collective good above individual rights.

Despite the wealth of research on the subject, there is little consensus in the literature over the ideal structural conditions for the growth of a far-right political movement. For instance, research on the political system has shown that proportional representation, in particular, benefits the far-right, as does a system with a weak conservative party (Carter, 2002; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Far parties can also have a lasting impact on their political systems, namely by polarizing the party structure (Harmel and Svasand, 1997; Bale, 2003). Beyond that, scholars have found that immigration and unemployment are key structural factors that contribute to the success of the far-right in Europe. However, there remain significant questions about the role of these two factors; in particular, scholars disagree on the importance of objective levels of immigration and unemployment in promoting demand for far-right politics (Golder, 2003). For one, Cochrane and Nevitte (2012) have argued that unemployment rates only predict anti-immigrant sentiment in countries where there is already a far-right political presence. Essentially, they argue that existing far-right parties use high rates of unemployment to support their anti-immigrant agendas, arguing that immigrants are to blame for the lack of work available to native-born citizens (Cochrane and Nevitte, 2012). In this vein, Lamprianou and Ellinas (2017) found that economic grievances do not directly predict far-right voting; rather economic grievances erode public trust in political institutions, leading voters to look for alternatives such as far-right parties.

The legacy of European fascism is also apparent in the rhetoric and beliefs of the far-right. For one, far-right parties work toward a vision of the population as a single political identity, bound together by a shared ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious history, so as to make inclusion within a national group based on ethnic criteria. In general, the far-right favors an ethnic understanding of citizenship (*jus sanguinis*) over a territorial one (*just soli*) (Rydgren, 2007). This insistence on the importance of language and culture to nationality is not restricted to the far-right: of the 27 European Union member states, only six had citizenship/language tests in 2006, compared to 18 in 2013 (Wodak, 2013). In this vein, European far-right parties tend to promote "ethno-pluralism," which entails the notion that, in order to preserve the unique characters of each nation state, their peoples must be kept separate (Rydgren, 2007). In fact, the far-right tends to position group outsiders as threats to the well-being of the ethnically homogenous population. In general, this is manifested in a distrust of immigrants and international elites—in fact, many far-right parties promote the idea that the nation state is being weakened by undesirable immigration and the overinvolvement of international players in the economy

(Rydgren, 2007). For this reason, most scholars agree that there is a common thread of ethnonationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism running through the European far-right (Rydgren, 2007). Thus, in the absence of definitive structural conditions, it would seem that culture has a significant role to play in the emergence of far-right parties.

THE SCANDINAVIAN FAR-RIGHT

The Sweden Democrats, the Danish People's Party, and the Norwegian Progress Party have all experienced a remarkable level of electoral success over the past decades. In the last election, held in the summer of 2015, the Danish People's Party took over 20% of the vote, giving them the largest share of the vote of any right-wing party (Nardelli and Arnett, 2015). Following the 2018 Swedish election, the Sweden Democrats hold 62 seats in the parliament; although they are far from forming a majority, the coalitionary nature of Swedish government means that the Sweden Democrats will likely exercise a significant amount of power in the new parliament (Mudde, 2018). The Norwegian Progress Party, for its part, joined in a coalition government following the 2013 election in Norway (Nardelli and Arnett, 2015). At one level, this success is, in part, due to the proportional representation electoral systems popular in the Scandinavian countries which, unlike the first past the post system practices in the UK and Canada, allow parties with sparse, geographically widespread support to gain a foothold in parliament (Nardelli and Arnett, 2015). At another level, however, the success of the far-right in these countries is also reflective of changing attitudes and preferences among the electorate in these countries. That said, given the lack of other structural factors supporting the growth of the far-right, such as high unemployment, it is remarkable that these parties have enough support across their respective countries to form a powerful political entity.

The Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—are characterized by strong welfare states. In Esping-Anderson's (1990) typology, the Scandinavian states typify the social democratic welfare state; these states push for the highest level of equality, rather than simply an equality of minimum needs. In these states, the state assumes responsibility for a large range of social rights, and takes over the burden of care of the population (Swenson, 2004). As **Table 1** shows, data from the International Social Survey Programme's 2013 survey on National Identity (ISSP Research Group, 2015) show that the social services system in Denmark, Norway and Sweden are overwhelmingly popular with their respective populations (see **Table 1**). As the delivery of social services is a key feature of the welfare state, their popularity can be taken as a measure of popular support for the welfare state. The far-right in these three countries is unusually supportive of the welfare state; while some far-right groups rail against big government, the Scandinavian parties argue for a strong welfare state whose protections are limited to an ethnically bounded national polity (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015). This feature alone distinguishes the Scandinavian far right from far-right politics in North

Pride in social services system

America, that tend to feature a strong distrust of the state (Lyons, 2017).

The lack of key structural conditions—such as high immigration rates, or high unemployment—makes the strength of the Scandinavian far-right parties of particular interest. Unemployment is low in all three countries: in early 2018, the unemployment rate was 4.8% in Denmark, 4% in Norway, and 6.2% in Sweden (Eurostat, 2018). Furthermore, immigration into the Scandinavian states is on par with, or lower than, other European countries. For example, over one fifth of the German population were first or second-generation immigrants, while only roughly 17.3% of the Norwegian population is first or second generation, as is roughly 13% of the Danish population (Thomasson, 2017; Statbank Denmark, 2018; Statistics Norway, 2018). Rates of immigration to Sweden are higher than in the other two countries, in part due to more relaxed immigration laws (Jakobsen et al., 2018), so that, in 2017, about 2.5 million of the population of roughly 10 million in Sweden were first or second-generation immigrants (Statistics Sweden, 2017). Given research that suggests that high immigration and high unemployment—specifically, high immigration in a context of high unemployment—are key structural conditions for the success of far-right parties, the success of the Scandinavian far-right suggests that there must be something over and above structural conditions allowing for their success. One possible explanation is that ideological undercurrents of ethnonationalism and welfare chauvinism among the Scandinavian populations provide a fertile ground for the growth of far-right parties, regardless of the structural conditions of the country in question.

Ethnonationalist Sentiments Among the Scandinavian Populations

Ethnonationalism involves the imposition of ethnic criteria for belonging to a national identity group; that is, when national identity is conceptualized as ethnically bounded. In this scenario, criteria for belonging tend to be linguistic, cultural, religious, and ethnic (Fozdar and Low, 2015). **Table 2** below presents data from the International Social Survey Programme's 2013 survey on

national identity, which asked respondents from across Europe about their opinions on what was important for national identity (Brien and Beck, 2015).

Data from the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish surveys show that speaking the language was generally seen as the most important marker of national identity; citizenship, too, was seeing as highly important. Birthplace and ethnic ancestry were also seen as fairly important overall, however to a lesser degree than language and citizenship. This trend, however, does not hold for religion, which only about a fifth of the respective population found to be important for establishing the national identity (ISSP Research Group, 2015). This points to a specific kind of ethnonationalist sentiment, one where national identity is centered around a shared language and history, and around a sense of belonging, and obligation, to the state (in the form of citizenship), and one where religion plays and insignificant role. The secularity of the Scandinavian states may explain the little importance placed on religion by the survey respondents.

In conclusion, our analysis here shows that there is a strong foundation of ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship and identity amongst Norwegians, Danes, and Swedes. We now move to a qualitative analysis of party platforms of the far-right political parties in each country, with an eye to identifying the interplay between gender, ethno-nationalism and race in creating anti-immigrant and exclusionary framings of citizenship and belonging.

Party Platforms: Findings

The Danish People's Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Norwegian Progress Party are all clear on their view of the family as the foundation of society, and advocate state protection and promotion of children's interests, in particular their right to both parents. The Danish People's Party even goes so far as to say that "[t]he ties of intimacy between husband and wife and children and parents are the pillars of Danish society and of great importance for the future of the country." (2002). Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats (2018) take a strong stance against child marriage, and forced marriage, advocating, like the (Danish People's Party, 2002), for an age limit of 24 years

Characteristics important to national identity

Legend:
- Being born in the country?
- Speaking the language?
- Having [country's] ancestry?
- Following the dominant religion?
- Having [country's] citizenship?

on marriage for foreign nationals. The Sweden Democrats also push natalist policies, such as government allowances for parents, and argue against the "use it or lose it" paternal leave common in Scandinavia. The Sweden Democrats (2018) clarify that their stance on the family comes from their view of it as an important carrier of culture and tradition. In this vein, all three parties worry about the threats to their cultures posed by immigration, advocation "fair and sustainable" immigration policies that control levels of immigration and allow for integration and assimilation of immigrants (Danish People's Party, 2002; Norwegian Progress Party, 2017; Sweden Democrats, 2018).

In line with their reputations, all three Scandinavian far-right parties maintain anti-immigrant stances. The Danish People's Party says it perhaps the clearest, declaring on their website that "Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus, we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society" (2002). The three parties emphasize restricting immigration to those immigrants who would respect the laws, cultures, and traditions of Sweden, Norway, or Denmark, and who would be easily assimilated (Danish People's Party, 2002; Norwegian Progress Party, 2017; Sweden Democrats, 2018). In this vein, both the Sweden Democrats (2018) and Norwegian Progress Party (2017) advocate for strict linguistic and cultural requirements for citizenship, even arguing for mandatory social orientation. The Sweden Democrats (2018), on their website, also call for a crackdown on illegal immigration. In this vein, all three parties are united in their calls for a strengthened security state, arguing for stricter laws, harsher punishments, more surveillance, and a stronger police force (Danish People's Party, 2002; Norwegian Progress Party, 2017; Sweden Democrats, 2018).

The three parties are vocal about their support for the welfare state, advocating for strong health care and social services. Common to all three is also the idea that care for children, for the elderly, and for persons with disabilities is a national responsibility, and should be taken seriously (Danish People's Party, 2002; Norwegian Progress Party, 2017; Sweden Democrats, 2018). However, the Norwegian Progress Party (2017), Sweden Democrats (2018) clearly argue for a privileging of Swedish citizens within the welfare state; they both go so far as advocating that access to social services be linked to citizenship status.

As the only country out of the three to still have a state church, the Danish People's Party are the clearest of the three parties about the importance of Christianity to their society. In the English language section of their website, the Danish People's Party (2002) argues that Christianity is crucial to Danish culture, and critical for the development of freedom, openness and democracy in any country. Interestingly, the Danish People's Party (2002) also stands in support of the monarchy, displaying a fundamentally conservative social stance. All three parties, however, advocate for Islamophobic policies, although at times covertly. For example, the Sweden Democrats propose banning halal slaughter of animals under the guise of preventing animal cruelty. Similarly, they also argue for a special category of punishment for the perpetrators of "honor crimes," a clear allusion to religiously motivated crimes (Sweden Democrats, 2018). Moreover, the Sweden Democrats (2018) contend that, while life for sexual and gender minorities is (and should be) improving in Sweden, the threat to LGTBQ peoples is worst in those parts of the country where Swedish culture is the weakest, and "foreign" cultures are the strongest.

The three parties also all display isolationist tendencies when it comes to foreign affairs. All three are anti-EU, arguing that the EU robs countries of their sovereignty. They also argue that their governments should be doing peacekeeping work so as to allow migrants and refugees to return to their homelands, rather than offering them asylum: the Sweden Democrats (2018) go so far as to say that they "want to stop receiving asylum seekers in Sweden and instead go for real aid for refugees. We want to enable more immigrants turning back to their native countries." They

further propose that the Scandinavian countries need stronger militaries and police, and more secure borders to protect their citizens (Danish People's Party, 2002; Norwegian Progress Party, 2017; Sweden Democrats, 2018). As the Danish People's Party says, "Denmark belongs to the Danes, and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law" (2018).

There is a striking similarity between the three parties in their stated goals and positions. All three parties look for a return to a more homogenous, more conservative society. The parties also show consistency in terms of diagnosing social ills and identifying scapegoats: the Sweden Democrats (2018) paint a dystopian picture of Sweden, of its civil society as crumbling and overrun by criminals, terrorists and gangs. Similarly, Norwegian Progress Party (2017) may lament the state of affairs in Sweden, arguing that the only way for Norwegian society to avoid falling into disorder like in Sweden is to place strict limits on immigration. In sum, not only are the Sweden Democrats (2018), Norwegian Progress Party (2017) and the Danish People's Party (2002) alike in their anti-immigrant stances, our examination of their platforms showed them to be closely aligned in their positions on security, on foreign relations, on the role of the family, and on the welfare system.

DISCUSSION

We find that the party platforms for the three main Scandinavian far-right parties—the Danish People's Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats—present a vision of society with the nuclear family as the foundation; the Sweden Democrats are particularly vocal in the support for the heteronormative nuclear family. All three parties further advocate for strong social support for the family, such as government support for young children, placing the family in a privileged position within the welfare state. Beyond that, all three parties advocate for strong border control, and severe limitations on both the number and the kind of immigrants that should be admitted. They are all vocal on the threat to their respective national cultures posed by excessive levels of immigration, with a special focus on immigrants from non-Christian, non-European, and non-white backgrounds. Coupled with their anti-immigrant stances—party rhetoric tends to frame immigrants as threats to the culture of the nation—their view of the family points to a construction of the ideal citizen as white, middle-class, and heteronormative. We argue that the success of far-right parties is due, at least in part, to a fertile ground of pre-existing ethnonationalist tendencies among the Scandinavian populations. More than that, these pre-existing tendencies have given rise to a unique form of far-right politics: one focused on transforming citizenship within the welfare state. Key to this project is a particular vision of what the citizen and the state are/should be; gender underpins both.

Recently, Elgenius and Rydgren (2018) highlighted the role of anti-immigrant sentiment in driving support for far-right parties. Our analysis confirms this and points to three main frames through which these ideas are refracted and disseminated:

first, that immigrants compete with native-born for welfare state resources; second, that immigrants present a critical threat to ethno-national identity; third, that immigrant values pose a threat to social-democratic and progressive values of the Nordic states (Elgenius and Rydgren, 2018). This kind of framing is for instance reflected in the Norwegian People's Party platform that highlights "Western" values of freedom and opportunity Norwegian Progress Party (2017) and suggests that Norway welcome only those who conform with those values.

These framings are intimately linked to popular understandings that merge belonging to a nation-state with having access to valuable social rights: for instance, Nordensvard and Ketola (2015) argue that the Swedish far-right, in particular, exemplifies a populist discourse that brings together the nation state and the welfare state. In general, Scandinavian far-right parties work to reframe the welfare state as belonging to a particular, distinct political community, where inclusion within the state's protective framework is dependent on ethnic and national belonging (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015). In our analysis, we found that both Norwegian Progress Party (2017) and the Sweden Democrats (2018) advocate for tying access to certain welfare state services to citizenship, and for ending what they refer to as "special benefits" for immigrants Norwegian Progress Party (2017).

We find, however, in addition, and following on recent work (see in particular Siim and Meret, 2016; Siim and Borchorst, 2017) that gendered understandings are used to amplify these frames, and create urgency and resonance to far-right claims. Interestingly, however, gendered understandings of citizenship are used to contradictory purposes in far-right rhetoric: First, to use Nordic values of gender egalitarianism in a way so as to create hierarchical distinctions between Nordic citizens and others; at the same time, the party platforms also reject the Nordic brand of egalitarianism, in favor of more traditionalist constructions of women's role in society and politics.

This first use of gender can be seen, for one, in rhetoric among the parties that gender inequality and oppression is a feature of minority groups, whereas it has been eliminated in mainstream society (see also Siim, 2008). The Danish People's Party, 2002) has an official stance against forced marriage, while failing to differentiate it from arranged marriage. This is a useful rhetoric device for these groups as it portrays women (of color) as victims of their own culture, but also sets up a dichotomy between Danish culture and other cultures, providing the former with a kind of progressive moral superiority. Another example here can be seen in the "cultural racism" of the Sweden Democrats (Mulinari and Neergaard, 2014); racism is given the cloak of gender egalitarianism through claims of the need to protect Swedish women from immigrants and migrants. At the same time, embedded in the party platforms of all parties are policy ideas that reject contemporary egalitarianism: for instance, the removal of mandatory "father" days as part of parental leave policies, as well as policies to give biological fathers' rights prior to the birth of a child (Sweden Democrats,

2018). Interestingly, these parties are not overtly homophobic—the Sweden Democrats (2018) even go so far as to argue that gender and sexuality and inborn and that individuals should not be harassed for their sexual orientation—but still strongly advocate policies that support and promote heteronormative family structures.

However, perhaps the most prominent theme of our analysis is the interplay and intersection between gendered claims and ethno-nationalist claims to citizenship. It is important here to emphasize some of the unique features of the Scandinavian far-right, in particular in comparison to other European members of the far-right political family. There are, first of all, key differences in terms of immediate structural triggers of far-right mobilization, as we discussed above. Second, as also mentioned earlier, the Scandinavian far-right has emerged in the context of a strong social welfare state and a strong social and political attachment to that state. A final point of difference, although one less explored in this paper, has to do with the historical backdrop against which the far-right in Europe currently operates. In continental Europe, new far-right parties must contend with the living history and ongoing memorialization of a traumatic fascist past. The citizen-nation framework is an important element of the memorializations of this past; official and unofficial accounts of the 2nd world war in Europe must account not just for the role of fascist state actors but also the role of the citizenry. How memorialization activities of the 2nd world war provide context for the emergence of far-right remains somewhat understudied, but there is emerging research on how these memorializations provide the context for both official and unofficial re-casting of citizens' roles in fascist regimes as well as "forgetful" renderings of the 2nd world war (Forest et al., 2004; Fisher, 2007). Examples here include both Hungary and Poland, where there has been a significant official campaign to rewrite the role of citizenry during the Nazi years (Barna, 2015; Grunwald, 2017). These histories however, play both a less prominent and a different role in Nordic memorializations of the twentieth century. The Scandinavian far-right, is in this way, a *new* discourse on Nordic belonging and citizenship, one that is less bound by both direct and mediated memories of European fascism, racism, and genocide.

Far-right groups do not exist outside of existing citizen-nation frameworks—that is, they are not free from the influences of existing conceptions of the role of state and of citizen in the welfare state. The welfare state structure implies a particular formation of citizenship—one where the lines of obligation between state and citizen are reciprocal. Welfare states, like the Scandinavian ones, work to create reciprocal lines of obligation between state and citizen by introducing laws and social programs which all citizens pay into, and are dependent upon, all the while working to instill feelings of obligation in the population (Esping-Anderson, 1990). In this way, the state structure shapes understanding of citizenship—both the rights attached to it, and the responsibilities. The state also performs important work in drawing the line between group insiders and outsiders—between citizens and foreigners (Revi, 2012). Social citizenship grants citizens access to services and goods administered by the state irrespective of

their market capacities (Korpi, 2006). Because of this, the distribution of services, and social rights, serves to draw boundaries around "the people," distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens; only those recognized by the state are placed under its protection (Revi, 2012). The sheer wealth of resources and services available within the welfare state mean that these boundaries are especially clear. When conceptions of national belonging based on ethnic criteria are institutionalized, then, citizenship, in turn, becomes based on ethnic criteria. When far-right parties engage in discourse of welfare chauvinism, they are not only advocating for a restriction of kinds of individuals that can access the social services system; rather, they are also advocating for a restricted understanding of citizenship within the welfare state, one that is based upon ethnic understandings of national belonging. We find by appealing to gendered values, in particular valorizing gender egalitarianism while simultaneously rewriting gender platforms into more traditionalist and heteronormative conceptions, far-right parties use gender as signal or trope for exclusionary, and ethno-nationalist politics.

CONCLUSION

In 2015, one in six people living in Sweden were born outside of the country, a 67% increase since 2000; half of those are from non-European countries (Statistics Sweden, 2017). Norway and Denmark have seen similar, albeit smaller increases in foreign-born residents over the same time period. Understanding the conditions and contexts for the emergence of far-right politics in response to this trend is clearly important and pressing, as is understanding how far-right politics place more generally a challenge to democratic politics in Northern Europe.

Far-right politics in the Nordic welfare states are characterized by a strong element of welfare state chauvinism, in which social rights are posited as rare, valuable, and zero-sum, and that their distribution must therefore rest on having appropriate ethno-nationalist credentials. This is an interesting phenomenon; whereas in other contexts, far-right politics seek to dismantle the state, in Scandinavia, far-right politics appear to seek to reconceptualize citizenship rights along ethno-nationalist dimensions, while at the same time deepening and thickening these rights. Given the pre-existing importance of ethnic markers to national identity in Nordic countries, however, the main work done by the far-right in these countries is not so much to convince them of the importance of ethnic markers in national identity, but of the threat to the welfare state posed by "outsiders."

Gendered conceptions of citizenship—who belongs, what constitutes belonging, and what web of mutual obligations exist between states and citizens—are key to far-right politics in Scandinavia. Far-right parties in Scandinavia emphasize the thickness of the relationships between the state and the citizen, but they impose ethnic and gendered criteria on those relationships. Outsiders, especially those of suspect origins (that is not European or Christian) are positioned as undeserving of the social protections of the state by dint of their social distance

from the "ideal" (white) citizen. This tactic is integral to the success of these parties in Scandinavia: instead of threatening the welfare state, the far-right in these countries frames itself as the defender of the welfare state against outside forces.

The far-right in Scandinavia thus uses gender and ethno-nationalist claims to simultaneously valorize and challenge egalitarianism in the welfare state while also shoring up exclusionary and anti-democratic claims to citizenship and belonging in the Nordic welfare state. The case of the emergence of far-right politics in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, illustrates that even strong states that are ostensibly formed around inclusionary politics can provide the context for the emergence of exclusionary politics and rhetoric. In this, the Scandinavian nations form a sort of exception to the pathways taken by right-wing parties in Southern Europe or in the United Kingdom and the United States. Whereas, in these states, there is a growing consensus that far-right politics has grown out of social and economic rupture and political polarization, the Nordic case illustrates that ethno-nationalism can also provide fodder for far-right movements on their own. In addition, within the context of a cradle-to-grave welfare state, inclusionary citizenship discourse could be used to justify exclusionary politics, by emphasizing the importance of shared history and shared ethno-national identity to the access of valuable social rights. Our focus was on how gendered language in their political platforms was used to amplify and strengthen ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship. The limitations of this study include however its focus on the party platforms of political parties; there is a pressing need to understand the complex ways in which the messaging of these parties is taken up and understood by citizens of these states, and to understand the contexts through which these claims may find resonance.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

MF completed the quantitative analysis and the bulk of the qualitative analysis and conducted the literature review for right-wing activism in Europe and welfare state chauvinism. HH contributed the literature review around gender and citizenship and to the qualitative analysis. Both authors are equally responsible for the framing of the paper, the writing, editing, and direction.

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Affective Attachments: Women's Suffrage in Austria and the Social Democratic Struggle for Women's Votes in *Die Unzufriedene*

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"Human progress lies in discontent!" was the motto of the Austrian magazine *Die Unzufriedene* (*The Discontented*). It was first published in 1923 as an "independent weekly magazine" designed to reach "all women." Yet, it was first and foremost a Social Democratic journal, established to socialize women politically and to obtain women's votes outside the Social Democratic purview in the 1923 National Council elections. Since women's suffrage had been established only a few years earlier, the struggle for women's votes was of utmost importance. This essay argues for understanding the journal as a mode and an instrument for the mobilization of affects for Social Democratic ends. Proposing the concept of affective attachments, it shows how the Austrian Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) used the journal in an ambivalent way to affectively address women and to create political moods that would attract them to the party's political agenda.

Keywords: women's suffrage, social democracy, affective politics, belonging, agency, discontent, Austria

INTRODUCTION

In her recent book *Crowds and Party*, Dean (2016) calls for reconfiguring the party form as a way to strengthen the emancipatory potential of left-wing politics. The party she envisions explicitly bears the crucial yet often neglected dimension of affect. Within politics, and particularly political parties today, emphasizing affect and emotions is nothing new. However, whether affect and passions are indeed instructive for emancipatory politics, as Dean suggests, remains contested—particularly in light of the rise in right-wing populist affective politics. In the early 2000s, Mouffe already attributed part of the success of right-wing parties to their ability to provide objects that voters could identify with. For Mouffe (2005, p. 25) this does not mean to suggest dismissing passions in politics but, rather, paying attention to and acknowledging passions as both driving forces and as a crucial mode of collective identification, especially during elections:

> In voting is an important affective dimension. [...] [W]hat is at stake there is a question of identification. In order to act politically, people need to be able to identify with a collective identity which provides an idea of themselves they can valorize. Political discourse has to offer not only policies but also identities which can help people make sense of what they are experiencing as well as giving them hope for the future.

Consequently, emancipatory politics needs to mobilize passions for democratic goals (Mouffe, 2001).

FIGURE 1 | First edition of *The Discontented* (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c) (Source: Association for the History of the Workers' Movement, Vienna; used with permission).

Awareness of the importance of political affects both structures and shapes the early twentieth century Social Democratic magazine *Die Unzufriedene* (*The Discontented*[1]). The magazine, however, does not merely stress the feeling of discontent, as its name suggests. By claiming that "Human progress lies in discontent!"[2] it also deems this feeling to work in favor of political transformation. The magazine was created in 1923 as an "independent weekly magazine" that sought to reach "all women" (see **Figure 1**). That being said, it was most of all a Social Democratic "militant magazine" (Hons-Nowotny, 1933, p. 6) or as Bader-Zaar (1996, p. 73) writes, an "easily digestible Social Democratic propaganda newspaper with articles on social legislation [...] and selected feminist objectives [...] interspersed with stories on housekeeping, fashion, and novels." It was, after all, established in order to socialize women politically and to obtain women's votes outside the Social Democratic purview in the upcoming National Council[3] elections. Since women's suffrage had been established only a few years earlier, in 1918, the struggle for women's votes was of utmost importance.

I suggest an affective reading of the magazine, which can help better grasp the complex ways in which affect has been mobilized for Social Democratic ends[4]. For some years now, the "affective turn" (cf. Clough and Halley, 2007; Koivunen, 2010; Bargetz and Sauer, 2015) has attracted and affected a variety of disciplines, amongst others the historical sciences, where the "history of emotions" was introduced "with a great deal of fanfare and frills," as Frevert (2009, p. 183) put it a few years ago. In my reading I specifically draw upon queer feminist insights on affective politics (cf. Sauer, 1999; Berlant, 2008; Ahmed, 2010; Bargetz, 2014b) and propose the concept of affective attachments. I argue that the magazine is not merely an object of affective identification as Mouffe claims. Rather, it is both an object and a mode of creating a mood for people to vote in favor of Social Democracy. As Flatley (2008, p. 23) asserts, any "kind of political project must have the "making and using" of mood as part and parcel of the project." The magazine represents an object that helps create,

nurture, or gesture toward structures of belonging. It provides a space of recognition and includes moments of caring and sharing, of hope and solidarity. Affective attachments are created and worked upon through the invocation of a social imaginary and the promise of a different future.

Yet, speaking of affective attachments also means investigating how affect is mobilized as a rhetoric of difference for the justification and reproduction of structural hierarchies as well as modes of exclusion and erasure. Historically, affect and emotions have frequently been devalued and delegitimized politically through their association with gender, sex, race, and class. In this manner, affect and emotions prove to be sticky because affect is, as Ahmed (2010, p. 29) writes, "what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects." Affects are sticky in the sense that multiple differences and hierarchies are attached to them. Affect and emotions are thus a contested battleground. In this manner, the concept of affective attachments asks how (manifold) sentiments are unequally distributed through *The Discontented* in order to create affective investments with and feelings of belonging to Social Democracy.

The concept of affective attachments offers a way for further theorizing an understanding of affective politics and bringing to light how affective registers are deployed for the purpose of political mobilization. Affective attachments emphasize both the connective and sticky mode of affect as well as the affective traces of social hierarchies and differences and how these are re-articulated politically. Developing the concept of affective attachments with regard to *The Discontented*, I also hope to offer more than a way of thinking through political affect. I engage with a magazine that has only rarely been explored in more detail[5] compared to other Social Democratic magazines from that same era such as the *Kuckuck* (*The Cuckoo*)[6]. Keeping in mind the magazine's aim of mobilizing women, I examine especially the

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[1]Throughout the article I translate the periodical's name *Die Unzufriedene* with *The Discontented* to keep with the magazine's telling name.

[2]All translations are by the author.

[3]The National Council is the legislative assembly.

[4]This paper is based on a short essay published in German (Bargetz, 2018).

[5]For some insightful master's theses cf. Billeth, 2003; Lillich, 2004; Gruber, 2007; Furchheim, 2009; Kraus, 2016.

[6]The Social Democratic magazine *Der Kuckuck* (*The Cuckoo*), published between 1929 and 1934, was one of the first "modern picture magazines in Austria" (Riesenfellner and Seiter, 1995, p. 7) and was meant to compete with nonpolitical mainstream boulevard weeklies through explicitly addressing a younger (working-class) audience.

issues that appeared around the elections of the First Republic. My analysis draws on feature and lead articles, the column entitled *Was sich Frauen von der Seele reden* (*Women Speak from the Heart*[7]), as well as letters to the editors and the magazine's responses. All these sections articulate relational dimensions. Conceiving of affect as a mode of relationality and connectivity—attachment, Berlant (2011, p. 13) observes, is a "*structure of relationality*"—these sections are therefore of particular interest in terms of an understanding of affective attachments.

SITUATING *THE DISCONTENTED*

In 1923, the year *The Discontented* was founded, the First Austrian Republic had been existing for only 5 years. The Republic was established after the end of World War I and marked the downfall of the centuries-long Habsburg Empire. In its place, a republican political system was introduced though, with it, came political conflicts and economic problems. The initial coalition between the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) and the Christian Social Party (CSP) was short-lived. When the coalition collapsed in 1920, the SDAP went into the opposition until 1934, when it was dissolved in the wake of the May Constitution and the emergence of the Austrofascist state[8]. The only exception was Austria's capital. Here, the SDAP won the absolute majority in the 1919 municipal election, paving the way for a strong Social Democratic opposition—what came to be known as Rotes Wien (Red Vienna)—to the conservative national government until 1934.

The end of the Habsburg Monarchy and the founding of the First Republic turned out to be a felicitous moment for women's suffrage—in contrast to the situation 11 years earlier, when Social Democratic women agreed to withdraw their own demand for suffrage in favor of obtaining a universal male suffrage. Still, compared to other European countries, demands for women's suffrage were voiced relatively late in Austria. These "belated demands" (Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 61) were closely linked to the political circumstances of the time. Women first demanded (active and passive[9]) universal suffrage[10] during the 1848 revolution and formed associations such as the Vienna Democratic Women's Association (Hauch, 1995a, p. 276; Hauch, 1995b, p. 30f). The situation changed drastically

once the revolution was repressed (Hauch, 1995b, p. 38; Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 61). The political opportunity structures did not favor women or their political struggles and became even less favorable when the 1849 and 1867 legislations prohibited women alongside minors and foreigners to form or join any kind of political association (Hauch, 1995b, p. 39). Demands for women's suffrage only resurfaced in the 1890s following the emergence of the women's movement in the 1880s[11]. In 1893, after three unsuccessful petitions, the Allgemeiner Österreichischer Frauenverein (AÖFV, General Austrian Women's Association)[12] was permitted—yet only after it was declared as explicitly apolitical association (Hauch, 1995b, p. 44).

FEAR OF WOMEN'S VOTES

Introducing the right to vote for (most) women in Austria in 1918[13] was not only met with enthusiasm but also with fear and uncertainty, amongst both the Christian Social and Social Democratic camp. The Christian Social Party (CSP) feared that politically conservative and presumably disinterested women would refrain from voting and that the votes of "radical women" would prevail (Zaar, 1998, p. 68). The Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) had been the first to advocate for women's suffrage in the 1890s, integrating this demand into their political program in 1892. In the early twentieth century, however, this goal was subordinated to demands for male universal suffrage. In 1903, the founder of the SDAP, Victor Adler, stated that demanding universal suffrage for men and women at the same time would cause a distraction and would even be "politically foolish" (2. Reichsfrauenkonferenz 1903, qtd. in Ellmeier, 2006, p. 7). When male universal suffrage was finally introduced in 1907, Adler conceded that it had mainly been achieved through "the sacrifice, discipline, understanding, and dedication of our female comrades" who had "voluntarily and self-evidently accepted the tactical necessities of this struggle" (Adler, qtd. in Dohnal, 1988, p. 9)[14].

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[7] I adopt Gruber's (1991, p. 88) translation of the column's name.
[8] On 12 February 1934, the police had started searching for weapons in the Social Democratic party secretary in Linz. As a reaction, members of the Social Democratic Republican Schutzbund, the paramilitary organization of the SDAP that had been forbidden the year before, opened fire. The uprising soon spread to other industrial towns in Austria, also to Vienna. Already the year before, then Christian Social chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß had used the resignation of all three presidents of the National Council to declare the elimination of the parliament and to install an authoritarian government. In May 1934, the Dollfuss regime decided on a new constitution, which manifested the authoritarian state.
[9] While active suffrage refers to the right to vote, passive suffrage designates the right to be nominated for election.
[10] Officially, suffrage was not limited to men then. It rather referred to an informal rule, as Hauch (1995b, p. 30) stresses, where women's alleged political immaturity seems to have made it unnecessary to even explicitly exclude them.

[11] Still, it is necessary to acknowledge the differences between bourgeois-liberal, Social Democratic and the autonomous suffragette movements (Bader-Zaar, 2006, p. 1007; Hauch, 1995b, p. 44).
[12] Existing from 1893 to 1919, the association's aim was to represent an autonomous position, without links to any of the political parties. Despite this, it did collaborate with the Social Democrats from time to time, but maintained a strict separation from the bourgeois Christian Social camp. (http://www.fraueninbewegung.onb.ac.at/Pages/OrganisationenDetail.aspx?p_iOrganisationID=8675071) (accessed April 2, 2019).
[13] Sex workers obtained this right only five years later in 1923.
Some women already had the right to vote a few decades earlier (Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 61). After 1849 in the Austrian region of the Habsburg monarchy, some women were allowed to vote—actively, but mostly not passively. Suffrage was then based on property and not on sexual difference (Initiative 70 Jahre Frauenwahlrecht, 1989, p. 2). In this sense, the universal suffrage for men in 1905 was even a drawback for some (privileged) women.
[14] This approval, however, was a contested issue. For instance, at the 1903 Social Democratic Women's Conference Therese Schlesinger advocated fighting for women's suffrage while Charlotte Glas-Pohl supported the party line (Bader-Zaar, 2006, p. 1017). Again in 1905, at the Vienna General Party Conference of the SDAP, Adelheid Popp declared that it was not the right time to engage in the struggle for women's suffrage. However, she did emphasize that Social Democratic women were deeply convinced of the backing they would receive from the men as the "first spokesmen and [...] pioneers", once they were "liberated from political servitude"

Ultimately, it was Social Democrats' anxieties, rather than those of the Christian Socials, that became reality. At the first National Council elections in 1920, women voted as conservatively as they had the year before in the Constituent National Assembly[15] elections (Zaar, 1998, p. 68). This tendency continued until 1930[16]. Regarding the 1927 National Council elections, Danneberg (1927, p. 14), a Social Democrat Member of Parliament and key politician of the Red Vienna era, stated that "60% of women's votes were bourgeois and 40% Marxist, while the men voted 55:45, respectively." He concluded that, "Women's suffrage has cost us five mandates" (Danneberg, 1927, p. 14). Social Democratic women, however, continuously rejected such accusations and blame, emphasizing instead the party's overall loss of votes and the need for common struggles (Hauch, 1995a, p. 280).

POLITICIZING DISSATISFACTION AND DISAFFECTION

Against this background, the magazine *The Discontented* was founded to generate an interest for and an attachment to the Social Democrats[17]. With the creation of the *Arbeiterinnen-Zeitung* (ANZ, *Women Workers' Newspaper*, renamed *Die Frau/The Woman* in 1924) in 1892, Social Democrats were already publishing an independent women's newspaper. The *Women Workers' Newspaper*, however, mainly reached women already involved in the party or in trade unions. In order to attract a broader audience, Max Winter launched *The Discontented*. Winter was not only the magazine's founder and first editor-in-chief, he also was the author of numerous social reportages for the Social Democratic *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (AZ, *Workers' Newspaper*) as well as a politician. Another major figure of the magazine was Eugenie Brandl, the magazine's administrative editor. After Winter left the magazine in 1933 at the age of 64, his former colleague Paula Hons-Novotny, who had started as a secretary to the editor in 1927, took his place as editor-in-chief[18]. While in-depth research on the magazine's editors and authors is lacking, it is interesting to note that both male and female authors contributed to *The Discontented*[19]. Following the February 1934

(Bader-Zaar, 2006, p. 1018). In Germany, Clara Zetkin and August Bebel criticized postponing the demand for women's suffrage as too modest and for not taking advantage of the political opportunities (Hauch, 1995b, p. 363).

[15]In February 1919, elections were held for the Constituent National Assembly, which shortly after, in November 1920, was replaced by the Austrian Parliament (consisting of the National Council and the Federal Council).

[16]These insights were possible, since men's and women's votes were placed in differently colored envelopes since the 1920s: light gray for men and blue-gray for women (Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 71).

[17]According to Bader-Zaar (1996, p. 70), the main question during the First Republic was not the women's right to vote, but rather finding ways "to manipulate women voters to the party's advantage". On these grounds, some Austrian provinces with a high Christian Social electorate like Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol and Vorarlberg introduced compulsory suffrage.

[18]She is also known as Hons or Novotny, her maiden name.

[19]A complete table of contents of *The Discontented* can be found under the following link that is provided by the Austrian National Library https://www.onb.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/1_Sitemap/Forschung/Ariadne/PDF_Inhaltsverzeichnisse/Die_Unzufriedene_inhalt.pdf (accessed April 2, 2019).

uprisings, the magazine's publication was temporarily suspended. After being politically completely revamped, it reappeared as *Das kleine Frauenblatt: eine unabhängige Wochenschrift für alle Frauen* (*The Little Women's Magazine: An Independent Weekly for all Women*), a political organ of the Austrofascist state.

The idea behind *The Discontented* was to keep the magazine simple and to strike a good balance between politics, education, entertainment, and self-help. It was relatively cheap in comparison to other magazines and newspapers, so as not to burden workers' tight budget. It was published once a week and was successful in reaching a large audience quickly. The first edition consisted of 59,000 copies; 106,400 by the end of December 1923; and 161,400 copies at its peak in 1930 (Furchheim, 2009, p. 2). A survey of 1,320 female factory workers in Vienna in the 1930s (Leichter, 1932) has shown that 21,4% read *Die Unzufriedene* (*The Discontented*), 48,2% read the daily *Das Kleine Blatt* (*The Little Newspaper*), and 28,8% read the daily *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (*Workers' Newspaper*) (Gruber, 1991, p. 89). The high rate of success from the very first issue onwards helped keep the magazine going, even though its initial purpose had only been to secure votes for the 1923 elections.

From a feminist perspective, the magazine's motto—discontent—is highly interesting. Discontent and complaint have been associated with women for many centuries, perhaps even millennia. Almost 2,400 years ago in *Politeia*, his book on the state, Plato demanded "lamenting" be stopped and left for "women" (Platon, 1991, p. 185). *The Discontented* was clearly aware of this trope, as the first issue's description of the magazine's aims suggest. The magazine was not to indulge in "lamenting," "complaining about fate," or "ranting" but to "reveal the actual state of affairs" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). Following Ahmed's (2010) work, *The Discontented* could even be called a "feminist killjoy." With the figure of the feminist killjoy, Ahmed (2010, p. 65) underlines that critiques of (hetero-)sexism are often devalued by considering those uttering such critique as "killing joy" and therefore standing in the way of others' happiness. Ahmed, however, advocates for the appropriation of the image of the feminist killjoy, which means keeping on exposing (hetero-)sexism and remaining politically uncomfortable. Embodying a feminist killjoy *avant la lettre*, *The Discontented* not only affirmed but also emphasized discontent as a mode of critique of ongoing gendered oppression. The first edition displays this when it contentiously asks: "Are we not still the oppressed? The slaves of men, factories, at work on the job or at home? Are we not slaves to our backward culture, our legislation?" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1).

By referencing discontent in its name, the magazine adopts a quite militant tone. Grievances must be named, made public, and fought against together. *The Discontented* aims to serve as the "voice" of oppressed women (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). The first issue explains that patriarchy oppresses women and that this oppression is visible in gender relations, economic and cultural conditions, and the state. Women's oppression, as the magazine states, is "reactionary" and prohibits "progress" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). In this manner and in line with the Social Democratic understanding of progress of that time, the magazine was meant to be a step into the future of a more equal

FIGURE 2 | *The Discontented* in the run-up to the 1923 National Council elections: "The 21st of October be your day of fate!" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923d, p. 6) (Source: ANNO. Historical Austrian newspapers and magazines, Austrian National Library; used with permission).

world. *The Discontented* "leads the fight against all that is unjust, ignorant and backward. Human progress lies in discontent" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). Overcoming patriarchal oppression was therefore both a sign and an expression of democracy.

At times however, this militant tone appears to soften. This is the case when the magazine considers itself less concerned with "letting our fury simply run wild" and more with "showing how to do things better" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). Moreover, although *The Discontented* emphasizes women's agency, it often frames it less as an opportunity and more as a duty. The lead article in the first issue argues women are obligated to take up this responsibility and closes with the following injunction: "If women are to move forward, you too must be discontent" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923c, p. 1). The mobilization of duty and responsibility, then, seems to refer as much to (ascribed) female attributes as to the Social Democratic idea of developing class consciousness. Subsequent issues continue addressing women in moral terms. In view of the upcoming National Council elections, the magazine raises the so-called "question of conscience": Evoking feelings of care and responsibility, the magazine addresses its readers and asks "How will you vote?" so that the elections are not followed by "years of remorse" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923d, p. 1)?

Apparently, this question of conscience may have been especially designed to gain the approval of Christian Social women. This reading is supported by the fact that in an article on 20 October 1923 the "Christian women" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923d, p. 1) is the first one of a total of 32 groups of women to be addressed. Additionally, for instance, Jewish women, German women, Czech women, mothers, servants, factory workers, settlers, blind women, grandmothers, and finally, "all of you" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923d, p. 6; see **Figure 2**) are being reminded of the reasons for voting Social Democracy. A sense of duty and gratitude, albeit in a more combative tone, is also emphasized by Marie T., a reader from the Austrian town of Klagenfurt:

> The Women should think about the fact that the ballot they hold in their hands is a weapon they can use to fight every injustice done unto them. [...] Women suffer under anti-working-class politics, and they have the power to change these politics to meet

their needs. They must recognize the power of women's suffrage and give their vote to those who have given them this right, who understand their suffering, and who can rectify it (T., Die Unzufriedene, 1923e, p. 5).

Four years later, in the run-up to the National Council elections of 1927, the magazine again addresses women's responsibility when it tries to persuade its readers to vote for Social Democracy (see **Figure 3**). One quarter of a double page portrays a bourgeois nuclear family with a servant, meant to represent the past; the rest of the space depicts 8 years of Social Democratic achievements— including the idea of "community," "common property" and a "laundry room" for women (Die Unzufriedene, 1927a, p. 4f)— as well as a glimpse into a Social Democratic future. The image caption is revealing: "Do you want to choose the past, wife and mother, or the future?" (Die Unzufriedene, 1927a, p. 4f).

The Discontented invokes women's affective attachment to Social Democracy through the deployment of anger and dissatisfaction as legitimate political moods. This, however, is only one way of trying to gain their support. Another one is to mobilize gendered sentiments such as gratitude and responsibility—accountability for the fate of Social Democracy, the fate of a democracy that is yet to come.

THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL?

The column *Women Speak from the Heart*, where "every woman has a chance to speak" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923b, p. 5), was meant to enable women to raise their (political) voice outside electoral periods. Since its inception, as Winter (1933, p. 2) notes in his essay "Ten Years of The Discontented," the magazine placed "great emphasis on letting women speak for themselves as much as possible." He describes the idea behind the column as a way of empowering "women who had never taken up a pen before" or have never had the "courage to do so" (Winter, 1933, p. 2). Indeed, the column became an affective political space for women to express a wide range of fears, worries, and everyday problems; or in Winter's words (1933, p. 2), an "inexhaustible abundance of proposals, suggestions, complaints, and opinions

FIGURE 3 | In the run-up to the National Council elections in 1927: "Black or Red. How should I vote? The 24th of April is the Day of Judgment." Die Unzufriedene (1927b, p. 1) (Source: ANNO. Historical Austrian newspapers and magazines, Austrian National Library; used with permission).

concerning the public state of affairs." The affective attachment to the magazine and consequently to Social Democracy itself was meant to succeed by demonstrating that the SDAP took women and their everyday activities seriously. One might describe the column with the famous slogan from the late 1960s/early 1970s as "The personal is political," echoing the longstanding feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy (Patement, 1989). The column allowed the politicization of feminized domesticity and minoritized embodiment. It suggests affective identification both as a part and as basis for political solidarity and thus articulates the potential of deindividualizing and collectivizing

experiences. In this vein, the column underscores the political dimensions of the everyday. The everyday, then, is not the insignificant, unrecognized or banal: rather, it is, as Lefebvre (2002 [1971]) emphasizes, an ambivalent assemblage of practices deeply embedded in power relations (Bargetz, 2014a); and the political is "hidden in the everyday" (Kaplan and Ross, 1987, p. 3).

Ultimately, however, *The Discontented* proved ambivalent. Women's everyday life was at best only partially considered political compared to the more "common" sphere of (state) politics. Furthermore, women were believed to lack political consciousness.

In order to elaborate on these two aspects, it is helpful to have a look at the Social Democratic newspaper *Das Kleine Blatt (The Little Newspaper)*, founded in 1927 as a small-scale, inexpensive and sensationalist daily. Modeled after the English penny press, *The Little Newspaper* was designed to offer an alternative to the *Workers' Newspaper* and to rival bourgeois tabloids (Seiter, 1995, p. 52). In an article entitled "Politik, die die Frauen verstehen" ("The Politics Women Understand"), the newspaper's co-editor Pollak (1927, p. 3) emphasizes the combative power of women regarding the 1927 burning of the Palace of Justice[20]. For it was women, she argues, who "above all, originally, vehemently, and from a deep inner feeling of solidarity jumped up and spoke out" (Pollak, 1927, p. 3). However, despite acknowledging women's involvement in these political struggles, the article's title—"the politics women understand"— indicates that women are not only supposed to have a "different" understanding of politics but, also, to only be able to understand particular forms of politics. According to Pollak (1927, p. 3), the forms of politics that women *do* understand are not focused on "discussing the budget," "central committees," or "party negotiations." She claims these are not venues for women's political passions, they do "not captivate women" (Pollak, 1927, p. 3). Rather, women are concerned with "the simple facts of everyday life" and this is "what they have come to learn" (Pollak, 1927, p. 3).

Pollak (1927, p. 3) nonetheless acknowledges the politics women pursue:

> And it has been proven that women's feelings—often belittled and waved aside as "sentimental"—can become a powerful moral force. The echo of those Bloody Days in Vienna [the Palace of Justice fire] has never sounded louder than in the hearts of mothers. [...] Where the pettiness of everyday life once faded into gossip, into rippling murmurs of women's voices in Vienna: this has now grown into a torrent of voices for a political cause.

Here, Pollak highlights women's agency, challenging long-standing portrayals of women as apolitical, emotional, and irrational (cf. Frye, 1983; Lorde, 1984; Prokhovnik, 1999; Sauer, 1999). Such assumptions still echoed when women demanded the right to vote. Women were supposed to be closer to nature and deemed emotionally "too impulsive, too nervous" (Initiative 70 Jahre Frauenwahlrecht, 1989, p. 9) to be able to handle voting. Because of this, they were to be relegated—physically and mentally—to the private sphere. Their "brains" were said to be "lighter and more finely organized" (Ettel, 1890; cf. Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 66f; Hauch, 1995b, p. 46f) and they were considered to represent a "natural lack of defensive strength, depth and prudence in judgment, determination in will and perseverance in action" (Schindler qtd. in Bader-Zaar, 2006, p. 1007). For some, women's political engagement was thought to negatively influence the family as much as the state (Ettel, 1890, p. 19).

Pollak counters this by emphasizing the political force of affect, which alludes to a sense of being affected and affecting others (Spinoza, 1999). In her view, the affective investments of the women protesting have fostered the 1927 uprisings. Unlike other commentators, Pollak does not discredit feelings. She contrasts them to what she labels "idle gossip (Pollak, 1927, p. 3) and what she relegates to (these) women's past. In this manner, women's involvement and actions make explicit affects' and feelings' force of solidarity which, for Pollak, has emerged during protests. Women are affectively addressed by being recognized as feeling political subjects.

However, Pollak also stresses that women's political engagement differs from commonplace politics, which matters in terms of their mobilization. Women's politics "must be human, comprehensible, and life-oriented," that is a politics "that captivates and engages them" (Pollak, 1927, p. 3). While Pollak virtually de-privatizes and acknowledges affect and feelings as political forces, a familiar mode of gendered denial simultaneously comes to light: because women are supposed to pursue "different" political interests and primarily function as a moral force, their ability to engage in "politics as a vocation," to speak with Weber (1946 [1919]), is ultimately made impossible. Accordingly, women appear to be imprisoned in everyday life, as Lefebvre (2002 [1971]) once put it. The personal is indeed political but only in very specific ways.

The specific female politics that Pollak points to also appear in *The Discontented's* response to a letter from I.C. in October 1924. The latter had turned to the magazine, searching for advice regarding difficulties organizing in an "industrial city in the province" (Die Unzufriedene, 1924b, p. 4). While the writer lists several issues that impede organization—ranging from lack of time, disinterest, objections from husbands or wives, to sensitivities between women—the magazine's response merely focuses on the very last. The "organizational misery in the provinces" (Die Unzufriedene, 1924b, p. 4) becomes individualized by the magazine's response. On the one hand, it is reduced to a feeling of overwhelming "self-love," from which the "great mass of workers" needs to be freed through education; only such education, the magazine claims, would teach the value of "solidarity" and a "sense of belonging" (Die Unzufriedene, 1924b, p. 4). On the other hand, the (presumably female) writer of the letter is addressed in her emotional capacities. The magazine encourages I.C. to act in a "conciliatory, mediating and enlightening" manner and to unite "the quarrelsome sisters, who attack one another with jealousy" (Die Unzufriedene, 1924b, p. 4).

ENLIGHTENMENT AND PATRONIZING

By emphasizing dissatisfaction and political agency, the magazine encourages women to take an active part in politics (Die Unzufriedene, 1923a). Yet, women are also considered ignorant, lacking critical political awareness and, most of all, in need of help. *The Discontented* was meant to educate women so that they could develop political consciousness. In the very same gesture where women are called up to participate in politics, they are denied political agency. Predictably, following this logic, women are assigned a subordinate position within the ongoing political

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[20]On 15 July 1927, during protests in Vienna, the Palace of Justice was set aflame. The protesters demonstrated against the acquittal of three members of a right-wing veterans association (Frontkämpfervereinigung). They had been accused of killing two innocent people in clashes with the paramilitary Republican Schutzbund in January of that year in Schattendorf, a small village in the province of Burgenland.

power structures, invoking the well-known liberal dichotomy of "male rationality" and "female irrationality."

In the aforementioned essay "Ten Years of The Discontented," Winter (1933, p. 2) looks back at the historical moment when the magazine was first created: "At that time it was necessary to approach the many tens of thousands perhaps even hundreds of thousands of unconscious working women." For that reason, the magazine was dedicated to "help them with the difficulties of voting" (Winter, 1933, p. 2). In a similar manner, on 20 October 1923, the day before the election, The Discontented responds to the question of how to vote as follows: "We will try to help everyone so that they can find their way" (Die Unzufriedene, 1923d, p. 1). This mixture of addressing women and promising them help and enlightenment as a mode of affective mobilizing is just as striking 7 years later. Welcoming its new readers in 1930, The Discontented describes its purpose as wanting to be "an aid" to "bring a little political enlightenment" and to "help a bit to think about why our circumstances are so unpleasant" (Die Unzufriedene, 1930a, p. 1). Still, this pedagogical emphasis was not only a gendered issue but symptomatic for the contemporary Social Democratic efforts and hopes to educate workers in order to fuel political transformation. As Otto Glöckel, a leading Social Democratic pedagogue and politician, puts it: "Once people have the courage to gain knowledge, they must become socialists" (Workers-Newspaper, 5 December 1930: 8, qtd. in Gruber, 1991, p. 87).

Providing aid and education for the supposedly ignorant woman was also a topic at the 1920 party congress of the SDAP: "For the enlightenment among those women who cannot be reached through our organization and the party press, a popular weekly paper is necessary [...] one that illuminates all problems of work, families and society in an easy-to-understand manner" (qtd. in Billeth, 2003, p. 8). This assessment was widely shared. August Bebel—co-founder of the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SDAP, German Social Democratic Workers' Party) who had pushed for the universal suffrage for women and men together with Clara Zetkin, a central figure of the proletarian women's movement in Germany— emphasizes the need to educate ignorant women in his 1878 book Die Frau und der Sozialismus (Woman and Socialism; Bebel, 2014 [1910], p. 608f):

> Even progressive people argue that it would be dangerous to enfranchise women because they are conservative by nature and are susceptible to religious prejudices. But these arguments are true to some extent only, so long as women are maintained in ignorance. Our object must therefore be to educate them and to teach them where their true interest lies.

In the pages of The Discontented, the assumption of women's lack of knowledge reads as follows: Regarding a protest of civil servants on 10 September 1925, a contributor to the newspaper, M.S., urges these "dear women" not to remain "ignorant": "You working women, do not remain in dullness and dumbness" (Die Unzufriedene, 1925, p. 1f). Similar beliefs shape the responses published in the column Women Speak from the Heart. By judging readers' insights voiced in their letters as right or wrong, the magazine takes up the role of a benevolent schoolmaster. For instance, on 22 November 1924 the magazine states, most generously: "Your line of reasoning is totally correct, if all housemaids would think that way and move in the right direction, namely to join the organization, nothing more would stand in the way of it becoming reality" (Die Unzufriedene, 1924a, p. 4).

In this same vein, the following article published for the tenth anniversary of The Discontented is noteworthy:

> Max Winter has introduced thousands and thousands of proletarian women to socialism and to the Social Democratic Party through the convincing and noble power of his speeches and writing. And if the Social Democracy of Austria of today does not regret standing up for women's suffrage, it is first and foremost thanks to Max Winter and The Discontented, which has become, as Winter's deceased friend Friedrich Austerlitz[21] once described him, as "the true awakener of working-class girls and workers' wives, whom he educates to read and think, and above all helps to educate themselves" (W. R., 1933, p. 3).

Notwithstanding the comprehensibly euphoric tone in view of a jubilee number, the references to the "noble power" and the "true awakener" that are used to describe the figure of the "founding father" Winter as well as the invocation of deep gratitude that his deeds are meant to require, still seems oddly patronizing.

Adelheid Popp, editor of the Women Workers Newspaper, at the time already The Woman, member of the National Council, and a central figure of the Social Democratic women's movement, was more cautious. Prior to the 1930 elections, she writes that "politically untrained women" had allowed themselves to be "confused" by the Christian Socials in the last election. However, by participating in the 1930 Social Democratic referendum regarding improvements in unemployment, age and invalidity insurance (Die Unzufriedene, 1930b, p. 2) they have shown to have become "more mature" (Popp, 1930, p. 2). And she continues: "You, the women, hold the fate of the working class and thus of Austria—that is your own destiny—in your hands" (Popp, 1930, p. 2).

AFFECTIVE ATTACHMENTS AND THE AMBIVALENT DYNAMICS OF MOBILIZING

The Discontented had set off to mobilize passions for Social Democratic concerns and to create a political mood for voting Social Democracy especially—though not exclusively— for women. Speaking of affective attachments, makes it possible to read the magazine as both a site of political longing and belonging. In her engagement with U.S. publics and politics from the nineteenth century onwards, Berlant (2008, p. x) identifies an affective space as a "space of attachment and identification that is not saturated merely by ideological or cognitive content but is also an important sustainer of people's desires for reciprocity with the world." In a similar manner, The Discontented represented a mediator for political hopes and promises as well as a possibility for affective identification with the Social Democratic Party. It was meant to create political bindings and attachments— both to the party and among the readers. Affective attachments emphasize that political engagement not only involves political

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[21] Friedrich Austerlitz was a member of the National Council and editor-in-chief of the Workers' Newspaper.

interests but also how these interests come to and ultimately do matter as world-building practices. In this sense, the magazine also proved to be a medium of affection (Spinoza, 1999; cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. xvi). Taking the everyday seriously and even more so women's everyday feelings as aspects of the political, the magazine aimed at opening up new political spaces of resonance. Discontent and anger epitomized political vehicles and were politicized along with women's struggles against multiple exclusions and exploitative conditions. Because the magazine did not dismiss voicing discontent but recognized it as a political force, it enforced agency and empowerment. As manifestation of discontent and dismay as well as of belonging and solidarity *The Discontented* expressed what I would call "feeling politics" (Bargetz, 2014b, p. 119): that is a sense that politics and power also circulate through feelings and are affectively perceived in the temporalities of the everyday.

That notwithstanding, the political recognition and appreciation of women, as well as the relation to affect and feelings ultimately remained ambivalent within the magazine. In *Why We Oppose Votes For Men*[22] (1915), American writer, poet, and suffragist Duer Miller (2004 [1915], p. 64) writes:

> Because men are too emotional to vote. Their conduct at baseball games and political conventions shows this, while their innate tendency to appeal to force renders them particularly unfit for the task of government.

Of course, this reference to men's overtly and overly emotional behaviors as justification for disqualifying them for dealing with politics is an ironic reaction to women's assumed

emotionality and irrationality. Still, the trope of female emotionality and ignorance to explain and justify women's limited political agency was also routinely deployed in *The Discontented*. Although Bader-Zaar emphasizes that "women's alleged 'inherent' qualities" (Bader-Zaar, 1996, p. 63) have also been placed in a positive and empowering light by Austrian suffragists, even by those in different political camps, these devaluing and minoritizing tropes were widely shared and politically effective. Women were addressed more often morally than politically. Their alleged female mode of existence was read as a form of political ignorance and helplessness. Within *The Discontented*, this was especially reflected in a wide range of patronizing gestures. Women were deemed less political subjects with agency and more often rendered objects.

To conlude, affective attachments are not neutral modes of mobilizing but remain deeply embroiled in (gendered) relations of power and domination. Trying to understand how affective attachments function, therefore, requires attending the complex and complicated mechanisms of affective legacies as well as their multifaceted re-articulations within the historical present.

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The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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[22]The text appeared as a response to the 1894 pamphlet *Some Reasons Why We Oppose Votes for Women* written by the National Opposed to Women's Suffrage (NAOWS) (Garber, 2014).

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Evaluating the Representation and Responsiveness of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) to Diverse Women Populations Worldwide

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The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) is "the principal global intergovernmental body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women." The continued success of the CSW's mission is critical. Under the guise of needing competent male leaders to protect them, women and girls in many countries nonetheless suffer dire consequences from international conflict and war. While females may send mostly male loved ones into armed conflict, women and girls themselves face economic sanctions, poverty, displacement, and heightened risk of sexual violence, in an environment that already fails to respect their equal human rights with men. It is no accident that in most countries, females are de facto excluded from positions of power where they could try to prevent such conflict (Enloe, 2014), and the CSW is actively working to overcome this reality. In this article, we use a mixed-method approach to evaluate the level of United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations as reflected in (a) state delegations' participation in formal session, (b) NGO participation, and (c) NGO priorities. We find that the CSW displays a high level of representation and responsiveness to diverse state delegations across UN regions in terms of their speaking time in formal session. The CSW is at best moderately representative of women's NGOs through regional advance consultations, and the level of responsiveness to women's NGOs is low. This is due to: costly barriers to entry to gain ECOSOC status, large underrepresentation of some UN Regions, and the fact that during formal session, women's NGOs participate primarily at parallel off-site events. Although the CSW passed important resolutions, its representation and responsiveness to women's NGO priorities is lower than it should be. We base our evaluation by comparing our surveys of attending and non-attending women's NGOs that showed top priorities that the 2010 CSW did not discuss or pass resolutions on such as: land rights, sex trafficking, internet access for women, and the effects of climate change on women. We contend that during 1970–1994, when World Conferences on Women occurred, parallel transnational advance consultations among women's NGOs in tandem with CSW regional consultations created a broadening of the CSW's agenda.

