Evelina Gisela Lezcano
Carlos Gustavo González Morel
Eva Nara Pereira
Danilo Fernández Ríos- 1Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Asunción, Asunción, Paraguay
- 2Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias de la Salud, Universidad Nacional de Asunción, San Lorenzo, Paraguay
- 3Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad Nacional de Asunción, San Lorenzo, Paraguay
The legal protection of in vitro embryos in Paraguay remains unresolved because no specific legislation regulates assisted reproductive technologies. This study analysed Paraguay's constitutional framework, Civil Code, judicial rulings, and international treaties through doctrinal legal analysis, complemented by a comparative review of international regulations and jurisprudence. Findings show that the Paraguayan doctrine and courts consider conception to occur at fertilisation, while the Inter-American Court of Human Rights associates conception with implantation. This difference generates tension between domestic law and international treaty obligations. A comparative analysis with the United Kingdom, Spain, Argentina, and Italy revealed diverse regulatory models and highlighted significant gaps in Paraguayan law concerning embryo storage, research, donation, consent, and dispute resolution. This work provides a comprehensive review of the challenges that Paraguay faces in developing a regulatory framework that balances respect for constitutional principles, alignment with international obligations, and nuanced ethical considerations of human embryos and reproductive rights.
1 Introduction
Definitions have a foundational role in both legal and scientific reasoning. In law, definitions determine how facts and conduct are classified under applicable norms. In science, definitions aim for precision by delimiting phenomena based on the current state of knowledge. When legal frameworks seek to regulate scientific development, definitional clarity becomes both a linguistic necessity and a normative act. The case of the human embryo exemplifies this tension, as the term may acquire distinct meanings depending on whether it is invoked by a biologist, ethicist, or judge (1).
The term ‘in vitro embryo’ historically refers to embryos that are developed within a laboratory setting using controlled culture conditions (2–4). This approach is integral to various assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), particularly in vitro fertilisation (IVF), which involves the process of fertilising an oocyte with sperm in vitro, followed by culturing the resulting embryos before they are transferred to the uterus or cryopreserved for future use (5).
ARTs comprise a range of interventions (6) and are typically categorized into three broad levels. First-level techniques are minimally invasive and involve procedures such as intrauterine insemination, which can be performed with or without prior ovarian stimulation. These methods are commonly used in donor sperm treatment and ovulatory disorders. Second-level techniques are more complex and invasive, involving direct manipulation of male and female gametes, as well as IVF procedures. This category includes IVF with embryo transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and cryopreservation of gametes and embryos. Clinicians recommend these methods when preimplantation genetic testing is necessary to prevent genetic disorders. Third-level techniques require surgical intervention under general anaesthesia. These procedures involve laparoscopic oocyte retrieval, intra-tubal transfer of gametes, zygotes, or embryos, and microsurgical sampling of sperm directly from the testicles or epididymides (7).
Scientific advancements in ARTs and stem cell research have progressively destabilized the traditional understanding of what constitutes an embryo (8, 9). The concept of the in vitro embryo now also includes laboratory-generated structures derived from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells (1, 10). Although these stem cell–based embryo models do not result from fertilisation, they reproduce key stages of natural embryonic development. Such developments challenge legal categories rooted in older biological assumptions and raise questions regarding the beginning of life, moral status, and limits of permissible use.
Legal systems have shown varying responses to these challenges. Spain, for example, introduced the concept of the ‘pre-embryo’ (11) and anchored regulatory thresholds in developmental criteria such as the 14-day post-fertilisation rule (12). The European Court of Justice has defined embryos based on their inherent capacity to develop into human beings. Many jurisdictions instead use ambiguous or variably qualified terms such as ‘early human embryo,’ or ‘pre-implantation embryo.’ These definitions rarely correspond directly to scientific classifications; instead, they reflect negotiated compromises between ethical considerations, legal issues, and societal values (1).
