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Insights In Biosafety & Biosecurity 2022/2023: Novel Developments, Current Challenges, and Future Perspectives

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Editorial12 March 2024
Editorial: Insights in biosafety and biosecurity 2022/2023: novel developments, current challenges, and future perspectives

Engineering controls are one of the key measures to ensure the safety and health of the laboratorians. Kurth et al. discussed a previously unrecognized contradic�on in the design of BSL-4 laboratories. For decades, it was suggested that both direc�onal airflow and pressure differen�als were essen�al safety measures to prevent the release of pathogens into the environment and to avoid cross-contamina�on between laboratory rooms. Despite the lack of an evidencebased risk analysis demonstra�ng increased safety by direc�onal airflow and pressure differen�als in BSL-4 laboratories, they were codified in various na�onal regula�ons. The authors provided a detailed risk assessment by calcula�ng pathogen mi�ga�on in maximum contamina�on scenarios. Their results indicated that both direc�onal airflow or a differen�al pressure gradient in air�ght rooms within a secondary BSL-4 containment did not increase biosafety and were not necessary. Instead, they suggested that a reduc�on of pressure zones from the outside into secondary containment may provide sufficient environmental protec�on.High-containment laboratories (HCLs) conduct cri�cal research on highconsequence pathogens and provide diagnos�c services for the diseases they cause. Moderniza�on of HCLs has led to an increasingly cyber-connected laboratory infrastructure. Crawford et al. discussed the cybersecurity concerns specific to these HCLs to raise awareness among laboratory decision-makers and offer poten�al risk mi�ga�on strategies. Rutjes et al. observed that during the Covid-19 pandemic, the surge in demand for diagnos�c tests had a substan�al impact on biosafety and biosecurity. To prepare for the next pandemic, par�cularly in low-and middle-income countries, the authors have provided lessons learned, tools, and recommenda�ons to improve biosafety and biosecurity prac�ces to protect the front-line workers.Ou and Guo provide an overview of current research on the applica�on of synthe�c biology in biomedicine and analyze the safety risks associated with this field. Based on their analysis, they propose fundamental principles for addressing these issues and offer prac�cal recommenda�ons for ethical governance, promo�ng the development and implementa�on of relevant policies, improving legal safeguards, and enhancing biocontainment.Holub and Agena discussed biofoundries, which are highly automated facili�es for processing biological specimens, and that have a major role in accelera�ng innova�on and product development by bringing public and private stakeholders together to share resources and develop collabora�ons on na�onal and interna�onal levels. The authors present an argument for expanding the scope for biofoundries to include roles in biosurveillance and biosecurity. Sabra et al. analyzed the poten�al bioterrorism threat from Bacillus anthracis resul�ng from advances in synthe�c biology, genome edi�ng, informa�on availability, and other emerging and enabling technologies. They concluded that rapid advances and availability of technologies has led to an evergrowing number and types of actors who could poten�ally weaponize B. anthracis.Zimny proposed a reform of the European Union (EU) regulatory system for New Genomic Techniques (NGT) products to avoid placing EU researchers and investors at a disadvantage when compared to countries such as Argen�na, Brazil, Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States.

for the accountability and control of high consequence pathogens and toxins that can have a significant impact on the economy as well as the health of agricultural animals and plants. In two contribu�ons, Pillai et al 1 & 2. described a process using Mul�-criteria Decision Analysis and Decision Support Framework logic tree approaches for evalua�ng: i) agricultural animal pathogens, and ii) plant pathogens to either support their inclusion on or exclusion from the list of agents for oversight and control. In contrast to lists of human pathogens where the impact on public health and safety were the primary factors for inclusion, nonbiological criteria, i.e., economic consequences and impact on interna�onal trade agreements, were of paramount importance in these studies.The need for enhanced biosafety and biosecurity prac�ces con�nue to grow as we con�nue to discover new pathogens with high transmissibility, which can cause major outbreaks or the next epidemic or pandemic. This necessitates that scien�sts around the world conduct appropriate risk assessments and implement risk mi�ga�on procedures to ensure the safety and health of the laboratorians, their family members, and the surrounding community. As we con�nue to

