%A Skokowski,Paul %D 2022 %J Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience %C %F %G English %K qualia,Consciousness,Integrated Information Theory,Sensation,sensory,Functionalism,identity theory,grounded functionalism,Behaviorism,Experience (experiential elements) %Q %R 10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405 %W %L %M %P %7 %8 2022-March-11 %9 Hypothesis and Theory %# %! Sensing Qualia %* %< %T Sensing Qualia %U https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnsys.2022.795405 %V 16 %0 JOURNAL ARTICLE %@ 1662-5137 %X Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple realizability while allowing for a scientifically based approach toward accounting for qualia in the natural world.