ARTs also challenge the traditional understanding of the beginning of human life and personhood. Therefore, the legal field is increasingly confronted with the task of distinguishing between the biological inception of human life and the point at which an in vitro embryo is recognised as a person with legal rights. This distinction influences a wide array of considerations about the definition of personhood.1 Although extensive literature exists on the ethical considerations of ARTs, research focusing on the legal status and protection of in vitro embryos, particularly in Paraguay, remains limited (15, 16).
2 Paraguayan legal context
2.1 Interpretations of conception
In Paraguay, no specific legislation currently outlines in vitro embryos and ARTs (17), leading to a lack of legal protection for embryos that have not yet been implanted (15, 16). This has resulted in a lack of clarity regarding the scope of constitutional rights.
Paraguay's regulatory framework is articulated based on constitutional norms that guarantee the protection of the right to life, reproductive rights, and access to reproductive health plans. International treaties, incorporated into domestic laws, constitute a component of these regulations. The rights and principles enshrined in these instruments serve as guides for protecting life during the early stages of development (Table 1).
Table 1. Evolution of Paraguayan legislation related to the protection of the right to life from 1985 to 2017.
The Constitution guarantees the right to life from the moment of conception, as stipulated in Article 4. This protection is reinforced by the incorporation of international treaties ratified by law, including the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (18, 19), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 and Convention on the Rights of the Child.3 However, the precise meaning of the term “conception” remains a topic of contemporary debate, particularly regarding its exact beginning, which is crucial for rendering rights effective (22).
The Paraguayan Civil Code acknowledges the inception of a natural person from the moment of conception, albeit without delineating the precise instant at which this occurs. In the absence of any explicit reference to ‘in the mother's womb’ in the Civil Code to denote conception, the domestic legal doctrine has endeavoured to bridge this interpretive gap. Consequently, it can be inferred that human life conceived via IVF is legally safeguarded (23).
It has been argued that the conception of a new human being should be viewed as the moment when fertilisation occurs, either inside or outside the mother's womb, through ARTs in a laboratory (23). This perspective holds that the embryo, whether implanted or not, has personhood and is entitled to legal protection, albeit in a limited and conditional manner, because it must be born alive. Therefore, the destruction of embryos is equivalent to that of human life (24–27).
2.2 Judicial ruling in Paraguay
Paraguay's judicial system has been subject to contentious issues. In 2018, an amparo4 action was initiated, which led the courts to examine the legal safeguards for the embryo in the case of ‘Amparo promoted by MCGG v PG Director of Clínica G’. The plaintiff's main request was to compel the clinic to continue with IVF treatment, which had been halted because of the male donor's refusal to proceed with the final stage of embryo implantation into the mother's uterus. The Adolescent Criminal Appeals Chamber of the Capital, resolved to grant the protection action, promoted and, consequently, forced the clinic to continue the embryo implantation procedure. The Chamber argued that the National Constitution establishes the right to life from conception, interpreting the term conception as the moment of fertilisation of the oocyte with sperm. Therefore, denying embryo implantation in the mother's womb would be an attack on the right to life (29).
The Chamber conducted an exhaustive analysis of domestic legislation, commencing with the Constitution, which safeguards the right to life from the moment of conception. Subsequently, it referred to the Penal Code, wherein it equates the terms ‘embryo’ and ‘foetus’ for the purpose of protecting the right to life, thereby establishing that anyone causing the death of an embryo would be subject to the criminal offence of abortion.
Additionally, the Court cited the Civil Code and the Code of Childhood and Adolescence, which grant protection to unborn individuals from the time of conception. The Court provided an interpretation of the term ‘conception,’ asserting that it should be defined as the moment of fertilisation, irrespective of whether it occurs within or outside the mother's womb (30). Considering this interpretation, the Court decided that conception had already occurred in the case under examination.
After thoroughly examining the issue of the commencement of the right to life, the Court attended to the claim made by the male donor that his readiness to revoke informed consent for treatment should be considered. In this regard, the Court employed the Estoppel5 judicial device to fortify the irrevocability of informed consent, grounded in the fact that the male donor, who agreed to undergo treatment by signing a contract, was obligated to engage in conduct consistent with this commitment.
