Urban land dispute and resolution mechanisms in two selected Ethiopian towns; from good governance perspective

The main objective of this paper is to examine Urban Land Dispute and Resolutions in two selected Ethiopian Towns from Governance perspective. Land tenure is widely recognized as vital to social security, sustainable development, economic growth and effective government. To achieve this objective a mixed methods research approach was used. Data were collected from 391households through questionnaires, 22 key interviews and two focus group discussions and analyzed descriptively. According to the study results, boundary disputes, expropriation of property rights based on false evidence, real estate loans, granting of use rights and illegal sale of urban land were the main causes of urban land disputes. The conflict resolution system was inadequate to protect the rights of vulnerable groups and public property. Judges were unable to interpret and apply land law because it was not an integral part of legal training. As a result, the quality of judgments was ultimately compromised by the fact that city-level judges were less qualified and experienced than higher court judges. Furthermore, the responsibility for conflict resolution at various levels has not been delegated to the actual practices of cities. In addition, there was a local informal dispute resolution system that occasionally made unfair decisions, but due to the development plan, it was never taken into account by the administrative dispute resolution system. Questions over city lands persisted in the first instance and in regional high courts for many years because disagreements could not be quickly resolved in the formal system. Finally, limiting the various forms of dispute resolution requires legal scrutiny and increases the ability of regional arbitration organizations to resolve disputes quickly and cost-effectively by providing them with access to training, legal resources and office space.

1 Introduction

Effective and efficient management of urban land is vital for fostering urban development and growth. To realize this goal, the land management process must be characterized by inclusivity, equity, and transparency. Presently, there is a significant focus on governance within urban land management, as this sector is frequently viewed as one of the most corrupt areas of public administration (Zakout, 2006). Land rights, which are defined by the regulations that govern access to land and the distribution of its benefits, play a critical role in social capital by empowering individuals to exercise their right to self-determination (FAO, 2002). This framework encompasses complex socioeconomic and legal regulations that dictate the allocation of land and its associated benefits (UN, 2012). Cities in Ethiopia are facing considerable challenges in land management.

Land disputes can involve a wide range of issues, ranging from a simple boundary dispute to a more general property rights claim. The main objective of urban land management is to support efficient land supply management and land tenure tracking mechanisms (Van der Molen, 2008). Land disputes are a major source of conflict in urban cultures around the world for a variety of reasons. Urban land disputes, whether silent or violent, have negative impacts on both individuals and society as a whole (Wehrmann, 2008). Therefore, it is advisable to handle these disagreements carefully. Lack of strong governance is one of the factors contributing to the spread of ineffective conflict resolution processes (World Bank, 2009). According to Zakout (2006), the importance of introducing good land management in urban land disputes is reduced through reducing land disputes, increasing land tenure, promoting economic growth, enhancing public trust, improving land tenure and managing state assets, providing adequate public services, and conflict resolution.

In Ethiopia, urban land management practices and processes have been prone to mismanagement and corruption due to the lack of good governance in urban land administration. According to Sungena et al. (2014), one of the most corrupt areas of public administration in Ethiopia is urban land management (Dinka, 2016). In the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, urban land is regulated and administered by the Urban Land Lease Law, which has been amended three times since it was first applied in 1993. The first Urban Land Lease Law (Proclamation 80/1993) by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the second (Proclamation 272/2002) by FDRE were issued with no underlying urban land policy. The third land lease law (Proclamation No. 721/2011) was also enacted after the adoption of the first land administration (FDRE, 2011). A recent study by Sungena et al. (2014) reveals concerning trends in urban land management practices nationwide, indicating serious systemic issues. Their research, which included discussions with public officials and land administration representatives across main towns concluded that the management of public land by town’s authorities has been inadequate. They warned that if current practices persist, it will be challenging to achieve urban growth without substantial reforms in land management. Land is not being utilized effectively, despite its potential to alleviate poverty.Besides, the result of the survey, which was conducted in various Ethiopian cities such as Bahir Dar, Addis Ababa, Hawasa and Dire Dawa, revealed that the resolution and management of urban land disputes is generally weak and comes with a growing number of challenges. These include the lack of independent, accountable institutions at the federal and state levels; resolving urban land disputes without transparency, accountability and effectiveness; and urban land leases in cities that did not adequately respond to the demand for urban land dispute and resolution management due to the inefficiency of public land management. The current dispute resolution procedure can generally be viewed as inadequate. The scope of a complaint is limited, the administrative body hearing complaints is not impartial as it is politically appointed, and individual disputants are encouraged to assert their claims against the country. Since the influential urban landowner has the power to resolve the dispute, the current dispute resolution process can generally be considered inadequate. As a result, landowners are confronted with a variety of social and financial challenges. Processes for resolving legal land disputes are typically not evaluated at the local government level. Nevertheless, the root causes of urban land disputes have been identified and there is a lack of empirical research examining urban land disputes and resolution mechanisms in a particular jurisdiction. However, good urban governance practices on land disputes and resolution mechanisms have not improved. Poor urban governance continues to prevail in resolving urban land disputes. This exists at the local level in the towns of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi. The Oromia Regional State Urban Land Development Bureau’s Assessment of Public Opinion on Good Urban Governance in Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi Towns (2023) shows that urban land dispute resolution practices generate negative public opinion. Corruption, land conflicts, unfair compensation, the scale of pending conflicts, and the ability of urban mediation are among the increasingly common issues impacting urban land disputes and resolution mechanisms. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate urban land disputes and resolutions in two selected Ethiopian towns, from a good governance perspective.

