Secure communication within smart power grid (SPG) systems has become a critical focal point in the development of contemporary smart cities, where the integration of information and communication technologies is enabling advanced demand response and real-time monitoring. Smart meters, widely deployed across high-tension electricity lines, perform the essential task of relaying information—such as outage reports and grid status—to utility centers through inherently insecure public networks. While these devices are indispensable for grid management, their extensive connectivity renders them vulnerable to a broad spectrum of security threats, heightening the need for robust privacy-preserving mechanisms. Despite growing research attention, many existing authentication protocols for SPG systems have demonstrated vulnerabilities when faced with sophisticated adversaries, leaving crucial infrastructures at risk.

Recent research has illuminated the necessity of lightweight, anonymous, and efficient authentication solutions that minimize computational overhead while maintaining strong security assurances. Advances such as the development of lightweight protocols employing physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and other privacy-enhancing techniques are actively being explored. Notably, rigorous formal and informal analyses are pivotal in establishing these protocols’ resilience against common and emerging attack vectors. However, substantial gaps remain. Many solutions either compromise efficiency for security or vice versa, and there is limited empirical validation of proposed protocols in real-world SPG deployments. The ongoing challenge is to harmonize privacy, anonymity, and efficiency, ensuring protocols remain practicable for the resource-constrained devices typical to SPG environments.

This Research Topic aims to advance the development and analysis of secure, lightweight, and anonymous authentication frameworks tailored for smart power grid systems. The goal is to bring together innovative approaches addressing the unique operational constraints of SPG environments, with particular emphasis on privacy preservation, computational efficiency, and resistance to evolving security threats. We invite contributions that rigorously evaluate new protocols, present formal threat models, and demonstrate real-world or simulated implementations capable of elevating the security posture of SPG systems.

To gather further insights into privacy-preserving communication within smart power grids, especially focusing on lightweight and anonymous authentication, we welcome articles addressing, but not limited to, the following themes:

• Design and evaluation of lightweight anonymous authentication protocols for SPG

• Threat modeling and security analysis for smart meter communications

• Performance metrics and computational efficiency in SPG security protocols

• Privacy-preserving techniques adapted for smart grid environments

• Case studies and empirical validation of authentication schemes in real-world SPG systems

• The role of PUFs and other hardware-enabled security in SPG authentication

• Formal vs. informal methods in protocol security evaluation

We welcome the submission of original research, state-of-the-art reviews, protocol evaluations, implementation case studies, and theoretical analyses pertinent to the outlined scope.

Are you interested in contributing a manuscript to this Research Topic?

Advances in Lightweight Authentication Protocols for Smart Power Grid Systems