Finally, the Court decided to grant a protective order and ordered the clinic to proceed with the implantation of the embryos in the petitioner's uterus. This ruling highlights the balance of rights between the right to life on one hand, and the right to privacy and not wanting to be a father, on the other, offering a conclusion that could contrast with the position assumed by Paraguay, specifically regarding that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the ruling Artavia Murillo vs. Costa Rica.
Regarding the analysis of the doctrine and the preceding ruling, it is evident that conception is linked to fertilisation. This indicates that life begins at the instant the oocyte is fertilised by sperm and is not contingent upon whether this occurs spontaneously or through artificial means in the laboratory. An in vitro embryo is categorised as analogous to the classification of unborn individuals in the Paraguayan Civil Code. This designation implies that the embryo is entitled to rights commencing from the moment of conception, under the condition that it is born alive.
3 Discussion
3.1 Legal and ethical considerations
The legal status of human in vitro embryos ranges from being considered a person to being viewed as mere property. The concept of an embryo as a person from conception is debated, with some arguing that life is a continuum from conception to death and that the transition from potential person to person occurs at birth (32).
The perspective that human life commences at the moment of conception, which is characterised by the fusion of male sperm and female oocyte, is a prominent viewpoint in the domain of reproductive rights. This perspective emphasises the emergence of a distinct biological entity with a unique genetic legacy (33) entitled to legal and ethical protection from the moment of conception. This viewpoint significantly influences the legal and political discourse regarding the rights of the embryo and its protection, particularly in debates surrounding ARTs, cellular research, and reproductive rights. The significance of this perspective is evident in its impact on shaping the laws and policies related to the inception of human development.
Another relevant aspect of this discussion is the nesting perspective, which posits that human life commences at the moment of embryo implantation in the uterus, a process that occurs between days 8 and 9 after fertilisation (34) (Figure 1). This stage signifies the onset of pregnancy, which can be identified by the presence of the human chorionic gonadotropin hormone in women (3).
Figure 1. Pre-implantation, implantation, and post-implantation. The gametes fuse during fertilization to form the zygote. The blastocyst forms around day 5. The blastocyst begins to implant and invades the uterine epithelium around day 7. Around day 12, the inner surface of the trophoblast and the outer region of the amniotic ectoderm and yolk sac endoderm are covered by the extraembryonic mesoderm. The figure was created in BioRender. https://app.biorender.com/citation/67f7d37a44eae55a5bad0035.
Advocates of the nesting perspective argue that, with nesting, the new individual acquires traits that define uniqueness or the quality of being unique, and individuality or the quality of being one (35). Prior to nesting, an embryo can divide and produce identical individuals (monozygotic twins) (27), and a large number of embryos can be discarded naturally (36). Therefore, there is a certain possibility of development only after implantation, and with this, the embryo becomes a subject of protection. The coexistence of an embryo and its mother is necessary for the embryo to have the elements required for its development and growth; this condition occurs only at the time of implantation (3, 37).
The central nervous system formation offers a unique perspective on this debate, arguing that a pivotal moment in human life is linked to the formation of the primitive nervous system, which is a process that occurs after nesting. This development occurs during the gastrulation phase, when the embryo transforms from a bipartite structure consisting of the epiblast and hypoblast into a three-layer configuration composed of the ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm. During this transition, the first signs of nervous system formation are evident (38).
Advocates contend that the inception of cerebral activity signifies the initiation of human existence because the capability of the brain is a distinguishing characteristic of human beings in relation to other life forms. Experts typically concur that this stage occurs approximately 14–15 days after fertilisation (3, 27).
Proponents of granting protection posited that the embryo, with its potential for human life, should have the same status as a child or adult (39). Conversely, critics have argued that since an embryo is composed of cells, it should not be considered a person until implantation in the womb, and thus should not be conferred a special protected status. This reflects the tension between viewing the embryo as potential human life and as a cluster of cells (40).