2 Land disputes and its management mechanisms

Effective land tenure management will support economic growth, reduce societal poverty, protect land and natural resources, improve public services, and avoid urban land conflicts (Samsudin, 2014). A land dispute refers to conflicting claims regarding land rights made by two or more parties concerning a specific parcel of land, which can typically be resolved within the current legal system. These disputes may or may not indicate a larger underlying issue related to land. In contrast, a “land conflict” encompasses competing claims over extensive land areas by groups, characterized by complexities that are not easily addressed through existing legal frameworks. There is frequently a lack of agreement on the applicable rules, and the involved parties may possess significantly different perceptions of the conflict’s nature. In this context, “conflict” denotes tension and the potential for violence, though it does not imply actual violence unless explicitly stated. Longstanding tensions rooted in structural or fundamental issues can be exacerbated by “trigger” events that escalate into violence (Bruce, 2013). The variety of land tenure systems plays a crucial role, particularly in nations with a mix of customary and statutory land tenure frameworks. Customary systems are increasingly acknowledged for their potential to offer secure land rights and deserve legal recognition, provided they align with fundamental human rights principles. When managed effectively, this acknowledgment of diversity can enhance national cohesion and serve as a foundation for strength, with “legal pluralism” emerging as a practical approach. However, this necessitates that both customary and statutory land tenures receive equal legal protections and that there is clarity regarding which lands are governed by each system. In the absence of such clarity, disputes over land can often take on an undesirable ethnic dimension at the intersection of these systems (McAuslan, 2005).

According to the UN (2012), land conflicts arise from actual or perceived discrepancies in demands, values, and interests. Disputes over urban land can negatively impact both individuals and the broader community. For the purposes of this study, ownership conflicts are characterized as non-violent disagreements between the government and private individuals (Wehrmann, 2008). The causes of land conflicts are multifaceted, encompassing political, economic, socio-economic, and demographic factors. Political elements may include the nationalization or privatization of land and the expansion of the real estate sector. Demographic issues can stem from rapid population increases. Additionally, legal factors contribute to land disputes, often manifesting as conflicting regulations. These disputes frequently lead to various detrimental effects on the socio-economic fabric of society (Wehrmann, 2008).

2.1 Land dispute management

Land disputes are recognized as a social issue that involves at least two parties, stemming from conflicting interests regarding land ownership. This encompasses various rights associated with land, such as usage, management, income generation, and the ability to transfer ownership or receive compensation (Wehrman, 2008). Essentially, a land dispute arises when two parties disagree over land use and related rights. Given the significant economic, political, and cultural implications of land, access to and rights over land are critical elements in tensions and conflicts surrounding it. Several factors can heighten the risk of conflict, including acute land shortages, insecure tenure, and longstanding disputes between groups. Researchers identify numerous causes of land disputes, with political factors being a primary contributor. Changes in political and economic frameworks, such as land nationalization or privatization, the introduction of unaccepted foreign institutions, and issues like political corruption and state capture, can exacerbate these disputes. Economic factors also play a role, as the growth of real estate markets, increasing property prices, and limited access to capital can lead to ownership conflicts. Socioeconomic issues, including poverty, marginalization, unequal resource distribution, and a lack of microfinance options for the disadvantaged, further contribute to land disputes. Additionally, demographic challenges, such as rapid population growth and the influx of new or returning refugees, can also be significant factors. Legal issues, including legal ambiguities and pluralism, may further complicate land disputes.

2.2 Governance in urban land dispute management

Sustainability has necessitated a focus on the interplay between social, economic, and environmental factors in decision-making, leading to the increased prominence of the term governance. Urban land governance encompasses the structures, processes, and mechanisms through which decisions about access to and utilization of urban land are made (FAO, 2009). While the definitions and concepts surrounding governance remain contentious and are actively debated across various academic disciplines, it involves state institutions such as courts, land administration bodies, and municipalities that hold authority over urban land. Additionally, it includes the legal and legislative frameworks governing the real estate sector, as well as established practices for property transfers, inheritance, and conflict resolution (FAO, 2009). Governance is recognized as a multifaceted concept, described in numerous ways (Samsudin, 2014). This debate can encompass the quality of social service systems and the establishment of appropriate institutional frameworks. Following the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) maintained the previous regime’s policy of state land ownership. The 1995 Constitution reinforced this approach, designating land ownership as a strict tool of government authority. According to Article 40 (3) of the 1995 Constitution, the rights to own land and natural resources are exclusively held by the state and the people. Urban land is recognized as the collective property of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia and is not subject to sale.

Land use rights in Ethiopia are governed by the Urban Land Management Proclamation No. 456/2005, which allows for inheritance and leasing under the Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation (2005). While improvements made on private property can be sold or exchanged, the underlying land rights cannot be sold, exchanged, or used as collateral. Conflicts often arise when the state expropriates land owned by individuals, leading to disputes between the parties involved. Concerns regarding potential government confiscation of land are a significant factor contributing to tenure insecurity in the country. Expropriation refers to the process through which an individual’s property may be taken for public use. The government is only required to compensate for the improvements made on the land when it is appropriated. The criteria for land acquisition are outlined in the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, which emphasizes the importance of upfront payment to assure farmers that they will be compensated for any enhancements they make to their land. However, the implementation of this provision has often fallen short of expectations, with compensation for expropriation typically deemed inadequate. It is essential to establish accessible, well-documented, transparent, and effective dispute resolution mechanisms within land management systems. Addressing land disputes should be a priority for urban land management. Alternative administrative systems or the judicial system could provide avenues for resolving conflicts, ensuring that these processes are available to all communities and preventing biased interpretations of contracts and agreements. Indicators of effective dispute resolution and conflict management include a well-defined distribution of responsibilities and a minimal number of unresolved conflicts (World Bank, 2013). Landowners may experience uncertainty and anxiety about land ownership due to concerns over potential unfair land valuations. To enhance property security, it is essential to tackle these concerns through established valuation and compensation guidelines. An evaluation of urban land conflicts and their resolutions should be approached from a governance perspective, utilizing a clearly defined assessment methodology. The Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) is widely recognized as a leading tool for assessing governance effectiveness in urban land management. It serves to analyze urban land disputes and their resolutions through a governance lens. Consequently, LGAF provides a comprehensive and diagnostic approach to evaluating urban land management from an alternative viewpoint (Burns and Dalrymple, 2008; FAO, 2007; World Bank, 2013). Thus, LGAF stands out as one of the most comprehensive frameworks for assessing urban land management from a unique perspective.

