Compliance mechanisms of the draft global plastics treaty: theory, current status, and prospects

Qiao, Xiongbing

doi:10.3389/fmars.2025.1683245

ORIGINAL RESEARCH article

Front. Mar. Sci., 28 January 2026

Sec. Marine Pollution

Volume 12 - 2025 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2025.1683245

This article is part of the Research TopicMarine Microplastics and their epibiotic Microorganisms (MMM)View all 8 articles

Compliance mechanisms of the draft global plastics treaty: theory, current status, and prospects

Xiongbing Qiao^*

Wuhan University Institute of International Law, Wuhan, China

Marine plastic pollution, with its transboundary nature, persistence, and extensive harmful impacts, has become a pressing challenge to the ecological security and sustainable development of the global ocean. In response, the international community has sought to integrate this issue into existing regulatory regimes through revisions to multilateral environmental agreements and annexes, supplemented by soft-law instruments such as the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activi-ties (1995) and the Honolulu Strategy (2012). Despite these efforts, significant regulatory gaps remain. The adoption of the Draft Resolution on End Plastic Pollution by the United Nations Environment Assembly on 2 March 2022 marked a pivotal step toward a Global Plastics Treaty. Since then, the United Nations Environment Programme has convened five sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, yet negotiations continue to face deep divergenc-es, particularly on compliance mechanisms, funding, and technology transfer. This article analyzes the theoretical foundations, current status, and prospective pathways of the draft compliance mechanism, identifying institutional deficiencies and proposing reforms. It argues that the future treaty should operationalize the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, establish a robust non-compliance procedure, secure sustainable financial and technological support, and foster inclusive international cooperation to ensure effective implementation.

1 Introduction

Since the advent of large-scale plastic production and use in the twentieth century, global output has risen steadily. Cumulative production has now surpassed ten billion metric tons and continues to increase by several hundred million metric tons each year. According to the latest report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), annual plastic production exceeds 400 million metric tons, yet only about nine percent is recycled. Approximately 11 million metric tons enter the oceans each year, causing high mortality among marine organisms and enabling microplastics to infiltrate the food chain. Without effective intervention, scientists project that the volume of plastic pollution will double by 2040, significantly increasing human health risks, including cancer and reproductive system disorders. Microplastics, defined as particles smaller than five millimeters in diameter, can contaminate food, water, and air. It is estimated that each person ingests more than 50, 000 plastic particles annually, with the figure rising further when inhalation is taken into account. Discarded or incinerated single-use plastics also pose serious threats to human health and biodiversity, contaminating ecosystems from mountaintops to the ocean floor (United Nations, 2025).

Marine microplastics also facilitate the transfer within marine ecosystems of persistent organic pollutants, other persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic substances, as well as other contaminants that either exist within or adhere to the particles. This process poses a serious threat to the conservation of marine biodiversity. In addition, marine plastic pollution raises issues of equity. Developing countries are disproportionately affected, and small island developing States, whose economies rely heavily on marine resources, experience especially severe impacts (Zhang and Jiang, 2024a). The harm caused by plastic pollution extends even further. The degradation of plastics is an extremely slow process; conventional plastics may require centuries to fully decompose in the natural environment, during which they generate microplastics. These microplastics can enter the food chain and, through bioaccumulation, ultimately threaten human health. Research indicates that microplastics may disrupt the human endocrine and immune systems and may also impair reproductive and developmental processes.

Faced with the escalating crisis of plastic pollution, the international community has acknowledged the need to establish a legally binding global convention to address this challenge. Against this backdrop, the development of a Global Plastics Treaty has been placed firmly on the international agenda. Negotiations on the treaty are currently underway, yet participating States have expressed substantial differences over specific provisions and implementation mechanisms. As a key safeguard for the effective functioning of the treaty, the compliance mechanism is directly related to the achievement of its intended objectives. Therefore, an in-depth examination of the compliance mechanism in the draft Global Plastics Treaty carries considerable practical significance.

In terms of structure, the second section of this article reviews the theoretical foundations of treaty compliance and the core principles applicable to international environmental agreements, with illustrative reference to existing plastics-related agreements. The third section discusses the negotiation process for the draft Global Plastics Treaty and its proposed compliance mechanism. The fourth section offers forward-looking perspectives and recommendations for the design of the treaty’s future compliance mechanism.

2 Theoretical foundations and existing compliance mechanisms in plastics governance

2.1 Theories on compliance with international treaties

The performance and observance of treaties have long been subjects of considerable debate within the field of international law. Under international law, a treaty that has been validly concluded imposes upon its parties an obligation to perform it in good faith throughout its period of validity. This is known in international law as the principle of pacta sunt servanda, or the sanctity of treaties, which constitutes a fundamental principle in the law of treaties (Li, 2003a).

With regard to compliance, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides that a treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Article 42 of the VCLT further establishes a presumption in favor of the validity and continuing force of treaties. This presumption is rooted in the general principle of international law that “agreements must be kept.” (Brownlie et al., 2007) In essence, a valid treaty is binding upon its parties and must be executed in good faith, which requires not only strict adherence to its text but also faithful observance of its spirit. States must refrain from any act that would undermine the treaty’s object and purpose, and they must carry out its provisions in full (Li, 2003a).

The principle of pacta sunt servanda has been affirmed in various international judicial and arbitral decisions. For example, in the 1910 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration between the United Kingdom and the United States, the Permanent Court of Arbitration declared that every State has an obligation to perform in good faith the duties arising from a treaty, and that the existence of customary practice regarding compliance creates a legal sanction that encourages States to honor these obligations (North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. U.S.), Award of September 7, 1910). Likewise, the Permanent Court of International Justice invoked this principle in several judgments and advisory opinions. In the S.S. Wimbledon case, the Court found that Germany, by applying its order of 25 July 1920 to the Kiel Canal, had violated the Treaty of Versailles and was thus liable to pay damages (Li, 2003b).

For centuries, both theory and practice in international law have emphasized the centrality of the principle that agreements must be kept, as it fosters mutual trust and reliance among States and thereby ensures stability in international relations. The spirit of this principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed in a range of international legal instruments and cases. Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations requires all Members to fulfill in good faith the obligations they have assumed under the Charter (Wang, 2013). The modern international order rests upon honesty and good faith; without compliance with treaties, the stability and order of the international community would be jeopardized. The principle of pacta sunt servanda has a long history in international law. As early as 1280 BCE, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded between Pharaoh Ramses II of Egypt and King Hattusili III of the Hittites included provisions embodying the obligation to keep agreements (Li, 2003c).

