COP29 at the climate crossroads: achievements, gaps, and implications for a warming world

The 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29), held in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2024, convened amidst escalating climate crises and unprecedented global warming, with 2024 recorded as the hottest year in history. This perspective critically examines the outcomes of COP29, evaluating its achievements, gaps, and implications for global climate governance. Notable achievements include the establishment of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), tripling climate finance commitments to $300 billion annually by 2035, and the operationalization of Article 6 carbon markets, which promise to mobilize significant resources for mitigation and adaptation efforts. Progress was also made on the Loss and Damage Fund, addressing climate justice for vulnerable nations, and the launch of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, a structured pathway for advancing global resilience. These initiatives promise enhanced transparency, increased climate finance, and a structured approach to adaptation. However, the summit fell short of delivering transformative actions necessary to align with the 1.5°C target, particularly in areas such as fossil fuel phaseout, equitable finance mechanisms, and loss and damage support. The NCQG's reliance on private finance and loans, rather than grants, underscored ongoing inequities, while insufficient funding and delayed implementation of the Loss and Damage Fund further strained trust between developed and developing nations. Geopolitical tensions, coupled with the influence of fossil fuel interests, diluted negotiations, leaving critical issues deferred to COP30. The findings emphasize the need for robust accountability, equitable financial mechanisms, and inclusive frameworks to align global efforts with the escalating urgency of the climate crisis. As the world turns to COP30 in Belém, Brazil, this perspective provides actionable insights into the transformative changes required to achieve a sustainable and equitable future.

1 Introduction

The year 2024 has starkly reinforced the global climate emergency, with a cascade of unprecedented impacts underscoring the urgent need for transformative action. Global average temperature records were shattered–2024 was confirmed as the hottest year on record, approximately 1.54°C−1.55°C above pre-industrial levels (WMO, 2024; NASA, 2025; NOAA, 2025). For the first time, the world breached the critical 1.5°C threshold, albeit briefly, offering a grim preview of future “dangerous” warming. Scientists have attributed these extremes unequivocally to human influence. The consequences have manifested in real time: rapid glacier retreat in Antarctica and Greenland is fueling concerns about feedback loops and ocean circulation disruption (Hanna et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2025; Otosaka et al., 2023; Siegert et al., 2025; Kubiszewski et al., 2025). Simultaneously, the planet has been rocked by an onslaught of climate disasters. Devastating heatwaves scorched multiple continents in 2022–2023, claiming thousands of lives and ravaging crops, while record wildfires in Canada in 2023 released around 480 megatons of carbon emissions into the atmosphere (Copernicus, 2023; Byrne et al., 2024). In 2024 alone, over 150 unprecedented eztreame climate-related disasters were recorded, which killed over 1,700 people and displaced 824,000 to prolonged droughts and super-charged storms across Asia and the Americas (WMO, 2025; Martina, 2025). These interconnected crises are no longer distant projections; they are our lived reality accelerating biodiversity loss, destabilizing food systems, and threatening water security for millions. The latest science warns that without immediate, deep emissions cuts, the window to limit warming to 1.5°C is rapidly closing (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2023). Indeed, carbon emissions hit a new peak of 37.4 billion tons CO₂ in 2024 with no clear sign of decline (IEA, 2025; GCB, 2024), putting the world on track to consistently exceed 1.5°C within the next decade absent drastic action. In short, the global community stands at a crossroads defined by unprecedented peril and the imperative for systemic solutions.

Amidst this escalating crisis, the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) convened in Baku, Azerbaijan (11–24 November 2024) under immense pressure to bridge the widening gap between climate ambition and reality. Expectations for COP29 were exceptionally high. Developing countries, in particular, arrived demanding concrete progress on long-standing issues of climate finance, adaptation support, and loss and damage compensation areas they consider vital for a just response to climate change. Climate finance has always been viewed as a cornerstone of effective climate action for vulnerable nations (Kinuthia-Njenga and Yasseen, 2023). However, past commitments have consistently fallen short, eroding trust between the Global North and South. The emblematic promise by developed countries to mobilize $100 billion per year by 2020 was not fulfilled on time. Even when that goal was belatedly met in 2022, analyses revealed much of the reported finance came as loans or overstated investments rather than new and additional support. For instance, it is reported that of the ~$83 billion claimed for 2020, only about $24.5 billion directly funded developing countries' climate actions, with the rest comprising nonconcessional loans and projects of questionable climate benefit (Oxfam, 2023). As (Arora 2025) argues, this reliance on debt-financed aid has left many vulnerable nations stuck in a cycle of borrowing to address climate impacts, exacerbating their debt burdens instead of promoting resilience. Unsurprisingly, climate finance agenda items remain among the most contentious in negotiations (Kinuthia-Njenga and Yasseen, 2023). Current climate finance flows (around $803 billion annually in 2019–2020) are only a fraction of the trillions needed each year for mitigation and adaptation by 2030 (Naran et al., 2024; OECD, 2025). This enormous gap has prompted urgent calls for a new financial paradigm. Reports from both within and outside the UN process have pressed for reforms to the global financial architecture and scaled-up support commensurate with the climate challenge. In this context, COP29 faced intense scrutiny over whether it would deliver the “quantum leap” in climate finance and solidarity that developing countries have long been promised (Larabi et al., 2024).

In this perspective, we integrate and critically evaluate multiple tiers of evidence to provide a scientifically grounded examination of COP29. Primary source material includes official UNFCCC documentation such as the COP29 Presidency's decisions and notes, Standing Committee on Finance assessments, Biennial Transparency Reports, and Parties' communications. These are complemented by authoritative syntheses, including UN system and intergovernmental reports, technical briefings, and established negotiation digests. We further draw on peer-reviewed scholarship, policy analyses, and selected gray literature ranging from expert presentations to institutional reports to triangulate negotiated outcomes against the broader corpus of climate governance research. The discussion is structured around the formal agenda strands most consequential to COP29 climate finance and the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), Article 6 carbon markets, the Loss and Damage Fund, methane mitigation, the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), transparency, and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Through this synthesis, we identify structural asymmetries and governance constraints embedded in the COP process, assessing their implications for equity and effectiveness.

Further detail on how the source material was reviewed and synthesized is outlined in the Methods section.

2 Methods

This perspective draws primarily on secondary academic scholarship and documented gray literature, complemented by targeted consultation of official UNFCCC materials when summarizing specific COP29 dispositions. We assembled a purposive corpus of recent peer reviewed articles, policy analyses, recognized negotiation digests, and institutional reports with clear provenance, explicitly excluding press commentary without traceable evidence. Reading proceeded through close textual analysis and structured note taking aimed at sense making rather than formal coding. For each topic, we recorded provenance and date, extracted operative language or quantitative statements as needed, and wrote brief analytical memos on what is substantively new, how instruments are designed to deliver (or not), and where uncertainties remain. Interpretive claims were then triangulated across at least two source types—for example, scholarship and an institutional brief, or a negotiation digest and a peer reviewed synthesis and, where the reading materially affected a conclusion, we searched for disconfirming cues to test robustness. Factual statements about what COP29 decided were cross checked against the public text of final decisions or associated UNFCCC materials, while broader implications and forward looking judgments were grounded in converging themes in the secondary literature. No specialized qualitative analysis software was used; references were managed in a standard bibliographic manager, and notes were maintained in a shared document to preserve traceability from citations to statements. This interpretive and selective approach, consistent with a perspective article, is intended to provide a transparent line of reasoning from documented sources to policy relevant insights, while clearly flagging areas where the evidence base or future UNFCCC workplans may alter emphasis.