2.3 Urban land management system in Ethiopia

A dispute refers to a conflict or controversy that typically culminates in a lawsuit, while a land dispute specifically pertains to conflicts regarding property rights or land resources (Wehrmann, 2008). This type of disagreement involves issues related to land rights, boundaries, or usage. A land dispute arises when individual or collective interests concerning land are at odds (FAO, 2002). Such disputes can be resolved through court litigation or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, including arbitration, negotiation, or conciliation, which function outside the formal judicial framework. In various societies, traditional dispute resolution methods may also be employed. Historically, many conflicts in Ethiopia can be linked to land disputes. Issues surrounding ownership, access, and land use have often manifested as symptoms of the social unrest that has affected the country. The inability to effectively address problems stemming from inadequate state policies has led to minor conflicts escalating into larger insurgencies. Historically, land governance and the mechanisms for resolving land disputes have received minimal attention. Despite land disputes being a significant aspect of court cases since Imperial times, it is essential that these matters are addressed through the formal justice system. During the Military Government (Derg) era, local Peasant Associations (PAs) managed most land disputes in rural areas due to the absence of a formal appeal process. The legal framework at both federal and regional levels in Ethiopia is largely hierarchical, granting local government’s substantial authority over land management. There are variations in land tenure systems and socioeconomic conditions across regions, with each regional state government tasked with interpreting and integrating state regulations. Ethiopia’s land policy and legislative processes have faced criticism for lacking public involvement (Alemie, 2015). Interest groups are seldom consulted when legislative proposals that could affect their lives are under consideration. The legal framework governing urban land in Ethiopia is based on the constitution and state land legislation. In the 1970s, legislation was enacted to distinguish between rural and urban land. This was followed by the Ethiopian military government’s Proclamation 47/1975, which nationalized all urban land and housing. Numerous declarations, including Proclamation 455/2005 regarding compensation, 721/2011 concerning municipal land management and tenancy, and 818/2014 for municipal land registration, have been amended or repealed over time. All rural and urban land, along with natural resources, is considered the collective property of the state and the people of Ethiopia. The government is particularly concerned that private ownership could result in the concentration of urban property among small, affluent elite. Expropriation remains a controversial topic, as it often provides inadequate compensation for land. Ethiopia’s land policy and its boundaries promote good governance in urban land management. Effective resolution of local land disputes is facilitated by land policy, but it also has a number of limitations. The administrative body established to hear complaints is not impartial; instead, it is tied to the authorities responsible for appropriating property.

3 Research methodology

3.1 Overview of study area

The towns of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi have recently emerged as new towns. Gelan is located in the Finfinne Special Zone in Oromia Regional State, 25 km southeast of Addis Ababa or between 70 12–9014 N and 38032 39032 E. The town of Lega Tafo Lega Dadi, on the other hand, is located in the Special Zone around Finfinne, which is 21 km northeast of Addis Ababa. The border of Gelan is physically connected to Addis Ababa and Dukam and the total area of the city is 7,516 ha, while the city of Lega Tafo Lega Dadi with a total area of 7,444.53 ha is also connected to Addis Ababa. Currently, the population of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi has increased to 64,729 and 40,864 respectively (Lega Tafo Lega Dadi and Gelan Municipality, 2022). The map of the study areas is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Figure 1. Location map of the study area (Gelan Town and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi Town).

3.2 Research design

The study used a mixed qualitative and quantitative research approach to identify and understand gaps in the implementation of good governance in urban land information provision as this enabled the researcher to collect data from numerous sources simultaneously and triangulate data sources Positions supported by various sources to prevent inaccurate information. To study the distribution of urban land information from a good governance perspective, a mixed method was adopted. This research used focus groups and structured interviews to collect qualitative information from key informants. Cross-sectional survey questionnaires were used to create a triangulation. This study used a Likert scale to measure quantitative data.

3.3 Sampling population

The study population for this research consisted of the heads of households in the towns and key informants at different levels of government employment. According to data from two municipal offices, the population of Gelan town increased to 31,043 males and 33,687 females, for a total of 64,729, and households within the town are 8722 (Gelan town administration, 2022); Lega Tafo Lega Dadi town is comprised of 17,927 males and 22,937 females, for a total of 40,864, and households within the town are 8173 (Lega Tafo Lega Dadi administration office, 2022). The sample was drawn from these households. Additionally, key informants such as land management officials and experts from the land management office, mayor, revenue, and customs offices of the town, the justice office, Kebele administrators, urban planners, and the municipal offices of both towns were included in this study.

3.4 Sample technique and size

In this research, both non-probability and probability sampling methods will be utilized to gather samples from the target population. The researcher will intentionally choose key informants, including mayors, urban planners, municipal officials, justice office representatives, urban land management personnel, kebele administrators, and urban land specialists, recognizing their significant role as information sources. Hence, the researcher purposively selected 11 key informant groups from each city out of which 22 key informants were from both cities for interviews. For the probability sampling component, systematic random sampling will be applied to select respondents from four kebeles in Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi towns. When the population consists of an N-ordered element and a sample size of n is needed, the ratio of these two figures, N/n, will be calculated to determine the sampling interval.

Therefore a systematic random sample was used to identify respondents from each town and Kebele. The study population for this study also consisted of the heads of households in the two towns. According to the data from the two towns, the number of households in Gelan and L/Tafo L/Dadi was 8722 and 8173, respectively, for a total of 16,895. To calculate the household sample size, the study used Yamane (1967), as shown in Equation 1

$\mathrm{n}=\mathrm{N}/\left(1+\mathrm{N}{\left(\mathrm{e}\right)}^2\right)(1)$

where n = sample size

N = population size

e = level of precision or sampling error which is +_5%

Hence n = 16,895/1 + 16,895 (0.05)²

n = 391 (the questionnaires were distributed to 391 out of the total population)

The sample size for both towns was determined from the total sample size based on the town’s household size by the stratified sampling formula.