The CSW rationally anticipated different kinds of feminism beyond liberal feminism and a broader set of priority issues for diverse women populations. We therefore argue for a Fifth World Conference on Women to increase the representativeness and responsiveness of the CSW.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) is "the principal global intergovernmental body exclusively dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women" (UN Women, a)[1]. Beginning in June 21, 1946 when an Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution elevated it from a sub-commission of the UN Commission on Human Rights to a commission, the CSW has been the site of landmark achievements in global women's rights. The CSW's achievements include contributing gender-inclusive language in the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, collecting global comparative data on the rights and status of women worldwide, and passing two declarations and three major binding multi-country conventions (including the 1979 *Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,* CEDAW)[2]. The CSW founded International Women's Year and the UN Decade for Women. The CSW is also responsible for setting in motion three World Conferences on Women, monitoring the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies, mainstreaming gender issues into UN development conferences, working on the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA), and developing the outcome of the twenty-third special session of the UN General Assembly (United Nations, b)[3] Over the course of its history, the CSW has played a key role in getting gender equality mainstreamed included in the UN's policy agenda as a Millennium Development Goal and a Sustainable Development Goal. The CSW has also engendered many UN programs: increasing female rights to hold property, developing programs to end violence against women and girls, and increasing female access to education, health, and self-determination.

The CSW has achieved all of these landmark results in a United Nations (UN) framework, in which the CSW faces important external and internal obstacles. Externally, the UN recognizes state sovereignty and therefore requires states to cooperate on shaping human rights and women's rights policies and voluntarily implement them. The CSW as part of the UN then navigates in difficult waters externally. At worst, state leaders' views on women's empowerment can range from open opposition to women's rights and therefore appointment of CSW delegates who oppose progress, to sanguine support and failure to provide adequate resources, to circumvention of the CSW to demonstrate superiority rather than the end goal of advancing women's rights. Even leaders that agree and work with the CSW's process can cave to pressure from citizens who see CSW policies as infringement on a country's sovereignty (see Baldez, 2014). Internally, the CSW faces similar obstacles, as CSW delegations and women's NGOs may face leaders who oppose the type of feminism they espouse, divesting needed resources to participate and creating a chilly climate for those outside the norm. Even cordial disagreement on pathways to women's empowerment can make it difficult to reach consensus on the best means or language for a resolution to pass the CSW under time constraints. All this being said, the CSW's history of remarkable accomplishments in the face of adversity mean that the institution must remain strong to advance women's empowerment in challenging times. In this article, we use a mixed-method approach to evaluate the level of United Nations Commission on the Status of Women representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations as reflected in (a) state delegations' participation in formal session, (b) Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) participation, and (c) NGO priorities.

After describing the CSW's role in gender equality policy, we examine the representativeness and responsiveness of the CSW to diverse women populations. We employ the methodological strategy of triangulation (Tarrow, 1995), combining quantitative and qualitative analysis to create a more comprehensive and nuanced evaluation. First, we use quantitative analysis to study speaking time in formal session, and find that the CSW displays a high level of representation and responsiveness to diverse state delegations regardless of their level of economic development. Second, we examine the CSW's representation and responsiveness to women's NGOs through advance regional consultations before the formal session to discuss the current priority theme issue as it applies to women of that region of the world. We use institutional analysis, examining the CSW/ ECOSOC rules for women's NGOs to gain necessary consultative status to be able to participate directly in the 2010 CSW meetings. Our analysis suggests that onerous rules and costs may limit CSW responsiveness to diverse women populations. We empirically test this proposition, using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to map all internationally visible women's NGOs in 2010 and compare these with a map

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[1] UN Women (a). *Commission on the Status of Women*. Available online at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw (accessed June 15, 2019).

[2] To date, 187 out of 193 countries have ratified or acceded to CEDAW [Feminist Majority. CEDAW (The Women's Treaty). Available online at: https://feministmajority.org/our-work/cedaw-the-womens-treaty/ (accessed June 15, 2019)]). The CEDAW does not discuss violence against women as topic, but the Preamble does condemn the discrimination of women as it violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.

[3] United Nations (b). *Short History of the Commission on the Status of Women*. Available online at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/CSW60YRS/CSWbriefhistory.pdf

of those that participated in 2010 CSW meetings. Our analysis shows regional overrepresentation of the United States, and underrepresentation from the UN Regions of Latin America, Africa (particularly the Middle East within it), and Eastern Europe (particularly Russia). To address critics who suggest that advance consultation is the main pathway by which the CSW responds to diverse women populations, we conduct online semi-structured survey interviews of women's NGOs (attending and non-attending) about their policy priorities, and compare their priorities to the resolutions passed during the 2010 CSW meetings.

A key contribution of this research is that we apply to the CSW at what Bachrach and Baratz (1962) describe as the two faces of power. We examine the viewpoints of both women's NGOs who attended the 2010 CSW meetings, and those that did not attend, about their top policy priorities. This research design helps us to see not just whether the CSW agenda matches participating NGO priorities, but also what is not on the CSW's agenda but should be. While our survey size is small, we demonstrate that our surveys are reflective of the geographical distribution of women's NGOs by the five UN regions. We find that although the CSW passed resolutions in important areas in its 2010 formal session, the CSW did not address some top priority issues emerging across regions. Triangulating our findings with historical, theoretical and empirical research on the CSW, we show that when more women's NGOs participate in the policymaking process through the four World Conferences on Women, the CSW's agenda rationally anticipates and broadens to include the concerns of other feminisms like women and poverty, and women in conflict. We find that while the CSW is highly representative and responsive to diverse women populations via official state delegation speaking time in formal session, the CSW is moderate at best in terms of including diverse women's NGOs before or during its formal meetings, or responding to the top policy priorities of women's NGOs worldwide. We conclude that a Fifth World Conference on Women is consistent with transnational women's NGO collaboration feeding into the CSW's regional consultation process, allowing the views of diverse women's NGOs inserted into the UN gender equality policymaking agenda (Fifth World Conference, 2017; Goetz, 2018).

Since its inception, the CSW has been comprised of members who represent their governments in an official capacity, reflecting the interests of their governments, as well as women's NGOs. The CSW is comprised of one state representative from each of an elected 45 member states of the United Nations. These 45 states are "elected by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of equitable geographical distribution across the UNs five regional groups: 13 members from Africa, 11 from Asia, nine from Latin American and Caribbean, eight from Western Europe and other States, and four from Eastern Europe, for a period of 4 years[4]". Because the key actors in the CSW are state delegations, we first will examine the points of view representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations as reflected in state delegations' participation in debates. The

Bureau of the CSW organizes preparations for the annual CSW Sessions, and serves for 2 years. Beginning in 2002, the CSW held an opening session for the subsequent CSW right after the closing of the previous CSW session, to elect the chairperson and Bureau members, one from each of the five UN regions. The CSW's methods of work consist of preparatory and consultative meetings over the year, culminating in a two week session in New York in March.

The CSW is comprised of state-appointed actors that seek to advance state interests on women's empowerment and gender equality, so some may question why CSW members meeting formally for just two weeks with little compensation would respond to women's NGOs around the world. We advance two main reasons why the CSW should represent and respond to women's NGOs. First, research shows that feminist mobilization in civil society i.e., women's organizations are the crucial factor explaining cross-national variation in policy development (Htun and Weldon, 2012). Second, the CSW's founding documents all acknowledge the information asymmetry that NGOs possess about the situation of diverse women on the ground in various countries, and recognize the role that women's NGOs play in aligning UN policies to what women need[3].

Because women's NGOs are often critical of the CSW, over time, the CSW has modified women's NGO "modalities of work," allowing only the participation of ECOSOC-approved groups, and moving them offsite to the NGO Forum (Owen, 2016). To be fully representative, the CSW would implement proposals from a diversity of women's organizations to dismantle barriers based on gender, race, class, and postcolonial status to empower women. The UN's processes have heard and been responsive to different women's groups and feminisms, but acknowledged them only in rhetoric, while in action mainly upholding liberal feminism in devising policies focused on reforming states, and removing discriminatory laws (Arat, 2015).

The CSW engages in regionally based consultation with women's groups particularly on priority theme issues that constitute an important avenue for representation and responsiveness to diverse women's populations. However, we argue that CSW policymaking is at its best when it anticipates prolonged and sustained transnational women's NGO involvement, such as in the lead up to the World Conferences on Women (WCW). In the lead up to WCW, women's NGOs meet within and across regions to strategize on how to address women's equality across regions, not just within regions.

How should we evaluate whether the CSW represents the claims of diverse women to empower women and bring about gender equality? Women's interests are plural, diverse, and sometimes conflicting. Women's NGOs appeal to the needs of women by making claims on behalf of women (Saward, 2010) to political elites in states and international organizations. Arat argues that in rhetorical terms, the UN has represented a broad diversity of women's claims and diverse feminisms described more below. However, Arat argues that when the UN identifies measures of women's empowerment they often reflect liberal feminism. She argues "the overall women's rights approach of the

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[4]Un Women (c). 2019. *Member States*. Available online at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/member (accessed June 15, 2019).

UN is still informed by the demands and expectations of liberal feminism" (2015, p. 674). Liberal feminism

> demand[s] equal opportunities for women's education, electoral rights, economic participation, equal access to the public domain, and integration into all male institutions, liberal feminism seeks gradual change through legislative reform and anti-discrimination laws; it considers the state an apparatus that can be used to create equal opportunities for women and to establish gender equality (qtd. in Arat, 2015, p. 676).

Arat argues that when the UN chooses an indicator of women's empowerment reflecting liberal feminism, such as the percentage of women in parliament, this indicator serves to strengthen certain countries that then appear empowering and successful, even though they may only be benefiting a few women at the top of the socio-economic strata. Alternatively other countries on this indicator may appear unsuccessful on women's empowerment, even while they may be taking very impactful steps to expand women's empowerment on a broad level (such as maternal mortality and reproductive rights).

Political actors motivated by other feminisms like Marxist feminism and post-colonial feminism have challenged the UN. These approaches cite different causes of and solutions to women's subordination, and have at times been the subject of UN action, when the relative power of states has changed in the UN. Arat describes how, during the 1960s, Cold War dynamics sharply defined the UN. The Soviets sought to control UN discourse over women's empowerment through Marxist feminist ideas. "Marxist [feminism] sees the emancipation of women as possible only through the emancipation of the working class by a proletarian revolution that would eliminate private ownership of the means of production, bring women to the production process as the equals of men, and treat child rearing as a social/collective responsibility" (Arat, 2015, p. 676). After decolonization, during the 1970s and 1980s, many countries broke away from former empires, and formed the non-aligned movement, using their new collective voting power in the UN to challenge the United States and western powers. Post-colonial feminism emerged; identifying that gender, class, racial oppression, and western feminism are causes of the economic dependence of many countries, and the oppression of women. The BDPfA included third world feminists' concerns, stressing "the problems of poverty, economic inequalities, and militarism; it openly criticizes the negative impacts of structural adjustment policies and affirms the need to address the "structural causes of poverty," (Arat, 2015, p. 679) as well as a need for transformational change.

We apply Arat's insights, examining the processes of the CSW itself, including identifying which women's NGOs worldwide participate in CSW events, and how successful they are at influencing CSW policy-making in setting the agenda or pushing for passage of CSW resolutions in areas they deem as top priorities. As policy entrepreneurs, women's NGO leaders discuss their priorities in places like directories, websites, newsletters, protests, and speeches.

The participation of women's NGOs across UN regions in accordance with the CSW's own distribution is crucial to CSW representativeness and responsiveness. Htun and Weldon (2012) argue that there are three reasons why "women's autonomous organizing has played such a critical role" in feminist policymaking. "First, women organizing as women generate social knowledge about women's position as a group in society…with "an oppositional consciousness as well as a set of priorities that reflect their distinctive experiences and concerns as a group." Second, the issues women's organizations bring up like violence against women "challenge, rather than work within established gender roles in most places" meaning that insider democrats are more reluctant to risk being fired for bringing up issues that require major societal changes. The third reason is agenda-setting: "[w]hen women's movements are organized autonomously they do not need to justify within a larger organization like a political party, why their issue matters if it is important "only" to women (Htun and Weldon, 2012, p. 533). In sum, women's NGOs have special knowledge about, independent space to raise, and a natural sense of urgency about issues affecting women that together help them identify gaps or shortcomings in women's empowerment initiatives. Adequate representation in the CSW by women's NGOs from different UN regions can allow for articulation of diverse feminisms beyond liberal feminism.

The CSW's mission statement, the ECOSOC resolution creating the CSW, the BDPfA, and other resolutions, all acknowledge the information asymmetry that women's NGOs possess about the situation of diverse women on the ground in various countries. The CSW styles its own mission as representing and responding to civil society because the CSW invites civil society organizations to participate in advance consultations and the session itself:

> During the Commission's annual two-week session, representatives of UN Member States, civil society organizations and UN entities gather at UN headquarters in New York. They discuss progress and gaps in the implementation of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the key global policy document on gender equality, and the 23rd special session of the General Assembly held in 2000 (Beijing+5), as well as emerging issues that affect gender equality and the empowerment of women[1].

By including them in advance consultations and the CSW session, the CSW implies that women's NGOs are an important reality check on state reports on "progress and gaps" in implementing the BDPfA, as well as on newly emerging issues that states may not yet know about. Molyneux and Razavi (2005, p. 983) lament that while:

> [t]he 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women (the 'Beijing Conference') was a landmark in policy terms, setting a global policy framework to advance gender equality. Ten years after Beijing, in March 2005, the UN's Commission on the Status of Women presided over an intergovernmental meeting in New York to review the progress achieved on the commitments made in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. This "Plus 10" event was decidedly low key.

Molyneux and Razavi discuss that there has been progress in many countries on issues like education and economic growth. However, there is much variation in gender equality

across countries and policy areas, and progress is not always linear. "Human rights and women's agendas and the entire multilateral framework within which the gains of the 1990s were made have been weakened by the current global political crisis occasioned by terrorism, militarism, the war on Iraq and hostility to unilateralism" (Molyneux and Razavi, 2005, pp. 1004–1005). During times when public or elite support for women's empowerment is low, women's NGOs have and continue to play an important role in the CSWs agenda-setting, and implementation. The CSW website says: "[t]he active participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is a critical element in the work of the Commission... NGOs have been influential in shaping the current global policy framework on women's empowerment and gender equality: the [BDPfA][5]." Yet the CSW does not adequately institutionalize consultations with women's NGOs, who possess first-hand knowledge about what women need, and who are more critical of their state's progress on than state-appointed CSW representatives. For example, numerous women's NGOs signed a Final Statement before the 2010 CSW meetings, noting:

> The Declaration on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women [was] agreed ahead of time and adopted without consultations with civil society...[it] appears to overstate the progress made, and to ignore the slow and partial nature of implementation. It underestimates the degree and types of challenges that remain for women in their multiple identities, including the persistence of all forms of violence against women ("Final Statement, 2010", p. 1).

This article builds on Arat's (2015) work to evaluate the level of the CSW's representation and responsiveness to different women populations as reflected in (a) state delegations' participation in debates, (b) NGO participation, and (c) NGO priorities.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

We focus our data collection on the 2010 CSW meetings, held 15 years after the Beijing Conference. We employ Tarrow's strategy of triangulation. As Tarrow discusses, "[t]riangulation is particularly appropriate in cases in which quantitative data are partial and qualitative investigation is obstructed by political conditions" (Tarrow, 1995, p. 473). Because evaluation of the representativeness and responsiveness of the CSW to diverse women's organizations is not merely something we can ask CSW members about to get a full evaluation, we use a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators together to create a more comprehensive and nuanced picture. We employ quantitative analysis of state delegation speaking time in CSW formal session, GIS analysis of which women's NGOs attend the CSW, and semi-structured surveys of attending and non-attending women's NGOs about their top policy priorities. We triangulate these data with institutional analysis of ECOSOC rules for NGO participation, historical analysis of NGO participation in the

[5]UN Women (d). 2019. *NGO Participation*. Available at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/ngo-participation (accessed June 15, 2019).

CSW, theoretical work on the ideological breadth of the CSW's agenda over time, showing that there is underrepresentation of most regions since Beijing. When we combine this reality with policy analysis of the resolutions passed by the 2010 CSW, our conclusion and policy recommendation is clear: we need a Fifth World Conference on Women. We discuss each step in turn.

First, we examine the CSW's representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations by examining speaking time of state appointed representatives sitting in the formal 2010 CSW session. We do this because the CSW is at its core an international body where state-appointed representatives convene and deliberate on how to advance the status of women and girls. One way to get a sense of the substance of the official CSW meetings and the power dynamics involved is to examine speaking time at the session by country, by P-5 status and by leadership roles. Analysis of speaking time in a deliberative body by identity characteristics such as gender, race, sexual orientation, social class, and other factors is a common method of examining the political power of differently positioned participants (Kathlene, 1994, 1995). We argue that examining speaking time by state appointed delegates to the CSW is a visible outward sign of what the CSW does and lays the groundwork for further analysis of the CSW's multi-faceted responsiveness to diverse women populations. We acknowledge that more speaking time is not equivalent to more power; it is possible that certain state delegates could speak infrequently in formal session but yet affect the priorities or draft documents prepared prior to session. This is why we subsequently examine other pathways by which diverse women's populations to receive representation and responsiveness by the CSW.

Second, we examine the representation and responsiveness of the CSW to diverse women's populations through the consultative work that the CSW did with women's NGOs in the extensive deliberations and lead-up to the 2010 CSW Formal Session. As part of the CSW's Programme of Work, in the lead up to the Formal Session, the CSW engages in regional consultations with women's NGOs on the priority theme issue. The priority theme for 2010 was the 15-year Review of the implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the outcomes of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly and its contribution to shaping a gender perspective toward the full realization of the Millennium Development Goals (UN Women, a)[1]. While we applaud the work of the CSW in preparing regional-specific reports and soliciting feedback from diverse NGOs on these reports, we note a few concerns. We discuss how the CSW sets the priority theme for regional consultation, rather than emerging bottom-up from diverse women populations within each region. We argue that the CSW may be prioritizing discussion and attention on an issue area that is not a top priority for women within a region. Even if the priority theme is broad enough to allow diverse women's populations within a region to advance their prime concerns and strategies, it is also up to minimally resourced CSW leaders to draw best practices or identify cross-regional trends, after conducting regional consultations.

Third, building on our analysis of state-representative speaking time, and CSW advance regional consultations with

women's NGOs, we examine whether women's NGOs from diverse regions participate in the CSW, and whether the CSW responded to their policy priorities in the form of resolutions passed during the 2010 CSW session. Specifically, we describe ECOSOC requirements for a women's NGO to apply for consultative status and discuss how these rules themselves might limit the diversity of women's NGOs that can attend, and either impact each other or the CSW. We empirically evaluate the diversity of women's NGOs that did participate in the 2010 CSW session against those that were internationally visible in 2010, showing important gaps in participation from some regions.

To do this, we use Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis to map all internationally visible women's NGOs in 2010 from the 2012 *International Directory of Women's Organizations* (IDWO-2010), when there were 1,760 such groups. The methodology section of this Directory notes that it is the most comprehensive and up-to-date of its kind worldwide, and that:

> a wide range of women's organization activity are covered from art to culture; business to education; gender equality to human rights; health to reproduction; families to development; politics to global leadership; women's empowerment; civil society promotion; and much more. The Directory includes information on all of the women's foundations worldwide, [and] Regions covered include: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, North and South America, and the Middle East. Data for this reference work was compiled from details submitted by national and international women's organizations, information gathered from the internet, and directly from individuals holding key positions in major women's organizations (Research and Markets, 2012, p. 2).

Because not all women's NGOs may have had working websites when this directory was published, we note that the *International Directory of Women's Organizations* likely underestimates the number of women's NGOs worldwide. We compare this with a map of women's NGOs that participated in the 2010 CSW events to see if diverse women's NGOs participate in the CSW (United Nations, a)[6], showing under-representation of women's NGOs from the UN regions of Latin America, Africa (particularly Northern Africa), and the Eastern European Group (particularly Russia), and the overrepresentation of the United States.

Skeptics may argue that women's NGOs participation at the 2010 CSW session itself is sparse or less diverse because women's NGOs have already exercised their true influence by way of advance regional consultations. It is possible that women's NGOs from a region or country do not attend the CSW because they know other similar groups from their region will attend, and they can get their views advanced during advance consultations. To address this criticism, we developed and fielded an online semi-structured survey interview questionnaire, asking the same survey questions to both women's NGOs who did and did not participate in the 2010 CSW. Ultimately, we were able to get interview responses from 26 attending and 10 non-attending women's NGOs about their views on and participation

(or not) in UN activities, as well as their policy priorities for women. To ensure simple, clear English-language questions, we used snowball survey methods to send a draft questionnaire to individuals with a college education who were not born in the United States. In the final version, we asked NGO leaders eight questions, including the home country of the NGO, and semi-structured open-ended questions on the NGO's top three policy priorities, views on how the UN advances women's interests, views on how the UN fails to advance women's interests, and whether or not the NGO had participated in UN events[7].

We developed this questionnaire drawing on the semi-structured survey method (Rincker, 2017) which combines the virtues of asking respondents the same question for reliability purposes, while allowing for extended open-ended responses to gain unique insights and perspectives on issues that political actors need to the ability to express, as they shape understanding of policy priorities. In interpreting the number of respondents we keep in mind that although from a public opinion point of view, a high percentage response rate is the gold standard, for elite interviews smaller numbers (30–50 interviews) is generally considered high, because the of the quality of in –depth, find-grained information that is gleaned explaining why actors report the outcomes they report.

We fielded the online semi-structured survey interview questionnaire in March-May of 2016, contacting women's NGO leaders in the following way. We carried out this study in accordance with the recommendations of the Purdue University Human Research Protection Program. The Purdue University Institutional Research Board approved the protocol. All subjects gave **written informed consent** in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The 2010 CSW listed the names of 445 women's NGOs who participated in the NGO Forum. The CSW provided email address information for 440 of these groups, which we used. Of these, 50 emails bounced back. This left 390 email surveys sent, from which we received 26 unique completed surveys or a response rate of: 6.78%. We examined all 1,760 women's organizations listed in the 2010-IDWO. The Directory listed 723 unique email addresses, but 437 bounced. This left 286 email surveys sent, from which we received 10 unique completed semi structured survey-interviews, a response rate of 3.50%. From a public opinion approach, these response rates are not atypical for online surveys (Deutskens et al., 2004). To try to increase the response rate, we did conduct two follow-up reminders 2 weeks after the initial deadlines to try to increase the number of participants without success. In terms of increasing observable implications (King et al., 1994) on the representativeness and responsiveness of the CSW to diverse women populations, completed questionnaires from 36 women's organizations (26 attending and 10 non-attending) gives us more systematic data on the policy priorities of women's NGOs than researchers have previously collected to the knowledge of the authors.

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[6]United Nations (a). *Advancement of Women*. Available online at: http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAowSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=false

[7]No groups selected our option to have survey questions translated and to respond in Spanish. Time and budgetary constraints prevented us surveying in all six official UN languages.

TABLE 1 | CSW state delegations by UN region and survey response rates by non-attending and attending women's NGOs.

	Number (%)					Total	Countries
	Africa	**Asia and the Pacific**	**Latin America and the Caribbean**	**Western European and others group**	**Eastern European**		
State Delegations in the CSW	13 (29)	11 (24)	9 (20)	8 (18)	4 (9)	45	45 countries
Non-Attending Women's NGOs*	279 (21.31)	215 (16.43)	63 (4.81)	253 + 418 (51.26)	81 (6.19)	1309	122 countries total; 63 countries which have women's NGO but no attending groups
Non-Attending Survey Respondents	3 (30)	2 (20)	1 (10)	3 (30)	1 (10)	10	10 countries: Uganda, Nigeria, Ghana; Cambodia, India; Mexico; US, Ireland, UK; Georgia
Attending Women's NGOs	57 (12.8)	51 (12.2)	22 (4.9)	162 + 148 USA (69)	5 (1.1)	445	74 countries
Attending Women's NGOs Survey Respondents	2 (7.7)	4 (15.4)	2 (7.7)	18 (69.2)	0 (0)	26	26 countries: Cameroon, Togo; Kazakhstan (2), Pakistan, Thailand; Mexico, Jamaica; USA (9), England, Canada (2), Australia (2), Germany (1), New Zealand (1) Spain (1), Switzerland (1).
Evaluation	Africa underrep	Asia underrep	LA underrep	USA overrep	EE underrep		

Despite small sample size (26), Surveys of Attending Women's NGOs reflect geographic distribution by UN region of those that attended the 2010 CSW.

Surveys of Non-Attending Women's NGOs also reflect geographic distribution by UN region of those that did not attend the 2010 CST. The response rate is low but to be expected since non-attending groups are more numerous that attending groups, and by definition they are less participatory in the UN, so likely less participatory in the survey.

The most marked disparity is by State Delegations in the CSW by UN Region and % Women's NGOs Attending the CSW by UN region.

US Women NGOs attending the CSW are overrepresented; African, Asian, Latin American, and Eastern European Women's NGO voices are underrepresented. We call for a Fifth World Conference on Women, to increase representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations by UN region, and for the location of that conference to be outside the US and accessible for women of these regions.

*Non-Attending Women's NGOs are 2010 IDWO-Attending Women's Orgs minus the attending Women's NGOs.

In order to strengthen confidence in the inferences that we draw with our semi-structured survey interview data, we do two things. We present information showing that our surveys of attending women's NGOs reflect the geographic distribution by UN region of attending women's NGOs, and same for non-attending women's NGOs. The larger disparity we identify is between the regional balance the UN requires for official CSW state delegations (Africa 29%, Asia 24%, Latin America Caribbean 20%, West. Europe Others 18%, East. Europe 9%), and the regional balance in women's NGOs that attended the 2010 CSW (Africa 12.8%, Asia 12.2%, Latin America/Caribbean 4.9%, West. Europe 69 %, East. Europe 1.1%; see **Table 1**).

Holding the CSW sessions in New York leads to a reality where women's NGOs from the United States are one third of all attending NGOs, and this from a country that has not ratified CEDAW. This regional under-representation of women's NGOs from Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, and Eastern Europe matters. As Bachrach and Baratz (1962) describe, one face of power is the visible face, the decisions that a political body hands down "when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B" (p. 948). The other face of power is the invisible face: the issues that never get on the agenda that affect our lived reality. As Bachrach and Baratz state:

> …*power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the*

extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences (p. 948).

In short, control of the agenda is a critical aspect of power. The non-participation of diverse women's NGOs is indicative of policy priorities that do not make it on the CSW's agenda: either through the top-down advance consultations on priority theme, the formal session in New York, or the resolutions passed by the CSW. We show this shortly when we summarize the resolutions passed by the 2010 CSW and compare it with our data on the policy priorities of attending and non-attending women's NGOs.

We also triangulate our survey data with other data that strengthens confidence in the inferences we are drawing. As Tarrow (1995) argues, triangulating different sources of quantitative and qualitative data helps to strengthen confidence in the inferences we could draw on just one type of data. We draw on historical data from the *Short History of the CSW*, which describes the number of NGOs participating in CSW-initiated events over time including the World Conferences on Women held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi, and Beijing, which have large attendance by women's NGOs. We contextualize our research with Arat's (2015) analytical table on the breadth of the ideological agenda of the CSW during times of widespread women's NGO participation in CSW policymaking. Reporting on these historical, theoretical and empirical sources in conjunction with the results of our survey of attending and non-attending women's NGOs increases our confidence in drawing inferences

that when the number of women's NGOs participating increases, so does the breadth of the CSW's policy agenda. We argue that while valuable, the CSW is most responsive and representative of women when there is a World Conference on Women on the horizon. This institutional design facilitates cross-regional or transnational women's NGO working with the CSW, providing grassroots and transnational feedback on what the priorities or top issues should be. We conclude by arguing for a Fifth World Conference on Women.

RESULTS

The principal body dedicated to working on gender equality is the CSW, and its principal actors are the 45 country commissioners elected to serve on the Commission. According to Ireland's Gender Equality Machinery website, "[e]very year, representatives of Member States gather at United Nations Headquarters in New York to evaluate progress on gender equality, identify challenges, set global standards, and formulate concrete policies to promote gender equality and women's empowerment worldwide[8]".

It is possible that states that do not speak that much in session are important to deciding what gets on the agenda, what issues are discussed and how other countries vote. Still, we wanted to examine the CSW as a body to see who speaks and why during CSW formal session. We therefore conducted analysis of speaking time in the formal CSW session to see if there were patterns in which countries spoke. We wanted to see whether wealthier or more economically developed countries dominated speaking time in the CSW, or whether countries controlling the dais called on allying countries in the CSW. Our research indicates that countries with a lower Human Development Index had equivalent speaking time during formal session as countries with higher Human Development Index (see **Figure 1**).

Furthermore, we find that official state representatives from the Permanent Five member countries (United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) spoke 9% of the time in the 2010 CSW session (see **Figure 2**).

Our analysis therefore shows that during the formal session, the UN CSW allows for the representation of a diversity of women's voices, not just representatives of the P5 countries but non-P5 countries, and this is an important strength of this most important international body working for women's empowerment. As far as the agenda of this formal session, we again note that the Bureau of the CSW is the CSW's leadership, elected for terms of 2 years, and the Bureau meets immediately at the close of each CSW session to elect the new Chairperson and officers, to begin preparations for the following year. According to the ECOSOC Resolution 2015/2016 on the CSW's "method of work," each CSW session must consist of eight components. The first is a ministerial segment, the second a consideration of one priority theme based on BDPfA and the 23rd special session of the UN General Assembly (GA), and the third is

FIGURE 1 | Frequency of speaking time at the 2010 CSW by Human Development Index Rating.

FIGURE 2 | Frequency of speaking at 2010 CSW By P-5 member states.

discussion of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The fourth component is evaluation of progress in implementing conclusions from previous sessions, the fifth engagement in general discussion of the status of gender equality in light of previous goals, and the sixth, a discussion of new issues affecting women requiring timely response. The seventh component is mainstreaming in the UN System, hearing the Working Group on Communications, agreeing to further actions by adopting conclusions and resolutions, and the eighth is observing International Women's Day if during the formal session (United Nations)[1],[9]. The design of the brief but formal CSW session

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[8]Gender Equality in Ireland (2019). Commission on the Status of Women. Available online at: http://www.genderequality.ie/en/GE/Pages/CSW (accessed June 19, 2019).

[9]Although the CSW has repeatedly sought from the Human Rights Council (before 2006 known as the Commission on Human Rights) the ability to hold individual states accountable, the CSW does not have the authority to do this. The CSW sends

encourages high levels of representativeness and responsiveness of diverse women populations as reflected in state delegations' participation in debates. This design reflects norms in the United Nations for regional balance in the CSW's membership. We now move to consider whether the CSW represents and is responsive to diverse women's NGOs during the CSW formal session.

The CSW engages in regional consultations in the lead-up to each yearly March CSW Formal Session. The Committee of the CSW goes to the five regions with the priority theme and data and reports tying that region to the theme. The CSW establishes their priority themes in multi-year programmes of work that are set out far in advance through CSW state deliberations, and not directly in consultation with women's NGOs. On the positive side, the priority theme gives shape and consistency to what the CSW regional consultations and preparatory documents look like, and women's NGOs fit their issues into this theme. On the negative side, a top-down priority theme may limit representation and responsiveness to diverse women's NGOs. First, there may be pressing current issues within a region that do not fit well into the theme and do not get consideration or problem-solving attentions of the CSW and women's NGOs. Second, there may be long-term, slightly lower issues that cross many regions, and in the absence of a space for coordinated transnational women's NGO participation, the UN may perennially ignore these issues just below the radar. While we recognize the CSW for meeting with women's NGOs through regional consultation, we rate the CSW as moderate on responsiveness to women's NGOS in this realm because the CSW determines the priority theme without advance input from diverse women's NGOs.

As of June 2019 the CSW website indicates that both ECOSOC approved women's NGOs and non-approved groups can participate in side events (UN Women, d 2019)[5] and admittance of non-approved groups is a more recent development. But, generally, the CSW recognizes four possible "modalities of NGO participation" reserved for women's groups that have consultative status granted by ECOSOC (UN Women, e 2019)[10]. The first modality is the aforementioned regional consultations, dates and locations published in the UN Journal. The second modality is submitting an under 2,000 word written statement on the thematic issue 10 weeks prior to the session. The third modality is intervening from the floor during an interactive panel, and this request must be made in advance, the comment should be on the issue theme, and no longer than three minutes, subject to time availability at the CSW. The fourth modality is a request to make a speech during the CSW General Discussion. The statement is limited to no more than three minutes long and should be on the theme topic, preferably on behalf of many NGOs. How has the CSW evolved to a system where, except for a few panels and hand-selected short prepared statements during the CSW Formal Session, on the topic of the CSW's choice, women's NGOs can only listen to state representatives or meet off site, away from actual decision-making?

We acknowledge the CSW, modeling it on UN principles of state sovereignty yet international collaboration, that it is a forum for deliberation to advance state actor's common interests on women's issue. However, we reiterate that *the CSW's own documents argue that it must be responsive to women's NGOs worldwide*. From 1970 to 1994, CSW Commissioners knew that World Conferences on Women were on the horizon, and that parallel transnational activism would be gathering thousands of women's NGOs in advance meetings, the CSW process of advance regional consultation rationally anticipated a broader agenda for diverse women populations. Since 2010, when the CSW has not approved a Fifth World Conference for Women, only hundreds of ECOSOC-approved women's NGOs attend high cost and relatively low impact formal session in New York, at which US women's NGOs constitute a third of the participants, underrepresenting women's NGOs from the regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. The women's NGOs participate predominantly offsite: at the parallel NGO Forum. In short, the CSW Formal sessions are a place where women's NGOs have an offsite and marginal presence in the process. Our findings echo those of other key scholars who have argued for a Fifth World Conference on Women (Goetz, 2018).

If the CSW is responsive to women worldwide, we should observe diverse women's NGOs reflecting regional distributions from UN regions participating in the CSW session, or their policy priorities making it through from advance regional consultations into resolutions at formal session. Using GIS, we identify where internationally visible women's NGOs were located, and compare these with the addresses of women's NGOs that participated in the 2010 CSW NGO Forum. Accordingly, we used ArcView GIS to map data from the 2010-IDWO on the locations of 1,760 internationally visible women's NGOs, which we present in **Figure 3**.

Using the same process, we mapped the 445 women's groups participating in the 2010 CSW NGO Forum. Examining **Figure 4**, and comparing it **Figure 3**, we see that women's NGOs active in the 2010 CSW were mostly from the Western European and others Group (particularly the United States was heavily overrepresented). Technically, the United States is separate from WEOG at times but gathers with this UN regional group. African women's NGOs were under-represented (particularly North Africa). Asian women's NGOs were under-represented (particularly Northern Asia). Latin America was under-represented (particularly outside of Mexico). Women's NGOs from the Eastern European Group (particularly Russia was absent).

What explains the lack of women's NGOs and the lack of diverse women's NGOs by region? About one third (151 or 33.4%) of women's NGOs at the 2010 CSW were from the United States, which makes sense given that travel was least expensive for these groups. The United Kingdom was second with 29 organizations (6.4%). France and China followed with a total of 12 (2.7%) and three groups (0.7%), respectively. Even though there were women's NGOs in Russia, none attended

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its resolutions and reports on to ECOSOC for follow up and consideration by the General Assembly.

[10]UN Women (e) (2019). *Opportunities for NGOs to Address the Commission.* Available online at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/ngo-participation/written-and-oral-statements (accessed June 15, 2019).

FIGURE 3 | Map of internationally visible women's NGOs, circa 2010. Source: Research and Markets (2012). *N* = 1,760.

FIGURE 4 | Map of women's NGOs participating in the 2010 CSW NGO Forum. Source: UN Data. *N* = 447.

the NGO Forum. Media Rights Voices (2017) argues that UN NGO Committee members including Russia "actively use their Committee membership to stymie applications for UN status from NGOs active in the field of human rights. Using procedural ruses, members of the Committee can, and often do, defer applications session after session with inappropriate, specious or repetitive questions and demands of the NGOs."

To attend the 2010 CSW, and be considered by the Committee on NGOs at one of their two meetings in 2009, a women's NGO had to apply for ECOSOC consultative status by 1 June 2008. Doing so involves submitting a complete application in English or French including: an online organizational profile

questionnaire, a copy of the organization's bylaws, a certificate of registration attesting that the group has been in existence for at least 2 years, and a copy of the NGO's financial statements (United Nations, b)[11]. The Committee may ask the NGO follow-up questions, and the committee must provide notice of organizations it is nominating for consultative status in advance to the ECOSOC, which the ECOSOC ultimately has the power to approve. Although the UN has six official languages: Arabic, English, French, Chinese, Russian, and

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[11]United Nations (b). *How to Apply for Consultative Status.* Available online at: http://csonet.org/?menu=83

Spanish, ECOSOC only accepts English or French language applications from women's NGOs seeking consultative status. NGOs need to have existed more than 2 years, produce financial statements and bylaws, and possess predictable electrical and internet access. We do not know which groups applied and were denied so cannot say definitively, but point out that the UN's inconsistent language requirements may inhibit women's NGOs from Spanish, Russian, and Arabic –speaking countries from participating in the most important international body working for women's empowerment.

After ECOSOC approval, travel costs to attend the CSW's meetings can be burdensome. From our survey, half of organizations that did not attend the 2010 CSW indicated lack of funding as the main reason. Seven of the 26 attending organizations indicated funding was the main barrier preventing wider participation in UN events. As noted by the Bangkok based Women Organizing for Change in Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (WOCAN), "[...] I do not perceive the UN as a body that is so open to ideas. Traveling to the CSW [New York] is very expensive and difficult for many to get US visas. [Moreover,] other events around the world are not frequent." If CSW held its meetings in a variety of locations, like the World Conferences on Women, participation by women's NGOs may expand.

The United Nations has taken on a primary role in development of treaties and agreements to promote the progress of humanity on a global scale. During its 71 years, the CSW has changed from its 1,946 origins in which "the first meeting was open to the public, with 250 seats open to the general public and 250 seats reserved for members of "educational groups and voluntary accredited organizations" (qtd. in Baldez, 2014, p. 48) to one in which women's NGOs must apply to ECOSOC for consultative status. From 1975 to 1995, over the course of four World Conferences on Women, women's NGO participation grew from 6,000 NGO representatives in Mexico City, to 8,000 in Copenhagen, 12,000 in Nairobi, and 30,000 in Beijing. However, as of 2017, periodic CSW-led reviews of the Fourth World Conference, and sporadic regional consultations between UN Women and women's NGOs preempt direct, broad participation of women's NGOs at the CSW.

As a result of moving outside of some of the external and internal obstacles that the CSW faces, the World Conferences on Women allowed for the CSW to become more responsive and representative to diverse women populations. As **Table 2** shows, starting with the First World Conference on Women in Mexico City (1975) the rhetorical agenda for women's rights grew much broader. The rhetorical agenda moved from a liberal feminist focus on women's rights, to Marxist, socialist, and post-colonial feminist approaches that emphasized the need for women in development, women's role in preventing and solving conflict, and the effects of race and class on women. When women's NGO presence grew at World Conferences on Women, the CSW's power in the UN system adjusted accordingly. "From 1970 to 1986, the [CSW] only met biannually" as it was not coordinating the World Conferences for Women, and "some states even proposed the abolition of the Commission in 1980,

and argued for transferring its functions to ECOSOC." However, at the 1980 World Conference on Women in Copenhagen, "they recommended the Commission be strengthened and given full responsibility for the preparation of [the 3rd World Conference on Women in Nairobi]" (United Nations, b, p. 11)[3]. Women's NGO participation numbered 30,000 in Beijing in 1995 (UN Women, f)[12], and the UN gender equality agenda expanded. The BDPfA outlined 12 areas of concern, reflecting a broad agenda, including not just traditional liberal feminist areas like women in power and decision-making, education and training of women, institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, women and health, women and the media. Additionally, the BDPfA highlighted areas of higher concern to socialist, postcolonial, and intersectional feminisms, such as: women and the environment, the girl child, women and the economy, human rights of women, violence against women, women and armed conflict, and women and poverty (UN Women, f)[12].

Since halting the practice of World Conferences on Women, CSW-led, state-centric reviews of Beijing have limited the ability of women's NGOs to work with the CSW to craft policy. Since 2001, the number of women's NGOs attending CSW sessions has remained low: from 136 groups in 2002 to 479 in 2005 (United Nations, a)[6]. In 2015, the CSW organized a 20 year review of Beijing, but more attention was focused on an event jointly sponsored by UN Women and the People's Republic of China Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: A Commitment to Action. This process was led by UN Women and state leaders, and sidelining women's NGOs further. When the CSW increases its representation and responsiveness to diverse women's populations through women's NGOs, it does its work more effectively.

In this section, we examine whether the seven resolutions passed by the 2010 CSW responded to the top priorities of women's NGOs. We report from original surveys the top policy priorities (ranked 1–5 by frequency) of women's NGOs in two groups, those that attended (a) and those that did not attend (na) the 2010 CSW. Items with an asterisk indicate a priority not shared by the other group. For attending groups (a): Priority 1 was eliminating violence, sexual assault, and spousal abuse. Priority 2 was women's health. Priority 3 was education*. Priority 4 was political representation and land rights. Priority 5 was maternity leave and wages. For non-attending groups (na): Priority 1 was eliminating violence, sexual assault, and spousal abuse. Priority 2 was political representation and land rights. Priority 3 was maternity leave and wage equality. Priority 4 was women's health. Priority 5 was economic development and poverty*. There was a great deal of overlap in top priorities of women's NGOs. A responsive CSW should have a particular urgency to address these shared priorities: *eliminating violence against women, political representation and land rights, women's health, and maternity leave and wage equality.*

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[12]UN Women (f). *The Beijing Platform for Action: Inspiration for Then and Now.* Available online at: http://beijing20.unwomen.org/en/about (accessed June 15, 2019).

TABLE 2 | NGO participation, Feminist approach, and Breadth of UN Gender-Equality Policy Agenda, 1946–2015.

Time period	NGO participation rules and numbers of NGOs in CSW events	Feminist approach	CSW-led UN gender equality agenda
1947	250 seats open for NGOs, several reps. attend	Liberal feminism	• Participate in drafts of Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1948–1959	ECOSOC consultative status required; 30–50 NGO reps. attend		• Convention on Equal Remuneration (1951) • Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952) • Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957)
1960–1969	ECOSOC consultative status; required 30–50 NGO reps. attend	Marxist Feminism	• CSW works with UNESCO on women's literacy, education • Women's economic participation and poverty • Research assessing status of women worldwide • Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1965) • Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1967)
1970–1974	ECOSOC consultative status; 30–50 NGOs reps. attend	Radical Feminism	• CSW considers Bose's *Women's Role in Economic Development* (1970)
1975–1979	6,000 NGO reps at International Women's Year Tribune	Socialist Feminism	• First World Conference on Women, Mexico City (1975) • UN Decade for Women:Equality, Development, Peace • CSW working groups draft CEDAW with the GA Third. • *CEDAW* (1979)
1980–1984	8,000 NGO reps. attend Copenhagen NGO Forum	"Women of Color" Feminisms	• Second World Conference on Women, Copenhagen (1980) focus on employment, health, education • Programme of Action: women's ownership, inheritance, child custody, loss of nationality
1985–1989	12,000 NGO reps. attend Nairobi NGO Forum	Third World/Post-Colonial Feminisms	• Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi • Nairobi Forward-looking strategies, mainstreaming women's equality, exposing violence against women
1990		"Women of Color" Feminisms	• Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Mainstreaming at development/environmental conferences.
1995	30,000 NGO reps.attend Beijing NGO Forum	Third World /Post-Colonial Feminisms	• Fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action's 12 critical areas of concern. • Optional Protocol to CEDAW (1999)
2000	2,000 NGO reps. attend	Intersectionality	• 23rd special session of GA • Security Council Resolution 1325, Millennium Development Goals
2005			Beijing +10
2010	479 NGO reps. attend		Beijing +15
2015	477 NGO reps. attend		Bejing +20 UN Women, People's Republic of China organize state Commitment to Action

Sources: Feminist Approach printed previously in Arat (2015); United Nations (b)[2]; UN Women (a)[1]; UN Women (f)[12]. Section of Arat (2015) is being used with the permission of the copyright holder Cambridge University Press. Others wishing to cite should seek separate permission clearance.

The 2010 CSW adopted the following seven resolutions (Commission on the Status of Women, 2010).

1. CSW Resolution 54/1. Declaration on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women
   This resolution reaffirmed the importance of the BDPfA on the occasion of its 15th anniversary, noting that more progress was needed.
2. CSW Resolution 54/2—Women, the girl child and HIV and AIDS
   This resolution recognizes the disproportionate vulnerability of women and girls to the HIV and AIDS pandemic worldwide, as both a cause and a consequence of poverty and other social and economic disadvantages. The resolution calls for governments and civil society to intensify efforts and international cooperation aiming to promote universal access

to comprehensive HIV prevention programs and treatment, as well as political and financial coordination to address gender equality in national HIV and AIDS policies.
3. CSW Resolution 54/3. Release of women and children taken hostage, including those subsequently imprisoned, in armed conflicts
   This resolution condemns hostage taking, requests states take all possible measures to rescue hostages, and to collect gender and age disaggregated data on hostage victims.
4. CSW Resolution 54/4—Women's economic empowerment
   This resolution acknowledges that the empowerment of women is a critical factor in the eradication of poverty. It urges member states to ensure women and girls equal access to education, basic services, including primary health care, housing, economic opportunities and decision-making at all levels, requesting states to adopt and apply effective measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal

remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value.

5. CSW Resolution 54/5—Eliminating maternal mortality and morbidity through the empowerment of women
This resolution recognizes that half a million women and adolescent girls die every year from preventable complications related to pregnancy or childbirth. Over 200 million women lack access to safe and effective forms of contraception. It stresses the need to combat discrimination, poverty, and harmful traditional practices and acknowledges the critical role of men and boys in supporting women's access to safe conditions for pregnancy and childbirth.

6. CSW Resolution 54/6 Strengthening the institutional arrangements of the United Nations for support of gender equality and the empowerment of women by consolidating the four existing offices into a composite entity.
This resolution reaffirmed CSW support for the creation of UN Women, a focal agency for research, advocacy and gender mainstreaming in the UN system.

7. CSW Resolution 54/7—Ending female genital mutilation
This resolution identifies female genital mutilation as a violation of girls' and women's bodies, causing irreparable harm to an estimated 100 million women around the world. This resolution calls for states to take all necessary measures to enact and enforce legislation to prohibit FGM and to protect girls from the practice.

We find that the CSW adopted resolutions on *some but not all priorities shared by attending and non-attending women's groups*. The CSW adopted resolutions in the areas of Priority 1 on eliminating violence against women (Resolution on Female Genital Mutilation), Priority 2 on women's health (Resolutions on HIV/Aids and Resolution on Maternal Mortality), and Priorities 3 and 4 on maternity leave and wages; as well as emphases on education and poverty (Resolution on Economic Empowerment). However, the CSW did not address the second highest priority of women's NGOs: that of land rights. We argue that the CSW's state-centric orientation means that it does not take substantial action on women's priorities if they contravene traditional territorial rights within states.

While recognizing the 2010 CSW's work on resolutions, we note two objections. First, in some cases a resolution is incomplete: addressing one aspect of an issue identified by women's NGOs as without additional resolutions. The resolution on FGM was important, but the 2010 CSW did not pass additional resolutions on sexual assault and spousal abuse outside of the context of FGM itself, even though both attending and non-attending groups reported that their Priority 1 was eliminating violence, sexual assault and spousal abuse. Second, the bundling of three broad policy areas into one omnibus resolution gives the individual issues short shrift, and limits the ability of women's NGOs to challenge their home state's records on women and girls in specific policy areas. While the Economic Empowerment resolution briefly mentions the need for women's equal access to equal wages, education, and poverty all within one resolution, it does not go into any specifics as to why these inequalities exist and what specific policies would

remedy them. By bundling these broad policy issues, the CSW and women's NGOs lose the ability to call out their home governments. States can point to any initiative that "economically empowers women" as fulfilling the resolution without changing underlying inequalities.

The CSW did not pass resolutions on key priorities articulated by women's NGOs, which we argue reflects the second face of power, or issues that are not getting on the CSW's agenda in its current institutional format, especially because of non-attending women's NGOs. First, the CSW did not pass any resolutions dealing with land rights, Priority 4 of attending women's groups but Priority 2 of non-attending women's groups. Such a resolution would require a fundamental transformation of patriarchal institution of the state, which tends to equate power with land, and to transfer land and property from elderly males to younger first-born males. Reforming inheritance and land rights in some developing nations could lead to major internal conflicts within and between states. This reality reflects Arat's discussion that "while many Third World/transnational feminist concerns are articulated in UN outcomes documents, these documents have been silent on class oppression or fail to mention capitalism by name as a contributor to the hardship faced by many women" (p. 686). Because of our focus on the second face of power, our empirical evidence shows that despite support across both attending and non-attending groups, a resolution on land rights did not get on the agenda for internal and external reasons. Internally, countries wouldn't support women's groups to attend the CSW with this as a top policy priority, but also externally, such a resolution passed with the CSW contravenes the CSW's and UN's focus on the international system being one of sovereign states and involves transformational change: post-colonial feminism rather than liberal feminism.

The CSW also did not pass resolutions on other issues listed by non-attending women's NGOs: the trafficking of women and girls, internet access for women around the world, and the effects of climate change on women and girls. These policy priorities also deal with flow of resources across traditional state boundaries. Perhaps political actors will take up these issues through gender mainstreaming efforts on Paris Talks on Climate Change or conventions on the digital divide. However, as the most important international body charged with women's empowerment, a responsive CSW should pass resolutions on these top priority issues of trafficking women and girls, internet access for women and girls, and the gendered effects of climate change.

Our surveys showed that women's NGOs believed that the CSW reflected the priorities of liberal women's NGOs, rather than inviting diverse critical women's NGOs:

[i]nfluence at the UN is hard won. Good ideas do not rise to the top. Long-term efforts, particularly with delegates, individuals in their home capitals, grassroots coalitions, and work inside the UN itself is needed to try to influence. Even then, significant influence is provided by powerful, well-funded international NGOs who dominate the questions related to women's health, rather than the women to whom programs are normally targeted (developing nations). The UN operates much as other political spheres and it is difficult to achieve evidence-based success in the decisions that are taken.

Another women's NGO stated: "[t]he United Nations does not appear to address worldviews, theologies or beliefs that support violence and patriarchal attitudes toward women, and promote political violence." Yet another women's NGO leader stated that their top priorities were harassment by husbands, sexual violence in the workplace, and forced entrance into the sex trade, issues not tackled head-on by the 2010 CSW. A women's NGO from a marginalized and poor region of a developing country stated that women bear the brunt of conflict, and have influence in preventing conflict, but are not included in UN discussions[13]. This group wanted to attend the CSW but could not afford it and "had never been invited." Statements by attending and non-attending women's NGOs underline our assessment that the CSW privileges state actors for women and NGOs supportive of liberal feminism.

Initially on the periphery of policy-making, World Conferences on Women grew out of a state delegation responding to a request from a well-organized women's NGO federation with offices around the globe. At the CSW's first meeting, a federation of women's organizations was present. This group was the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF): a federation with member organizations from 70 plus countries and executive board memberships from all regions, including Western Europe. The WIDF was not allowed to participate in subsequent CSW sessions because it was deemed a "communist front," (Baldez, 2014, p. 49) so the Romanian state delegation on behalf of WIDF proposed that the UN General Assembly (GA) designate 1975 International Women's Year to remind the world of persistent gender inequalities (United Nations, c, p. 88). This idea was not only endorsed by the CSW, but grew into a GA-endorsed First World Conference on Women in Mexico City (1975), a UN Decade for Women (1976–1985), punctuated by the Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen (1980), and culminating in the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi (1985). Basu argues the "most productive global influence on women's movements have been United Nations' support for women's rights and women's conferences" (Basu, 2010, p. xxi) At the World Conferences on Women, women's NGOs from all over had a chance to meet, network, and strategize (Lycklama i Nijeholt et al., 1998; see Keck and Sikkink, 1999). During the consultative process in the lead-up to the 1995 Beijing Conference, women's NGOs met in regional groupings to discuss their priorities and knowledge of UN processes, coalitions, and allies. During this time that women's movement actors drafted, prepared and negotiated the outcome document of the conference, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPfA).

Throughout the UN gender equality policy-making process, state-selected representatives on women's rights in the GA Third, CEDAW, and UN Women directly interface with one another to influence gender equality policy at multiple levels. Women's NGOs with significant resources may be in a position to work with or influence the GA, CEDAW, and UN Women if the women's organizations themselves are large and well-financed to get the attention of their state delegates to the UN, or through consultative processes as members of the GA draft numerous resolutions dealing with women's rights. Because in the UN, state representatives on women's issues subordinated women's NGOs, the UN ultimately upholds the power of states. Diverse women's NGOs such as those that challenge the state as patriarchal do not have the opportunity to meet with CSW commissioners. The ECOSOC process for granting consultative status filters such women's NGOs out of the process of representation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this article, we use a mixed-method approach to evaluate the level of United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) representation and responsiveness to diverse women populations as reflected in (a) state delegations' participation in debates, (b) NGO participation, and (c) NGO policy priorities. We find that the CSW is highly representative and responsive to diverse women populations in terms of state delegation participation across UN regions. We find that the CSW is at best moderately representative and responsive to women's NGOs. On one hand, the CSW conducts regional advance consultations, but on the other women's NGOs face costly barriers to entry to gain ECOSOC status, attending women's NGOs are not diverse across UN regions, and those that do participate are primarily involved in parallel off-site events during CSW formal session. Although the 2010 CSW passed important resolutions in some areas, we find its level of representation, and responsiveness to women's NGO policy priorities is low. We base this evaluation on our surveys of attending and non-attending women's NGOs that show top policy priorities the 2010 CSW did not discuss or pass resolutions on including land rights, sex trafficking, internet access for women, and the effects of climate change on women. We contend that during 1970–1994, when World Conferences on Women occurred, parallel transnational advance consultations among women's NGOs in tandem with CSW regional consultations created a broadening of the CSW's agenda. The CSW rationally anticipated a broader set of priority issues for diverse women populations. Further research to explore UN gender equality policymaking is needed, but in the meantime, we argue for a Fifth World Conference on Women, so that CSW work can represent and respond to cross-regional women's NGO activism and solutions.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Purdue University Human Research Protection Program with written informed consent from

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[13]On 31 October 2000, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325), recognizing that gender–based violence is a tool of war and conflict that must be eliminated and addressed by the participation of women at all levels of political decision-making, in militaries, and in peace-building processes.

all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the Purdue University Institutional Research Board.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

MR, MH, RV, and DD all contributed to the conception and design of this study, the GIS data collection and analysis, online survey questionnaire and analysis,

and writing sections of the manuscript. All authors contributed to manuscript revision, read and approved the submitted version.

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French Red Cross Ladies in International or Universal Exhibitions (1867–1937)

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This paper attempts to pinpoint what French Red-Cross women were doing in the international exhibitions from 1867 to 1937. They engaged their energies into organizing meetings, exhibitions, and into healing, receiving awards for their work. In spite of their dual activity of exhibitors and healthcarers, they had no specific pavilion at the world fairs. They hovered between the worlds of politics and medicine as distinguished guests but without their own space.

Keywords: red cross, women, societies, world fairs, France

Although at the turn of the twentieth century, it was probably not surprising to notice the presence of women within the Red Cross Societies and in International Exhibitions, belonging to both institutions had not yet been considered. At first sight, they seemed both to be and not to be settled in a global environment. No iconographies represent Red Cross ladies at work in International Exhibitions. Yet, they were on Parisian sites starting from the early phase of the 1867 Universal Exhibition up until the 1937 International World Fair, the last paradigm of its kind. An intuitive thought places women from Red Cross Societies on the rescuing side in the public spaces of exhibitions all the way through this period.

The issue here, other than knowing who they were, is to identify what, in the eyes of the world, they did: were they just ordinary members of nationwide societies, professional health staff who ensured the protection of visitors in international exhibitions? Or, did they carry out, in a national agenda, an International philanthropic activity, showing generosity, kindness, benevolence, help, assistance and "love of mankind" (Littré, 1982)? In other words, were they local representatives casting transnational objectives at world fairs? As "regulars" in congresses and International Health Committees, did women in French Red Cross Societies speak with one voice in International Exhibitions? Was there a prevalent society of women at the world fairs? To what extent did International Exhibitions exhort women in French Relief societies?

SHARING IDEALS

The involvement of French Red Cross women in International Exhibitions is an aftermath of Solférino. It brings us back to the emotion Henry Dunant (1828–1910) a philanthropist (Jaeger, 2009)[1] from Geneva expressed the day after the Battle of Solforino (Duquet, 1896). Following the conflict for Italian unity with Franco-Piedmontese troops who were opposing the Austrians, in 1859, Dunant could not forget the hundreds of wounded piled up on the battlefield. He wrote about it to the Countess de Gasparin (1813–1894) to beg her "to start a fund for relief or at least to collect money in Geneva" (Française, 1974, p. 47). At the same time, Dunant noticed that Italian women were spontaneously helping and comforting. He particularly recalled that:

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[1] For a somewhat general biography of Henry Dunant (see Chaponnière, 2010).

"In the church the women of Lombardy go from one to the other with jars and pitchers full of water, which serve to appease the thirst and to bathe the wounded. Some of these improvised nurses are good-hearted old women, other are charming young girls. Their gentleness, goodness, compassion and their attentive care restored a little courage to the wounded" (Dunant, 1911, p. 32–33).

The Countess Verri-Borromeo (-1860) took the lead of the Italian Ladies Relief Committee (Sturzenegger, 1914, p. 12). In providing moral support and assistance in war times, women both soothed the pain and shared the same drive.

"Women of Castiglione, seeing that [Dunant made] no distinction in nationality, imitate[d] [his] example, showing the same kindness to all these men of such different origins and who [were] to them all equally strangers" (Dunant, 1911, p. 40).

They developed the assistance that existed from the past[2]. Women's "uncalculated acts and behavior"[3] inspired Dunant who recorded them in his memories (Dunant, 1862). But his writing did not bring him relief. He never showed any "resilience" (Moynier, 1903, p. 4–5) and he co-founded with Gustave Moynier[4] (1826–1863) a relief society in 1864. His impulse also came from 16 plenipotentiaries[5] who met at the Geneva Convention and whose nations engaged that same year in treating the wounded, the sick, and respecting medical personnel (see also Maxime Du Camp, 1889, p. 75–98; Moynier, 1903, p. 27; French Red Cross, 1936, p. 15). In military camps a flag and a white arm-band with a red cross was adopted as the emblem. But this convention did not remain just a simple moral legislation, "an affair for the government" (Werner, 1938, p. 42–43).

Both doctors and women felt for their fellowmen and put a lot of effort into curing and caring. In France, the *Société de Secours aux Blessés Militaires* (S.S.B.M.—Society for the Relief of Wounded Soldiers—) started with this motto "Inter Arma Caritas" (In War, Charity). Its main objective was to assist civilians and military who were wounded. Its members, having Catholic and Royalist backgrounds,

"…were to help not only their own country's sick or wounded, but also 'all the unfortunate who fall into their hands, irrespective of nationality.' This mutuality would ensure proper treatment for any wounded man which ever society had him in its care" (Boissier, 1985, p. 336).