3 Background: the road to COP29

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), established in 1992, has served as the bedrock of global climate governance for over 3 decades, evolving through key milestones to address the escalating climate crisis. Founded on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC), the UNFCCC recognizes the historical responsibility of industrialized nations for greenhouse gas emissions and their obligation to lead in climate action. Early efforts, such as the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, introduced legally binding emissions reduction targets for developed nations, marking a significant step toward collective climate responsibility. However, the Kyoto framework was eventually succeeded by the Paris Agreement in 2015, which embraced a more flexible, bottom-up approach. Under this framework, countries committed to limiting global warming to well below 2°C, preferably 1.5°C, through nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that are updated every 5 years to reflect increased ambition. Central to these agreements has been the issue of climate finance, a cornerstone of global negotiations. In 2009, developed nations pledged to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries in mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, this commitment has repeatedly fallen short, with actual disbursements lagging behind promises, eroding trust between the Global North and South. The goal was finally met in 2022, 2 years late, but many argued it was insufficient to address the scale of climate impacts faced by vulnerable nations. This persistent shortfall has deepened tensions and created significant friction in subsequent negotiations. Adding to the urgency, the 2024 UN Environment Program's Emissions Gap Report revealed a stark reality: current climate policies are projected to place the world on a trajectory of 2.6°C−3.1°C warming by the end of the century, far exceeding the Paris goals. This alarming gap between ambition and action set the stage for COP29, which was widely viewed as a critical opportunity to address structural barriers hindering progress. Dubbed the “Finance COP,” the summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, carried heightened expectations to deliver a new, more ambitious climate finance goal to replace the expiring $100 billion/year target. Developing nations demanded significantly greater financial commitments to cover the escalating costs of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, with the UN's Standing Committee on Finance estimating that $1.3 trillion annually would be needed by 2035 to align with the Paris Agreement's objectives.

4 Literature review

Scholarship on contemporary climate governance frames COP29 within long-running debates on finance, markets, adaptation metrics, justice, and the geopolitics of the UNFCCC process. Analyses of recent COP cycles emphasize how expectations have shifted from agenda-setting to delivery, with finance and implementation emerging as the decisive tests (Kinuthia-Njenga and Yasseen, 2023; Arora, 2025). Work focused on Azerbaijan as host underscores the political economy context of a petrostate presidency, the opportunities for green-energy signaling, and the risks of perceived capture or legitimacy deficits (Azizbayov and Mirzayeva, 2024; Ibadoghlu and Bayramova, 2024; Lokmic-Tomkins et al., 2024).

On climate finance, a growing empirical literature links green finance instruments to measurable emissions reductions when paired with clean-energy deployment. Using multi-country data, (Jiang et al. 2025) find that green finance strengthens the mitigation effect of renewable energy, lending support to calls for scaling concessional flows and blended finance models. Complementary sectoral and regional studies similarly examine pathways for mobilizing investment and lowering transition costs across emerging markets (Parveen et al., 2025; Patel et al., 2025; Su et al., 2025; Wei et al., 2025; Wang and Liu, 2022; Yang and Sattar, 2024; Zhou and Pan, 2025; Liu et al., 2025).

Together, these contributions argue that headline pledges need matching pipeline-ready projects, policy certainty, and debt-sensitive terms concerns also raised in COP-focused commentaries that assess the “Baku finance goal” and wider MDB/IFI reform debates (Arora, 2025; Kinuthia-Njenga and Yasseen, 2023).

A second strand examines Article 6 carbon markets. (Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019) provide the foundational integrity framework highlighting four determinants: robust accounting (avoiding double counting), unit quality (additionality, permanence, leakage), transferring-country target ambition, and forward incentives. Historical and comparative reviews diagnose the persistent implementation gaps from Kyoto to Paris and the post-Paris shift toward bottom-up and hybrid approaches (Asadnabizadeh, 2024). Governance-oriented analyses probe trade-offs in standard-setting, buyer safeguards, and supervisory-body methodologies as preconditions for scale (Minas, 2022). A parallel critical literature cautions that offsets can underdeliver without strict rules and credible enforcement, urging high-integrity baselines, corresponding adjustments, and transparent registries (Romm et al., 2025; Obergassel et al., 2025). Read together, these studies converge on a pragmatic conclusion: Article 6 can mobilize finance for cooperation, but only if integrity architecture is prioritized over volume (Schneider and La Hoz Theuer, 2019; Minas, 2022; Romm et al., 2025).

Loss and damage (L&D) has evolved from a contentious agenda item to an institutionalized finance track. (Mace and Verheyen 2016) laid the conceptual and legal foundations clarifying the relationship between L&D, mitigation/adaptation limits, and liability debates. More recent work explores delivery systems able to reach affected people quickly and fairly. (Jona and Murray 2024) propose channeling part of L&D funding through national social-protection systems to address both rapid- and slow-onset impacts, including noneconomic losses, while minimizing transaction costs. COP-facing syntheses similarly stress that the fund's effectiveness will hinge on grant-based support, clear eligibility, and access modalities aligned with country systems (Kinuthia-Njenga and Yasseen, 2023; Arora, 2025).

Adaptation scholarship since Paris has moved simultaneously toward better measurement and deeper rethinking of what counts as success. (Biesbroek et al. 2025) systematically map globally available datasets against the UAE–Belém framework's thematic areas and stages of the adaptation cycle, showing large gaps in indicators for planning, implementation, and monitoring. At the same time, Amorim-Maia (2025) synthesize expert narratives to argue for a paradigm that embeds risk reduction within wider development, justice, and psychosocial dimensions pushing beyond narrow technocratic framings. The gender–climate–health nexus literature demonstrates why equity must be mainstreamed across adaptation design and UNFCCC processes; (van Daalen et al. 2024) document persistent representation gaps and gender-differentiated health risks intensified by climate extremes, reinforcing calls to operationalize gender-responsive action in negotiations.

Across these domains, several cross-cutting patterns emerge. First, finance, markets, and policy credibility are interdependent: green-finance effectiveness rises when paired with strong domestic policies and high-integrity market rules (Jiang et al., 2025; Schneider and La Hoz Theuer, 2019; Asadnabizadeh, 2024; Minas, 2022). Second, implementation bottlenecks are political as much as technical. Studies of COP dynamics and host-country contexts illuminate how lobbying, energy-export dependence, and geopolitical bargaining shape outcomes and perceptions of fairness (Azizbayov and Mirzayeva, 2024; Ibadoghlu and Bayramova, 2024; Lokmic-Tomkins et al., 2024; Maslin et al., 2023). Third, justice-centered delivery architectures matter: social-protection channels for L&D and indicator sets that reflect local realities can narrow the gap between global pledges and lived impacts (Jona and Murray, 2024; Biesbroek et al., 2025; Amorim-Maia, 2025). Finally, the literature cautions that without transparency and enforcement, Article 6 and voluntary markets risk repeating earlier cycles of over-crediting and greenwashing (Romm et al., 2025; Obergassel et al., 2025).

In sum, the evidence base relevant to COP29 points to a coherent agenda: scale and de-risk climate finance (Parveen et al., 2025; Patel et al., 2025; Su et al., 2025; Wei et al., 2025; Wang and Liu, 2022; Yang and Sattar, 2024; Zhou and Pan, 2025; Liu et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2025); hard-wire integrity in Article 6 (Schneider and La Hoz Theuer, 2019; Minas, 2022; Asadnabizadeh, 2024; Romm et al., 2025; Obergassel et al., 2025); operationalize grant-based, people-centered L&D (Mace and Verheyen, 2016; Jona and Murray, 2024); and advance adaptation metrics and practice that center equity, gender, and local knowledge (Biesbroek et al., 2025; Amorim-Maia, 2025; van Daalen et al., 2024). These strands collectively define what “delivery” beyond COP29 must look like.