• ni= (n/N)Ni

where,

⁃ Ni = population size in the stratum

⁃ n = Total sample Size needed for Study

⁃ N = the total number of elements in the population of all strata combined

⁃ ni = Sample Size Stratum,

Accordingly, the sample size of the two towns is obtained as:

For Gelan town = (391/16,895) × 8722 = 202.

For Lega Tafo Lega Dadi = (391/16,895) × 8173 = 189.

The details of the interviews are depicted in Table 1. Using a random starting point for an independent household, the K = N/n formula was used. Also, the researcher adds 20% of the sample size to increase the response rate, i.e., 391 * 20/100 = 78 questionnaires were distributed in addition to the specified sample size. In this study, quantitative data is measured on a measurement scale. The Likert scale was used to use closed-ended questions. In this study, respondents are asked to rate each item on a Likert scale by assigning a value from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

Table 1

Table 1. Sample techniques.

3.5 Data analysis method

Narration, description, and content analysis techniques, as well as text, were used to examine qualitative data. Conversely, the quantitative data were analyzed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) (version 25) and Microsoft Excel. The process of data analysis was conducted through Microsoft Office software, such as Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel. In the process of qualitative and quantitative data analysis, two kinds of data were used to be analyzed. One is the data recorded from the individual interview and focus group discussion, and the other is the data collected through a survey questionnaire with households. Finally, the collected data, both quantitative and qualitative, was triangulated to increase the validity of the information.

3.6 Ethical consideration

This study paper was ethically approved by Addis Ababa University, the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building Construction, and City Development. The ethical review board is composed of five committees: Dr. Mindesinot Woldeamanuel (chair), Dr. Fiseha Wogayehu (member), Dr. Eng.Birhanu Woldetinsae (member), Dr. Dangachew Adugna (member), and Dr. Liku Workalemhu (member). For this study, written informed consent was obtained from the thesis proposal evaluation committee before the collection of primary data. The ethics approval letter contains a conclusion, a recommendation and an evaluation of the results of the dissertation proposal. After that, the university wrote a cooperation letter to the cities of Gelan and Lega Tafo Lea Dadi for studies. The cooperation letter is attached as supplementary material. After informing and obtaining consent from all subjects, individuals and institutions involved in this study, the data collectors were trained to maintain the anonymity of the individuals and the respondents were verbally informed about the nature and purpose of the research before the interview in order to ensure the necessary confidentiality and to ensure anonymity of all participants. Informed consent: Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants in the study.

4 Results and discussions

This study focused on examining the extent of good governance practices in urban land disputes and resolutions in towns from governance dimensions by focusing on sources of dispute, assignment of responsibility, and level of pending conflict, which are discussed as follows.

4.1 Sources of dispute

Urban land disputes predominate, accounting for around 64% of civil cases in the states of the Oromia region, document studies show (Oromia Justice Bureau, 2021). Findings from a survey conducted in the towns of Lega Tafo, Lega Dadi, and Gelan further supported this argument. For instance, urban land disputes account for 60% of cases in Lega Tafo and Lega Dadi towns and 55% in Gelan town, according to the urban justice office. The most typical problems are related to land title issues. According to the urban justice office, there are numerous reasons why disputes over urban lands arise. These disagreements arose mainly from disagreements about the distribution of urban land and the regularization procedures implemented in the towns. Occasionally, the number of cases related to the issue of conflicting claims to urban land also increases. In urban areas, the most common causes of land disputes were relocations, boundary disputes, shady land deals, overlapping zoning, and post-marital divorces. Urban land disputes were also frequently involved, as evidenced by the illegal sale of urban land, land exchanges, real estate loans, tenure grants, expropriation of property rights using flawed evidence, and boundary disputes, according to the key informant group interview and focus group discussion. In some cases, there are also cases of expropriation and compensation. Moreover, conflicts over urban and land-related issues were believed to ultimately lead to the commission of many violent crimes, including premeditated property destruction and other similar crimes. Family cases involving land ownership and land-related issues have increased dramatically. Such conflicts result in the loss of life and threaten to destroy cherished values among close relatives and loved ones, in addition to imposing significant social and economic costs and jeopardizing poverty alleviation efforts. Some of these dissensions, particularly in Lega Tafo and Lega Dadi communities, have the potential to escalate into widespread violence as they show indicators of ethnic conflict pointing to negative political outcomes.

As mentioned above, problems related to the institutional structure and staffing of the urban land management institutions were also reasons for the land dispute, although the main cause was the unfair allocation and regularization process of urban land. Because the urban land management institution at the Kebele level was not strong and areas near the towns were not demarcated by a city map, local land registration was not securely maintained, and consequently, property rights were easily violated. The implications of this study suggest that the urban dispute settlement system, unlike the rural land dispute settlement system, is too weak to protect the rights of vulnerable groups and common urban community property and is therefore a cause for further disputes. The present study is consistent with the survey conducted in Ethiopia by Agegnehu, S. (2021), as land tenure disputes are more common in peri-urban areas than in rural areas and study conducted by (Elziny et al., 2016) in Egypt. In addition the finding related with survey result conducted by Hailu (2016) Land and property-related conflicts are also believed to be the primary causes or contributing factors in the commission of numerous violent crimes such as homicide, attempted homicide, assault, battery, theft, arson, intentional destruction of property, etc. Cross-border disputes, land tenure disputes, land lease disputes, divorce-related land disputes, probate disputes, parcel exchange disputes, and land use disputes are the types of land tenure issues found in the surveyed locations.

4.2 The capacity of arbitrators of local institutions

The discussion by the key informant groups revealed that there were few ways to resolve urban land disputes, particularly for land for which there was no supporting evidence. It was very likely that cases would be dealt with simultaneously by two parallel organizations, such as the municipal quasi-judicial committee and the Kebele level. Kebele-level urban land management agencies lack substantive legal understanding, and their decisions, largely based on local community comments, adversely affect women and the poor, who lack bargaining power and are unfavorable to regular rules. They sometimes accept payments from disputing parties because the informal Kebele-level regularization arbitration committees have no incentives and have not been recognized by law. In addition, since committee members or residents were unpaid, it was difficult to find them in time during regularization, especially in urban areas. Even in urban areas, there was no adequate support for Kebele-level urban land office officials in terms of legal manuals, training, and jobs that could help them make fair judgments, especially on no-evidence documents. These types of practices, used only on urban land, are unregulated and are found in suburban areas.