Although international legal scholars generally recognize the existence of the pacta sunt servanda principle, there are divergent views regarding its theoretical foundation. The natural law school has consistently upheld the necessity of treaty compliance. Hugo Grotius, regarded as a founder of international law, accorded the principle a position of great importance, maintaining that even treaties concluded with pirates or tyrants must be observed, as compliance is essential for maintaining international peace (Li, 2003d). Grotius’s followers likewise supported the principle. Samuel Pufendorf described the keeping of promises as “one of the most sacred maxims of natural law.” (Li, 2003d). However, grounding pacta sunt servanda solely in natural law is insufficient, as differing interpretations of “pure reason” and human nature within natural law give rise to disputes (Tang, 2009). In the nineteenth century, the rise of the positivist school shifted the emphasis to State consent. Positivists maintained that international law has only two sources, namely treaties and custom, and that both bind States only upon their explicit or implicit consent. Thus, the obligation to comply with treaties arises solely from such consent (Tang, 2009). Oppenheim observed that no international legal rule can be imposed on a State without its consent, just as no domestic legal rule can be imposed upon a citizen without their consent. However, once a State consents to be bound by an international legal rule, it is bound to the same extent and for the same duration as a domestic legal subject is bound by national law (Li, 2003e). Nonetheless, relying solely on consent leaves unanswered the question of why a State must be bound by the consent it has expressed ; (Li, 2003e).

Since the twentieth century, new theoretical perspectives have emerged. Abram Chayes and others proposed the “managerial model” as a replacement for the “enforcement model, “ which assumes that compliance depends on coercive measures. They argued that incorporating coercive enforcement mechanisms, such as economic or military sanctions, into treaties is based on a simplistic and inaccurate analogy to domestic legal systems. Such sanctions are politically and economically costly, often ineffective in altering State behavior, and therefore difficult to employ as a practical deterrent (Chayes and Chayes, 1995a). Instead, Chayes and others advocated enhancing transparency, improving dispute settlement mechanisms, and building the capacity needed for compliance. These factors, when combined, generate the “power of persuasion, “ which encourages non-compliant States to bring their conduct into alignment with their legal obligations (Chayes and Chayes, 1995b).

As to the theoretical basis of pacta sunt servanda, eminent Chinese international law scholar Professor Li Haopei has argued that the principle derives from customary international law. This custom-based principle has taken shape not only through the long-standing and consistent practice of States accompanied by opinio juris, but also through the solemn declarations and reaffirmations made by governments, international organizations, international conferences, treaties, judicial decisions, and scholarly writings (Li, 2003f).

2.2 Fundamental principles of compliance with international environmental treaties

The core of global environmental governance rests upon Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The extent to which these treaties can effectively achieve their ambitious objective of safeguarding the Earth’s ecosystems ultimately depends on the genuine compliance of States with their obligations. Compliance is not automatic; rather, it depends on guidance and support from a set of widely accepted fundamental principles. A thorough examination of these principles is essential for understanding the implementation mechanisms of international environmental law and for enhancing its effectiveness.

2.2.1 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities

Global environmental issues, particularly climate change, ozone depletion, and the loss of biodiversity, often stem from historical accumulations of emissions and consumption patterns. Furthermore, States possess markedly different capacities to address and resolve these problems. Against this background, the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) emerged as a fundamental principle of equity in international environmental law, especially in global environmental treaties. The principle was first formally established at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration states:

“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development, in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.” (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 7).

The principle contains two core elements: (1) Common Responsibility: All States, regardless of their level of development, share a collective responsibility to protect and improve the global environment. The integrity of the Earth’s ecosystems requires that environmental challenges be addressed collectively by the international community. (2) Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities: Developed countries, given their historical contribution to global environmental problems such as the cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases and their possession of greater financial resources and more advanced technologies, are expected to take the lead in reducing emissions and in providing financial and technological assistance. Developing countries, while recognizing the common responsibility, undertake obligations commensurate with their national circumstances and capabilities. Their ability to comply depends heavily on whether developed countries fulfill their commitments regarding funding and technology transfer (Sands and Peel, 2018). Differentiated responsibility does not, however, imply that developing countries can afford to neglect environmental protection. On the contrary, they must strive to reform production patterns, eliminate poverty, strengthen economic and environmental capacity, and follow a path toward sustainable development (Wang, 1998).

In MEAs, the CBDR-RC principle is primarily reflected through the following mechanisms:

1. Differentiated Obligations: For example, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, developed countries are subject to quantified emission reduction targets or more stringent reporting requirements, while developing countries benefit from more flexible arrangements. The preamble of the Kyoto Protocol explicitly reaffirms the need to adhere to Article 3 of the UNFCCC and to take measures in accordance with the CBDR principle. The Protocol’s Compliance Committee addresses compliance issues concerning Annex I developed countries and economies in transition, and binding measures apply only to these Parties, although the Committee itself must include members from developing countries (United Nations, 1998). The preamble of the Paris Agreement likewise affirms that the Agreement’s objectives are to be pursued in accordance with the principles of equity and CBDR-RC, taking into account different national circumstances (United Nations, 2015). Article 9 further provides that developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties in both mitigation and adaptation, thereby continuing to fulfill their existing obligations under the Convention (United Nations, 2015). Similarly, the Basel Convention requires particular attention to the specific needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition (UNEP, 1992a), and the Montreal Protocol provides developing countries with grace periods and dedicated financial mechanisms (UNEP, 1987).

2. Financial Mechanisms: Dedicated financial mechanisms, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund, provide grants or concessional loans to support compliance-related activities in developing countries (UNEP, 1992b).

3. Technology Transfer: Developed countries are required to transfer environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favorable terms, thereby enhancing their capacity to comply. For instance, Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC explicitly calls for such assistance (UNEP, 1992b).

4. Capacity-Building: Capacity-building initiatives targeted at developing countries are incorporated into treaty frameworks as essential elements for enabling effective compliance.

The CBDR-RC principle is essential for ensuring both the equity and the feasibility of the global environmental governance system. It acknowledges historical responsibility and current disparities, with the aim of promoting broader participation and international cooperation. Ignoring this principle would significantly undermine the willingness and ability of developing countries to comply, thereby jeopardizing the achievement of global environmental objectives. However, as the global economic landscape evolves and emissions from emerging economies continue to rise, determining with greater precision and flexibility the scope of “differentiation” and “capabilities” has become a focal point and a challenge in the ongoing negotiations of the draft Global Plastics Treaty.