5 Key achievements of COP29

COP29 marked a turning point in several aspects of global climate governance, addressing longstanding barriers to progress and laying the groundwork for future advancements.

5.1 Advancing climate finance

A major milestone of COP29 was the establishment of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, which commits developed nations to mobilize $300 billion annually by 2035. This represents a tripling of the previous USD 100 billion annual target first set in 2009 and reflects a long-overdue acknowledgment of the growing financial needs of developing nations. The NCQG also includes an aspirational target to scale up climate finance to USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 from both public and private sources, aiming to close the global funding gap across mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Reaching an agreement on the NCQG was the highest negotiating priority heading into COP29, as Parties had agreed at COP15 to set a new and stronger target before 2025. Beyond its quantitative ambition, the NCQG introduced a suite of innovative financial instruments to diversify and accelerate capital mobilization. Among them, the Climate Finance Action Fund (CFAF) and the Climate Investment Funds' Capital Markets Mechanism (CCMM) were designed to leverage sovereign contributions and catalyze private investment in low-carbon and climate-resilient sectors. These mechanisms aim to overcome what describes as the “fragmentation of global climate finance architecture,” by integrating multilateral, bilateral, and market-based flows into a more coherent system that aligns development finance with climate objectives. The Baku Initiative for Climate Finance, Investment, and Trade (BICFIT) further underscores this vision by linking trade policy, sustainable investment frameworks, and finance to create a synergistic ecosystem for green growth. At the same time, early analyses note important implementation caveats that will shape whether the NCQG delivers at the scale and speed required. As observed in post-COP29 assessments, a substantial share of the USD 300 billion is expected to come from non-governmental sources, and the balance between grants and loans is not specified issues that have implications for debt sustainability in vulnerable countries. Moreover, while the NCQG calls for developed countries to lead, the role of higher-income “developing” countries is framed as voluntary, and the “Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion” is indicative rather than binding points that have prompted caution about the predictability and adequacy of future flows relative to needs. Finally, some commentators highlight that the NCQG decision text does not itself earmark specific funding for loss and damage (addressed instead through the separate Loss and Damage Fund track), reinforcing the importance of complementarity between the NCQG and purpose-built mechanisms to ensure comprehensive coverage of developing countries' needs.

5.2 Operationalization of article 6 on carbon markets

One of COP29's landmark outcomes was the finalization of Article 6 under the Paris Agreement, which governs international carbon markets. After nearly a decade of negotiations, delegates finalized the rulebook for Article 6, with the European Union lauding the agreement as a “rulebook on carbon markets” (David, 2024). This framework provides the much-needed trust and credibility to a market previously marred by skepticism and operational inefficiencies. Article 6 enables voluntary international cooperation in achieving emission reduction targets by allowing countries to trade carbon credits, which are generated through activities such as reforestation, protecting carbon sinks, and transitioning to clean energy. The finalized framework aims to align carbon market mechanisms with the best available science, fostering climate finance flows and promoting sustainable development.

Article 6 includes three primary mechanisms: Article 6.2, which supports bilateral trading of emissions reductions through Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs); Article 6.4, known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), which establishes a centralized system for trading carbon credits with safeguards for environmental integrity and human rights; and Article 6.8, which promotes non-market approaches such as biodiversity conservation and climate adaptation. The summit achieved significant progress in operationalizing Articles 6.2 and 6.4, introducing enhanced transparency through robust tracking and reporting mechanisms, including a centralized accounting and reporting platform (CARP). The operationalization of Article 6.4, which governs international carbon markets, was particularly notable. It established a centralized registry to verify and monitor carbon credits, introduced mandatory safeguards to protect Indigenous Peoples and uphold ethical standards, and implemented an adaptation finance levy on transactions to support vulnerable communities. These advancements address concerns about greenwashing and double counting, which have historically undermined the effectiveness of carbon markets. Robust enforcement mechanisms will be essential to maintaining the integrity of these systems and ensuring their meaningful contribution to global decarbonization efforts.

The operationalization of Article 6 has the potential to unlock significant climate finance, particularly for developing countries, by creating a global architecture for carbon markets. According to World Bank, the carbon market reached a valuation of $104 billion in 2023 (World Bank, 2024), more than climate finance commitments made by developed nations. Looking ahead, BloombergNEF projects the market could generate $1.1 trillion annually by 2050 (BNEF, 2024), highlighting its potential as a transformative tool for mobilizing climate finance. For developing nations, this represents an opportunity to attract significant investment to fund their green transitions, supporting initiatives such as reforestation, carbon storage, nature-based solutions and the transition to renewable energy. By fostering economic diversification and job creation, these mechanisms could play a crucial role in advancing sustainable development.

However, the operationalization of Article 6 is not without challenges. Ensuring the integrity of carbon credits and preventing greenwashing requires rigorous monitoring, enforcement, and adherence to additionality standards. The Supervisory Body's 2025 workplan, which focuses on developing new methodologies, addressing risks of non-permanence, and refining additionality criteria, will be pivotal in maintaining the credibility of the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). Equally important is the continued development of Article 6.8 on non-market approaches, which emphasizes holistic strategies such as ecosystem conservation and communitybased climate adaptation.

5.3 . Operationalization of the loss and damage fund

Another significant milestone achieved at COP29 was the operationalization of the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF), a critical mechanism to provide financial support to countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Building on commitments made at COP27, COP29 finalized the Fund's working modalities, making it ready to address the growing financial needs of developing countries facing climate induced disasters. At COP29, several critical agreements were finalized to ensure the Fund's full operational readiness, including the Trustee Agreement and Secretariat Hosting Agreement with the World Bank and the Host Country Agreement with the Philippines, which will serve as the Fund's main operational hub. With over $730 million pledged to date, the LDF is expected to commence funding projects by the end of 2025. The creation of the Fund underscores a growing recognition of climate justice and the responsibility of the global community to support those disproportionately affected by climate change. The Fund will address both economic and noneconomic losses caused by extreme weather events and slow-onset disasters, including displacement, loss of biodiversity, and cultural heritage. Notably, the inclusion of provisions for displacement, planned relocation, and migration within the Fund's scope underscores its comprehensive approach to loss and damage. The fund is intended to offer financial support in the form of grants, as opposed to loans, thereby avoiding the creation of additional debt burdens for vulnerable nations. This approach aligns with calls from civil society and activists who have long argued that climate finance should be non-debt creating and focused on equity. As a critical component of the broader climate finance architecture, the LDF is positioned to play a transformative role in supporting recovery, resilience, and adaptation efforts in the world's most vulnerable regions. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this mechanism will depend on the commitment of developed nations to scale up contributions and implement transparent and equitable practices that prioritize the needs of those most impacted by climate change. As the global community prepares for COP30 in Brazil, the LDF's progress will serve as a critical benchmark for international solidarity and climate accountability.

5.4 . Methane reduction commitments

At COP29, methane reduction emerged as a critical focus with the launch of the “Reducing Methane from Organic Waste Declaration,” a global initiative endorsed by over 30 countries. This landmark agreement targets methane emissions from waste streams such as landfills, composting facilities, and organic waste management systems. Collectively, the signatories represent nearly 50% of global methane emissions from organic waste, including seven of the top ten global emitters in this sector. The declaration commits these nations to integrating sector-specific methane reduction targets into their future Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and implementing robust policies and programs to achieve these goals. It represents a significant step in tackling one of the most potent greenhouse gases, responsible for approximately 30% of the rise in global temperature since the industrial revolution (which began in 1750) (NASA, 2024; IEA, 2024) and rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions are key to limiting near-term global warming and improving air quality (IEA, 2024). To support these commitments, $500 million in new grant funding was pledged to assist low- and middle-income countries in adopting advanced waste-to-energy technologies and upgrading waste management infrastructure. This funding builds upon the Global Methane Pledge, which has now mobilized over $2 billion in grants for methane abatement projects globally. These grants will facilitate the deployment of cutting-edge waste-to-energy technologies, which are instrumental in capturing and repurposing methane emissions, thereby reducing their impact on the atmosphere. By addressing methane emissions through comprehensive strategies, COP29 underscored its commitment to leveraging practical, actionable measures to combat climate change.