In contrast, through interviews with the justice of office, it was found that there was evidence of judges’ inability to interpret and apply land law, which was not a subject included in the Ethiopian legal curriculum. Urban courts have first-instance jurisdiction over property disputes, as these disputes are not usually expressed in monetary terms, either due to the nature of the claim or because Ethiopian urban land has a low market value. The consequences of these results, therefore, showed that the arbitrators of local institutions had very few opportunities to settle property disputes. Woreda-level judges were less qualified than higher court judges; this affects the accuracy of their decisions. These results contradict Sayeh Kassaw’s. A et al. (2016) land ownership disputes are mainly resolved through formal means such as court proceedings and administrative decisions or through informal means known as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the Amhara region. However, the researchers did not assess the ability of arbitrators at local institutions to resolve the disputes efficiently and in a timely manner.

4.3 Assignment of responsibility

There were various ways of resolving land disputes, and there have been overlapping powers in land-related disputes, depending on practice, federal and state constitutions, and court formation laws. Even without special legal powers, courts, administrative authorities, and urban land administrations take care of all property-related problems. Similar cases could be handled by two different authorities at the same time, and there was no system in place for those authorities to interact with each other. The courts were not accepting the arbitration procedures for urban land disputes as the first evidence of the results of the plan’s lack of legal expertise and concerns about abuse. Compulsory urban land dispute settlement was illegal and not applied in towns. The impoverished were affected by the neglect of the community because they did not have access to the justice system. On the other hand, local-level institutions such as Kebeles and urban land representatives were unfamiliar with arbitration due to their ignorance of land laws, which affected how fairly local-level disputes were resolved. On the other hand, in the kebeles of urban communities, unlike in rural areas, there were no recognized dispute settlement committees. In addition to the regular courts, there were also legally recognized religious courts that were held in a place where predominantly Muslim adherents lived. Article 78 paragraph 5 of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution recognizes the possibility of establishing religious and customary courts in addition to the ordinary courts. As a result, Sharia courts were established at the federal level (Proc. 188/1999) and at the regional level. However, such processes were not observed in the study areas. In addition, the Customary Court or Cultural Court was also recently officially established by the Oromia Regional State Proclamation 240/2013, which was not yet in force. As shown in Figure 2, respondents were asked to rate their opinion that responsibility for conflict management is distributed at different levels according to actual practice. Accordingly, 179 (45.8%) and 63 (16.1%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 80 (20.5%) and 18 (4.6%) of the Respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree”. and 51 (13%) responded “undecided.” Figure 2 shows that the majority of the 179 (45.8%) respondents confirmed that responsibility for conflict management was not practically assigned at different levels.

Figure 2

Figure 2. Response rate of respondents on the assignment of responsibility (Source; Survey result, 2022).

In addition, there were several other hearing committees for land disputes in urban areas: compensation and expropriation hearing committees. The local committees were the ones who negotiated compensation claims for the displaced farms when the city government became involved. The Municipal Clearing and Compensation Hearing Committees handle local government and certain court decisions related to the matter. With the exception of compensation issues, the verdicts were final and could not be appealed. Courts and lawyers criticize the fact that disputes, whether leased or expropriated, cannot be challenged in ordinary courts. On the one hand, it strips the courts of their authority; on the other hand, it calls into question the fairness of these institutions. It was difficult for the general public to identify these committees and make an appointment. These committees were administrative bodies with quasi-judicial powers. Therefore, the implications of these indicate that responsibility for conflict management at different levels was not assigned according to the actual practice in the towns. However, these findings contradict the principles of the land governance assessment framework (World Bank, 2016) that responsibilities for conflict management are clearly assigned at the various levels in accordance with actual practice, which the responsible bodies are responsible for the applicable legal matters and that decisions can be appealed.

In addition as shown in Figure 3, respondents were asked to assess their opinion of the relevant authorities responsible for applicable legal matters and whether decisions can be appealed. Accordingly, 182 (46.6%) and 57 (14.6%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 84 (21.5%) and 19 (4.9%) of the Respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree”. and 49 (12.5%) responded “undecided.” Figure 3 therefore shows that the majority of the 182 (46.5%) respondents confirmed that the competent authorities have no jurisdiction over applicable legal matters and decisions cannot be appealed. Many land cases have been delayed due to the inapplicability of land-related legal matters and abuse decisions. This means that competent bodies have no jurisdiction over applicable legal matters and decisions cannot be appealed.

Figure 3

Figure 3. Response rate of respondents on relevant bodies are competent in applicable legal matters (Source; survey result, 2022).

4.3.1 Conflict resolution mechanisms and its accessibility

While interviews with judicial experts showed that the cost of initial dispute resolution was reasonably affordable for the majority of urban disputants, the cost of disputes in the Court of Appeal was higher, particularly for poor people who were forced to make repeated trips to Addis Ababa. There were ordinary courts of first instance for land disputes. Of course, the costs may not be as low as traditional dispute resolution, as the parties to the dispute must pay the court fee and sometimes the fee for formal and informal legal representation. And if the case proceeds through an appeal to a higher court, and therefore to the Supreme Court, those affected could incur more costs and time. As indicated in Table 2, respondents were asked to provide their opinions on whether there are affordable and unbiased mechanisms for resolving land disputes. Accordingly, 210 (53.7%) and 64 (16.4%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 52 (13.3%) and 19 (4.9%) of the Respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree”.” and 46 (11.8%) answered undecided. Thus, it can be seen from Table 2 that the majority of the 210 (53.7%) respondents confirmed that there are no affordable and unbiased mechanisms for resolving land disputes.

Table 2

Table 2. Response rate of respondents on the resolution of land disputes.