S.S.B.M. ladies were generally acted in the name of a community, a country or a nation participating in the birth of the word nationality (Noiriel, 1995) whose base was religious at the very beginning. Ordinary S.S.B.M. female members did not

however make a name in this International philanthropic activity. That would have been sounded since women's organizations were developing beyond the S.S.B.M. *La France Charitable et Prévoyante* for example recorded 53 societies founded by women[6].

S.S.B.M ladies had therefore predictably some figureheads such as the Grand Duchess Louise de Bade (1838–1923) was to be remembered for praising the Marquis de Vogüé, President of the French Red Cross Central Committee, and Gustave Moynier, President of the International Red-Cross Committee, who wanted to extend "charitable activities all over the world" (Boissier, 1985, p. 351). Chairwomen of the S.S.B.M. Ladies Committee also went down to history, especially when it was reset in 1875 (Pineau, 2006, p. 13). Madame la Maréchale Niel was then less known for her Red Cross philanthropic activity than her followers the Comtesse de Flavigny, the Princesse Czartoriska, Madame la Maréchale de Mac-Mahon, the Duchesse de Reggio, the Countesse Haussonville, the Marquise de Montebello, Madame la Maréchale Lyautey, and Mademoiselle d'Haussonville[7]. Madame la Maréchale Lyauté (1862–1953) was particularly celebrated for her service in the Red-Cross. She was awarded the Légion d'Honneur because she "worked for the human body of France" (Chavenon, 2010, p. 207) whereas her husband worked to glorify the country. Their fame was set according to the traditional gender sphere of activity.

As the S.S.B.M. was gradually increasing in world fame, the second Universal Exhibition opened in Paris in 1867. The first of French Relief societies had long thought it would be an opportunity to assert itself in this International happening (Foucault, 1936, p. 27; see as well Pineau, 2014, p. 17). It was rather pleased to respond to the "daring"[8] invitation of the organizer, Frederic Le Play (1806–1882). He wanted all existing societies and new circles to participate and collaborate. His idea was to offer the S.S.B.M. and the other 19 International Relief Societies a chance to put on display articles over 700 m^2 (Foucault, 1936, p. 27). He also wished to "stimulate the zeal of academicians and industrials so as to improve rescue services which would play in favor of the wounded" (Moynier, 1901, p. 8–9). A large number of inquisitive visitors and members of relief societies would visit the Red Cross exhibition site. The S.S.B.M. staff specifically invited their visitors to pay tribute in front of the statue of H. Dunant's bust (Gigan, 1943, p. 191–192).

For the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.), Le Play's invitation was primarily the opportunity to promote their first International Conference[9]. It was also the way to notice how the S.S.B.M. would organize a meeting for International Red Cross societies "in a more peaceful setting" (Boissier, 1985, p. 334) other than on the battlefields. For Clara Barton (1821–1912), a lady in charge of the hospitals during the American Civil War and future founding mother of the American Red Cross (Price,

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[2]On the early women's devotion (cf. Guillermand, 1988).

[3]Philanthropy has been partly defined as such in *Trésor de la Langue Française*, 1986, Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.

[4]https://www.icrc.org/fre/assets/files/other/554-557_livres.pdf (accessed March 17, 2015). *On the relations between Gustave Moynier and Henry Dunant* (cf. Bennett, 1983).

[5]These representatives came from all over Europe and also from several American States (cf. Boissier, 1985, p. 225; see also Française, 1998, p. 10–11).

[6]*La France Charitable et Prévoyante*, 1899, Paris, Plon.

[7]On the different chairwomen of the S.S.B.M. Ladies Committee see page 2 of General meetings from 1864 to 1937.

[8]This adjective was used by Gustave Moynier in his memoir on the founding of the Red Cross and handed out to the International Committee in 1903.

[9]http://www.icrc.org/fre/resources/documents/misc/5fzf8w.htm (accessed March 19, 2015).

1954; see also Jones, 2013), this was the opportunity to highlight a central authority (Boissier, 1985, p. 340). As "it was believed that Red Cross societies had a common purpose … [and] should be united and interdependent" (Boissier, 1985, p. 333), the Parisian Universal Exhibition was the place to apply it. Le Play's invitation allowed therefore Red Cross societies to establish long lasting encounters and identify the objectives and expectations of the society's future International Conferences (Moynier, 1901, p. 12). In addition to this, the second Universal Exhibition bestowed the I.C.R.C. to produce a list of people who had given their services to the relief societies and who deserved a medal.

In willing to distribute awards, the I.C.R.C. was acting like the organizers of the 1867 Exhibition. It was also under pressure to take part in the world fair and displayed among 600 objects, some publications (Foucault, 1936, p. 27). But, these writings drew little interest from visitors. The panel of judges at the Universal Exhibition awarded nevertheless a Grand Prize to the S.S.B.M. Its intention was primarily to honor Henri Dunant, the man who healed wounded men thanks to the help of women. "Nobody then contested the right for the International Committee of the Red Cross to be awarded in this way" (Moynier, 1903, p. 33). In the eyes of the world, International Relief Societies benefited from the S.S.B.M.'s success when some women of the French Red Cross society decided to break apart the national unity.

COMPETING WITH OTHER RELIEF SOCIETIES

By 1879 the S.S.B.M., which did particularly well during the 1870 war in managing hospitals and ambulances (Rouge, 1963, p. 16–17), underwent a period of division transpiring on the international scene. Some French female members started to be concerned with the management of the society left exclusively to men (Pineau, 2006, p. 13). Therefore, they splitted officially to found a new society, the *Association des Dames Françaises* (A.D.F.—French Women's Society—) that was solely managed by women (Association des Dames Françaises, 1900, p. 6). On the International scene, the A.D.F. was also particular in that it was composed of members with nursing skills (Rouge, 1963, p. 17, 36). The split with the S.S.B.M. was also triggered by the fact that Dr. Duchaussoy noticed that during the 1870 war, outstanding women distinguished themselves publically in spite of their lack of medical skills. He recorded then that women provided all the attention needed (Chevalier, 1986, p. 29). He felt that a "completely independent paramedic public school"(Pineau, 2006, p. 13) should be established and confer degrees to take care of mankind on the International arena. Therefore, he co-founded with Emma Koechlin Schwartz the A.D.F. (Pineau, 2006, p. 21). Exams were regularly organized in different A.D.F. local committees. The Nice Committee, for example, reported that:

"The exam had two parts. The first part was held at the Dispensary of the Ecole Pratique, where applicants had to do bandages on patients and answer questions about the material used in this school and the antiseptic precautions concerning the material. The second part of the exam was held at the Headquarters of

the Committee, and dealt with questions on 1/anatomy and physiology, 2/hygiene, 3/pharmacy, 4/medicine"[10].

On their application forms, applicants in every single committee were required to show evidence of their regular attendance at classes and be specific about their membership[11]. The A.D.F. chaired for nearly 30 years by the Countess Foucher de Careil (1881–1911), a wealthy lady who enjoyed the position of her husband as Senator and Ambassador in Austria[12], had always spoken highly of its activities in prestigious and International circles. At the Paris 1900 world fair, the society took particularly great care in exhibiting therapeutic objects.

Boats with their life-saving appliances, medical dressings, and stretchers for transporting the wounded and sick after a naval battle were thought to have been amongst the first things displayed. The A.D.F. also considered deploying different models of stretchers which were dragged by bicycles or carts. This was a way for the society to show its International scope[13]. But, Maréchal Lyautey (1854–1934), the organizer of the 1900 Universal Exhibition, as regards the other societies, only granted them a small space. The A.D.F. was then obliged to abandon its initial plan. As a result, the society presented material that was lighter in weight, material such as hygienic spittoons, stretcher-bearers' bonk bags, canteen, and rescue bags, hospital bed-linen, bandages, plasters, but also hospital beds and cars to transport the sick and wounded. Furthermore, the A.D.F. decided to extend the world fair and exhibit outside the official venue, in its hospital in Auteuil, a hospital-tent, with all the material needed for 20 beds. The A.D.F. also invited guests in its general stores (Association des Dames Françaises, 1900, p. 13–14, 38).

As for the other relief society the S.S.B.M, it was satisfied with the space that was allotted to it in the pavilion for hygiene and sanitary equipment (Exposition Internationale, 1900, p. 254). That fitted with the little the society had to display, that is to say charts showing its local committees, temporary provincial hospitals, main county hospitals, sick-bays, hospital bed-linen, and bandages[14]. Even the latest of the relief societies, the *Union des Femmes de France* (U.F.F—French Women's Union—), founded in 1881 by Mme. Koechelin-Schwartz (1838–1911), was contented[15]. The A.D.F. held particularly strong on its choice to display as many objects as possible at the 1900 world fair because the I.C.R.C. rather wanted to interact with one French Red Cross society, and that was the S.S.B.M (Pineau, 2006, p. 13). The A.D.F. would not let the S.S.B.M. hold a world-wide dimension. Twenty-two years after the first International Congress for the Rights of Women (Auclert, 1878) and in the midst of a similar situation[16],

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[10]*Bulletin de l'Association des Dames Françaises*, n°6, 19th year, May 1905, p. 123.
[11]*Bulletin de l'Association des Dames Françaises*, n°6, 19th year, May 1905, p. 118.
[12]Obituary notice signed by Dr. Duchaussoy, in *Bulletin de l'Association des Dames Françaises*, n° 3, 25th year, February 1911, p. 65–70.
[13]On the programmes led by women in the medical field (see Diebolt, 1984).
[14]*Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge*, n° 124, 31st year, October 1900, p. 237.
[15]Mme. Bardier-Hugo's speech, U.F.F. chairwoman, in *Bulletin de l'Association des Dames Françaises*, n° 5, 12th year, May-June 1931, p. 269.
[16]Cf. the 1900 International Congress on women's rights and conditions—Congrès international de la condition et des droits des femmes, 1901, *Congrès international de la condition et des droits des femmes, tenu les 5, 6, 7 et 8 septembre 1900 à*

a society managed by women wanted to be more visible than a society with a mixed management. Red Cross ladies put their case forward in the 1900 International event but in a moderate way. Therefore, the A.D.F. expressed, in the *International Bulletin of Red Cross Societies,* the need to gather together all men of humanity and charity during the world exposition[17]. These subdued national tensions were unheard and most probably ignored by the 1900 exhibition organizers who finally decided to award the I.C.R.C. with a Grand Prize[18]. Women in French Red Cross Societies were inconspicuous although they exposed.

Faced with these different national components, problems were not to be smoothed at the 1931 International Colonial Exhibition. France's colonial empire was by then a driving force in women's presence at this particular World Fair. It provided the opportunity for French Red Cross ladies to participate into the country's world power. They were involved in a larger project carried out by men such as Jules Ferry (1832–1893) who openly stated "the higher races had duties over the lower races" (Ferry, 1885). Colonialism had revived completion between relief societies.

Yet, the I.C.R.C. wished that, among the competing French relief societies, only one would correspond with the well-known General Commissioner, the Maréchal Lyautey. Thus the I.C.R.C. set an inter-society commission to make a decision and called upon their "spirit of fraternity"[19]. But French Red Cross societies preferred to exhibit separately. Having "no power to influence the destiny of the Red Cross [Societies, the I.C.R.C.] stressed endlessly that the national societies enjoyed total independence" (Boissier, 1985, p. 335). "To voice its opinion, the [I.C.R.C only] had the Bulletin [and that was the] link between one society and another" (Boissier, 1985, p. 335).

Therefore, in 1931, some sort of common strategy, showing a "spirit of solidarity"[20] was discussed. It was finally agreed that French Red Cross societies were going to exhibit both individually and together. A standard exhibition on the second floor of the Palace Museum gave insight into the constitutions and the relief societies' aims and means of action[21]. Flyers and leaflets completed these tables of activities[22]. Beside this event, the three Red Cross societies exhibited in the colony pavilions where they carried out their activities. The S.S.B.M displayed its constitution and also maps and photographs relating to past and present activities on boards in the Indochinese pavilion. The A.D.F. set up an identical arrangement in the Dakar and Guadeloupe pavilion. As for the U.F.F., it displayed

in the Malagasy and Togolese pavilions small red crosses on a map of France, which showed where the society owned regional committees.

The 1931 International Colonial Exhibition not only more or less enabled the S.S.B.M., the A.D.F. and the U.F.F. to speak with different voices, but also to shed light on the U.F.F. fiftieth anniversary[23]. The relief society was invited to end its commemoration ceremonies with a visit to the Colonial Exhibition[24]. The *Femmes de France* honored themselves with "privileged entries" issued by the Exhibition's commissioner. But, the inauguration day was postponed and a large number of U.F.F. members found themselves in front of closed doors of the designated pavilions.

> "[They] were only able to do a complete tour outside the building, under lashing rain; but, although they had been hardened during the war, they were nevertheless greatly interested in the show and also in explanations kindly supplied by Mr. the administrator of the colonies who showed himself willing to monitor them"[25].

The dynamism of the U.F.F. was so blatant that "they had no need (during the Colonial Exhibition) to keep in touch with their sister societies" (Boissier, 1985, p. 333). Madame Saint-René Taillandier (1865–1959), the philosopher Hippolyte Taine's niece and future chairwoman[26], readily praised her own society:

> "On this, our fiftieth anniversary, let us feel the strength of the link that binds us with one and another, in the present as in the past, to the chairwomen who have come after, to the one who after 40 years of "service-duty," still generates today strength and tenderness over us" (Française, 1931, p. 6)[27].

This call was far from the first U.F.F. claim asking the S.S.B.M. and the A.D.F. for collaboration and deployment of forces. Nurses were not exactly working with each other at world fairs but they had been through similar training. Like Dr. Duchaussoy at the beginning of the A.D.F., Dr. Boulimé had trained U.F.F. ladies[28]. But in the long run, U.F.F. trainees were given more esteem for organizing visitors' protection. Both this conversion and diversion between these two relief societies also lied in terms of their members. By the mid-1930s, the A.D.F. and the U.F.F. had a similar increase in their number of members (Pineau, 2006, p. 11–12), with the greatest prestige for the U.F.F. in International Exhibitions held in France. In this rival situation, the S.S.B.M. stood back, although it had over 140,000 supporters after the 1937 Paris World Fair.

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l'Exposition universelle, au Palais de l'économie sociale et des congrès: questions économiques, morales et sociales, éducation, législation: droit privé, droit public, Paris, Imprimerie des arts et manufactures (see also Durand, 1901; Rasmussen, 1989).

[17] *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge,* n° 123, 31st year, July 1900, p. 177.

[18] *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge,* n° 124, 31st year, October 1900, p. 225.

[19] *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 9, 12th year, October 1931, p. 399.

[20] *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge,* n° 350, part LXII, October 1931, p. 891.

[21] See also *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 9, 12th year, October 1931, p. 400.

[22] *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 9, 12th year, October 1931, p. 401.

[23] It was mentioned as early as February; cf. *Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge,* n° 342, part LXII, February 1931, p. 162.

[24] *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 5, 12th year, May 1931, p. 283.

[25] *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 5, 12th year, May 1931, p. 284.

[26] *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 5, 19th year, October 1938.

[27] *Union des Femmes de France – Cinquantenaire 1881–1931,* 1931, Paris, Croix-Rouge Française: 6.

[28] Mme. Bardier-Hugo's speech, U.F.F. chairwoman, in *Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France,* n° 5, 12th year, May–June 1931, p. 269.

GAINING A WORLD-WIDE DIMENSION

There were many reasons why the U.F.F. had a prominent place in International Exhibitions. Its awards and professionalism can be highlighted here. It started at the 1931 Colonial Exhibition when the U.F.F. received two awards. The first was a Grand Prize[29] obtained under the Metropolitan section in charge of developing exchanges with the colonies. Testimonies from colonizers relating, for example, the disappearance of small pox in Madagascar thanks to the U.F.F. endeavor, especially generated public interest[30]. The second award was no other than the gold medal which was presented by the Commissioner General to the U.F.F. for being the best exhibitor at the Colonial Exhibition[31].

The U.F.F. International fame and recognition also lied in providing care at the Aid-Post. Between 15 May and 25 November, 1931, 82 nurses had treated 5,114 visitors and organizers

> "…which gives an average of 28 persons per day. Amongst the diagnostics noted on patient records we can see several serious falls resulting in spinal fractures, fractures of limbs, deep wounds with severing of the arteries, dislocations; a large number of people passing out, two fatal heart attacks, some epileptic fits, one renal colic attack, one acute appendicitis, an alcoholic coma, a pulmonary edema, all necessitating evacuation to neighboring hospitals or calling an ambulance to drive the injured to their homes"[32].

But those U.F.F. activities at Aid-Posts of the Colonial Exhibition were considered as quite secondary. The society's major concern was to make itself known, and promote its image on an International site. Therefore, as early as 1935, the U.F.F. launched an appeal to metropolitan committees in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, in countries under mandate as well as foreign countries to kindly send them "as soon as possible and ex gratia, pretty views of the outsides or insides of their establishments"[33]. Nursing schools, dispensaries, sanatoriums, preventoria[34], open air schools, consultations for prenatal and the newly born, creches, nurseries, formula milk[35], holiday camps were thus required to prepare for the International Exhibition of Arts and Technology in Modern Life which was to be held in Paris 2 years later.

When visitors arrived at the Palais de Chaillot in May 1937, Spain was in the middle of civil war (see also Vilar, 1994; Bloch, 2014). The I.C.R.C. had been working actively with victims, prisoners and their families and concentrated in

collecting money for the Spanish Red Cross[36]. However, French Red Cross Societies were to organize, attend and participate in the International Exhibition but with no mention of this in the I.C.R.C. bulletin. It was left to an unknown paid[37] nurse and assistant manageress of the U.F.F. Mme. Jobert-Dalligny, to report. In office while there was a transfer of power between two U.F.F. chairwomen, Mme. Bardier-Hugo and Mme. Saint-René Taillandier (Pineau, 2006, p. 12), Mme. Jobert-Dalligny was probably an Infirmière-Hospitalière (a Hospital nurse with a state diploma)[38]. At a time when the history of professionalization of nursing was in progress with trainees in Léonie Chaptal's *Maison-Ecole* (a School-Home) divided between first class nurses for curing and second class nurses for caring (Belliard, 2009, p. 191; see as well Belliard, 2017), that meant Mme. Jobert-Dalligny had attended one of the five U.F.F. nursing schools (Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge, 1928, p. 27). In 1889 courses concentrated on anatomy, surgery, symptomatology, fever, and other functional disorders[39]. She presumably knew more than an upper class amateur nurse with a *certificat d'auxiliaire* (paramedic certificate) that did:

> "… not confer the right to cure, [but] knowing effective gesturing in the case of an accident... [It was] mainly intended for all women who could not devote the proper time for studying nursing and yet who wanted to be helpful and acquired elementary knowledge in hygiene" (Pineau, 2006, p. 49).

Although it was quite difficult to state precisely the content of Mme. Jobert-Dalligny's training at the U.F.F., she was definitively an experienced nurse, having spent some time in the Rabat Health Center (Chavenon, 2010, p. 165). Her office duty, on the contrary, indicated a lot on her background. As an assistant manageress at the U.F.F., Mme. Jobert-Dalligny might be called to replace the Head. Therefore, she knew how to organize meetings when needed, that is to say at least every 2 months, and draft reports. She also knew how to be part of the Personnel Committee where she sat with six other members. Her duty was to inquire on efficient employment in the society, to monitor nursing students during their training period, to handle relief and family relationships and to enlist auxiliary helpers[40].

With such responsibilities, Mme. Jobert-Dalligny became the natural U.F.F. spokesperson at the 1937 International Exhibition

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[29]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 11, 12th year, December 1931, p. 463.

[30]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 10, 12th year, November 1931, p. 454.

[31]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 11, 12th year, December 1931, p. 466.

[32]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 11, 12th year, December 1931, p. 470.

[33]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 9, 15th year, October 1935, p. 287.

[34]Singular for "preventorium." It was "preventive" a sanatorium where patients suffered from a first tuberculosis infection and had no risk of contagion. cf. http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/pr%C3%A9ventorium/63872 (accessed March 14, 2015).

[35]Milk charity for mothers in the physical or social inability to feed their children with good quality milk (cf. Julien, 1997).

[36]*Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge*, n° 413, part LXVIII, January 1937, p. 92–97.

[37]From 1922 all nurses were paid. This came along with the establishment of a state diploma (cf. Pineau, 2006, p. 15; Chavenon, 2010, p. 105).

[38]On the different kind of nurses i.e., assistant nurses with an elementary, first or second degree, visiting nurses for tuberculosis and pediatric, and hospital nurses (cf. Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge, 1928, p. 26–27). See also Ecole d'infirmières de la Croix-Rouge française, no date, *Société de secours aux blesses militaires – Hôpital-Ecole*, Paris: 3. See as well Pineau (2006, p. 15) or again Diebolt and Fouché (2011).

[39]Union des Femmes de France, 1889–1890, Personnel Committee, 10 pages handwritten notes on "Cours de médecine élémentaire donnés à l'Union des Femmes de France pour les membres auxiliaires: notions générales d'anatomie – pansement, petite chirurgie – symptomatologie – embolie, fièvre, troubles fonctionnels."

[40]Union des Femmes de France, 1889–1890, Personnel Committee, 10 pages handwritten notes on "Composition et fonctionnement de la Commission."

and filled the "space for women." She stood at a time when women's suffrage was consistently rejected and when there was an "ambiguous reflections of the question of women's rights in France (Reynold, 2017). According to Mme. Jobert-Dalligny the Red Cross was fulfilling the well-being of mankind in presenting its general activities and providing medical care[41]. Her report was not just a professional witness account of what took place. It pinpointed women's polyvalent two-fold nature. They were able, at the same time, to exhibit and also to care. However, the 1937 International Exhibition exhorted their exhibiting activities. They preferred to bear witness to their hedonic activities rather than to the caring ones. They also were just as much attached to the spirit of competition as to the prizes or in-kind donations that they received to thank them for the great care they gave to the injured. The U.F.F. therefore seemed to be turning more toward patriotism than toward hygiene matters. That war more profitable and more promising in a world-wide approach.

This 1937 experience at the World Fair stood against the already existing collaboration among International Red Cross Societies where professionalism was important. The Anglo-French-American Hospital, in Neuilly-sur-Seine, for example, was run by a Red Cross "… lady versed not only in nursing but in the practical details of organization…"[42]. Her duties, similar to those of Mme. Jobert-Dalligny, were to build up a network and not separate the nations.

But, in an International Exhibition context, the U.F.F. tended to isolate itself and opposed the worlds of medicine and politics. Women in this French Red Cross society positioned themselves primarily as distinguished guests. They were there more for the show than as a reference.

Universal or International Exhibitions that took place in Paris had definitely a different impact on Women in French Red Cross Societies. If it was too early for Red Cross Ladies to invest in the first Universal Exhibition, the 1867 World Fair, held in Paris, was an opportunity to organize and structure the newly born International Relief Movement. But, the 1900 Universal Exhibition was an obstacle and a competitive place where French Red Cross Societies argued about the space they were allotted. The 1931 Colonial Exhibition worsened the relationship among French relief societies to the extent that only U.F.F. women were heard by the I.C.R.C. and held the front stage. In the history of the Red Cross Societies, the French case was peculiar in a sense that there were competing objectives. These were forecasting to a certain extent the 1940 legislation signed by the Maréchal Pétain enforcing a single French Red Cross society (Rouge, 1963, p. 18; Chauvy, 2000, p. 115–123; Bras, 2002, p. 62–66)[43]. The persistent predominance of the U.F.F. women again at the 1937 International Exhibition was not just a matter of hovering in their own space, but a question of collaboration that would be imposed in the near future. The framework reached its turning point by 1951 at Lille's World Fair. These early International or Universal Exhibitions served as a launching pad for women's national philanthropic unity.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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[41]*Revue de l'Union des Femmes de France*, n° 1, 19th year, January 1938, p. 3–5.
[42]British Committee sitting at the London Homeopathic Hospital, no date, *The Anglo-French-American Hospital: an account of the work carried on under Homeopathic Auspices during 1915–1916 at the Hôpital Militaire Auxiliaire*, n° 307, Neuilly-sur-Seine, in conjunction with the French Red Cross Society, p. 18–19.

[43]See also the account of Madame la Maréchal Lyautey's niece, Jacqueline Mallet, *Du joug à la délivrance, Paris 1940–1945*. Paris: Chantenay, 13.

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Exclusion Through Inclusion. Struggles Over the Scalar Regimes of Belonging *Europe* and the *Family* at the 1995 Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the Agency of *(Polish) Women*

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Gender regimes of belonging are contextually variable and closely linked to other regimes of belonging, such as the *family*, the *nation*, or, the *region*. In the case of Poland, this contextuality and interdependence becomes apparent when analyzing struggles between feminist and Catholic anti-choice environments. While the first group opts for gender democracy, the other favors a familistic social order. In the mid-90s, the struggle over "Polish" gender regimes took an international dimension and was played out as well at the international fora of the UN. When women's rights actors from Poland appeared at the 4th World Conference on Women held by the UN in China in 1995, they experienced being positioned within a pre-structured spatial order and learned that this positioning and the synthesis within scalar regimes of belonging, such as the scale of *family* but also that of *region,* have a major impact on their political agency. The spatial order of the UN is a field of conflict, as certain positioning within regimes of belonging might limit political agency and therefore constrain the making of claims. NGOs struggle to get representation and definitional power over space and collective identity categories, but they also put effort into changing the very composition and hierarchies within identity regimes. Toward this end, they form coalitions and networks and perform group identities and may even act in opposition to institutionalized regimes of belonging. The use of concepts such as *belonging* and *scale* allows us to avoid the analytical limits that are linked to the theoretical frameworks of recognition and identity politics. This article explores the strategies of scalar politics of belonging applied by NGOs, which also lead to the establishment of bodies representing women from the post-socialist countries of

Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Karat Coalition, but it also draws attention to the political effects of scaling belonging through the "family" or "Europe." Today, the question as to what shape gender regimes of belonging should take is still an important site of struggle.

INTRODUCTION

This article looks at the importance of scales in struggles to obtain political agency and representation in and through spatial and scalar constructions of belonging, such as *European women* or the *Polish family*. Firstly, I am concerned with representation, definitional power, and agency through scalar constructions, and secondly, with the other- and self-positioning of social actors in hierarchical regimes of belonging. In examining the strategies of feminist actors from Poland to attain political agency through spatial and identity constructs, I take the example of struggles over gender regimes in Poland and a United Nations meeting and then consider the importance of *scale* in the development of regional advocacy organizations for gender democracy and in struggles between familistic Catholic and gender-democratic actors. *Scale* is understood by me as a formal and sensible organizing principle that describes the integration of units into other subordinate units. The very concept of *scale* is helpful for analyzing the organization of regimes of belonging, their intertwining with spatial constructs and the possible effects *scaling* can have on political agency.

I concentrate firstly on why the regional scale is chosen (beyond the national framework) in the collective self-positioning of non-governmental actors and organizations, and secondly, on the possibilities available in the context for acting as a collective subject to formulate political demands from this position. The social and political context is provided by United Nations processes which produce interactional spaces that include so-called "civil society" actors[1]. I address the relational constructions of "regions" and "identity" and their scaling with regard to the external categorization and the self-definition of emerging collective subjects. This process is accompanied by boundary drawing, by the organization of inclusion and exclusion, and by the definition of relations in a spatial order of belonging.

My argument is 2 fold. Firstly, taking a perspective on scalar dimensions of organizing belonging allows me to analyze struggles which are often portrayed as "identity politics" or "struggles for recognition," beyond the most common frameworks of identity and recognition. Secondly, my aim is

to draw attention to the political dimension of hierarchically organized scalar constructs of belonging, the effects the scaling of belonging have on political agency, and finally, the similarity between certain scalar formations.

The organizations and actors under study have to do with feminist and gender democracy initiatives that arose in Poland largely in the late 1980s and early 1990s[2]. System change, which involved the final surrender by the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) in 1989 of its monopoly on power, pluralized the political landscape further. It also mobilized many actors at home and abroad intent on influencing the future shape of government and society in Poland. How the topic of abortion was addressed provides one example of this pluralization. In Poland, the subject provoked heated public discussion (see, e.g., Chałubiński, 1994; Fuszara, 1994; Chołuj and Neusüß, 2004a) that has continued to this day. In 1989, a bill prohibiting abortion was tabled and debated by the Senate (second chamber of parliament). It was based on a draft prepared by episcopate staff (Jankowska, 1991; Ignaciuk, 2007). However, the Catholic Church had first sought to influence the law on this subject in the late 1980s. After 1989, the legality of abortion and women's rights in general were debated in the context of whether Poland was to adopt a laicist or Catholic orientation. Despite numerous protests, religion was introduced in schools and the ban on abortion was passed in 1993, which still applies today.

From the very first, the future shape of the Polish state was discussed far beyond the borders of the country, too, involving numerous international and transnational actors (e.g., the Catholic Church, World Bank, European Union, United Nations, particularly the United Nations Development Programme), but also private donors, NGOs, and religious movements from all over the world. Opportunities were thus seized to influence the development of Poland through advocacy in international forums. The 1995, the Fourth UN World Conference on Women was not only a crucial event, a deciding moment within the struggles over "Polish" gender regimes, but also deserves attention, as analyzing this particular event allows us in many ways to unfold the complicated nature of those struggles, elements of which can still be observed today.

The processes and meetings organized by the UN Economic and Social Council on the subject of women's rights brought together both government and civil-society actors of various political persuasions, establishing important intermediary spaces

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[1]They include conferences, meetings, consultations bringing together representatives of NGOs, governments, and international organizations, and meetings in the context of these processes that assemble NGO representatives and so called "civil society" actors. The term civil society here refers to an actor categorization and intermediary space between society and states or international organizations that has relevance within UN-processes. The term itself is controversially discussed (more recently for the polish context see for example Fábián and Korolczuk, 2017).

[2]Some of the interviewees lived abroad, but their activities and organizations focused on political and societal changes in Poland or they returned to Poland after system change.

(prior to accession to the European Union) where the shape of the Polish state was negotiated. This context of action played a key role in regional alliance building and in the development of Central and Eastern European and Central Asian NGOs. Both the contexts of action and the constitution of collective subjects (for example, the Karat Coalition), in regard to scalar dimensions of familistic[3] and European regimes of belonging, their analogy and their impact on political agency, have hitherto attracted little scholarly attention. That scale matters and that scaling belonging is of crucial importance for successful politics, not only in the 1990s but today as well, can be observed in, for example, the intensified activities of international right-wing familist alliances, that work to change not only national but the UN human rights frameworks as well, in such a way that would broaden the playing field for the conservative, religious and (far) right.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The article presents outcomes from research focusing on the struggles of "Polish" gender regimes and the reasons behind the development of regional organizations that represent women from former state-socialist Europe. This research was done in the frame of a broader international research project on the "Transnationalization of Struggles for Recognition." The research was conducted with mixed methods[4]. I took a sample of initiatives and actors that have been involved in UN-processes, that have "polish" origin and were involved in struggles about the composition of "Polish gender regimes," who organized themselves regionally or/and beyond nation states. They include, above all, SKOP—'95 (Społeczny Komitet na Rzecz Organizacji Pozarządowych Pekin 1995, Polish Committee of NGO's—Beijing 1995'), the Karat Coalition, and the Central and Eastern European Women's Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (ASTRA). Other organizations looked at in this context are regional and transnational networks, such as the Network of East-West Women (NEWW), as well as local women's organizations in Poland that have defended women's rights outside the national framework, too. My sources include, among others, documents from the archives and websites of the NGOs under study[5], as well as United Nations documents and

press releases. I also conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with actors and experts who had participated in the processes and events under study[6]. The interviews helped me to identify what moments and events were seen as crucial in regard to transnational feminist activism in Poland and its impact. A further method employed was participant observation between 2009 and 2013 and in 2017 at conferences, workshops, and internal meetings of organizations[7].

An important finding during my initial research was that there still exists no definition neither of "the region" nor on its scope and borders (beyond the state-socialist past) that would be shared by all actors and initiatives under study. The analysis, therefore, focused on how institutionalized scalar regimes of belonging (such as the region at the UN or the family institution) are negotiated, contested and might contextually change in terms of their form (composition, scaling, hierarchies).

I integrate research perspectives from critical cultural studies, gender studies and queer theory, the arts, political aesthetic theory, and political and human geography. The theoretical framework applied within this analysis is transdisciplinary, with a strong emphasis on thinking in terms of critical aesthetic theory (Rancière, 2006) and processual spatial theory (Löw,

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[3]I refer here to the definition of familism of Notz (2015, p. 17–19).

[4]My initial research focused on processes of "transnationalization" and existing transnational activism, especially I aimed at finding out the reasons for establishing regional post-state socialist "Eastern European" initiatives. My research also focused on the problem of "East-West divisions" within feminism and possible differences between "regions". I collected a very broad basis of empirical data. The development of an adequate theoretical approach emerged throughout the study and the ongoing analysis of data. This approach to the empirical material allowed me to recognize problems and patterns throughout the research. Based on these emerging patterns samples and particular exemplary cases for were selected and analyzed more in-depth within the study. From all of the interviews for this particular sub-study I focused on initiatives and actors that have been involved in UN-processes and that have a "Polish" origin. The information from the interviews was compared with other interviews, documents from UN-Archives and archives of the organizations under study, information coming from academic publications, official publications and movies documenting the participation of feminist activists at the UN.

[5]Above all the archives of the Women's Center PSF (PSF Centrum Kobiet) in Warsaw (dissolved), the document collection of the Karat Coalition, the archive of

NEWW network in Gdansk, as well as documents and publications made available by participating actors. Next to this I have used materials collected in my private archives since the early 90s.

[6]In the 90s in Poland there have been a limited number of feminist NGOs and advocacy actors. Therefore it was possible to interview representatives of most NGOs and most individual actors from Poland that advocate for women's right also on international fora. Qualitative in-depth interviews have been conducted with a large number of gender-democratic NGO and individual actors (individuals were mainly specialists for advocating at the UN and EU) from Poland, Central-Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the U.S.A. Next to this I included all transnational networks that are based in Poland and aim at influencing policy and have formalized structures. I was also searching for other border-crossing networks including members of post-state socialist countries.-Interviews have been conducted by the author in the years 2009-2013. The information from the interviews was compared with other interviews, documents from UN-Archives and archives of the organizations under study, information coming from academic publications, the press, official publications and movies documenting the participation of feminist activists at the UN. They provided background information helping to understand the processes analyzed in this article. Quotes from interviews with individual members of those organizations have been authorized (written consent) and do not represent the opinions of the organizations in general. My initial broad research on gender-democratic activism transcending borders revealed limits of the existing theoretical and methodological approaches on transnational activism and struggles for recognition that was focusing very much on the problem of "recognizing" identities and the legitimacy of claims postulating a difference.

[7]Among other things, I have taken part in various events, conferences, and important internal meetings of the organizations, such as board meetings and workshops of the Karat Coalition on, for instance, development and UN human rights, the general meeting of the Karat Coalition in Bucharest in 2010, and the 54th meeting of the CSW UN 2010 thanks to NEWW. The participant observation at the 54th meeting of the CSW UN United Nations in 2010 was crucial for me in order to realize the importance of scalar socio-spatial arrangements in organizing subject-positions and its influence on political agency, as well as, above all, the difficult position of those who do not fit into pre-established regimes of belonging. Also I have been taking part at parallel events and caucuses organized during the CSW61 in New York in 2017. Those practical experiences provided important practical knowledge for comparison and the reconstruction of the events and advocacy work described in the interviews. And last but not least I have been analyzing the activities, discourse and strategies of the most vocal opponents of gender equality in the public discourse in Poland.

2001). This research perspective moves the practice division and the ordering of "the sensible" (Rancière, 2006) in politics of gender-democratic actors and their opponents to the center of the analysis. The methodological approach is combining elements of critical discourse analysis Jäger, 2015, an analysis of "divisions of the sensible" (Rancière, 2006) and processual productions of space (Löw, 2001) in the practice and discourses of the actors under study. I also applied methods of close observation and reconstruction of social actions next to their context and provide subjective explanations of the actors involved.

CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES: HIERARCHIES OF SCALE AND BELONGING

It's no surprise that research on scales and the discussion of *scale* as an analytic concept is most advanced in the discipline of geography, since defining territories and spaces as objects of study is crucial for research in this field. As a consequence, the critical discussion of certain normative or essentialist assumptions within the discipline (for example, about the "scale") are objects of lively dispute, which disciplinary outsiders can also learn from. Critical human geographers, including feminists, question the scholarly use of spatial scales as hierarchizing and ahistorical units (see, e.g., Marston et al., 2005)[8]. For instance, they problematize the hierarchizing effect of scaling in such terms as micro, meso, macro; national, international, transnational; space, place; and local, global. Scaling of this sort treats the global as abstract and is independent of the local and concrete (Massey, 2002, 2004). The bird's-eye view that the scalar perspective provides of the world from a supposedly objective position marks a further dichotomy between universal and particular. Doreen Massey suggests treating space instead in terms of relations, paths, connections, and understanding the global as being concretely located (Massey, 2002).

This criticism has induced some scholars to favor abandoning all use of scale to avoid reinforcing its discursive and naturalizing effects (Marston, 2000; Marston et al., 2005). The concept of horizontal networks is proposed to replace vertical and hybrid theories of space (Marston et al., 2005).

Legg, however, considers the idea of completely rejecting scale as a vain attempt to obviate the effects of scalar practices. "The unequal distribution of power relations in the world make a human geography without scale both idealist and unrepresentative of the lived and historically specific hierarchies, which scalar rhetoric and technologies create, both epistemologically and ontologically" Legg (2009). "Scale," as other authors argued before, "is not simply an external fact awaiting discovery but a way of framing conceptions of reality" (Delaney and Leitner, 1997, p. 94–5). Similar arguments on "regional identity" have been brought up by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who writes that such classifications as "regions"

are based on "characteristics which are not in the slightest respect natural and are to a great extent the product of an arbitrary imposition, in other words, of a previous state of the relations of power in the field of struggle over legitimate delimitation" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 223). Since *scale* is a way to frame reality, one could argue that we do not need the term *scale*, because there exists the term *frame*. Fraser has this to say about frame-setting, which she illustrates with the division of political space within the Westphalian Order: "Far from being of marginal significance, frame-setting is among the most consequential of political decisions. Constituting both members and non-members in a single stroke, this decision effectively excludes the latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary representation" (Fraser, 2009, p. 19). While Fraser's observation is also relevant for the research presented here, I decided to use the concepts spatial order, belonging, and scale because the concepts frame and frame-setting do not adequately cover relations within and outside of a frame or the possible relations and multiplicity of structures that order belonging.

Hierarchizing spatial narrations can be converted into powerful spatial orders. Scales are not only imaginary in a symbolic and spatial sense but, due to the hierarchies and bordering effects they produce, also form a lived reality for individuals. Bodies move in spaces that are created by human agency and/or defined in the course of social exchanges. They repeatedly come up against the limits of materialized spatial orders, but also participate themselves in constituting such arrangements. Spatial arrangements, as described by Löw (2001), are embedded in institutions and secured through resources.

The production of scales is tied to power. Erik Swyngedouw explains this as a process: "I conceive scalar configurations as the outcome of sociospatial processes that regulate and organize power relations. Scale configurations change as power shifts, both in terms of their nesting and interrelations and in terms of their spatial extent. In the process, new significant social and ecological scales are constructed, others disappear or become transformed" (Swyngedouw, 2004, p. 132–3, quoted from Marston et al., 2005, p. 418).

Thus, space not only takes the form of equal relations but also appears as space within space, as space that encompasses other spaces or ties them together. Scale can therefore be, among others, understood as a form of organizing space, which is capable of producing hierarchical effects by enclosing a smaller unit within a larger one.

Theorists of scale argue that scale does not necessarily need to take the shape of a vertical top-down hierarchy (Leitner et al., 2008, p. 161), nor that the smaller unit is always dominated by the larger one (Collinge, 1999). In the case of dominant hierarchizing integration through scalar practices, exclusion might be achieved through inclusion. In the case of dominant scalar subordination, the unit subordinated by scale can exist only in relation to the superordinate unit. In a political situation, such subordination could imply that a unit is not fully recognized as independent or prevents its performing as an independent unit.

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[8]I would like to thank John Binnie for reviewing an early version of my paper (2010) from the perspective of human geography and his very helpful suggestions on the criticism of scales.

I use the term scale not only with reference to geographical ordering units. I understand scaling rather as an ordering principle that can be applied to various formations of spatial order, but not to these alone. This includes spatial allocations in the process of subject constitution as well as the subordination of people by their integration in identitary constructions and the attribution of social roles. The relationship between scale and identity, gender and sexuality, in regard to regional representation and geopolitics, has also been recognized by other scholars, although mainly from the field of political and human geography (e.g., for more recent publications Conway, 2008; Binnie, 2016). Many geographers, especially feminist ones, argue that scaling processes also include smaller units than for example states or regions, such as the body or the household/home (Smith, 1992, 1996; Marston and Smith, 2001). However, my understanding of the term *scale* is not limited to a (human) geographical understanding. I attempt instead to integrate non-essentialist critical perspectives inspired above all by political aesthetics in the tradition of Jacques Rancière, in particular his theory on the "division of the sensible," which draws attention to the politics of the division of space, time, and identities, as well as their intersections Rancière (2006). I therefore understand scales as a specific way of arranging, bordering, and dividing "the sensible" that often implies specific divisions of time, space, and identities.

In order to grasp the entanglement of space, territory, and identity-categorization within regimes of belonging, I have also borrowed the concept of *(An)Ordnung.* That concept originally refers to *space* only and was introduced by Martina Löw in her "Sociology of Space" in 2001, where she is combining the terms *Anordnung* (positioning toward something) and *Ordnung* (order). According to the sociologist, this synthesis and the relational positioning, arrangement/ordering [*(An)Ordnung*] of living beings and material can be undertaken by the subjects themselves or by outsiders (Löw, 2001). It indicates that the process of producing space involves an act of arranging and the production of order. In my view, the perspectives applied within critical theories of space combined with perspectives coming from political aesthetic theory are suitable for analyzing the constitution of subjects and processes of identity construction. When I use the term "identity" I am referring to a category of practice and an outcome of human categorization and socio-political processes that also defines the position of the subject in relation to other positionings. The subject (representing an "identity") is "identified" and synthesized with other subjects and/or material to form shared regimes of belonging, which have spatial dimensions as well.

A very popular and inspiring but also slightly different understanding of the concept of *belonging* is that which Nira Yuval-Davis introduced in her book *The Politics of Belonging: Intersectional Contestations* in 2011. Yuval-Davis links belonging to social locations and emotional attachments, to the identifications and identities of individuals and their attachments to collectivities and groupings (2011). The term *belonging*, as used in this article, is meant as a formalist and aesthetic category and stands in opposition to the notion of "identity." *Belonging* is an analytical term for describing relational organizing principles

capable of arranging "the sensible" (as understood by Rancière, 2006) and forming attachments among its elements (such as, for example, "identities" and "territories"), while *scale* refers to the hierarchies and boundaries.

Use of the concepts *scale* and *regimes of belonging* and their understanding as particular orders of "the sensible" allows us to capture the practices of the organizations under study and the associated processes with greater precision. Furthermore, the essentialization of "identity" constructions can be more likely avoided. This approach makes it possible to show not only the processes of constructing scales but also the situatedness, relativity, and, above all, changes in subject positionings and constructions of "identity," "gender" and "region."

THE IMPORTANCE OF SCALE AND BELONGING IN FEMINIST STRUGGLES. THE DEBATE ON SPACE AND REPRESENTATION AT THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1995

Taking the example of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women of the United Nations in Beijing and the parallel NGO summit in Huairou in China, I examine inclusion and exclusion through the scalar construction of space, territory and identity.

Among the feminist actors from Poland who went to Beijing were members of SKOP. The SKOP initiative had been organized in 1994 by NGO representatives and individuals in Poland to prepare a "shadow report"[9] for the Fourth World Conference on Women (Fuchs, 2003; Chołuj and Neusüß, 2004a)[10]. At the preparatory regional conference for the World Women's Conference, in Vienna in 1994, which was open to NGOs from Europe and North America, there was a small group of women from Eastern European NGOs. In the view of the NGO activists from Poland who were present and that I have interviewed, the draft report of the Polish government prepared in 1994 presented the situation of women in Poland incorrectly[11]. Aleksandra Solik from the SKOP—'95 initiative explained to me, that the report was "full of gender stereotypes and indicated a complete misunderstanding of the essence of women's rights as well as the government commitments in the area of gender equality policy"[12]. According to Chołuj and Neusüß (2004a), the new post-state socialist liberal government had moved closer to the Catholic Church and submitted to the pressure of the Church

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[9] Shadow reports" are alternatives to governmental reports. In this case the shadow report provided a "civil society" perspective on the situation in Poland that provides alternative information to the official report of the Polish Government.

[10] Statements in interviews with Solik, Aleksandra (member of SKOP and Karat secretary, former member of the NGO Neutrum, Federation for Women and Family Planning and the ASTRA-Network), interviewed by author in 2009 and 2010 in Warsaw. Interviews with Chołuj, Bożena (member of SKOP and individual member of Karat, Head of Gender Studies at Warsaw University) interview by author in 2009 and 2010 in Warsaw.

[11] Interviews conducted among others with B. Chołuj in 2009 and 2010 in Warsaw by author.

[12] Interviews conducted with A. Solik in 2009 and 2010 in Warsaw by author. Revision in 2019.

in order to obtain support for EU accession. The government's report stated, for example, that female unemployment resulted from women's overactivity (Chołuj and Neusüß, 2004a, p. 184). On the basis of experience with successful advocacy work in Vienna (1994 preparatory regional conference for the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995), the local NGO actors decided to mobilize and unify women's rights activists in Poland in preparation for the Fourth UN World Conference on Women. This was the origin of SKOP—'95. Under pressure from the NGO advocacy in Vienna, the Polish government revised their report.

The feminist actors who had organized themselves to strengthen women's rights in Poland and address demands to the Polish government found a new field of activity for their political struggles in the forums of the United Nations. The Fourth World Conference on Women and the preparatory processes thus reorganized relations between states and civil society as promoted by the United Nations (in this case women's rights activists). The conference enabled actors to assume representational functions (a subject position that had previously been reserved to the state).

For actors from Poland, however, there were two further changes in their own subject position within scalar inclusion and exclusion practices: first, recognition of the autonomy of the category woman and introduction of the category gender, and, second, classification in the category Europe.

Recognizing the Autonomy of the Category Woman in the Context of Poland

In the 1990s, after the disintegration of the political Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union, shifts occurred in global orderings and power relations. System change in Poland led to the reorganization of the state and society. Debates on the shape the new Poland would take addressed, among other things, the category woman and its subordination to the category family. The topic of reproductive rights and, later, criticism of domestic violence, which national Catholic actors took to be an attack on the integrity of the family, were and have remained focal themes in these debates[13].

In matters of representation, the struggle to establish the office of a national women's commissioner in Poland was a telling example of this, as the frequent changes in the title of the authority show. As power changed hands, the word woman was replaced by family. After the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1986, the office was set up by the communist government under the name "Government Commissioner for Women." In 1991, after a coalition of center-right and national-Catholic parties (under Krzysztof Bielecki) came to power, the name was changed to "Commissioner for Women and Family." In 1995, it was renamed "Commissioner for Family and Women" (1995[14]−1997), and then merely

"Commissioner for Family"[15]. From 2001 to 2005, the authority was titled "Government Commissioner for the Equal Status of Man and Woman" only to be abolished until resuscitated in 2008 under pressure from NGOs and the EU under the name "Government Commissioner for Equal Treatment," avoiding any mention of who was to be treated equally.

In the national-Catholic view, espoused by, among others, parties close to the Catholic Church the category woman functions always in relation to the categories man/husband and family[16]. This view is shared by the Polish and the international Catholic Church (e.g., Raday, 2012a). In contrast to this, feminist actors fight for the autonomy of the category woman, to allow it to function in a range of relations and to give agency to the people placed in this category. In this context, agency means the freedom to order/arrange oneself relationally and also to represent oneself. The relational and complementary tying of woman to man (with man being treated as universal and, unlike woman, able to function autonomously) is seen by feminist actors and feminist theory as a discriminatory relation of dominance (e.g., Beauvoir, 1989; Butler, 1991).

For feminist activists from Poland, the United Nations provided a political opportunity. Thus, Human Rights law extended the right to equality to all family members thus "repudiating patriarchal hierarchy in the family" (Raday, 2012a, p. 227)[17].

The recognition of the autonomy of the category woman and of women's rights as an integral part of human rights (see the Vienna Declaration of the 1993 World Human Rights Conference), as well as the goal of the 1979 UN CEDAW[18] convention and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action to eliminate discrimination against women therefore changed the subject positions[19]. It enabled women's rights activists to assume spokesperson and representational functions. Activists were enabled to "occupy" the category woman, a position from which they could then negotiate and address demands to the Polish government. By contrast, political representatives of conservative Catholic actors in Beijing and Huairou found their scope for action weakened and the representational

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[13]For a discussing of the relationship between the Polish State and Catholic Church see among other the works of Ramet (2014, 2017), Ramet and Borowik (2017) or Frances Millard (1997). For the particular church stances on gender and reproductive issues by the studies by Mishtal (2009, 2015), Szwed (2015), Szwed and Zielińska (2017) and Kulawik (2017a,b) are giving important insights. In regard to the bodily dimension of citizenship and the struggle for autonomy see e.g. Outshoorn et al. (2012).

[14]After an interval of time, the office was re-established in 1994 shortly before the Fourth UN World Conference on Women. See also court rulings in the database Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych

[Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych (ISAP), n.d.] on the function of the Pełnomocnik Rządu do Spraw Rodziny i Kobiet.

[15]On the changes in name until the end of the 1990s see Nowakowska, Urszula "Instrumenty państwa na rzecz awansu kobiet" (Nowakowska, 2000).

[16]In the mid-90s such as the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZchN), Electoral Action Solidarność (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS), and later the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), as well as the still existing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS).

[17]For a discussion of human rights law and the relationship to religious norms, gender equality and the family see also e.g., Diduck and Raday (2012).

[18]The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) requires members of the convention to submit a report every four years, which is then examined by the committee (UN Women (n.d.)). For a discussion about the impact and critic of CEDAW see e.g., Raday (2012b).

[19]The history of feminist struggles to influence international human rights norms and the impact of UN in terms of enhancing the situation of women and feminist transnational activism around the UN has been subject of research especially in the field of political science, international relations, sociology and history (for an overview see e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Ruppert, 2002; Friedmann, 2003; Joachim, 2007; Krook and True, 2012).

position already occupied. This had to do with, among other things, the circumstance that Catholic, anti-choice actors had underestimated the importance of the forum and had decided to participate only at a very late date (compare Fuchs, 2003, p. 127). Women's organizations struggling for women's rights had been involved much earlier in the Beijing and UN processes, while Catholic women did position themselves in opposition to the forum by contradicting its basis. They thus stated in the opening sentence of the shadow report that women in Poland were not discriminated against. For they positioned themselves in both debates and in the shadow report not only as "Polish women" but also as members of "Polish families." In the report, the organizations advocated, for example, restriction of the right to divorce (opposing divorce "on demand"). Research describing the developments at the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing and analyzing the reports and demands has pointed out the differences between the shadow reports, one provided by the gender-democratic NGO organized within SKOP—'95 and the other prepared in response by national-Catholic groups (e.g., Fuchs, 2003, 2004, p. 48; Fuszara, 2005). The final postulate of the report relates only to families and mothers (Polska Federacja Ruchów Obrony Życia, 1995). The women who represented the Catholic pro-life and family organizations from the Polish Federation of the Defense of Life (Polska Federacja Ruchów Obrony Życia, 1995) were in a contradictory situation when they positioned themselves solely as women. They were on the defensive when, with respect to an autonomous understanding of the category woman, they repeatedly had to point to the relational integration of women in the superordinate scale of family.

Classification in the Category Europe. Regional Spatial Orders and Strategies for Interest Representation

Women's rights activists at the conference in 1995 experienced not only scalar autonomy. In the United Nations, the general category woman is produced through positioning in a regional order by integrating state territories and state areas of authority. With regard to generalization in the UN context, this means that the subjects of civil society are ordered as follows: human beings of the world, women and human beings, women in general (globally), women of a region, women of a state.

Lohmann of the SKOP—'95 initiative and later co-founder of the Karat Coalition notes: "Our presence in Beijing made us aware of how important it was to belong to a region" Lohmann (1997, p. 27).

Not only the consultation processes for the Beijing Declaration and the Beijing Platform for Action but also the strategically important NGO Caucuses at the conference were organized on a regional pattern.

The United Nations (UN Economic and Social Commission) divides the world into five regions[20]. This division and the

allocation of seats are guided by geopolitical and economic categories and not by purely geographical criteria. The division into regions is decided on the basis of, among other things, common political and cultural heritage, religion, development status, economic relations, and only partly in terms of geographical location[21]. What is more, the countries to be included and the names of regions and subregions change, so that multiple memberships occur[22].

In the Beijing Process, the principle of regional division took over, which meant that separate regional consultations were organized and regional papers were prepared. The situation is different under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which requires states to report only individually. The result is that work on CEDAW shadow reports are submitted at different times by member countries. The situation is similar for NGO mobilization.

Being organized on a regional basis, the Beijing process accordingly allowed the regional presence and consolidation of NGOs and civil society actors. NGO-specific spatial orders reflected the spatial order devised by the United Nations, since the institutionalized and administrative spatial orders influenced the networking and consolidation of NGOs, which were also assigned to regions and were addressing UN processes.

For women's rights NGOs, accepting these spatial orderings was a major challenge. The Women's Feature Service, which in 1994 provided information on the preparations undertaken by the UN region "Europe and North America" for the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing/Huairou, placed Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Israel, Canada, and the United States in one region. Also included were Russia, geographically partly in Europe and partly in Asia, as well as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, geographically in Asia. The editorial team was well aware of how diverse the region was and was nevertheless willing to accept the UN spatial order. A text entitled "Who Are We?" which cites the appeal by the 1994 UN regional preparatory conference in Vienna "Women in a changing world—call for action from a regional perspective," points out the contrived nature of the region. They write: "But how is a 'regional perspective' possible in a collection of states so protean that it includes Andorra, Iceland, Moldova, Switzerland, Malta, Slovenia and—Canada? Not to mention France, Uzbekistan, Norway and the United States. Where is our common ground? In 5 days from now we will know the answer" (Women's Feature Service, 1994, p. 8).

The regional spatial order was also reflected in the NGO Caucuses at the parallel NGO forum of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Huairou, a suburb of Beijing. For example, regional divisions determined the structuring of the civil society campus and its Caucuses. Each official United

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[20]United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA). See UN Regional Commissions (RCNYO (n.d.)).

[21]However, not all these criteria have to be met. For example, the European Union, the United States, Canada, and Israel are all assigned to one region. Obviously, it does not meet any geographical criteria. The situation is similar with other United Nations regions. For example, Latin America and the Caribbean is a region defined in terms of "historical, economic and cultural ties" (ECLAC, 2013).

[22]This is particularly true of former European colonial powers, but also, for example, of the United States.

Nations region had a tent of its own for meetings between organizations. Delegates from the post-socialist countries were largely assigned to the European region.

Eastern Europe as a "Non-region"

As we will be seeing, integration of the subject category woman in a regional, scalar order had both advantages and disadvantages for women's rights activists from Poland. The advantage lay in the subordination of countries to the higher scale of the region in the spatial order defined by the UN. Many post-socialist countries in particular, at a time when the political "Eastern Bloc" had just collapsed and the Soviet Union disintegrated, had no immediate interest in acting as a common region. They were intent solely on gaining the recognition of the international community in order to assert their newly won sovereignty.

Neither among the states that had emerged from the former so-called "Eastern Bloc" nor among feminist actors who often felt themselves to be in political opposition to the old system, was a common "identity" really wanted. In my 2010 interview with the co-founder of Karat Coalition Kinga Lohmann, conducted in Warsaw, I learned that women from the former Eastern Bloc initially even had to overcome "distrust." The difficulty of finding a stance on a common "identity" or organization is shown, for instance, by the interviews I have conducted, as well as by texts produced by women's rights activists. However, unlike the states of post-socialist Europe, women's rights activists had decided to accept the superordinate scale of region in order to gain a voice. Relations with Russia and with actors from Russia, in particular, are still often fraught with prejudice and mistrust, even where representatives of women's organizations are concerned.

The disadvantage of regional positioning is that scalar integration of the former political Eastern Europe in a common Europe means in practice subordination to Western Europe. To this day, Europe is largely equated with the European Union. But in 1995, Poland and the other Eastern and Central European countries were not yet members of the EU. At the same time, the post-socialist countries on the border between Europe and Asia are either marginalized or transferred to the Asian region. The relation of "Eastern Europe" to "Western Europe" was (and by some still is) defined as a "transition,"[23] a "becoming Europe." The relationship between candidates for EU membership and members of the Union was and has remained that between teacher and pupil (compare Kuus, 2007).

As Doreen Massey has shown in her study on the construction of North-South relations (Massey, 1999), the spatial difference is produced as a temporal difference. Such a relationship means that the prototype is taken to represent the whole and hence also the units subordinate in scale. Such similar interpretations regarding Eastern Europe as an early or incomplete version of developed Western Europe (however setting out from a different dichotomy to become Western) have been called into question by scholars (e.g., Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Kuus, 2004, 2007; Kovacevic,

2008; Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2012; Hann, 2002; Todorova, 2009)[24].

Another relation that played a role in the Caucus, and which decided the relational positioning of Europe, was the dichotomy between the global North and the global South. Regulska and Grabowska postulate that "the Polish women's organization was confronted by a debate defined in advance in international feminism, which limited itself to a dialogue between the First and Third Worlds" (2008, p. 47). Such a dichotomy left no space for articulating the ambivalent experiences from a "second world" perspective (Suchland, 2011, p. 837). According to the activists I interviewed, these forms of spatial synthesis and spatial ordering mean that topics that failed to fit within the North/South dichotomy were simply not addressed[25]. For this reason, many actors from post-socialist countries found it difficult to identify with the scalar order. Scholars such as Jennifer Suchland and Magdalena Grabowska do recognize the second world as a "site of global struggles" and argue for posing "the question of the implications of the ambivalent postcolonial status of some Eastern European locations for transnational feminist theory and practice" (see Grabowska, 2012, p. 387; or similarly Suchland, 2011, p. 854). With this, these authors are actually responding to claims for autonomy and postulates of difference, as feminist actors from former European socialist countries also partially articulated at the UN Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing, where they called for a revision of the applied geopolitical divisions, dichotomies, and frameworks.

At the NGO Caucus of the UN Conference in the Republic of China, an East-East Caucus was called for. Working sessions of the resulting Eastern European Caucus criticized the Platform of Action, which, among other things, described

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[23]Between 2009 and 2010, the time when the interviews were conducted, actors feminist NGOs are already distancing themselves from the concept of "transition." The concept "transition" is now no longer used so frequently in the feminist movement. Also academic feminist scholars critically discussed the term "transition" (e.g., Gal and Kligman, 2000; Einhorn, 2006).