5.5 Advancing the global goal on adaptation (GGA)

COP29 made incremental but meaningful progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), building on COP28's framework for global climate resilience while responding to long standing concerns about how to define, track, and finance adaptation at scale. The Baku Adaptation Roadmap introduced at COP29 creates a structured pathway for advancing implementation ahead of COP30, including a streamlined set of no more than 100 globally applicable indicators across seven thematic targets (water, food, health, ecosystems, human settlements, livelihoods, and cultural heritage) and the launch of a Baku High Level Dialogue on Adaptation to sustain political attention. Conceptually, situating these steps within the scholarship on global adaptation governance helps clarify both their promise and their limits. As (Persson 2019) argues, the very idea of “global” adaptation governance remains contested because adaptation has been framed as highly place specific (“territorial”), even as transboundary risks and interdependence intensify (Persson, 2019). In this context, the Roadmap's turn to a bounded, cross country indicator set reflects a move from a purely territorial logic toward a hybrid model that seeks comparability without erasing context.

From a measurement standpoint, a bounded indicator set responds to calls to move beyond ad hoc metrics and count the plans exercises toward rigorous, consistent tracking of government progress that is scalable across contexts (Berrang-Ford et al., 2019). Yet indicators alone do not identify the leverage points that shift whole systems. Combining indicator diagnostics with participatory, systems oriented tools such as a Capital Approach Framework (to map human, institutional, financial, social and environmental “capitals”) and Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (to reveal causal pathways and prioritize high impact interventions) enables subnational implementers to convert metrics into strategy (Williams et al., 2020). In practice, this implies pairing headline GGA indicators with locally co produced diagnostics that surface where small, well chosen changes can yield system wide gains in adaptive capacity (Williams et al., 2020).

Recognition of “transformational adaptation” in the COP29 outcome raises the bar from incremental adjustments to interventions that alter incentive structures and coordination across scales. Evidence from adaptation governance shows many challenges have the structure of social dilemmas contexts where individual rationality produces collectively sub optimal outcomes so effective responses require institutions and policy mixes that realign incentives and organize joint action (Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016). In parallel, stakeholders tend to favor mixed governance modes combining regulation, markets, networks, communicative instruments and space for self governance rather than any single approach, with fairness and clear responsibility allocation as cross cutting design criteria (Molenveld et al., 2020). At the same time, scholarship cautions that highly technical architectures can depoliticize choices and obscure power relations; procedural justice, contestation and accountability must therefore be institutionalized in indicator design and expert dialogues (Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020; Ishtiaque, 2021).

Delivering the GGA also depends on “means of implementation” that reach beyond the UNFCCC. Comparative analysis shows adaptation is being mainstreamed across intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but progress is often discursive strategies and narrative while concrete programmatic change and budget reallocation lag and vary by sector (Dellmuth and Gustafsson, 2021). Mapping of institutional entry points similarly underscores opportunities for coordination with non climate mandates health, migration, food security if GGA guidance links indicators to sectoral workflows and prioritizes budget linked mainstreaming (Hernandez and King, 2021). Embedding these linkages within the Roadmap would help convert political attention into operational traction across systems where adaptation actually occurs.

Finally, equity and localization are not optional add ons but conditions for effectiveness. Intersectional thinking offers a practical lens for translating global goals into locally meaningful actions, ensuring that measurement frameworks attend to distributional outcomes, procedural inclusion and the lived vulnerabilities of marginalized groups (Amorim-Maia et al., 2024). A complementary heuristic developed from expert narratives reframes adaptation as an ongoing, justice oriented process that bridges climate risk reduction with human development and rights, providing guardrails for aligning global frameworks with on the ground realities and avoiding technocratic blind spots (Amorim-Maia, 2025).

Taken together, COP29's GGA package begins to reconcile comparability with context, signals transformational ambition, and creates fora to sustain attention. Its impact will hinge on coupling indicators with participatory systems tools that guide action, deploying mixed instrument portfolios to address social dilemmas, hard wiring justice into process and outcomes, and converting discursive mainstreaming into budgeted, programmatic change across sectors (Berrang-Ford et al., 2019; Bisaro and Hinkel, 2016; Molenveld et al., 2020; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020; Dellmuth and Gustafsson, 2021; Hernandez and King, 2021; Amorim-Maia et al., 2024; Amorim-Maia, 2025).

5.6 Accelerating the energy transition

COP29 marked a pivotal moment in the global energy transition with the launch of the Global Energy Storage and Grids Pledge, which aims to scale global energy storage capacity six fold to 1.5 terawatts (TW) by 2030 and expand or refurbish 25 million kilometers of grid infrastructure. This initiative, supported by 58 countries and 48 organizations (GRA, 2024), underscores a collective commitment to enhancing grid flexibility, reliability, and resilience, essential components of a decarbonized energy system. Key achievements include the formal recognition of energy storage and grid modernization as integral to achieving renewable energy targets. The pledge complements the broader goal established at COP28 to triple global renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency improvements by 2030. By integrating advanced energy storage technologies such as long-duration energy storage (LDES) and pumped hydropower into grid systems, COP29 emphasized the importance of reducing energy wastage and optimizing renewable energy use. However, achieving the 1.5 TW energy storage target will require addressing systemic challenges, including policy and regulatory gaps, infrastructure bottlenecks, and equitable access to resources. These challenges call for enhanced international collaboration, robust policy reforms, and substantial investments to transform COP29's vision into sustained, tangible progress toward a cleaner, more resilient energy future.

To date, over 100 Parties have now submitted their first Biennial Transparency Reports.

5.7 Advancing transparency and accountability

COP29 in Baku marked a significant milestone in advancing global transparency and accountability in climate governance, reinforcing the commitments established under the Paris Agreement. A notable achievement was the submission of the first-ever Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) by over 100 Parties (UNFCCC, 2024a), marking a substantial step toward operationalizing the Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework (UNFCCC, 2024b). These reports provide critical insights into emissions trajectories, progress toward Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), and efforts in climate finance, adaptation, and capacity building. This milestone underscores the growing commitment of nations to align their reporting mechanisms with the principles of accountability and evidence-based climate action. The introduction of enhanced reporting requirements at COP29 further reinforced this momentum. These measures aim to standardize and improve data quality across emissions inventories, climate finance flows, and adaptation progress. By ensuring more consistent and granular reporting, the new framework enhances the ability of policymakers, financial institutions, and civil society to track progress, identify gaps, and make informed decisions to align actions with the 1.5°C target. However, the road ahead presents challenges, as disparities in technical and financial capacities across nations hinder uniform implementation of these transparency measures.

