ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Cognit.
Sec. Reason and Decision-Making
Volume 4 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fcogn.2025.1576987
Effects of Maximum and Minimum Offers on Reciprocity and Trust Perceptions during Economic Decision Making
Provisionally accepted
- 1University of Central Florida, Orlando, United States
- 2The Pennsylvania State University (PSU), University Park, Pennsylvania, United States
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Although it is understood that previous betrayals affect future decisions to trust, the degree to which this is true remains unclear in terms of frequency and severity. Additionally, it is currently unknown as to whether this same relationship between the frequency and magnitude of received actions and subsequent decisions to trust is mirrored when individuals experience acts of generosity. Prospect Theory proposes that losses are weighed more heavily than gains, but the comparison between frequent, minor losses or gains and infrequent major losses or gains has yet to be explored. The current study (n=123) utilizes an adapted version of an economic trust game from Berg et al. to examine the effects of minimum and maximum offerings on both reciprocations and perceptions of trust. Participants played the game with two partners: one who offered a maximum or minimum offer (extreme) and one who did not (stable), in either a high or low offer condition where all offers from the stable partner were above or below the median amount, respectively. The results align with Prospect Theory in that minimum offers had a greater impact on both behavior and perceptions than equivalent gains (maximum offers). This study highlights complexities between trust, reciprocity and perceptions of fairness, with implications for understanding social behavior in real word settings.
Keywords: Reciprocity, decision-making, Economic game, Trust Game, fairness
Received: 14 Feb 2025; Accepted: 24 Sep 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Doheny, Lighthall and Roque. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Margaret M. Doheny, margaret.doheny@ucf.edu
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