3.2 The 14-day rule
The Warnock Report6 (WR) of the United Kingdom serves as a prominent illustration of applying the central nervous system formation in a legal context (41). This report was produced by a panel of experts commissioned to provide recommendations on ART. WR centres on the significant question of the embryo's status, eliciting different viewpoints. The decision to use the formation of the “primitive streak” in the early embryo as a basis for the 14-day rule was a key decision. This rule has been used as a guideline for experimental research in this field for decades (42).
WR declined to address the ontological question of whether an embryo becomes a person or provides a definitive response. Instead, it emphasises the need to treat embryos ethically (43). The report argued that the embryo should be legally protected from day 14 of gestation (14-day period post-fertilisation), which coincides with the emergence of the primitive streak of the nervous system (12). The primary consequence of this conclusion is that scientific research is permissible with embryos that develop up to day 14 of gestation and forbids research on embryos after the 14th day of existence (44, 45).
WR justified the 14-day restriction by presenting both utilitarian and scientific arguments. Utilitarian arguments emphasised the potential advantages of research, whereas scientific arguments were largely influenced by the advice of embryologist Dr. Anne McLaren, who believed that individual human life begins around the time when the appearance of the primitive streak of the brain is observed (46). However, WR recognised that the 14-day limit was an arbitrary compromise designed to alleviate public concerns and provide scientists with the necessary time and conditions for experimentation (43, 47).
3.3 International perspectives
Legal systems exhibit significant diversity in their approaches to defining and regulating the legal status of embryos. This diversity is shaped by a combination of scientific, ethical, religious, and socio-political factors that influence both statutory laws and regulatory practices.
Countries such as Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Singapore leave room for interpretation within regulatory guidelines, allowing flexibility in application. This strategy can lead to ambiguity but also enables adaptation as new medical knowledge emerges. Other countries maintain minimal or no formal regulations regarding ARTs, where professional bodies may issue guidelines but lack legislative authority (7, 48).
Australia's ART Act 2024 is being implemented in stages. The primary objective is to enhance public confidence by introducing increased oversight, transparency, and safeguards. The legislation prioritizes the welfare and interests of individuals undergoing ART procedures and emphasizes the well-being of ART-conceived individuals (49).
Switzerland initially had restrictive ART laws prohibiting the culture of more than three zygotes. This led to the transfer of cleavage-stage and multiple embryos to avoid the risk of no embryo being available for transfer on day 5, resulting in high rates of multiple births. In 2017, Swiss ART regulations became more permissive, allowing up to 12 zygotes to be cultured and cryopreserved as blastocysts. This has led to an increase in single and blastocyst embryo transfers, reducing multiple births. Legislative change also caused an increase in both fresh and frozen embryo transfers and a shift from cleavage-stage to blastocyst transfers (50).
In the Philippines, the Reproductive Health Law is among the most controversial pieces of legislation. In a country with a predominantly Catholic population, various religious and conservative groups have questioned its constitutionality and actively sought to delay or block its implementation. While reproductive health care is defined as access to a full range of methods, facilities, services, and supplies that support reproductive health and well-being by addressing related issues, it does not include any mention of ARTs in its provisions (51).
In regions such as Muslim-majority countries, religious doctrines exert a pronounced influence, and ART regulation has been shaped by both legislative actions and fatwas7, which serve as guidelines within Sunni Muslim contexts. While these fatwas have guided regulatory developments for subsequent regulations, their dissemination and implementation have varied widely (53).
Understanding Paraguay's legal stance for the protection of in vitro embryos requires contextualisation within comparative legislative models. Different jurisdictions have addressed embryo protection through ‘value-oriented,’ ‘procedure-oriented,’ or ‘hybrid’ regulatory approaches (54). A comparative analysis reveals variation in how legal systems protect in vitro embryos, allowing for a more precise assessment of Paraguay's position within the global spectrum of reproductive rights legislation. Here, we selected the United Kingdom, Spain, Argentina, and Italy to represent the three regulatory approaches (Table 2).
Table 2. Comparative overview of the regulations on assisted reproductive techniques and embryo protection.
These approaches differ based on specific legal elements (55, 56): (i) legal status of in vitro (non-implanted) embryos, (ii) access to and practice of ARTs, (iii) informed consent requirements, (iv) embryo donation policies, (v) embryo cryopreservation regulations, (vi) disposal of surplus embryos, (vii) use of embryos for scientific research and experimentation, and (viii) pre-implantation genetic diagnosis protocols.