5.8 Advancing adaptation and resilience

COP29 made incremental yet noteworthy progress in adaptation and resilience efforts, a priority for developing nations confronting escalating climate impacts (UNCTAD, 2024). A key achievement was the launch of the Baku Adaptation Road Map, a strategic framework designed to operationalize the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). This roadmap aims to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts, aligning with the overarching objectives of the Paris Agreement. However, its potential impact remains uncertain, as detailed modalities for implementation are yet to be defined. Alongside the roadmap, the conference inaugurated the Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation, which is set to convene annually alongside future COP sessions. Additionally, the Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation was inaugurated, designed to convene annually alongside COP sessions to foster implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience. This dialogue seeks to advance actionable measures under the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and has the potential to elevate adaptation as a global priority by fostering the integration of resilience measures into national and regional planning processes. Notably, COP29 also solidified adaptation as a standing agenda item, ensuring its continued prioritization in future negotiations. The adoption of the Baku Workplan was another significant milestone, emphasizing the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in adaptation strategies. By integrating traditional knowledge and ensuring equitable participation, this initiative underscores the importance of locally informed and inclusive approaches to global climate action. Additionally, a support program for implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) for least-developed countries was introduced, providing critical resources to communities most vulnerable to climate-induced shocks. Despite these achievements, progress was hindered by unresolved disagreements over the definition of transformational adaptation (UNFCCC, 2025a) and the omission of transboundary climate risks from the final text (Lorenz et al., 2024; UNFCCC, 2025b; IISD, 2024; Persson, 2019). This exclusion represents a missed opportunity, as cascading cross-border climate impacts are increasingly evident and demand coordinated international responses. The fragmented nature of adaptation negotiations continues to limit the development of comprehensive frameworks for addressing shared vulnerabilities, undermining the potential for robust global cooperation. To transition from incremental progress to transformative change, COP29's adaptation commitments must be followed by clear strategies and enhanced financial support. Bridging the growing gap between global adaptation goals and the urgent realities of climate impacts will require a concerted effort at COP30 and beyond, ensuring that resilience-building measures are both actionable and adequately funded.

5.9 Advancing climate technology initiatives

COP29's deliberations on technology programs marked a critical step toward advancing greenhouse gas mitigation technologies and fostering global innovation through collaborative efforts. Building on the Poznan Strategic Program established at COP14, the conference underscored the urgency of accelerating technology transfer and development to support climate action in developing nations. Delegates adopted a draft decision tasking the Secretariat with a comprehensive evaluation of the program to assess its successes, challenges, and lessons learned. This evaluation will play a crucial role in shaping actionable recommendations and refining the program's direction ahead of COP31. Furthermore, COP29 tasked the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) with exploring enhancements to the Technology Implementation Program, a mechanism introduced during the first Global Stocktake in 2023. Scheduled for detailed discussions at the 62nd SBI session in June 2025, this initiative aims to address the technological priorities of developing countries and overcome barriers identified in the initial assessment of the Technology Mechanism. These efforts reflect COP29's commitment to integrating innovation into global climate policies and ensuring equitable access to transformative technologies for nations most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

5.10 Strengthening NDCs for enhanced climate action

A major focus at COP29 was encouraging countries to enhance their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and make them more ambitious, investable, and equitable. As countries approach the 2025 deadline for updating their NDCs under the Paris Agreement, the conference witnessed some incremental progress, with nations such as Brazil and the UK committing to revised and more aggressive emission reduction targets. NDCs, established as the cornerstone of the Paris Agreement adopted at COP21 in 2015, are designed to enable countries to outline and periodically revise their strategies to combat climate change. The Paris Agreement mandates a 5-year update cycle for NDCs, ensuring that commitments remain responsive to emerging scientific insights and the escalating urgency of the climate crisis. At COP28 in 2023, the first global stocktake revealed that current efforts were insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement's goals. This assessment amplified the pressure on COP29 to drive meaningful progress. A major focus of COP29 was encouraging countries to translate their enhanced climate commitments into stable, long-term policies that are both credible and attractive to private sector investment. The conference underscored the importance of tailoring NDCs to region-specific priorities to maximize both environmental and socio-economic benefits. Despite the progress, challenges remain in translating ambitious targets into concrete outcomes 2024. For instance, the European Union's proposal for all countries to adopt absolute emissions reduction goals in their NDCs prompted extensive debate among major economies, including China and Saudi Arabia, leading to a decision to revisit this discussion at COP30 in 2026 (GoS, 2024). This delay underscores the complexities of achieving consensus on universal standards for emissions reductions. Looking ahead, the groundwork laid at COP29 is expected to influence the preparation and submission of transformative NDCs in 2025, setting the stage for emissions reductions through 2035. COP29's achievements highlight the necessity of aligning national climate plans with global goals while ensuring that they are both actionable and inclusive, thereby advancing the collective climate agenda.

6 Systemic gaps, unmet goals, and missed opportunities

The outcomes of COP29 underscore persistent barriers and unresolved issues that hinder the realization of global climate goals.

6.1 Inadequacies of the NCQG

One of the most notable yet heavily criticized outcomes of COP29 was the establishment of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) of $300 billion annually by 2035. While touted as a significant achievement, the NCQG has been widely condemned for its lack of ambition, inequitable framework, and insufficient mechanisms for implementation (Aman and Nikita, 2024; Wolfgang et al., 2024; Matti, 2025). These shortcomings expose persistent inadequacies in the global climate finance architecture and underscore a disconnect between the urgency of the climate crisis and the financial commitments made by developed nations.

A Substantial Gap Between Needs and Commitments: While the $300 billion target, while triple the previous $100 billion annual commitment, it falls drastically short of the $1.3 trillion to $2 trillion (of which 50% for mitigation and 50% for adaptation) required annually by 2030, as estimated by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance's Needs Determination Report (UNFCCC, 2024c) and other analyses (Songwe and Stern, 2022). Developing nations, particularly those most vulnerable to climate impacts, have consistently called for substantially higher levels of financing to address mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. The stark disparity between pledged amounts and actual needs reflects a fundamental misalignment between global climate goals and the financial resources allocated to achieve them (Bertram et al., 2024; Barbara et al., 2024).

Overreliance on Debt-Based Financing: A significant portion of the NCQG's target is expected to be sourced from loans rather than grants, exacerbating the financial strain on vulnerable nations already grappling with economic instability and climate-induced disasters (Sudharshan, 2024). By prioritizing loans over grant-based financing, the NCQG threatens to hinder long-term sustainable development. Loans increase indebtedness, limiting the financial flexibility of developing nations to invest in critical adaptation and mitigation measures. The NCQG's failure to prioritize grant-based financing reflects a lack of commitment from developed nations to offer equitable and meaningful financial assistance to those most impacted by climate change.

Structural Ambiguities and Inequities: The NCQG suffers from significant ambiguity, particularly regarding its funding sources and distribution mechanisms. The agreement invites contributions from a “wide variety of sources,” including private finance and voluntary donations from emerging economies like China and Gulf States, without establishing binding commitments or clear burden-sharing frameworks. This approach dilutes the accountability of historically high-emitting developed nations and disproportionately shifts financial responsibility onto the Global South, contravening the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC), a cornerstone of the UNFCCC framework (Larabi et al., 2024; UNFCCC, 1992). Moreover, the NCQG lacks clarity on the balance between public and private contributions and between grants and loans, raising concerns about the additionality and accessibility of the pledged resources. The absence of robust monitoring and accountability frameworks further weakens the agreement, increasing the risk that the NCQG will remain an aspirational target with limited real-world impact.

Neglect of Loss and Damage: Another critical shortcoming of the NCQG is its failure to include loss and damage as a sub-goal, despite repeated calls from vulnerable nations for dedicated financing to address irreversible climate impacts such as rising sea levels and extreme weather events (Sindra, 2024; Alice, 2024, and Liane, 2024). Despite its centrality to equitable climate action, the NCQG fails to earmark funds specifically for loss and damage, leaving it reliant on ad hoc measures and existing funding streams that often prioritize other objectives like mitigation and adaptation. This oversight raises serious concerns about the alignment of the NCQG with the broader goals of climate equity and justice.