2.2.2 The principle of facilitating compliance

Traditional international law has primarily relied on the doctrines of State responsibility and dispute settlement mechanisms, such as litigation before the International Court of Justice, to address breaches of treaty obligations. However, these adversarial and punitive approaches often prove ineffective in dealing with the complex compliance challenges posed by environmental treaties, and may even undermine the cooperative atmosphere needed for their effective implementation. In response, modern MEAs have developed distinctive compliance mechanisms oriented toward the facilitation of compliance.

The compliance mechanisms of MEAs generally share several defining characteristics. First, they are non-adversarial in nature. The primary aim of most MEA compliance mechanisms is to assist rather than to punish Parties that face challenges in fulfilling their obligations. As scholars have noted, the prevailing assumption underlying MEAs is that States are, in principle, willing to comply but may encounter obstacles arising from limited capacity, misinterpretation of requirements, or other objective circumstances. These mechanisms are not designed as tools for the coercive enforcement of treaty obligations. Countermeasures are particularly ill-suited to the environmental context, as environmental obligations are non-reciprocal and grounded in the pursuit of common interests (Maljean-Dubois et al., 2021).

Second, they are incentive-based. These mechanisms emphasize the provision of positive incentives, such as access to assistance or the enhancement of a Party’s reputation, rather than relying primarily on punitive deterrence. Successful completion of a compliance action plan is often regarded as a positive outcome. For example, in implementing the Paris Agreement, the Parties deliberately chose not to adopt a traditional compliance enforcement mechanism. Given the Agreement’s emphasis on the pursuit of common benefits, the Parties considered it preferable to provide financial and technical assistance to those facing difficulties in compliance, rather than holding them legally responsible for non-performance. In effect, the majority of Parties view the facilitation of compliance as more important than the punishment of non-compliance, particularly because the use of sanctions may discourage States from joining the treaty and could even foster free-rider behavior (Maljean-Dubois et al., 2021).

Third, they exhibit a high degree of flexibility. MEAs generally respond to non-compliance by tailoring measures to address the underlying causes, whether these arise from an unwillingness or an inability to comply, and by calibrating the response to the seriousness of the situation. A typical facilitative compliance process may include several stages: initiation, which may be triggered by self-reporting, by concerns raised by another Party, or by findings of the Secretariat based on reporting; information gathering and preliminary review; dialogue with the Party concerned; the provision of recommendations and assistance; possible formulation of a compliance action plan; and periodic review of progress. Only in exceptional cases, where a Party clearly has the capacity to comply but deliberately and seriously violates core obligations, may the mechanism consider stronger measures, such as the suspension of certain rights under the treaty. The Montreal Protocol, for example, authorizes the suspension of access to funding or trade rights in extreme circumstances (UNEP, 1992b).

In order to encourage the broad participation of States at different levels of development in MEAs, to promote active fulfillment of obligations, and to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, a range of facilitative and incentive-based measures have been progressively incorporated into MEAs. These measures aim to promote participation in international environmental cooperation, ease the burden of environmental governance, and support the implementation of treaty obligations. Incentives may take a variety of forms, including financial support, technical assistance, and preferential market access (Lan, 2011a).

Facilitative compliance mechanisms have proven to be more effective in enhancing overall compliance rates, preserving the universality of participation in treaty regimes, and maintaining a cooperative spirit among Parties. By acknowledging the complexity of environmental challenges and the practical constraints faced by States, such mechanisms focus on constructive problem-solving and on the joint attainment of environmental objectives.

2.3 Compliance mechanisms in existing plastics-related agreements

At present, the governance framework for marine plastic pollution is administered through a set of overlapping rules, resulting in a fragmented system (Welsh, 2025). Existing multilateral rules include both binding conventions and certain soft-law instruments, yet there is still no dedicated and effective multilateral treaty specifically regulating marine plastic pollution.

Traditional methods of implementing international treaties have significant limitations. Since the 1980s, new practices have emerged in the field of compliance with multilateral environmental agreements. This section examines the compliance mechanisms of the London Convention and the Basel Convention as examples of multilateral marine environmental agreements.

2.3.1 The London convention

As an early multilateral environmental agreement, the 1972 London Convention contained only basic monitoring provisions. The 1978 amendment introduced a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism; however, this amendment never entered into force. The Meeting of the Contracting Parties has actively engaged in monitoring the implementation of the Convention on an annual basis and has frequently discussed allegations of non-compliance by certain Parties. Nevertheless, under the London Convention, Contracting Parties have no substantive authority to address instances of confirmed non-compliance.

To further encourage compliance, the 1996 London Protocol was adopted, establishing a formal compliance mechanism (International Maritime Organization, Article 11). Under this mechanism, a Compliance Group composed of up to 15 members with expertise in science, technology, or law was created. The procedure for initiating compliance review may be triggered by the Meeting of the Parties or by any individual Party. Where a Party initiates the procedure, two situations are recognized: first, where a Party raises questions concerning its own compliance; second, where a Party raises questions regarding another Party’s “failure to comply with obligations under the agreement, “ provided it can demonstrate that such failure “affects or may affect its interests.” (International Maritime Organization, Report of the Thirty-Ninth Consultative Meeting and the Twelfth Meeting of Contracting Parties).

The Compliance Group is the body responsible for reviewing compliance matters. Although non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not formally entitled to initiate compliance proceedings, the Compliance Group may consider evidence submitted by NGOs when reviewing a Party’s compliance. After its review, the Group may recommend to the Meeting of the Parties a range of actions, including measures to promote cooperation and assistance, the development of a compliance action plan, or the issuance of a formal statement of concern.

2.3.2 The basel convention

The Basel Convention itself does not originally contain explicit provisions on compliance. Its procedure and mechanism for promoting implementation and addressing cases of non-compliance were established by a decision of the sixth COP in 2002. Pursuant to this decision, the COP established a subsidiary body under Article 15(5)(e) of the Convention, known as the Implementation and Compliance Committee (Lan, 2011b). The Committee’s mandate is to assist Parties in complying with their obligations under the Convention, and to promote, facilitate, monitor, and aim to ensure implementation and compliance (Basel Convention, Overview of the Compliance Committee).

According to Article 19 of the “Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and Compliance with the Basel Convention, “ the Committee is to review all submissions within its mandate in order to identify the facts and causes of compliance-related issues and assist in their resolution. COP decisions VII/30 and VIII/32 authorized the Committee to give priority to specific submissions related to compliance. However, as of the ninth meeting of the COP, the Committee had not received any such submissions (Mechanism for Promoting Compliance with and Implementation of the Basel Convention). In addition, in accordance with paragraph 21 of the Mechanism and at the direction of the COP, the Committee reviews compliance with, and implementation of, specific obligations under the Convention.