The United Kingdom and Spain apply ‘procedure-oriented’ approaches, influenced by WR and subsequently undergoing legislative reforms (57). Italy exemplifies a ‘value-oriented’ approach, emphasizing the protection of in vitro embryos. Argentina, on the other hand, has embraced a regulatory framework that aligns with the ‘hybrid’ approach. However, it remains in its nascent stage and is somewhat limited in scope compared to other jurisdictions.
3.4 Rulings of the inter-American court and foreign jurisdictional bodies
The Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica ruling of 2012 by the IACtHR was a significant legal decision regarding the protection of in vitro embryos, considering various perspectives on the beginning of human life and the use of ARTs (Table 3). This case began with Executive Decree 24029-S issued by Costa Rica's Ministry of Health on 3 February 1995 which authorised and regulated the practice of IVF exclusively for married couples (58).
Table 3. Comparative analysis of international judicial decisions on the beginning of human life and the protection of in vitro embryos.
The decree was challenged because it violated the right to life, leading the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica to declare it unconstitutional and ban IVF treatment. This ruling also prohibited ARTs in Costa Rica. Consequently, many couples were forced to suspend treatment or seek treatment abroad.
IACtHR decision in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica was significant in protecting women's procreative autonomy and reinforcing an interpretation of the ‘right to life’ that favours procreative autonomy. It revoked a previous decision by the Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica which banned IVF (59). The ruling emphasised reproductive rights as a human right and placed women's rights over embryo rights. It differentiated between fertilisation and conception, arguing that the legal protection of an embryo from conception does not apply between its creation by fertilisation and implantation in utero (6).
Costa Rica was the only country in Latin America that completely banned access to IVF, citing embryos’ right to life. This position was challenged by the IACHR and later by the IACtHR (60). Its influence on other Latin American countries, including laws regarding the beginning of life and ARTs, has been noted (61, 62).
The primary issue with which the IACtHR grapples is the interpretation of Article 4.1 of ACHR, which pertains to the right to life protected from the moment of conception. Article 1.2 of the ACHR defines a person as a human being. The central question is whether in vitro embryos can be considered humans (2). The IACtHR went into the interpretation of the terms, ‘conception’ and ‘in general.’ It asserted that given the absence of a consensus at the beginning of life, the term “conception” should be understood as the moment of implantation. Therefore, it is inappropriate to apply Article 4.1 of the ACHR before this event occurs.
The IACtHR highlights that scientific evidence distinguishes between two crucial moments in embryonic development: fertilisation and implantation. Only after the completion of the second event could conception be considered to have occurred. Fertilisation of the oocyte results in a cell with sufficient genetic information for the potential development into a human being, and the lack of implantation into the maternal uterus nullifies the possibility of development.
Regarding the expression, ‘in general,’ the IACtHR maintained that it allows for exceptions to be made to the principle of protecting the right to life from conception. The IACtHR further supported its argument by emphasising that the right to life is not an absolute right that justifies the complete denial of other rights and that the protection of life is gradual and incremental, varying depending on the degree of development.
The Supreme Court of the Nation in Argentina adopted a unique stance on the issue of conception, asserting that it occurs at the moment of fertilisation (63). Consequently, the Court determined that the embryo should be recognised as an individual from that instant onwards. This interpretation adhered to lower court rulings (64, 65) until the implementation of the new Civil Code in 2015 (66) and Law 26862/2013 (67), which established the regulations for access to ARTs.
After the enactment of these regulations, there has been a trend towards granting embryos special protection without assigning rights until implantation. Argentine courts adopted the same interpretation as the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo vs. Costa Rica, granting rights to the embryo from the moment of implantation, and national norms established the revocability of informed consent until the moment of implantation (68).