Lack of Concrete Implementation Mechanisms: The “Baku to Belem Roadmap to $1.3 trillion,” while acknowledging the funding gap, lacks concrete mechanisms for implementation and enforcement. Its vague language and absence of specific targets and timelines weaken its potential impact, rendering it insufficient to meet the urgent financing needs of developing nations. Without clear accountability frameworks and robust monitoring mechanisms, the roadmap risks becoming another unfulfilled promise, further eroding trust between developed and developing countries.

Adding to these challenges is the looming threat of a potential U.S. withdrawal from international climate finance commitments under a renewed Trump administration. Historically one of the largest contributors to climate finance, the United States' retreat would create a substantial funding gap, leaving developing nations even more vulnerable. In summary, while the NCQG marks progress in advancing global climate finance, its reliance on ambiguous sources, lack of concrete implementation mechanisms, and failure to reflect historical responsibility underscore its limitations.

6.2 . Missing Momentum on Fossil Fuels Transition

COP29 failed to advance the transition away from fossil fuels, a fundamental pillar for achieving the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C target. Building on the historic commitments of COP28, which pledged to “phase down unabated coal power” and “phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies,” COP29 was anticipated to reinforce and expand these commitments. Instead, the conference witnessed a notable regression, with no strengthened or reaffirmed pledges on fossil fuel phaseout, underscoring the widening gap between the urgency of the climate crisis and the incremental nature of international negotiations. This stagnation was primarily driven by entrenched geopolitical and economic interests. Major emitting nations and fossil fuel-exporting countries resisted calls for decisive global commitments to phase out coal, oil, and gas. This resistance, coupled with the substantial presence of fossil fuel interests at COP29, impeded meaningful progress and highlighted the formidable political and economic challenges of decarbonization. The lack of a unified stance on fossil fuels not only undermines global decarbonization efforts but also erodes the credibility of the Paris Agreement, as its temperature goals become increasingly unattainable without addressing the primary drivers of global greenhouse emissions. Activists and vulnerable nations voiced sharp criticism, emphasizing the urgency of binding commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies and establish clear timelines for transitioning to cleaner energy systems. Without such measures, energy markets remain skewed in favor of fossil fuel expansion, hindering the widespread adoption of renewable alternatives. This disconnect between political pledges and real-world actions was further underscored by the continued expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure and subsidies in several regions, directly contradicting the stated goals of COP29.

The absence of substantive progress on fossil fuel phase-out mechanisms and timelines exposes a fundamental inconsistency in global climate action. Despite the growing scientific consensus that a rapid and equitable transition from fossil fuels is essential to avert the worst impacts of climate change, COP29 offered little beyond rhetorical acknowledgment of this imperative (Michele, 2024; Martina, 2024). This failure leaves critical decisions deferred to future COPs, raising questions about the international community's capacity to align actions with the escalating urgency of the climate crisis.

6.3 Limited progress on the mitigation work program (MWP)

COP29 highlighted significant challenges in advancing mitigation ambition and addressing the outcomes of the Global Stocktake (GST), signaling a troubling stagnation in global climate efforts. The GST process, established under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement at COP21 and initiated at COP26, is central to evaluating collective progress in achieving the agreement's goals. This mechanism, which concluded its first assessment phase at COP28, aimed to provide clear guidance on enhancing ambition, particularly for mitigation. However, COP29 failed to capitalize on the GST outcomes, delaying actionable decisions to future negotiations and raising concerns about global commitment to climate targets. The GST's primary objective was to drive short-term domestic action by identifying conditions that hinder or enable progress. Its findings highlighted the inadequacy of current NDCs, which collectively put the world on a trajectory exceeding 2.5°C of warming by 2100. Despite these alarming projections, COP29 did not establish a robust framework to integrate GST insights into updated NDCs. Instead, contentious issues, such as aligning mitigation ambition with the 1.5°C target and transitioning away from fossil fuels, were deferred to COP30, leaving a critical gap in global climate strategy. Discussions in COP29 were characterized by deep geopolitical tensions, with developed and developing nations divided on priorities and responsibilities. Developed nations sought stronger commitments without offering significant support for the energy transitions of developing nations, which emphasized the need for greater financial and technological assistance. The decision to focus the MWP on themes such as cities, buildings, and urban systems, while valuable, sidelined broader and more impactful measures needed to address global emissions effectively. The absence of binding commitments to integrate GST findings into updated NDCs undermines the credibility of the process and delays critical action. The failure to translate the outcomes of the GST into concrete steps represents a missed opportunity to accelerate climate action at a time when it is most urgently needed.

6.4 Failure to advance just transition

At COP29, efforts to advance the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), a pivotal initiative for ensuring equitable pathways to a low-carbon future, concluded without consensus. The JTWP, intended to address the socio-economic impacts of transitioning from fossil fuel-dependent economies, faced significant challenges, including disagreements over its scope, lack of defined implementation timelines, and absence of financial commitments to support vulnerable workers and communities. These obstacles highlight the complexities inherent in aligning diverse national priorities under a common framework. The negotiations revealed divergent perspectives between developed and developing nations. Developed countries favored a mitigation-focused approach that emphasized emission reductions, while sidelining essential considerations of adaptation, financial equity, and social justice. In contrast, developing nations advocated for a broader scope, incorporating adaptation, equity, and financial support as integral components of a just transition. The lack of alignment on these priorities prevented the adoption of a decision text, leaving the JTWP to be revisited at COP30. Furthermore, the absence of explicit timelines, measurable outcomes, and mechanisms to ensure financial and technical support for affected communities undermined the momentum needed to operationalize the JTWP effectively. The failure to integrate just transition principles into broader climate finance frameworks, such as the NCQG, highlights the systemic barriers that persist in global climate governance (Manish and Dorothy, 2024).

6.5 . Lack of focus on gender justice and human rights

At COP29, the opportunity to advance gender justice and integrate human rights into climate policy was profoundly missed, despite the pressing need to address the disproportionate impact of climate change on marginalized groups. Although the conference extended the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) for another 10 years (UNFCCC, 2024d), this decision fell short of delivering the transformative outcomes needed to achieve gender-responsive and equitable climate action. The extension was accompanied by a commitment to finalize a new Gender Action Plan at COP30, but substantive progress was undermined by a lack of ambition, financial commitments, and inclusive frameworks. The negotiations were marked by significant challenges, including regressive pushbacks from socially conservative parties against progressive language on gender equality and intersectionality. References to human rights, women's empowerment, and diverse gender identities were diluted or removed from key texts. This erasure reflects a broader erosion of rights-based approaches within multilateral climate processes, signaling a troubling retreat from commitments made under the Paris Agreement and previous COPs. Furthermore, the absence of dedicated funding for gender-responsive policies further limits the potential impact of the extended LWPG, leaving the urgent demands for gender equity and climate justice unmet.

