About this Research Topic
We are pleased to announce a call for papers for a Research Topic on "Framing Effects in Behavioral Game Theory" for the journal Frontiers in Behavioral Economics, section Behavioral Microfoundations.
Framing effects have been systematically studied in individual decision-making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This Research Topic aims to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon in strategic decision-making. A non-exhaustive list of framing effects that this research topic will focus on is provided below. We are open to studies from Economics, Management, Political Science, Psychology, etc., if those adhere to the standards of Behavioral Economics or and fall into our scope.
It is well known that changes in experimental instruction, including how a game is described to participants in an experiment, can have a profound impact on behavior. We invite submissions that explore how subtle modifications in experimental instructions or use non-neutral wording to describe a strategic situation to participants shape perceptions of the game, beliefs, and strategic play within game settings (see for examples Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 2000; Liberman et al., 2004; Branas-Garza, 2007; Masiliūnas, A. and Nax, H.H., 2020). Contributions that delve into the impact of framing on strategic reasoning and cooperation dynamics are particularly encouraged.
The representation of payoffs plays a crucial role in individuals’ understanding of incentives. We encourage submissions that explore how graphical representations, numerical formats, or any non-standard payoff format impact beliefs, strategic decision processes, and ultimately behavior (for examples see Fisman et al., 2007; Isoni et al., 2020).
We are also interested in studies that explore a change in the payoff frame from gains to losses or any form of payoff-irrelevant game decomposition (see, for example, Fiedler & Hillenbrand, 2020; Boun et al., 2018; Leliveld et al., 2009; Bland, 2019; Penczynski et al., 2022).
Contributions examining the influence of strategy labels inspired by Schelling's focal points (1960) are also particularly welcome. Investigating how subtle changes in the nomenclature of strategies and their salience affect coordination and cooperation can offer valuable insights into their effects on collective and individualistic modes of strategic reasoning (see Sugden, 1993; and Crawford 2007).
While the primary emphasis of this research topic will be on the framing of experimental instructions, changes in the description of the game, the way payoffs are represented, and on the role of strategy labels, we will also consider studies that investigate any other framing effect not included in the list provided and welcome studies that bring the relevance of strategic framing into the context of real-world issues. Such studies may depart from traditional experimental methods, which typically rely on monetary incentives and abstract framing, and instead, engage with specific applications in practical settings.
References
1. Andreoni, J. (1995). "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1), 1-21.
2. Bland, J. R. (2019). “How many games are we playing? An experimental analysis of choice bracketing in games.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 80, 80–91.
3. Brañas-Garza, P. (2007). "Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games." Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(4), 477-486.
4. Crawford, V. P., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2008). "The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures." American Economic Review, 98(4), 1443-1458.
5. Cookson, R. (2000). "Framing effects in public good experiments." Experimental Economics, 79, 55–79. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28, 477–486.
6. Fiedler, S., & Hillenbrand, A. (2020). "Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice." Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 232-251.
7. Fisman, R., Kariv, S., & Markovits, D. (2007). "Individual preferences for giving." American Economic Review, 97(5), 1858-1876.
8. Isoni, A., Sugden, R., & Zheng, J. (Year not provided). "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points." European Economic Review, Volume 127.
9. Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., and Ross, L. (2004). "The name of the game: predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner’s dilemma game moves." Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull., 30, 1175–1185.
10. Masiliūnas, A., & Nax, H. H. (2020). "Framing and repeated competition." Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 604-619.
11. Penczynski, S. P., Sitzia, S., and Zheng, J. (2022). "Decomposed games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests."
12. Schelling, T. C. (1960). "The strategy of conflict." (First ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
13. Sugden R (1993) Thinking as a team. Social Philos Policy 10(1):69–89
14. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice." Science, 211(4481), 453-458.
Framing effects have been systematically studied in individual decision-making (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This Research Topic aims to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon in strategic decision-making. A non-exhaustive list of framing effects that this research topic will focus on is provided below. We are open to studies from Economics, Management, Political Science, Psychology, etc., if those adhere to the standards of Behavioral Economics or and fall into our scope.
It is well known that changes in experimental instruction, including how a game is described to participants in an experiment, can have a profound impact on behavior. We invite submissions that explore how subtle modifications in experimental instructions or use non-neutral wording to describe a strategic situation to participants shape perceptions of the game, beliefs, and strategic play within game settings (see for examples Andreoni, 1995; Cookson, 2000; Liberman et al., 2004; Branas-Garza, 2007; Masiliūnas, A. and Nax, H.H., 2020). Contributions that delve into the impact of framing on strategic reasoning and cooperation dynamics are particularly encouraged.
The representation of payoffs plays a crucial role in individuals’ understanding of incentives. We encourage submissions that explore how graphical representations, numerical formats, or any non-standard payoff format impact beliefs, strategic decision processes, and ultimately behavior (for examples see Fisman et al., 2007; Isoni et al., 2020).
We are also interested in studies that explore a change in the payoff frame from gains to losses or any form of payoff-irrelevant game decomposition (see, for example, Fiedler & Hillenbrand, 2020; Boun et al., 2018; Leliveld et al., 2009; Bland, 2019; Penczynski et al., 2022).
Contributions examining the influence of strategy labels inspired by Schelling's focal points (1960) are also particularly welcome. Investigating how subtle changes in the nomenclature of strategies and their salience affect coordination and cooperation can offer valuable insights into their effects on collective and individualistic modes of strategic reasoning (see Sugden, 1993; and Crawford 2007).
While the primary emphasis of this research topic will be on the framing of experimental instructions, changes in the description of the game, the way payoffs are represented, and on the role of strategy labels, we will also consider studies that investigate any other framing effect not included in the list provided and welcome studies that bring the relevance of strategic framing into the context of real-world issues. Such studies may depart from traditional experimental methods, which typically rely on monetary incentives and abstract framing, and instead, engage with specific applications in practical settings.
References
1. Andreoni, J. (1995). "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1), 1-21.
2. Bland, J. R. (2019). “How many games are we playing? An experimental analysis of choice bracketing in games.” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 80, 80–91.
3. Brañas-Garza, P. (2007). "Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games." Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(4), 477-486.
4. Crawford, V. P., Gneezy, U., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2008). "The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures." American Economic Review, 98(4), 1443-1458.
5. Cookson, R. (2000). "Framing effects in public good experiments." Experimental Economics, 79, 55–79. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28, 477–486.
6. Fiedler, S., & Hillenbrand, A. (2020). "Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice." Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 232-251.
7. Fisman, R., Kariv, S., & Markovits, D. (2007). "Individual preferences for giving." American Economic Review, 97(5), 1858-1876.
8. Isoni, A., Sugden, R., & Zheng, J. (Year not provided). "The pizza night game: Conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points." European Economic Review, Volume 127.
9. Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., and Ross, L. (2004). "The name of the game: predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner’s dilemma game moves." Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull., 30, 1175–1185.
10. Masiliūnas, A., & Nax, H. H. (2020). "Framing and repeated competition." Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 604-619.
11. Penczynski, S. P., Sitzia, S., and Zheng, J. (2022). "Decomposed games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests."
12. Schelling, T. C. (1960). "The strategy of conflict." (First ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
13. Sugden R (1993) Thinking as a team. Social Philos Policy 10(1):69–89
14. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice." Science, 211(4481), 453-458.
Keywords: Behavioral Game Theory
Important Note: All contributions to this Research Topic must be within the scope of the section and journal to which they are submitted, as defined in their mission statements. Frontiers reserves the right to guide an out-of-scope manuscript to a more suitable section or journal at any stage of peer review.