[24]The sometimes problematic dimensions and relationships within transnational feminism and East/West divisions (e.g., Funk, 1993, 2006, 2007; Chołuj and Neusüß, 2004b; Frunză and Văcărescu, 2004; Muharska, 2005; Lukić et al., 2006; Slavova, 2006; Regulska and Grabowska, 2008; Fábián, 2014) and the marginalization of the so-called "second world" within theory and feminist practice have again become in recent years of major interest to gender and sexuality studies scholars. Scholars also draw on approaches borrowed from postcolonial theory (e.g., Kulpa and Mizielinska, 2011; Suchland, 2011; Grabowska, 2012; de Haan et al., 2013; Koobak and Marling, 2014; Tlostanova, 2015; Tlostanova et al., 2016; Mitić, 2017). Next to this, a growing body of literature critically discusses the link of "europeization" and neoliberal transformation (e.g., Koobak and Marling, 2014). Whereby, some state that feminism post-state socialist countries in Europe was "designed" by foreign agencies and foster neoliberalism with the help of human rights framework (e.g., see Ghodsee, 2004; Gregor and Grzebalska, 2016). The above mentioned critique, however, are first of all political and philosophical interventions that address many important problems (e.g., class based exploitation, ngoization etc.), but simultaneously miss out the complexity of both, the feminisms in the post-state socialist region and the advocacy work aiming at the transformations of institutions and structures. From my empirical research I learned that the feminist movement in Poland was highly diverse from the early 90s on (e.g., including grassroots feminisms that were opposed to capitalism). Feminists working in advocacy as well have been critically addressing the negative impacts the "transition" to a marked based economy (such as the describe statement of non-region). For a further critique of the "imperial critique"/"feminism-by-design" thesis see among others Funk, 2006; Ostertagová, 2016).

[25]Interviews with Lohmann, Kinga. (SKOP, Co-founder and Executive Director of Karat Coalition). Interview by author in 2009, and 2010 in Warsaw. Interview with W.N. Interviewed by author in 2009, Warsaw.

poverty as a "short-term consequence of transformation" (East-East European Caucus, 1995). The Statement raised concerns, because of the "decline of the status of women," the increasing unemployment, violence, human trafficking, and the more than 20 armed conflicts, that forced many women to leave their homes. Next to this the prohibition or planned prohibition of abortion was defined as the "most pressing concern for women" in the region (Ibiden). The caucus then relocated from Huairou to Beijing (Nowicka, 1995). The East-East Caucus criticism was formulated in a "Statement from the Non-Region," which the women's rights activist from Poland Wanda Nowicka presented to the Beijing plenary session of the UN conference (East-East European Caucus, 1995). Later on, the situation was explained by an organization that emerged partly in reaction of those experiences the UN (and that involved as well Wanda Nowicka) in the following way: "During the UN Conference on Women in 1995 in Beijing, the CEE[26] region was referred to as a 'Non-Region,' and today it continues to be situated somewhere between developing and developed countries. Not fitting perfectly well into the Global North or South framework resulted in the marginalization of our issues in international forums" (ASTRA, 2012, p. 1).

To strengthen its legitimacy and validity, the authors of the statement claimed to represent 400 women from 80 NGOs in 19 countries. An actor from Russia, Anastasia Posadskaya-Vanderbeck, wrote of the work done in the East-East European Caucus: "Those of us in the post-Communist countries know how the legacy of the Soviet empire prevents cooperation and communication among people of the region, so we considered it a special challenge to work out our own unified statement" (Posadskaya-Vanderbeck, 1995). The Statement from the Non-Region could be interpreted as an attempt to oppose a regional order. However, it did not really escape thinking in regional, scalar syntheses, for a statement by a region that claims to be a "non-region" is contradictory. This contradiction could be attributed to, among other things, the fact that subject positioning, the ordering in a spatial synthesis of a post-socialist Eastern and Central Europe, was also questionable for representatives of NGOs and women's rights activists. In the Statement from the Non-Region, we read: "Our group of countries is a non-region because there is no recognizable political or geographic definition for the region composed of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union" (East-East European Caucus, 1995).

A participant in the conference had this to say: "We were nobody, we were not identified, nobody, nobody knew at that time who we are, even we didn't know who we are, because it was chaotic times in a way and even structures like the UN were not sure how they should treat us, they did not know the differences of course. Eastern Europe was all in one basket"[27]. The question whether post-socialist Central- and Eastern Europe and Central Asia be at all named that way and if they form joint region or not or if there are any present common denominators (beyond the

socialist past) has become an ongoing issue of debate and dispute, not only among activists, but also scholars until today[28].

Empowerment by Regional Representation: The Founding of the Karat Coalition and ASTRA Network

In political practice at United Nations meetings, subject constitution ("identity attribution") is tied not only to the subjects themselves and their relations or the direct, social context but also to an intrinsic spatial dimension, because subjects are attached to and integrated in concrete notions of space and territory, for example politico-geographical entities. The possibility of attaining representation in the United Nations was therefore strongly dependent on regional classification. In an application for a project called "Regional action of Karat Coalition," the authors wrote: "After arriving in Beijing we realized how important attachment to a specific region is" (Karat Coalition for Regional Action, 1999, p. 2).

The prospect of gaining leverage (also vis-à-vis individual states and their representatives) associated with regional subject constitution induced members of SKOP—'95, on their return to Poland, to set up a regional Eastern and Central European organization for gender democracy, the Karat Coalition[29], which was to have a watchdog function vis-à-vis states[30]. The idea of founding an independent regional organization grew in the course of interaction and experience at the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (compare e.g., Fuchs, 2003; Lang, 2009). Some of the Eastern and Central European NGOs represented there joined the coalition. The strategy of the Karat Coalition is summed up in a leaflet issued out by the organization by the following quotation:

> "WE ARE A GATEWAY AND A MEGAPHONE. Through Karat, the voices of our member organizations are amplified and channeled together in order to be heard and listened to on a European level and beyond. As the only network of this kind in the [CEE] region, the important and difficult efforts of our members are internationally recognized when often undervalued in their own countries."
>
> Karat Coalition (n.d.)

Their aim, as stated in the project proposal for Karat Coalition, was, among other things, "to make our region visible at

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[26]CEE stands for Central and Eastern Europe.

[27]Karat Coalition member (N.N.), participant in the conference in Huairou 1995, interview conducted by the author in Warsaw in 2010.

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[28]Not only among feminist activists and NGOs, but also among academics there exist a variety of opinions and analysis on whether we can distinct a center-"Eastern European" (based on the east-west dichotomy), "Center-Eastern European", Center-Eastern European and Central Asian" region. While some scholars referred to the socialist legacy in order to explain further developments in the post-state socialist countries, others argue that there exist no common characteristics, or that some developments are common for so called "east" and "west" countries. For example Roobak and Marling, who draw analogies between post-socialism and post-colonialism, next to this, write that "CEE is not on a different temporal plane, but facing the same challenges from neoliberal ideologies as transnational feminisms. Our focus should therefore be on co-presences, interactions and interlocking understandings and practices rather than divisive dichotomies" (2017, p. 339–340).

[29]Karat is the name of the Warsaw hotel where the founding meeting of the organization took place in 1997. For more information on the Karat Coalition see as well Marksová-Tominová work (Marksová-Tominová, 2006).

[30]Interviews with B. Chołuj conducted in 2009, 2010 in Warsaw and by the author.

international fora" and "to represent our region and advocate for it in international fora"(Karat Coalition for Regional Action, 1999, p. 1). In the early years, Karat developed its own structures and a regional network. A highlight for Karat, whose work in UN processes (e.g., at meetings of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the quinquennial reviews of implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action for the UN regions) was the presentation of a first joint regional report at the 43rd meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in New York in 1999 (Karat Coalition for Regional Action, 1999). In the course of time, the Karat Coalition attained the status of a regional voice at the level of the United Nations through its regular presence. It had itself become a representative organization and had come to be recognized as such. The strategy of the Karat Coalition for attaining representative status had proved successful. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Karat Coalition has been called upon by international organizations such as the United Nations to report on the situation in the region or in the individual countries of the region, or even to represent the civil society of the region and specific countries of the region. Karat Coalition also holds a status of ECOSOC at the UN Social and Economic Council.

At presentations of the regional Karat Coalition at international fora's such as organized by UN or the EU Institutions, examples from member countries are repeatedly cited and representatives from the relevant countries attend by invitation. Member organizations see membership in a regional coalition above all as strengthening their position in negotiations with government representatives. Transnational action can thus further the strategic aim of enhancing an organization's standing at the national level (compare Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999, p. 69).

For strategic reasons, and owing to similar experience with a lack of profile and voice, Wanda Nowicka (co-author of the Statement from the Non-Region, important advocate in the international arena, and a key figure in the women's rights NGO landscape in Poland)[31] also co-founded the regional network ASTRA in 1999. In this case, the principle of regional spatial ordering was applied to a thematic NGO focusing on reproductive rights. One important motive for establishing the organization as a regional body was growing regionalization at the political level.

The examples show that scale can be used strategically to attain legitimacy and representation, as well as symbolic dominance over units subordinate in scale. A scalar practice is illustrated by the cartographic presentation of the Karat Coalition on the organization's website (website-header of Karat Coalition, accessed in October, 2010).

The Karat region includes post-socialist countries (including Germany[32]), Eastern Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union. The map does not show the exact location of the individual member organizations (this would give a quite different, selective picture focused on cities), but a region-wide presentation that includes national borders. This shows the coalition as powerful and extending far beyond individual states.

The different countries in the region belonging to the coalition can be accessed from the website. Although the map emphasizes Poland, it is only a scalar part of a large, regional Karat unit. Actors from Poland occupy leading positions in the regional initiatives mentioned. Three of the most important gender-democracy advocacy organizations that address post-socialist Eastern Central Europe and to some extent Asia have their official headquarters and secretariats in Poland: the Karat Coalition (Warsaw), ASTRA (Warsaw), and the Network of East-West Women (Gdańsk).

The interviews conducted with actors from the Karat Coalition and ASTRA show that they are aware of the contrived nature of regional spatial syntheses. The "identity" and composition of the region is constantly being rethought within the organization. In the case of the NGOs under study, such as the Karat Coalition, this process is also one of negotiating changes in the external boundaries and membership of the organizations, as well as in the shifting definitions of the region, which serve to legitimize their own spatial synthesis.

Whereas, the 1995 Statement from the Non-Region had still seen transition as a common characteristic, the program of the Karat Coalition as well as members of the secretariat, many years after the EU accession of the states of some its members, see a change of integration in a spatial construction through the relation of development aid. The concept of development thus replaces the concept of transition which, in the 1990s, had defined what the countries of post-socialist Europe had in common in the UN context (to quote the Statement from the Non-Region: "We are bound by the common problems associated with the transition to democracy," and the region is termed "Countries in Transition in the ECE Region"). The difference, however, is that, in the eyes of NGO actors from the new EU member states like Poland, as well as the NGOs from this region, these countries after EU-accession have to assume the role of "prototype," of "mediator" or "bridge". Such self-positioning as mediators between the "East" and "West" is (or at least had been until the democratic crisis that ensued with the far right nationalist takeover after the elections in 2015) very popular among intellectuals, and politicians in Poland[33]. From the perspective of the Karat Coalition, the inclusion of outlying neighboring regions into the political project of "Western European" type of democracy is an important task.

The status of the former socialist countries changed after the EU enlargement to the East. EU member states were regarded as secure and democratic—a perception that partially changed after the nationalist takeover and the partial dismantling of democratic governance structures in Hungary and Poland[34].

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[31] A former member of Neutrum, SKOP – '9 and the Federation for Women and Families. She was also a member of parliament (Ruch Palikota) and marshal of the Sejm (speaker of the lower house of parliament) in the seventh legislative period.
[32] However, the participation of Germany is more symbolic in nature. Actors living in Germany occupy seats on the supervisory board. There are no member organizations in Germany.

[33] However, in other contexts the bridge metaphor often also indicates that Poland is distinct from the "East" and assumes for it a position of "Western" superiority. This ambivalence reflects the semiperipheral position of Poland and also that of the other former state-socialist countries within "Europe" (compare Boatcă, 2006).
[34] In the German Media for example Hungary and Poland were described as "model pupils" ("Musterschüler") that have turned into "problem-children" ("Problemkind") (e.g., Makro, 2016). In December 2017 the European Commission decided on activating the procedure of the Article 7 of the

The changing position of Central Europe after the EU accessions of 2004 was described by Alan Dingsdale as "shifting from a status as the Western edge of the East, to being, once again, the Eastern edge of the West" (2002, p. 267). In the cartographic self-presentation of the Karat Coalition, too, Poland is located relationally within the scalar unit "Western."

Relational integration in a common region is expected to allow organizations from the post-socialist, new donor countries of the EU to pass on their experience with "transition" to member organizations of the Karat Coalition outside the EU (and particularly from countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS). A fear that has been expressed in interviews was that, for example, states from the CIS region and Central Asia would distance themselves from the democratic principles espoused by members of the European Union and from women's human rights. Collaboration is seen as a guarantee that access to "Europe" is not lost for non-EU members. The expertise in former recipient countries from the Karat Coalition that have become EU-members is used to influence development aid policy in the new donor countries and to strengthen the gender component in programs. This spatial synthesis of the Karat Coalition, which integrates both countries receiving development aid and donor countries, also gives access to development aid funding. Regional divisions as practiced by donors (private foundations, government funds, and international organizations) mean in practical terms that funding is also distributed along regional lines. But the NGOs that practice other spatial syntheses do not often fit into the distribution pattern. The lack of funding sources makes it difficult to maintain the cohesion of organizations. For, in the given socio-political context, there are few possibilities to carry out projects in the self-defined "region" without external funding. On the other hand, introducing the subject of gender-democratic development lends new legitimation to the Karat regional spatial synthesis in a situation in which the post-socialist region is becoming increasingly differentiated and the importance of the common political past (membership in the state-socialist community of states) is declining.

However, members of Karat criticize in interviews the official development policy of governments and international organizations and call to mind their experience with incapacitation and the risk of reproduction. The term of "development" is partly replaced by the concept of "cooperation."

This brings us back to Doreen Massey's criticism of the hegemonic distribution of space through temporal difference, where one spatial construction is understood as being equivalent to another, related space construction, albeit at an interval of time, and with a development path being incorporated in the definition of space (Massey, 1999). Scalar, relational integration that corresponds to the idea of a development path can thus also lead to incapacitation.

Looking back on their experience, Karat members have also come to criticize the development aid policy of the 1990s, which influenced the transformation of post-socialist countries as a means for automatically transferring concepts on the development agenda. As one representative of a Karat Coalition member organization and UN consultant said in an interview: "Especially the USA, I have to say, made a lot of mistakes; they tried to enforce their vision of society on countries where this concept was completely alien. So after all the years I've been in development, I'm pretty sure you simply cannot, you cannot, without any kind of modesty, when you have maximal respect for society, even if it's a poor society, you cannot change the world to suit yourself, in your own image"[35].

Members of the Karat Coalition are aware of limits to such scalar strategies based on hegemonic spatial regimes/orders (be it in resistance to or in mirroring existing regimes). Such a reflection on the structures of belonging is also expressed in a quote from an interview with a representative of a Karat Coalition member organization from outside of Poland: "Karat has to perhaps find a way not to think about territorial division, but instead start to think how the network could work regardless of divisions of regions. The Karat Coalition is an NGO, we don't need to follow the structure, to be a servant of the structure. I think there is a huge opportunity for the Karat Coalition to broach new themes, because we can be much more flexible, to open up to new things which are emerging now." Some members of the Karat Coalition have accordingly expressed the wish to practice other forms of spatial synthesis with regard to the organization. They demand that the coalition be more flexible and action-oriented in its own spatial synthesis.

Over the years, Karat's strategies have been developed further also in terms of the strategies applied and issues addressed. The institutionalized regional structure however proved to have a powerful impact, also implicitly influencing the "civil society" (e.g., by political opportunity structures or funding and networking opportunities such as national development aid, the EU neighborhood policy). In the long run, the change in the framework of belonging (many years after the EU integration of some former state-socialist countries) made it very difficult for Karat to continue its own scalar agenda. On top of that, a right wing, nationalist, and fundamentalist religious backlash forced NGO's (including Karat member organizations) in many countries to focus on national issues while lacking human and economic resources to engage regionally as well. NGOs specializing in advocacy depend on funding in order to carry out their work. It requires specialist skills and a profound knowledge of institutional mechanisms, as well as mobility and continuity in order to follow up decision making processes. This accounts especially for transnational advocacy. The backlash itself has been considered as an international problem that is not specific only for Karat coalition's region (post-state socialist Europe and Central Asia). It requires action beyond an east/west divide. After a general assembly conducted electronically in December 2018, Karat decided on its dissolution as a regional network.

Treaty on European Union against Poland. In September 2018 it was activated against Hungary. The procedure may lead to suspend certain rights of breaching the EU's founding values European Union member states (European Parliament, 2018).

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[35]Anonymous. Interview with representative of a non-Polish Central European Karat Coalition member organization. Interviewed by author in 2010 in Warsaw.

The final dissolution of Karat Coalition indicates how difficult it is to maintain an alternative spatial synthesis, especially when that synthesis is not supported or compatible with dominant and formalized spatial regimes of belonging, and the opportunity structures they provide.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. TURNING HUMAN RIGHTS SCALES UPSIDE DOWN

Why is it important to refer today to the events that accompanied the UN *World Conference* on Women and the struggles over gender regimes in *1995*?

Despite the immense critique of the UN Human Rights framework and its language, including on the part of feminist actors for its being far behind the demands of feminist social movements[36], the introduction of the notion of gender and the definition of women's rights as human rights, as a norm and point of reference for critique, has major relevance. The simple idea that women be granted autonomy in relationship to the family is still highly contested today, and human rights discourse still remains an import reference and instrument for social movements.

Although the UN is weakened and the European Union has become much more important when it comes to political frameworks, both outside of Europe and within the new EU member or candidate countries, the UN Human Rights framework continues to be important because it is used not only for setting and legitimating norms internationally but also within political struggles between various social groups, state and non-state actors, including social movements, NGOs, and religious organizations.

Human Rights remains a point of reference for various actors (in both negative and positive ways), when it comes to such issues as protection from violence within the family or issues of reproduction, to take an example from women's rights.

At heart, many of the struggles that we can observe today and that involve the religious and conservative (far) right are struggles over regimes of belonging, largely guided by attempts to restore a so-called "natural order"[37]. The neoconservative backlash that is taking place in many countries (including Poland), and that is often accompanied by a revival of ethno-nationalism, seeks to subordinate individual human beings not only under the *nation* but under the *family* as well. This backlash does not stop on national grounds. It is played out at the UN, where diverse actors work at fundamentally transforming the human rights framework. The efforts include attempts to change regimes of belonging on the level of nation states, the UN, and the European Union, in order to establish a familist regime. International and supranational organizations are meant in future to be used as instruments for the top-down implementation of such changes

on national grounds. A first victory in this effort is the Resolution of the Human Rights Council "On the Protection of the Family" from 2014. This resolution was made possible due to pressure from, among others, states and NGOs, including coalitions of Christian (Vatican, Russian Orthodox Church) and Muslim religious and state actors, for instance the United Nations Family Rights Caucus at the CSW61 2017 in New York. In the joint declaration, the Caucus declared that their mission is to "protect and promote the natural family as the fundamental unit of society as called for in Article 16 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights." Furthermore, they declare: "The one thing that unites us all, regardless of faith, national origin, or cultural background is our understanding that a nation's strength and the well-being of its people depends largely on the stability and strength of its families" (UN-Family Rights Caucus, 2017). That the familist ideology is often closely interrelated with nationalism can be traced, for example, in the activities of the UN lobbyist NGO called Family Watch International (FWI), where demands of "protecting the family" are linked with claims for "protecting national sovereignty" (Family Watch International, 2017). As women's rights advocates working for AWID (Association for Women's Rights in Development) have observed, this implies a major shift from the protection of individuals to the protection of institutions and social regimes (AWID and OURs, 2017). This would imply that the idea of rights granted to individuals in order to protect them from violence experienced at the hands of states and communities is moved toward the idea of protecting scalar constructs of belonging. In this way, the basic idea of human rights protecting individual humans from powerful collectives and institutions, such as states, religious communities, or the family, is turned upside down and envisioned as a tool for those who already govern communities. In other words, the idea that rights are granted to individuals in order to protect them from violence at the hands of states and communities is displaced by another idea that seeks to protect scalar constructs of belonging. However, changing a UN framework would be a very long, step-by-step, and multi-leveled process. How this struggle over regimes of belonging will end is still an open question, and it's apparent that this process will not develop uniformly within all UN bodies. While the UN resolution "On Protecting the Family" has been confirmed and further developed through two other resolutions in 2016 and 2017, UN frameworks and bodies by and large still follow up on the agenda of "Women's Human Rights," as it was confirmed and developed in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action produced thanks to the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995. Sexual and reproductive health and the rights of women and girls are still central in the human rights framework. The concluding observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the periodic report under ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) of Poland from November 2016, exemplify this. The Committee expressed concerns about the high number of women victims of domestic violence and urged the Polish state to "refrain from adopting any legislative reform that would amount to a retrogression of already restrictive legislation on women's access to safe legal abortion" (Human Rights Committee, 2016).

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[36]A good summary of the feminist critique of the human rights discourse from the perspective of theory has been provided by Mullally (2006).

[37]"Natural order" is a popular phrase within neoconservative and far right discourses. One well known example is the brochure and manifesto "Restoring the Natural Order: an Agenda for Europe" (see also Datta, 2018).

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have discussed the importance of scales such as "Europe" and the "family" in women's rights advocacy, their impact on the possibility of representing "Polish" and "European" women at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women and NGO Caucus in Beijing in 1995 and, above all, the impact of scale on political agency.

Instead of taking an identity approach and discussing supposed "differences" between women positioned as "Eastern" or "Western European," which would lead feminist actors to demand the recognition of their difference, I have focused on the structural reasons that political agency has become constricted and on strategies that aim at changing those very structures, such as institutionalized regimes of belonging.

Keeping in mind that scalar regimes are not only constructs but, when institutionalized, they become very influential in organizing not only daily life but politics as well, it is not simply possible to ignore them. Political action also requires dealing with pre-existing structures of belonging, such as the organization of categories of humans within hierarchical scales and one's own positioning within them. The very form scalar regimes of belonging take; the hierarchical distribution of identities within lies at the very foundation of many socio-political struggles. Those struggles always take place in a specific context, in a specific spatial order, and from a specific position. As the example of positioning by women's rights actors from Poland at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women has shown, the possibility of advancing political demands and of attaining representation depend strongly on the positioning of the actors and movements involved in a spatial order of belonging.

The very positioning of identity categories within regimes of belonging lies at the very foundation of many socio-political struggles; The question of power that is implicit in these positionings is especially crucial in the conflict between the national-Catholic and gender-democratic camps in Poland.

I have argued that the UN spatial order, which granted autonomy to the category "women" in regard to the category "family," allowed gender-democratic actors from Poland to gain political agency. The spatial order of belonging gave them some advantage in their struggle against religious activist women from anti-choice Catholic family organizations, in regard to the question of the legitimate representation of "Polish women." However, the activists from Poland who are struggling for gender democracy also experience some disadvantage due to the superiority of a regional spatial division and their symbolic and formal inclusion into Europe, which is represented by core countries of the former "West."

The construction of autonomous regional spatial syntheses and their perpetuation in the form of organizations was closely associated with the United Nations, the development programs [regional until 2004 [CIS-CEE]], the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, and the Beijing Process, since these events and the associated consultation procedures were organized on a regional basis. The organizations mentioned use regional categorization, spatial "we-production," strategically to gain representation in a spatial ordering that favors regional constructions over other constructions and subordinates the national space to the greater entity of the region.

Karat Coalition's dissolution in 2018, after more than 20 years, indicates that for advocacy NGOs networks maintaining an own scalar synthesis (that does not follow institutional regional patterns) is difficult in the long term. Furthermore the UN, which had a consolidating impact on gender democratic movements from CEE in 90s, lost its overall significance as a forum to enhance women's rights on national levels[38]. What this means for transnational activism requires further observation and research. Recent developments indicate a decline of transnational advocacy work aiming at transforming existing institutions (e.g., the UN, station states), because opportunity structures are shrinking. Simultaneously, contentious politics and new social movements are rising locally, which also network and spread beyond nation states.

The strategies of women's rights activists are based on a scalar hierarchy. The national principle in spatial ordering is not canceled or transcended but integrated in the spatial construction, as the Statement from the Non-Region, the East-East Caucus, and the regional Karat Coalition show.

What in the above-discussed cases is decisive in questions of representation and the ability to perform political agency is not so much the difference between same and other but that between universal and particular, as well as the scalar time-space hierarchy of prototype and becoming. This concerns both the positioning of the category woman (as autonomous or integrated scalarly in the family), as well as the positioning as a region, whether as Europe or as an autonomous, post-state socialist European region. It is exemplified in the entrenchment of development paths, such as *becoming* family, *becoming* Europe. The examples I have given show that inclusion, too, in the sense of scalar integration within hierarchically organized regimes of belonging, can contribute to restricting access to representation and to spokesperson functions.

Inclusion, therefore, might effectively limit political agency and the ability to influence discourses and policies. Thus, struggles, such as those observed at the UN World Conference on Women in 1995, cannot be adequately described using only the limited framework of "identity" and "recognition." They were first and foremost struggles over the composition of regimes of belonging and their internal hierarchies. The scale in those hierarchies of belonging draws boundaries around social categories and this has an impact on the relative autonomy and agency of a category. It organizes political exclusion through inclusion.

DATA AVAILABILITY

The datasets for this manuscript are not publicly available because they might contain confidential information.

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[38]The view that the UN lost its impact is shared by many observers. According to interviews with advocacy actors (e.g., Interview with Lohmann conducted in 2019 by author) the space to advocate at the UN has dramatically sized down. I had similar observations during participatory observation at the CSW in 2017.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This study was carried out with informed consent from all subjects. All quotes used in this article have been authorized prior to publishing by the interviewed persons and their written informed consent has been obtained. Ethics approval was not required at the time the study was conducted as per Institution's guidelines and national regulation.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work. She was responsible for conducting the research, archival research, participatory observation, conducting interviews, the analysis of empirical material, the framing of the paper, the writing, and the literature review. The author has approved it for publication.

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"Human Beings Is What Women Want to Become, and to Partake of the Garland of Work and Victory." Visions of Emancipation, Community Spirit, and Social Reform in the First German Women's Movement

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My reflections draw attention to the General German Women's Association (German: Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein—ADF), which was founded on 18th October 1865 under the chairwomanship of writer, journalist and publicist Louise Otto-Peters (1819–1865). This event marks the beginning of the organized women's movement in Germany. I will pay special attention to Louise Otto-Peters, who not only initiated the ADF and chaired it for many years, she was also its most important theoretical thinker, and crucially, developed specific policies for women. This happened at a time when women were largely excluded by law from political participation. They did not have the right to vote until 1918 and were therefore unable to play any role in city and state parliaments, or in the Reichstag, either. Until 1908, they were not even allowed to be members of political parties or associations with a political orientation. The first part of this article sets out to depict Louise Otto-Peter's views and visions based mainly on her writings "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb. Blicke auf das Frauenleben der Gegenwart" (The Right of Women to Gainful Employment. Views on Contemporary Women's Lives) from 1866, and "Frauenleben im Deutschen Reich. Erinnerungen aus der Vergangenheit mit Hinweis auf Gegenwart und Zukunft" (Women's Lives in the German Reich. Memories from the Past with Reference to the Present and Future) from 1876. The second part attempts an appraisal of her ideas against the backdrop of the existing gender order and the dominant gender thinking. Part three is interested in the legitimization of her visions and, to this end, examines important—but by no means all—discernible lines of argumentation and interpretations.

Keywords: emancipation, women's movement, Germany, Louise Otto-Peters, social reform

"Human beings are what women want to become, and to partake of the garland of work and victory." With these words, Auguste Schmidt summed up what she had previously set out in a more extensive speech held at the start of the first all-German Women's Conference, which took place on the evening of 15th October 1865 in the hall of the Leipzig Booksellers' Exchange. There, in front of several hundred people, she had spoken about "the natural right of women to raise themselves from their current subordination to the equality they deserve alongside men." According to Schmidt, this

"reformation of a woman's place" or "rebirth of women" would "breathe new life [...] into creation." The women's conference convened on this occasion was "summoned to the service of love for the great women's world in its entirety"; and it was only the inner awareness of the good cause that allowed women not to waver and to enter public life[1].

How might this type of language—infused as it is with religiosity, and perhaps somewhat pathos- filled, confusing and quite difficult to understand from today's point of view—have affected those present? Did they share the feminist aspiration[2] toward gender equality formulated here, in which participation in work was apparently intended to play a key role? Why was that? How did those in favor of the idea of equality imagine the new sought-for relationship between the sexes and the new society associated with it? What were the ways and means they considered suitable for moving closer to their goal? And finally: What arguments did they use to promote the idea of equality? Was there a special emphasis on religious convictions here?

These are the questions that have inspired the following reflections. They draw attention to the General German Women's Association (German: *Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein—ADF*), which was founded on 18th October 1865, the anniversary of the Battle of the Nations, as a result of the deliberations of the above-mentioned women's conference under the chairwomanship of writer, journalist and publicist Louise Otto-Peters[3]. In most descriptions of the history of the women's movement, this event marks the beginning of the organized women's movement in Germany[4], despite still remaining relatively under-researched[5]. Most studies on the history of the women's movement as one of the great social and political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are interested in its heyday, which is understood to be the period from 1894 to the First World War. This period was very much defined by the existence of an umbrella organization of the German women's movement, the Federation of German

Women's Associations (*Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine– BDF*), and was characterized by great thematic diversity and differentiation[6].

As a consequence, we still know too little at present about how the "first generation" of the German women's movement who were active in the ADF understood emancipation, and which social concepts and ideas about gender guided them. Just how the pioneers of the ADF argued against the backdrop of the ruling middle-class gender ideal, and the ideas, values and convictions they drew on are questions that are by no means completely clarified. The fact that religious interpretations of meaning would probably have played a role in the thoughts, feelings and actions of most people at the time, given the still widespread dissemination of religious ideas, has barely been addressed so far, let alone investigated[7]. In general, apart from a few exceptions[8], religious interpretations only play a role in the relevant depictions of the history of the women's movement where there is no escaping them: In dealing with the large denominational women's associations that originated after the end of the nineteenth century[9]. These were the German Protestant Women's Union of 1899, the Catholic Women's Union of Germany, founded in 1903, and the Jewish Women's Union of 1904, which have also been individually investigated (Kaplan, 1981; Kaufmann, 1988; Baumann, 1992; Breuer, 1998; Wenzel and Wolff, 1999; Maierhof and Wenzel, 2004). However, the subjective significance of religion and church for the people of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has also only come into sharper focus since the 1990s, following the boom in the social history of religion (Hölscher, 1994; Hübinger, 1994; Blaschke and Kuhlemann, 1996). In this context, aspects of female life have also sometimes been critically examined (cf. in particular, Götz von Olenhusen, 1995; Meiwes, 2000; Bauer, 2006). Nevertheless, it can still be stated that there remain clear shortcomings regarding the investigation of religious orientations among the representatives of the non-denominational women's movement, whether organized in the ADF or in other associations.

These shortcomings, however, are scarcely less evident when researching into secular orientations and into the interactions and mixes of secular and religiously transcendent interpretations among the founders of the first German women's movement

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[1]Cf. the reproduction of the content of the speech by Otto-Peters (1890). Communicated on the basis of the minutes.

[2]The first time that French women's rights activists used the concept of feminism as a central political idea against what they believed to be the prevailing masculinism of the Third Republic was in the 1880s. In Germany, it was mostly only taken up in the twentieth century, where terms such as "social dimensions of women's issues," "women's movement" and "women's emancipation" were used for a long time. The specific contents can only be analyzed in historical terms; at the core, however, was or is the rejection of the view of women as a secondary or subordinate group to men, and the resulting unequal rights of participation of women. This often involves the development of strategies and measures to implement better life chances for women, mostly incorporated in more or less comprehensive reforms of society as a whole. Today, a multitude of feminist theories and currents exist (cf., among others, Offen, 2000; Metz-Göckel, 2003; Cudd and Andreasen, 2005; Hark, 2007; Becker-Schmidt and Knapp, 2011; Knapp, 2012).

[3]Regarding the noteworthiness of holding the first German Women's Conference from 15th to 18th October 1865, on the anniversary of the Battle of the Nations in Leipzig, and the founding of the ADF on 18th October resulting from this, on the exact date of the decisive day of the Battle of the Nations, see Schötz (2013b).

[4]Cf. for example, Bussemer (1988, p. 190), Gerhard (1990), and Schaser (2006).

[5]Herrad-Ulrike Bussemer in particular has dealt more intensively with the first decade of the ADF. Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung. The most comprehensive depiction of the ADF up to the beginning of the 1890s continues to be the overview by Gerhard (1990). Cf. U. Gerhard: Unerhört (cf. also Twellmann, 1972; Koepcke, 1981; Boetcher and Boetcher, 1983).

[6]Cf. the instructive bibliography in A. Schaser: Frauenbewegung.

[7]Iris Schröder is the only one to have made initial observations on the religious consensus in the ADF in the 1870s, which I will return to later (cf. Schröder, 2001).

[8]The investigations of Sylvia Paletschek, Iris Schröder, and Britta Konz are the main exceptions. The former deals with the connection between religious emancipation, democracy and women's emancipation in the period preceding the March Revolution in 1848, and characterizes the liberal women's associations as pillars of the early German women's movement of the 1840s (cf. Paletschek, 1990). Iris Schröder on the other hand, is interested, among other things, in how religious perceptions and interpretations manifested themselves in the women's movement at the turn of the twentieth century, and in particular to what extent social reformers refer to their religious convictions. Cf. I. Schröder: Arbeiten. Britta Konz also shows that it was possible for social work to have a sound theological basis (cf. Konz, 2004; cf. for the British women's movement, Schwarzkopf, 2011).

[9]Cf. U. Gerhard: Unerhört, section "Auflehnung gegen Gottes Ordnung"? – Die konfessionelle Frauenbewegung, pp. 201–207, and A. Schaser: Frauenbewegung, section IV.3: Die Gründung der konfessionellen Frauenverbände, des Verbandes fortschrittlicher Frauenvereine und des Verbandes Deutscher Hausfrauenvereine, pp. 44–48.

who were actively involved in the ADF, and among the men supporting them. At present, I know of about 70 women and 20 men who belonged to this group of people between 1865 and 1890 (cf. Schötz, 2005, p. 153). Biographical research that would allow a closer insight into their ideas of emancipation and the convictions underlying these ideas is only available for a very small number of them.

Louise Otto-Peters, however, is an exception. The research into her life and work, promoted by the Louise Otto-Peters Gesellschaft e. V. over the last two decades, has led to us now knowing more about the intellectual influences that shaped Louise Otto-Peters and the emancipatory ideas she developed[10]. But here too, a great deal of research is still necessary. From her extensive written works, comprising songs, poems, novellas, tales, more than 30 novels, some opera libretti, accounts of history and women's history, biographical portraits, literary criticism, music and theater reviews, and the sociopolitical and women's political journalism published between 1843 and 1895, only a few titles have been taken note of so far and examined in their specific contexts[11]. Most of them still await historical and critical assessment and appraisal. At present, this situation allows neither for a meaningful evaluation of Louise Otto-Peters the writer, journalist and publicist, nor for the politician involved in women's issues, let alone for the ADF as a whole.

In the following, it will therefore only be possible to highlight some key issues and possibly to refer to those still open to research, but not to present a comprehensive analysis of socio-political concepts of women's emancipation and the intellectual influences and values these reflect. I will pay special attention to Louise Otto-Peters, who headed the ADF from 1865 until shortly before her death in 1895. She not only initiated the ADF and chaired it for many years, she was also its most important theoretical thinker and, crucially, developed specific policies for women. This happened at a time when women were largely excluded by law from political participation. They did not have the right to vote until 1918 and were therefore unable to play any role in city and state parliaments, or in the Reichstag, either. Until 1908, they were not even allowed to be members of political parties or associations with a political orientation[12].

Unlike her fellow campaigners at the head of the ADF, Louise Otto-Peters was able to draw on a wealth of experience in examining the issue of women's rights, as she had already been dealing with it since the "Vormärz" era (the period preceding the March Revolution) and the revolution of 1848/49. For example, she purposefully took over the publication of the association's

newspaper "Neue Bahnen" (*New Paths*), first with Jenny Hirsch, and then together with Auguste Schmidt until her own death in 1895[13]. This enabled her to exert a high degree of influence on opinions in the emerging women's movement. Even if the concrete reception of her views within and outside the ADF largely constitutes a desideratum for research, there may well be a great deal to support the view of Ruth-Ellen Boetcher-Joeres that

"possibly [...] the whole women's movement was scarcely imaginable without Otto—or more precisely, that it would have developed quite differently without her. Otto influenced everything related to the movement, even its language: She gave terms, such as self-help, rights and duties, freedom, independence that meaning which, from a historical perspective, is so characteristic of the entire middle-class women's movement of the 19th century."[14]

The first part of this article sets out to depict Louise Otto-Peter's views and visions based mainly on her writings "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb. Blicke auf das Frauenleben der Gegenwart" (*The Right of Women to Gainful Employment. Views on Contemporary Women's Lives*) from 1866, and "Frauenleben im Deutschen Reich. Erinnerungen aus der Vergangenheit mit Hinweis auf Gegenwart und Zukunft" *(Women's Lives in the German Reich. Memories from the Past with Reference to the Present and Future)* from 1876. The second part attempts an appraisal of her ideas against the backdrop of the existing gender order and the dominant gender thinking[15]. Part three is interested in the legitimization of her visions and, to this end, examines important—but by no means all—discernible lines of argumentation and interpretations. In doing so, I will, as far as possible, trace the genesis of her ideas. Finally, I will return to the questions raised at the beginning by making some observations on them.

VISIONS OF EMANCIPATION, COMMUNITY SPIRIT, AND SOCIAL REFORM

The essay "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" can be understood as the ADF's programmatic pamphlet. Louise Otto-Peters wrote it in the winter of 1865/66 with the aim of providing a comprehensive account of the motives for founding the ADF, its views and goals, and also of how the first women's conference proceeded. The text also communicated the resolution unanimously adopted by the women's conference, as well as the statute of the association. The idea was to win over "a wider audience" for the endeavors of the newly-created association[16]. This certainly happened in agreement with, if not on the authority of the ADF board.

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[10]Cf. regarding the spiritual development, in particular, the essays by Johanna Ludwig, Irina Hundt, Susanne Schötz, Barbara Bauer, Siegfried Wollgast, and Ingrid Deich in Louise Otto-Peters Jahrbücher I–III, edited by Johanna Ludwig, Elvira Pradel, and Susanne Schötz in Sax Verlag Beucha, 2004, 2006, 2010. Details are given in the depiction. Regarding the biography of Louise Otto-Peters, see also Ludwig, Johanna: Louise Otto-Peters (pseudonyms: Otto Stern, Malwine von Steinau), in: Sächsische Biografie, published by the Institut für Sächsische Geschichte und Volkskunde e. V., edited by Martina Schattkowsky. Available online at: http://www.isgv.de/saebi/ (accessed August 31, 2018).

[11]See also the Louise-Otto-Peters Archive of the Louise-Otto-Peters-Gesellschaft Leipzig e. V., whose aim is to collect all written material by and about Louise Otto-Peters (cf. for an appraisal, Schötz, 2013a).

[12]Cf. U. Gerhard: Unerhört, pp. 73, 280, and von Gelieu (2008).

[13]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 12.

[14]Cf. R.-E. Boetcher Joeres: Anfänge, p. 21.

[15]An appraisal of her concrete practical work cannot be made at this point (cf. Schötz, 2014a).

[16]She wanted to publish the book under the title "Das Recht der Frauen" but could not find a publisher for it. The Hamburg publishing house Hoffmann und Campe finally published it in 1866 under the aforementioned title. See Otto-Peters (1997). Republication of the first edition from 1866, with a reminiscence by the author and reflections on the text from today's perspective.

The second essay from 1876, "Frauenleben im Deutschen Reich," is somewhat different in character. In the form of this text, Louise Otto-Peters once again, 10 years after the founding of the ADF, presented a major blueprint of her views on women's issues, this time under the new political conditions of the German Empire.

To the best of my present knowledge, this is also her last comprehensive statement on women's emancipation. The book was concerned with tracing the technical, economic and social changes that cultural life had undergone over the previous 50 years, and how these influenced women's lives. It also discusses what further changes she believed would result from this (cf. Otto, 1876). Of particular interest in this context is the last chapter, entitled "Zukunft" (*Future*); here, in the section headed "Zukunftshoffnungen" (*Hopes for the future*), she provided a complex depiction of her vision for the emancipation of women and for social politics. So far, this text has attracted virtually no attention in the research on the history of the first German women's movement. This is astonishing because Louise Otto-Peters, who in this work was not making specific demands in terms of women's politics for the present, but was instead creating an image of women's lives in the future, was able to formulate her own, very personal ideas and convictions without having to be unduly considerate.

This holds true both with regard to board members and to members of the ADF, who may have disagreed on some points, and with regard to the existing association laws for women, since this was not a politically correct association program that was subject to approval, but a draft for the future, a utopian idea. Her chapter "Zukunft," succinctly introduced with the poem "Drei Jahre, 1865, 1875, 1962," is an artful device by Louise Otto-Peters, a small political masterstroke even, allowing her to depict her political visions for women and society. However, exactly which visions, understood as images of future events, become clear when examining the above-mentioned texts?

Work, Education, Emancipation, and Social Reform

The founding documents of the ADF already show the liberation of female work, the betterment of female education and the principle of self-help to be absolutely pivotal points in all efforts to improve the individual and social situation of girls and women. For example, § 1 of the association's statute stipulates: The ADF "is tasked with joining forces in working for the improved education of the female sex and the liberation of female work from all obstacles to its evolvement"[17]. According to § 2 of the program, the appropriate means of remedying this situation were seen to be the

"agitation by women's education societies and the press, the establishment of productive associations, which are preferably recommended to women, the setting up of industrial exhibitions for women's work products, the founding of industrial schools for girls,

the building of girls' hostels, but ultimately also the cultivation of higher scientific education."[18]

Thus, the founders of the ADF initially understood "female work" to be the "gainful employment" of women. They regarded promoting employability and opening up the widest possible employment opportunities as an overarching goal "for all" women. In principle, women were to be put in a position of "independence." According to Louise Otto-Peters, "as linguistic usage suggests, only those who are themselves able to stand—that is, those who are able to sustain themselves on their own two feet and without outside help—can be considered to be independent"[19]. It was therefore her view that helping women to become economically independent by practicing a profession was "the foundation of female independence" and the most important step from which everything else would follow[20].

However, she did not see the ability to become independent through gainful employment merely as a stopgap measure or as a means of securing one's livelihood against the "vicissitudes of destiny"[21] in the shape of spinsterhood, widowhood or a husband's employment problems. For her, employment that could secure one's livelihood formed the basis for a life of dignity and self-realization, "as those who are solely dependent on the help of others to advance in the world can never be fully conscious of their own strength, nor achieve the dignity of independence and thus of true humanity"[22]. Just like boys, girls should therefore be trained for a job that corresponds to their abilities and inclinations; daughters as well as sons should be asked by their parents "what they would like to learn and become"[23]. According to Louise Otto-Peters, "they ought to be able to find a field of activity that provides their lives with meaning, secures their livelihood and makes them useful members of human society"[24]. For her, the "main thing" was "to develop the talents slumbering in women, to form characters, to make their lives meaningful and productive for themselves and others"[25]. This is a second, more comprehensive meaning of the term "female work," which I believe was principally shared by the women around Louise Otto-Peters.

Louise Otto-Peters' concept of female gainful employment does not contain any specific guidelines for or barriers to the development of talents, but its genesis needs further research. In her programmatic pamphlet from 1866, she outlined a wide range of areas for female employment. Starting from the already more or less accessible professions of the artist and the writer, the teacher, the kindergarten teacher, the increasingly more numerous shop girls and saleswomen, the photographers and lithographers, she assumed—due to commercial and technical training beginning to open up for women—they would be employed in the counting houses of merchants, in offices of the

[17]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 10.

[18]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 10.
[19]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 10.
[20]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 59.
[21]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 179.
[22]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 48.
[23]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 179.
[24]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 171.
[25]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 21.

railways, in telegraph and post offices and on agricultural estates. In particular, the freedom to pursue a trade which was introduced almost everywhere in 1865, and the abolition of the rights of guilds and fraternities to prohibit individuals from practicing trades caused her to reflect on the independent opening of businesses in trades and crafts by women, presuming they were able to acquire the necessary commercial and technical training. She also considered it possible for women to study medicine and become doctors. She did not even rule out "elevated" factory work for middle-class women, referring to examples from America and Switzerland, as well as to women typesetters who were already working at the time in a Leipzig printing works[26].

In her "Zukunftshoffnungen" from 1876, she then prophesied[27] that women would be personally involved in "all concerns that are closest to them," such as setting up, supervising and running all kinds of institutions for small children, girls' schools, all rescue centers, prisons, hospitals and asylums where female inmates were to be found. Women would also be involved in poor relief, should this still be necessary[28]. There would also be female lawyers and judges who would pass sentence[29]. Her vision is most comprehensive in the area of girls' education. She is confident that at all educational institutions for girls and women, there would be equal numbers of male and female teachers who would be completely equal in terms of pay. She expressly mentions grammar schools and universities as the highest educational institutions to which girls and women would have access, and at which women would teach alongside men. Also, in future, there would be no regulations on how far learning capacity and performance could go, neither for women nor for men[30]. And she continues:

> "Whether or not in this future, women will be called doctors and professors is a matter of complete indifference, just as long as they have had the same opportunity to develop their abilities as men, and the same rights to make use of them. If this is the case, then the goal we have in mind will have been reached."[31]

What she put into words here was no longer aimed only at equal participation of women in education and employment, but at the general aspiration to individual self-realization of personal abilities and talents, and the right to use them to contribute to social life. This constitutes a third, all-embracing understanding of "female work" or of work in general. It culminates in the vision of attaining human completeness[32] through the development and perfection of humanity, which she also refers to as the "rule of all-conquering humanity" or the "ideal of the harmony of humankind":

> "The goal is the harmony of humankind and this will not be established as long as human beings are still prevented by law or society from achieving harmony with themselves and their environment; and they are prevented from this as long as it is not possible for them—or at least made more difficult by other people—to develop themselves and their abilities, and to use them in their own interest in free self-determination, as well as in the general interest in voluntary subordination and devotion."[33]

For Louise Otto-Peters, this vision can be read as an understanding of "emancipation." Reflected from the perspective of different historical philosophies, the term had been elevated since the 1840s to become a term of movement and purpose. It included liberation from legal, social and political or economic dependencies, the elimination of which would create an empire of freedom without domination[34]. This is exactly what Louise Otto-Peters described in her ideal of the harmony of humankind. Her vision of emancipation applied, of course, to every human being. Accordingly, women's emancipation meant that women should have the same rights and opportunities as men to develop their skills and the same rights and opportunities to employ them. Regarding the women's rights that were to be fought for, she herself used the term "women's question," thereby distancing herself emphatically and critically from the so-called emancipated of the 1840s (cf. Grass and Koselleck, 1975)[35].

Her fundamental conviction—that the meaning of human existence is to participate in the perfection of humankind through the development of one's own specific strengths—did not prescribe a direction but applied to all areas of human life. Wherever every man and every woman is willing and able, the development of the individual's own talents for his or her own sake and in the service of the community should be possible—within marriage and the family, in employment, and in public and political life. Her comprehensive vision of emancipation expressly included all women's groups. She wrote:

> "In the future, there is everything to be gained for life in all its parts! The young girl no longer idly dreams away her time; she has her years of learning and preparation, she makes herself useful and only love will lead her to the altar and thus into a new circle of duties which she can also often enough combine with her former profession, just as the man can. The housewife, who can look back on a youth well spent, now turns her house into a temple of satisfaction and beauty, the mother educates her children for the fatherland and humankind and cultivates every ideal in them—the unmarried woman, the widow, the older woman: They all are not unsatisfied; they have a field of activity, either in a profession that feeds them at the same time, or in the community, in political life"[36].

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[26]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 179.

[27]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, in particular the last section "Fortschritte und Aussichten weiblicher Erwerbstätigkeit", pp. 99–107.

[28]She really does speak of prophecies, cf. L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 261.

[29]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 261.

[30]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 263.

[31]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 261. Only experiments would be able to decide this question, but these had never been undertaken.

[32]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 253.

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[33]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 256.

[34]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 254.

[35]Formerly a technical term of Roman law, the term emancipation became a political term with anti-class content at the end of the eighteenth century, implying that group-specific rights were to be abolished. Around 1830, "emancipation" had become a commonly used catchword.

[36]She repeatedly criticized them, describing their attempt at emancipation as a "hoax." In her opinion, the barriers crossed by the so-called emancipated of the 1840s concerned only external habits and customs but "not the seriousness of striving and work". According to Louise Otto-Peters, these emancipated women sought to do the same as men purely in terms of their appearance, sometimes

The design of a meaningful, useful life that is focused equally on the individual and the common good becomes clear. In it, work in the sense of learning and meaningful activity is pivotal; occupation in the sense of employability and gainful employment unites all groups of women. Gainful employment is also thought of as something that is possible for the married woman, whose duties lie firmly in marriage and family.

In "Zukunftshoffnungen," the participation of women in public and political life is implied as a matter of course. There is, indeed, no other way within a utopian vision of the free realization of individual abilities and talents: It includes the self-evident right of women to full political participation. Louise Otto-Peters therefore describes a time "when it will simply be considered impossible that one once spoke of the 'people' [...] but understood this to mean only men," and when one had granted universal suffrage, but allowed half the people, the women, to go without[37]. In the future, whatever the electoral procedure, it would be the same for men and women. It would be worthy of a state based on the principles of the human ideal that women "introduce" their female views and their female will "into law alongside those of the male"[38].

Alluding to the growing militarism in the German Empire, she refers to a peace balancing on the "tip of the sword" and a people in arms "mostly striving for profit and pleasure" as conditions that do not "correspond to the ideal of the harmony of humankind"[39]. The still prevailing exclusion of one half of the people, the women, from most educational means and civil rights, also shows, according to her, "how little progress humankind has made in its development, especially in the development of humane conditions that benefit all"[40]. For her, such conditions had no claim to permanence, not even to a long duration.

> *"Why should we not be able to predict that a time will come when the whole unfortunate and inhuman warmongering with all its barbarity and all its misery will cease? Where the peoples will live peacefully side by side and where any potential disputes [...] will be decided by tribunals of nations, but not by the brute law of the jungle?"*[41]

If world history so far had shown "how far or rather how little humankind has advanced in its development, especially in the development of humane conditions that benefit all, without the self-confident and legal participation of women," why, then,

should not even the attempt be made to see how far one could come with it?[42]

Here, the connection between women's emancipation and social reform in Louise Otto-Peters' thinking becomes particularly clear. A society whose ideals are the free development of all its members and the peaceful coexistence of all peoples is unthinkable without the participation of women. It can only be achieved through "the joint work of man and woman, only through the equality of both sexes in all things"[43]. Thus, the participation of women in solving social problems is not only the goal but already a path to it, a path to social reform.

She follows this up with her vision of marriage and family, and the gender relations of the future. It is the image of equal conditions—such as a marriage entered into by completely equal partners and based exclusively on "love and spiritual kinship," but not on "calculating secondary intentions." The spouses are not dependent on each other by force of circumstance, but are connected to each other by love and a "common onward striving." Women will then gladly consider their most important duties to be those undertaken for their families. All in all, however, the fact that women and men not only meet socially, but also get to know each other in the collegial and political intercourse of public life, makes the relationship between the sexes "purer and nobler"; it will no longer be infused with eroticism at every opportunity. The exchange of female and male souls in science and art, politics and religion, or their striving for a common goal will promote mutual spiritual development and make life more noble[44].

However, Louise Otto-Peters did not equate women's participation with a mere imitation of men's actions[45]. In the future, women would have worked their way through to "a noble femininity"; they would help men in all their endeavors for the good of humankind as "guardians and priestesses of the ideal"[46].

This idea can already be found in "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" from 1865, and, indeed, can be traced a long way back. In "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," Louise Otto-Peters speaks of the "truly feminine" or the "eternal feminine," which women must be made aware of, and which must be introduced into humankind, "so that it raises not only the individual but the whole of humankind to higher positions, in order to attain the goal of perfection"[47]. Exactly this could only be achieved if women were not held captive in a small, limited space "in which they atrophy and never learn to know and practice their noblest powers, let alone have the opportunity to make full use of them." According to Louise Otto-Peters' vision of a specific female role, the woman was therefore "the priestly guardian of the sacred and sanctifying flames of enthusiasm (not only at the domestic hearth but also at the sacrificial altar in the temple of the fatherland), [...] without which the whole of humankind is lost!"[48] While the male sex remained at liberty "to rule the world through physical

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wearing male clothes and in particular, imitating the bad habits of the male sex, for example, by trying to outdo each other in smoking and drinking, spending days and nights in public houses, and so on. Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 48, 67. Irrespective of whether this evaluation does justice to the endeavors of the Saint-Simonians or of someone like Louise Aston, whom Louise Otto-Peters assessed critically on a number of occasions, what does become clearer is her own understanding of women's emancipation, in which the struggle for participation and self-realization as well as cooperation for the sake of the common good were of central importance.

[37] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 266.
[38] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 258.
[39] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 262.
[40] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 257.
[41] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 257.

[42] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 257.
[43] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71.
[44] L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 265.
[45] Cf. L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 261.
[46] Cf. L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 261, and p. 268.
[47] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 72.
[48] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71.

power and strength as well as through the sharpness of its mind and the stricter logic of its thinking," the "female sex, precisely on account of its emotional life, its receptivity to everything great and beautiful, its excitable imagination and its aspiring ideal direction" had to be given access "to *co-regency*"[49].

In view of such an altered, equal female role, it is clear to Louise Otto-Peters that the legal foundations of society have to change, that the civil laws "have to be modified," based as they are on outmoded beliefs[50]. Gradually, step by step, "not by brutal despotism, but by the mature will of the people," all barriers that "still restrict women in their independence, in their rights" would be removed—such was her hope[51]. The idea of evolutionary change through reform expressed here finds its complement in Louise Otto-Peters' views on self-help.

Self-Help, Community Spirit, Social Reform

In her "Zukunftshoffnungen" from 1876, the topic of self-help is not discussed. Given the logic of the depiction, this would also be superfluous, since her ideal of the free development of abilities presupposes individual endeavor and being an active human being.

Instead, the chapter "Selbsthilfe" (*Self-help*) constitutes an important part of her programmatic pamphlet from 1866, "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb." She introduces this chapter with the words: "Those who do not want to help themselves cannot be helped, indeed they do not even deserve to be helped! *Only what is achieved through one's own endeavors has any value*"[52]. She continues with a thought she had already become convinced of in April 1849, given how women were denied political participation rights and general rights by the revolutionaries. At that time, in the first issue of the "Frauen-Zeitung" (*Women's Newspaper*), which was published by her, she expressed herself in these words:

> "*The history of all times and of ours in particular teaches that those who forgot to think of themselves were likewise forgotten—those who did not stand up resolutely for their rights, those who stood idly by, while the others around them continued to work robustly, striding on and on in the service of progress.*"[53]

For Louise Otto-Peters, the notion that female emancipation would only be realized through the interaction of individual and collective self-help of women was, as it were, a quintessence of her entire life up to that point. For her, self-help started with every girl, every woman working "on herself." To come to the view of oneself as having a purpose, even outside of marriage and family, and therefore having to learn and prepare "to become— not only in an event that might never occur, but in any event—a useful member of human society, and not a burden to anyone"[54] was what she considered to be the crucial starting point of female self-help. It meant no longer leaving one's fate to chance[55].

However, since the problems at hand principally concerned the fate of the entire female sex—due to prevailing opinions, existing habits and the legal situation—she understood the necessity of everyone reaching agreement with regard to the most pressing problems and then jointly going into action. In this way, self-help and public spirit merged in her thinking. She was deeply convinced that a real solution to the women's question could only be found "by the women themselves, through their own will and their own strength"[56]. Women would have to decide for themselves what they deemed right and wrong, what should and what should not be done[57].

She therefore described the founding of the ADF as being of great importance. In her view, its creation supplied the decisive means for promoting common aspirations and safeguarding common interests[58].

Louise Otto-Peters urged every woman who had so far been longing in vain "for working for the general good" to take the first step and join the ADF: "In doing so, she becomes a link in the great chain of a complete entity, thus joining a community that allows her to be useful to herself and others, and to make her strengths doubly productive in conjunction with those of others"[59]. Throughout her life she emphasized that the ADF had acted under the watchword "All for One and One for All"—as a women's organization based on solidarity and transcending class, implementing the principle of self-help through self-organization[60].

In purely practical terms, this meant that men could not become members of the ADF. This had nothing to do with misanthropy, but was due to the conviction that women first had to learn "to trust in their own strengths" and "to develop the strength, which to a large extent had until then only been employed in the service of domesticity, into beneficial work for the general good"[61]. For men, it was only possible to obtain honorary membership, bestowed on them by the women. As honorary members, however, they only had an advisory, non-decisive vote, in accordance with section An Appraisal of Louise Otto-Peters' Visions Against the Backdrop of the Existing Gender Order and Dominant Gender Thinking of the association's statute[62]. Consequently, the pioneers of the ADF certainly never excluded cooperation with men as a matter of principle, but they did make it dependent on specific purposes and concerns and, of course, on specific men[63]. This attitude also expressed their commitment to the principles of independence and self-help. Having said this, the above-mentioned section, which virtually turned on its head the prevailing reality of membership being denied to women in most associations, had been the subject of tumultuous arguments, not only during the first German

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[49] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71 [emphasis in the original].
[50] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 59, 73.
[51] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 59.
[52] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 76 [emphasis in the original].
[53] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 76 [emphasis in the original].
[54] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 82.
[55] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 82.

[56] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 99.
[57] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 96.
[58] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 96.
[59] L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 96.
[60] L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. VIII.
[61] Quoted from Neue Bahnen 3 (1868), No. 23, p. 182.
[62] L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 11.
[63] Cf. the empirical and systematic overview of the circle of founders of the ADF in S. Schötz: Bausteine.

women's conference in 1865, but also at Whitsun 1867 at the first General Assembly of the ADF in Leipzig[64].

AN APPRAISAL OF LOUISE OTTO-PETERS' VISIONS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE EXISTING GENDER ORDER AND DOMINANT GENDER THINKING

Louise Otto-Peters' views and visions of emancipation, community spirit and social reform as outlined above stood in stark contrast to the social reality of the nineteenth century, in which women were not entitled to equal rights in any area—neither in marriage and family, nor in education and employment, nor in political life. With a view to the present, much—but by no means everything—has been achieved: According to the prevailing marriage and family law during the lifetime of Louise Otto-Peters, the husband had the final right of decision in all matters. If there was no separation of property, he also had control over his wife's possessions. The introduction of the German Civil Law Code in 1900 did nothing to change this. The partnership of equals outlined by Louise Otto-Peters was only implemented in German law after 1945, and first of all in the GDR. Her vision in the field of education became reality somewhat more quickly, at least in part. Thanks to the great commitment of the German women's movement, the first girls in Berlin were able to pass the German high school exam, the *Abitur*, with special authorization in 1896. From 1908, new rules in Prussia made this possible as a matter of course. Universities began to open up to women in 1900, but we are still a long way from having the same number of female and male professors and equal pay. The world of work had already begun to change considerably during Louise Otto-Peters' lifetime, with the pioneers of the German women's movement making an important contribution through their many initiatives to improve education and training for girls and women. Under current EU law, today there can be no discrimination against women in the form of inaccessible areas in employment, but there are many so-called female and male professions, with a tendency toward lower pay in what are considered to be women's professions. Equal political rights for women and men were achieved in 1918/19; the fact that a woman currently rules in the German Chancellery illustrates the momentous change in the area of political participation. However, we still seem far removed from Louise Otto-Peters' vision of peaceful coexistence of peoples and non-military conflict resolution through international arbitration courts, even though steps in this direction have been taken since 1945 with the creation of the UN and various international treaties.

