PERSPECTIVE article

Front. Behav. Neurosci.

Sec. Individual and Social Behaviors

Volume 19 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2025.1544997

The Neuroexistentialism of Social Connectedness and Loneliness

Provisionally accepted
  • Department of Neuroscience, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada

The final, formatted version of the article will be published soon.

Social isolation and loneliness have been subject to extensive investigation and discussion by both modern neuroscience and existentialist philosophy. Neuroexistentialism, though controversial, examines how neuroscientific findings inform human existential concerns. In the present discussion, we argue that (1) in the absence of meaningful attributes, typically provided by relationships with objects and others, social isolation and loneliness lead an individual to a pervasive fear of being or the perception of "being-in-the-empty-world" which resembles an existential horror of loneliness; and (2) the pervasiveness of these influences justifies the ubiquity of cerebral responses to both objective and subjective prolonged social disengagement in humans.We also contend that current neuroscientific models of social behaviours, especially within social neuroscience, need to avoid self-affirmative and tautological notions to explain the originality of social connections in human life. By adopting a more integrative and critical approach, these models can better address the complex interplay between social disengagement and their neurological correlates known as the "social brain". This can be accomplished through the establishment of a novel conceptual framework in modern neuroscience to remodel the triad of brain, solitary mind, and society.

Keywords: Existentialism, Social Isolation, social enrichment, outreach, stress resilience, MRI, brain plasticity, Philosophy of science

Received: 13 Dec 2024; Accepted: 20 Jun 2025.

Copyright: © 2025 Faraji and Metz. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence:
Jamshid Faraji, Department of Neuroscience, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, T1K 3M4, Alberta, Canada
Gerlinde A.S. Metz, Department of Neuroscience, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, T1K 3M4, Alberta, Canada

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