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Anthrax revisited: how assessing the unpredictable can improve biosecurity
The zoonotic bacterial pathogen B. anthracis is the etiological agent of peracute, acute, subacute, and chronic anthrax, an often fatal toxin-mediated disease primarily affecting herbivores, but also encountered in other mammals, including humans, and occasionally birds. B. anthracis is one of the high-priority and most dangerous biological weapon agents of statesponsored bioweapon programs since World War I. Anthrax was also employed in terrorist and bio-crime attacks causing enormous economic damage and societal disruption. This study transdisciplinarily explores many intertwined fields within public health, natural science and security studies to question the widespread narrative, that significant advances in science and technology could increase the anthrax biothreat and its accessibility to a broader realm of actors. It evaluates if and how synthetic biology, genome editing, information availability, and other emerging and converging sciences and technologies would impact a contemporary attempt to use B. anthracis as a weapon of bioterror. Drawing on novel countermeasure capabilities including diagnostics, treatment, decontamination and prevention, this study suggests necessary biosecurity architecture adaptation to prevent a bioterrorist anthrax attack from occurring and/or protect against it, to increase the ability to react during such an event, and to mitigate its subsequent impact. Being the first of its kind, it will be of value for all involved stakeholders and hopefully raise awareness in the broader scientific community.

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18 citations

ORIGINAL RESEARCH
25 July 2023
Cyberbiosecurity in high-containment laboratories
Elizabeth Crawford, 6 more and Nicole Tensmeyer
Cyberbiosecurity in high-containment laboratories
High-containment laboratories (HCLs) conduct critical research on infectious diseases, provide diagnostic services, and produce vaccines for the world's most dangerous pathogens, often called high-consequence pathogens (HCPs). The modernization of HCLs has led to an increasingly cyberconnected laboratory infrastructure. The unique cyberphysical elements of these laboratories and the critical data they generate pose cybersecurity concerns specific to these laboratories. Cyberbiosecurity, the discipline devoted to the study of cybersecurity risks in conjunction with biological risks, is a relatively new field for which few approaches have been developed to identify, assess, and mitigate cyber risks in biological research and diagnostic environments. This study provides a novel approach for cybersecurity risk assessment and identification of risk mitigation measures by applying an asset-impact analysis to the unique environment of HCLs. First, we identified the common cyber and cyberphysical systems in HCLs, summarizing the typical cyberworkflow. We then analyzed the potential adverse outcomes arising from a compromise of these cyber and cyberphysical systems, broadly categorizing potential consequences as relevant to scientific advancement, public health, worker safety, security, and the financial well-being of these laboratories. Finally, we discussed potential risk mitigation strategies, leaning heavily on the cybersecurity materials produced by the Center for Internet Security (CIS), including the CIS Controls ® , that can serve as a guide for HCL operators to begin the process of implementing risk mitigation measures to reduce their cyberbiorisk and considering the integration of cyber risk management into existing biorisk management practices. This paper provides a discussion to raise awareness among laboratory decision-makers of these critical risks to safety and security within HCLs. Furthermore, this paper can serve as a guide for evaluating cyberbiorisks specific to a Cyberbiosecurity in High-Containment Laboratories 2 laboratory by identifying cyber-connected assets and the impacts associated with a compromise of those assets.

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As the world continues to battle the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, it is a stark reminder of the devastation biological threats can cause. In an unprecedented way the global community saw a massive surge in the demand for diagnostic capacities, which had a substantial impact on biosafety and biosecurity. Laboratories had to cope with a surge in laboratory testing capacity, while resources and training possibilities were limited. In addition, the pandemic highlighted the impact biological threats can have, thereby giving rise to new dialogue about biosecurity and new biological threats. This paper aims to highlight some of the most pressing issues regarding biosafety and biosecurity observed during the COVID-19 pandemic with special focus on low and lower middle-income countries. The authors provide lessons learned, tools and recommendations to improve future biosafety and biosecurity and increase preparedness for the next global health crisis.

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22 citations