ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Mar. Sci.
Sec. Ocean Solutions
Volume 12 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fmars.2025.1655085
This article is part of the Research TopicBlue Carbon and Sustainable Development: Bridging Ecological and Policy Landscapes.View all articles
Research on shipping carbon governance considering rent-seeking behavior: An evolutionary game analysis based on prospect theory
Provisionally accepted
- Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan, China
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Accurate carbon emission data serve as the foundation for the effective functioning of carbon markets. However, strategic collusion driven by perceived utility values among market participants can systematically erode governance efficacy. In response to the vulnerability of shipping carbon governance systems caused by rent-seeking behavior, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving shipping companies, carbon verification agencies, and governments based on prospect theory. Using system dynamics modeling and numerical simulation, we validate the equilibrium constraints and analyze the impact of basic parameters and perceived value coefficient. The results indicate that shipping carbon governance evolves dynamically in stages across its lifecycle, driven by the formation of self-sustaining in shipping companies. Moreover, stakeholder decisions predominantly determined by cost-benefit structures, and the anticipated rent-seeking gains incentivize such collusion. Additionally, perceived coefficients exert differentiated moderating effects. Shipping companies’ transition decisions show negative correlations with the risk attitude and loss aversion coefficients, whereas carbon verification agencies and governments demonstrate overall positive correlations with these coefficients. Consequently, we propose a systematic governance framework to provide decision support for solving the rent-seeking dilemma and promoting a carbon governance in shipping industry.
Keywords: carbon governance, Rent-seeking behavior, Emissions trading system, Sustainable development goal, evolutionary game, Prospect Theory
Received: 27 Jun 2025; Accepted: 05 Aug 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Chen, Chen, Gu, Tian and Fu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Yufang Fu, Zhejiang Ocean University, Zhoushan, China
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