Instances of non-compliance may be submitted to the Committee by Parties to the Convention. This process is designed as a facilitative procedure intended to assist Parties in fulfilling their obligations, rather than as a punitive measure. Although the Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation establishes rules on liability and compensation for damage resulting from transboundary movements, accidental spills, and illegal traffic of hazardous wastes, the Protocol has not entered into force. The absence of binding enforcement means that the cost of non-compliance remains low, which, within a cost–benefit framework, may lead States to favor non-compliance (Khan, 2020).

The amendments to the Convention have also failed to address plastic pollution and its threat to the marine environment in an effective and equitable manner. The plastic-related amendment to the Basel Convention merely requires that the transboundary movement of certain plastic wastes obtain the prior written consent of receiving States (Milea et al., 2024). The Convention does not sufficiently account for the practical circumstances of developing countries. Although the amendment aims to protect developing States from the harms caused by the transboundary movement of plastic waste, it applies to all Parties that have not formally opted out of the Basel Convention, including most developing States. For many of these countries, particularly small island developing States, the capacity to recycle or safely dispose of plastic waste is limited. As a result, the restrictions imposed by the amendment may impede their ability to export plastic waste, thereby exacerbating domestic land-based and marine plastic pollution. In practice, the amendment has increased the difficulties faced by developing States in managing plastic waste, hindering its effective implementation (Li and Kou, 2024).

Moreover, the Technical Cooperation Trust Fund established under the Convention to assist developing States in implementation has proven inadequate due to low levels of voluntary contributions and the selective preferences of donor States. This lack of sustained and reliable support further weakens the capacity of developing States to comply with the Convention’s requirements (Wang and Chen, 2022).

3 Compliance mechanism of the draft global plastics treaty

3.1 Negotiation process of the draft global plastics treaty

The United Nations began promoting the development of a global treaty on plastics as early as 2014. From 23 to 27 June 2014, the first session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) of the UNEP was held in Nairobi. The Assembly adopted Resolution 1/6 on “Marine Plastic Debris and Microplastics.” (Nagtzaama, 2024) The resolution recognized marine plastic pollution as a “rapidly growing problem” and noted the significant risks posed by the “inadequate management and disposal of plastics.” It further acknowledged that marine plastic pollution could have “serious impacts on the marine environment, marine ecosystem services, marine natural resources, fisheries, tourism and the economy, as well as potential risks to human health.” (Nagtzaama, 2024). Delegates emphasized the urgent need for action to address the problems caused by plastic debris and microplastics, and requested the Executive Director to conduct a study on the “main sources” of such debris, potential solutions, and recommendations for urgent action ; (Nagtzaama, 2024). The resolution also called upon States and industry to “promote more efficient use of resources and sound management of plastics and microplastics” and encouraged national governments to “take comprehensive action to address the issue of marine plastic debris and microplastics.” ; (Nagtzaama, 2024).

From 23 to 27 May 2016, the second session of UNEA was held, during which State representatives emphasized the problem of marine pollution, including microplastics (United nations environment assembly of the united nations environment programme). The Assembly subsequently adopted Resolution 2/11 on “Marine Plastic Litter and Microplastics, “ which characterized marine plastic litter and microplastics as a serious global problem requiring urgent global responses, and called for measures to be taken in accordance with local, national, and regional circumstances (United nations environment assembly of the united nations environment programme).

In March 2019, during the fourth session of UNEA, the European Union pledged to “work constructively to help the Environment Assembly fulfill its role in providing global environmental leadership, including through an ambitious outcome document reflecting the urgency of addressing climate change and plastic pollution.” At that session, the Assembly adopted Resolution 4/6 on “Marine Plastic Litter and Microplastics” and Resolution 4/9 on “Addressing Single-use Plastic Products Pollution.” (UNEP, 2019) Resolution 4/6 addressed the serious global environmental problems caused by plastic litter and microplastics, while Resolution 4/9 called upon States to develop and implement national or regional actions to develop environmentally friendly alternatives and improve the environmental impact of single-use plastics (United nations environment assembly of the united nations environment programme).

Following the third UNEA, in 2017 an Ad Hoc Open-Ended Expert Group (AHOEG) on Marine Litter and Microplastics was established to discuss a potential international agreement on such waste. In preparation for UNEA-5, the AHOEG was tasked with providing advice on potential voluntary or legally binding governance approaches to plastic pollution at national, regional, and international levels (Report of the First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Expert Group on Marine Litter and Microplastics, 2018).

From 28 February to 2 March 2022, the resumed fifth session of UNEA (UNEA-5.2) was held at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. The meeting adopted Resolution 5/14 entitled “End Plastic Pollution: Towards an International Legally Binding Instrument.” This resolution was of major significance, as it established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to develop a legally binding instrument based on a comprehensive approach addressing the full life cycle of plastics. It was agreed that the INC would hold five sessions, aiming to conclude negotiations by the end of 2024. This marked the official launch of negotiations on the Global Plastics Treaty and a critical step by the international community in addressing plastic pollution (UNEP, 2022a).

Pursuant to Resolution 5/14, the first session of the INC was held from 26 November to 2 December 2022 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, with over 2, 300 registered participants representing more than 160 countries. Discussions focused primarily on the form of the instrument, the core elements (such as objectives, structural options, and scope), and substantive provisions (including obligations, control measures, and voluntary or binding approaches). The session first addressed procedural matters relating to the INC’s work (UNEP, 2022b).

From 29 May to 2 June 2023, the second session of the INC (INC-2) was held in Paris, France. This historic meeting brought together more than 1, 700 participants, including 700 representatives from 169 member States and at least 900 observers, at the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, with the aim of advancing negotiations on a legally binding instrument on plastic pollution (UNEP, 2022b). Significant divisions emerged during the discussion of the treaty text. A key point of contention was whether the instrument should include legally binding commitments. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and China, among others, advocated for a “bottom-up” approach modeled on the Paris Agreement, whereby each State would determine its own commitments in accordance with its capacity and national priorities (UNEP, 2022b). By contrast, the Least Developed Countries and members of the High Ambition Coalition favored strong, legally binding commitments for all countries, while recognizing that these should be adjusted to reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, given the significant historical accumulation of plastic waste in developed countries (UNEP, 2022b).

The third session of the INC (INC-3) took place from 13 to 19 November 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya, where delegates discussed the draft treaty text. Regional and other negotiating groups presented their positions. On the principles to guide the instrument, most speakers emphasized the importance of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities contained in the Rio Declaration. Many also referred to other Rio principles, including the “polluter pays” principle and the precautionary principle (UNEP, 2023c).

