Altruism and Morality: Some Problems for Max U

Geoffrey M. Hodgson^*

• Loughborough University, Loughborough, United Kingdom

This essay considers some limitations of the assumption of utility maximisation (Max U) as an explanation of human action. Leading promoters of the assumption explicitly avoid the question of motivation, to focus instead on manifest behaviour. Max U is strictly unfalsifiable. With appropriate assumptions and contextual variables, it can be made to fit any real-world behaviour. Max U is neither specifically human nor a product of evolution: it assumes a static set of preferences. Altruism, by definition, is can be costly. This is If those costs result overall in a net disutility, even with a 'warm glow' from helping others, then this is incompatible with the Max U assumption, where no voluntary behaviour reduces utility. Relevant too are criticisms of 'folk psychology', where behaviour is deemed to stem from stable preferences and beliefs. Turning to the question of moral motivation, weWe also need to consider the nature of moral sentiments and how they evolved in cooperative human groups. Overall, an evolutionary perspective enables the development of a richer explanation of human behaviour, including moral motivations, altruism and self-interested pursuits.