Imagery Rescripting (ImRs) is a therapeutic technique that aims to reduce the distress associated with negative memories of early aversive experiences. It consists of prompting patients to rescript the autobiographical memory in line with their unmet needs. In recent years, ImRs was found effective in reducing symptoms of disorders such as depression, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and personality disorders. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying such broad effectiveness are currently an object of debate. Empirical evidence has shown that ImRs reduces the negative self-belief derived from aversive memories in different types of mental disorders. However, existing accounts are not very accurate in explaining how this change in self-belief occurs and therefore why ImRs is effective across psychopathologies. We propose that ImRs changes the semantic self-representation encapsulated in the aversive memory by reducing the meta-emotional problem (i.e., perceiving a negative emotion as problematic and unacceptable). Empirical evidence implicates the meta-emotional problem or “secondary problem” in the maintenance of different disorders and has shown that treating it leads to symptoms reduction. Here we hypothesize that: (i) ImRs as a stand-alone treatment may lead to a reduction of symptoms; negative self-belief and the meta-emotional problem; and (ii) the reduction of the meta-emotional problem might mediate the relation between symptoms and negative self-belief reduction. To test our hypothesis, we present an experimental procedure that could be used in future studies. We conclude discussing the existing theoretical frameworks that attempt to unravel the mechanisms that play a role in ImRs.
Diachronic unity is the belief that, despite changes, we are the same person across the lifespan. We propose that diachronic unity is supported by the experience of remembering the self over time during episodic recall (i.e., phenomenological continuity). However, we also predict that diachronic unity is also possible when episodic memory is impaired, as long as the ability to construct life narratives from semantic memory (i.e., semantic continuity) is intact. To examine this prediction, we investigated diachronic unity in Alzheimer's Disease (AD) and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), two conditions characterised by disrupted phenomenological continuity. If semantic continuity is also altered in these conditions, there should be an associated deterioration in diachronic unity. Participants with AD, aMCI, and healthy controls (HC) completed a self-persistence interview measuring diachronic unity (beliefs about self-persistence, explanations for stability/change). Semantic continuity was assessed with a life-story interview measuring autobiographical reasoning (self-event connections), and coherence (temporal/thematic/causal) of narratives. Our results highlight a complex relationship between semantic continuity and diachronic unity and revealed a divergence between two aspects of diachronic unity: AD/aMCI groups did not differ from HC in continuity beliefs, but AD explanations for self-persistence were less sophisticated. Semantic continuity was most impaired in AD: their narratives had fewer self-event connections (vs. HCs) and lower temporal/thematic coherence (vs. HC/aMCI), while both AD/aMCI groups had lower causal coherence. Paradoxically AD participants who scored higher on measures of beliefs in the persistence of the core self, provided less sophisticated explanations for their self-persistence and were less able to explore persistence in their life narratives. These findings support the importance of semantic continuity to diachronic unity, but suggest a more nuanced and multifaceted relationship than originally proposed in our model. In AD, diminished life narratives that retain features of cultural life scripts are sufficient for strong subjective beliefs of self-persistence, but not for sophisticated explanations about persistence. Better semantic continuity, with the ability to weave high-quality life narratives, may scaffold the capacity to understand and explain one's diachronic unity, but this produces less surety about self-persistence.
We draw upon the Associative Network model of memory, as well as the principles of encoding-retrieval specificity, and cue distinctiveness, to argue that self-generated cue mnemonics offer an intuitive means of facilitating reliable recall of personally experienced events. The use of a self-generated cue mnemonic allows for the spreading activation nature of memory, whilst also presenting an opportunity to capitalize upon cue distinctiveness. Here, we present the theoretical rationale behind the use of this technique, and highlight the distinction between a self-generated cue and a self-referent cue in autobiographical memory research. We contrast this mnemonic with a similar retrieval technique, Mental Reinstatement of Context, which is recognized as the most effective mnemonic component of the Cognitive Interview. Mental Reinstatement of Context is based upon the principle of encoding-retrieval specificity, whereby the overlap between encoded information and retrieval cue predicts the likelihood of accurate recall. However, it does not incorporate the potential additional benefit of self-generated retrieval cues.
What makes unique and unrepeatable individuals is their ability to write their own story attributing meaning, sharing it through narration, giving coherence to the information related to the interpersonal motivational systems, and creating alternative hierarchies to those biologically provided by the genetic code. Through clinical narratives and narrative literature, we can observe the recurrence of specific topics, across time and different cultures. Hence, we wondered whether there are some evolutionary suggestions that guide us in the construction of the narrative-autobiographical contents. In this article we proposed a theoretical-clinical hypothesis about the existence of a biological disposition to identify as fundamental six Life Themes (LTs) that contribute to defining the image of the self and the world: Love, Personal Value, Power, Justice, Truth, and Freedom. Besides the innumerable narratives dependent upon context, there may be many ways of telling stories that, instead, would be reported to these few essential themes. A narrative review of the literature about these concepts follows the systematic explanation of the perspective about the LTs as attractors of meaning. The manuscript considers also the process of co-construction of meanings within the interpersonal relationships and the influences of these on the narratives. In particular, we focused on the importance of episodic and autobiographical memory related to the attachment and significant figures, in the construction of the personal story and the LTs. We also explained the possible clinical implications of the theoretical hypothesis of LTs. Within clinical conversations, the LTs could be expressed rigidly or, otherwise, in a confused way. The lack of narrative integration may lead to the dominance of chaos or rigidity that generates suffering. A better comprehension of the LTs in patients’ narrations could be useful to identify a narrative profile about the areas of greatest suffering related to the idea of self and the world, as well as to construct an adequate care plan.