ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.
Sec. Biosafety and Biosecurity
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fbioe.2025.1620678
This article is part of the Research TopicInsights In Biosafety & Biosecurity 2024/2025: Novel Developments, Current Challenges, and Future PerspectivesView all 7 articles
Mapping variation in DURC risk assessments of synthetic biology projects
Provisionally accepted
- 1Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, Stanford, United States
- 2International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), Geneve, Switzerland
- 3Department of Bioengineering, Stanford University, Stanford, United States
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Introduction When a life science project is identified as potential dual use research of concern (DURC), US government policy and biorisk management professionals recommend conducting a risk assessment of the project and using its results to choose strategies to manage any associated risks. However, there is little empirical research on how real-world projects score on DURC assessments, the extent to which reviewers agree or disagree about risks for a given project, or how risk judgments map to recommended risk management strategies. By studying the process of DURC risk assessment, it may be possible to develop methods that are more consistent, accurate, and cost-effective.Using a modified version of the framework in the Companion Guide to the United States Government Policies for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, we elicited detailed reviews from 18 experienced DURC reviewers and 49 synthetic biology students of the risks, benefits, and recommended risk management strategies for four real-world synthetic biology projects.We found significant variation among experts, as well as between experts and students, in both perceived DURC risk and recommended risk management strategies. For some projects, expert risk assessments spanned 4 out of 5 possible ratings. We found substantial disagreement between participants about the appropriate actions to take to manage the DURC risks of each project.The observed variation in participants' judgments suggests that decisions for similar projects may vary significantly across institutions, exposing the public to inconsistent standards of risk management. We provide several research-based suggestions to reduce reviewer disagreement and manage risk more efficiently when reviewers disagree.
Keywords: Dual use research of concern (DURC), biosafety, biosecurity, Synthetic Biology, Biotechnology, Risk Assessment
Received: 30 Apr 2025; Accepted: 16 Jul 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Greene, Alexanian and Palmer. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Daniel Greene, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, Stanford, United States
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