The concept advocated by Louise Otto-Peters of the "eternal feminine" and its fundamental orientation along a system of two genders have come under criticism. Transgender, intersexuality, and a "third sex," elusive in terms of its possible expressions, have significantly changed our ideas and convictions. Louise Otto-Peters' vision of emancipation, aimed as it is at the free development of each human being's individual abilities in order to participate in the upward movement and perfection of humankind, is, by contrast, not outdated. Where general human and civil rights are constitutionally enshrined, it has a legal basis, something that is by no means the case everywhere in the world. However, fulfilling the associated aspiration remains a seemingly never-ending task—both individually and collectively.

Just how challenging and explosive, and yet at the same time how innovative the visions of Louise Otto-Peters must have felt in the nineteenth century can only be appreciated if we take into account the middle-class gender and family ideology that was tirelessly propagated at the time.

According to this ideology, it was considered appropriate for women to work in the inner circle of the house—the so-called female profession of wife, housewife and mother—while the outside world of gainful employment, general public life, science and politics was supposed to belong to men[65]. It is true that many things began to change in this respect; artists, writers, kindergarten and school teachers, and governesses gradually became slightly more numerous[66], and some liberal politicians began to discuss the precarious situation of unmarried middle-class women—the so-called women's question[67]—but fundamentally, little changed in gender thinking.

These middle-class gender concepts were justified by claiming contrasting natural physical and mental characters of the sexes that were derived from the reproductive purpose. Such views were nothing new. They gained fresh significance, however—as Claudia Honegger in particular has shown—with the "rise of the naturalistic sciences" in the second half of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century, modifying older theological justifications that alleged women were second-rate and inferior by virtue of creation (Honegger, 1991). Doctors and medical philosophers now asserted they were able to document human nature scientifically from the perspective of an "objective view of facts." Using the method of anatomical comparison, they considered themselves justified in being able to deduce corresponding mental and moral differences from the distinctive physical organization of man and woman—for example, a stronger bone structure, tauter muscles, larger skulls and consequently a stronger intellect, increased vigor and more courage in men; by contrast, a more delicate form, "softer flesh" and thus more emotion, sensitivity, passivity and less self-confidence in women. The different spheres of women and men mentioned above then logically resulted from this, as it were. However, such an order

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[64]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 11, 14. Henriette Goldschmidt, for example, initially refused to work in an association in which her husband could not also be a member. However, she joined the ADF and the Leipzig Women's Education Association (FBV) in 1866, and was a member of the board of the ADF from 1867. After the death of Louise Otto-Peters, she became its deputy chairwoman in 1895, and Auguste Schmidt took over the chairwomanship (cf. Schmidt, 1895; Fassmann, 1996).

[65]Cf. on the middle-class gender ideal, in particular (Hausen, 1976; Duden, 1977; Gerhard, 1978; Frevert, 1988).

[66]Cf. for a description of the situation in the mid-60s of the nineteenth century, L. Otto-Peters: Recht, chapter II: Die Unzulänglichkeit der gegenwärtigen weiblichen Erwerbszweige, pp. 33–45.

[67]Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung.

of the sexes, seen as perfectly wise and just, not only represented polar opposites but was also intended hierarchically. Due to their specific physique and psyche, men had the right to the role of head of the family in civil society, as had been the case in the pre-modern era.

Such views were persistent; they did not simply evaporate in the course of time. During the period that is of interest to us, the book "Das Studium und die Ausübung der Medicin durch die Frauen" (*The study and practice of medicine by women*), published in 1872 by physician Theodor von Bischoff, gained some considerable fame, because in it, Bischoff "proved"— scientifically in his view, i.e., on the basis of results of comparative skull and brain anatomy—the fundamental inability of women to study medicine and to work as doctors. He had concluded from, among other things, differences in skull and brain formation, and from smaller sizes of women's brains, the mental inferiority of women. In addition, he considered women to be unsuitable for studying and for the sciences, in particular medicine, on account of their specific female characteristics—he emphasized, for example, timidity, docility, gentleness, weakness of will, being controlled by emotions rather than reason, superficiality and modesty[68]. His book would certainly have been understood by all dissenters as nothing short of a declaration of war. Looking back in 1893, Louise Otto-Peters assessed it as "one of the most crushing blows ever delivered against the female gender in Europe" (cf. Otto-Peters, 1893).

Anyone who stood up for the right of women to self-realization and social participation had no choice but to deal with the ideas of the "master thinkers" who influenced realities in all areas of life. Against this backdrop, how did the pioneers of the ADF argue in order to legitimize their demand for participation? Here, different lines of argument can be discerned, only a few of which I can outline in brief. The focus is once again on Louise Otto-Peters and the essays already mentioned above.

ARGUMENTATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS

It is characteristic of Louise Otto-Peters and her fellow campaigners that they initially seemed to take up and affirm the middle-class ideal of marriage entered into out of love, and the purported female profession of wife, housewife and mother; however, they did this only to show that the ideal was in need of modification for a variety of reasons.

Reality as Argument: Limits to the Feasibility of the Middle-Class Ideal of Gender and Family

One of the most common arguments was to point out the incompatibility or only partial compatibility of the ideal of middle-class women with the actual living conditions of broad sections of the population. Thus, Louise Otto-Peters did indeed describe being a wife and mother as the most beautiful and, to a certain extent, the easiest, "profession of women, as it has simply

been sketched out by the hand of nature itself." That it should be, however, the only profession of women, was, she thought, not only a "confusion of terms," but also "in glaring contrast to reality"[69].

On the one hand, she identified this "glaring contrast" with regard to the growing number of manual laborers. In "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," she says:

"Among the proletarians, everyone who does not wish to starve has to work. It is indeed proclaimed always and everywhere: The man is the breadwinner of the family, the acquirer; the woman has only to preserve—but where, as in the lowest classes, the man can often scarcely earn enough to eke out his own existence, then the woman must also take care of hers, and, in turn, the children—boys and girls—must do the same."[70]

Accordingly, she considered women's gainful employment, and even child labor, to be indispensable in the lower classes for existential reasons; here, the middle-class ideal of gender and family came up against obvious limits to its feasibility.

She saw the widespread necessity of either earning one's living completely through gainful employment or contributing in some way to the family income, not only for many widows, but also for a considerable number of married women and adult daughters from the middle classes, such as those of civil servants, pastors, lawyers, artists, private scholars and small merchants. In these cases, she observed that widows' pensions, if they were available at all, or the salaries of husbands and fathers were often insufficient to satisfy the needs of families[71]. In her view, the fundamental cause lay in the transformation in the lives of women and families resulting from the technical and socio- economic changes of the preceding decades[72]. In the past, housewives had "much to do, admittedly" and "female helping hands" were welcome in every household in order to be able to satisfy the countless needs involved in keeping house. Things that used to be made at home were now produced by industry, however, and almost all household necessities were purchased for money[73]. Thus, providing for adult daughters in a way befitting one's social station, but also for unmarried female family members who had once had their place in the household of relatives and contributed their labor in one way or another, proved increasingly to be a problem—particularly for members of the educated classes who were employed as civil servants or clerical workers and who were not particularly well paid. It is precisely this question of "where to put all of these individuals who were otherwise occupied in the home"[74], that had been intensely debated for a time as the "women's question" by liberal politicians since the mid-1860s. Some of them initiated projects to promote the employability of unmarried women from the middle classes in order to provide for female members of their own social group through integration

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[68](cf. Glaser, 1996, p. 301).

[69]Otto-Peters, Louise: Recht, p. 19.

[70]Otto-Peters, Louise: Recht, p. 34.

[71]Cf. Otto-Peters, Louise: Recht, p. 43.

[72]Modern family history research sees this no differently (cf. Mitterauer, 2009; Gestrich, 2010).

[73]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 56.

[74]L. Otto: Frauenleben, p. 154.

into the labor market in a way that was appropriate to their status and to prevent their social relegation[75].

But for Louise Otto-Peters, the "women's question" could in social terms not be reduced to lower middle-class women or to middle-class women threatened by social relegation. Throughout her whole life, her thinking included female workers; in fact, it even emanated from their living conditions. As early as 1840, her encounter with the misery of the lace makers and female spinners working in industrial factories in the Ore Mountains had become the key experience in recognizing social ills that particularly affected women and children. Since then, she had been interested in the employment conditions of women doing manual labor and had published a variety of texts on the subject. During the revolution of 1848/49, she demanded that working women not be forgotten when organizing work. This was done in the shape of her famous address of a girl, directed at the Saxon Interior Minister Martin Gotthard Oberländer and the so-called Workers' Commission[76]. When, in 1860, after the long period of repression, she again began to publish openly on women's issues in the "Leipziger Sonntagsblatt," she focused once more on the question of female gainful employment. This time, she also began to look more closely at the problems of female gainful employment in the "upper classes"; in her series of articles she anticipated much of what she then set out in "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" in 1865. Among other things, she already addressed the lot of governesses and that of women from the middle classes who, although contributing to the family budget through various types of gainful employment, attempted to conceal this. They wanted to be seen as richer than they were, and considered it "shameful" to work, because this would not be befitting of their "destiny"[77]. She also focused on the examination of the problems of marriages entered into for the purpose of maintenance and of a completely neglected and misguided female education. If this amounted to anything at all, it was to please a man, to be married to and provided for by him, and to be a housewife and mother. However, if for some reason this goal could not be achieved, the situation of women would be a "desperate" one[78]. For this very reason, the main objectives of the ADF were, in view of the few professions that were open to women and especially middle-class women, to advocate opening up new branches of employment for women, but also to work for a change in girls' education toward independence and to boost the creation of education and training opportunities for girls and women of all social classes and strata. Better education and training were intended to open up better employment opportunities and to help in achieving a respected independent position; at the same time, they were supposed to protect against marriages entered into imprudently for the purposes of maintenance and against the drift into prostitution.

The Special Female Characteristics as a Positive Argument

Arguments for making use of the characteristics that were purportedly specifically female in a way that would benefit female youth or women, and thus be of service to the common good beyond the family, developed plausibility during the course of the nineteenth century. They took up the prevailing discourse of the difference between the sexes, but endowed the female gender characteristics allegedly arising from women's nature with positive connotations, using them to expand women's scope for action in society.

This has been shown to be particularly true in the case of Henriette Goldschmidt, a board member of the ADF[79]. For decades, at the General Assemblies of the ADF, she did indeed put forward many concrete proposals to expand the sphere of activity for women, such as improving the training and social position of primary school teachers, the employment of women in local administrative offices, the establishment of continuing training schools for women, the education of Fröbel-kindergarten teachers, and also the scientific training of female doctors and teachers[80]. Building on the theories of Friedrich Fröbel, who attributed to women a special natural aptitude for the upbringing of children that was allegedly due to their ability to bear children, she made a significant contribution from 1870 onwards to the development of the concept of "spiritual" or "organized motherliness"[81]. At the end of the 1880s, Helene Lange and Mathilde Weber also used this strategy, which was successful in the medium term, in a modified form to justify women's access to the study of high school teaching and medicine[82].

This connection to the discourse of gender difference, albeit in the version of resulting equivalence and thus equality of both sexes, also becomes evident in the many references Louise Otto-Peters made between 1868 and 1871 to K. F. C. Krause's philosophy and to representatives of Krausism. Krause considered the contrast between man and woman to be the most original, to be "eternal and inalienable"[83]. He assumed specifically male and female "peculiarities," which he did not, however, rank according to a hierarchical patriarchy, but in terms of equality and complementarity. In his view, men relied primarily on cognition, women on emotion, but both "peculiarities" were of "equal, uniquely characteristic beauty." "For this reason, man and woman stand on the same level, facing each other as beings of equal worth, not the woman below the man, nor the man below the woman"[84]. Both therefore have completely equal rights—an idea that no other representative of classical German philosophy advocated so resolutely[85]. Krause considered difference linked to

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[75]Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung, pp. 195 ff. In 1866, Adolf Lette, Chairman of the Prussian Central Association for the Welfare of Working Classes, founded an association in Berlin to promote the employability of the female sex.

[76](cf. Ludwig, 2003).

[77]Laute aus den "stillen Jahren". Series of articles, "Den Frauen" by Otto (1995, p. 75).

[78]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 29.

[79]Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung, p. 199.

[80]Cf. the many pieces of evidence in: L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert.

[81]Cf. A. Schaser: Geschichte, p. 28 f.; U. Gerhard: Unerhört, p. 124 f., and Kemp (2002). The term "geistige Mütterlichkeit" (*spiritual motherliness*) was used in 1865 for the first time by Henriette Schrader-Breymann, Friedrich Fröbel's niece. Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung, p. 204.

[82](cf. Schötz, 2011), in particular, pp. 360–365.

[83]Quoted from Wollgast (2004, p. 47).

[84]Quoted from Wollgast (2004, p. 47).

[85]According to Wollgast (2004, p. 47).

simultaneous equality to be the decisive reason why men and women should work together, using these specific abilities in order to create a better, more humane society, just as if they were imperfect halves of a larger, noble whole. Women should therefore not be excluded from any field.

Hermann von Leonhardi, Professor of Philosophy in Prague and perhaps Krause's most important student and follower, had been in personal contact with Louise Otto-Peters and the ADF since 1868. He explicitly invited women as equal participants to the Philosophers' Congress he organized at that time in Prague; in 1869, he then gave a welcoming address at the General Assembly of the ADF in Kassel, in which he emphatically invited women to study Krausism[86]. It is therefore not at all surprising that Louise Otto Peters recommended—in the "Büchertisch" column of the "Neue Bahnen" from 1869—that her readers study Krause, "because this is almost the only philosopher who correctly explains 'the feminine' and regards women as completely equal to men"[87]. As she stated in a letter in 1869, Krause's assertions as a philosopher were not new to her, but confirmed rather what she herself believed and saw[88].

"Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" from 1865 does indeed reveal Louise Otto-Peters' very similar way of thinking in the passage where she developed her vision of the "truly feminine" and the "eternal feminine" and the necessity of its development in the service of human perfection. Here, like Krause, Louise Otto-Peters addressed an assumed contrast between male reason and female emotion. She considered "the capacity for enthusiasm, the receptivity for what is great and beautiful, an excitable imagination and a soaring, ideal direction" to be the "eternal feminine." In 1865, she obviously did not presume a strong love peculiar to women[89] or a specifically female vision of education or caring, as supported by other protagonists of the women's movement; such thinking is also not discernable in the "Frauenleben im Deutschen Reich" from 1876. Quite the contrary: In "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," she remarked that there were certainly many girls "who carry within them different skills and aspirations other than to occupy themselves with children," and asked why they should be forced into something they did not care for[90]. For her, the "eternal feminine" needed to be introduced into the development of various specific talents, as something which had been granted to women by the Creator, "as divine legacy"[91]. Religious and philosophical interpretations thus complemented each other as far as she was concerned.

I consider Louise Otto-Peters' concept of the "eternal feminine," in contrast to other interpretations, to be part of her comprehensive vision of emancipation, in which women have the right to use their own specific nature to perfect not only men but all of humankind—just as men must also employ what is specific to them. With this view, she reacts to the dominant

middle-class notion of the difference between men and women, not only physically but also psychologically, and in particular creates a connection to the different categories of reason and emotion. However, "the capacity for enthusiasm, the receptivity for what is great and beautiful, an excitable imagination and a soaring, ideal direction" emphasized by her are qualities that can in principle be used in every area of private, social and political life. They thus support her comprehensive vision of emancipation as the free development of one's own strengths in the service of humanity, without restricting women in any way. This concept neither views femininity as superior in working to ennoble humankind[92], nor does it assume femininity to be a primary source for altruism, compassion and love based on the biological capacity for motherhood, in this way declaring the female side to be better and more humane, as later theorists of the women's movement, such as Helene Lange did (cf. Greven-Aschoff, 1981). It is therefore difficult to describe Louise Otto-Peters' idea of the "eternal feminine" as an important starting point for the theoretical framework of difference and dualism of the sexes under the terminology of the "cultural task of women" in the later German women's movement (cf. Greven-Aschoff, 1981, p. 43). It would be a misinterpretation to have understood it in this way.

To date, we do not know how the concept of the "eternal feminine" was received by her fellow campaigners on the board of the ADF, whether it was of any significance, or whether Henriette Goldschmidt and Louise Otto-Peters ever discussed their different ideas of femininity. This is potentially a wide field of research—if other influential activists of the emerging women's movement inside and outside the ADF are also included in the investigation of femininity and gender concepts.

It is also a largely open question when and under what influences Louise Otto-Peters developed the idea of the "eternal feminine." Her essay "Das Ewig-Weibliche" (*The Eternal Feminine*) in the "Frauen-Zeitung" from 1851, oft-quoted in this context, represents more of an endpoint or the perfected product; it is also not a moderate answer to the question of "How to move forward?" after the failure of "radical activity" by women in the revolution of 1848/49 to lead to an improvement of their legal situation[93]. It would be a worthwhile task to trace the genesis of her understanding of gender roles and the construct of the "eternal feminine" in the 1840s on the basis of autobiographical writings, manuscripts from her estate, journalistic works and literary output. As Gisela Bock showed, thoughts about the "female sphere" or "mission" had been circulating in Europe since the 1830s. These legitimized the opposite of domesticity— namely female occupation or other activities outside the family. It remains to be examined whether Louise Otto knew the bestsellers by Sarah Lewis, Louis-Aime Martin, Marion Kirkland-Reid or Juliette Adam-Lamber (cf. Bock, 2000). According to autobiographical recollections from 1871, it was her later husband, August Peters, who, on the occasion of them meeting in person in January 1849, put into words for the first time what she

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[86]Cf. S. Schötz: Bausteine, p. 157 f., sowie Wollgast (2004).
[87]Cf. Neue Bahnen 4 (1869), No. 6, p. 48.
[88]Cf. S. Wollgast: Louise Otto-Peters, p. 45.
[89]This is the view of Yamada (2006, p. 109).
[90]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 80.
[91]Cf. L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 72.

[92]This is how Barbara Greven-Aschoff interprets the "Ewig-Weibliche" in Louise Otto-Peters (cf. Greven-Aschoff, 1981).
[93]This is the view of Diethe (2002).

"probably already thought, but did not yet dare to say publicly": That the "eternal feminine" needed to be brought to fruition in humankind, since only in this way would true progress toward the goal of humanity be possible" (cf. Otto, 1871). So, did she adopt the term of the "eternal feminine," first appearing at the end of Goethe's Faust II, from August Peters?

The Discourse on Human Rights and Humanity

Research to date on the history of women's movements has highlighted their links to the principles of the Enlightenment and Liberalism[94]. According to Ute Gerhard, this history has, since 1789, always been about the same contradiction—about the promise or the conceivability of freedom and equality for women and about women's rights not being honored or being insufficiently implemented[95].

In fact, the sources demonstrate a connection to natural law and to the discourse on human rights and humanity of the Enlightenment and of Classicism among many women who spoke up within the ADF—but also among the men who supported its endeavors. They have in common the fundamental conviction of the complete and natural equality of women and men as "species-beings." In particular, the idea of the freedom of the individual—inalienably inherent in every human being due to them having been endowed with reason, and understood as the necessary basis for their self-development—and the ideas of human dignity and legal equality, which were to enable every human being to improve their social position through talent, diligence and good fortune[96], offered great potential for justifying claims to women's emancipation. Referring back to the ideas of the Enlightenment, those debating in the ADF repeatedly pointed out the political immaturity and dependency imposed on women as well as the absence of their rights. In accordance with the aims and objectives of civil society, they therefore advocated granting equal rights to both sexes, because if in the name of human rights, people were fighting against a corporate society based on birth and descent, and if formal equality in all rights was one of the fundamental principles of the new order, then the legal inequality of women and men would legitimately also have to be eliminated. In principle, most ADF members probably wanted this to include political participation rights, which, however, were not legally enforceable in Germany for the time being.

In Auguste Schmidt's speech at the ADF's founding conference, references not only to religion but also to the Enlightenment and natural laws had already been touched upon, when she had developed "in a longer speech, the *natural entitlement of women* to raise themselves up from their current subordination to the equality due to them alongside men"[97]. It is precisely this aspiration to promote women's natural entitlement to full equality with men that led Louise Otto-Peters to write "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" as the programmatic basis for the ADF. As we have seen, she legitimized her opinions and ideas

with a wide variety of arguments. However, it becomes clear that she borrowed directly from the human rights discourse of the Enlightenment, particularly when giving her reasons for the principle of independence and self-help. For example, she wrote the following sentence as a comment on her conviction that a real solution to the issue of women's rights could only be found by the women themselves, through their own will and their own strength: "The *right to free self-determination* is the holiest and most inalienable of every being endowed with reason"[98]. This "most simple right to human dignity" was not to be denied to women by anybody,

> "*and where it should be tried, they must resist with all the consciousness of their moral dignity until the victory of humanity finally becomes a general victory*"[99].

Time and again, she expressed the basic conviction that it was the task of the ADF

> "*to broaden the sphere of action for women—not only unilaterally, but regarding all the talents given to them and the unlimited assertion of these in all circumstances of life, in the family, the community, the nation, and in the whole of humankind.*"[100]

At the General Assembly in Eisenach in 1872, she argued that the ADF strove "to achieve what is every being's inalienable right: The free development of their talents and strengths"[101]. As we shall see, in "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," she described the right to free self-realization as a right granted to every creature by the Creator[102]. So, once again, Louise Otto-Peters' philosophical and religious interpretations complemented each other.

The discourse on human rights and humanity of the Enlightenment and Classicism can be understood as a common bond of the values aspired to by the ADF pioneers; as a bond that united them across all other differences. In 1868, Louise Otto-Peters put it as follows:

> "*In our striving, we women [...] take the view of pure humanity, or if you will, of natural law; when it is a question of coming closer to our goals: A dignified existence for everyone, including for women, we do not ask for any philosophical or religious, political, national or social declaration of belief*" (Otto-Peters, 1868).

This commitment to participatory rights for women and to humanity obviously had a unifying effect, despite differences in the understanding of femininity; otherwise, the decades of collaboration between Louise Otto-Peters and Henriette Goldschmidt on the board of the ADF, for example, would not have been possible.

Louise Otto-Peters herself had already been heavily politicized under the conditions of the unfolding German national movement in the "Vormärz" era. Political convictions that were

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[94]Cf. B. Greven-Aschoff: Frauenbewegung, p. 37.
[95]Cf. U. Gerhardt: Frauenbewegung, p. 8.
[96]U. Frevert: Meisterdenker, p. 20.
[97]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 8 [emphasis in the original].

[98]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 99 [emphasis in the original].
[99]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 77.
[100]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 24.
[101]L. Otto-Peters: Vierteljahrhundert, p. 24.
[102]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71.

based on the ideas of the Enlightenment and that manifested themselves in the growing liberal movement—but even more so in the democratic movement which, to a larger extent, factored in the social question of the working classes—attracted her greatly. Seen from the perspective of their historical genesis, such political convictions were arguably the first to develop significance for the formation of her feminist emancipatory thinking. However, under the influence of the reformed religious interpretations of German Catholicism, these would have complemented each other symbiotically very early on, probably no later than 1845.

As Louise Otto-Peters later pointed out repeatedly, her political interest had already been awakened in her parental home, where her father regularly read the newspaper to his daughters and now and again discussed political events with them. Reading classical literature together—works by the Romantics and the "Junges Deutschland"—will probably also have contributed to arousing a general political interest. Before she could even read, she knew entire ballads and poems by Friedrich Schiller by heart, and she later emphasized how important his female characters and his liberal texts that were directed against prejudice had been for her (cf. Hundt, 2004).

In her essay "Die Theilnahme der weiblichen Welt am Staatsleben" (*The participation of the female world in political life*), published by Robert Blum in the "Volkstaschenbuch Vorwärts" from 1847, she identified the general sources of the emerging political interest of women in the 1840s: First political poetry, in particular the young German poets, then the political conflicts in the state parliaments, to which women were admitted as spectators in Saxony, and finally the religious movement of German Catholicism. All this would probably have applied to herself as well—alongside the autodidactic studies I consider to be eminently important (cf. Hundt, 2004). In this process, her friendly relationships with Robert Blum and Ernst Keil played an important role for the young Louise Otto at the beginning of her literary career, with her acquaintance and friendship with socially critical Austrian poets being of particular significance (cf. Hundt, 2006). Following conflicts with Austrian censorship and police authorities, the young Austrians had moved to Leipzig— Saxony's book, publishing and trade fair city. Among them was Karl Beck, one of the most popular German- speaking political poets of that time. As early as 1840, Louise Otto was inspired by the ideas of equality and freedom he proclaimed, by the denunciation of social destitution, the hope for forthcoming political reforms and his passion for modern technology (cf. Hundt, 2006, p. 120). Karl Herloßsohn—in whose "Komet" she published—also belonged to this circle, as did Hermann Rollett, whom she described as a personal friend and political kindred spirit. In 1848, Rollett published a "Republikanisches Liederbuch" (*Republican Songbook*) in several editions. He was a well-known democrat who was persecuted after the suppressed revolution of 1848/49, and later belonged to the contributors to her "Frauen-Zeitung." Eduard Mautner and Alfred Meißner also counted among their number. She esteemed the latter more highly as a poet of liberation than Robert Prutz, Georg Herwegh, or Ferdinand Freiligrath (Hundt, 2006). Women were also granted certain rights of participation in the politically lively literary scene of the "Vormärz" era. At any rate, the democrat Robert

Blum asked in his "Sächsische Vaterlandsblätter" of 1843 how women would have to express their participation in political life if everyone were called upon to participate in the community and in political life. The reader Otto replied to his question and began a journalistic career under her own name with a series of articles on the topic: It is this series of articles that is regarded by some female historians as the beginning of the history of the German women's movement[103].

In these pages, it is not possible to trace her own political actions and the exact manner in which her understanding of political participation took shape from the 1840s onwards, through the revolution of 1848/49 and on to the ADF period. Her courage during the 1848/49 revolution remains outstanding: She intervened in the political events, in particular with the already mentioned "Adresse eines Mädchens" and with the publication of the "Frauen-Zeitung" under the slogan "I Recruit Female Citizens for the Realm of Freedom." Her understanding of democracy was significantly broader than that of most democrats: For example, in the journal "Sociale Reform," published by Luise Dittmar, Louise Otto-Peters spoke out in favor of women's voting rights as early as 1848[104]. The "Frauen-Zeitung" as a medium for articulating women's interests was founded by her partly on account of the disappointment she felt at the circumstance that revolutionaries who otherwise acted liberally and democratically had forgotten to demand women's rights in 1848/49. A feminist perspective resulting from a comprehensive understanding of freedom and democratic rights was characteristic of her.

The report published by Julius Mühlfeld in the "Mitteldeutsche Volks-Zeitung" on the founding of the ADF shows that it fell within the context of the human rights discourse of the Enlightenment and even of fundamental liberal and democratic values, and was understood by contemporaries in exactly that way. As a longstanding personal friend of Louise Otto-Peters and a supporter of women's emancipation, he concluded his report almost imploringly with the following words:

> "Our sincere wishes and sympathies [...] accompany the beautiful and great work that has begun. Themselves unworthy of freedom are those who fight against the striving for freedom, and contemptuous are those who, in the service of prejudice and egotism, despise and suppress the rights of others to free human dignity, free work and self-determination. May the last opponents of the true, worthy emancipation of women towards spiritual and social independence alongside men, which is necessary for the welfare and salvation of humankind and of future generations, not forget this!"[105]

This is an expression of the knowledge concerning the widespread opposition toward the emerging women's movement, to be expected not only among conservatives, but also among liberals and democrats. Even in 1865, there was only a very small

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[103] U. Gerhardt: Unerhört, p. 16.

[104] She was probably the first woman to do this publicly in Germany. Cf. Ludwig, Johanna: Rechte, p. 504.

[105] Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 119 [emphasis in the original].

minority among democrats who included women in the human rights program of the Enlightenment.

Arguably, the pioneers of the ADF, in calling for universal human rights for women, were on a belated path of catching up and were now discovering for themselves ideas that had already preoccupied men for decades. This seems problematic to me, however. As far as we know, women were not included in the thinking about general natural rights. With few exceptions—one being K. C.

F. Krause—the great master thinkers, such as Rousseau, Campe, Kant, or Fichte, when they philosophized in general about human destiny, contemplated male destiny, while at the same time always emphasizing the purported natural profession of wife, housewife and mother for women. It is therefore more apt to phrase it this way: The pioneers of the women's movement interpreted the texts of the philosophers anew. Completely in keeping with Immanuel Kant's understanding of the Enlightenment, they had the courage to use their own intellect and to overcome the state of immaturity and heteronomy. With the deepest conviction, they claimed for themselves the general human rights as these had been set down. Auguste Schmidt phrased it very aptly on the inauguration evening of the first German women's conference in Leipzig in 1865: "Human beings is what women want to become, and partake of the garland of work and victory."

RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATIONS

With regard to Louise Otto-Peters' visions of the emancipation of women, religious interpretations have scarcely been addressed so far[106]. This stands in clear contrast to the existence of—or even saturation with—such visions in some parts of her more comprehensive writings on women's emancipation. The same is also true of her 1865 programmatic essay "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," to which the most frequent assessments of Louise Otto-Peters' positions on women's politics in the research on the history of the women's movement refer. So far, religious legitimizations of the claim to equality and emancipation have manifestly been overlooked—including by me—because they have not been the subject of investigation. The hitherto identified influences on Louise Otto-Peters' thinking, in particular the human rights discourse of the Enlightenment, but also the way she took up the discourse of the postulations of diversity, seemed to give satisfactory explanations in accordance with individual expectations. However, this does not do sufficient justice to the historical protagonists: Louise Otto-Peters also demonstrably argued as a Protestant Christian.

In "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," she made the case for the principle of self-help—so fundamental to her—with reference to the highest authority, God's will:

"Only their own strength can ennoble and exalt human beings, that strength whose development and consolidation is the will of God, who created all beings so that they would develop all the abilities

that lie dormant within them and strive for free development and moral perfection."[107]

In her view, those who persisted in inertia and apathy, without making an effort, sinned not only against their fellow human beings, who looked after them without their deserving it, but even more so against God[108]. For Louise Otto-Peters, the active human striving for perfection is the human willed by God. This self-evidently applies to men as well as women, with their specific intrinsic characteristics.

In order to lend plausibility to her idea of the unfolding of the "eternal feminine" in the service of the development of humankind, she dealt in detail with fears that exactly those most beautiful female qualities might be lost if girls and women were educated to become more independent and to participate in political life. In defense of her idea, Louise Otto-Peters argued that the Creator granted every creature the right to allow themselves space and freedom for the innate peculiarity of their being to develop fully; now it was only this particular right that "women claimed and had to claim if they did not want to fail in the purpose of the Creator"[109]. And she continues:

"Man and woman have emerged from the hands of the divinity or of creation [...] as two equal creatures; but the dissimilarity of their characteristics also holds true in the life of the soul. Balancing out this dissimilarity happens in the union of both. The man as such and the woman as such are entities of equal significance; only when both are united do they form a whole. This is how the wisdom of creation, which subordinates none to the other, wished it."[110]

The similarity of these thoughts with those of the philosopher Krause is astounding—was it possible that Louise Otto-Peters already know his writings or those of his students before 1868, after all? And since the wording in the 1851 essay on the "eternal feminine" is almost identical, did she already know Krause's philosophy at that time?

In 1865, however, she invoked the highest possible authority by referring to none other than God, who had equipped human beings as men and women differently but equal, and therefore possessing equal value, while from 1868, she quoted the philosopher Krause as the scientific authority. In "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" she continues:

"What has been bequeathed to woman by the divinity, to bring to bear in his power and holiness against the predominance of either a cold or brutal force, should not be a futile endeavor in the general development."

In her view, it was precisely this "eternal feminine" that had to be brought to the consciousness of women and to the fore in humankind in order to attain perfection[111]. In order for women and men "to participate in the work of the century, together with

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[106]Several clues to her religiosity can be found in Otto (1995), Deich (2004, p. 65–68), and S. Wollgast: Louise Otto-Peters.

[107]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 76.
[108]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 76.
[109]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71.
[110]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 71.
[111]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 72.

one another in dignified union within marriage and *alongside* one another outside of it," the ADF called for a changed and independent position of the female sex[112].

What is interesting about these arguments is that they completely disregard—as if they did not exist—the interpretations of the story of Creation that had been customary for many centuries, and according to which the secondary status of the female sex resulted either from the later creation of Eve from Adam's rib or from Eve's sin[113]. Obviously, in the above case, another concept of faith was relevant for Louise Otto-Peters—that of the holiness of the dissimilarity and equality bestowed by the Creator upon man and woman. Lucian Hölscher describes this adjustment of religious beliefs to the needs of place and time as a culture of reflection typical of Protestant middle-class religiosity in the nineteenth century[114]. From the point of view of the history of ideas, Hegel's interpretation of the Reformation had made a decisive contribution to this. According to him, the freedom of the subject had entered the world with the principle of Protestantism, for the authority of the Church was replaced by the Bible, from which everyone was supposed to teach themselves and define their consciences[115]. Faith could only be substantiated in the subject's self-reflection and, in view of the challenges of life, also had to be examined constantly for the religious truths that were of personal significance. Did Louise Otto-Peters know such considerations from her Hegel studies? Or had she been brought up in this spirit during her religious instruction as a child and adolescent? There is a lot to be said for this, because her autodidactic studies in the years 1841–1843 illustrate the fact that she applied herself extremely seriously to gaining knowledge[116]. At that time, she was particularly interested in the interrelations between religion and philosophy, religion and nature, and between God and a thinking human being[117]. However, it is difficult to say when religious convictions became significant for Louise Otto-Peters' thoughts on women's emancipation. As Johanna Ludwig shows, Louise Otto-Peters attached great importance—in later autobiographical statements—to her confirmation and in particular to her confirmation quote. She had been blessed with the Bible saying: "Be faithful unto death, and I will give you the crown of eternal life." Louise Otto-Peters subsequently described this scene several times, always emphasizing how moved she had been and how much she accepted these words as the maxim of her life. In 1869, in "Genius des Hauses" she stated:

> "*Sublime shivers came over me at that moment—life lay before me as a great, wide arena and I prayed full of fiery devotion, although not that I would be spared the fight, but precisely that it might come—come with all its force, so that I might then prove myself to be a worthy fighter, so that I might really deserve a crown of victory. Here, before the throne of God, everything was indeed*

> *equal, whether man or woman—even the trembling girl's hand was allowed to take up the sword and wield it in this fight.*"[118]

According to this portrayal, the 15-years-old Louise Otto-Peters, on account of her religious education and upbringing, already understood herself to be equal with men before God. She therefore laid claim to a life of struggle and confrontation to justify God's trust in her and prove herself to be worthy of it. It is difficult to determine to what extent this depiction was a subsequent stylization in order to show how strongly her conviction of men and women having equal worth and equal rights was based on her faith from her earliest youth, with faith itself therefore being the source of her motivation. Presumably, as a confirmand, she was convinced of the fundamental capacity for salvation of all human beings and of their duty to prove themselves worthy to God, to do good and to strive for their own perfection. However, it is unlikely that she recognized in this a potential for women's emancipation or that she was, in 1834, interested in the issue of women's rights.

In my opinion, her basic religious conviction that man and woman were equal before God was conveyed to her not through the Protestant teachings of her childhood and youth, but only later through German Catholicism. Her autobiographical studies and her increasing political interest since 1840, influenced especially by political poetry, will also have contributed to this. In 1847, she wrote in the "Volkstaschenbuch Vorwärts," published by Robert Blum: "German Catholicism gave us the shibboleth of a general spiritual equality before God, of priests and of laypeople, scholars and the ignorant, men and women" (cf. Otto, 1847). But in 1845, she had already given an enthusiastic account in the "Wandelstern" newspaper of a sermon by Johannes Ronge in Dresden. The founder of German Catholicism was on a journey across Germany to promote his cause at that time. Having witnessed Ronge's sermon, she described it as the "most solemn hour" of her life, as an hour that had been "a piece taken from world history"[119].

There were three thoughts in particular that she emphasized: Firstly, Ronge had described it as the task of the nineteenth-century Reformation to fulfill Christianity, because the Reformation had made no more progress for three centuries. The Reformation would recognize the moral world order and human destiny and would reintroduce them into world history. Both were based on these words of Christ: "Become perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, and love one another."[120] Secondly, according to Ronge, women also demanded their part in the struggle of world history:

> "*And so it shall be, and so women, too, shall help in their way to build our holy work, and shall not be left behind where we are*

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[112]L. Otto-Peters: Recht, p. 72 [emphasis in the original].

[113]Cf. regarding such arguments (Lundt, 1996).

[114]Cf. L. Hölscher: Religiosität, p. 209.

[115]Cf. U. Baumann: Protestantismus, pp. 20.

[116]Cf. I. Hundt: Studien.

[117]Cf. I. Hundt: Studien, p. 35.

[118]Quoted from Ludwig, Johanna: Eigener Wille und eigene Kraft. Der Lebensweg von Louise Otto-Peters bis zur Gründung des Allgemeinen deutschen Frauenvereins 1865. Nach Selbstzeugnissen und Dokumenten, p. 26 [in print, emphasis in the original]. My thanks to the author for the opportunity to see the manuscript.

[119]Otto (1845, p. 1057). In 1846, she met Johannes Ronge in person in Breslau (cf. R.-E. Boetcher-Joeres: Anfänge, p. 54; Otto, 1847).

[120]L. Otto: Wort, p. 1056.

called upon to work for the people and the fatherland and the holiest human rights."[121]

In Ronge's view, German Catholicism as the "faith of freedom and love" created "a priestly people entirely made up of high priests and high priestesses." But it was not only the thoughts of women participating with equal rights in this religious renewal movement and the right of every human being, including women, to perfection that were extremely important for Louise Otto's own thinking. In her account of his appearance in Dresden, she also emphasized a third fundamental idea of Ronge's—his reply to the accusation that the new movement took too much notice of earthly life: Christ, who healed the sick and fed the poor, Ronge said, had not wanted "millions to be cast into servitude and misery and to have their human rights taken away, and in return have heaven opened up to them." According to Ronge, the German Catholics taught love for people as Christ had done, they were united in their love for him, as one Christ[122]. This thought, then, meant religious authorization for a program of inner-worldly living, directed at common action in solidarity against the ills of the present and for human rights. It was thus oriented decisively toward the common good and had its place in the democratic movement.

If all three thoughts are merged from the perspective of women's emancipation, the result is a participation of women in the improvement of the world that is legitimized by religious ideas and a right for women—likewise legitimized by religious ideas—to partake of human rights, the first of which was the right to personal self-realization toward perfection. It was precisely this program that determined the visions of women's emancipation developed by Louise Otto-Peters in her essays "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb" and "Frauenleben im Deutschen Reich." It determined even more, however: Her "Zukunftshoffnungen" from 1876, which included not only women but all human beings.

As she stated in an article in 1848, Louise Otto-Peters developed, in an explicit departure from the "Orthodox Christian standpoint," a Christian position "where Christianity and humanity are equally important"[123]. This was obviously possible within the framework of her church, because she did not become a German Catholic, despite her being very close to the religion and having many close acquaintances in her personal environment[124]. The program of the "Frauen-Zeitung," published by her in 1849, reveals religious as well as political and socio-economic interpretations influenced by the religiosity of German Catholicism; but the detailed depiction of these interpretations would go beyond the scope of this article[125]. However, already at that time, she stressed that "true freedom" was indivisible—that is, that political, social and religious freedom can only mean real freedom as a unity and that the civil rights and liberties for men are only rights of one half of humankind (cf. Otto, 1849b). Here, too, political, social and religious interpretations were already intertwined.

After a visit to Louise Otto-Peters in 1869, Paul Hohlfeld, a follower of Krause, wrote in a letter to Hermann von Leonhardi that judging by her religious point of view she was a rationalist[126]. This probably captures it well: Various characteristics—emphasized by Lucian Hölscher—of a religiosity determined by the rationalism of the Enlightenment are reflected in her visions, such as the belief in a general world plan of improvement and perfection, which included the belief in the perfectibility of human beings and in inner-worldly cultural, moral and scientific progress; the belief in the divine principle of reason and in the discernibility of God's hand in nature and history; the idea of God as a loving Father who ultimately accepts all his children; feelings of humility and gratitude toward God and feelings of love and humanity toward humankind, from which a wide field of activity arose[127]. However, inasmuch as Louise Otto-Peters' religiosity expressly included the belief in completely equal rights given to women by God, it would be even more appropriate to describe her as a feminist rationalist. A widespread belief in equal women's rights cannot be observed in the representatives of enlightened rationalism and of Protestantism in general. For them, the story of creation, among other biblical passages, still provided the decisive reason for the subordinate, unequal position of women: Man was created before woman and to have independence; he was master, she helper and unthinkable without him[128].

Auguste Schmidt, the long-time deputy of Louise Otto-Peters in the ADF, was also influenced in her thoughts on women's emancipation by religious interpretations. This shone through during her speech at the opening of the first German women's conference in Leipzig in 1865. Nevertheless, it is currently an open research question as to what extent specific religious concepts constituted a source of commitment to women's emancipation for Louise Otto-Peters' fellow campaigners in the ADF. This is all the more true since the first phase of the association's development between 1865 and the beginning of the 1890s was marked by the cooperation of Protestants, Jews, and non-denominational women—at least on the board and the committee of the ADF. This is reflected, among other things, in the cooperation of Louise Otto-Peters, Auguste Schmidt, Henriette Goldschmidt and Marianne Menzzer, who were members of the Leipzig board for decades; the former two as Protestants, Henriette Goldschmidt as Jewess and wife of the Rabbi of the Jewish community in Leipzig, and Marianne Menzzer as a supporter of the free churches[129].

It might be worthwhile to ask when, in which constellations and contexts and in which media these women expressed their

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[121]L. Otto: Wort, p. 1056.

[122]L. Otto: Wort, p. 1057.

[123]In the article, she called for the emancipation of the Jews (cf. Otto, 1848, p. 61).

[124]These included Robert Blum, Emil Adolph Roßmäßler, Franz Wigard, and Auguste Scheibe.

[125]Among other things, she used the parable of "Martha and Mary", Luke 10, 38–42; the staff of the "Frauen-Zeitung" were supposed to see themselves as successors of that noble Virgin from Bethany, according to the wish of Louise Otto (cf. Otto, 1849a).

[126]Cf. S. Wollgast: Louise Otto-Peters, p. 57.

[127]Cf. L. Hölscher: Religiosität, p. 210.

[128]Cf. U. Baumann: Protestantismus, pp. 56–66.

[129]Cf. regarding the biography of Auguste Schmidt (Ludwig et al., 2003); on Marianne Menzzer (Stolze, 2005); as well as Scholz (2008); on Henriette Goldschmidt (Kemp and Kemp, 2012).

specific religious convictions. An initial, though fleeting look at the "Neue Bahnen," the ADF's fortnightly joint association newspaper, reveals that it relatively rarely contains religious convictions that were formulated as guiding principles. There are contributions on the importance of Martin Luther and the Reformation for the school education of girls, or short reports on women's activities in non-denominational communities. In the latter, the connections of religious and women's emancipation as established by Sylvia Paletschek—albeit for the "Vormärz" era—shine through[130]. The "Kulturkampf" (*cultural struggle*) also finds little expression in "Neue Bahnen." What expression does exist, is, however, approving in its rejection of the papacy and the Jesuits. Likewise, reports on "agitation against Jews" or Jewish emancipation are marginal.

According to my thesis, religious tolerance and an overarching interdenominational or interreligious consensus that religion was a private matter prevailed in the ADF as shaped by Louise Otto-Peters. This included referring publicly to one's own religious convictions without offending those of other faiths, as Iris Schröder has already established in the case of the ADF of the 1870s[131]. However, activities relating to women's emancipation were clearly at the heart of the association's magazine. Women of different religious, political and social orientations created the ADF as a space for discussing and implementing their own, principally identical interests, because their legal position was principally identical. The ADF provided them with a common umbrella organization for action toward women's emancipation that did not exist in any other context of life for the women involved. This was to change at the end of the nineteenth century, when the churches opened up to discussing certain "women's issues," and the denominational women's movement came into being.

In the foreword to her 1873 book "Weihe des Lebens" (*Consecration of life*), Louise Otto-Peters stated that she lived in the "trinity of work, endeavor and enthusiasm." But, for her, "in looking up to God and being steeped in the human task," lay the glory of life. In more detail, she says:

> *"But if you ask me: how and by what means did I keep myself free from destruction and despair, even in the most difficult hours of my life? How did I manage never to tire of working, never to lose heart in my endeavors, never to feel the current of enthusiasm ebb—then I have only one answer: Because I knew that God was and is above me, that I, his child, spirit of his spirit, walk on this earth not only to enjoy its blessings, but to exert all my strengths, as much as possible, to help humankind towards perfection"* (Otto, 1873).

This is followed by commandments and prohibitions in the name of humanity, and chapters on God, reason, nature, humankind, the turn of the year and the guiding stars of life. In the chapter "Die Menschheit" (*Humankind*), she states that every human being carries their individual divinity above, inside and with them; for this reason alone it would be foolish to seek to impose the same faith on all human beings (Otto, 1873, p. 74). In her

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[130]Cf. S. Paletschek: Frauen.
[131]Cf. I. Schröder: Arbeiten.

view, love for humankind meant love for everyone in its ranks, all its strengths and works. "If we love humankind, we will love all human beings, without excepting a single one" (Otto, 1873, p. 77). However, as Louise Otto-Peters emphasized in the foreword that her book provided a free adaptation of didactic pieces by her favorite philosopher K. C. F. Krause, we can ask at this juncture: What is the source of her religious tolerance? Is it the Bible, Krausism, the discourse on fundamental rights of the Enlightenment, the practical cooperation—perceived as necessary—of all women in the ADF interested in emancipation, or is it, somehow, everything together?

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

If we take a look back at the questions inspiring this article, a first finding is that the feminist aspiration to equal rights for men and women was shared by the women gathering around Louise Otto-Peters in the ADF. Work played a key role in the implementation of their aspiration in three respects: Firstly, as gainful employment in order to have a basis for economic independence in the event of precarious widowhood, employment problems of the husband/father or of being unable or unwilling to marry. To be able to feed oneself—and possibly children, parents etc.—not to be dependent on alms and to be able to determine one's own life to some extent were the imagined goals here. Secondly, associated with work was the idea of the creative development of one's own talents and strengths, of self-realization in the service of humankind. This ought to be work that was useful for society. Self-development and focusing on the public good were inseparably linked here. The work could, but did not have to be paid work; it could also be done in one's own family, for example by bringing up children, or by volunteering, such as in a women's association. This position seems to me to have been widely accepted among the founders of the ADF, in which single, married and widowed women worked together. The areas of society that this self-development in the service of humankind was supposed to take place in depended strongly on the specific understanding of femininity, but also on the political and religious convictions of the individual woman—with Louise Otto-Peters there were no prescribed limits.

Thirdly, work could also be understood as an all-encompassing entitlement of every individual to self-realization and participation in social development toward a better world. It was possible to prove that Louise Otto-Peters had such a comprehensive vision of emancipation, one that was supposed to span class and gender, but was also open in terms of national and religious affiliation. Whether her fellow campaigners shared this vision, or whether there was even a second woman in Germany in 1876 with such a liberal and democratic vision of the future, I am unable to say at present. It also remains an open question whether Louise Otto-Peters developed any ideas about how such a future would have to be shaped socio-economically in terms of ownership structures in order to be able to function, or whether she left it at the stage of an ideal draft plan.

This already says something about how the new relationship between the sexes and the new society were envisaged. The

new society needed to differ from the old in varying degrees, depending on whether the primary goals were equal access to employment, fulfillment in professional life and economic independence of women, whether the possible participation of women in all areas of social life was imagined, or whether the free, self-determined participation of all human beings in the service of humanity was conceived of. In any event, society had to change. The first step toward the equal participation of all women in professional life was to achieve the opening up of areas that were previously barred to women, such as the academic professions. This required a fundamental reform of the girls' school system, so that girls could acquire the entrance requirement for studying, the "Abitur." The same applied to all areas of employment that were hitherto barely accessible to girls and women. However, free access to employment for women also meant the removal of private-law barriers, such as the removal of the tutelage of husbands and fathers over women who were not yet of age. Free development of one's own talents in all areas of private and social life, however, required changes in the entire legal system—not only in education and employment, but also in marriage and family law, and in civic rights. Admittedly, legal equality did not yet mean actual equality; also required was a fundamental change in socialization, customs, traditions and habits in the daily coexistence of the sexes. Comprehensive participation of all human beings in the progress of humankind meant corresponding changes in legal systems and habits for the members of all social classes and strata, ethnic groups, religions, age groups etc.

Regardless of how far emancipation was intended to go, there was agreement on the path of peaceful reform toward Utopia. Starting with oneself and with the mutual help and support of women, the existing society was expected to begin to change. In this process, Louise Otto-Peters and her fellow campaigners understood the civic association to be the decisive organizational means. This also applied to women if, as a disadvantaged social group, they were to become active beyond their own, more or less narrowly drawn personal framework, and if they were not only to introduce their own concerns into the public discussion, but also to ensure these were put into practice. The ADF differed from all other associations in its aspiration to be a women's organization based on solidarity across all classes. The organizational principle of self-help had great consequences for personal development, because the participants acquired self-confidence, assertiveness and, in certain cases, leadership qualities through independently forming opinions and through independent action. This already represented a slice of alternative life in the here and now: They created a specific female association culture that fostered solidarity and friendships between women. This strengthened those prospective forms of life in which individual initiative, sisterhood and solidarity among women played a role.

All in all, an extraordinarily strong influence exerted by the "middle-class system of values" on Louise Otto-Peters and her fellow campaigners becomes apparent. What they devised was an inner-worldly program of how to lead one's life and create meaning, a secular plan for the future. It revolved around middle-class "ultimate" values, such as work, education, independence, self-help and progress, as they were imagined for male ways

of life[132]. In the belief in their usefulness for the development and permanent self-improvement of one's personality, the self, in accordance with the progress of humankind, they were truly super-elevated and made sacred (cf. Nipperdey, 1990). All of this was also, to take up an expression of Louise Otto-Peters, something she "believed and recognized herself"[133]. There was, however, one important difference: She saw the guiding stars of middle-class life as instruments in the readjustment of the female life plan. In this respect, her visions represented an alternative middle-class concept of gender and society in competition with dominant middle-class ideas. In it, the equal participation of women was the fundamentally different approach, not contained in the original concepts of almost all master thinkers.

However, the formative influence of the "middle-class system of ideas" on the founders of the ADF also becomes apparent inasmuch as they assumed the dissimilarity of men and women. With their notions of femininity, they tapped into the prevailing gender discourse of difference. In contrast to this discourse, though, they were convinced that the sexes, despite their differently imagined psychological constitution and the resulting different abilities, were of equal value. Depending on how important they as individuals estimated so-called natural psychological differences of the sexes to be, their deliberations differed as to whether there were areas for which women would be more suitable than for others. Some deduced certain specific female character traits from the biological ability to be a mother. In the context of the concept of "organized motherliness," they considered areas of education, nursing and caring to be particularly suitable, and argued for corresponding professions and voluntary posts to be opened up to women. This is what Henriette Goldschmidt stands for. By contrast, the "eternal feminine," introduced by Louise Otto-Peters, in its significance for all areas of human existence meant no restrictions for women, corresponding as it did with her comprehensive vision of emancipation. Whether, alongside it, there were also positions in the emerging women's movement—inside or outside the ADF— that did not associate biological difference with psychological difference, but assumed fundamental psychological equality, remains to be investigated further. I have not yet been able to identify them among the persons I am aware of[134]. Ultimately, these always were (and are?!) beliefs, and therefore gender can be imagined as constructed unavailability or as a transcendent resource[135] to legitimize the desired gender order.

The founders of the ADF used different lines of argumentation and interpretations to promote the all-unifying idea of equal rights for men and women. Characteristic of Louise Otto-Peters is that she was an extraordinarily well-read personality with a wide range of interests, who had acquired a considerable amount

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[132]Hettling and Hoffmann (2000). Cf. in particular, the introduction by the editors and the essays by Hettling (2000, p. 15) and Kessel (2000, p. 141).

[133]Cf. S. Wollgast: Louise Otto-Peters, p. 45.

[134]Herrad-Ulrike Bussemer considers such egalitarian positions as being dominant in the ADF before 1870, and after that, the concept of "spiritual motherliness." It is unclear to me who is to be regarded as the representative of the first position. Cf. H.-U. Bussemer: Frauenbewegung.

[135]I am using terminology here that Nele Schneidereit has introduced into the discussion (see also Scherer, 2013).

of expertise autodidactically. She developed a high degree of critical reflexivity and assessed socio-economic, religious, political and other developments in a clear-sighted manner.

In the lines of argumentation traced here, her examination of the serious technical and socio- economic changes in their effects on family life has been made clear, as has her examination of the so-called natural female gender characteristics, her examination of the human rights discourse of the Enlightenment, and of the religious reform or renewal movement of German Catholicism.

Regarding her essay "Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb," it is possible to identify the interweaving of different lines of argumentation; different interpretations thus had an intensifying effect, so to speak, toward a certain goal. Again and again, the arguments included complementing philosophical and religious interpretations, with some of them being interchangeable. For Louise Otto-Peters, science and religion, knowledge and faith were not strictly separate areas. She regarded the things she believed and the things she knew to be of equal significance; secular and religiously transcendent interpretations could thus be linked. Transcendence of nature became apparent where it tied into natural law and the idea of natural equality and equal human dignity of all human beings. Religious transcendence took place where God created man and woman in different but equal ways. In Louise Otto-Peters, philosophical—i.e., scientific— and religious interpretations met in the assumption that God had given men and women their natural disposition. The spirit of the Enlightenment with its human rights discourse was, in this respect, an advance into the core of Christianity beyond ecclesiastical dogmas, since coming closer to God meant recognition of God.

In addition to those traced here, further lines of argumentation deserve consideration, such as those having recourse to history with regard to personalities, events and developments of significance to women's emancipation, or those referring back to literature, music and art, to developments abroad as well as to modern science and new expert opinions on the nature of the sexes[136]. It is therefore difficult to find an answer as to whether religious interpretations played a special role in legitimizing or transcending Louise Otto-Peters' thinking on the emancipation of women. Against the backdrop of great social change, I would term it a lifelong search for a personal religious worldview in which her specific world of experience as a woman was individually and unmistakably linked to the reception of political, religious, social and other trends prevailing at the time[137]. In this world of ideas, composed of belief and knowledge, only those aspects endured that gave her stability and strength in her striving for a "dignified existence for all, including for women." It was in this striving that she saw her destiny.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

[136]Cf. here, such lines of argumentation and interpretations in the struggle for the opening of universities and the introduction of studying for women in Schötz, Susanne: Gehirn.

[137]She had this in common with many other members of the educated classes of the nineteenth century. Cf. L. Hölscher: Religiosität, p. 194.

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Expanding Understanding of Motherhood Penalty: How Gaps in Family Policies Contribute to Gaps in Old-Age Earnings in Russia

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This study identifies policy shortcomings in the structure of Russian family policies and old-age pension calculations and shows how gaps in coverage contribute to the motherhood penalty in Russia. I first show that shortages in access to affordable childcare contribute to mothers' involuntary labor market inactivity leading to loss in earnings. I then discuss how childcare breaks are treated in terms of pensionable experience and present simulation of pension outcomes to show the negative impact of long childcare breaks on mothers' pensions.

Keywords: inequality, family policy, Russia, motherhood penalty, gender

INTRODUCTION

Russian family policies, inherited from the communist past, extend maternity, parental leave coverage, and affordable childcare to families with children. Women continue to actively participate in labor force in modern Russia, despite the collapse of communist planned economy, that encouraged female labor participation by sharing childcare responsibilities (Pascall and Manning, 2000; Ogloblin, 2005; Razzu, 2016). Post-communist labor market experiences brought former non-market economies on par with the such socio-economic consequences as the gender wage gap (Waldfogel, 1997; Budig and England, 2001; Correll et al., 2007; Miller, 2011; England et al., 2016). Although studies report a general trend of closing the gender wage gaps (Waldfogel, 1998; Blau and Kahn, 2003, 2016), this trend does not universally describe the experiences of all employed women. Parenthood dampens mothers' positions compared to fathers or childless women who are making advances in closing the gender gap (England, 2005; Correll et al., 2007; Misra and Strader, 2013).

Mothers, unlike childless women, experience a persistent wage gap. Women provide most care for children, a collective good valued by societies (England and Folbre, 1999; Lewis and Giullari, 2005). Despite societal expectations of high-quality care, mothers pay a disproportionally high price, motherhood penalty, manifested in diminished income caused by occupational segregation, reduced employment, discrimination at hiring, and promotion connected to perceptions of incompetence and lack of commitment, and loss of tenure, skills, and other components of human capital during childcare breaks (Budig and England, 2001; Mandel and Semyonov, 2005; Correll et al., 2007; Budig et al., 2012; Boeckmann et al., 2015; Cools and Strøm, 2016; Javornik, 2016; Roosalu and Hofacker, 2016).

Public policy mechanisms can mitigate the negative effects of career breaks on mothers' wages (Budig et al., 2010; Fodor and Kispeter, 2014; Boeckmann et al., 2015; Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2017). While scholars have extensively focused on the levels of compensation, length, and eligibility requirements for maternity, and parental leave and childcare policies, less attention has been paid

to how these policies complement each other making the transition from one level of protection to another seamless. Using the relatively understudied case of the Russian Federation, I show that the gaps in coverage of the transition period from paid parental leave to state-provided childcare exacerbate the motherhood penalty in both the short-term and long-term. Public childcare in Russia is primarily provided by municipal childcare facilities regulated by federal and local laws that cover educational, sanitary, and nutritional aspects of care. In the short term, lack of childcare options for youngest children push women out of workforce because there is an 18 month gap in family policy coverage between the expiry of paid parental leave and onset of state-provided childcare guarantee.

In the long term, lack of childcare for the youngest children prolongs childcare breaks from employment leading to lower social insurance retirement income. Currently the application of pension credits for parenthood fail to mitigate the motherhood penalty on old-age earnings. This finding contributes to the existing scholarship by stressing the connection between the design of family policies and mothers' old-age earnings. To quantify this relationship, I report results of pension benefits simulation for women with and without children to show that motherhood has a long-term effect on future pensions. The use of the novel simulation methodology allows the assessment of the existing policy effects on mothers' earnings. The simulation is validated by testing its results on a representative sample of Russian mothers who reported taking parental leaves. The paper contributes to the extant research by presenting a framework that expands the institutional discourse to highlight its implications for the old-age income. I show that family policies can have long-lasting effects that amplify gender inequalities in the old age.

THEORETICAL SETTING

Gender Wage Discrimination

This study investigates the effects of family policies on mothers' earnings and seeks to disentangle how the continuity of family policies affect mothers' wage-earning ability and eligibility for old-age pensions. The paragraphs below review the current academic discussion on gender wage discrimination in the short and long-term and discuss whether the existing debate applies to the post-communist context. Wage discrimination has been identified as a most profound tangible manifestation of motherhood penalty (Budig and England, 2001; Miller, 2011; England et al., 2016). Mothers with smallest children experience the largest motherhood penalty (Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003). Motherhood wage penalty may stem from discrimination based on perceptions of incompetence or lack of commitment. Correll et al. (2007) find that mothers in the US are expected to poorly perform due to lack of focus and commitment, thus are scrutinized more heavily leading to such quantifiable losses as offers of lower starting salaries. Benard and Correll (2010) show that competent professional mothers are discriminated in performance evaluations by being viewed as less warm and less likable. Glass and Fodor (2011) report that employers in Hungary channel mothers into lower-paid positions because of perceived lack of devotion to the job.