6.6 Inadequate action on loss and damage fund

COP29's failure to advance the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) represents a critical missed opportunity for supporting climate-vulnerable nations grappling with escalating climate impacts. Despite the historic establishment of the LDF at COP27 and the adoption of its governance framework at COP28, COP29 exposed significant delays and structural inadequacies in its operationalization, leaving many of these nations uncertain about when and how they will receive the much-needed financial support. The fund, created to address the irreversible impacts of climate change, such as sea-level rise and extreme weather events, holds symbolic and practical significance for developing countries. Initial disbursements are not expected until mid-2025, leaving vulnerable communities exposed to escalating climate disasters without reliable financial support. Furthermore the omission of loss and damage financing as a distinct sub-goal within the NCQG highlighted a persistent reluctance among developed nations to address the full scope of climate impacts. While developing countries called for predictable and accessible funding mechanisms, wealthier nations resisted such commitments. The $702 million pledged by COP28 (?) for the LDF was only marginally increased by $43 million at COP29 (UNFCCC, 2024e), bringing the total to $745 million an amount far below the estimated annual needs, which range from $130 billion to $724 billion according to various studies (Sindra et al., 2024; Songwe and Stern, 2022; Reinhard et al., 2024). This glaring funding gap has further eroded trust between the Global North and South, underscoring the disproportionate burden borne by those least responsible for climate change. COP29 also failed to advance the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage, which serves as the institutional framework for addressing loss and damage under the UNFCCC. Developing nations advocated for tangible advancements, including the introduction of guidelines to report loss and damage in official climate plans and the establishment of a regular “loss and damage gap” report to track financing. These proposals were met with resistance from developed nations, including the United States, Australia, and the European Union, which opposed measures that could amplify their financial liabilities. Consequently, discussions on the WIM were deferred to the June 2025 climate negotiations, perpetuating uncertainty for nations in urgent need of support. The operational and financial inadequacies of the LDF highlight a broader reluctance among wealthier nations to fully confront the scale of the climate crisis. The lack of binding commitments to integrate loss and damage financing as a core component alongside mitigation and adaptation reflects a shortfall in global leadership and ambition. This omission risks further marginalizing the LDF, undermining its ability to provide equitable and sustained support to the communities most affected by climate change. The slow progress in operationalizing the Loss and Damage Fund and the insufficient financial commitments from wealthier nations underscore a broader reluctance to confront the full scale of the climate crisis. Without decisive action to address these shortcomings, the promise of the LDF risks being diminished, leaving vulnerable countries to bear the brunt of climate impacts with inadequate global support.

6.7 Challenges in advancing GGA

Despite some modest achievements, COP29 underscored significant shortcomings in advancing the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), highlighting persistent challenges in meeting the urgent adaptation needs of vulnerable nations. While the introduction of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap marked a step forward, its potential impact remains uncertain due to the absence of concrete financial commitments and clear implementation pathways. The dialogue emphasized equity by prioritizing marginalized communities and incorporating Indigenous knowledge to ensure culturally relevant adaptation measures. However, the voluntary nature of indicator reporting allows countries to selectively disclose progress, undermining accountability and complicating the assessment of global adaptation efforts. The omission of transboundary climate risks from the framework, despite mounting evidence of their significance, reflects a critical gap in addressing interconnected vulnerabilities. Discussions under the GGA negotiating sessions on “means of implementation” (MOI) including capacity-building, technology transfer, and financial support revealed deep divisions between developed and developing nations. While developing countries, While developing countries represented by the G77 and China, advocated for measurable MOI indicators to address the widening adaptation finance gap, developed nations resisted binding provisions, resulting in the inclusion of softer language on “enablers of implementation. This compromise underscores ongoing tensions over the resources needed to meet global adaptation demands, which UNEP's Adaptation Gap Report estimates at $387 billion annually by 2030 (UNEP, 2024), a stark contrast to the $130 million pledged to the Adaptation Fund this year. The debate over transformational vs. incremental adaptation further highlighted these divides. Although COP29 acknowledged the importance of both approaches, developing nations expressed concerns that an emphasis on transformational adaptation could create barriers to accessing climate finance. A technical paper on this concept by the UNFCCC Secretariat (UNFCCC, 2024f) sparked mixed reactions, with further discussions postponed to future negotiations. Additionally, progress on National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), vital for country-level adaptation efforts, stalled, with no agreement on advancing their development or assessment. This delay risks impairing the capacity of developing nations to implement effective, localized adaptation strategies, further exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.

6.8 Geopolitics and power dynamics at COP29

COP29 exemplified the complex interplay of geopolitics in global climate negotiations, highlighting how power dynamics can both impede and propel progress in addressing the climate crisis. The summit deeply shaped by geopolitical rivalries, financial disputes, and shifting global power dynamics, which often hindered meaningful progress. Geopolitical rivalries deeply influenced the outcomes at COP29. Relations between Azerbaijan and European nations were strained, with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accusing European countries of “colonial crimes,” prompting France's climate minister to boycott the event. The re-election of Donald Trump in the United States further fueled uncertainties about potential withdrawals from international climate agreements and a rollback of critical financial pledges.

Developed nations, led by the United States and the European Union, advocated for a climate finance framework centered on private sector contributions, while developing nations, represented by blocs such as the G77 and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), emphasized the urgent need for grants and unconditional public financing to address climate vulnerabilities. This clash underscored the enduring divide between the Global North and South, as wealthy nations prioritized minimizing financial obligations, while vulnerable nations sought reparations for climate impacts caused by historical emissions.

China's role at COP29 exemplified the duality of emerging economies in global climate politics. As the world's largest emitter, China faced mounting pressure to contribute more substantively to climate finance. Beijing resisted binding obligations, citing historical inequities and its status as a developing nation under UNFCCC classifications. However, it voluntarily committed to the $300 billion target, reflecting an attempt to balance its global responsibilities with domestic priorities. This duality highlighted broader tensions over the evolving roles of emerging economies like India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, which continue to be classified as developing nations despite their substantial emissions contributions.

The summit was further tainted by the overt influence of fossil fuel interests. Azerbaijan's heavy reliance on oil and gas exports, coupled with the disproportionate presence of fossil fuel lobbyist, reportedly outnumbering national delegations, sparked concerns about the host country's commitment to climate action. Allegations of last-minute amendments to negotiation texts, allegedly influenced by fossil fuel exporters, fueled suspicions of procedural bias, further eroding trust among developing nations.

Despite these challenges, geopolitical dynamics also revealed opportunities for advancing climate action (Scott Moore, 2024). Initiatives such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (White House, 2023), framed as a response to economic competition with China, demonstrate how rivalries can drive clean energy investments. Similarly, Europe's accelerated transition to renewable energy in response to Russian aggression illustrates how geopolitical imperatives can spur decarbonization. Such examples demonstrate that, while geopolitics often complicates climate diplomacy, it can also serve as a powerful motivator for transformative action.

7 Implications, reforms, and the path from Baku to Belém

COP29's mixed ledger credible steps on finance architecture, markets, transparency and adaptation governance, yet deferral on the core fossil fuel question lays bare the central paradox of today's climate multilateralism: the machinery can still produce incremental improvements, but its current design struggles to convert scientific urgency into equitable, system scale change. The decisions taken in Baku will shape economic and social pathways through the 2025–2035 window, when countries must bend emissions decisively downward while protecting people and places already on the front line of climate impacts. The agreement on a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), operational guidance for Article 6, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap under the Global Goal on Adaptation, the first wave of Biennial Transparency Reports, and steps to operationalize the Loss and Damage Fund collectively expand the toolkit. Yet they also highlight the trust and delivery gaps that have accumulated over a decade of uneven implementation (Simon, 2024).

Finance signals without guaranteed delivery risk perpetuating the trust deficit. The tripling of headline public finance to 300 billion USD annually by 2035, an indicative pathway toward 1.3 trillion USD with private capital, and new leveraging instruments (e.g., capital markets mechanisms) represent a political step forward; they also foreground unresolved questions about predictability, grant share, debt risks, and access for the most vulnerable. Without transparent burden sharing, strong country platforms to translate pledges into bankable pipelines, and credible monitoring of who pays and who benefits, the NCQG could repeat past patterns of under delivery (Simon, 2024). A similar duality runs through the Article 6 outcome: full operationalization can crowd in mitigation finance and cooperation if integrity remains paramount, but weak baselines, non-additional credits, or lax social safeguards would undermine both climate outcomes and public legitimacy. Adaptation governance likewise advanced most notably through a capped, globally comparable indicator set and a standing high-level dialogue yet the absence of binding means of implementation and the omission of transboundary risk keep the agenda short of what escalating impacts demand.

