Optimization of Multi-party Cooperative Game Strategies for Port Consolidation and Distribution under the Goal of "Dual Carbon"

Qi Xu¹Hailun Deng¹Jie Huang¹Jiahao Wang¹Qingyan Wu¹Wei Zhang^2*

• ¹Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin, China
• ²University of Tasmania Australian Maritime College, Launceston, Australia

Under the guidance of "Dual Carbon" goal, the multi-party cooperative mechanism of port consolidation and distribution system faces many challenges, particularly the conflict between the high costs of green transformation and the pursuit of individual profit maximization by various stakeholders, as well as the difficulty in reaching strategic consensus among different parties under policy constraints. Based on the evolutionary game theoretical framework, this paper constructs a tripartite dynamic evolution model including port operators, river-sea intermodal transport operators and road transport operator. The study specifically describes the strategic interaction mechanisms among the port operator's active progression / negative progression strategy, the river-sea intermodal transport operator's cooperation / competition strategy, and the road transport operator's low-carbon mode / traditional mode strategy. Key variables such as additional cost, management effort, and additional income are incorporated into the payoff matrix of all parties. By constructing replicated dynamic equations to analyze the stability of system evolution, and further applying Matlab numerical simulations, the study explores the mechanism by which key parameters influence the evolution of cooperative strategies. It is found that: 1) In the non-responsive state of the operators, the acceptance threshold of additional cost to the port operators increases and shows a stronger tendency of active promotion. River-sea intermodal transport operators are more sensitive to additional cost than road transportation operators, which are more dependent on policy-derived benefits. Moreover, there is a strategy-driven effect among operators, and the adjustment of management effort of one party will change the evolutionary trajectory of the other party. Additional income and subsidy show low sensitivity to the evolution of operators' strategies, and a synergistic effect between them is needed to change the stability point. 2) Port operators show strong stability to changes in additional cost and subsidy when operators respond positively. The port operators need higher indirect gain to change to the "active progression" strategy, and the response threshold decreases the evolution rate increases in the tripartite coordination state. This study reveals the evolution law of the multi-party game in the port consolidation and distribution system, and proposes the optimization path of multi-parameter coordinated regulation.