As scientists or clinicians, we all have an implicit theory about how the mind relates to the nervous system, which infuses our research and practice. This theory entails what has been traditionally known as “the mind-body problem.” Intrinsically connected to the question of potentials and constraints of human and conscious artificial life, it still represents an open and highly debated philosophical and empirical question.
The common assumption for many cognitive neuropsychologists and neuropsychiatrists is that by looking at the anatomical brain function or malfunction it is possible to predict the behavioral experience of individuals. This view, often called reductionism, has dominated the research trajectories in neuroscience and psychiatry in the past decades.
Recent studies have focused on finding empirical evidence favoring a non-reductionist relationship between brain and mind at both neuronal and brain network levels. All these approaches share the underlying idea that the mind can be implemented by neural correlates of different kinds and that there is not a one-to-one relation between mind and brain, i.e., it is multiply realized. However, a large amount of literature based on the reductionist approach is difficult to counterbalance.
This Research Topic provides a venue for addressing on a theoretical and empirical ground the challenges fostered by a reductionist or anti-reductionist view in the field of consciousness research, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, and philosophy of mind. We welcome theoretical or empirical research and case studies highlighting the connection between conscious experience and implementation to provide evidence in favor or against reductionism or anti-reductionism about the human mind.
Topics and questions might include the following:
- empirical evidence in favor of reductionism or anti-reductionism
- theoretical reductionism and anti-reductionism approaches
- case studies that decline the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism
- neural and computational models that shed light on the mind-body problem implementation
- the relationship between psychotherapy and psychoactive drugs in the context of the reductionism and antireductionism debate
- comparison between neural correlates elicited by psychotherapy and psychoactive drugs
- which scientific level (e.g., molecular, intra-inter neuronal, metabolic) is the best candidate for testing the mind-body problem
- how can we address on an empirical ground the mind-body problem
Authors are welcome to submit the following research articles: original research, systematic review, review, mini review, methods, hypothesis and theory, perspective, case report, conceptual analysis, brief research report, general commentary, and opinion.
As scientists or clinicians, we all have an implicit theory about how the mind relates to the nervous system, which infuses our research and practice. This theory entails what has been traditionally known as “the mind-body problem.” Intrinsically connected to the question of potentials and constraints of human and conscious artificial life, it still represents an open and highly debated philosophical and empirical question.
The common assumption for many cognitive neuropsychologists and neuropsychiatrists is that by looking at the anatomical brain function or malfunction it is possible to predict the behavioral experience of individuals. This view, often called reductionism, has dominated the research trajectories in neuroscience and psychiatry in the past decades.
Recent studies have focused on finding empirical evidence favoring a non-reductionist relationship between brain and mind at both neuronal and brain network levels. All these approaches share the underlying idea that the mind can be implemented by neural correlates of different kinds and that there is not a one-to-one relation between mind and brain, i.e., it is multiply realized. However, a large amount of literature based on the reductionist approach is difficult to counterbalance.
This Research Topic provides a venue for addressing on a theoretical and empirical ground the challenges fostered by a reductionist or anti-reductionist view in the field of consciousness research, cognitive neuroscience, psychiatry, neuropsychology, clinical psychology, and philosophy of mind. We welcome theoretical or empirical research and case studies highlighting the connection between conscious experience and implementation to provide evidence in favor or against reductionism or anti-reductionism about the human mind.
Topics and questions might include the following:
- empirical evidence in favor of reductionism or anti-reductionism
- theoretical reductionism and anti-reductionism approaches
- case studies that decline the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism
- neural and computational models that shed light on the mind-body problem implementation
- the relationship between psychotherapy and psychoactive drugs in the context of the reductionism and antireductionism debate
- comparison between neural correlates elicited by psychotherapy and psychoactive drugs
- which scientific level (e.g., molecular, intra-inter neuronal, metabolic) is the best candidate for testing the mind-body problem
- how can we address on an empirical ground the mind-body problem
Authors are welcome to submit the following research articles: original research, systematic review, review, mini review, methods, hypothesis and theory, perspective, case report, conceptual analysis, brief research report, general commentary, and opinion.