Ahead of the fourth session of the INC (INC-4) in April 2024, UNEP released a revised draft of the Global Plastics Treaty as the starting point for negotiations at INC-4. During the April 23 meeting, States engaged in substantive negotiations on various parts of the text, with significant disagreement over Part III on financial and technical assistance mechanisms. No consensus was reached on whether to establish such mechanisms, the modalities for providing assistance, or whether they should be mandatory or voluntary. Although financial and technical assistance are essential for encouraging participation—particularly by developing countries—in efforts to combat plastic pollution, reaching agreement on Part III was deemed unrealistic in the absence of consensus on the substantive provisions of Part II (Pan, 2024).

From 25 November to 1 December 2024, the fifth session of the INC (INC-5) was held in Busan, Republic of Korea, with the aim of finalizing a legally binding international instrument on plastic pollution, including marine plastic pollution. The meeting was attended by approximately 3, 800 registered participants from 177 UN member States, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Negotiations were held on the text relating to objectives (Article 1), product design (Article 5), emissions and releases (Article 7), waste management (Article 8), existing plastic pollution (Article 9), just transition (Article 10), implementation and compliance (Article 13), and national action plans (Article 14), with progress made toward finalizing the draft text. However, no consensus was reached on provisions concerning plastic products (Article 3), supply (Article 6), and finance (Article 11), due to substantial differences among States (Ministry of the Environment of Japan, Press Release). Since 25 November, more than 3, 300 delegates, including representatives from over 170 countries and observers from more than 440 organizations, negotiated on the basis of two documents presented by INC Chair Ambassador Luis Vayas Valdivieso. It was agreed on the closing day to forward the Chair’s text to the resumed session for further negotiation.

From August 5 to 15, 2025, the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.2) was held in Geneva, bringing together over 2, 600 participants, including more than 1, 400 representatives from 183 member countries, as well as nearly 1, 000 observers representing over 400 organizations. Approximately 70 ministers and vice-ministerial officials, along with 30 high-level representatives, also held informal roundtable meetings during the session. On August 15, after 10 days of negotiations, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meeting aimed at developing an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, adjourned early without reaching a consensus on the instrument text. The Committee agreed to announce follow-up negotiation arrangements at a later date.

3.2 Compliance mechanism under the draft global plastics treaty

At present, the Global Plastics Treaty remains under negotiation and has not yet been finalized. In practice, the detailed procedures for the implementation of compliance mechanisms are usually adopted at the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties. This section therefore discusses only the design of the compliance mechanism as currently set out in the draft treaty. In general, existing multilateral environmental agreements adopt several models for compliance mechanisms, most notably: the “Montreal model” (facilitation of compliance combined with dispute settlement), the “Kyoto model” (facilitation of compliance combined with the handling of non-compliance), and the “Paris model” (compliance facilitation only) (Feng, 2023).

The draft treaty has gone through several iterations, including the “zero draft” of September 2023, the revised zero draft of December 2023, the Co-Chairs’ draft text of October 2024, and the Chair’s draft text of December 2024. The December 2024 Chair’s text was prepared on the basis of the results of informal consultations held on 30 November, as well as inputs from the Co-Chairs of the contact groups and the facilitators of the informal consultations.

From the current text, it appears that the Global Plastics Treaty essentially adopts a compliance model similar to the Montreal model, which combines compliance facilitation with dispute settlement. The December 2024 draft provides for the establishment of a subsidiary body to ensure that Parties comply with their obligations under the treaty. The compliance mechanism under the Minamata Convention on Mercury serves as a model for the plastics treaty. It is facilitative and non-punitive, allowing Parties to work towards fulfilling their obligations without fear of sanctions. It provides for regular reporting, including the sharing of national experiences and the identification of best practices (International Institute for Sustainable Development, A Guide to the Global Agreement to End Plastic Pollution).

This section discusses the compliance mechanism as set out in Article 13 of the December 2024 Chair’s draft of the Global Plastics Treaty.

The compliance provisions have not been the main focus of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meetings. In the zero draft of 2023, Part IV contained the provisions on implementation, setting out how treaty obligations were to be fulfilled and how compliance would be assessed. The draft envisaged that compliance would be achieved through national plans, under which each Party would develop and implement a plan containing the elements specified in the treaty in order to fulfill its obligations and achieve its objectives. Reports would be submitted in accordance with the rules established under the treaty. The governing body would review and evaluate the implementation of the treaty’s objectives, with a view to achieving the global goal of reducing plastic pollution. To this end, the text also provided for Parties to enhance international cooperation, exchange information, and raise public awareness in order to promote the achievement of the treaty’s goals (Zheng et al., 2024).

First, regarding the compliance mechanism itself, Article 13 (United Nations, 2025) of the draft provides for the establishment of a mechanism, including a committee, to promote implementation of and facilitate compliance with the provisions of the treaty. The committee is to operate in a transparent, facilitative, non-punitive, non-adversarial, and expert-based manner (UNEP, 2024a).

In the original zero draft and the revised zero draft, Article 2 of Part IV presented two options for the compliance committee. The first option provided for the establishment of a review mechanism, including a committee as a subsidiary body of the governing body, to facilitate and promote implementation and compliance with all provisions of the instrument, as well as to promote cooperation among Parties (UNEP, 2023a). The second option envisaged a mechanism, including a committee, to facilitate implementation and review compliance with the provisions of the instrument, and to promote cooperation among Parties in this regard (UNEP, 2023a). The latest draft adopts the second option.

On the issue of implementation and compliance, during the fourth session of the INC, delegates agreed to narrow the options regarding the establishment of the compliance mechanism as a subsidiary body of the governing body, but expressed differing views on the level of detail to be discussed at the first meeting. Many delegations stressed that the mechanism should be facilitative, non-adversarial, and non-punitive, and that it should respect national sovereignty, national capacities, and environmental circumstances, while ensuring equitable geographical representation. Some delegations called for the eventual compliance mechanism to establish its own rules of procedure. One delegate, supported by another, proposed that the body be called the “Implementation and Cooperation Committee” to reflect its non-adversarial character. On the question of voting rules within the committee, several delegates stated that, if all efforts to reach consensus had been exhausted and no agreement could be reached, decisions on implementation and compliance should be taken by majority vote (IIDS, 2024). The latest Chair’s draft draws on the compliance mechanisms of other multilateral environmental agreements, incorporates the views of delegations, and makes explicit that the compliance mechanism is to be non-punitive and non-adversarial (UNEP, 2024a).