Hungarian employers, especially in higher-paid business and finance sectors, screen out mothers during the hiring process and deny return to workplace after parental leave despite legal protections (Glass and Fodor, 2011, 2018). Other studies show that motherhood contributes to productivity penalty leading to stymied professional advancement and career growth (Wolfinger et al., 2008; Krapf et al., 2017). Hook and Pettit (2016) find that highly-educated women are less likely to become mothers or to have more than one child to avoid gender wage segregation and meager career advancement.

Career breaks due to childrearing exacerbate motherhood wage penalty in the short-term (Albrecht et al., 1999; Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003). Employment patterns of mothers differ from men and childless women. Mothers take career breaks to provide care while men do not, except for mandatory paternity leave breaks such as one instituted in Sweden. Budig and England (2001) report a 7% motherhood wage penalty per child, of which about one-third is caused by childcare-related breaks. Miller (2011) estimates that for each year of postponement of motherhood, women's earnings can increase by 9%. Erosa et al. (2016) find that women suffer a gap in human capital accumulation because of having children, which translates in a 40% increase in gender wage gap for women between ages of 20 and 40 when return on human capital is high. Budig et al. (2016) estimate that mothers lose about 15% of their annual earnings per child.

In the long term, old-age inequality is a result of penalties that accumulate over women's life (Meyer and Herd, 2007; Kahn et al., 2014). Gender pension gaps form when women are engaged in low-paid employment, part-time employment, or take breaks from employment (Ginn and Arber, 1993; Meyer and Bridgen, 2008; Leitner, 2011; D'Addio, 2013; Grady, 2015; Rutledge et al., 2017). Women's pensions are connected to lower lifetime earnings due to occupational segregation into lower-earnings' sectors, discrimination at hiring or promotion of women, and lower pensionable experience due to career breaks associated with parenthood responsibilities (Ginn and Arber, 1993; Hakim, 2005; Meyer and Bridgen, 2008; Meyer et al., 2013; Hagewisch and Hartmann, 2014; OECD, 2015; Hook and Pettit, 2016; Herd et al., 2018).

Motherhood Penalty: Institutional Approach

A large body of research connects motherhood wage penalty to institutions of the welfare state. Welfare states provide healthcare, childcare and education, public pensions, taxes and tax credits, parental leave, disability, unemployment, and other well-being benefits. Welfare state institutions differ in the ways they conceptualize eligibility in connection to labor market participation, financing sources, and breadth of coverage based on need (Esping-Andersen, 1990). These differences shape societal outcomes such as class relations, income inequality, access to social insurance, and shape gender inequality structures.

Gender scholars have expanded the welfare state regime literature by arguing that the original classification is based on a male breadwinner experience and needs while ignoring the

experiences of women in the contemporary workforce (Orloff, 1993, 2009; Lewis, 1997; Lewis et al., 2008; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Saxonberg, 2013; Hobson, 2018). The gender approach to the welfare state centers on whether the state balances, supports, or ignores the needs of women in performing the caregiving function (Fraser, 1994; Korpi, 2000; Gornick and Meyers, 2003, 2008). Attention is drawn to the design of the welfare state policies such as maternity and parental leave as well as childcare policies that accommodate the variety of paths taken by modern mothers. On the one side of the spectrum, there are the conservative welfare states that focus on caregiving by maintaining long paid leaves, family allowances, supporting flexible working hours, and part-time work. This approach reinforces traditional gender roles of a male breadwinner and woman caregiver that is connected to greater chances of old-age poverty (Misra et al., 2007b). The opposite side of the spectrum are the dual earner-career approach, often exemplified by the Scandinavian welfare state model. It not only supports mother's labor force attachment through generous family policies but also challenge traditional gender roles through policies that encourage or mandate shared caregiving by both parents. The liberal welfare state prioritizes women's labor force participation and market-based delivery of care services. Thus, welfare state regimes foster different patterns of family policy institutions, that have become an important determinant of women's experiences on the labor market (Korpi, 2000). The emphasis on elements of family policies as an explanatory factor of contemporary mothers' work-family relations is referred to an institutional approach to explaining gender equality, as opposed to the cultural-normative aspect of gender roles within family and at a work place (Boeckmann et al., 2015).

Design of family policies can shape women's employment by either contributing to larger wage penalty or reducing it by facilitating labor market attachment (Pettit and Hook, 2005, 2009; Misra et al., 2007a, 2011; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011). Paid maternity leave, parental leave, and childcare support the attachment to labor market participation and thus help increase earnings, protect mothers from forced exit from the labor force, aid in maintaining mothers' work-life balance, and increase overall tenure, which helps reduce wage penalties (Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; Lewis and Campbell, 2007; Misra et al., 2007a; Gornick and Meyers, 2008; Hegewisch and Gornick, 2011; Misra and Strader, 2013). Maternity leave is designed for caring of a newborn and commences at childbirth or, in some countries like Russia, a few weeks before childbirth. Maternity leave compensation is distinct in many countries by high levels of wage replacement. Parental leave starts after the expiry of maternity leave. Compared to maternity leave, it lasts longer than maternity leave but is compensated at lower rates or may feature an uncompensated term. Public childcare includes a range of services from government-run care centers to government-subsidized or government-regulated care centers. High-quality available and affordable childcare institutions facilitate full-time employment at affordable rates (Gornick and Meyers, 2003).

Empirical evidence finds that maternity leave reduces gender inequality and contributes to mothers' attachment to labor force. A comparative study of ten European countries found that one

week of paid maternity leave reduces wage penalty by 5.3% (Hallden et al., 2016, p. 12). Budig et al. (2016) find that paid maternity leave lasting for 25 weeks reduces motherhood penalty per child by 6%. However, the relationship between parental leave and gender equality is not straightforward. While paid parental leave in general is considered beneficial for mothers, specific gains depend on the length of parental leave. Short paid parental leave lasting no more than 1 year is found to aid mother's labor force attachment (Boeckmann et al., 2015; Javornik, 2016). Budig et al. (2016) find that moderately-timed well-paid parental leave of up to 2 years lowers motherhood penalty, but the relationship between parental leave and motherhood penalty is curvilinear. Misra et al. (2011) find that moderate-length paid leave reduces chances of maternal poverty. The effects of long parental leaves, exceeding 2 years in length, are less straightforward. Motherhood penalty increases when parental leave approaches 3 years due to employer discrimination or loss of human capital (Misra et al., 2007a, p. 819; Pettit and Hook, 2009; Boeckmann et al., 2015, p. 18; Budig et al., 2016). Cukrowska-Torzewska (2017) finds that long parental leave reduces maternal employment in countries with low childcare coverage, an outcome especially prevalent in the post-communist CEE countries. Fodor and Kispeter (2014) show that long or poorly-paid parental leave promotes maternal caregiving and leads to labor force detachment as well as increases chances of maternal poverty. Rules of parental leave uptake introduce another dimension to the impact of leave policy (Leitner, 2003; Ciccia and Verloo, 2012; Javornik, 2014, 2016). States, such as Sweden, allow for sharing of care responsibilities by extending and encouraging parental leave to both parents. This can help alleviate the negative career impact of childcare on women (Javornik, 2014). This leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: long parental leave should increase motherhood penalty.

Childcare policies, especially for children under 3 years old, reduce motherhood penalty (Ronsen and Sundström, 2002; Pettit and Hook, 2005, 2009; Misra and Strader, 2013; Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2017). Care for children bears vital gendered implications. Welfare state's institutions can aid mothers with caring functions by funding or subsidizing high-quality affordable childcare, including nurseries and preschools. Availability and affordability of childcare facilities has far-reaching consequences for work-life balance, earnings history, and broader gender equality. Boeckmann et al. (2015) show that childcare diminishes gaps in mothers' employment, but motherhood penalty can reach 18% in countries that do not provide access to affordable full-time quality childcare. Borisov (2017) connects childcare breaks to shorter employment history for Russian women when compared to men. Each year of employment adds 1.6% to earnings of Russian women with university degree, thus childcare breaks lead to quantifiably lower earnings and shorter length of overall employment. Misra et al. (2007b) find that availability of childcare decreases the likelihood of female poverty with stronger effect than family benefits. Hallden et al. (2016) find that childcare mitigates possible motherhood penalty by 1.6% for each percent increase in

childcare enrollment. Harkness and Waldfogel (2003) and Lewis (2009) stress the importance of quality full-time childcare for children younger than 3 years old, arguing that childcare for the youngest children is the scarcest and but vital for mothers' labor force attachment. Karabchuk and Nagernyak (2013) find that the likelihood of return to work for Russian mothers is significantly reduced if they care for children under 3 years old. Where childcare is only available part time, women are unable to return to full-time work, thus are channeled to low-paid part-time employment (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

Hypothesis 2: Low childcare enrollment rates for children aged 1.5–3 years old should correspond to higher motherhood penalty.

Gendered policy implications are evident in the effects of pension designs. Career interruptions disadvantage mothers, especially in systems where pension outcomes are connected to contributions (Leitner, 2001; Ginn and MacIntyre, 2013; Grady, 2015). D'Addio (2013) finds that women, who interrupt their careers for child-rearing, suffer a 10% reduction in pension replacement rates after a 5-year break, 22% reduction after a 10-year break, and 33% reduction after a 15-year career break. Ginn (2003) occupational pensions due to occupational segregation and care responsibilities. Finch (2014) argues that in the UK mothers extend their work years beyond the retirement age to make up for lost income.

In countries with social insurance pension schemes, old-age benefits are calculated based on the number of years in labor force. Childrearing can dampen future pension benefits if caring for children lead to labor market inactivity (Grady, 2015; Borisov, 2017). Countries that guarantee public pensions can mitigate the negative effects of career breaks for childcare using policy mechanisms, such as inclusion of care periods as pensionable experience (Ginn, 2004; Vlachantoni, 2011). Pension credits represent a form of compensation for socially significant activities such as childrearing (Leitner, 2001; Herd, 2005; Vlachantoni, 2011; Herd et al., 2018). In general, pension credits for periods of inactivity, including childcaring, have been found to have a positive effect on future pensions (Ginn and MacIntyre, 2013; OECD, 2015). D'Addio (2013) finds that child-care pension credits reduce the motherhood penalty by 3 to 7%, depending on the pension scheme and the length of career breaks. Scholars, however caution against overestimating the value of compensating mothers with either means-tested mechanisms or pension credits for care functions without addressing the underlying focus on defining pensions based on male-centered full-time uninterrupted work history (Leitner, 2001; Marier, 2007). The next hypothesis reflects the gendered implications of the pension design:

Hypothesis 3: Pension credits should decrease motherhood penalty in old age benefits by accounting for the lost income during childcare leaves.

The Russian Context

Much of the extant research focuses on the advanced Western democracies. This study covers a less-studied case of the Russian Federation. The Russian case provides valuable insights into the complex nature of motherhood penalty in a country with paid maternity and parental leave and public childcare, pension credits for childcare, and high female employment rates. Russian Federation inherited from a communist past a set of family policies including paid leave, childcare facilities, baby bonus programs, and family allowances (Rivkin-Fish, 2010; Avdeyeva, 2011; Chernova, 2012; Sinyavskaya, 2016). Currently, a Russian mother is entitled to a fully-paid 140-day maternity leave and a one-time baby-bonus payment of 16,350 rubles (US$266). Employed Russian mothers receive 100% wage replacement rates for the duration of maternity leave. Unemployed mothers are compensated based on the fixed rate indexed yearly (Sinyavskaya, 2016). The partially-paid parental leave commences immediately after maternity leave and lasts until the child is one-and-half years old. It is compensated at the levels of 40% of previous wage with the minimum payment set at 3,066 rubles (US$50) for the first child, and 6,131 rubles (US$100) for the second and more children. The maximum benefit for high-earning mothers is 23,089 rubles (US$426). As the child reaches 18 months, a mother can take what is widely considered an unpaid parental leave until the child is 3 years old. Additional parental leave is compensated in the form of a family allowance in the amount of 50 rubles (US$0.80), making this payment so negligible, that it is safe to refer to the extended parental leave as unpaid. Workplace guarantee is reserved for up to 3 years of parental leave. Mothers giving birth to a second or more child are entitled to the Maternity Capital Certificate, a one-time non-cash benefit that can be invested into mother's pension, child's education, or applied toward a mortgage payment for a dwelling (Avdeyeva, 2011; Sinyavskaya, 2016). Additional family benefits may be provided by regional and local administrations, but scope of support varies by location and are subject to budgetary constraints. For example, the government of Saint Petersburg pays additional family benefit per child for low income families disbursed to debit cards to be redeemed at specialized children's stores for the purchase of child-related goods like diapers, clothing, shoes, or formula. All Saint Petersburg families receive a one-time baby bonus payment at birth of a child.

In post transition years, the Russian Federation overhauled its old-age pension policies. After a botched attempt at a three-pillar pension scheme, in 2015 the government introduced a pension formula that structures the social insurance retirement based on earned pension coefficients (Eich et al., 2012). Recognition of life experiences during economically active years is an important part of the reformed pension scheme. The assignment of pension coefficients for childrearing is an attempt to increase its societal value, a part of the larger demographic strategy championed by President Putin. Initially, the idea of including the entire period spent caring for children, irrespective of the number of children, was introduced by the Vice-Premier for Social Policy Olga Golodets (RG, 2012). If implemented in full, this policy initiative had a chance to positively affect the problems of work-life balance in Russia by recognizing care work without placing term limits. However, fiscal conservatives in the government intervened by proposing thresholds on the duration of care work that could be considered pensionable experience. Maxim Topilin, then Head of the Labor Ministry, supported the idea that childcare work

should be recognized, but his Ministry's policy proposal limited the total compensated childcare period to the maximum of 4.5 years (Malykhin, 2013). The new pension law adopted the conservative policy proposed by the Labor Ministry in 2014. It instituted per-child limits of 1.5 years with a maximum ceiling that was extended to 6 years by 2015.

The Russian case presents an interesting dynamic between the structure of the family policies and old-age pensions given that Russia remains one of the last developed states with the lowest female retirement age, still at 55 years. The literature on post-communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) fits the region in the broader family policy context of developed democracies (Gal and Kligman, 2000; Glass and Fodor, 2007, 2011; Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008; Fodor and Kispeter, 2014; Javornik, 2014; Blum, 2016; Razzu, 2016; Roosalu and Hofacker, 2016; Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2017; Fodor and Glass, 2018). In the past, socialist governments pursued full employment of mothers by funding paid maternity and parental leave, government-subsidized childcare and subsidies for families with children (Rudd, 2000; Haney, 2002; Cook, 2007; Rivkin-Fish, 2010). High female employment was driven by shortage of labor in closed planned economies and declining fertility, thus states shared the caregiving burden with women as a part of the socialist social contract (Einhorn, 1993; Pascall and Manning, 2000, p. 248; Fodor et al., 2002; Haney, 2002; Szikra and Tomka, 2009). In Russia, the transition to market economy shifted the policy accents on care obligations. The state no longer aimed to share childcare obligations in pursuit of full employment. Childcare delivery, care options, and responsibility was shifted to parents, overwhelmingly women, who nonetheless continued to work at high rates. The communist social contract was replaced with a new one centered on an autonomous family which makes own life decisions including employment and childcare. The primacy of market mechanisms in defining policy needs and services introduced a greater variety of care options but emphasized the parental autonomy over caregiving choices (Chernova, 2013).

Post-socialist transition set CEE countries on divergent paths (Fodor and Glass, 2018). Privatization, free-market demands, and shrinking public and service sector jobs channeled women out of labor market (Razzu, 2016). The end to the near-full compulsory employment patterns of the past contributed to the widening of gender wage gap and spiking female poverty (Kligman, 1994; Fodor, 2002; Fodor and Horn, 2015). The change manifested in acute problems with reconciling work and care, high unemployment and job insecurity, along with the devaluation of mothering and care. Saxonberg and Sirovátka (2006) describe the profound push in re-introducing traditional gender roles, or "re-familialization," manifested in repudiation of practices associated with the communist rule, specifically the dual-earner family structure, and the renewed emphasis on cultural and religious views on family roles practiced before the Soviet rule took over (Fodor et al., 2002; Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008; Inglot et al., 2012). Russia, along with the rest of the CEE countries underwent transformation from the dual-earner near-full employment socialist heritage to employment driven by demands of market economy (Pascall and Manning, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Cerami, 2006; Pascall and Kwak, 2009). In Russia, soaring

unemployment was compounded by the disruption of childcare provision when enterprises were no longer obligated by the state to provide social welfare services to its workers.

Extant research estimates that the wage gap due to motherhood in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe differs by country (Razzu, 2016). In Russia, gender wage gap persists around one-third of a man's salary (Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000; Kalugina et al., 2009). Newell and Reilly (1996) report that in 1990–1995 the gender wage gap in Russia was about 30%, attributing the gap to gender differences. Ogloblin (2005) calculates that a long-run gender wage gap in Russia is close to 31%. Atencio and Posadas (2015) report that the adjusted gap in hourly wages has fluctuated around 28% since 1994. Labor market structure adds to the persistence of the Russian gender wage gap, with greater gender wage gap reported in male-dominated occupations (Glinskaya and Mroz, 2000). Klimova (2012) finds significant female occupation segregation leading to over-representation of Russian women in low-skilled low-paying jobs. Gerry et al. (2004) find that while the wage gap remains stable after an initial post-soviet collapse increase, it disproportionately targets low-income female workers.

In sum, this paper expands on the institutional approach to explaining causes and mitigating effects of motherhood penalty in the context of the post-socialist family policy setting (Blum, 2016). The literature belabors the impact of various configurations of separate leave policies on maternal employment and the size of motherhood penalty. I draw attention to the importance of a seamless transition from paid parental leave to high-quality affordable childcare and connect the gaps in childcare coverage to motherhood penalty in wages and pensions.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

To illustrate the impact of motherhood on earnings, I first discuss the scope of family policy coverage in Russia, focusing on the limits of state-run childcare coverage. I present enrollment data to show that childcare is primarily provided by public institutions, detail shortage of available slots, and use female employment data to elaborate on the support the hypothesized connection between long parental leaves, lack of childcare, and motherhood penalty in earnings. The results are based on the data and author's calculations derived from the yearly statistics and published survey data (Savinskaya, 2011; Rosstat, 2017a).

What follows is the discussion of pension outcomes for Russian women who took childcare breaks from employment. First, I simulate pension outcomes for an average Russian mother factoring in a variation of common childcare leave periods using a web-based pension calculation tool, and second, I test the simulation's outcomes on the sample of Russian mothers. This approach is a form of a static simulation usually employed to estimate the impact of public policy on citizens (Mitton et al., 2000).

The Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFRF) makes available a *pension calculator,* an interactive tool that helps the Russian citizens to estimate the future social insurance

pension benefits. The calculator factors in work history, including childcare breaks, and earnings. Currently, social insurance pensions are comprised of the fixed-rate base benefit, established, and indexed by the government, and insurance pension, determined by the number of pension coefficients as expressed in monetary terms (**Figure 1**). Pension coefficients are accrued yearly if an employed individual makes social insurance contributions of 16% of her wage. Monetary value of individual contributions is divided by the pre-determined maximum social insurance payment to find the total yearly number of accrued pension coefficients. The maximum number of coefficients that can be accumulated in 2017 was 8.26. The value of pension coefficients is indexed yearly by the government. Thus, social insurance pension benefits are largely a function of length of employment and wages.

For the simulation, I calculate future pensions for hypothetical scenarios of earning histories for women with children, holding age, and wages constant while allowing for education, care breaks, and number of children to vary. Childless women serve as a base reference point that is compared against pension outcomes of mothers with one, two, or three children who take parental leave of 18, 28, or 36 months. For women without a university degree the overall employment history without career breaks is set at 37 and 33 years for women with a university degree. Female retirement is 55 years. Levels of education are modeled via salary values and length of employment. To focus on the effects of motherhood on pension outcomes, I set the assumptions of no other career breaks in women's employment history, except for childcare. Wage value for college-educated women adopted at 42,000 rubles (US$685), corresponding to an average wage of a public-sector employee. Wages for women without a college degree is adopted at 28,000 rubles (US$457), an average salary of a retail cashier (Rosstat, 2017b). The ratio of salaries based on education assumes a premium on college education of 33%, a premium that fits the reported range between 30.4 and 42.8% depending on occupation (Belokonnaya et al., 2007). The Pension Calculator sets all other intervening variables such as workplace discrimination, lack of opportunities, or income inequality at constant. These factors undoubtedly affect women's labor market experienced when women are discriminated at hiring, retention, and promotion. However, the purpose of this simulation is to model the effects of labor market inactivity that is not covered as a pensionable experience. Detailed data sources are discussed in the **Data Appendix**.

To test the simulation's assumptions, I predict pension outcomes for a subset of mothers based on the representative Russian household survey data of 60,000 households (Rosstat, 2017a). The survey contains responses from mothers who completed parental leave in 2016 ($N = 719$). These data do not include wage information but provide average family income that includes all family earnings. To separate mothers' salaries from men's, I limit the inquiry to a subsample of single mothers with children ($N = 145$). To calculate the penalty in pension benefits related to childcare breaks, I estimate the total length of employment based on age, reported actual past work history, reported number of children and duration of parental leave assuming no other career interruptions until

the onset of retirement. Motherhood penalty is estimated as a ratio of earnings lost due to childcare career breaks as compared to single mothers in the subsample who took no childcare leave.

FINDINGS

Russian Childcare Provision: Gaps That Contribute to Motherhood Penalty

Despite comprehensive paid maternity and parental leave family policies, the abrupt ending of state support after 18 months produces a gap in coverage. There is no income replacement for the period of unpaid parental leave (ages 28 to 36 months) and the government-provided childcare obligation does not onset until the age of 36 months. Childcare facilities for younger children exist, but attendance rates are low due to severe shortage of available slots. Thus, Russian mothers who are unable to secure childcare before or at the end of paid parental leave face the increased prospects of incurring motherhood penalty until the childcare coverage becomes available (Hypothesis 2). I support this argument by examining data on childcare enrollment, childcare availability, and motherhood employment.

The total number of state-run preschools has declined 2-fold between 1990 and 2012 despite the growing number of children, leading to shortage of available slots observed by the year 2010 (**Table 1**). In 2012, the government pledged to increase financing of existing childcare infrastructure and building new facilities to care for children ages three and older (Savitskaya, 2004; President of RF, 2012). Enrollment of older children returned to the pre-collapse level by 2014, while attendance of nurseries declined from 31% in 1990 to 18% in 2012 (**Figure 2**). In 2016, only 12.8% of Russian household survey respondents with youngest children indicated satisfied need for public childcare. At the same time, 49% of families stated they needed nursery care, but it was unavailable (Rosstat, 2017a). The emphasis on the age of three as a coverage threshold cemented the gap in family policy coverage, leaving the needs of younger children unmet.

The end of paid parental leave is a pivotal point in mother's life course. Russian scholars define three patterns of return to work for mothers with small children: first, at expiry of paid maternity leave, second, at the end of paid parental leave, and, third, at the end of unpaid parental leave. Savinskaya (2011) reports that an equal share of Moscow mothers, 18% each, exercised the first two scenarios, while 30% remained on parental leave for 3 years. In 2016, mean duration of parental leave for women who re-entered workforce was 2.3 years, indicating that on average Russian mothers remain out of workforce 9.6 months longer than covered by paid parental leave (Rosstat, 2017a). The chief reason for the long gaps in employment of Russian mothers is the lack of accessible government childcare.

Despite impediments, Russian women continue to highly value work. Employment data show a 9% increase of labor market participation for women older than 35 when compared to 25 to 29 age group, the average age for the first childbirth (**Figure 3**). Women with preschool age children are 13% less active in the workforce than mothers of older

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Social Insurance Pension: Fixed-Rate Base Pension + Total Number of Coefficients*Pension Coefficient Value

FIGURE 1 | Russian social insurance pension formula.

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TABLE 1 | Government preschools in Russia 1990–2016.

Year	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Preschools, (thousands)	87.9	68.6	51.3	46.5	45.1	44.9	44.3	43.2	51.0*	50.1	49.4
Enrollment, (thousands)	9,009	5,584	4,263	4,530	5,388	5,661	5,983	6,347	6,814	7,160	7,343
Children per 100 slots	108	83	81	95	107	106	105	105	106	106	105

Source: Rosstat (2014; 2017c); *Including facilities not functioning or under renovation.

FIGURE 2 | Public childcare enrollment percentage in Russia*. Source, Rosstat and UNICEF; *UNICEF nursery data are available only through 2012.

children. Participation rates of mothers of older children outpace childless female employment rate (81%), indicating unwavering preference of Russian mothers to returning to paid employment.

Strategies for dealing with the shortage of accessible childcare vary. Those who have relatives nearby rely on unpaid care by other female family members. Although, in a departure from past practices, modern Russian grandmothers remain employed longer and are less available or unwilling to assume unpaid full-time care for grandchildren (Zdravomyslova, 2014). Private childcare facilities are unaffordable for most families. In Moscow, prices can reach up to 25 times higher than government preschools (Forbes.ru., 2012). Nation-wide, costs of private childcare exceed that of government-run preschools 6-fold (HSE, 2016). The share of children attending private facilities remain in the 1.2–2% range around the country (Rosstat, 2017c).

Engagement of private nanny services is reported by 4–6% of families (FOM, 2004; Savinskaya, 2011).

These data support the argument that the main source of childcare in Russia remains government-run preschools and childcare facilities. The lack of available government childcare and prohibitive cost of private facilities force women to remain unemployed, limiting their choice of life and career paths. Thus, the flaw in family policy coverage leaves women unsupported for the duration of unpaid parental leave, manifesting in motherhood penalty. As hypothesized, gaps in public childcare availability for children under 3 years old, hampers mothers' ability to return to work leading to penalty in earnings. The next section describes the way the state treats childcare breaks for calculation of pension benefits and connects childcare breaks to motherhood penalty in pension earnings.

FIGURE 3 | Labor force participation percentage in Russia by sex and age in 2016. Source: (Rosstat, 2017b).

Pension Earnings and Motherhood Penalty: Simulation Results

Under the Russian social insurance pension schema, pension coefficients assign values to various life experiences during the economically active years. Care for children older than 1.5 years of age receives no recognition in pension calculations. The distribution of pension coefficients benefits women who care for a second, third, and fourth children. One year spent caring for the first child yields 1.8 pension coefficients, but 1 year spent caring for the second child yields 3.6 coefficients, and 1 year spent caring for a third and fourth children yields 5.4 coefficients. Reportedly, one-third of Russian mothers care for their children for 3 years. Many women report that long parental leave breaks are forced because affordable government childcare is unavailable. The 2015 pension formula only covers half of this period in determining pension benefits. Thus, long career breaks impose motherhood penalty in pension benefits.

To illustrate the negative impact of career breaks on pension earnings, I first simulate pension outcomes in a typical scenario of a life course based on the pension formula spelled out in **Figure 1**. **Table 2** shows the difference in estimated pension benefits depending on the number of children, employment history, and length of parental leave. The calculations are performed for women born in the year 1979, who are active on labor market and are done having children. Choosing 1979 as the base year sets the woman's age to thirty-nine, the age at which most are done with childbearing. However, the formula calculation applies to all women with birth year 1967 and later.

Life scenarios 1–10 predict pension outcomes for a woman with a college degree. Scenarios 1 and 11 are the base scenario

for college-educated and non-college-educated childless women, respectively. Women without a college degree have a longer work history, due to starting employment 4 years prior to college graduates, but earn less over the course of their lives due to lower wages. Scenarios 2–4 and 12–14 calculate pension benefits for mothers who only withdraw from employment to uptake paid parental leave. Scenarios 5–7 and 15–17 present outcomes based on the reported average leave duration in Russia for the last available survey year (Rosstat, 2017a). Scenarios 8–10 and 18–20 show pension outcomes for women who take long unpaid parental leave. The simulation illustrates the comparative disadvantage in pension outcomes women face when taking childcare breaks, not the precise amount in rubles that a pensioner would collect.

Holding salary and age constant, I show that mothers incur a reduction in future pension benefits, as compared with benefits of childless women. The size of motherhood pension penalty, calculated as a ratio of mothers' pensions to pensions of childless women (base scenario), varies by length of a childcare break. Those mothers who manage to return to the workforce after the end of paid parental leave are at an advantage to those who take long unpaid parental leave. For example, compared to childless women with post-secondary education and the same earnings, educated mothers with one child incur a 4% penalty for taking paid parental leave, 5% penalty for additional 9.6 months of unpaid parental leave, and 6% penalty when staying on unpaid parental leave for 18 months until the child's third birthday. Pension penalty remains the same for college-educated mothers with two children taking paid parental leave only. Taking paid parental leave with three children leads to a 5% pension penalty.

TABLE 2 | Simulated pension outcomes for Russian women.

Scenario	Number of children	Years of parental leave	Years in workforce	Total pension coefficients	Pension value, rubles	Comparison to base pension, %	Motherhood pension penalty, %
PENSION OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN WITH COLLEGE EDUCATION							
1	0	0	33	189.00	19,656	100	0
2	1	1.5	31.5	181.06	19,048	96	4
3	2	3	30	180.70	19,004	96	4
4	3	4.5	28.5	177.30	18,737	95	5
5	1	2.3	30.7	177.50	18,755	95	5
6	2	4.6	28.4	168.50	18,045	92	8
7	3	9.2	26.1	161.90	17,526	89	11
8	1	3	30	175.00	18,556	94	6
9	2	6	27	163.44	17,648	90	10
10	3	9	24	154.28	16,929	86	14
PENSION OUTCOMES FOR WOMEN WITH SECONDARY EDUCATION							
11	0	0	37	141.95	15,959	100	0
12	1	1.5	35.5	137.00	15,571	98	2
13	2	3	34	138.51	15,689	98	2
14	3	4.5	32.5	158.12	15,723	99	1
15	1	2.3	34.7	134.00	15,334	96	4
16	2	4.6	32.4	129.40	14,971	94	6
17	3	9.2	30.1	127.15	14,797	94	6
18	1	3	34	133.11	15,265	96	4
19	2	6	31	127.00	14,785	93	7
20	3	9	28	123.60	14,517	91	9

Based on the 2017 rate of 78.58 rubles per pension coefficient and base social insurance pension of 4,805 rubles (PRF, 2017). Age at first birth is 25, age at second birth is 29.5, and age at third birth is 32 years old (Human Fertility Database). The age of labor force entry is assumed at 18 and 22 for secondary and college education respectively. Wages for college-educated are set at 42,000 rubles and for secondary-educated at 28,000 rubles. Base pensions are benefits calculated for women who do not interrupt employment for childrearing.

Overall, the simulation results validate Hypothesis 1 that long and unpaid parental leave has a greater impact on future pension benefits. The penalty grows substantially with second and third children. **Figure 4** plots pension penalties for college-educated mothers by length of parental leave. These data are the ratio of mother's pensions to the base pension of childless women; they can be found in the last column of **Table 2**. They indicate that even with pension credits, childcare breaks diminish mothers' pensions, but the number of children, employment history, and length of childcare breaks influence the total size of the pension gap. The difference in pension penalties by number of children is smaller for women with secondary education who have longer work history which off-set the career breaks. Higher earners with shorter careers incur a greater penalty for unpaid parental leave that expands with each child, as evident from the plot of penalty for college-educated mothers.

Pension penalty is the smallest for all mothers sticking to paid parental leave only, but non-college educated women with three children are expected to see their pension outcomes improved reflecting the higher coefficient value for the third child. This simulation suggests that the intended design of the pension formula to reward women with more than one child may have a positive impact only for a limited subset of mothers who take short paid leave, care for three children, and have

long employment histories (Scenarios 12–14). Pension penalty for mothers with secondary education halts its expansion for mothers of two children.

The results of the simulation in **Table 2** indicate that motherhood penalty on pensions is connected to childcare breaks and rises with the number of children and length of childcare breaks. I test these results using a subset of single mothers from the Russian Comprehensive Monitoring of Living Conditions (RCML) 2016 data (Rosstat, 2017a). RCML is an internationally-recognized reliable comprehensive representative survey of the Russian households that includes data on incomes, family structures, health, and well-being. RCML includes data on the number and ages of children in the household, length of parental leave uptake, and met and unmet need for childcare enrollment. The use of RCML data on actual parental leave uptake and childcare enrollment is used here to validate the simulation results, which are constructed based on the assumptions about predicted characteristics of Russian mothers. RCML data reveals that on average, single mothers took 2.2 years of parental leave. A part of the sample, 38% of mothers, have not interrupted their employment for parental leave. These results are not surprising given that in the absence of a second wage earner mothers seek to minimize breaks in employment. Of those who did take parental leave, 73% incurred unpaid leave ranging from 1 to 31 months on

FIGURE 4 | Pension penalty for childcare breaks for college-educated mothers, by number of children.

top of the paid 8-month leave. Ten women reported remaining on unpaid parental leave over 3 years. On average, women in this sample reported 13 years of schooling, indicating some combination of a secondary and vocational training. Average sample wages are 32,740 rubles (US$518).

The employment history of mothers who took parental leave is 27.8 years. It is on average 4.8 years shorter than employment history of mothers without career interruptions ($t = 6.2$; $p = 0.00$). The average overall motherhood penalty for this sample of single mothers who took unpaid parental leave is 6%. These statistics confirm that childcare breaks significantly reduce employment histories of Russian mothers, leading to lower pension earnings.

Figure 5 details average motherhood penalty by duration of parental leave and the number of children. These data confirm the simulation findings presented in **Table 2** in that they show that motherhood penalty grows with each child and differs by the duration of childcare breaks. The Mann-Whitney test indicate that there is a statistically-significant difference between motherhood penalty incurred during paid (average 0.64; S.D. 1.35) and unpaid (average 5.99; S.D. 3.33) parental leave ($t = -12.74$; $p = 0.00$). This evidence lends support to Hypothesis 1.

As the average education years reported in the sample are below what is expected for a college degree (at least 14), I compare these results to Scenarios 11–20 of the **Table 2**. Scenarios 12–13 predict that the motherhood penalty for paid parental leave should be 2% for each of the first two children. These results are supported by the microsimulation outcomes spelled out in **Figure 5**. The motherhood penalty dropped, however insignificantly, for the third child, somewhat contradicting Scenario 14 predictions, which expect a whole percentage point reduction in penalty. As expected, unpaid parental leave imposes

a motherhood penalty in pension benefits that grows with each additional child. Motherhood penalty on pensions incurred for unpaid parental leave for one child is 4.7%. It increases to 6.9% for the second child, reducing future pension by additional 2.2 percentage points. Motherhood penalty for unpaid leave for the third child is the greatest at 7.6%, reducing pension benefits by an additional 0.7 percentage points. This means that motherhood penalty on social insurance pension in Russia grows by 47% for the second child, and by 10% for the third child. These findings render mixed support for the Hypothesis 3, which postulates that pension credits for decrease motherhood penalty. Limited nature of pension credits that cover paid parental leave negate the potential egalitarian feature of this policy mechanism.

DISCUSSION

Women approach greater equality when they are less constrained in life choices be it employment, fertility, motherhood, or family status. Studies show that short paid leave policies and accessible childcare help mothers to reconcile caring duties with careers. Paid leave alleviates the negative impact of career breaks, while accessible childcare provides women choice of strategies and timing for combining motherhood and labor market activity (Lewis and Giullari, 2005; Gornick and Meyers, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Hobson, 2011; Cukrowska-Torzewska, 2017).

This paper contributes to the institutional literature, by arguing that, in addition to examining the levels of compensation and length of coverage, it is necessary to consider how individual policies complement each other creating continuous coverage to parents. I show that when the state provides paid parental leave and workplace guarantees but allows for gaps in coverage

FIGURE 5 | Pension penalty for childcare breaks for non-college-educated mothers, by number of children.

between paid leave expiry and guaranteed childcare provision, mothers incur motherhood penalty. The structure of Russian family policy creates a serious impediment to mothers wishing to return to gainful employment at the end of paid parental leave because the state-provided childcare is scarce but private childcare options are unaffordable.

This research contributes to the existing debate on motherhood penalty by providing contextual evidence for the argument that long and poorly-paid parental leave has a negative effect on maternal employment (Budig et al., 2012; Hallden et al., 2016). I qualify this argument by specifying that when long and essentially unpaid parental leave remains the only option of affordable care, it amplifies motherhood penalty. Thus, it is not only the structure of parental leave but its relationship to the lack of affordable childcare options that contribute to motherhood penalty.

Further, I show that the combined impact of unpaid parental leave and lack of childcare for the youngest children increase motherhood penalty in a complex way: it not only leads to career interruptions and loss in wages, but also affects pension benefits in the long-term. It is important to consider how family policy design impacts retirement income in a country with social insurance pension scheme. When the state limits pension benefits to periods of paid parental leave, mothers incur a long-term motherhood penalty in pensions due to labor market inactivity during unpaid parental leave. Lack of government childcare pushes Russian mothers into taking unpaid parental leave causing not only loss of wages but also pension benefits. I calculate, based on a subsample of single Russian mothers, that unpaid parental leave reduces pension benefits by 6% with variations based on the number of children.

The way the Russian pension policy is designed signals the strong preference by the state to encourage women to re-enter workforce after the end of paid parental leave of 18 months. If women are unable to combine care and work, they are penalized because additional parental leave is not included into the pensionable experience and thus reduces future pensions. Moreover, as my simulation shows and the analysis of survey data confirms, pension credits do not alleviate the pension penalty. Women taking paid parental leave still incur pension penalty.

This penalty applies not only to women who want to re-enter workforce but cannot secure childcare. It also affects women who wish to continue to care for their children at home and choose to not re-enter workforce. Through the design of pension formula, the state explicitly favors working mothers who re-enter workforce at the end of paid parental leave, limiting life and career choices. Experiences of all other mothers is neglected by not being included into pensionable experience.

An important shortcoming and long-term impact of Russian family policy is its potential contribution to female poverty. Poverty among women in old-age is a significant concern due to lower lifetime wages, career breaks, and female longevity. Pension credits for parental leave can mitigate future old-age female poverty. In Russia, however, the existing pension formula does not eliminate the gender gap in pension allocation. Women do not receive full credit for all years spent caring for their children. Women who have only one child are disadvantaged more than women who have two or three children. These pension credit rules decrease the overall value of future pensions, contributing to the heightened probability of old-age poverty among women. The low retirement age threshold compounds the severity of motherhood penalty in Russia. Russian retirement age remains

the lowest across Europe at 55 years for women, despite longer female life expectancy.

CONCLUSION

Despite the provision of paid parental leave and government-financed childcare, Russian family policy lacks a comprehensive approach to address the main drivers of motherhood penalty: gender gap due to career breaks for childrearing. This creates systematic disadvantages for Russian mothers who struggle to combine work and family obligations, especially when their children are of preschool age. Given that access to public childcare in Russia is neither guaranteed nor plentiful, mothers remain chief caregivers sans real choice.

To connect the gaps in family policy coverage to long-term effects of childcare breaks on mothers' retirement earnings, I simulated pension outcomes for hypothetical scenarios and tested the simulation results using survey data to show that mothers' pensions are reduced because of childcare breaks. The pension credits cover childcare breaks only partially and do not eliminate the penalty entirely. The loss of pension is incurred mainly during unpaid childcare leave. In effect, the state does not support the entire range of life choices for mothers by not committing to providing care to children under the age of three. These family policy limitations appear to negate the potential gains of paid maternity and moderately-timed paid parental leave on motherhood penalty in Russia and instead incur a greater motherhood penalty that extends into the old age.

This study has implications for further research. On the design of family policy in connection to motherhood penalty, this research calls for further systematic focus on the continuity of coverage by family policies and the connection of family policy design to pension benefits. Given that there is a clear connection between family policy and pension outcomes, what would be the best policy design that diminishes the long-term motherhood penalty? Russian female retirement age is one of the lowest in Europe. Should the Russian government increase the retirement age and would the increase in retirement age alone alleviate motherhood penalty on pension benefits?

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

This work was an original research completed by MK.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2019.00067/full#supplementary-material

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frontiers
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The Normalization of Conservative Gender Politics in Chile and the Role of Civil Society

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The article discusses two cases of gender policy making during the Chilean transition to democracy, the policy on domestic violence and the divorce law. By comparing the official discourses on these two policy projects we show that authoritarian gender regimes can resist transition to democracy despite a vivid civil society. The case of Chile was selected, on one hand, because it exhibits particularly resistant authoritarian institutional enclaves. On the other hand, Chilean women's movements are often cited as a paragon of women's movements in transitions. Despite the central role of Chilean women's movements as a strong civil society force conservative gender roles and institutions inherited from the autocratic regime (e.g., conservative divorce and reproductive rights) have remained dominant. I argue that during the time of transition conservative political actors, but also parts of civil society, negotiated on these gender roles and institutions and thereby reached a status quo. Recent cases of sexual violence in response to student's uprisings show that this status quo is quite stable and prevents a real coming to terms with state violence.

Keywords: transition to democracy, civil society, women's movement, authoritarian gender regime, domestic violence, divorce law

INTRODUCTION

In October 2019, the prices for metro tickets in the Chilean capital Santiago de Chile increased by 30 pesos. This led to hughe civil protests that are described to be the biggest uprising in the history of the country. The response of the government were massive police and military operations and the declaration of a state emergency. Five homicides, 92 cases of torture and 19 cases of sexual violence commited by state agents—this is the resume the Chilean National Human Rights Institute published regarding the protests (Tapia, 2019).

This resume stands in opposition to the country's model character among Latin American countries. The rule of law and economic performance are considered exemplary (Hillebrand, 2004). Chile is considered a consolidated democracy and an example of successful system transformation (Merkel, 2010). In this article we argue that this paradox picture can be explained by looking at the history of Chilean policy making in the field of gender politics and the role of the Chilean women's movements.

The Chilean women's movements are credited with an important role in this transition to democracy. They are considered as one of the few movements that were allowed to act politically during the military dictatorship and massively protested against human rights violations (Boris, 1998). After the end of the military dictatorship, some protagonists of the women's movement became members of the national women's secretariat, thus shaping the gender politics of the young

democracy. Considering the importance of women's movements, it is important to ask why Chile still has numerous disadvantages for women today: It ranks 17th on the Gender Inequality Index[1]. Only 16% of parlamentarians are female, and in 2017 the country was listed as having one of the strictest abortions bans worldwide (Die, 2017).

The case of Chile was selected, on one hand, because it exhibits particularly resistant authoritarian institutional enclaves. On the other hand, Chilean women's movements are often cited as a paragon of women's movements in transitions. In public opinion and scientific literature (Jaquette, 1994; Valenzuela, 1998; Franceschet and Macdonald, 2004), Chilean women's movements are regarded as playing a decisive role in resistance to the dictatorship. Despite the central role of Chilean women's movements as a strong civil society force—especially for gender politics—institutions—and gender images inherited from the autocratic regime (e.g., conservative divorce and reproductive rights) have remained dominant. I argue that in the time of transition there was a "normalization of hegemonic discourses of the authoritarian" (Graf et al., 2017) that stabilized conservative institutions and gender images. In this chapter, I examine the nature of these normalization processes, as well as the role played by civil society in this normalization. The theoretical basis of this chapter is the governmental perspective on gender relations, which assigns an important role to civil society in the stabilization of transition. We will focus on the predominant discourses in democratic opening and closing processes (Graf et al., 2017). This paper will not further deal with the recent cases of sexual violence in Chile. However, we consider the overall framework and the conclusions drawn from the historical cases as relevant in order to explain the recent gender politics.

METHODS

The study of Chilean women's movements is based on a literature review of the role of women's movements in transition and on a secondary analysis of speeches and interviews of movement members and members of the transition regime.

According to Bryman (2015) general search terms were defined (Chile, divorce, sexual violence, women's movement, transition). The search was exercised in Spanish and English on the EBSCO database, the library of the Berlin Ibero American Institute, the Latin American Scielo database, and the library of CEPAL. The literature was selected respective the time frame and the focus on parliamentary and institutional discourses.

From the literature two case studies on two concrete legislative processes, the Law on Domestic Violence and the regulations on marriage and divorce were built. I chose these policies because their analysis clearly demonstrates how the dictatorship's conservative family image was normalized in a democratic context. In a second step, I examine the role of women's movements in democratic transitions. For this purpose, the initial situation of women's movements at the end of the dictatorship is presented. On this basis, I analyze how the

women's movement became more and more divided after the end of the dictatorship and how this was accompanied by a normalization of authoritarian discourse. Finally, from the case of Chile, general observations on the normalization of conservative gender discourses in other political systems are drawn.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Gender relations play an important role in securing the stability of authoritarian regimes and in de-democratization. Numerous cases, such as the military dictatorship in Spain or the Peruvian gender policy under Fujimori, highlight the influence of autocratic regimes on gender relations. There are, however, large gaps in research on gender relations in autocracies and transitional regimes. The gender images and roles often found in informal institutions and power relations are neglected due to the common focus on the "deficits" of formal institutions. Studies in comparative analysis have emerged that systematically explore the role of gender relations in autocracies. In recent times, this strand of research has focused on the legitimacy of autocratic regimes (Gerschewski et al., 2013). In this approach, it is assumed that autocratic regimes not only accumulate output legitimacy, for example by means of political results and regime performance, but also generate input legitimacy.

In the following, approaches of citizenship, democratic-theoretical assumptions, processes of norm formation and the approach of gender regimes are used to gender relations in transition processes and to analyze mechanisms for the consolidation of authoritarian gender discourses.

Citizenship as Status and as Practice

When we talk about processes of democratization, the concept of citizenship usually has the role of pointing out the process of institutionalizing certain rights. However, this conceptualization does not take into account that citizens play an important role in this process. Kabeer (2012) based on Lister (1997) suggests operationalizing the struggle for gender justice as citizenship as practice on the one hand and citizenship as status on the other. With the category of status Kabeer analyzes "how the existing constitutional/legal arrangements in a society define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, including its gender dimensions". Practice means "the different ways in which members of a society seek to act and challenge these collective definitions" (Kabeer, 2012, p. 220). The advantage of this dichotomy it the possibility to look at the dissent between actors and the negotiation processes regarding the status of citizenship, i.e., women's rights. This opens a path to the democracy-theoretical debate on citizenship. The concept of citizenship has an ambivalent position in the political science debate. While pluralistic concepts regard the competition of organized interests as the core of democracy (Dahl, 1967), theoretical classics like Hobbes show a mistrust in the citizen (Schmidt, 2013). This ambivalence is also reflected in recent debates on organized civil society. Organized civil society automatically plays the role of the antipode to the autocrats, the role of the "school of democracy" (Graf et al., 2017, p. 73). Feminist research criticizes

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[1]However, it ranks better than Mexico (Rank 76), Brazil (Rank 94), and Argentine (Rank 81).

this perspective as it obscures internal social power processes, for instance between actors of individual movements or between movements and state institutions (Nüthen, 2019). On the one hand, the term "voluntary" seduces to put civil society actors automatically into connection with instruments of deliberation, beyond compulsion and repression. However, there are examples, such as the "Shining Path," a Peruvian guerrilla movement, which show that social movements exist even without internal democratic processes. On the other hand research on right-wing feminism in Germany (Wielens, 2019) show that social movements and also women's movements do not equated with struggles for democracy. It is therefore important to liberate the concept of citizenship as practice from the normative attitude and to look at the negotiation processes for citizenship as status, i. the concrete struggles for gender justice. How these negotiation processes are related to (de-) democratization processes?

In the following, we will illuminate democratic-theoretical assumptions as well as concepts of authoritarianism research in order to get a better look at the relationship between political regime and citizenship.

Concepts of Democratization

Democratic regimes achieve input legitimacy through democratic consent. It has long been assumed that among autocratic regimes only the electoral autocracies could access this source of input legitimacy, because they connect the population by means of pseudo-elections (Buzogány et al., 2016). As Hannah Arendt asserted, authoritarian regimes still have other sources of input legitimacy, with ideologies and identity policies playing central roles. Ideology "promises to explain all historical happenings, the total explanation of the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future" (Arendt, 1951/1966, p. 470). Recent reflections on the role of legitimacy in autocracies are taking up this perspective once again (for an overview see Kailitz and Wurster, 2017).

As Arendt pointed out in her remarks on totalitarian rule, totalitarian systems seek to destroy social pluralism: "Ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction" (Arendt, 1951/1966, p. 471). In terms of gender relations, this means that pluralist gender subject positions are replaced with uniform images. These images—embedded in ideologies and identity policies—are very influential (Wilde, 2012). I argue that this holds true for autocracies, too. Authoritarian regimes can use their gender policies to transport their ideologies and express their visions of family, social security, education, and gender roles (Woods and Frankenberger, 2016).

What is the relationship between the gender policies of autocracies and transitional regimes? Gender research so far has mainly analyzed the effects of gender on formal and informal institutions (Waylen, 2016). The research strand of historical institutionalism (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) assumes that both formal and informal institutions are not simply replaced but can be "deposited" in later regimes. During regime transitions, powerful actors negotiate which institutions of the authoritarian system will be "inherited" and the limits of civilian rule (Fuentes,

2000). Who are the actors of negotiation? Studies on women's movements in Latin America (Valenzuela, 1998; Franceschet and Macdonald, 2004), authoritarian Spain (Threlfall, 2013), and Eastern Europe (Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998) indicate that some women's movements exerted pressure on authoritarian regimes.

Literature on international norm creation and norm entrepreneurs suggests that organized civil society can contribute to political opening by pressuring the regime to implement international women's rights on a national level (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Rošul-Gaji, 2014). These women's movements successfully linked national and international levels, which enabled them to influence and shape discourse about gender. Knowledge of how discourses are negotiated and shaped is helpful when considering gender in autocracy and transition scholarship. However, as has been pointed out above, feminist research shows that women's movements can also be shaped by internal power struggles and lack of solidarity. This makes it difficult for women's movements to speak with one voice and shape gender discourses.

Gender Justice as Norm Creation

Analyzing the influence of women's movements on norm creation also requires to analyze the connections between movement actors and the government apparatus. Literature on norm creation is helpful for investigating the breakdown of autocratic discourse, as it emphasizes the dynamics of change and the significance of networked actors in an organized civil society. However, literature on international norm entrepreneurs has a strong normative foundation. In this strand of literature, organized civil society and especially women's movements are perceived to act and to strive only for democratic aims and ways of government. However, by supporting the transition regime, women's movements can also serve to stabilize conservative institutions and gender images. This stabilization is referred to by Graf et al. as a "normalization of antifeminist and conservative gender images" (2017, p. 82): there is the generation of norms, on the one hand, and, on the other, gender images are being explained as "normal," everyday practice—despite their contestation by parts of civil society. This process of normalization, however, generates input legitimacy for the transition regime because it helps to form a "we-feeling," or a collective identity.

Gender Regimes

To refer to such conservative institutions and gender images, I use the term "authoritarian gender regime." According to Henninger and Ostendorf, gender regimes focus on "the core political question of politics and power" (Henninger and Ostendorf, 2005, p. 20). The focus is thus not only on how formal and informal institutions shape gender relations, but also on the power and dominance relations underlying discursive practices and gender norms (Bothfeld, 2008).

How can we define authoritarian gender regimes? Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965, p. 5)define authoritarianism as "any political system in which the rulers are insufficiently, or not at all, subject to antecedent and enforceable rules of law—enforceable, that is, by other authorities who share in the government and who

have sufficient power to compel the lawbreaking rulers to submit to the law." In the absence of pluralism and diversity, autocracies are based on ideologies and mentalities that support the regime and maintain the unity of national identity (Buzogány et al., 2016). Authoritarian gender regimes are thus characterized by the fact that political positions and resources influencing gender relations are beyond the scope of state institutions and practices[2]. Second, the gender norms and discourses of authoritarian gender regimes are based on ideologies and mentalities that do not allow a variety of gender images. Gender norms that could become "dangerous" for the regime are thus precluded. In transitions, authoritarian gender regimes must compete with democratic gender regimes. The authoritarian gender regime can become normalized in this process.

The mechanisms and discourses contributing to this normalization are investigated in the following in the case of Chilean gender policy during the transitional government of Patricio Aylwin (1989–1994). Subsequently, I analyze the after-effects of gender norms established during the transitional government and how they shaped the scope of reform of gender policy under Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010, 2014–2018)[3].

GENDER POLICIES IN CHILE

Among Latin American countries, Chile is often presented as a model for the successful transition to democracy. Chile is seen as exemplary in terms of it rule of law and economic performance (Hillebrand, 2004). It is categorized as a consolidated democracy and depicted as a successful system transformation (Merkel, 2010). When Patricio Aylwin, the first democratically elected president, took over the political leadership in Chile after 16 years of military rule, he removed the last military dictatorship in the southern part of Latin America. Nevertheless, authoritarian ideologies are still at work in the subjects, mentalities, and institutions and guide the thoughts and actions of the people. Authoritarian enclaves—authoritarian institutional "islands" within a democratic political system—contribute to this effect. These enclaves are still apparent in several policy areas, including the area of gender policy. In the following, I will examine which mechanisms and discourses led to the negotiation and stabilization of these enclaves.

The Establishment of an Authoritarian Gender Regime During Military Dictatorship

Chilean women's movements played an important part in the transition to democracy. They are considered as one of the few movements capable of acting during the military dictatorship, since civil society organizations operating within the parties and trade unions were violently oppressed (Boris, 1998). The motives

of the women who organized during the military dictatorship were highly varied. On the one hand, women of different backgrounds organized soup kitchens in poverty-stricken areas (Boris, 1998). On the other, women increasingly took over the role of breadwinners due to the "disappearance" of many men during the military dictatorship. Also, the neo-liberal, export-oriented policy created new employment opportunities for women, especially in the agricultural sector. Toward the end of the military dictatorship, these women workers organized themselves in the fight for better labor rights (Tinsman, 2000). They also organized to protest human rights violations and to search for those who disappeared.

The military regime was not blind to the formation of women's movements. In an effort to suppress alternative visions of society, eliminate anti-regime tendencies, and control gender relations, Augusto Pinochet transformed the National Women's Secretary, which had been created by President Allende in 1972, into an ideologic propaganda tool. His wife Lucia Hiriart served as director and was joined by several officers' wives and upper-class women in the administration (Chuchryk, 1994). The Women's Secretary was intended to generate legitimacy for the military regime and to propagate Pinochet's vision of the "patriarchal family" as the ideal order. In Pinochet's vision, women were to concentrate on family affairs, patriotic childhood upbringing, welfare, and the fight against poverty (Thomas, 2016). This traditional division (vision) of gender roles was not unique to Pinochet, as it had already been promoted under the rule of Salvador Allende and been institutionalized in the National Women's Secretary (Godoy Ramos, 2013): the slogan of the leading parties under Allende was "Give land to the man who works it," which institutionalized gender-specific land rights (Tinsman, 2000, p. 158). Fischer describes the Chilean agrarian reform under Allende as representing a "monstrous" masculine, heteronormative ideal (Fischer, 2016, p. 41). To sum up, during the final period of the military dictatorship there was a broad women's movement, which made demands on the military regime. The military regime responded by founding the Secretary as the first Chilean institution for gender policy.

Normalization of Authoritarian Gender Images During the Transition

In 1988, Pinochet lost his own referendum, which would have secured him a "second term." This opened the way for Chile's transition to democracy. However, the conservative gender and family images of the dictatorship survived this referendum and were normalized during the 1st years of the transition.

The focus of the first democratically elected transitional government under Patricio Aylwin was how to cope with past human rights abuse. Here, too, conservative gender images were passed down. Since Aylwin was severely restricted and under pressure by numerous prerogatives still possessed by the military, he chose the discourse of the Reconciliación (reconciliation) in order to enforce a human rights policy oriented toward reconciliation and forgiveness. Aylwin applied the strategy of non-cooperation with the military and tried to limit the constitutional power of the military, i.e., the

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[2]In democratic as well as authoritarian gender regimes, the resources and power positions can be unequally distributed between the genders. In authoritarian gender regimes, however, there is a lack of control by accountable institutions and actors.

[3]The Chilean constitution does not allow a direct reelection; the term of office is four years.

authoritarian enclaves within the democratic constitution. Aylwin's establishing of the Rettig Commission to investigate human rights violations led to the Dia de Enlace: In response to the commission's institutionalization, Pinochet ordered unannounced military exercises throughout the country (Fuentes, 2000). In terms of human rights policy, Aylwin made concessions.

This influenced Aylwin's understanding of the transition, which he claimed was completed with the first democratic election, as well as his assertion that the view should now be directed toward the future (Forstenzer, 2017). Human rights violations should only be pursued "as far as possible" (Hiner and Azocar, 2015). Above all, the Catholic Church was able to make use of its proximity to the Christian Democratic Party in order to implement its vision of reconstruction. Actors of the Church and of the conservative parties were key to shaping the discourse of the Renacimiento, the rebirth of Chile. For this rebirth, a consensus was necessary. Victims of political or sexualized violence as well as of ill-treatment and other criminal acts that did not end with death were excluded from the first report on the crimes of the dictatorship, the so-called Rettig report. Correspondingly, the report produced a picture of a dictatorship that had mainly been violent to men (Hiner and Azocar, 2015). The fact that women during the military dictatorship engaged in acts of political resistance and suffered massive human rights violations is usually excluded from the debates accompanying this development (Hiner and Azocar, 2015). At the presentation of the report, Aylwin reiterated the formula of reconciliation: "For the good of Chile we must look to the future that unites us more than the past that separates us.… Forgiveness requires regret by one party and generosity by the other" (cited in Hiner and Azocar, 2015, p. 57).

The discourse of reconciliation and consensus meant the continuation of the dictatorship's gender policies, namely, they were left untouched or even linked to liberal norms. This continuation was mirrored in the institutional landscape: in 1990 Patricia Aylwin founded the National Women's Service (SERNAM) in continuation of the National Women's Secretary.

The foundation of SERNAM was not without critique, especially from radical women's movements. On the one hand the creation of an institutionalization of women's affairs was a strong claim of the women's movement. On the other hand the relative lack of power of SERNAM was criticized. The influential feminist corporation La Morada, for example, viewed the institutionalization of SERNAM as an important "gesture" (cited in Díaz Rubio, 2012, p. 31) but pointed on the low budget and the lack of the status of a ministry. On the other hand SERNAM's dual responsibility for women's and family affairs was reproved (Díaz Rubio, 2012).

The Case of Domestic Violence Legislation

This persistence of gender policies is reflected in domestic violence legislation. It was a major concern of feminist organizations in the 1st year of transition to pass legislation in this arena (Haas, 2010). In 1994 the Chilean Government signed the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Elimination of Violence against Women. This increased the pressure of feminist activists on the Chilean Government to become active in this area, which Aylwin seemed open to, as he had already put stopping violence against women on the reform agenda. However, when the Socialist Party introduced a corresponding bill, the Senate called for cooperation with SERNAM (Haas, 2010). SERNAM converted the draft into a bill for the prevention and punishment of "family violence" to protect the family (and the woman in it with her "natural" role) (Ríos Tobar, 2007). Right-wing parties were bothered by the term "family violence", since it questioned the natural order of the institution of marriage (Hiner and Azocar, 2015). Aylwin solved the dilemma, once again, by founding a National Family Commission. As in the case of the Rettig Commission, the aim was to establish a consensus and an expert committee. Aylwin stated that he wanted to avoid "to go to the press, get involved in controversies or produce spectacular effects." He continued, "[I]t is a commission like the Rettig Commission, which accomplished its mission well, that aims to work in silence and with due gravitas" (speech by Patricio Aylwin cited in Hiner and Azocar, 2015, p. 62).

When the bill finally entered the conservative Senate in 1993, the debate on family violence was framed in antifeminist terms: "[T]here is no worse family violence than abortion and divorce," noted Senator Eugenio Cantuarias, member of the right-wing party Unión Demócrata Independiente. The senator of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, Nicolas Díaz, expressed his opinion, which still influences the discussion on women's and reproductive rights: "[T]he most brutal violence is that used to assassinate a child in the uterus" (cited in Hiner and Azocar, 2015, p. 62–63). From an initially feminist reform proposal emerged a discussion that granted antifeminist discourse a prominent place.