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court of Spain has examined the constitutionality of legislation pertaining to abortion (69), embryo and foetal donation and use (70), and ARTs (71). In these deliberations, it adhered to a consistent line of interpretation; while denying the unborn child8 the ownership of the right to life, it acknowledged that it deserves special protection as a constitutionally protected legal entity. Consequently, the legality of permissible embryo experimentation has been upheld, provided that it is conducted in accordance with human dignity and sanctioned research on embryos under specific conditions.
The United Kingdom's judicial system, as established in Evans v. United Kingdom, does not consider the embryo as a person with rights protected under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (73). This viewpoint aligns with the notion that legislation should allow couples to undergo IVF treatment and that couples have the power to revoke their consent at any time before embryo implantation. This approach was later supported by the European Court of Human Rights in its ruling on 7 March 2006 which emphasised that the determination of the beginning of the right to life was within the discretionary scope of the Member States.
According to British jurisprudence, an embryo lacks autonomous rights or interests, and is neither capable of claiming, nor has the right to life claimed in its name, in accordance with Article 2 of the European Convention (74). This understanding highlights the absence of a violation of European regulations in this regard, reflecting the intricacy and diversity of approaches to the regulation of reproductive rights and the protection of the embryo in the European legal framework.
In 2009 and 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the norms of Law 40/2004 that provided in ART the obligation to obtain and implant up to three embryos per reproductive cycle and the prohibition of heterologous fertilisation (75, 76).
3.5 Future challenges
In Paraguay, the lack of specific regulations on ARTs has created a significant challenge in forming a legal framework that protects the rights of individuals using these technologies. The domestic legal hierarchy places the Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay as the highest authority, followed by the international treaties ratified by law (77).
The Constitution recognises a supranational legal order that guarantees human rights, peace, justice, cooperation, and development in various spheres (77). Within this framework, Paraguay incorporated the ACHR into its domestic law (78) and accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR (79).
The IACtHR introduced the ‘doctrine of conventionality control’ in its rulings, beginning with Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala (80–82), and further developed in Almonacid Arellano v. Chile (83) and Trabajadores Cesados del Congreso v. Peru (84). This doctrine allows judges in signatory states to compare domestic laws with international treaty obligations, requiring them to prioritise treaty norms when conflicts arise. In cases where a domestic norm contradicts an international provision, judges may set aside national laws to uphold treaty obligations.
The IACtHR emphasised that upon ratifying an international treaty like the ACHR, states must ensure that domestic laws do not undermine the treaty's dispositions. This involves interpreting national laws in line with the ACHR, as interpreted by the IACtHR, which serves as the ultimate authority on the Convention's meaning (83).
In Paraguay, there are divergent views on applying conventionality control, particularly when a constitutional provision appears to be incompatible with ACHR or IACtHR interpretations. Proponents argue that Paraguay's Constitution endorses a supranational order, requiring alignment with international treaties as per the Vienna Convention ratified by Law No. 289 (85), mandating compliance with treaty obligations. This interpretation supports the modification9 of the Constitution to confer constitutional status on international human rights treaties (86).
Critics of conventionality control argue that it lacks normative support within domestic law, where the Constitution is supreme, and assert that international courts should not override constitutional primacy (87). Additionally, conventionality control may pose practical challenges for local judges, who lack the authority to disregard national laws in favour of international ones (87, 88).
In ‘Amparo promoted by MCGG v PG Director of Clínica G ‘ (29), the Paraguayan courts declined to apply conventionality control, adhering strictly to domestic laws rather than following the IACtHR guidelines in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica regarding the right to life.
Both, the ACHR and Paraguay's Constitution, broadly recognise the protection of the right to life from conception, yet the definition of ‘conception’ varies, affecting the scope of legal protection. According to the interpretation of domestic courts and the local doctrine, conception is defined as the moment of fertilisation, conferring personhood status on in vitro embryos, and indicating a value-oriented approach.
Adopting the interpretive standards set in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Paraguay could consider conception to occur at implantation, potentially allowing for ART procedures during the pre-implantation stages. This highlights the challenge of balancing embryo personhood with the use of ARTs.