Furthermore, in both towns, the FGD showed that first-instance conflict resolution institutions were not accessible at the local level in most communities. The dispute resolution mechanisms were recently established in 2018 by the town government to be open to the public, especially in towns that fall under large town areas. Although the towns were classified into the regional state structure level as a unified zone level, they have not had a town court for many years, except that they have been using the first instance court from the surrounding woredas since 2018. Therefore, most urban land disputes were brought before the town courts due to the bias of the local arbitration committees or representatives of the urban land kebeles. However, the role of the municipal land council was to encourage the disputing parties to resolve their issues through arbitration and negotiation. For urban land disputes, the required court fee is 28 Eth Birr (<$1). For this reason, the required solutions are usually not quantified in monetary terms. But for the land, the numbered and estimated court fees have been expanded to 12,000 eth Birr for land-related property, estimated at 1 million. The above survey discussion implies the court fee was very low, unless the case involves the sale or payment of rent where the applicant seeks a monetary remedy. As a result, conflict resolution mechanisms have been unaffordable and biased public access for formal and informal settlement of land disputes.

As indicated in Table 2, respondents were asked to rate their view of whether the existing mechanisms work effectively in practice. Accordingly, 177 (45.3%) and 60 (15.3%) respondents answered that they disagreed and disagreed, while 76 (19.4%) and 14 (3.6%) respondents answered that they agreed and strongly agreed, and 64 (16.4%) respondents replied that they had not made up their minds. Thus, from Table 2, it can be stated that the majority of the 177 (45.3%) respondents confirmed that existing mechanisms did not work effectively in practice.

These survey results and the interview results imply that the existing urban land conflict resolution was not working at different urban levels, and partiality was seen even when deciding in favor of a group. On the other hand, local-level institutions and urban land disputes were not formally established, unlike rural and kebele-level land sector representatives or woredas courts, which had no competence to arbitrate as the judges had no legal knowledge, which affected fair dispute resolution at the local level. However, finding inconsistent with the principles of land governance framework (World Bank, 2016) as first-instance conflict resolution institutions are accessible free or at an affordable cost at the local level in most communities. In most areas, dispute resolution mechanisms must be established at the lowest administrative level and are open to the public. They are affordable and open to the public, although they have capacity issues.

4.3.2 Appeal mechanisms for conflict resolution

According to key informant interviews, filing an appeal is possible but costs more money, effort, and legal expertise. Parties to a conflict had the opportunity to appeal to bring their case to higher courts. However, this was not affordable, especially for women and the poor, due to the longer time and higher expenses. The matter was more difficult for the disputing parties to handle without legal representation as the higher court was more complicated. As indicated in Table 2, respondents were asked to give their opinion on whether there are dispute mechanisms for land compensation dispute resolution. Accordingly, 183 (46.8%) and 54 (13.8%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 80 (20.5%) and 17 (4.3%) of the respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree” and 57 (14.6%) answered “undecided”. Thus, from Table 2, it can be seen that the majority of 183 (46.8%) respondents confirmed that there were no dispute resolution mechanisms for land compensation. However, as clearly defined in Ethiopian constitutions and urban land lease proclamations, there was no appeal mechanism or conflict mechanism for the expropriation of landholders except for compensation complaints.

As indicated in Table 2, respondents were asked to give their opinion on whether there are clearly defined and transparent mechanisms for resolving land disputes. Accordingly, 193 (49.4%) and 55 (14.1%) respondents answered that they disagreed and disagreed, while 74 (18.9%) and 55 (14.1%) respondents answered that they agreed and strongly agreed, and 49 (125%) of the respondents answered undecided. Thus, from Table 2, it can be noted that the majority of 193 (49.4%) respondents confirmed that there are no clearly defined and transparent mechanisms for settling urban land disputes. Furthermore, federal and regional land statutes and court formation laws indicate that there were different avenues for resolving land disputes and that there were overlapping jurisdictions over property-related disputes. All land-related disputes, even without special legal powers, were conducted by the urban land offices, administrations, and courts. There was a possibility that similar cases could be handled by two different authorities at the same time, and there was no mechanism for these authorities to communicate with each other. Therefore, the implications of this survey suggest that local-level institutions and city district courts, particularly district courts, did not register to have transparency in arbitration as they were not paid by anyone they favored by claiming pet corruption. Woreda-level judges were also unfamiliar with state laws that affect the fairness of dispute resolution at the local level. Similarly, this finding is consistent with the survey conducted by Hailu (2016) that although redress is accessible, it requires more money, time and legal knowledge. Disputants have the opportunity to take their case to higher courts. However, this requires more time and money and is not affordable, especially for women and poor people. The higher the court, the more complicated the case would be and the more difficult it would be for the parties to the dispute to cope without legal support.

4.4 Level of pending conflict

4.4.1 Mutually accepted agreements reached through informal dispute resolution systems

The survey results suggest that, while there was a local, informal dispute resolution system that successfully and fairly resolved a significant proportion of disputes, it may not be recognized in the formal judicial or administrative dispute resolution system. Focus group discussions indicate that, under normal circumstances, agreements reached through negotiation, compromise, or arbitration was encouraged unless they violated the legal system and legal framework. However, they have hardly ever been implemented because so many cases have been decided before local and judicial committees that they can damage and occasionally destroy local and city institutions. Some disputes were resolved by a local informal institution (such as elders) before reaching the formal judicial system, but these institutions were not officially recognized in towns, unlike in rural areas, due to the statutory plan. As indicated in Figure 4, respondents were asked to rate their opinion on the mutually accepted agreements reached through informal dispute resolution systems. Accordingly, 192 (49.1%) and 43 (11.0%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 79 (20.2%) and 19 (4.9%) of the respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree,” and 58 (14.8%) answered undecided. Thus, from Figure 4, it can be stated that the majority of 192 (49.1%) respondents confirmed that mutually accepted agreements reached through informal dispute resolution systems were not encouraged in urban land disputes as a result of their lack of skill in land use planning.

Figure 4

Figure 4. Response rates of respondents on mutually accepted agreements (Source, survey result, 2022).