The Case of Matrimonial Law and the Right to Divorce

The right to divorce is another area in which there have been long-standing legislative initiatives and in which rights have been enforced substantially late.

In 1910, María Esíndola Núnez, the Chilean delegate of the Int'american Federation, informed that women had won the dispute on divorce in both New Zealand and Uruguay. It was not until 1958 that Inés Enríquez, the first female member of parliament, proposed a divorce bill. In the new family status of Allende from 1971, it was also planned to set up family tribunals to facilitate the divorce (Vitale n.d.). It took until 2004, with the law on civil marriage that divorces were made possible. Chile was the last country in Latin America to introduce divorce law. In practice, however, it has often been circumvented by a simulated action for annulment; for this "divorce á la chilena," the spouses' assertion, confirmed by two witnesses, that at the time of the marriage they did not live in the district of the civil servant in charge of marriages was necessary (Gómez Urrutia, 2012).

The lack of divorce law was based on the continuation of a traditional, patrimonial family image, as in the case of barriers to enforce a law on domestic violence. In the constitution, which was adopted under Pinochet in 1980, the ideas of Allende were no longer represented. There was no definition of family there either.

The benefit of missing a definition was that it did not take into account the variety of family forms that existed in the history of Chile. Instead, the image of the nuclear family of man and woman could be implicitly accepted (Gómez Urrutia, 2012). Until the modification of the Código Civil the woman had the role of an incompetent legal entity. Her property rights automatically passed to the man with the marriage. The introduction of a divorce law would have endangered this patrimonial family image: The indissolubility of marriage was perceived as the last legal bastion for the traditional family. By important political sectors it was therefore considered as an expression of the values that give rise to an orderly and stable society (Gómez Urrutia, 2012, p. 188 translated by the author[4]). As in the case of reproductive rights, it was argued that legal reform puts the family at risk as the core of national unity. And even in the case of divorce law, the Catholic Church took active position against divorce (Gómez Urrutia, 2012). Since the church was closely linked to the Concertación[5], it slowed down the reactions of the parties of the Concertación regarding the activists'demands (Guzmán et al., 2010). The church also contributed significantly to the fact that, in parallel with the case of reproductive rights, a veritable demonization of divorce law took place in the Senate and Congress debates. Gómez Urrutia (2012), who examined the debates on divorce law during the Concertación, found that the right to divorce was framed as being socially disintegrating. There were fears that poverty in general and drug use and juvenile crime would increase if divorce law would be introduced. (Gómez Urrutia, 2012). The following excerpt of a speech of a deputy illustrates the fears associated with the divorce law: "For the society it matters whether the family is stable or not; [society] cannot give up its right to promote the values on which it is founded, and the family is the most important of all. Therefore, the law must protect and promote the stability of marriage [...] In consequence, it cannot be stated that divorce does not threaten the stability of the family and therefore the whole society" (Male deputy, Center Right party (PDC, cited in Gómez Urrutia, 2012, p. 189, translated by the author[6]).

In conclusion, both in the case of divorce law and in the case of domestic violence, it can be summarized that actor constellations and related discourses ensured that, despite the political opening up in Chile since the mid-1990's, the project of legal reforms in women's rights was postponed for 14 years. In the case of divorce law, it was not until 2004 that a change in the law of civil marriage brought about a reform that Guzmán et al. (2010) would classify as rather restrictive.

The Role of Sernam

What role did SERNAM as the institution in charge of women and gender policy play? And what role did the women's movements play in relation to SERNAM?

SERNAM assumed a moderate position in this dispute to avoid damaging its own institution. Controversial issues such as domestic violence and reproductive rights were downplayed and less controversial issues of gender equality were taken up.

Rather than strengthening women's rights in the family, SERNAM sought political support by focusing on children's rights. According to Josefina Bilbao, who was an independent MP affiliated to the Christian Party of Chile and from 1994 to 2000 Minister of SERNAM, this was for strategic reasons. Thus, the impression should be avoided that the SERNAM pursued a distancing from the traditional family picture (cited in Gómez Urrutia, 2012).

Differences—deviant gender images or identities (e.g., indigenous groups such as the Mapuche[7])—had no room in this conception of gender policy; the intersectionality of discrimination on the basis of race and sex was therefore neglected by SERNAM (Richards, 2005). An activist who identifies as Mapuche describes her interaction with SERNAM concerning the acceptance of intersectionality in politics in the following passage: "It hasn't been talked about [intersectionality], this is only starting recently. But generally before, they talked about the issue of gender, and that doesn't fit, because the relations between men and women in Western culture is one, and within Mapuche culture, it's another. Our way of relating with men is different. So long as they don't recognize us as a people, they are always going to try to assimilate us, so that we will be the same as the Chileans" (Richards, 2005, p. 212).

The Role of the Women'S Movement

Considering the broad landscape of feminist organizations and women's movements that had contributed decisively to ending the Pinochet dictatorship, how was such a normalization of antifeminist and conservative gender models possible at all? First, it must be noted that social movements generally lost their influence in the transition to democracy, as political participation—similar to the time before the dictatorship—was concentrated strongly on the political parties. If the "public invisibility" (Chuchryk, 1994) of women had opened a window of opportunity for political organization during the dictatorship, it now limited their engagement: the candidates of the first elections were mostly male. This is also the fault of the binomial electoral system[8], which is advantageous for well-known politicians from established families and disadvantageous for less-familiar female candidates.

For this reason, a group of women belonging to the parties of the center-left coalition came together with independent feminists in the Concertación de Mujeres por la Democracia

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[4]"Vista como el último bastión legal para la familia tradicional, la indisolubilidad del matrimonio era considerada por importantes sectores políticos como expresión de los valores que dan origen a una sociedad ordenada y estable."

[5]The "Concertación por la Democrácia" was the name for a Coalition of center-left parties. The strongest party in this coalition was the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). It was in power between 1990 and 2010.

[6]"A la sociedad no le da lo mismo que la familia sea estable o no; ella no puede renunciar a su derecho a promover los valores en que se funda, y la familia es el más importante de todos. Por eso, la ley debe proteger y fomentar la estabilidad del matrimonio [...] En consecuencia, no se puede decir que el divorcio no atenta contra la estabilidad de la familia y, por ende, contra la sociedad en su conjunto".

[7]The Mapuche are an indigenous people, mainly located in the capital region, the 8th and 9th regions of Chile, as well as in Argentina.

[8]On the party lists, the number of female and male candidates must not exceed 60 per cent of the total candidates. For every female candidate, the party will be "rewarded" by the state. Parties receive $20,000 for each elected female representative or senator.

(Coalition of Women for Democracy). They formulated a program to be included in the election program Concertación (Chuchryk, 1994). However, this led to further divisions between the women's movements: The presence of a common enemy, Pinochet, had bonded the extremely heterogeneous women's movements. Many leftist activists had already established close ties with the Left and Center parties during the dictatorship. This close connection to the state provoked protest among many smaller radical organizations and led to the division of the movements. This division was encouraged by the institutionalization of women's policy in expert committees and institutions, such as the SERNAM, and the establishment of a state feminism in which, most importantly, the "institutionalists" (Forstenzer, 2017, p. 171) among the activists were included. Their strategy was to adapt feminist demands to the dominant power relations and social narratives. In addition to the institutionalists and radical activists, there was another group of young women who, after the end of the dictatorship, focused their efforts on organizations that reflected traditional gender roles, e.g., parent organizations and religious associations (Marques-Pereira, 2005). In general women were only rarely political party members or worked actively in political parties. And Marques-Pereira noted the political disinterest of young Chileans during the transition period, which was evident in their low rates of electoral registration, i.e., a large portion of young Chileans passed up their chance to vote.

To sum up, during the transition to democracy, Chilean gender policies, as well as the treatment of dictatorship violence, focused on generating a politics of consensus in expert committees. As a result, everyday violence and oppression in Chilean society remained in the dark: "After so many years of violent dictatorship, we as a society were inclined to blame the military and thus were unable to recognize the daily violence in our families" (Bacigalupe, 2000, p. 438).

A hegemonic discourse became in due time the norm. This discourse determined societal relations and the way to deal with the authoritarian past: through the narrative of reconstruction, Chilean society was depicted as a whole. Key to this discourse was the hegemonic unity of the Chilean people, which excluded deviant gender images or identities. This normalization was made possible by a division of civil society in view of its relation to the transition state. The price paid for the institutionalization of gender policies and for allowing female activists to hold political positions was an extreme narrowing of women's and gender policies to the dominant narrative. Thus, parts of the gender regime were democratized, the parts that had access to political power and resources. But in concrete policies—in the underlying mentalities and attitudes of those who took part in shaping these policies—there was also a normalization of aspects of the authoritarian gender regime.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the transition to democracy, the conservative gender images and roles that emerged during the military dictatorship or even earlier were perpetuated. As has been shown, more than two decades after the end of the dictatorship, these conservative discourses still limit the political frame and possibilities. This is also due to divided attitudes toward gender equality and the gendered division of labor in society. A survey by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) shows that while 62 per cent of the population strongly support or at least accept the traditional role distribution (UNDP, 2010, p. 16), 38 per cent of the population, especially young adults and women, at least support the equal distribution of roles or believe that the state should be more committed to gender equality and diversity.

How this perpetuation of conservative gender images and roles limits reform ambitions can be seen in the two presidencies of Michelle Bachelet, who explicitly sought gender and social policy reform but only could show mixed results. The institutionalization of SERNAM, the introduction of a legislation to decriminalize therapeutic abortion and the change of the binomimal electoral system are clear milestones of Bachelet's presidencies (2006–2010 and 2014–2018) (Staab, 2016; Thomas, 2016) On the other hand, Bachelet had to bring in all her presidential power to get these reforms passed. Especially the case of social reforms shows that only compromises were possible that left the picture of the caring mother intact. On example is the struggle for paid care work. Bachelet was seeking for a general pay of unpaid work but due to protest, the compromise was a maternalist policy exclusively for women: women now receive child "bonuses" for their unpaid care work (Staab, 2016). By not recognizing the importance of gender equality in care work, the traditional image of the caring mother was strengthened (Staab, 2017). Therefore, the Chilean case shows that traditional gender roles are extremely persistent in policy making.

What general conclusions can be drawn from this case study of the interplay between liberalization and authoritarian gender discourses?

First of all, it shows that dealing with the authoritarian past in democratization processes causes high costs that can negatively affect the liberalization of gender relations. In the Chilean case a discourse of reconciliation was established, which conceived of Chileans as a unified whole in an effort to prioritize (economic) progress. This kind of reconciliation policy can be problematic as they have an influence on the room for divergent roles, gender images, and conflictive topics. In the Chilean case attempts to implement international standards on the national level were unsuccessful, because they were reinterpreted and integrated into conservative notions of gender relations. This is also a contradiction to the literature of international norm creation, which assumes that national norm entrepreneurs can achieve national liberal advances by recourse to the international level. A general learning is that despite international links of actors international norms may have small impact on authoritarian processes if they are not bound to sanctions.

A second general finding aims at the institutionalization of gender relations. The Chilean example shows that the emergence of state feminism and the integration of "institutionalists" within the women's movement into the National Women's Secretariat SERNAM led to a split between radical women's movements and institutionalists. The establishment of a hegemonic discourse was possible by establishing a state feminism and integrating

the "institutionalists" among the women's movements into SERNAM. This integration divided radical women's movements and institutionalists. Such an institutionalization and cooptation can weaken feminist demands, as the coopted groups have to "pay" for its access to power by adapting feminist demands to the dominant power relations and societal narratives. Therefore, despite of state feminism, authoritarian gender regime may only undergo partial reforms. Formal access to positions of power and resources may change, but the conservative discourses and gender images tend to be carried over to democratic regimes.

A third finding is revealed by the comparison of the policy cases. The reform processes differ in duration and role of international norm building. However, in both cases we observe that the linkage of gender issues and family issues supported conservative norm building. The family was seen as the nucleus of society. Both policy reforms were perceived by conservative actors, especially the Catholic Church, as endangering this nucleus.

In the case of divorce law, a link of the reform project to social change in general increased the conservative backlash. Divorce was framed by conservative actors as leading to juvenile crime and social disintegration.

This leads to a last finding regarding the current phase of Chilean gender politics. It has been shown that authoritarian gender regimes can be of long duration, as the recent cases of sexual violence show. This is also due to the interaction with other authoritarian institutional enclaves, such as the electoral system. In the case of Chile, before the reforms of Bachelet, the previous electoral system brought about a narrowing of political content, since candidates representing critical issues did not receive a place on the party lists. The literature on gender effects of electoral reforms shows, however, that even reforms of electoral systems that have gender equality as a perspective, do not necessarily lead to a higher substantive representation. However, as Waylen (2006) shows in the example of the constitutionalization process in Iraq[9], the guarantee of descriptive representation is not enough if in the transition process there are already elements of an authoritarian gender regime in the constitution.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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[9]"Article 14 states that Iraqis are equal before the law 'without discrimination because of sex' at the same time as it states that laws cannot be passed that contradict the 'established rulings' of Islam" (2006, 1218).

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Engendering Governance After Armed Conflict: Observations From Kosovo

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This article addresses gender-responsive governance reforms in post-conflict Kosovo from two perspectives: (1) the perspective of human rights as fundamental for state-building, and (2) the resolutions of the UN Security Council regarding Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), notably the initial UNSCR 1325. Special focus is laid on women's agency in governance matters—at the level of the state and at the level of civil society. A gender approach to three dimensions of governance—political-administrative governance, security governance, and socioeconomic governance—shows successes and problems in this post-conflict society. Special attention is given to the strategies of the women's movement in reaching gender-responsive governance. Some initiatives for new masculinities address the necessity of norm change in gender governance. The analysis of the literature and documents, supplemented by interviews, reveals the transformative potential of gender governance that solidly roots in women's rights and combines a multi-actor approach at grassroots, and at national and international levels with strong alliances and very concrete actions.

Keywords: gender governance, equality, post-conflict, state-building, security, CEDAW, UNSCR

INTRODUCTION

The challenging task of rebuilding the state starts functioning when war and armed conflict have ended, when armed groups have been dismantled, and when violence and destruction have stopped. Peace agreements define democracy hand in hand with new forms of governance. For women, huge opportunities arise in terms of inclusion in the new structures. However, reality shows that participation and representation of women remain deficient and that discrimination and violence against women continue in different manifestations than during the armed conflict/war.

After the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990's, the peace agreements or referendums created new states—Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, the Former Republic of Macedonia/North Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. In Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, international actors of the United Nations (UN), of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and of the European Union (EU) became responsible for security and state-building, whereas the other new states filled the political and administrative vacuum without much external assistance. Hereto, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assists all successor states with a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects, including gender equality.

International organizations emphasized governance as a key instrument in building the new states and as a guarantee for sustained security (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 231). Good governance should serve economic development on the one hand, and avoid

the recurrence of violent confrontations on the other. Linking development with security served also as the goal of gender governance, but feminist grassroot activists and femocrats in national and international institutions broadened this link with an emphasis on human rights. Notably, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the UN conferences of the 1990[1] and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSC, 2000) on WPS brought legitimacy to engender governance from the perspective of women's rights. In the post-conflict context that necessitates the creation or reform of the constitution and that requires the building of new government institutions governance with a focus on gender equality and women's rights, gender governance has the potential to improve the realities of women, but this potential requires a permanent struggle and is not smooth (Cornwall and Molyneux, 2006, p. 1176).

Focusing on the example of Kosovo, I show the dynamics, the successes, and failures around gender-responsive governance from the following: (1) from the perspective of human rights, and (2) from the perspective of UNSCR 1325 on WPS. By inserting gender into three dimensions of governance—political-administrative governance, security governance, and socioeconomic governance—I identify the actors, their alliances, and concrete activities that brought women's rights to public attention and expanded women's entitlements and capabilities. In addition, I claim that gender-responsive governance cannot avoid the confrontation with persistent patriarchal values and requires new interpretations of masculinity.

The purpose of this article is to show the importance of rights-based gender governance as it legitimates demands for justice, mobilizes for participation, rule of law, and accountability, and in the case of gender-based violence calls for prosecution and reparations.

In the following sections, I shall first present the conceptualization of gender-responsive governance with a focus on human/rights as the basic ingredient and shall proceed with a short presentation of two basic human rights-oriented instruments for post-conflict societies: CEDAW and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325+ and the UN Security Council's resolutions regarding women, peace and security. Third, I'll turn to Kosovo and will show how gender equality advocates used those two human rights instruments for their claims of justice and security. Fourth, I will analyze with a gender lens three aspects of governance, that is, political-administrative, security, and economic governance. Last, in the conclusion, I shall turn to the issue of norm challenge and norm change toward new gender-equal masculinities.

What Is Gender-Responsive Governance?

The concept of governance and of good governance was launched in the 1990's by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP defines governance as the exercise of economic,

political, and administrative authority to manage the affair of a country at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate differences (UNDP, 1997, p. 2).

First, situated within the notion of sustainable human development, the concept was soon broadly adopted for the Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015) emphasizing the "vital link between good governance, development, and human rights" (UNDP, 2014, p. 2). Good governance serves later also as a principle for the Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030), adopted by all member states of the United Nations. "The new Agenda recognizes the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions. Factors which give rise to violence, insecurity and injustice, such as inequality, corruption, poor governance and illicit financial and arms flows, are addressed in the Agenda" (United Nations, 2015, Section 35).

Governance relates to a "system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political, and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector" (UNDP, 2014, p. 287). Mentioning the values of a society hints already toward the norm change embedded in the nine characteristics of good governance: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability and strategic vision (UNDP, 1997). However, there is no uniform consensus about the importance of those characteristics, for example, "The UN, USAID, DFID, and the EC emphasize the social and political aspects of governance, highlighting the processes of participation, and responsiveness (to the needs of the people), democracy and human rights concerns. The banks and financial institutions focus more on economic governance, prioritizing transparency, accountability, and (public sector) efficiency and effectiveness" (Corner, 2005, p. 3). Although the indicators are gender-blind, several are of special importance to women's participation, rule of law, and accountability (Corner, 2005; UNDP, 2007, 19f).

After "governance" has found ground in the development discourse (World Bank, 2017), feminist writings were engaged with gender governance. Gender governance claims an inclusive process that includes the demands of women for rights and resources into policies and rules of implementation. In her overview report about gender and governance, Alyson Brody asserts that "(g)ender-sensitive governance requires that gender equality and the realization of women's rights are at the heart of the goals and practices of governance. Policies and legislation should address the differing needs, interests, priorities, and responsibilities of women and men, as well as their unequal economic and social power" (Brody, 2009, p. 2). Also, Niraja Gopal Jayal asserts in her essay that a gendered view of governance must be rights-based (Gopal Niraja, 2003, p. 102). This rights-based conception of governance obliges duty bearers to protect and guarantee rights, mandates governments to enable conditions for claiming rights, encourages to identify obstacles,

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[1]World Conference on Human Rights 1993, Vienna; United Nations Conference on Population and Development 1994, Cairo; Fourth world Conference on Women 1995, Beijing.

and engages in process and outcomes (Gopal Niraja, 2003, 106f). With this focus on rights, engendered governance is rooted in formal state structures that can address also the informal structures of power in family and households (Gopal Niraja, 2003, p. 124). Women's rights would make governance effective, in the public as well as in the private realm (UNDP, 2012: 63).

Elaborating the practice of effective gender governance, UN Women, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UNW), defines gender-responsive governance as "the management of public affairs in a manner that addresses the social relations that undermine women's capacity to participate in public decisions and responds to gender biases and patterns of exclusion" (UNW, 2012, p. 1). This response to gender biases would mean, according to philosopher Martha Nussbaum in her essay on governance, to emphasize the necessary change in social norms that undermine gender equality and women's empowerment (Nussbaum, 2003).

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In the post-conflict context, governance concentrates on political-administrative governance, security governance, and socioeconomic governance, all connected to each other (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 233). The authors criticize that most post-conflict governance programmes concentrate on political-administrative governance, whereas security governance is reserved to programmes, such as Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR), rule of law, and peacekeeping with little civil society participation. The third aspect, socioeconomic governance, is largely ignored except the promotion of economic liberalization (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011). International actors would see governance as an instrument to attain and maintain security, and in the long run, as conducive to development (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 231). Overall, as a sign of good governance, institutions should be "accountable, transparent, inclusive and responsive" to their citizens (Brody, 2009, p. 1). Gender-responsive governance reforms, therefore, focus on women's needs, livelihoods, rights, and participation as entry points and parameters for the political-administrative, security, and socioeconomic governance components discussed above (UNW, 2015b). In general, a gender-responsive approach to post-conflict governance would insert gender mainstreaming in all those three governance aspects.

The political-administrative domain of governance would focus in general on democratization and institution building: free elections, representative political parties, municipal and national level structures, such as Ombuds office, ministries, and specialized departments. Here, gender mainstreaming would

mean equal opportunity for women and men to be elected, and the absence of family voting[2]. In order to guarantee women's representation in elections and public governance, usually a quota system is established. Although quotas for women receive skepticism or even outspoken resistance, without a quota for women rarely more than 25% of women can be found on electoral lists of political parties, in parliament and in administrative bodies, including the judiciary (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 239). The strongest instrument for gender mainstreaming in public governance is a Ministry for Women's Affairs or a specific department either attached to another ministry or directly in the prime minister's office or the chancellery.

Gender-responsive security governance would include women who were members of the armed forces or at least those affected by armed forces [Women Affected by Fighting Forces (WAFF)] in DDR programmes that also provide training and income generation. Rule of law agendas would draft or improve a legal framework in harmony with international conventions and would allow access to justice for women, reparations for victims of gender-based violence, and wartime rapes, and would promote to achieve inheritance and property rights, freedom from gender-based and domestic violence, and self-determination in matters of marriage, divorce, and reproductive rights (Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 260). Furthermore, Security Sector Reform would be gender-sensitive—women police officers would need to be recruited, all police staff would receive training about women's rights. Specialists inside the police for human rights and domestic violence would need to be found, action plans with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to combat gender-based violence and human trafficking would need to be created, and for all this, a substantive legal basis would be required.

The third aspect of governance mentioned above, socioeconomic governance, follows mostly the thinking of economic liberalization as the assumed fastest way for poverty alleviation, economic growth, and reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure. Feminist critique of the liberal economic agenda raises the gender-bias inherent in that approach, especially the neglect of unpaid care work (Elson, 1995; Bakker, 2014). However, a problematic macro-economic policy might include skills development and professional training, leading to income generation either through self-employment, small enterprise development, cooperatives and job creation in agriculture, industry, and services that are essential for women if they want to attain income and economic independence for sheer survival and a decent life.

An important non-governmental component for institution building is the creation of and the support to civil society, that is, the non-state actors referred to above. Civil society initiatives usually arise already during the armed conflict, either

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[2]Definition of family voting: "a family member casts votes on behalf of the entire family or where one member of the family pressures other members to vote for a certain candidate" (iKNOW Politics, 2019 no date, p. 1).

concentrating on survival, shelter, health, and education, or engage directly for peace and an end to violence. In many post-conflict societies, international actors support civil society initiatives for the belief in their contribution to democratization, their articulation of societal concerns, and as a corrective to former warring groups that demand access to and inclusion in governmental or administrative structures. Apart from faith-based groups, non-governmental organizations, the NGOs, grow out from civil society's work during the conflict. Big varieties of women NGOs in post-conflict societies can be observed; they engage for social, educational, economic, and political issues. They provide health, including reproductive health care, for women and also for victims of rape and domestic violence, and income-generation for women including war widows. They help the reintegration of displaced persons and former combatants engage in awareness-raising and advocacy for women's rights and in the fight against discrimination, and they campaign for reparations to war victims, and organize women's participation in post-conflict elections and monitor elections. Post-conflict NGOs and initiatives by women might have different visions, identity, and constituencies, and are not always free from tensions within and among them; nevertheless they are important actors in gender-oriented governance (OSCE, 2004; Kumar, 2010; Helms, 2013; Jacobson, 2013; UNW, 2015a).

That comprehensive gender governance agenda—political-administrative governance, security governance, and socioeconomic governance—envisions an ideal post-conflict transformation. The ideal lies in the belief that gender relations can rather smoothly be reformed because they have been shaken already during the armed conflict. Despite all the human pain, loss, and especially the experience of gender-based violence against women, armed conflict can bring also empowering effects for women due to their new multiple roles as civil and military actors (Lindsey, 2001, p. 31; Ní Aoláin et al., 2011, p. 41; Webster et al., 2019). Hope for gender equality rests, ironically, on the disruption of social, political, and economic life in situations of war and armed conflict and the assumption that after conflict, traditional gender relations will be newly negotiated on the basis of women's empowerment gained during the armed conflict and then fairly arranged.

Before I discuss below important elements of gender governance in Kosovo, I delineate two, in my opinion, basic ingredients of gender governance in post-conflict societies, CEDAW, and UNSCR 1325.

Human Rights as Basis of Gender Governance

CEDAW is also called the "magna charta" of women's rights. Adopted by the UN General assembly in 1979, CEDAW defines discrimination against women and sets national agendas to end discrimination and encompasses all aspects of human rights. The Convention defines discrimination against women as "...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of

their marital status, on the basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field"[3].

The introductory text on the CEDAW website states that "(b)y accepting the Convention, States commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including:

- to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws, and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women;
- to establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and
- to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises" (Webster et al., 2019).

The gender governance elements of CEDAW lie in legal and institutional measures that must be presented to the CEDAW Committee. The mechanisms of CEDAW with regard to periodical, written, and direct reporting require government institutions, notably ministries, to inform whether women's needs and priorities have advanced. Through the participation of women's organizations in the reporting mechanism, gender-responsive governance becomes transparent, accountable, and inclusive, which are the characteristics of good gender-governance.

UNSCR 1325+: UN Security Council Resolutions Regarding WPS

For conflict-related governance, the UN Security Council Resolutions regarding women, peace and security are the main instruments addressing times of war and peace alike.

In October 2000, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1325 on WPS. UNSCR 1325 is considered as a milestone for the protection of women against violence in the context of armed conflict/war and for the call to women's participation in peace negotiations and further inclusion in governance. The initial resolution, 1325, focuses on three main pillars: prevention of conflict and gender-based violence, protection against violence, and participation of women in peace, security, and conflict-related matters (3 Ps), thus emphasizing the human rights of women as related to bodily integrity and political inclusion. A fourth pillar refers to relief and recovery, specifically addressing the needs of women and girls in refugee camps and settlements.

Some specific paragraphs of UNSCR 1325 relate to our discussion of governance: UNSCR 1325 reaffirms the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts; it (u)rges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; and it (c)alls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective,

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[3]CEDAW, Available online at: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm, p. 1.

including, inter alia: "(a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction," (b) measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; "(c) measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary" (UNSC, 2000, p. 3).

Thus, we see UNSCR 1325 calling for human rights of women during and after the conflict on legislative, judicative, and executive levels, women's decision-making at all levels as a matter of inclusion, and a gender perspective in all peace arrangements. Until today, the Security Council adopted nine additional WPS resolutions: 1820 (2009), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2010), 1960 (2011), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019). All those nine subsequent resolutions confirm UNSCR 1325 and expand to specific issues. Five of the resolutions (1820, 1888, 1960, 2106, and 2493) focus on sexual violence; six resolutions focus mainly on monitoring, expertise, and leadership (1888, 1889, 1960, 2122, 2242, and 2493). Monitoring, for which the UN and EU have developed indicators as demanded by UNSCR 1889, as well as expertise and leadership can also be seen as elements of governance. A strong monitoring instrument includes National Action Plans hitherto (August 2020)[4] adopted by 86 Member States of the United Nations. Monitoring of the requirements of WPS is a task for all stakeholders—the United Nations, international organizations, national governments, and civil society organizations (McLeod, 2016). Again, transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness reflect the implementation of WPS governance prescriptions.

Alignment of CEDAW and UNSCR 1325

In order to align CEDAW with UNSCR 1325, the CEDAW Committee adopted the General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, and in conflict and post-conflict situations in 2013[5]. This Recommendation gives guidance on "concrete measures to ensure women's human rights are protected before, during and after conflict. This General Recommendation makes clear that the Convention applies in all forms of conflict and post-conflict settings and addresses crucial issues facing women in these settings, including violence and challenges in access to justice and education, employment, and health"[6]. This means that states are required to include the WPS issues of UNSCR in their periodical reporting to the CEDAW Committee (UNW, 2015b).

The share of UNSCR on WPS with CEDAW, "the demand of women's participation in decision-making at all level, the rejection of violence against women as it impedes the advancement of women and maintains their subordinate status,

equality of women and men under the law, protection of women and girls through the rule of law, the demand that security forces and systems protect women and girls from gender-based violence, the recognition of the fact that distinct experiences and burdens of women and girls come from systemic discrimination, and the demand to ensure that women's experiences, needs and perspectives are incorporated into the political, legal and social decisions that determine the achievement of just and lasting peace"[7]. Linking the WPS requirements with CEDAW and the General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations reporting mechanism has increased the dialogue between the two regimes and "inter-regime accountability" (O'Rourke and Swaine, 2018, p. 199).

In review, although the WPS resolutions have received critique for focusing solely on women as victims and actors in peacebuilding, but ignoring intersectional differences among women and also for ignoring women as combatants, for glossing over hierarchical gender relations, for co-option into non-feminist power regimes and for not addressing militarism and masculinities (Puechguirbal, 2010; Holzner, 2011; Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011; SDC, 2013; McLeod, 2016), women peace activists embrace the WPS resolutions as a powerful instrument for acknowledging women's human rights and incorporating women in peace negotiations and in governmental functions which can be seen in the abundant publications collected by Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)[8].

Gender Governance in Kosovo

In the following sections, First I provide a brief background of the history of the Kosovo conflict, the process to the country's independence in order to provide context and move then to the discussion about the implementation of CEDAW and UNSCR 1325. Mainly I use information from the government of Kosovo, the Kosova Women's Network (KWN)[9], publications by the UN and OSCE, and my own interviews with key personnel.

The Yugoslav Constitution established the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija within the Yugoslav constituent republic of Serbia. Ethnic tensions between the minority Serb and the majority Albanian population had a long history that culminated in the late 1980's in the first popular uprisings and peaceful protests, but then also in the violent attacks of Albanian groups. The Milosevic regime of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ended the autonomy status of the province in 1990 and dismissed Albanians from all public functions. In response, the Albanian population founded underground schools and medical services, financed by the Albanian diaspora and the population. During that period, women played a strong role by providing food, education, and medical services. Going beyond providing services, women

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[4]https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states
[5]https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2015/guidebook-cedaw-general-recommendation-30-women-peace-security-en.pdf?la=en&vs=1850 (accessed April 23, 2020).
[6]https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2015/8/guidebook-cedawgeneralrecommendation30-womenpeacesecurity, p.1

[7]https://web.archive.org/web/20120501140626/http://www.gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Cedaw-1325-1820-synergy2.pdf (text slightly adapted by the author).
[8]https://www.peacewomen.org/who-implements
[9]I use here the official designation Kosova by KWN, which is the Albanian name; otherwise I use the international official name for the country: Kosovo that does not prioritize ethnicities.

organized several huge demonstrations with up to 15,000 persons in 1998, protesting against Serbian blockades and violence (Farnsworth, 2008, p. 15).

During the 1990's, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a rebel group was formed and resorted to armed struggle against Yugoslavian police stations and security personnel with smuggled weapons, which were looted from Albanian ammunition depots after the collapse of the so-called pyramid gambling scheme in 1997. Reports of violent retributions by the Serbian police and by paramilitary groups against the Albanian population caught international attention and response. In 1998, the OSCE entered Kosovo and attempted to reach a ceasefire, but failed. When reports of severe massacres became public in January 1999, NATO gave president Milosevic an ultimatum to withdraw his troops; after his refusal and the failure of negotiations, between March and June 1999, NATO forces bombed Serbian military and police structures in Kosovo and infrastructure in Serbian Yugoslavia, including Belgrade. Then the Serbian forces started a policy of ethnic cleansing, displacing hundreds of thousands of Albanians to neighboring countries. After 11 weeks of bombing, the Yugoslav regime agreed to withdraw from Kosovo, and on 10 June 1999, the so-called Kosovo Force (KFOR) consisting of NATO and several Non-NATO countries entered as peacekeeping force with 40,000 troops. Immediately, the country came under the control of the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), mandated by UNSCR 1244[10]. For assistance in state-building, many well-staffed organizations opened offices in Kosovo: the UNKT (United Nations Kosovo Team) with all its agencies and the two international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, and many international NGOs like Caritas, CARE, and [Union Centrale des Coopératives Agricoles de l'Ouest (UCCAO)] a.o. [11].

UNMIK describes its mandate as "help the Security Council achieve an overall objective, namely, to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo and advance regional stability in the western Balkans." UNMIK has been divided into four sections which it calls "pillars." These include the following:

- Pillar I: Police and justice (United Nations-led)
- Pillar II: Civil Administration (United Nations-led)
- Pillar III: Democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
- Pillar IV: Reconstruction and economic development (European Union-led).

KFOR became responsible for maintaining security and deployed thousands of military personnel in the country[12].

Until 17 February 2008, when the Assembly of Kosovo declared unilateral independence, UNMIK was responsible for running the country. With that declaration of independence,

supported by most EU member states[13], the tasks of UNMIK were taken over by the EU, and the EU office in Kosovo, and a European Union Special Representative (EUSR). Building on the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was created. EULEX assists and supports the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law, specifically in the police, judiciary, and customs areas. In September 2012, international supervision ended, and Kosovo became responsible for its own governance, but UNMIK, KFOR, OSCE, and EULEX remain active in the country.

CEDAW in Kosovo: Legal Basis for Gender Equality

Although Kosovo does not have the status of a UN member state, and thus cannot be obliged to report to the CEDAW Committee, it had adopted very early international obligations and laws directed at gender equality, non-discrimination, and protection of women against violence and abuse. A few months after the declaration of independence in 2008, the parliament of Kosovo ratified the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo[14]. The text of the constitution is greatly based on the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, signed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in May 2001 (UNMIK, 2001).

The Constitution (Article 7) acknowledges gender equality as "a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society". Moreover, Article 24 of the constitution maintains that all forms of discrimination are prohibited, including discrimination on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation as well. Article 22 of the Constitution about the Direct Applicability of International Agreements and Instruments says: "Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following international agreements and instruments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions. Under this article, "The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" is mentioned in a row with other international agreements and conventions [i.e., the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)][15].

The principle of incorporating equality between women and men is also mentioned in Article 24 of the constitution that guarantees "Equality before the Law[16]" in three paragraphs, with an explicit reference to gender in the second paragraph:

1. All are equal before the law. Everyone enjoys the right to equal legal protection without discrimination.
2. No one shall be discriminated against on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion,

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[10]For more details, see Available online at: http://www.britannica.com/event/Kosovo-conflict and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War

[11]FAO, ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNWOMEN (formerly UNIFEM), UNCTAD, UNDP, UNDSS, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, WHO.

[12]Until today, there are still 3,500 KFOR troops in Kosovo. See Available online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_Force

[13]Until today, five EU member states have not acknowledged Kosovo's independence; these countries include Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. As of 4 September 2020, 116 UN member states have diplomatically recognized Kosovo, of which 15 have withdrawn their recognition. See Available online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Kosovo

[14]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_Kosovo

[15]http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/Kushtetuta_RK_ang.pdf, p. 6.

[16]http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/Kushtetuta_RK_ang.pdf, p. 7.

national or social origin, relation to any community, property, economic and social condition, sexual orientation, birth, disability, or other personal status.

3. Principles of equal legal protection shall not prevent the imposition of measures necessary to protect and advance the rights of individuals and groups who are in unequal positions. Such measures shall be applied only until the purposes for which they are imposed have been fulfilled.

Other constitutions that guarantee importance to women, include Article 37 and the Right to Marriage and Family[17] that emphasizes equality of the spouses.

Already in 2004 (UNMIK, 2004), the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a Law on Gender Equality with the introductory text: "The present law shall preserve, treat and establish gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the Kosovo society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economical, social, cultural and other fields of social life"[18]. In this law, a quota system was enshrined in Article 3.2 that states "Equal gender participation of both females and males, (....) is achieved in cases where the participation of the particular gender in the institutions, bodies or at the level of authority is 40%." This law was lastly amended in 2015[19], and the quota was extended to 50%, including all levels of decision-making "in political and public life" (Articles 3.1.15 and 6.8).

In addition, "gender responsive budgeting and gender mainstreaming in all institutional policies (for bodies "at all levels of legislative, executive, judicial and other public institutions)" are required (Morina and Farnsworth, 2015, n. p.). Other improvements lie in the definition of sexual harassment, stronger fines for violating the law, the obligations to collect gender-disaggregated data, clearer responsibilities of gender equality officers, fines for sexual harassment, broad definition of gender, (Morina and Farnsworth, 2015).

By this constitution, women of Kosovo enjoy de iure human rights in all aspects—political, economic, and social. For gender-responsive governance in Kosovo, the key standard of human rights as cited in UN Women's definition quoted above is achieved and further strengthened by the Law on Gender Equality. In addition, the Law on Protection against Domestic Violence, the Law on Prevention and Combating of Trafficking with Persons and Protection of Victims of Trafficking, the Law on Family and Social Services and the Criminal Code intend to protect victims of gender-based violence, to prosecute and punish offenders and to offer women various social services. Hence, the legal foundation for implementation was profoundly laid.

Since August 2019, also lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex people (LGBTI) rights are recognized when the Kosovo Court of Appeals officially approved the request of a trans citizen to change the name and gender marker in the Central Civil Status Register and Civil Status Principal Register[20].

In the formulation of those laws and the action plans for implementation, women activists, notably the organizations united in KWN were involved, in line with its mission "to support, protect and promote the rights and interests of women and girls throughout Kosovo, regardless of their political and religious beliefs, age, level of education, sexual orientation, and abilities"[21]. EULEX and OSCE that have the mandate to give legal advice to the government of Kosovo assisted in the formulation of laws and related action plans.

To sum up, with the incorporation of CEDAW in the Constitution of Kosovo, the basis was laid for laws regarding gender equality and women's rights and their implementation by institutional mechanisms, action plans, and programmes.

UNSCR 1325 in Kosovo

"We've used 1325 since 1999, even before such a Resolution existed" (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 5).

This quote reminds that Kosovo women continued their activism of the 1990's when Albanian citizens were dismissed from public functions, when the health care and school system broke down, and the country was tormented by the armed conflict. That activism persisted in the post-conflict period of the next decades until now.

After the war, women lobbied over and over again for participation in peace talks, referring to UNSCR 1325, but met much ignorance and refusal by international mediators (Villellas Ariño and Redondo de la Morena, 2008: 18). The publication, "1325 Facts and Fables" of the KWN[22] illustrates vividly women's activism during those years (Farnsworth, 2011). Kosovo women activists had confronted the all male international negotiators for the status talks like Martti Ahtisari and Security Council members on their visit to Kosovo in 2007 with UNSCR 1325 and its enshrined call for women's participation. Letters sent to the officials were not responded; therefore, women chose to change the tactics and demonstrated on 8 March in the streets with the slogan, "No more flowers, we want power," referring to the practice that in socialist countries on International Women's Day, women receive flowers from men (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 47). They used a banner saying "Resolution 1325 gives us the right to be in the negotiation team" (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 48). Even this effort was in vain; at the end, women were only permitted to join a few working groups. The final text of a new resolution following UNSCR 1244 that would guarantee Kosovo's independence included a reference to UNSCR 1325, but it "was not even put on the table of the Security Council because Russia said they would veto it" (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 51).

These frustrating experiences demonstrate on the one hand that Kosovo women consciously used UNSCR 1325 as a lobby and advocacy instrument, but that, on the other hand, influential and highly placed international negotiators were ignorant about

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[17] http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/Kushtetuta_RK_ang.pdf, p. 11.
[18] http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/?cid=2,191,103
[19] https://gzk.rks-gov.net/ActDetail.aspx?ActID=10923, and https://equineteurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Annex-LAW_NO._05_L-020_ON_GENDER_EQUALITY.pdf

[20] https://www.lgbti-era.org/news/kosovo-court-appeal-takes-historic-decision-legal-gender-recognition
[21] Quote taken from https://womensnetwork.org/programs/
[22] Kosova is the Albanian word for the country. In official texts, Kosovo is used.

this resolution and resisted acknowledgment of its content. That lack of respect to this instrument of the highest UN body, the Security Council, prevented the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This unawareness, unwillingness and resistance can only be explained by a "patriarchal" and "traditional" attitude of the male negotiators themselves, an attitude they accused of belonging to Kosovo society. Hence, uninformed, male-biased and orientalist perceptions of outsiders generated the exclusion of Kosovo women in talks about the future of the country.

Yet, the silence about UNSCR 1325 changed in 2010 at the occasion of the commemoration of 10 years of UNSCR 1325. Then, and in the following years, international organizations embraced the messages of the resolutions on WPS. Public events with stakeholders from UN, KFOR, OSCE, EULEX, EU, embassies, government and NGOs, notably KWN, transported the message of prevention, protection, participation, and recovery to their own staff and a wider public audience and promoted a.o. a zero tolerance of sexual violence[23].

In 2014, the government of Kosovo under the guidance of the Agency on Gender Equality and with the participation of civil society, UN Women and Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) has adopted an Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 for the period 2013–2015[24] (Injac et al., 2014). The Action Plan integrates a call for women's rights and includes:

- Promote and implement Resolution 1325 in Kosovo, locally and regionally;
- Coordinate joint actions among institutions, civil society, and interest groups toward implementing Resolution 1325 and other programs that promote gender issues;
- Create a new premise for strengthening and promoting the rights that belong to women and girls in Kosovo;
- Integrate gender issues into the security sector;
- Create opportunities for promoting transitional rights in Kosovo;
- Exchange experiences with different countries in implementing the Resolution, contributing to women in peace and security issues;
- Enhance society's attention to and the commitment of institutions in mitigating the consequences of the war in Kosovo.

The Action Plan can be seen as a response to the critique of the KWN in their above-mentioned publication "1325 Facts and Fables" of 2011. That publication includes an assessment of the UN indicators on WPS with systematized, perception-based data. KWN developed scores from 0 (not implemented), 1 (partially implemented), 2 (fully implemented), and a category for "don't know." Also, values for the progress or regress are given for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 during the decade 2001–2011.

The results of this assessment are slightly positive for an impressive range of obligations enshrined in the WPS

resolutions: for direction issued by the heads of military and police in the peacekeeping missions and for the measures taken by Kosovo police to protect women's and girls' human rights, for more women in senior positions in UN and in other international field missions, by the representation of a negotiator (Ms. Edita Tahiri) for the EU-mediated Serb-Kosovo dialogue, for increased representation and meaningful participation of women in national and local governance, as citizens, elected officials and decision makers (though the legal quota has not been fulfilled), for the national laws on political, economic, social, and cultural rights in line with international standards, for operational mechanisms and structures to strengthen physical security and safety for women and girls, for the control of illicit small arms and weapons, and for trainings for security and justice personnel. Regarding indicators for relief and recovery, improvements were observed about the school enrolment of girls with the exception of the minority Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, and Gorani girls, and access to reproductive health care has expanded. Transitional justice measures see progress, albeit insufficient, in the prosecution of crimes against women and witness protection (Subotic and Zaharijevic, 2018).

In KWN's evaluation study on UNSCR 1325, international organizations (UN, KFOR, OSCE, EU) also were asked to report about their gender mainstreaming activities. Some of those offices have gender advisors or at least gender focal points. Gender advisors in international organizations share the feeling of "marginalization and powerlessness" according to KWN's study, unless they have direct access to decision-makers (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 37). Finding allies among men in high positions as well as nominating men in the function of Gender Focal Point (Farnsworth, 2011, p. 37) compensate for the absence or low representation of women in those organizations. KFOR and also EULEX used this dual strategy for internal governance[25].

Without a doubt, KWN was and is a driving force for the recognition of UNSCR 1325. The Network continuously organized activities, such as public debates, awareness campaigns, roundtables, media events, and the presentation of its publications for promoting Resolution 1325 in Kosovo and strengthened their demands by alliances with gender advisors in national and international organizations (KWN, 2014).

Despite these multiple efforts and the continuous lobby for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda also at international meetings of the EU and NATO[26], the struggle for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Kosovo remained necessary. Recently, in autumn 2020, on the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, KWN wrote a public letter to the EU Special Representative for Belgrade–Pristina dialogue with the demand to take part in the consultations with civil society in Kosovo concerning the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. KWN argues: "KWN and its members have been engaged in cross-border peacebuilding in the region, including Serbia, for 30 years. Our members include women's rights groups of all ethnicities. We monitor the situation and liaise with diverse women to

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[23] See for example the press release of EULEX in October 2010 under http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/pressreleases/0101.php

[24] https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/kosovo_nap_2014.pdf (in Albanian, Serbian, English).

[25] Personal observation of the author.

[26] https://womensnetwork.org/?s=1325

identify their needs and priorities"[27]. Referring to the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the Network also addressed the own government to include women in the Dialogue with Serbia[28]. KWN criticized politicians at the national and EU level that they have not yet internalized their obligation to comply with national and international responsibilities of the WPS agenda. It is the strategy of the women's movement to steadily remind the power holders of their duties.

ASPECTS OF GENDER GOVERNANCE

Political-Administrative Governance

The government of Kosovo has undertaken several political-administrative measures for gender governance. The independent institution of an Ombudsperson has been installed to hear complaints of human rights violations from individuals or entities in Kosovo. In 2004, along with the Law on Gender Equality, the Ombudsoffice established a specialized unit on gender equality. In the same year, the Office for Gender Equality (renamed later as Agency for Gender Equality, AGE) within the Office of the Prime Minister was created and each ministry appointed a Gender Equality Officer. At the level of local government, an Office of Gender Affairs with a Gender Affairs Officer in each municipality was installed[29]. In 2008, the Kosovo Program for Gender Equality (2008–2013), a strategic programme to institute gender equality in all policies and programs, including staffing, was approved. After many critiques about the lack of implementation of the Law on Gender Equality with regard to women's political participation called for a national programme and an alignment with the EU Gender Equality Acquis (Morina, 2017; Zymberi, 2017). The new, progressive government of Kosovo under Albin Kurti responded to the critique: In early 2020, he presented the final draft of the National Program on Gender Equality, together with the Amendment of the Legal Framework for Protection against Domestic Violence[30].

An important official for gender equality was voiced by President Atifete Jahjaga, the first female president (2011–2016) in the region and a former deputy director of the Kosovo police. She spoke in public about gender equality and soon launched the establishment of a Center on Gender Studies and Research at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Pristina. She also founded the National Council for Survivors of Sexual Violence during the War in Kosovo. In her Foundation, established in 2018 after her period as president, she continued committing to women's empowerment and rights, social inclusiveness, interethnic and regional reconciliation, and security[31].

In late 2012, President Atifete Jahjaga with the assistance of the US based National Democratic Institute (NDI) hosted the international conference on "Partnership For Change Empowering Women" that resulted in the Pristina Principles. The Principles listed a number of demands regarding gender equality in all sectors of society affirming the rights of women to political participation and representation, economic resources, women's property rights, and access to security and justice, and call for actions to make these principles a reality[32] (BalkanInsight, 2012; NDI, 2012).

In assessing achievements and deficiencies, the Kosovo Country Gender Profile of 2014 draws a critical picture of political-administrative governance: Though the good legal framework for women's rights and inclusion, "(g)overnment institutions at all levels tend not to understand how to mainstream gender within their work. Gender equality officers within ministries and municipalities are marginalized; few are ever involved in programmatic planning, budgeting, impact assessments, and/or analyzing draft laws or policies from a gender perspective." Other actors like women's civil society organizations are rarely consulted by international stakeholders active in Kosovo when setting priorities (Färnsveden et al., 2014, p. 7). The Kosovo Gender Analysis, conducted 4 years later, confirms the underrepresentation of women governmental functions and that "(m)ost primary and secondary legislation in Kosovo lacks a gender perspective, not targeting the potentially different needs and priorities of women, men, girls and boys" (KWN, 2018a, p. 1).

Voices of critique about the lack of implementation of the Law on Gender Equality with regard to women's political participation called for a national programme and an alignment with the EU Gender Equality Acquis (Morina, 2017; Zymberi, 2017). The new, progressive government of Kosovo under President Albin Kurti responded to the critique: In early 2020, he presented the final draft of the National Program on Gender Equality, together with the Amendment of the Legal Framework for Protection against Domestic Violence[33].

These deficiencies in the implementation of the non-discrimination and equality laws extend also to the realm of justice: for the access of women to justice is hard especially with respect to inheritance, protection from domestic violence, and custody over children in case of divorce. Again, patriarchal attitudes are named to explain those deficiencies: "The effective enjoyment of women's rights is affected to some extent by patriarchal customs and tradition, but also perpetuated by weak rule of law" (Färnsveden et al., 2014, p. 19). These "patriarchal customs and traditions" originate in the *kanun*, a code of customary law, going back to the 15th century, which regulated rural societies in Albanian-speaking areas in the Balkans. The *kanun*, mildly said, is gender-biased: it assigns

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[27]https://womensnetwork.org/resolution-1325-requires-consultations-with-womens-rights-groups-in-kosovo/ (accessed October 31, 2020).

[28]https://womensnetwork.org/resolution-1325-requires-consultations-with-womens-rights-groups-in-kosovo/

[29]http://www.stopvaw.org/

[30]https://womensnetwork.org/the-agency-for-gender-equality-and-government-pledge-to-advance-gender-equality/Kurti's presidency lasted (accessed 3 February 2020 until 3 June 2020)

[31]https://www.facebook.com/JahjagaFoundation/posts/162560131223409

[32]https://www.ndi.org/kosovo-summit-pristina-principles

[33]https://womensnetwork.org/the-agency-for-gender-equality-and-government-pledge-to-advance-gender-equality/ Kurti had to step down in spring 2020, a new government was formed but due to the arrest of the President Hashim Thaci in November 2020 and his indictment by the Kosovo Special Chambers in The Hague for alleged war crimes; this government fell and new election is foreseen in February 2021.

rights to the husband and duties to wives (Rexhaj, 2018, p. 35). Women's total submission to men in the patrilineal and patrilocal family arrangement allows domestic violence: "The husband has the duty to teach and yell at his wife, when she does mistakes, does not listen to him and when she does not do her belonging chores. When the wife shows contempt to her husband's words and when she is guilty and violent, then the husband has the right to punish her" (Rexhaj, 2018, p. 36). Due to the inability of the state to provide social security, the family economy, based on the patriarchal principle of assigning reproductive roles to women who also are held responsible for the honor of the family contributes to the perseverance of the patriarchal mindset in the *kanun* (Latifi, 2014). To conclude, political-administrative gender governance does not only require profound laws and government offices and officers, but also a bundled effort by state and non-state actors, critical researchers, and women's groups to install and implement national programmes with in-built accountability (UNIFEM, 2008). However, political-administrative gender governance faces the problem of legal pluralism, when legal norms of the state are undermined by traditional social norms.

Security Governance

Gender-responsive security governance in Kosovo has advanced very far: Security Sector Reform increased the number of police women (in March 2016 at 14%[34]) who have formed an association with 600 members for capacity building, outreach, networking, and partnerships (Stickings, 2015). A special human rights unit and a special domestic violence unit have been installed in the police, and laws and action plans with SOPs are drafted. A National Coordinator ensures cooperation and coordination among institutions to combat domestic violence and human trafficking, respectively (Färnsveden et al., 2014). In the Ministry of Justice, a Victims Protection Division is established. Free Legal Aid offices exist in several regions. Nine partly government, partly donor funded shelters for battered women and children are established countrywide; thus an anti-domestic violence structure is in place. In addition, national strategies for ensuring security governance for women complement the gender equality and the anti-discrimination laws released, include National Strategies against Trafficking in Human Beings from 2011 onwards[35], a National Strategy and Action Plan against Domestic Violence also from 2011 onwards, and the already mentioned Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325.

In the following section, I discuss the two most salient features of women's bodily security–domestic violence and wartime sexual violence.

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[34]https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?2,26,398
[35]National Strategy against Trafficking in Human Beings 2011–2014, Available online at: https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/5025/file/Kosovo_National_strategy_action_plan_against_THB_2011-2014_en.pdf, and National Strategy against Trafficking in Human Beings 2015–2019, http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/NATIONAL_STRATEGY_AGAINST_TRAFFICKING_IN_HUMAN_BEINGS_IN_KOSOVO.pdf

Domestic Violence

With regard to women's personal security, high incidences of domestic violence appear in public debates with big concern (Government of Kosovo, 2016). Already in 2008, KWN published the study "Security begins at home. Research to inform the national strategy and action plan against domestic violence in Kosovo" (KWN, 2008). In 2015, KWN published a similar study titled "No more excuses. An Analysis of Attitudes, Incidence, and Institutional Responses to Domestic Violence in Kosovo". Both studies "assess citizen awareness of domestic violence, incidence, and institutional response" (KWN, 2015, p. 5).

According to the 2008 study, ∼43% women and men of the respondents said that they had suffered domestic violence in their lifetimes, but the figure in 2015 is much higher: 62% in total, 68% women, and 56% of men. On average, annually 1,000 women report domestic violence to the police (Färnsveden et al., 2014, p. 46). Economic dependence by women on male household heads and prevalence of women's reproductive role in gender relations are seen as the main reason of domestic violence. Girls as well as boys are disciplined often violently into moralizing gender roles as mothers, respectively as bread-winners in line with the *kanun* (UNICEF Kosovo, 2014: 70; Qosaj-Mustafa, 2015, p. 10). Whereas, women victims suffered mainly violence from their spouses, male victims suffer from their fathers. Both instances can be attributed to the role of the autocratic father. Also, a more recent survey on men's attitude toward gender equality revealed that 12% of men have exerted violent behavior toward their female partners and one of 20 have admitted engaging in unconsented sexual relations (UNFPA/OSCE, 2018, p. 5).

Patriarchy does not only mean "rule of the father" but refers also to a social ideology (Lerner, 1986). Many women have internalized men's "right" to hurt them as the Demographic, Social, and Reproductive Health Survey of Kosovo[36] has revealed: in case of leaving the house without the permission of the husband, neglect of children, quarrels, refusing sex, and even for burning food, female respondents find beating/striking acceptable. Although the study shows differences in terms of urban/rural residence, education, age, and ethnicity, in comparison, surprisingly, more women approve domestic violence due to their own "misbehavior" than men, ranging from 5 to 30% of the respondents, depending on their age: approval is less among the younger population. The lesser approval by men might be due to the effect of social desirability in answering; however, the data show an appalling attitude toward domestic violence (Statistical Office of Kosovo, 2009, p. 80). Also, the 2015 KWN study found that 21% of Kosovo citizens (men and women) agree that "sometimes it is okay for a husband to hit his wife" (KWN, 2015, p. 5).

Problems with regard to mitigating domestic violence include, "underreporting of violence by citizens; inadequate services available for persons including weak rehabilitation and reintegration programs; insufficient sustainability of shelters; poor enforcement of measures, such as child alimony; some inadequately trained or poorly performing persons within institutions; insufficient human and financial resources in some

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[36]https://ask.rks-gov.net/media/1832/demographic-social-and-reproductive-health-survey-in-kosovo-2009.pdf, p.78 f.

institutions; a lack of professional psychologists; inadequate coordination among institutions in domestic violence case management; and traditional gender norms that contribute to "blaming the victim" and provide an enabling environment for violence to continue" (KWN, 2015, p. 5). Some of these problems are related to human resources, some to insufficient structures, and some to misogynist attitudes (Council of Europe, 2017). In addition, women face difficulties to access the labor market due to few employment opportunities and often have to return home after their stay in a shelter for lack of other perspectives (Färnsveden et al., 2014, p. 23).

As a response to the widespread domestic violence, the Kosovo Agency for Gender Equality together with other government agencies in cooperation with civil society and academia evaluated the National Action Plan against Domestic Violence for the years 2011–2014 (Government of Kosovo, 2015). This Action Plan "addressed the needs of victims of domestic violence by instructing the response of Kosovo institutions on three main pillars: (Government of Kosovo, 2015) (1) Prevention, (2) Protection and Security, and (3) Support, Treatment and Reintegration" (Qosaj-Mustafa, 2015, p. 11). The National Coordinator against Domestic Violence, supported by UN Women, produces annually a list that marks the challenges concerning the understanding and implementing the legal framework and the functioning of the institutional mechanisms (Qosaj-Mustafa, 2015, p. 16). Consultation with civil society, shelter staff, legal experts, and international representatives resulted in an updated Strategy and Action Plan on Protection from Domestic Violence for the years 2016–2020[37] with detailed objectives and indicators. Furthermore, the new Criminal Code, dated 14 April 2019, provides that violent offenses when committed within the family relationship are considered aggravating circumstances and punished with higher sentences (AGE, 2019, p. 121).

In order to improve practice, the Kosovo Agency for Gender Equality published in 2019 an "Assessment of the level of implementation of the Standard Operating Procedures for Protection against Domestic Violence in Kosovo"[38]. It recommends, in line with the Istanbul Convention against violence against women and domestic violence[39], training for prosecutors and judges regarding the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in order to raise their efficacy in dealing with such cases. Also, the police should have at each station a special interviewing room for victims of domestic violence, and protection orders should be routinely monitored.

On the initiative of UN Women, an interagency working group for gender equality and security with NGO representation and inclusion of the government's Agency for Gender Equality and the police officer in charge for cases of domestic violence was created in 2010 and persisted since then. The working group

exchanges information on initiatives and cooperates in eventually joint activities like International Women's Day and the "16 Days of activism against gender-violence/violence against women." The working group can be seen as an informal governance activity of state and non-state actors, expanded by members of international organizations, who all adhere to inclusive and responsive governance principles.

In conclusion, feminist women broke the topic of domestic violence out from the sphere of taboo first through conducting research to manifest the magnitude of the problem, then informing the public, addressing policy-makers and governmental institutions, and lobbying them for concrete steps of improvements, which finally the government siphoned into laws, strategy, and action plans that became instruments of accountability. We see that gender governance in Kosovo starts with a push from civil society before the implementation of Act from governmental institutions. Demands call for the improvement of the legal framework, policies and procedures, awareness of officials, and the society as a whole, institutional and public support for victims/survivors[40].

Wartime Rapes

Security governance in post-conflict societies addresses also the prosecution of gender-based violence during war. In Kosovo, number of wartime rapes are estimated between 10 and 45,000 (HRW, 2000; Smith, 2000; Kosova Women's Network, 2011, p. 82; OHCHR, 2013, p. 40), but only a few prosecutions and even less convictions were effected so far (BalkanInsight, 2012; AI, 2017, p. 7; Haxhiaj and Martinovic, 2020).

In 2012, KWN started a campaign for justice to victims of war rapes on the occasion of an 8 March celebration organized by EULEX, who had at that time the mandate to prosecute war criminals. KWN handed over a letter with recommendations to the present EULEX Head of Mission for fast and sensible prosecution of suspects and comprehensive victim/witness protection. He had distributed roses to the women attending the celebration, but was with this letter persuaded to utter a supportive statement[41]. Also, the Amnesty International pressured EULEX to prosecute wartime rape (AI, 2012). Prosecuting wartime rape is very difficult as there are no DNA traces, and prosecutors have to rely on statements by victims and witnesses. Both, victims and witnesses and especially victim-witnesses (those victims who are called to court to give testimony what happened to them) usually are traumatized what might lead to inaccurate memories, or they are reluctant to report due to feelings shame, guilt, or timidity. Such limitations may be used by the defense to question the reliability of victims/witnesses with the consequence that the case is dismissed for lack of evidence[42].