Comprehensive guidelines for embryo storage, research, and donation are necessary to facilitate the use of ARTs. Domestic laws should also address consent, filiation, and civil liability in cases of embryonic harm or loss to ensure the protection of all parties involved. A particular challenge in regulating ARTs involves the development of legal processes to resolve conflicts between the rights of ART users and in vitro embryos.
The only legal case concerning ARTs in Paraguay involved an amparo action. This type of action does not result in a final decision, allowing for further litigation with expanded terms and evidence. To handle ART-related disputes effectively, procedural law should evolve to provide mechanisms for timely and thorough judicial responses, promote access to justice for all parties, and ensure comprehensive consideration of evidence and arguments.
Even as Paraguay continues to address local legal and ethical hurdles in regulating ARTs, certain emerging technological challenges demand attention. To navigate through these evolving issues, Paraguay must foster national debate involving politicians, judges, medical professionals, bioethicists, and researchers. Such dialogue is critical for developing adaptive frameworks that balance ethical considerations, constitutional principles, and implications of scientific progress.
The proposal to extend the culture period of human embryos in the laboratory from 14 to 28 days has the potential to significantly reshape our understanding of human development (41, 89) and necessitate a reassessment of the moral value attributed to embryos during the earliest stages (90).
Genome-editing technologies represent a dual-edged sword in embryonic research. While these tools hold immense clinical promise, they also introduce putative risks, such as off-target effects, which require careful oversight (91).
Additionally, the development of human embryo models derived from stem cells, which can mimic stages beyond the 14-day post-implantation period (92), blurs the lines between naturally occurring and laboratory-produced embryos, creating a regulatory gray area.
The advent of unisexual reproduction has raised various legal considerations,10 and the possibility of producing nonviable embryos using synthetic DNA11 technology has raised more questions about the moral status of human embryos.
Breakthroughs in artificial womb technology, initially designed to improve outcomes in premature infants (95, 96), open new possibilities but also provoke debates about parental rights and the legal status of entities developing within these systems. The terminology used to describe these entities has also come under scrutiny and some researchers argue that terms like ‘neonate’ are inappropriate due to their implication of live birth, leading to the proposal of alternatives, such as ‘foetonates’ or ‘foetal neonates’ (97).
These discussions require clear definitions and updated legal frameworks to address possible implications. It is essential to conduct a comprehensive regulatory review to balance potential benefits with respect to human dignity (98).
4 Recommendations
This analysis of the legal protection afforded to in vitro embryos in Paraguay reveals several key findings and areas for future consideration. Paraguay currently lacks comprehensive legislation to regulate ARTs and the legal status of in vitro embryos. This regulatory gap creates uncertainty regarding the rights and protection of embryos created by ARTs.
Paraguay's Constitution and ratified international treaties provide general protection for the right to life from conception. However, the precise definition and implications of ‘conception’ in the context of in vitro embryos remain subject to interpretation.
The limited case law in Paraguay tends to interpret conception as occurring during fertilisation, granting personhood status to in vitro embryos. This value-oriented approach contrasts with more permissive interpretations of other jurisdictions. Paraguay's domestic interpretation of embryo rights diverge from the guidelines established by the IACtHR. This creates potential conflict between domestic and international legal obligations.
Paraguay needs comprehensive and specific legislation on ARTs, covering all aspects related to the subject, including who can benefit from these treatments, which techniques are permitted or prohibited, and other relevant issues. There is a pressing need for informed public discourse to shape Paraguay's approach to such complex questions.
Significant work remains to be performed to develop a comprehensive, ethically sound, and scientifically informed regulatory system for in vitro embryos and ARTs. As reproductive technologies continue to advance, Paraguay faces the challenge of crafting legislation that respects constitutional principles, aligns with international obligations, and addresses the nuanced ethical considerations surrounding human embryos and reproductive rights.
Author contributions
EGL: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. CGM: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Methodology, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Writing – original draft. ENP: Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Validation, Writing – review & editing. DFR: Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Software, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
The author(s) declare that financial support was received for the research and/or publication of this article. This work was supported by the Faculty of Exact and Natural Sciences, National University of Asunción under Grant PIC-01-2024, project ‘Innovation in Regulatory Science’.