Second, regarding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities between developing and developed countries, during the third session of the INC, some delegates emphasized that binding global and national targets should be established alongside voluntary measures. Many recalled the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and expressed strong support for national action plans that would allow each State to tailor its obligations to its specific needs, priorities, and capacities. Some also stressed that the instrument should not impose an excessive compliance burden, in order to make compliance realistic and achievable, particularly for small island developing States. However, one delegate stated that the provision on existing plastic pollution, including marine plastic pollution, should contain mandatory rather than voluntary measures. This view was shared by many delegates, who considered addressing marine plastic pollution to be of critical importance. Many representatives also emphasized the need to coordinate with a wide range of stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, civil society, academia, and the private sector. One delegate noted that cooperation at the national level and the development of public–private partnerships would be essential for the future implementation of the instrument (UNEP, 2022b).

The revised zero draft, in Article 2 (Zhang and Jiang, 2024a) of Part IV, had explicitly provided for particular attention to be given to the respective capacities and circumstances of the Parties, especially developing country Parties and, in particular, small island developing States, and for flexibility to be granted accordingly (UNEP, 2023a). However, this provision was deleted in the latest Chair’s draft.

Third, regarding the conditions for triggering the committee’s review, Article 6 of the revised zero draft had provided that the committee could consider matters on the basis of: (a) a written submission from any Party regarding its own compliance; (b) a written submission from any Party regarding another Party’s compliance; (c) a request from the governing body; (d) information provided by the Secretariat on the status of information submitted under Article 3 of Part IV on reporting progress; (e) a request from the Secretariat based on available information, particularly information from national reports; and (f) information obtained by the committee, particularly from national reports (UNEP, 2023a). The latest Chair’s draft simplifies this provision considerably. Under Article 13 (Zhang and Jiang, 2024a) of the current draft, the committee may consider matters on the basis of: (a) a written submission from any Party regarding its own compliance; (b) a request from the Conference of the Parties; and (c) information provided by the Secretariat on the status of information submitted under Article 15. This represents a narrowing of the conditions under which the committee may be triggered.

Fourth, with regard to the scope of the committee’s review, Article 4 of the revised zero draft had provided that the committee should promote the implementation of all provisions of the instrument and review compliance with all such provisions. It should review both individual and systemic issues of implementation and compliance, including the challenges faced by developing country Parties in implementation, and make recommendations to the governing body, including, where appropriate, recommendations on providing effective means of implementation by developed countries to address areas of non-compliance in small island developing States (UNEP, 2023b). However, the latest Chair’s draft does not contain provisions to this effect.

Compared to the Chair’s text produced after the INC-5.1 Busan meeting in December 2024, the final version of the Chair’s draft text of 2025 reflects a key shift: from a rigid framework to flexible governance. This is specifically reflected in the following aspects:

First, the financial mechanism has been weakened. According to the latest draft convention, the funding obligation of developed countries has been downgraded from “shall provide” sufficient funds in the Busan version to “are encouraged to provide” in the Geneva version. The financial structure has shifted from a single “multilateral fund” to a “tripartite hybrid mechanism” (Global Environment Facility, a new multilateral fund, and a public-private coordination network), introducing private sector involvement to share the burden. Second, while the Busan draft insisted on “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR) and emphasized the historical responsibilities of developed countries, the Geneva version removes mandatory references to CBDR. The wording of financial obligations has been softened from “shall” to “should, “ diluting the responsibilities of developed countries towards developing countries, least developed countries, and small island developing states. Third, regarding the compliance mechanism, Article 13 of the 2025 Chair’s draft largely retains the provisions of Article 13 of the 2024 Chair’s draft.

4 Prospects for the compliance mechanism under the draft global plastics treaty

4.1 Upholding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities

The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) serves to correct the substantive inequities that absolute equality may produce, and it has become a fundamental principle in addressing global environmental challenges. The principle of CBDR was formally defined and consolidated in the 1992 Rio Declaration, particularly in Principles 6 and 7 (United Nations, 1992). The Paris Agreement combined CBDR with the nationally determined contributions framework, thereby evolving the principle further. The definition of CBDR provided by Rio Declaration remains the most widely accepted formulation: developed and developing countries are placed within a unified international legal framework, subject to common legal obligations, yet each Party retains the right to determine differentiated commitments according to its “national circumstances.” (Liu, 2021) Responsibility and capacity are the two components relating to the application of CBDR (Wang, 2025a).

The inclusion and application of CBDR have become a focal point of debate in the Draft Global Plastics Treaty, with divergent positions among States (Stöfen-O’Brien, 2023). Explicit advocates of CBDR are primarily developing countries, including members of the Like-Minded Countries Group and the Arab Group (Wang, 2025b). These States emphasize that CBDR should be the cornerstone of the treaty, calling on developed countries to take the lead in addressing plastic pollution and providing financial/technical support based on historical responsibility.Their proposals concerning CBDR align with the pursuit of equity and fairness in international law and could help deal with the unequal consequences of plastic pollution (Wang, 2025c). Implicit supporters are countries which do not explicitly name CBDR but emphasize the incoporation of principles of Rio Declaration, which inlcude the principle of CBDR (e.g., African Group), or emphasize the basic two components of CBDR (e.g., Tonga, Bangladesh) (Wang, 2025d). Silent or opposing parties are members of the High Ambition Coalition (HAC) (e.g., Norway, Rwanda, Kenya) (See high ambition coalition to end plastic pollution) that prioritize Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) and do not reference CBDR or its components (Wang, 2025e).

In fact, the Global Plastics Treaty has already identified CBDR as an important means of reconciling the interests of developing and developed countries (Wang, 2023). Two particularly notable working papers stand out as worthy of consideration in this context, which are a reflection of the results from the earlier sessions (Wang, 2025f). One is the compliance of draft text (CDT) prepared by the INC in July 2024 (UNEP, 2024b). The CBDR principle is explicitly enshrined in the preamble of CDT in line with the reflection of each Party’s national circumstances and capabilities, and the intended objective of CDT integrates the CBDR principle, followed by provisions including the consideration of national conditions, capacity, and priorities, alongside financial and technical support, and targeted capacity-building and the CBDR principle as part of the principles of the Draft Global Plastics Treaty (Wang, 2025g). The other is the Chair’s draft of 1 December 2024 (UNEP, 2024a). Similiar to the CDT, the Chair’s draft also codifies the CBDR principle in the preamble, and highlights the importance of factoring in national circumstances and capabilities, and formally recognizes the CBDR principle as a guiding principle for all Parties (Wang, 2025h). Although the draft Chair’s text presented at the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in 2025 softened the mandatory language regarding “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR) from the 2024 draft—weakening the obligations of developed countries toward developing nations, least developed countries, and small island developing states by replacing “shall” with “should”—this principle remains a foundational objective and a critical guiding direction for the future negotiations of the plastics convention. In line with the requirements of UNEA Resolution 5/14, it is equitable to incorporate the CBDR principle as stated in the Rio Declaration, along with the respective circumstances and capabilities of countries.