However, apart from cases terminated at the local level, there was no uniform recognition of these agreements by a court. In addition, the courts fear that final arbitration agreements could leave the disputing parties without appeal rights. In other words, a party that might be forced to give up a particular interest due to cultural influences would ultimately be a victim of the agreement and therefore warrant a fair investigation by the courts. Hence, this study was consistent with the study conducted in Ethiopia by Sisay Habtamu (2016).

This study implies that there was a local, informal dispute settlement system that made decisions that were not always fair, but this system was never recognized in the administrative dispute settlement system as a result of both sides’ lack of skill to know land use planning on the ground.

4.4.2 Formal conflict resolution

According to interviews with key informant groups, arbitration decisions were treated by the arbitrator as informal dispute resolution, which indirectly supported the courts. This means that a decision made by these courts may not be legally recognized by the courts. This means that the parties have the right to bring new actions before the ordinary courts. As shown in Figure 5, respondents were asked to rate their opinions on the conflicts in the formal systems that are promptly resolved. Accordingly, 208 (53.2%) and 62 (15.9%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”, while 63 (16.1%) and 13 (3.3%) of the Respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree”. and 44 (11.3%) responded “undecided.“Figure 5 shows that the majority of 208 (53.2%) respondents confirmed that conflicts in the formal system were not resolved promptly. There is a costly process for appealing landfall verdicts, and the process takes a long time.

Figure 5

Figure 5. Response rate of respondents on whether Conflicts in the formal system are resolved on time (Source; Survey result, 2022).

Furthermore, a right of appeal was recognized in all urban land dispute settlement systems, except of course in the case of expropriations, where appeal was permitted only for claims for damages. Any first-instance decision may be appealed to a state or federal court. If the court rules in favor of the plaintiff, the injured party also has the right to appeal to the state or federal court. And if the decision of one of the highest courts was legally wrong, the cases can ultimately be filed in the Federal Court of Cassation. Because interviews with Justice Department experts found that the cost of initial dispute resolution was reasonable for the majority of urban litigants, the cost of litigation in appellate courts was particularly high for poor people, who are forced to return to the courts again and again. There are regular courts of first instance that deal with urban land disputes. Of course, the costs may not be as cheap as traditional dispute resolution as the parties to the dispute must pay the court fee and sometimes the attorney’s fee as well. And if the case is appealed to a high court and therefore to the Supreme Court, people will incur greater costs and time. Disputes in the city’s lower courts were typically resolved within an average of three to 5 months when there were more cases. According to an interview with an expert from the urban rural sector and the city’s judicial department, the judicial reform introduced in the region requires judges to process the cases entrusted to them within a certain period of time, unless the cases were found to be complicated and corrupt. The city’s judicial office said a case could be decided in just 3 months when all the evidence was presented. However, in reality, there were many ups and downs until all the evidence was complete due to bureaucratic problems and corruption in the industry. Municipal courts typically collect evidence from the Kebele city or land management offices, and due to poor data collection and retention, the office in turn collects evidence from local city officials and residents. The Kebele/state representative calls a public meeting again, collects evidence from the public discussion, and transmits these findings to the state office and thus to the court. In most cases, this finding can be challenged on a variety of grounds, and therefore there is a likelihood of a second investigation by the Town State Authority representative or committee. In addition, the urban land dispute has almost been delayed, and unnecessary procedures in the towns have led to the delay. Table 3 The magnitude of land-related cases in Gelan and Lega Tafo Lega Dadi towns.

Table 3

Table 3. The magnitude of land-related cases in Gelan and Lega Tafo (Lega Dadi) towns.

Table 3 data indicates that urban land-related cases made up the majority of total cases decided within the budget year. In addition, according to FGD, it has been found that quick court decisions are commendable, but the side effect is that since they are decided quickly, they later take longer and longer periods (3–6 years) in higher (high and supreme) courts. Higher courts either refer the case to a woreda or community court or hold or hear it themselves, taking more time to formulate questions and even hear new evidence. The decision time of the courts of appeal was usually longer than that of the first instance or woreda courts. Typically, town courts decide cases without considering all the evidence and understanding the laws, which could lead to a miscarriage of justice, and therefore appellate courts require more time to reconsider the case. The Court of Appeals may take time to consider whether there has been an error of fact or law, a lack of factual statements, or a disregard for evidence. The Court of Appeals can then proceed with the case itself and make a decision, or refer or remit the case to the lower court and give instructions on how the lower court should deal with it. In other words, the decision takes, on average, three to four times longer than the time required by lower courts. Courts of appeal were expensive for the poor, not because the court fees were so high, but because they had to pay higher costs for legal counsel, transport, room, and board. First, appellate courts took a long time to thoroughly investigate the case, and second, they were inundated with more appeals. These survey results imply that conflicts in the formal system were not resolved promptly.

4.4.3 Level of urban land dispute cases in the formal legal system

As indicated in Table 4, the respondents were asked to rate their views on whether land disputes constitute a small proportion of cases in the formal legal system. Accordingly, 185 (47.3%) and 46 (11.8%) respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed, while 73 (18.7%) and 25 (6.4%) respondents agreed and strongly agreed, and 62 (15.9%) respondents were undecided. Thus, from Table 4, it can be stated that the majority of 185 (47.3%) respondents confirmed that urban land-related cases constitute a major proportion of total cases decided within the budget year in the formal legal system.

Table 4

Table 4. Response rates of respondents on Land disputes.