Acknowledgments
We would like to express our sincere appreciation to Rocío Riveros, Marcos Florentín, and Samuel Gabaglio for their kind contributions of scientific references. We gratefully acknowledge the support received from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT, Paraguay) through a fellowship granted by the Sistema Nacional de Investigadores (SISNI). Figure created in BioRender. Fernandez, D. (2025) https://BioRender.com/ah7fhdy.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Correction Note
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the scientific content of the article.
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The author(s) declare that Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. We acknowledge the use of Paperpal (https://paperpal.com/) to assist with English language editing of the abstract, which improved the fluency and grammar of the text.
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Footnotes
1. ^Historically, personhood has been defined by attributes such as consciousness, self-awareness, and free will, all of which are subject to debate. The ACHR recognises the right to life and includes a consensus definition that personhood begins with conception. This concept is fundamental to human rights concerns, as reflected in the first draft of the ACHR (13, 14).
2. ^The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights acknowledges the need for special protection for unborn children, as indicated by its provisions prohibiting the execution of pregnant women. This implies the recognition of an unborn child as a human being that requires protection (20).
3. ^The Convention on the Rights of the Child, while not explicitly stating the protection of life from conception, asserts that a child requires special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection before and after birth (21). This suggests the acknowledgment of the rights of the unborn child, although the extent and nature of these rights are subject to interpretation.
4. ^In most legal systems in the Spanish-speaking world, the writ of amparo, also known as ‘recurso de amparo’ or ‘juicio de amparo,’ serves as a remedy for the protection of constitutional rights (28).
5. ^Estoppel is an equitable doctrine, a bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before, or what has been legally established as true (31).
6. ^The WR, published in 1984, forms the basis of the UK legislation on embryo research. This was the first report of its kind to consider regulation of advancements in human fertilization and embryology. The report was developed after extensive consultation and consideration of various ethical viewpoints and evidence submitted to the Warnock Committee (39).
7. ^Fatwas represent formal legal opinions or interpretations in Islamic jurisprudence, traditionally issued by recognized religious scholars to address queries concerning Islamic law and its application (52).
8. ^The Constitutional Court of Spain employs the term ‘nasciturus’ in its rationale, yet it does not specify the particular stage of human development that the term encompasses. However, nasciturus can be understood to refer to the ‘conceived but not yet born’ based on the precedents set by Roman law, which have had a significant influence on Spanish law (72).
9. ^The Constitution of Paraguay provides two procedures for modification: amendment and reform. Depending on which provisions are modified, this may give rise to another debate on whether the provision on the hierarchy of laws can be modified by reform or amendment.
10. ^The recent generation of bi-paternal mice via targeted imprinting modifications and their potential to enhance embryonic stem cell development further complicate the debate on embryo protection (93).
11. ^Refers to the artificial synthesis of DNA sequences with the aim of reconstructing the genomes of various organisms. This technology has the potential to generate a human genome devoid of genes essential for embryonic development. Such a genome could then be introduced into oocyte that are in the early stages of development but lack the capability to progress to full-term development (94).
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Keywords: assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), conception, in vitro embryos, reproductive rights, right to life
Citation: Lezcano EG, González Morel CG, Nara Pereira E and Fernández Ríos D (2025) Legal protections for in vitro embryos in Paraguay and comparative contexts. Front. Reprod. Health 7:1633574. doi: 10.3389/frph.2025.1633574
Received: 22 May 2025; Accepted: 18 August 2025;
Published: 5 September 2025;
Corrected: 9 September 2025.
Edited by:
Lijun Shang, London Metropolitan University, United KingdomReviewed by:
Maoxing Tang, Southern Medical University, ChinaEmilio Gomez, University of Murcia, Spain
Benjamin Emery, The University of Utah, United States
Karim Zaouaq, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Morocco
Copyright: © 2025 Lezcano, González Morel, Nara Pereira and Fernández Ríos. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Danilo Fernández Ríos, ZGZlcm5hbmRlekBmYWNlbi51bmEucHk=