The application of CBDR to the Draft Global Plastics Treaty is justified by three core realities: since all countries in the world have been inevitably suffered from plastic pollution (Weiss, 2002), which happens in one part of the Earth may affect the environment in other parts, responsibilities of governing plastic pollution are common to every member of the international community (Wang, 2023); many developing countries rely on the plastic industry for economic development (Wang, 2025i), and the treaty’s goal is not to eliminate plastics but to manage their full life cycle—making differentiated responsibilities essential to avoid unduly burdening developing countries (Andersen, 2024); developed countries have benefited disproportionately from plastic production while contributing more to cumulative pollution, and they possess greater technological and financial capacities to address the issue, while developing countries face disproportionate harm from plastic pollution (e.g., illegal dumping of hazardous plastic waste) and lack the means to implement effective solutions without support (Wang, 2025j).

As meantioned above, the position of the majority of HAC members, expecially EU remains consistent in favor of EPR, emphasized the role and responsibilities of the private sector in ending plastic pollution, following the polluter pays principle (Xu et al., 2024a). It appears that the principle of CBDR and EPR are contradictory. Developing countries that also are producers are burdened more heavily under the EPR than under the CBDR in coping with plastic pollution (Wang, 2023). And this stance will reduce the historical responsibility of developed countries in plastic pollution control and reduce the obligation of developed countries to help developing countries in plastic pollution control (Xu et al., 2024a). Besides, HAC supported binding national plans with strict compliance mechanisms, uniform accounting rules, and strict measurement, reporting, and verification protocols in its implementation framework (Xu et al., 2024a). However, extreme positions have less chance of success than moderate ones (Oberthür and Groen, 2018). Japan opposes the demanding uniform measures internationally and favors greater national autonomy (Xu et al., 2023). Therefore, EU takes a relatively moderate stance on national plans (Xu et al., 2024b), suggesting that the implementation should be based on national reporting (bottom-up) and environmental monitoring (top-down) (European Commission, 2022b). Furthermore, Resolution 5/14 and Zero Draft advocated a bottom-up mechanism that would promote more flexible national plans, taking into account national circumstances and capacities (Xu et al., 2024c). It is noteworthy that there is possibility of reconciling CBDR with EPR. The Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries has proposed a solution: tailoring EPR where feasible and restrictions on single-use, avoidable and unnecessary plastic products to national circumstances and capacities, enabling the coexistence of the two principles (See Opening Statement of the Group of Latin American and the Caribbean Countries (grulac), 2024). Considering the foregoing, the treaty could adopt a hybrid approach: core obligations for all parties, supplemented by voluntary contributions scaled according to economic capacity and historical plastic production.

The treaty must therefore incorporate CBDR in a manner that is both principled and pragmatic. This requires recognizing the historical responsibility of developed countries while also acknowledging the growing role of emerging economies. That is, the Global Plastics Treaty should apply CBDR in a manner that accounts for national circumstances, adjusting targets for plastic recycling and requirements for plastic production technologies to a reasonable extent, and providing financial and technical assistance to developing countries in areas such as infrastructure development for marine plastic pollution control, technological capacity-building, and access to financial resources (Zhang and Jiang, 2024b). Actually, the issue of provision of necessary assistance to developing countries has been contentious throughout the five sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). At INC-1, the Indonesian delegation stressed that financing, capacity-building, and technology are crucial means of implementation, especially for developing countries lacking adequate infrastructure to manage plastic pollution. Several countries, including Syria, proposed the establishment of a financial mechanism to assist developing countries in meeting their obligations under the ILBI (Nagtzaama, 2024). At INC-4, several delegates emphasized that the financial mechanism should remain flexible until agreement on the treaty’s substantive provisions is reached, and that eligibility criteria should not be defined prematurely. Divergent views were expressed on whether the GEF should serve as the financial mechanism. Many delegations strongly favored establishing a dedicated financial mechanism similar to the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol. Others supported the GEF, noting the high operational costs of running an independent mechanism and highlighting the GEF’s experience in addressing pollution-related issues. One delegation cautioned that GEF disbursements are based on per capita GDP, which disadvantages Small Island Developing States and Least Developed Countries in accessing urgently needed implementation funds (INC-4 Negotiation Review of the Plastics Treaty).

4.2 Introducing a non-compliance procedure

The “non-compliance procedure” first appeared in the Copenhagen Amendment adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol. It is a specialized process for identifying and addressing non-compliance with treaty obligations (Lan, 2011c). Its primary purpose is to ensure compliance by assisting Parties that may fail to meet their obligations through technical or financial support, or, in serious cases, by recommending sanctions. The objective is to maintain Parties in a state of compliance, rather than to punish non-compliance or compensate injured States for harm caused. Unlike traditional dispute settlement mechanisms, which focus on resolving disputes after environmental harm has occurred, compliance mechanisms aim to prevent disputes by facilitating the fulfillment of treaty obligations. They are therefore forward-looking rather than retrospective in nature. States are the makers and the breakers of international law. Because no central authority–at least in a traditionalist view–exists for the enforcement of international law, only unilateral methods are available for its enforcement by the states themselves. These traditional methods encompass the concepts of state responsibility and liability, traditional dispute settlement, and countermeasures such as reprisals, retorsions, and sanctions. However, these methods are not suitable for the enforcement of international environmental treaties (Ehrmann, 2002).

Following the success of the Montreal Protocol, a number of global and regional environmental treaties have incorporated specific non-compliance procedures, including the Basel Convention, the Aarhus Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ().

For plastic pollution, a transboundary issue requiring global cooperation, countermeasures would exacerbate North-South tensions and encourage treaty withdrawal. The treaty’s goal is to “end plastic pollution, “ not to punish non-compliance. Non-punitive mechanisms address root causes (such as capacity gaps) rather than symptoms, leading to sustained compliance. The NCP offers a number of very significant advantages as regards the “management” of legal relations among the parties to the MEA. Typically, the NCP aims less at branding a state party as “defaulting on its obligations, “ and at imposing sanctions or providing remedies for past infractions, than at helping the incriminated party come into compliance and protecting the future integrity of the regime against would-be defectors. The NCP is hence forward-rather than backward-looking. It embodies a quintessentially collective approach, rather than being steeped in the traditional paradigm of bilateralism–the relationship between the non-complying state and the directly injured other state or states (Günther, 1997).

