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Front. Polit. Sci.
Sec. Political Participation
Volume 6 - 2024 | doi: 10.3389/fpos.2024.1288798

The Timing of Interest Group Lobbying in the U.S. States Provisionally Accepted

  • 1Duke University, United States

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This paper examines macro-level lobbying data to determine how budgeting affects the timing, intensity and composition of lobbying expenditures. Using a database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during the budgeting process and the budgeting process is unlike other issues the lobbyists face. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups, and these business groups account for most of the changes on the margin in lobbying activity. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the "Christmas tree" effect of appropriations and budget bills.

Keywords: Lobbying, Interest Groups, Budgets, policy windows, State Legilsatures

Received: 04 Sep 2023; Accepted: 18 Mar 2024.

Copyright: © 2024 de Figueiredo. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

* Correspondence: Mx. John M. de Figueiredo, Duke University, Durham, United States