Crucial governance actors, the then Minister for Integration, Vlora Citaku, and especially the president of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga, who has founded For Survivors of Sexual Violence

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[37]https://md.rks-gov.net/desk/inc/media/52BA49FC-80C2-4172-A2F7-9E83D078F3E7.pdf

[38]https://abgj.rks-gov.net/assets/cms/uploads/files/Raporti%20ABGJ%20-%20Versimi%20i%20nivelit(1).pdf

[39]https://www.coe.int/fr/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168008482e

[40]https://womensnetwork.org/programs/gender-based-violence/

[41]Personal observation of the author.

[42]Personal communication of the author with the Head of Kosovo's Special Prosecution Office, August 2012.

during the War in Kosovo, supported the call for justice for victims of sexual violence during the war. The president had used diligently her position by receiving victims in her office, reminding the police and the judiciary of their responsibility, and addressing the public with the message that the victims deserve support and care (CSIS, 2019).

With the highest governmental support and intense lobbying by women's groups and UN Women, in March 2014, the "Law on the Status and the Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and their Families" included also women survivors of sexual violence as civilian survivors of war. This law is important as it opened the door for reparations. Several ways to find a modus for reparations without stigmatizing or endangering wartime rape victims can be found in the consultancy report[43] commissioned by OHCHR Kosovo (OHCHR, 2013). A Verification Commission, which involved two NGOs (Medica Kosova and the Center for Victims of Torture), who had helped the survivors for many years with counseling and material relief and established application criteria for the victims of war-time sexual violence, who are legally entitled to a monthly pension of € 230,- (AI, 2017, p. 35). Yet, access to justice for survivors and poor judicial performance in the prosecution of those war crime suspects are still matters of concern, because the stigma adhered to sexual violence prevents many women to come forward (AI, 2017, p. 6). Amnesty International also criticizes that the limitation of the period for eligibility for the period between 27 February 1998 and 20 June 1999, the official period of the war "excludes most Kosovo Serb women and girls, and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian women and girls, who were predominantly raped after the end of the war, as well as some Kosovo Albanian women, perceived to have been disloyal to the KLA" (AI, 2017, p. 44).

In order to increase the compassion for victims of sexual violence during the war, Medica Kosovo, the NGO which assisted war victims of sexual violence already since 1999, had invited an artist to assist victims painting their pain on canvas as a form of art therapy. An exhibition of those paintings was shown in Kosovo and has also been brought to London at the "Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict" in June 2014 in the presence of the Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga. Some months later, in 2015, artist Alketa Xhafa-Mripa organized a public art installation, called *Thinking of You*, in the soccer stadium in Pristina, where 5,000 skirts and dresses were hung on 45 clothes lines. Women from the whole country, including the president A. Jahaga had donated the clothes. "The laundry is washed clean, like the women who are clean and pure—they carry no stain," she said (Cole, 2015). Yet, despite the message of the art installation that wartime rape should not be a taboo and that raped women deserve compassion and justice, the installation also serves as a nationalist project that reproduces gender asymmetries: the soccer stadium as a masculine space and feminine clothing representing women's sacrifice for the sake of the Kosovo-Albanian nation (Krasniqi et al., 2020).

In the same year, 2015, in the city center of the capital, a tall statue, named, Heroinat (heroine) was erected, portraying a woman's face. The statue should highlight women's sacrifices during the war and thus appropriates the masculine notion of hero toward women as victims but also as survivors. It is made of 20,000 pins, each pin a miniscule portrait of the monument, and referring to the alleged number of raped women during the war (Ferizaj, 2015a; Krasniqi, 2020).

So far, critique of the slow judicial process has continued: at a hearing at the US congress in 2019, a survivor of war rape together with the former president, Atifete Jahjaga criticized the failure of the judicial system to prosecute sexual violence carried out during the armed conflict (Travers, 2019). Criticizers refer also to the persistence of the *kanun*, the 500 years old traditional, male-oriented customary law that regulated social and family life through a strong emphasis on family honor. The public awareness actions of the paintings, the laundry exhibition and the Heroinat statue confront the old social norms of women's submission under the male rule.

These examples show that gender-oriented security governance in Kosovo needed strong pressure from civil society, foremost by women's organizations. Awareness creation, advocacy, and lobbying, high-level political support, especially by women of power, alliance building with government institutions and with international organizations made public awareness, empathy, and prosecution of some suspects/war criminals possible. Gender-aware security governance with all these components entails also "emotional governance" by reaching out to the souls of the population for compassion with victims.

Socioeconomic Governance

Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe: based on the data of the Household Budget Survey 2017, it is estimated that 18.0% of Kosovo's population lives below the poverty line, with 5.1% of the population below the extreme poverty line, living on €1.85 and €1.31, respectively per day (KAS, 2019). Hence, one quarter of the population is considered poor. Women are especially deprived in terms of access to employment, resources, and power and voice. The employment rate is at 12%; only 8% of property owners are women and 6% of the positions with decision-making authority in the public sector are held by women (Embassy of Sweden, 2017, p. 7). Women's rights to property and inheritance are continuously violated (OHCHR, 2020: 22). Apart from the generally restricted labor market, women experience many barriers for work outside the home: their traditional role as the primary caregiver in the family, lack of care services for the children, lack of flexible working arrangements, and favoring of male candidates over female candidates for private sector jobs (UNDP, 2016; KWN, 2018b). To combat some of those barriers, KWN supports with small grants women's economic initiatives (KWN, 2018b).

This bleak economic situation of women, coupled with low levels of education and inadequate skills for employment bring women into a situation of economic insecurity and into dependence on family resources. Thus, it is understandable that battered women return to violent husbands for lack of any other choice of sustenance (Krasniqi, 2014). Mitigation

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[43]Title: *Healing the Spirit: Reparations for Survivors of Sexual Violence related to the Armed Conflict in Kosovo.*

of economic dependence would require better education and well-designed employment schemes for women. Essential are skills development and professional training, leading to income generation either through self-employment, small enterprise development, cooperatives, and job creation in agriculture, industry, and services (World Bank Group in Kosovo, 2015).

Such approaches can, for instance, be found in the Kosovo's European Reform Agenda (ERA) from 2016 that intends to increase the labor market participation of women. Similarly, the sector strategy 2018–2022 of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare aims at reducing the level of unemployment and economic non-activity, in particular, focus on women, in addition to young people and other marginalized groups (World Bank, 2018). Nation-wide, government-directed initiatives demonstrate public awareness of women's under-representation in the labor market along with the necessity to strengthen women's productive and professional role, aside from their reproductive responsibilities in household and family.

In addition to state-led socio-economic governance schemes, there are some impressive income-generating initiatives by women. Two of them I present below.

In the village of Kruje, where a big massacre took place during which most of the men were killed and all buildings burnt, one of the widows, Fahrije Hoti, founded already in 2002, the Association of Women Farmers named, "Krusha e Vogel." One-eighty women from the Association produce *ajvar* (a relish of red peppers and aubergine, very popular in the Balkans) and a variety of pickles from vegetables and fruits; they raise cattle and sell the milk (KWN, 2016). The founder declares in an interview that she always wanted to work and did not want to depend on charity, but that she had to overcome many prejudices about widows. "But I triumphed and had great success!" (OSCE and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2015; video).

Up in the southern hills of Dragash, the midwife Gjejrane Lokaj established the interethnic Albanian and Gorani-Bosnian Women's Initiative Association. Women and adolescent girls are brought together for training in tailoring, health care, and women's rights, especially about the laws on marriage, education, and inheritance. The activism of the women reached out to village politics when the group presented a whole list of demands to the male candidates for the election of the mayor with the announcement that if the then elected mayor would break his promises, the women would make sure that he would not be elected again[44].

These two examples show that economic security must not only rely on political-administrative security, but even more so on overcoming the gender ideologies around women's "place," virtue and honor, hence the dominant social gender norms (Nussbaum, 2003). Individual initiatives can and do break the barriers of those norms, which are entrenched in limited economic opportunities.

CONCLUSION

In the discussion of the three dimensions of gender governance—political-administrative governance, security governance, and socioeconomic governance—we see that in the political-administrative sphere, the cooperation between state and non-state actors created a solid legal basis for gender equality with adherent implementation structures. Women activists called on those structures when addressing the two aspects of gender-oriented security governance discussed here, i.e., combating domestic violence and the struggle for justice for wartime rape survivors. Their actions targeted the prevalent social norms of family honor, the lack of compassion for victims, and the right to reparations. Also for gender-focused socioeconomic governance, women break the social norms that relegate them to the private sphere. The examples show that women succeeded in entering the labor market and in generating income either through government-supported schemes or through private initiatives.

Ní Aoláin et al. (2011, p. 253) stated that in the post-conflict period, "the strongest emphasis must be placed upon protecting women's rights, the post-conflict work in a human rights framework, fostering equality and preventing future discrimination." In Kosovo's post-conflict era, gender governance rests solidly on women's rights: CEDAW as a legal basis and UNSCR 1325 as a tool are supplemented with administrative structures, national strategies, programmes, and action plans in order to guarantee a gender inclusive approach. But, it seems as if gender governance in Kosovo would float on a pendulum of success and failure. Success lies in the creation of a comprehensive, action-oriented legal system, in a very vocal women's movement, and in a supportive alliance between international and national actors, and between state and non-state actors. Failure lies, as so often, in insufficient implementation of the laws and weak accountability mechanisms to which the women's movement acts as an opponent (Pierson and Thomson, 2018). This opposition is then challenged with the creation of those strong alliances.

In order to make the government accountable, the Kosovo women's movement chooses for continuous public advocacy and smart lobbying in addressing "gender biases and patterns of exclusion," seen as so central for gender-responsive governance (UNW, 2012, p. 1, see page 2). This started soon after the war when the new constitution was drafted, and when international stakeholders were reminded of their responsibility to follow UNSCR 1325. Consequently, the women's movement persistently reminded the various governments to take gender equality seriously. Advocacy and lobbying continued with campaigns to end domestic violence and to prosecute wartime rapes. Women's NGOs, also those founded for victims of the war, entered the business sector and created some employment and income opportunities for women. The strong KWN and its 153 member organizations, its charismatic director, Igballe Rugova[45], its representative board, which includes also a few men, and its diligent approach to governance through documentation,

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[44]Personal communication of the author with Gjejrane Lokaj.

[45]See her portrait in https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,26,806

advocacy, and lobbying is the loud voice for gender-responsive democracy and justice. Lately, also artists entered the scene of gender governance to reach the awareness and conscience of the society not only symbolically expressed women's grievances but also women's solidarity was exposed in paintings and installations. We can conclude that in Kosovo, the transformative power of gender governance combined a multi-actor approach at national and international levels, strong alliances, commitment on the highest political level, and very concrete actions.

For the problems, deficiencies, and failures in gender governance in post-conflict societies, gender relations in a patriarchal gender order are held responsible, especially the social norms that undermine gender equality and women's empowerment (Nussbaum, 2003). From the experiences in Kosovo, we can ask many questions. Why are patriarchal gender relations so sticky? Why is the gender habitus (Bourdieu, 1998) of masculine domination so pervasive? Is it due to the adherence to the gender norms stipulated in the *kanun*, the old customary law, is it male bonding practices, is it the loyalty among former male combatants, is it the gender division of labor, is it hierarchal family ties with a patriarch as the highest decision maker, is it the internalization of a male-dominated gender order in both women and men? The complexity of the gender habitus in Kosovo generates multiple questions each of which deserves elaborate scrutiny. For this scrutiny, attention to masculinities is a valuable avenue.

Ní Aoláin et al. (2011, p. 253) called for the identification of masculinities in the post-conflict context "in order to reveal and yield actual opportunities for women to gain agency and traction within the political and economic sectors." The identification of the so-called "toxic" masculinities has been addressed already successfully by the "Young Men Initiative" in Kosovo. Schoolboys of the age 13–19 are joining clubs where they reflect in workshops about sexuality, non-violence, gender roles, non-discriminative behavior toward girls and women, and caring behavior, and engage in social activities (CARE, 2013; Bates, 2014). A similar project, called "Be a Man," uses also peer education to challenge misogyny rooted in the *kanun* (Ferizaj, 2015b). Breaking gender stereotypes is also attempted by the initiative "Men in the Kitchen" (KWN, 2021).

Such initiatives can shatter to a certain degree the "stickiness" of the patriarchal order as testimonies of participants in those initiatives reveal. Nevertheless, as said above, governance for gender equality requires a multi-actor approach with strong alliances and persistence in identifying and addressing cases of gender discrimination in the political-administrative, security, and socioeconomic spheres.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and has approved it for publication.

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The fight for power: historical women's movements of Russia and Great Britain in comparison

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In the second half of the 19th century, women began to organize worldwide to achieve the goal of gender equality. National women's movements emerged and were followed somewhat later by the first transnational political mobilization of women on a larger scale. The range of topics that were on the national and international agenda included, alongside the access to education and the enforcement of equal civil rights, as well as the fight for political participation, with the women's right to vote taking center stage.[1] The political, social, and cultural contexts, in which women raised their voices, varied. On the national level, female activists often had conflicting positions and their strategies reflected a wide spectrum; the chosen forms and the course of the protest, on the other hand, showed similarities.

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1   This applies not only to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, but also to Chile, Japan, and China, to name but a few (Tripp, 2006, 55).

1 The fight for power: an introduction

A systematic comparison[2] of selected historical women's movements presents an opportunity to map out the differences and parallels regarding framework conditions and starting points, as well as point out the continuities and gaps between historical and current women's movements. With the early Russian and British women's movements of the turn of the century, the choice fell to two movements that were subject to unique historical and political circumstances.

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2   This article is based on a joint research project of Jana Günther and Eva Maria Hinterhuber, which has taken its starting point in an article published in 2017 under the title "Der Kampf um Macht: Historische Frauenbewegungen in Russland und Großbritannien im Vergleich," in Femina Politica 2017(1), 24−39. In several papers, the authors discussed further questions related to the topic. The article reflects these questions and discussions. The authors would like to thank Anastasia Kappo-Klevska and Rebecca Knecht for its translation into the English version at hand and Lotta T. Barabasch for the editing. Nonetheless, any mistakes are the responsibility of the authors.

Therefore, we are using the "most-different-case selection rationale" (Beckwith, 2005, 419), which is relatively rare in comparative studies of women's movements.[3]

The central issue of our comparative case study is how early women's movements acted in their specific national contexts, which external and internal power relations existed, how the women's movements themselves defined such relations, and whether these relations could be utilized for empowerment or were a reason for failure of the movement. For that purpose, we develop firstly a theoretical interpretation framework for the analysis of power and empowerment in (historical) women's movements. Against this background, the history of the early British and Russian women's movement will be described. Based on this, there will be a systematic comparison exploring parallels and differences, and drawing conclusions – including, but not limited to, continued challenges of gender based political mobilization.

2 Theoretical framework of interpretation: power 'over', power 'with', and power 'to'

It is the ability to act and to embark on something new that turns people into political beings (Arendt, 1972, 179). "[T]o get together with [...] peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises" (Arendt, 1972, translation by the authors) is what refers to the creative forces of individuals in their societal contexts and to the correlation between action and power. Social movements – as an association of "political beings" in the Arendtian sense – undertake the attempt to jointly influence social conditions and to advance social change (Roth and Rucht, 2008, 13).

Therefore, women's movements as social movements cannot be dealt with without addressing the concept of power. In the context of women's movement(s) different manifestations of power are important: the spectrum ranges from 'power over (someone or something)', through 'power with' in cooperation with others to 'power to (something)' (Rowlands, 1998, 14) as the "capacity to reach a goal and show resistance" (Göhler, 2012, 255; translation by the authors). Each of these forms also has its drawbacks; additionally, in this understanding, power is not a limited resource, meaning a gain in one form may also lead to a gain in another (comp. Göhler, 2012).

Women's movements are considered to be agents of a change that was won or, respectively, that is to be won in terms of equality of the genders. Women's movements result from and act in specifically shaped hierarchical gender relations. Already in the previous centuries, they indicated complex, heterogeneous relations of

domination and subordination and used them as a starting point for various kinds of gender political mobilization. In this context of gender relations as power relations, it is the 'power over something or someone' that is meant, such form of power that is in the position to exercise control over actions or choices of others by the means of one person or a group, for example according to Weber (1972, 28), or Robert Dahl: "A has power over B to the extent that he [sic] can get B to do something that he otherwise would not do" (Dahl, 1957, 209). From a gendered perspective, women's movements (including those of previous generations) mobilized against the overt practice of 'power over' – e.g., as physical coercion – as well as against its subtler form, that is internalization of control, which makes violence obsolete.

Gender political mobilization against existing gendered power relations shows a further expression of power in the context of (not only) historical women's movements: the 'power with' – to act in solidarity with others, the fact that the chances to make impact are generally higher for a group than for separate individuals (Rowlands, 1998, 14). This is where the type of power already mentioned comes into play in Arendt's sense (interpreted positively in this context), power as "the human ability not just to act but to act in concert" (Arendt, 1972, 143, translated by the authors). In addition to dominant gender regimes, women's movements anchored in specific historical, political, economic, social and cultural circumstances characterized by other dimensions of social injustice. The specific power constellations that result from the intersection of those factors form the field in which women's movements operate. To gain power, alliances are also made with hegemonic actors; power relations within women's movements can be altered and tensions may arise. Co-operation with external actors can lead to successes; however, they also harbor the danger of co-optation and erosion of positions and demands.

Consequently, women's movements differ according to their national contexts, although an international comparison of their specific goals and ways of mobilizing shows considerable parallels.[4] Further, the history of women's movements is not only heterogeneous from a national perspective. There are similar hints that within national movements, the "putty" (Haunss, 2011, 36) of social movements, meaning the specific forms of collective identity (Melucci, 1989; Eder, 2011), are articulated in various ways. Seen from such a perspective, women's movements are not only producers or carriers of social struggles in gendering and gendered power relations. They themselves become a place where power relations reflect and replicate. The 'putty' of identity politics, in particular the appeal to gender identity, consequently provides a trigger for social explosive power already in the early feminist movements. That is, other societally relevant social relations of injustice are targeted and express themselves through demands, forms of mobilization and organization. Where people act in concert (Arendt, 1972, 179), i.e., at the level of resistance protest, it comes even to fighting for power to act, but also for power of interpretation.

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3 In response to a reluctance toward comparative research concerning historical women's movements across national borders particularly among historians, especially related to an emphasis on a 'cultural distinctiveness' ascribed to Russia, we share Edmondson (2001, 165) assessment: She stresses that "[t]he issue of citizenship and gender, however, needs to be studied across national boundaries, and across differing political systems. It is only then that we may be able to comprehend the full complexity of the relationship between gender and power in human society, as well as arriving at a clearer understanding of the true distinctiveness of any particular culture."

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4 "Looking at the nineteenth- and twentieth-century movements for gender equality overall, what is as remarkable as the differences is the extent of the similarities and parallel developments, as well as the mutual influences and interactions" (Edmondson, 2001, p.164).

Conflicts and factions are, in our conceptualization, an inherent part of historical women's movements, in which exclusions are established along with inequality and hegemonic gender concepts. These lines of conflict, however, also enable the broadening of the protest spectrum, the establishment of new organizations and solidarization as well as the setting of new goals. This is where 'power to' plays a role, the power that is generative and productive (Hartsock, 1983, 223) – "power as potential, as energy […], which aside from the own self can be bestowed upon others, and which is expressed in forms of mutual transfer of power" (Albrecht, 1999, 112; translation by the authors). To utilize these forms of power, gender political mobilization under the circumstances of the above-mentioned conflicts depends on continuous processes of deliberation and (self) communication within women's movement(s): in the words of Nicholson (1995, 62) it is always also a kind of internal politics of coalition: "The coalition politics of such movement[s] would be formulated in the same way as coalition politics in general are formulated, as either comprised of lists of demands articulated at a certain abstract level to include diversity, or as comprised of specific demands that diverse groups temporarily unite around" (Nicholson, 1995, 62). The necessity of coalitions between vastly different groups in order to achieve (generative) power together also applies to historical women's movements. The (self-) empowerment to begin 'something new' is a complex collective act.

The aim of the following parts is to describe the struggles of historical Russian and British women's movements against gendered power relations and with that, 'power over', to present whether and how they acted together and in solidarity (Göhler, 2012, 255) in the sense of 'power with' as well as how they managed to reach new goals ('power to'; Göhler, 2012).

3 Historical women's movements in Russia and great Britain between power and empowerment

At first, outlooks on the histories of the British and the Russian women's movements between the fin the siècle and 1917 are presented. In a brief review, the first protests against the hierarchical gender order in the first half of the 19th century will be discussed, and then the mobilization of gender politics in the period between 1905 and 1917 will be examined: This period can be identified as the genesis of the British and Russian women's movements.

The late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century have been marked by massive social tensions and historical events in both countries, followed by incisive societal, political and economic changes. In connection with the social and political upheavals of the time, the solidification of the two women's movements, their increasing visibility on a national level as well as in an international context, the establishment of new organizations, their forms of protest and objectives as well as the internal differentiation within the British and Russian women's movements are traced.

3.1 Russia: socialism vs. feminism

Russia looks back on a traditional and comparatively longstanding women's movement. Its start is usually identified in the year 1863, and

linked to the publication of Nikolay G. Chernyshevsky's utopian novel "What is to be done?" (Chernyshevsky, 1900). Widely received within existing revolutionary movements – "from the Narodniki[5] to Russian social democracy to the Bolsheviki[6]" (Möbius, 2015, 159; translation by the authors) – "What is to be done?" is considered a key text as well for the emerging Russian women's movement (Möbius, 2015), not least because the author closely tied his vision of a future society to gender equality.

The existent gender regime of czarist Russia in the 18 and 19th century was far from coming close to this, instead, it rather reflected the absolutist character of the political regime (Stites, 1978). The subordination of women was enshrined in law, particularly within the moral code Domostroy and the Swod zakonov collection of laws (for details see Köbberling, 1993, 10). However, this is another case in which the actual consequences could vary: On the one hand, there was the unrestricted power of the husband in the countryside (Köbberling, 1993, 12), on the other, early attempts within the Intelligentsiya[7] to establish more leeway within lived gender relations. This was accomplished through subversive practices such as fake marriages (for which, after its publication, the novel "What is to be done?" often provided a point of reference and a kind of script).

From the middle of the 19th century, made possible by political reforms[8] and inspired by emancipatory social utopias such as those of Chernyshevsky, it is possible to speak of the formation of a women's movement in Russia. This was not a movement of the masses, but primarily supported by the Intelligentsiya within conurbations such as the metropolises of Moscow and St. Petersburg (Köbberling, 1993, 13). From the beginning, the women's movement consisted of different currents: feminists, nihilists and radicals.

The first primarily directed their efforts toward social services, associations, and conferences; they examined family, education, and economy through a gendered lens and aimed for reforms, not a change of the system (Köbberling, 1993). At no point, the feminists constituted a homogenous movement; instead, they were made up of a variety of sometimes contradictory strands (Köbberling, 1993, 15). Nihilism, on the other hand, strived for total freedom in an anarchist sense (Köbberling, 1993, 14), which was linked to demands for a right to sexual self-determination and equal educational opportunities for

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5   For a detailed description of the Narodniki ("folklorists"; Schröder, 2010; "Friends of the People"; Stökl, 1990, 574) movement, see for example Stökl (574–582).

6   Schröder calls the Bolshewiki the "radical wing of Russian social democracy" (2010).

7   Schröder (2010) characterizes the Intelligentsiya as a community of ideas, which aimed for the end of the czarist autocratic political system, criticized social inequality and based its worldview on science.

8   The downfall of Czarist Russia in the Crimean War (1853–1856) led to political, economic and social reforms under Czar Alexander II (1853–1881), with a particular focus on the liberation of peasants (Stökl, 1990, 536) and the abolition of serfdom. However, the reforms did not prevent the formation of revolutionary movements within the ranks of the Intelligentsiya, such as the Narodniki, who "aimed for the overthrow of Czarism through the enlightenment of the peasant masses" (Schröder, 2010, translation by the authors), partially through violent means: Czar Alexander II died 1881 in a terrorist attack.

women and men. Goals were meant to be achieved mainly through alternative forms of living, rather than political means.[9]

Repressions after the fatal attack on Alexander II in the second half of the 1880s pushed the movement(s) into illegality, which led to a radicalization of the protagonists (Köbberling, 1993). Among the so-called radicals, who aimed to abolish Czarism through political murder – a goal which they achieved after the attack on Alexander II in 1881 – were numerous prominent women. Topics of gender equality took a back seat, leading Köbberling (1993, 15) to the verdict that they ceased to be a "women's movement in the proper sense" (Köbberling, 1993, translation by the authors). Since the "tyrannicide" of the Czar was not followed by a democratic system, but by the continued existence of an autocratic system, the movement eventually to a large extent ceased to exist (comp. Köbberling, 1993) For the women's movement at large, it is also possible to speak of a "break" from 1881 to 1905.

From the Russian Revolution on 1905 to 1907,[10] carried by a "revolutionary movement rising and declining in several great waves" (Stökl, 1990, 596; translation by the authors), the women's movement emerged visibly (Iukina, 2013, 38ff.; Ruthchild, 2010). A socialist women's movement and a feminist suffrage movement following the British suffragettes proved the most visible (Köbberling, 1993, 16; Racioppi and See, 1997, 20; Edmondson, 2001, 155–156).

On the feminists' side, the focus lay on social affairs and therefore, among other things, on education and upbringing and the fight against prostitution. One of the best-known associations is the "Russian Benevolent Society of Women" founded in St. Petersburg as early as 1895 (Köbberling, 1993, 16; Garstenauer, 2010, 79). The socialists, on the other hand, referred to Nadezhda Krupskaya's newspaper "The Woman Worker" (1900), in which Lenin's life companion rejected "all 'feminist' solutions" to the women's question (Köbberling, 1993, 19; translation by the authors), as well as August Bebel's "Women under Socialism" (Bebel, 1879). The central point was the (main) contradiction between capital and labor that could be overcome through socialism, resolving the "side issue" of the inferior social position of women.

When after the "Bloody Sunday" on January, 9th (22nd) 1905[11] (Stökl, 1990, 596), a brutal suppression of worker protesters of all genders (comp. Also Alpern-Engel, 2003, 254) before the Winter Palace of St. Petersburg leading to many casualties, authorities were pressured into new reforms, including the freedom of association, new women's associations were formed. Among these were the "Union for Women's Equality" in February 1905 (Garstenauer, 2010, 79; Köbberling, 1993, 17) that united a broad spectrum to fight for women's rights: liberal feminists, social democrats, socialists and social revolutionaries. Alpern-Engel (2003, 255) even goes so far to assess that "[t]heir common ground of opposition to autocracy led

members of the Union for Women's Equality to collaborate with liberal and leftist men far more than feminists did elsewhere in Europe or in the United States" and emphasizes, that the Union aimed at speaking "on behalf of all women, and not just the women of the middle class who were their main constituency" (Alpern-Engel, 2003).

In 1907, the Union already counted 12,000 members. It advocated the rights of worker and farmer women, as well as coeducation. Its demands were addressed toward both opposition and government; to the former, it appealed to see the women's question as an integral part, from the latter, it demanded social and especially political rights for women (Köbberling, 1993, 17). Despite the official interdiction of promoting women's suffrage, the aforementioned "Russian Benevolent Society of Women" opened a so-called "suffrage department" in 1905, while in the same year a "Progressive Women's Party" was formed. Indeed, the reforms achieved by the revolutionary upheavals included the convocation of the parliament which had limited rights, land reforms and on December 11/24th, 1905, the enactment of a "general" suffrage.[12] From the women's movement's perspective, this election law proved disappointing, since it granted suffrage to women only in very few cases, bound to specific pecuniary and family circumstances, where the woman acted as a representative.

Three years later, the "First All-Russian Women Congress" was held in St. Petersburg with approx. 1,000 participants (Köbberling, 1993, 18; Godel, 2002, 298; Alpern-Engel, 2003, 256ff.). Though first boycotting the congress, the socialists then decided to send a delegation headed by Alexandra Kollontai.[13] Her position that the solution of the "woman's question" was secondary to the overcoming of class antagonism was met with considerable protest. The resolution drafted eventually contained "demands for work safety and maternity protection, right to education and reform of divorce rights" as well as "the universal, equal, free and secret suffrage" (Köbberling, 1993, 18; translation by the authors). The differences surfacing during the congress "within the feminist movement, but even more profound between middle-class feminists and the few working women in attendance" (Alpern-Engel, 2003, 256), however, led to the end of the "Union for Women's Equality" (comp. e.g. Garstenauer, 2010, 79) which had provided common ground for different currents within the women's movement (Köbberling, 1993, 19).[14]

On the socialists' side, certain accomplishments could be noted within their own political camp. Firstly, from 1913 on, the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) intensified the recruitment of women for their political agenda. On the 8th of March of the same year, socialist women managed to celebrate the International Women's Day for the first time. Beyond that, secondly, the demand to open

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9   Here, too, a novel played a central role: Ivan Turgenev's "Fathers and Sons" (1862) (Turgenev, 2009).

10   During the Russian Revolution the intelligentsiya, industrial workers and farmers allied against the czarist regime. The aspired overthrow of the czar could not be achieved, however, a parliament with limited rights (duma) was established (Schröder, 2010).

11   The difference in the given dates stems from the Julian vs. the Gregorian calendar; the latter was introduced in the Soviet Union and therefore in Russia in 1918.

12   Compared internationally, the introduction of the suffrage and its extension to women is often divided by decades; taking that into consideration systematically would have large-scale implications for theoretical reflections and empirical studies (Paxton, 2010).

13   "The Bolsheviks insisted that the woman question must be solved within the framework of socialist revolution, and their (male) leadership accepted the idea of participation in the women's conference only very reluctantly" (Alpern-Engel, 2003, 257).

14   Shortly after, in March 1907, it merged into the newly founded "All-Russian League for Women's Equal Rights" (Garstenauer, 2010, 79), which remained the most influential women's organization until the October Revolution (Köbberling, 1993, 19).

women's departments was granted, even though these had only little influence. Both parts of the RSDLP, split since 1903, published women's magazines, on the Bolshevik side the "Rabotnitsa" (engl. "The Woman Worker"), on the Menshevik side the "Listok Rabotnitsy" (engl. "The Woman Worker's Paper"; comp. Alpern-Engel, 2003, 159).

The differences within the Russian women's movement became even more apparent with the onset of the First World War in 1914. "Between June 1907 and the outbreak of World War I, the women's movement splintered and lost membership and momentum" (Alpern-Engel, 2003, 256). On the feminist spectrum, patriotic groups openly supported the war, among them the "All-Russian League for Women's Equal Rights." The vast majority – even of those feminists, who did not support it – saw it as an opportunity to change the gender relations, not least to introduce the women's suffrage (Köbberling, 1993, 19; Garstenauer, 2010, 80). The opening of universities to women in 1916 has been attributed to the bourgeois women's movement, without considering the military-economic causes (Köbberling, 1993, 20f.).

The socialist part of the women's movement, however, opposed the war by a majority and showed pacifist and anti-militarist involvement, even on an international level. Together with other socialist women's movements, it assembled at the International Socialist Women's Conference in Bern in 1915 and the 1915 International Congress of Women of the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace in The Hague. Alpern-Engel, thus, relates the divergent attitudes toward the war mainly to class issues, according to which "[w]omen of the upper class had enthusiastically supported the war effort" (2003, 261) in the hope of an increase in equal participation, whereas working-class women could not expect neither an improvement of their material well-being, nor more peaceful times. Military defeats as well as catastrophic supply conditions led to insurrections against the ruling Czar Nicholas II for the population, starting from 1916, which led to his abdication and assassination in 1917 (comp. Schröder, 2010). And it was women's demonstrations that "took place on February, 23rd (March, 8th) [1917] on the occasion of the Socialist Women's Day," that "were going to be the beginning of the sudden end of the Russian czarism" (Stökl, 1990, 635; translation by the authors). Strikes and demonstrations of politically unorganized worker women eventually catalyzed the February Revolution (Köbberling, 1993, 23; Godel, 2002: 299). After the czar's resignation on March, 3rd (16th), a provisional government took charge of the government affairs (Stökl, 1990, 639 and 640ff.); "Russia had become a republic overnight" (Stökl, 1990, 639; translation by the authors).

In hindsight, it appears that feminist organizations seized the opportunities arising at this point. Still in March 1917, a major demonstration for the introduction of women's suffrage was held by 40,000 participants of all genders (Köbberling, 1993, 24). A merger of several feminist organizations into a "National Women's Council" got recognized by the government in May of the same year. During the 8 months of its reign, the provisional government introduced the women's suffrage, giving Russia a historically pioneering role by international comparison, and established the principle of equal pay; even the opening of women's universities was planned.

Assessing these accomplishments in women's politics, further differences between feminists and socialists manifested: the latter "considered a true liberation of women only possible through the abolition of private ownership of means of production" (Köbberling, 1993, 25; translation by the authors) and rejected mere reforms, even within a new political system. The conflict escalated further when a delegation of Bolshevik women ostentatiously left the All-Russian

Women's Congress in April 1917, a further cooperation seemed impossible (Fieseler, 1993, 169).

After the October Revolution (Stökl, 1990, 646) and coming into power by the Bolsheviks, ushering at the beginning of the Soviet era, the feminists definitely got on the defensive. Feminism, a former political fighting slogan, became stigmatized.[15] The growing political pressure on feminist figures led to an increase in emigration to Europe (Köbberling, 1993, 26). "Starting from late 1917, the political activity of women was limited to the Communist Party – any other approaches had been eliminated very soon" (Köbberling, 1993, 27; translation by the authors). During the years following the Bolshevik seize of power, a significant "equal treatment from above" has been imposed: among other things, liberalization of marriage and divorce laws, introduction of coeducation, legalization of abortions within certain limits, but most importantly, the accessibility of work spaces to women and their position within these has been profoundly reformed, aiming at the socialization of domestic work (Köbberling, 1993, 28ff.; regarding the Soviet gender politics: Attwood, 1990; Evans Clements, 1991; Rosenbaum, 1991; Schmitt, 1997).

Köbberling (1993) summarizes the differences between socialists and feminists in the women's movement along theoretical, organizational and practically-political questions: on a theoretical level, feminists strived for reforms, without questioning the political system *per se*, while socialists aimed for a system change; feminists pursued the objectives of women's politics in different organizations, whereas socialists organized themselves under the umbrella of the RSDLP; and finally, feminists hoped for an instrumentalization of the war in favor of women's political aims, thus supporting the war, in contrary to the socialists, who opposed it. These differences had different significance at different times: "When, around the turn of the century, a socialist women's movement started to emerge for the first time, a limited cooperation of feminists in the interest of achieving certain goals (such as women's suffrage) would absolutely have been possible" (Köbberling, 1993, 22; translation by the authors). And indeed, "meaningful collaboration between socialist organizers and feminists did occur during these years, revealing a greater permeability in the boundaries between Russian socialism and feminism than is generally recognized" (Norton, 2011, 237, referring to Ruthchild, 2010).

To strive for goals of women's politics from different – feminist and social revolutionary – standpoints, however, was no longer possible after the Bolshevik takeover. And, putting aside the achievements, it has to be remarked that the strategy of "equality from above" since 1917 has also led to the co-optation and destruction of the proletarian women's movement, which had existed since 1905 (Ruthchild, 2010, 43ff.).

How, in comparison, did the British women's movement act within its specific historical and political context? Which external and internal distributions of power influenced it, and how could the movement influence them, in turn? Which potentials for emancipation did it have, and where did it meet a greater risk of failure?

3.2 Great Britain: constitutionalism vs. militancy

In Great Britain – in contrast to its Russian counterpart – the women's movement succumbed to the changing political and

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15 For more detailed terminology, see Möller (1999, 123, 127).

economic conditions that resulted from the Glorious Revolution of 1,688 and the emerging industrialization. Even though increasing democratization and disempowering of the absolute monarchy were interrupted by restorative phases, the British had a long tradition of parliamentarism. This was characterized, among other things by the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie successive to the reformist politics (Karl, 2011, 62). Women explicitly joined in with the demands for political participation. In "Vindication of the Rights of Women" (Wollstonecraft, 1792), Mary Wollstonecraft highlighted the systemic exclusion of women and rose to become one of the founders of modern feminism (Caine, 1997, 24). Nevertheless, Great Britain in the Victorian era continued to keep women confined to "the domestic hearth" (de Beauvoir, 2000, 172; translated by the authors). Consequently, Jane Austen had to hide "in order to be able to write" and "much courage and an extraordinary fate" was required in order to become "a George Elliot or Emily Brontë" (de Beauvoir, 2000). In addition to this, Queen Victoria herself believed that women who asked for suffrage should simply be subject to the lash (Lloyd, 1970, 5).

The earliest feminist activists found a political occupation in the Owenist[16] union's movement (Hannam, 1995, 219). Thus, for instance, the Owenists/early Socialists William Thompson and Anna Doyle Wheeler insisted in their "Appeal of One-half of the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretensions of the Other Half, Men, to Retain Them in Political, and Thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery" (Thompson and Wheeler, 1825), that women were "more in need of political rights than any other portion of human beings" (Caine, 1997, 59). The emerging worker's movement itself, along with its counterparts in other European countries, had an ambivalent stance toward the women's question. As in the Russian example, this mirrored the idea that with the resolution of class struggle, gender inequality would also be resolved.

In the United Kingdom, women of the working class became members of the Trade Unions (Thompson, 1981, 175). They also organized against the restrictive New Poor Laws, which promoted social division. This meant that public resistance, such as the bread riots and the worker's struggles, were carried by female workers and wives of workers. Consequently, they were more visible to the public eye than the women of the middle and upper classes (Hannam, 1995, 219; Rowbotham, 1980, 86). The increasing, at times vehemently and violently fought struggles led to significant reforms. However, these reforms benefited chiefly middle-class men.

The independent "Chartist party" was formed following the Great Reform Acts of 1832, which instituted voting rights based on property and thereby excluded a large portion of the working class, as well as women as a whole (Engels, 1891, 100). "Women played their role in the general upheaval of Chartist politics. They participated in protests and actions against the police, the established church, against corporate exploitation and the encroachments of the state" (Thompson, 1981, 177). Although in its beginnings, the Chartist movement had demanded suffrage for women (West, 1920, 11), it eventually abandoned this demand in favor of general voting rights for men (West, 1920, 79). The strategic assumption was, that after full

voting rights for men had been secured, "the expansion of political rights to women would follow on the basis of natural justice" (Thompson, 1981, 179). This logic was later echoed by the women's movement in its demands for suffrage, in particular to justify the exclusion of certain classes (and thereby poorer, mostly working-class women).

The Charter Movement is particularly relevant to the construction and specifics of the history of women's movements in Britain because it represents the earliest documentable organizations and strategic mobilizations of women. Not least among these was the foundation of the first organization for women's suffrage – the Sheffield Female Political Association – in 1851, by the Chartist Anne Knight. She justified her activism as follows: "NEVER [!] will the nations of the earth be well governed, until both sexes, and all parties, are fairly represented, and have an influence, a voice, and a hand in the enactment and administration of the laws. […]" (Knight, 1847; as cited in Blackburn, 1902, 19).

Apart from fighting for political power, women in the middle of the 19th century also protested the double-standards of Victorian society regarding moral questions. Women of the upper classes, who were active in social reforms and philanthropic causes, had to face the problem that "men of their own class" were the beneficiaries of poverty in women of the working class, while they themselves were trying to "cure the social consequences of prostitution" (Rowbotham, 1980, 71). The "ease with which men of the middle class regarded the prostitution of working women" ironically contrasted with their "concern for the virginity of their own daughters" (Rowbotham, 1980, 72). With the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and the institution of the Contagious Disease Acts, this gender[17]- and class[18]-based exploitation was enshrined in law. The protests against these laws are commonly associated with activist Josephine Butler, who organized a broad protest of her Ladies National Association (LNA; Caine, 1997, 122). The demands for abolition of the laws were supported by the working class (Walkowitz, 1980, 146). This enabled strategic coalitions across class boundaries. The broadly based movement could therefore realize a repeal of the law in 1886 (Lloyd, 1970, 27). This "cross-class solidarity" (Holton, 1996, 36) was then translated – although not without conflicts – into the context of voting rights. As this shows, the thematic spectrum and goals of women's movements in Russia and the UK show considerable overlap.

Even though since the 1850s campaigns for women's right to vote had a certain public response and such political figures as John Stuart Mill, Henry Fawcett, and Richard Pankhurst, to name just a few parliamentarians, proposed and supported requests for women's voting rights in the House of Commons, their advances did not succeed (Blackburn, 1902, 55).

With the foundation of the National Union of Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) in 1897, the suffragette organizations of the British women's movement managed to create an organizational roof, under which focused organizing for the issue of voting was to take place. The

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16   The Owenist-Socialist union's movement campaigned, among other things, for a fundamental reorganization of society according to the principles of the Co-Operative movement (Schäffner, 1997, 22f).

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17   Women who were 'conspicuous', could, under these laws, be arbitrarily detained and subjected to forced diagnosis and internment (Rowbotham, 1980, 72).

18   According to Judith R. Walkowitz, the law also showed significant state intervention into the lives of poor people (Walkowitz, 1980, 3).

NUWSS – under the leadership of a liberally minded economist Millicent Garrett Fawcett – understood itself as a constitutional organization. The political system was supposed to change on the basis of existing democratic principles. The tactics were limited to the parliamentarian logic of the corresponding lobbying policy that was expected to convince the parties (Holton, 2008, 289). Individual Members of Parliament (MP), who were sympathetic to the cause of the women's vote, brought in the corresponding Private Member Bills.[19] The female activists with their petitions were accepted and treated politely (Lloyd, 1970, 46). However, for the most part, the requests were not brought to a vote because of 'talk out'-practices of the opponents: "In 1890, this happened in favor of a bill about raisins and currants; in 1893 in favor of a bill on the taxation of machines; in 1897 in favor of a bill on vermin and in 1905 in favor of a bill on street lighting" (Schirmacher, 1976, 24, translated by the authors).

The tactic of NUWSS, therefore, did not work out on the level of the Parliament, while at the same time it raised awareness of women's political disadvantage countrywide through special campaigns. Particularly within the industrial districts in North England, the member organizations managed to mobilize a broad faction of working women for the fight for suffrage. Here, the bourgeois activists met politically active working women and female union members, who enriched the campaigns of the previously decidedly bourgeois suffrage movement with their own tactics.

In the socialist and social democratically shaped industrial centers, a new generation of the women's movement established itself. After the disappointing experiences of recent years, they used more radical tactics to make themselves heard. With the founding of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1903 by members of the Independent Labor Party (ILP), the struggle for political determination took a new, militant pace. Contrary to the NUWSS, the WSPU did not accept any male members and wanted to be independent of the party despite its roots (Pankhurst, 1913, 38). Like the NUWSS, however, WSPU demanded only a limited right to vote on the same conditions as men had until that time. Although this form of voting excluded in particular "lower" classes, initially it was supported by the organized workers (Neumann, 1921, 9). Here the British movement succeeded, in the sense of the 'power with', in creating a basis for common action, which was not yet historically possible in czarist Russia, which was at the time parliamentary completely uncoined.

However, a goal of achieving restricted women's voting rights had led to conflicts at international conferences on the issue. So, Fawcett's request in 1909 at the International Congress of the World Federation for Women's Voting Rights, London, caused, among other things, irritation among the socialists Alexandra Kollontai and Clara Zetkin: it seemed unacceptable to them that only members who demanded the right to vote on the terms as they were set for the men in the respective countries could be elected to the Union (n. a, 1909, Gleichheit, 270). Consequently, Socialist women were faced with the question whether there would be "voting rights for the female pocketbook of political power for the owning class and the reactionaries, or civil rights for all those of age irrespective of gender

and, therefore, the political liberation of women of all classes and a strengthening of democracy" (n. a, 1909, Gleichheit, 276).

In contrast to czarist Russia (and, by the way, also the German Empire), however, the British working class did not consolidate with the same force, since Socialist and Social Democratic movements were not prosecuted and oppressed by those in power, but (at least through their male representatives) incorporated into the parliamentary process. Consequently, the women's movement managed to draw on the tradition of "cross-class solidarity," which drew the attention of international delegates at the mass demonstrations (Pappritz, 1909, Centralblatt, 25ff).

However unspectacular the demand for restricted voting rights may seem to be from today's perspective, the suffragette movement pursued its goal, gaining public attention and with increasing radicalism, as did the British constitutional and voting rights organizations in other countries. The tremendous popularity and success of the marches and demonstrations also illustrates the fact that cross-class alliances for the right to vote have managed – despite the modest goal – to convey strategic demands. The commotion and following arrest of Annie Kenney and Christabel Pankhurst in Manchester, 1905, is considered the first militant act, in which they disrupted an event by Liberals, incited a street protest together with other women, vehemently resisted their arrest and spat at several Bobbies in the process (Pankhurst, 1931, 190).

The narrative of a fighting suffragette, which exists to the present day, was established with– not always beneficial – media attention which was also heated by the militant tactics. The emerging militant movement subsequently succeeded in gradually presenting itself as a modern and radical one through effective public actions, in attracting numerous fellow fighters to its side and playing on the attention of the press and media economy by the means of constant scandal (Günther, 2017). This strongly suggests that the women's movements successfully shaped public discourse the way they meant to. The topic of the democratic participation of women was discussed in media and had to be negotiated parliamentary on the basis of petitions, deputations and submitted requests. Parades, assemblies, and arrests near the Parliament or houses of well-known politicians were not only critically covered by the press, but also provided the militant activists with many new supporters (Wingerden, 1999, 76). From 1907, the constitutional NUWSS also opened itself up to forms of street protests and shifted its campaigns more intentionally into the public sphere (Rosen, 1974, 79). Fawcett condemned the militancy of the Suffragettes, but admitted in a solidary letter to the Times that they had achieved more for voting rights for women in the past 12 months than the entire movement had within the past 12 years (Fawcett, 1906, as cited in Marlow, 2001, 46).

Not only the Russian women, but also other European women's movements, such as the German middle-class women's movement, looked to the British campaign as a model and gatekeeper. The "victory of women's right to vote" was first expected here, after which the "beginning of triumph would be in the world" (Schleker Marlow, 1909, 4ff.; translation by the authors). Between 1909 and 1911 due to increasing clashes with the police, further arrests and the first case of destruction of public property, the law enforcement reacted with more restrictive measures and tougher prison sentences. Detained suffragettes called out the poor conditions of their imprisonment, went on hunger strikes and fought for their recognition as political prisoners (Wingerden, 1999, 85). The devastating riots in Birmingham

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19   These bills submitted by individuals could, given the support of the cabinet, become actual laws.

that happened during a visit by the Prime Minister and opponent of women's right to vote, Herbert Asquith (Pugh, 2002, 192) led to the introduction of forced feeding, for the most part in order not to have to release every protester weakened by hunger. The public outrage over that triggered a reaction of solidarity and led to a multi-party alliance of MPs, who worked together on a Conciliation Bill to introduce women's voting rights. The vote on the bill in 1910 was, however, delayed, which led to further riots, e.g., on the Black Friday (Pankhurst, 1970, 492ff.). As a result, the militant activists relied on violent and destructive acts. Intentional window smashing and arson of mail boxes became regular forms of resistance. Golf courses, museums, churches as well as houses of prominent politicians fell victim to the struggle of the suffragettes. Or in the words of a prominent author and contemporary witness: "And so acids were poured into letter-boxes or upon golf greens, telegraph lines were cut, fire engines were called out on false alarms" (Zangwill, 1916, 309). Parliamentarians, former long-term allies and constitutional women's vote activists also became the targets of the militants.

This "propaganda of action" ultimately brought the men of the "ruling class" (Rowbotham, 1980, 117; translation by the authors) to their knees. After the bomb attack on the weekend house of the deputy David Lloyd George in 1913 and resulting increasing police repressions against militant women's movement organizations, the constitutionalists decisively distanced themselves from them, even though they condemned the conditions of imprisonment and force-feeding. The autocratic style of leadership (Thébaud, 2002, 89) along with the stubbornness with which the WSPU's leadership pushed to bring the Conciliation Bill to the vote again through its militant campaigns, were considered counterproductive (n. a, 1912b, Common Cause, 831). A dispute about the use of violence developed in the WSPU itself, too. Former allies from the working-class movement together with those from the bourgeois and aristocratic spectrum, who had been generously supporting suffragettes organizationally or financially, left the circle of activists after arrests and house searches, although they still publicly supported the cause of women's right to vote: "Née en 1903 dans le Lancashire, la Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) qui, adoptant la stratégie et le type de propagande des socialistes, a réussi à faire du vote une question majeure en Angleterre et ailleurs, s'est effritée sous l'effet conjugué du cycle violence-répression et de l'autoritarisme des Pankhursts." (Thébaud, 2002, 89). Finally, the member organizations of the NUWSS were also facing hostility of the general public, the press, and the police. The final failure of the Conciliation Bill also recorded the constitutional flow on the account of the militants (n. a, 1912a, Common Cause, 877).

The "Guerilla Warfare" of the WSPU (Atkinson, 2002, 33) resulted in a "cat-and-mouse game" between the small militant groups of the WSPU and the police. Suffragettes who were on hunger strikes were released, their prison sentences withdrawn. From the parliamentary side, there was an attempt to break this vicious circle in 1913, when the Prisoner's Temporary Discharge for Ill Health Act, better known as the "Cat and Mouse Act," was introduced. The law allowed the release of those suffragettes weakened by hunger strikes, to place them under police surveillance, and to arrest them later (Günther, 2009, 112; Rosen, 1974, 193). Although the law was severely criticized and was seen by the public as a way for suffragettes to attack the liberal government, it opened the possibility for the detainees to gradually pull back from the militant struggle (Pugh, 2002, 210).

With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the government issued an amnesty for all imprisoned suffragettes (Strachey, 1928, 337). The war, just like in the Russian movement, caused a break in the British women's movement. A part of the militant wing immediately declared itself patriotic. Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurst, for example, vehemently supported the government's military policies and renamed the organization magazine "Suffragette" into "Britannia." In 1917, still in wartime, Emmeline Pankhurst became friends with the Russian general Maria Bočkareva in Petrograd. She was traveling through Russia in order to convince the Soviet government not to withdraw from the war. Bočkareva herself had entered the military in 1914 under the Name Jaschka and was appalled by the diminishing discipline on the frontline following the February Revolution. Under the patronage of Alexei Brussilow, she established the Women's Battalion of Death in Petersburg (Hacker, 1998, 215ff). Bočkareva and her battalion embodied the military discipline (Hacker, 1998, 215ff) which the WSPU-leadership aimed to also instill in the Suffragettes, following the motto "One Policy, One Programme, One Command "(n. a, 1914, Suffragette, 387).

On the domestic front, the WSPU saw its task now in getting men for the army and women for the home front, the militancy for the right to vote was channeled into a form of national militancy (Wingerden, 1999, 161): "Just as the suffragettes had used military parallels to characterize the suffrage campaign as a war, so they described their own approach to the world war (Wingerden, 1999, 162).

This strategy, however, encountered resistance, and led to splitting of some organizations and formation of others (Rowbotham, 1999, 67f) such as the Independent Women's Social and Political Union and the Suffragettes of the WSPU (Hanschke, 1990, 34). The NUWSS experienced a similar division: the umbrella organization called on its member organizations to prove themselves ready for showing their capability for citizenship by joining the national military service (Strachey, 1928, 338). Thus, activists of the militant camp such as Sylvia Pankhurst saw themselves united with prominent constitutionalists and pacifists (Rowbotham, 1999, 68).

Women's rights organizations and women's trade unions organized the work of women in the factories, not without difficulties but successfully in the long run (Strachey, 1928, 337). Approximately 23,000 health care workers joined the Voluntary Aid Detachments (VADs) on the western front of the British army, and they were recruited from bourgeois and aristocratic circles (Hacker, 1998, 189). Already during the war, the Conference of Electoral Reform worked out a new amendment on the right to electoral law, which allowed for voting rights of women in a restricted form. The law finally came into force in 1918.

4 Conclusion: building coalitions, exercising different manifestations of power, and beginning something new

As outlined in the introduction, women's movements can never be considered homogenous groups, although they tend to be viewed – especially by analyses within political science – as political actors. Women's movements consist of many currents, sometimes conflicting ones, that at a certain point or over a limited time span pursue similar goals, together or in parallel to one another. They address different expressions of power and depending on their own circumstances

reproduce social power relations, for example class relations, within their own ranks. And last but not least, they move in specific historical, political, and other contexts.

This also applies to early women's movements in Russia and Great Britain. While the British political system was strong and stable and had a long-standing parliamentary tradition, Russia experienced three revolutions and various forms of government, from czarist absolutism through a parliamentary monarchy and transitional governments to a revolutionary dictatorship (Ruthchild, 2010, 5; comp. For consequential effects also Edmondson, 2001, 154, 162–163).[20]

This also has effects on the application of 'power over' as the ability to literally limit the choices of women and, as a consequence, on the struggle of historical Russian and British women's movements against gendered power relations. The Russian women's movement was directed against the exclusion of women from social, economic, and political participation in absolutist czarism (whether by its reform or overthrow), it stood for civilian (e.g., regarding matrimonial and divorce legislation), social (e.g., the rights of female workers and female farmers) and, last but not least, political rights (first and foremost, the right to vote).

In the historical British women's movement, the voting right of women stood in the center of the struggle and was supposed to improve the social position of women in all areas. On the one hand, its approach was built on the tradition of choosing the parliamentary path in order to attain political rights. On the other hand, militant groups did not avoid even violent confrontation with the authorities, while being aware of considerable individual risks. Even if forms and the scale of the resistance were not the same throughout the movement, the joint struggle against the exclusion of women from political participation remained intact.

Exercising 'power with', in association with others, was a continuous challenge for both the Russian and the British women's movement. In the Russian women's movement, the most evident break was between socialists and feminists, while in Great Britain the sharpest conflict line lied between constitutionalists and militant activists. In Russia, the conflict was happening along the intersections of different axes of inequality: feminists saw the starting point for their cause the oppression through gender, while among the socialists the class struggle was perceived as the main motivation (Similar – though not the same – processes can be found in the history of the women's movement within the German Empire. Here, too, actors of the proletarian and the bourgeois women's movement were involved in an "obstinate struggle"; Gerhard, 2009, 67).

These class divisions are not found in the British women's movement on such a scale. The disagreements that arose after the turn of the century were, above all, on the tactics that the movements were supposed to use. Female workers and their organizations demonstrably cooperated for the sake of voting rights for women, although the history of the British women's movement is as much marked by rifts as by new alliances: "It was not a question of struggle between reactionary middle-class feminists on one side and enlightened Socialists from the working class on the other. The political reality of

the Suffragettes' movement was much more complicated than conventional stereotypes betray" (Rowbotham, 1980, 107, translated by the authors).

Feminist politics, as the history of historical women's movements points out, is in this sense always a kind of internal coalition policy (Nicholson, 1995, 62), that is, a conscious joint effort undertaken despite existing differences in a certain constellation and often only for a certain period of time in order to pursue a common gender policy goal. In Russia, the movement has been able to unite under the banner of women's rights for a certain period of time: Under the umbrella of the "Union for Women's Equality," representatives of different directions joined forces for a limited period to work together for the sake of shared goals, which was always possible even during marches/demonstrations. In Great Britain as well the right to vote was at the center of the campaign, but even though the main organizations demanded at least restricted women's voting rights, the unwillingness of the suffragettes to compromise separated different groups from one another. Nevertheless, constitutional suffragettes came to agreement with the organized female workers under the motto "We stand for justice for the workers and women" (n. a, 1913, Common Cause, 360).

A look at the history of different national women's movements shows that individual actors could often draw on a varying reservoir of (generative) power, based on resources like money, education, time, influence, and networks. This also influenced the internal power plane of the movements, and significantly shaped the relationship between different strands and groups. Especially between Russian working women and the Intelligentsiya, there are demonstrable conflicts around this (comp. Köbberling, 1993, 19). In contrast to this, the WSPU grew out of the movement of working women and the Socialist/Social Democrat milieus in Northern England. Especially in its early years, it recruited its members from this spectrum, however, without the broad and generous support of women from the upper bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, its enormous success in terms of mobilization would not have been possible. The WSPU proved unable to uphold this coalition in the long term and lost a share of its members to constitutional organizations, which only started to systematically address workers' organizations on the eve of the World War I. The formation of "external" coalitions with other social actors is also relevant for the strengthening of the 'power with': here is the social support that the movements experience in their respective contexts plays a role. In this regard, women's movements happen to also be dependent on the respective prevailing discourse, which strengthens or weakens power positions – even within the movement. In Russia, the divided rejection of the absolutist czarism enabled, despite the already existing differences, a limited amount of joint action. The conflict between feminists and socialists escalated during historical events; against the different political backgrounds in times of massive change, the individual groups were each able to derive some benefit from their proximity to existing (external) power relations. This is how the feminist women's movement in Russia was able to realize demands central to their agenda in the bourgeois-dominated Provisional Government between the February and October revolutions. With the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, the socialists gained momentum; the achievements regarding the legal equality of women in the beginning Soviet era can be considered their contribution.

British self-understanding was based on the idea of parliamentarianism and the fight of the population for its political

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20 "[W]hile women in countries with representative government fought for decades to win the right to vote, the same struggle took a mere 12 years in autocratic Russia" (Lindenmeyr, 2011, 211 with reference to Ruthchild, 2010).

rights. The movement skillfully took advantage of this rhetoric and put its demand into the context of the common history that highlighted Great Britain as the birthplace of parliamentary democracy and the representative institutions (Eustance et al., 2000, 6). That is why other national women's movement organizations also saw Great Britain as the country which, through its "century-long parliamentary schooling had taken such an uninterrupted rise to ever greater freedom" and therefore would rapidly introduce women's voting rights (Schleker Marlow, 1909, 4ff.; translation by the authors). Support for demands of gender politics by hegemonic, and therefore powerful, actors can lead to their realization, but may also result in their co-optation, as the example of Russia demonstrates. Successes notwithstanding, Soviet gender equality policy is an example of the aforementioned danger of co-optation and the accompanying erosion of positions and demands: The women's question had been considered "solved" (see Köbberling, 1993, 57), and gender policies of the following decades were modeled on various topical considerations of demographic and economic nature. Consequently, they often aimed for goals apart from gender equality (see Hinterhuber, 1999, 112, 2012).

The power of the historical movements of women to act ('power to'), their ability to achieve goals, can be made particularly clear in the struggle against the respective political regime in the certain historical times. In the course of the Russian Revolution (1905–1907), this is shown first by the (newly) founded of women's organizations (facilitated by the revolution movements that in the czarist regime fought for the right of assembly), and especially in 1917 with the emergence of the Provisional Government of the suffrage was introduced as well as the right to equal wages and access of universities to women. During the Bolsheviks' seizure of power, profound changes were enabled by "equality from above."

In the United Kingdom, the generative, productive 'power to' manifested itself not least in the ability of the women's movement to engage in a long-term resistance, to sensitize society and politics using various, partially controversial strategies, and finally gain women's right to vote by parliamentary means.

After the introduction of political rights, a long-lasting effect is not guaranteed, as the struggles of women's movements worldwide after the first and second world wars prove. The question about the reproduction of power relations within the women's movement also came up over and over again, as the critical objections and debates of the early 1970s show: not only issues of class, but also "race" had to be negotiated (Hooks, 1981; Davis, 1986). Even in the present, there are conflict lines along different dimensions of social inequality

within the women's movement that are of great controversy. The overview of historical women's movements can be used to return to longstanding discussions, to take up old threads, to point out and acknowledge gaps as well as continuities, to establish external and internal power relations, to renew alliances or to enter new coalitions in order to initiate something new in the process of collective empowerment.

Author contributions

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Conflict of interest

Publisher's note

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