According to the overall situation in the Oromia region, more than 64% of civil cases heard in urban courts concern land and land-related property. These cases can be traced back to inheritance, marriage, encroachments on land rights, and property transactions. In the study area, property disputes outweigh other forms of dispute. According to FGD in both towns, more than half of the urban residents in the study areas had no access to land. The last land allocation was in 2017 through the Cooperative House, specifically in the town of Lega Tafo Lega Dadi, and these youth under 18 years were currently looking for land in 2020, according to the municipality’s data. This was why there were always conflicts between family members about divorce, donations, and birthright. The landless were involved in massive land grab activities belonging to the communities that have a town’s government. The other factor that contributed to the increase in land disputes was the land values of the towns, which were grounds for disputes. Especially in the towns surrounding Addis Ababa cities, the significant increase in urban land value due to its center and proximity to Addis Ababa city becomes a reason for major land disputes. Regional data shows that there were a large number of informal land sales around the city of Addis Ababa and other major towns in the states. Farmers only sell land informally, and over time, this becomes a source of conflict because of the value of the land. They want their land back. Courts at all levels keep official records of civil cases as follows: marriage, divorce, urban land and related cases, reclamation/ownership, boundary disputes, inheritance, gifts, site plans, urban land exchange, compensation, and the like. A clear problem, however, was that most of the categories related to rent, divorce, land reclamation, boundary disputes, compensation, and the like are related to land. However, determining the exact size requires more time and manpower. This therefore implies that a high proportion of cases in the formal legal system are urban-rural level disputes, which are contrary to the principle of the Land Governance Assessments Framework (World Bank, 2023), as the proportion of areas affected by this is at risk of conflict is low and decreasing.

4.5 Extent of upcoming urban land conflicts

As indicated in Table 4, respondents were asked to rate their opinion that there are few long-standing (>2 years) land conflicts. Accordingly, 184 (47.1%) and 39 (10%) of the respondents answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree,” while 79 (20.2%) and 41 (10.5%) of the respondents answered “agree” and “strongly agree,” and 48 (12.3%) of the respondents answered undecided. Table 4 thus shows that the majority of the 184 (47.1%) respondents confirmed that there were many long-term (>2 years) land conflicts. Likewise, long-standing urban land disputes account for less than a year of total land disputes pending in regional high courts than in woreda courts. Because they were very complicated cases or cases for which it was difficult to find evidence, they were kept by woreda courts for a long time. Conversely, some cases were adjourned to the woreda, or regional high court, due to the need for pet corruption. However, several such cases can be found in higher supreme courts due to the complicated procedure. According to interviews with the judiciary, the office found that in most cases, municipal court disputes are resolved within three to 5 months on average. According to interviews with court experts, reform judges believe that the court must process the cases entrusted to them within a short period of time unless the cases are judged to be difficult. Cities and trial judges said cases could be decided in as little as 3 months if all the evidence was available. However, in practice, there were many delays until all the evidence was completed. Municipal courts usually seek evidence from the City/Kebele Land Management Office, and due to poor record-keeping and retention of data, the office in turn requests evidence from the local Land Management Board. There were only a few land conflicts that lasted longer (>2 years). These results are consistent with a World Bank survey (2022). In 90% of cases, a decision in a land dispute is made in the first instance within a year. This means that many urban land disputes have been pending in the first instance and in the higher regional courts for many years, contradicting the quality standards of the courts.

5 Conclusion and recommendations

Land tenure is widely acknowledged as essential for social security, sustainable development, economic growth, and effective governance. To enhance urban land management and ensure property security through various governmental mechanisms in the surveyed regions, the FDRE government has introduced policies and developed strategies that have seldom been implemented in these areas. Urban land conflicts often stem from issues such as the illegal sale of land, land exchanges, the granting of usage rights, expropriation based on invalid evidence, and boundary disputes. The system for resolving urban disputes has proven to be significantly weaker than that for rural land disputes, failing to adequately protect the rights of vulnerable populations and common urban properties. Evidence suggests that judges struggle to interpret and apply fundamental laws, which are not mandatory subjects in the national legal education curriculum. Judges at the municipal level tend to be less trained and experienced compared to their counterparts in higher courts. Consequently, there are few effective mechanisms for addressing urban land disputes, especially in cases lacking supporting documentation. Additionally, responsibilities for conflict management at various levels are not aligned with local practices, and the relevant authorities lack jurisdiction over applicable legal issues.

Local-level institutions and urban land disputes lacked formal establishment, unlike kebele or town-level courts, which do not possess arbitration authority due to the judges’ lack of knowledge. This deficiency undermines the fairness of local dispute resolution. While a right of appeal exists in all municipal dispute settlement systems, it is notably absent in expropriation cases, where only damage claims can be pursued. Furthermore, state courts and local entities involved in urban land disputes often fail to maintain transparency in arbitration processes due to a lack of funding, leading to corruption. Local judges are frequently unaware of state laws, further compromising the fairness of local dispute resolution. Additionally, an informal local dispute settlement system exists, but its decisions are not always equitable and often overlook administrative dispute resolution frameworks due to development plans. Moreover, disputes within the formal system are not resolved promptly, with many urban land cases lingering in first-instance and regional superior courts for extended periods. To address these issues, it is essential to enhance local arbitration bodies by providing training, legal resources, and employment opportunities to improve their capacity for cost-effective and efficient dispute resolution. If the local community possesses confidence in their skills, ethics, and efficiency, it is likely that more individuals will opt for their services instead of traditional courts. Courts and administrative bodies can further support this initiative by acknowledging and enforcing local decisions, as well as by backing local legal aid organizations that assist disadvantaged and vulnerable populations with their legal issues. In situations where cases are adjudicated in woreda courts, the wealthy often hire legal representation, leaving the poor without the means to afford such services, which can result in unfavorable outcomes for them. There is a need for short-term training and awareness initiatives aimed at judges at the woreda level and arbitration committees at the town level. Additionally, to effectively monitor the performance of the Kebele Level Dispute Resolution Committee and evaluate the number of cases resolved at this level, a new protocol should be established to allow the Kebele Level Land Management Office to keep accurate records of these cases.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary Material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Ethics statement

The studies involving humans were approved by Addis Ababa University, the Ethiopian Institute of Architecture, Building Construction, and City Development. The studies were conducted in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. The participants provided their written informed consent to participate in this study.

Author contributions

FU: Conceptualization, Formal Analysis, Writing–original draft, Writing–review and editing. DA: Investigation, Supervision, Visualization, Writing–review and editing.

Funding

The author(s) declare that no financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Generative AI statement

The author(s) declare that no Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript.

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