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BRIEF RESEARCH REPORT article

Front. Behav. Econ.

Sec. Behavioral Microfoundations

Volume 4 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/frbhe.2025.1495995

This article is part of the Research TopicCoordination/Cooperation GamesView all 5 articles

Communication among selected members improves cooperation in a social dilemma

Provisionally accepted
  • 1Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan
  • 2Kochi University of Technology, Kami, Kochi, Japan
  • 3Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Hokkaidō, Japan

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

Communication is crucial to resolving conflicts such as social dilemmas. Previous literature concurs that communication among all group members increases cooperation. However, gathering all the members is often difficult. Hence, the effect of communication among some group members needs to be examined. The current study addressed this notion in a public goods experiment framework measuring the social value orientation of individuals. We conducted a six-person public goods game 20 times with members fixed. Between the tenth and eleventh periods, we implemented different communication tactics: communication among all members, communication among three members selected randomly, or no communication (control). We observed that communication among some members increased the cooperation rate compared to no communication; however, the effect was weaker when compared with communication among all the members. Furthermore, partial communication increased the cooperation rate of prosocial individuals regardless of whether to join the communication process themselves. Proself individuals, on the contrary, cooperated as long as they communicated. Non-communicating members did not decrease their perception of goal-sharing and reciprocity compared to communicating members. These observations affirm that communication among some members is beneficial, even if assembling all the members is not always feasible.

Keywords: Common goal, Communication, cooperation, Public goods game, selected member, Social Dilemma, Social value orientation

Received: 13 Sep 2024; Accepted: 14 Oct 2025.

Copyright: © 2025 Kitakaji, Hizen and Ohnuma. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence: Yoko Kitakaji, ykitakaji@gmail.com

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