(Re-)Theorizing the Psyche: Exploring Foundational Shifts in Psychological Science

The replication crisis has exposed deep-seated tensions within psychological science. Beyond technical or procedural flaws, it has raised fundamental questions about the epistemic architecture and ontological assumptions of the discipline. While most responses have focused on methodological refinement, such as improved statistical tools, preregistration, or open science initiatives, these efforts often leave unexamined the more foundational question: what the replication crisis reveals about psychological theory and about the assumptions psychology makes about its object of inquiry, the “psyche” beyond technical procedure.

The goal of this Research Topic is to create an open space for foundational contributions that use the replication crisis as a diagnostic lens on the conceptual foundations of the field. We invite work that examines how psychological constructs are formed and stabilized, what kinds of explanations are being pursued, what counts as evidence for theoretical claims, and how epistemological, methodological, and ontological commitments jointly shape theory (often implicitly). While the Topic is anchored in the question of what replication difficulties imply for theory, it does not seek to prematurely impose thematic constraints, instead fostering open exploration across established philosophical, ontological and methodological boundaries.

Drawing on philosophy of science (e.g., Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Roy Bhaskar, Rom Harré, John Searle) and theoretical alternatives (e.g., critical realism, constructivism, Luhmannian systems theory), we welcome original research articles, theoretical analyses, conceptual reviews, and critical commentaries from psychology, philosophy, systems theory, and related disciplines.

We especially encourage submissions that engage questions such as:

o What does the replication crisis imply about the status, structure, and validation of psychological theories?
o Do recurring replication failures point primarily to measurement problems, construct problems, theory problems, or specific combinations of these?
o How do methodological norms shape the kinds of theories psychology produces and the meanings those theories can (and cannot) express?
o What alternative conceptions of mind/psyche (e.g., constructivist, system-theoretical, relational, critical realist) suggest different standards for explanation, evidence, and generalization?
o How should psychology rethink the relationship between method and meaning when evaluating theoretical claims?

Submissions may challenge, revise, or defend dominant paradigms. What matters is that contributions make their theoretical commitments explicit and clarify what follows from them for the future development of psychological science.