Given that many multilateral environmental agreements face issues of Parties being unable or unwilling to comply, the draft Global Plastics Treaty should explicitly incorporate a non-compliance procedure to address such eventualities. At present, Article 13 of the Chair’s draft merely provides that the compliance committee may consider matters under three circumstances, while Article 20 stipulates that the COP shall establish one or more subsidiary bodies at its first meeting to provide scientific and technical advice and assessment in support of informed decision-making. At the final INC session, consideration could be given to establishing, pursuant to Article 20, an “Implementation Committee” to address compliance matters.

Fortunately, the August 2025 Chair’s Draft (Article 12) provides a strong foundation for such a mechanism. It explicitly establishes a committee to “facilitate the implementation of, and promote compliance with, the provisions of this Convention, “ which shall function in a manner that is “transparent, facilitative, non-punitive, non-adversarial and expert-based.” (Chair’s Revised Text Proposal, 2025) This language perfectly captures the essence of a successful NCP. Article 12.2 outlines channels for initiation, aligning with established practice. Crucially, the inclusion of self-reporting encourages Parties to disclose challenges proactively, treating potential non-compliance as a situation to be remedied cooperatively rather than a violation to be punished.

To counter potential objections from states favoring a stricter enforcement approach, it can be argued that a non-punitive mechanism is more conducive to universal participation and long-term compliance. Environmental treaties rely on cooperation rather than coercion, and a facilitative approach reduces the risk of states withdrawing or underreporting due to fear of sanctions. A punitive approach could lead to “compliance asymmetry, “ where developed countries use sanctions against developing nations, exacerbating inequities. the non-compliance procedure’s major attraction lies in the fact that it enables the meeting of the parties to fine-tune “enforcement” of the various normative standards of the MEA. Such flexibility however, comes also at a price: A possible perception among parties that the details, if not the principle, of compliance with obligations arising under the MEA might be negotiable, a perception which could work at cross-purposes with compliance control efforts. However, in assessing costs and benefits, it should be remembered that while the NCP might well contribute to the “softening” of the international normativity of individual rules and regulations of the MEA, it keeps intact the regime as a whole. Indeed, the NCP might well be characterized as “an effort at continued consensus building…;” or, in other words, “a process that straddles traditional law-making and law-enforcement functions.” (Handla, 1997).

4.3 Promoting international cooperation and coordination

International cooperation and coordination will be critical to the future development of the compliance mechanism under the Global Plastics Treaty.

In terms of financing, developed countries are expected to increase assistance to developing countries through the establishment of a dedicated plastic pollution control fund. This fund, jointly financed by developed countries and international financial institutions, is anticipated to amount to several billion US dollars and will be used to support projects such as the construction of plastic waste treatment facilities, research and development of plastic pollution control technologies, and the dissemination of best practices.

In the technological sphere, cross-border technology transfer and cooperation are likely to intensify. Research institutions and enterprises in developed countries will share advanced plastic recycling technologies and biodegradable plastic research with developing countries. An international plastics technology-sharing platform could be established, enabling countries to post their technological achievements and needs, thereby fostering technical exchange and collaboration.

With regard to international cooperation, Article 12(1) of the Chair’s draft provides that developed country Parties shall cooperate to provide timely and appropriate capacity-building, process assistance, and safe technology transfer to developing country Parties—particularly the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States—including on mutually agreed concessional and preferential terms, to assist them in meeting their obligations under the treaty. Article 12(3) further provides that Parties shall cooperate to promote and facilitate technology development, transfer, dissemination, and access for developing countries, including on mutually agreed concessional and preferential terms (UNEP, 2024a).

Information-sharing will also be an essential aspect of future cooperation. Countries could develop a unified database on plastic pollution control, sharing data and experiences relating to plastic production, consumption, and waste management. Through such exchanges, States can learn from each other’s successful practices, remain informed of global developments in plastic pollution control, and jointly address the challenge. Furthermore, collaboration among international organizations will be strengthened, with entities such as the UNEP and the World Bank working together to create synergies, thereby promoting the effective implementation of the Global Plastics Treaty and ensuring the efficient functioning of its compliance mechanism.

5 Conclusion

Marine plastic pollution has emerged as a pressing global challenge requiring urgent resolution. While a number of international conventions have addressed this issue to some extent, significant shortcomings remain. The drafting of the Global Plastics Treaty represents the latest initiative to tackle global plastic pollution, particularly that affecting the marine environment. However, as evidenced by the five sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) convened since 2022, the formulation of the treaty remains a complex and challenging undertaking, with many substantive issues yet to be resolved.

With respect to its compliance mechanism, the most recent draft of the treaty has established a basic framework. Nonetheless, in areas such as the operationalization of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the procedures for addressing situations where Parties are unable or unwilling to comply, the draft text still requires further refinement and elaboration.

Despite the failure to reach a consensus on the convention text at the resumed fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in August 2025, Ambassador Luis Vayas Valdivieso, Chair of the INC, stated: “Failing to achieve our goal may be deeply disappointing and even frustrating, but it should not lead to discouragement. On the contrary, it should inspire us to renew our spirit, reaffirm our commitment, and unify our vision. Although no breakthrough was made in Geneva, I firmly believe that the international community will ultimately unite its will and work together to protect the environment and human health.” (Talks on global plastic pollution treaty adjourn without consensu).

Although the road ahead is long and fraught with challenges, the eventual adoption and effective implementation of the treaty will constitute a critical step towards a future free of plastic pollution. Achieving this objective will demand sustained global effort and cooperation. Delegates from various countries have expressed the hope that the next round of negotiations will yield greater political commitment and advance the development of a more binding and operationally viable instrument. However, formidable obstacles remain, including conflicts of economic interests, divergent political positions, and disparities in environmental enforcement capacity. Striking a balance among these competing factors, and ensuring that the treaty can be implemented effectively, will be a central challenge in future negotiations.

International cooperation will be indispensable. States must work closely together in the fields of technological innovation, policy coordination, and financial support, sharing technology, aligning regulatory approaches, and mobilizing resources to advance the process of plastic pollution control. The adoption of a plastics treaty is not solely a matter of environmental protection; it is also an essential step towards achieving global sustainable development.

Data availability statement

The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Author contributions

XQ: Writing – original draft, Formal analysis.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was received for this work and/or its publication. National Social Science Foundation Project No. 21BFX161.

Conflict of interest

The authors declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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The author(s) declare that no Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript.

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References

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