It is a fact of everyday life that people devote time and effort to talking, truthfully or not, about what they know, what they plan to do, and about the outcomes of their interactions. The effect of communication on the outcome of strategic interactions between decision-makers has been studied extensively, both in theoretical models and in laboratory experiments. The theoretical literature has built primarily on models of strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games, while lab experiments have allowed for the flexible manipulation of communication protocols (e.g. from restricted messages to open, chat communication).
The goal of this special issue is to improve our understanding of the content of effective communication between players in games. Therefore, we invite submission of theoretical, experimental, or methodological studies that focus on the nature and content of messages shared during pre-play, interim, or ex-post communication in games between individuals or teams (for communication between or within teams). Relevant work for the special issue includes studies on
• precise versus imprecise or vague language in games (theory or experiment),
• the analysis of the content of chat communication in lab or field experiments, including methods for classifying messages from chat logs in lab or field experiments,
• the role of non-verbal language (e.g. “body language”) in games, including the comparison between the contents of in-person versus computer mediated communication.
Studies of communication that is either one-sided, such as in sender-receiver and principal-agent contexts (e.g. manager to employee feedback or recommendations, but also messages from government agencies to members of the public, etc.), or two-sided, such as in cooperation and coordination games, are within the scope of the special issue.
It is a fact of everyday life that people devote time and effort to talking, truthfully or not, about what they know, what they plan to do, and about the outcomes of their interactions. The effect of communication on the outcome of strategic interactions between decision-makers has been studied extensively, both in theoretical models and in laboratory experiments. The theoretical literature has built primarily on models of strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games, while lab experiments have allowed for the flexible manipulation of communication protocols (e.g. from restricted messages to open, chat communication).
The goal of this special issue is to improve our understanding of the content of effective communication between players in games. Therefore, we invite submission of theoretical, experimental, or methodological studies that focus on the nature and content of messages shared during pre-play, interim, or ex-post communication in games between individuals or teams (for communication between or within teams). Relevant work for the special issue includes studies on
• precise versus imprecise or vague language in games (theory or experiment),
• the analysis of the content of chat communication in lab or field experiments, including methods for classifying messages from chat logs in lab or field experiments,
• the role of non-verbal language (e.g. “body language”) in games, including the comparison between the contents of in-person versus computer mediated communication.
Studies of communication that is either one-sided, such as in sender-receiver and principal-agent contexts (e.g. manager to employee feedback or recommendations, but also messages from government agencies to members of the public, etc.), or two-sided, such as in cooperation and coordination games, are within the scope of the special issue.