The missing piece remains a credible multilateral architecture to wind down fossil fuels at Paris compatible speed. COP29's inability to advance beyond prior language on “transitioning away” exposes how geopolitical interests and concentrated lobbying can stall collective action precisely where it matters most locking in infrastructure that sets the emissions trajectory for decades. This asymmetry detailed operational progress on market plumbing, reporting and adaptation metrics, alongside deferred decisions on fossil supply and demand illustrates why many observers argue that the COP forum must evolve from a negotiation centric model to an implementation and accountability model (Sandrine, 2024).

Against that backdrop, this perspective proposes a pragmatic reform agenda that complements ongoing UNFCCC workstreams and can be advanced between now and COP30:

i. From pledges to enforceable accountability: Countries should agree a lean, universal delivery framework that sits alongside the Paris rulebook: common interim milestones; independent technical review of both emissions outcomes and finance delivery; standard disclosure on grant/loan composition; and consequences for non-delivery that blend reputational, market access, and concessional finance conditionalities (Club of Rome, 2024). The first wave of BTRs shows the plumbing is in place; what is missing is an expectation that data triggers course correction. Independent verification of emissions, finance, and policy traction should become routine, not exceptional (Sandrine, 2024).

ii. A just and orderly fossil fuel phase out architecture: Beyond generic language, Parties should converge on the building blocks of an equitable wind down: (i) national fossil fuel phase out schedules consistent with 1.5 °C; (ii) robust constraints on new long lived supply; (iii) country tailored Just Transition Compacts that combine social protection, worker reskilling and place based investment; and (iv) sectoral agreements on methane control, power decarbonization, and heavy industry pilots. Access to concessional finance and guarantees should be explicitly tied to these compacts so that communities reliant on hydrocarbons see credible alternative development pathways (Club of Rome, 2024).

iii. Finance that is fair, fast and fit for purpose. To restore confidence in the NCQG, contributors should publish multi-year commitments, raise the grant share for climate vulnerable countries, and expand use of sovereign risk tools (guarantees, foreign exchange hedges) that unlock private investment without loading debt on recipients. Delivery should be organized through country platforms that integrate NDCs, NAPs and long-term strategies with concrete project pipelines so that each dollar mobilized is traceable to outcomes in resilience, access and emissions (Club of Rome, 2024; Crowfoot, 2024).

iv. Institutional redesign for speed and problem solving. The COP can remain the anchor for legitimacy while spawning more agile, outcome-oriented formats. Smaller, more frequent ministerial “delivery forums” should be mandated to unblock implementation issues on grids and storage, Article 6 integrity, adaptation indicators, and loss and damage disbursements reporting back to the COP with time bound actions (Sandrine, 2024). Parallel “coalitions of the willing” can move faster on standards and incentives where universal consensus is elusive. A Climate Club with clear entry criteria (carbon intensity benchmarks, subsidy transparency, fossil fuel phase out plans) and benefits (preferential market access, finance) could complement the UN track by rewarding ambition and creating competitive pressure to align.

v. Rebalancing participation and influence. Credibility requires correcting representational asymmetries. Admission for fossil fuel sector participants should be conditioned on verifiable transition plans; quotas or funding windows should protect participation for Small Island Developing States, LDCs, Indigenous Peoples and youth; and negotiation spaces must embed conflict of interest rules to mitigate regulatory capture (Club of Rome, 2024; Crowfoot, 2024). Inclusion is not cosmetic; it is instrumental to designing policies that are implementable and just (Club of Rome, 2024).

vi. A standing science and delivery interface. Negotiators need a permanent advisory function to translate rapidly evolving science and systems evidence into policy relevant guidance between assessment cycles. A light footprint body drawing on IPCC authors, system modelers, and social scientists could issue living technical notes on issues such as feasible fossil fuel decline rates, integrity thresholds for Article 6 methodologies, or adaptation indicators that capture social outcomes, thereby improving decision quality (Crowfoot, 2024; Club of Rome, 2024).

Taken together, these reforms would shift the center of gravity from negotiation to verifiable delivery, without sacrificing inclusivity or legitimacy. They also define a concrete Belém test for 2025:

• NDCs 3.0 that close the 2030 gap. All major economies should table updated NDCs that (i) cover all greenhouse gases and sectors, (ii) embed an absolute 2030 target aligned with net zero trajectories, and (iii) include sectoral roadmaps for power, transport, buildings and industry. Methane specific targets and the integration of COP28's tripling renewables/doubling efficiency goals should be standard. Credibility requires policy packets standards, fiscal measures, and public investment plans alongside the headline numbers.

• NCQG early delivery package. By COP30, contributors should publish 2025–2027 schedules (volumes, instruments, grant/loan mix), with an agreed transparency template. A share of proceeds from Article 6.4 and transaction level disclosure under Article 6.2 should be operational, with proceeds demonstrably reaching the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund. Country platforms in a first wave of priority countries should show signed deals grid investments, resilient water systems, just transition funds so finance is visible in communities, not just documents (Simon, 2024).

• Article 6 integrity guardrails. The Supervisory Body's 2025 workplan must tighten baselines, additionality and non permanence provisions; establish grievance and benefit sharing norms for Indigenous and local communities; and mandate corresponding adjustments that eliminate double counting. Parties piloting 6.2 should publish contracts and accounting, enabling civil society verification and investor confidence.

• Adaptation outcomes you can count and feel. The Baku Adaptation Roadmap should deliver a ≤ 100 indicator suite that balances global comparability with local relevance; embed participatory diagnostics to turn indicators into strategies; and include means of implementation metrics that track finance, capacity and technology. Early disbursements from the Loss and Damage Fund grants, not loans should support locally led recovery where slow onset and extreme events are biting hardest.

• Fossil fuel phase out, operationalized. A core group should table model legislation and timelines for ending new unabated coal, peaking and declining oil and gas, and ending public finance for new fossil supply bundled with just transition support. Where consensus text stalls, club style arrangements can set the pace, with trade and finance advantages for members.

If delivered, this package would convert Baku's patchwork into a trajectory: finance with teeth, markets with integrity, adaptation with measurable outcomes, and fossil fuel decline with justice at its core. It would also respond directly to widespread calls for a COP process that privileges accountability and problem solving over set piece theatrics (Club of Rome, 2024).

This perspective concludes that the lesson from COP29 is not that multilateral climate governance is failing, but that it is under designed for the task at hand. The system has grown expert at writing scaffolding frameworks, guidance, platforms yet remains hesitant to lock in the incentives and constraints that drive real economy change at speed. Reforms that make delivery measurable and default, finance fair and fast, and participation genuinely representative are within reach. With COP30 in Belém looming as the moment when NDCs, finance schedules and implementation guardrails converge, the question is whether Parties will use the next year to modernize the COP's operating model: fewer page long recitals, more verifiable milestones; fewer open ended work programs, more funded projects breaking ground; fewer negotiating theatrics, more coalitions proving what works. That pivot from incrementalism to focused execution is the only credible path to restore trust and keep 1.5 °C within reach.

Author contributions

MK: Conceptualization, Investigation, Formal analysis, Writing – original draft. FA: Formal analysis, Writing – review & editing. MA: Writing – review & editing, Formal analysis. NH: Writing – review & editing, Formal analysis, Investigation. SA-G: Writing – review & editing, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition. MF: Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing – review & editing. TK: Writing – review & editing, Investigation, Formal analysis.

Funding

The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.

Conflict of interest

The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

The author MK declared that they were an editorial board member of Frontiers at the time of submission. This had no impact on the peer review process and the final decision.

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