ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Blockchain
Sec. Blockchain Technologies
Volume 8 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fbloc.2025.1650188
This article is part of the Research TopicDAO, Governance and FairnessView all 6 articles
Futarchy in Decentralized Science: Empirical and Simulation Evidence for Outcome-Based Conditional Markets in DeSci DAOs
Provisionally accepted
Lukas Weidener1*
Sasha Shilina2- 1BIO.xyz, Zug, Switzerland
- 2Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj universitet imeni M V Lomonosova, Moscow, Russia
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This study explores the feasibility of embedding futarchy, specifically policy-binding conditional prediction markets anchored to democratically chosen key performance indicators (KPIs) in Decentralized Science (DeSci) governance. By externalizing belief formation to speculative markets while anchoring values democratically, futarchy offers a structurally distinct alternative to existing Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) governance models. Through an empirical analysis of governance data from 13 DeSci DAOs, this study examines governance, participation, and cadence patterns that condition futarchic adoption. A retrospective simulation using proposals from VitaDAO assessed the degree to which historical decisions align with futarchy-preferred outcomes. The results indicate full directional alignment under deterministic modeling, suggesting latent compatibility between futarchy and existing DeSci governance. The analysis further outlines the design principles for implementation, emphasizing measurable KPIs and epistemic diversity. Futarchy, if carefully instantiated, may serve as a governance alternative for funding truth-tracking science through probabilistic decision making and market-based information aggregation.
Keywords: futarchy, conditional prediction markets, decentralized science (DeSci), decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), Market-based governance
Received: 19 Jun 2025; Accepted: 22 Sep 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Weidener and Shilina. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Lukas Weidener, lukas@weidener.eu
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