The Crises of the Israeli Democracy: Introduction to a Research Topic

Yael Shomer^1*Eitan Tzelgov²Roi Zur^3*

• ¹Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
• ²University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom
• ³University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom

The Crises of the Israeli Democracy:Introduction to a Research TopicJune 9, 2025Introduction: Israeli Democracy’s CrisisDuring the past ten years, Israel has faced a series of challenges, including governmentinstability, recurring elections, increased populism (Levi and Agmon,2021), intensified polarization (Gidron, Sheffer and Mor, 2022), democratic decline(Gidron, 2023), corruption (Kubbe and Harel-Fisher, 2021), and an imminentconstitutional crisis (Mordechay and Roznai, 2017; Yiftachel, 2023). Thepolitical landscape in Israel has significantly deteriorated since the 2022 election.Following the temporary hiatus in his leadership during the 2021-2022 "changecoalition," Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu reassumed the role of Prime Minister,this time at the helm of a far-right coalition. This coalition’s campaign adoptedrhetoric characteristic of right-wing populist movements, emphasizing themessuch as national pride, security, law and order, the promotion of traditionalJewish values, and a distinct approach to governance (Zur and Bakker, 2025).On January 4, 2023, only seven days following the inauguration of Israel’s37th right-wing government,1 Justice Minister Yariv Levin formally introducedan extensive initiative aimed at reforming and restructuring the judiciary (Cohenand Shany, 2023). The legislative initiative, which received minimal attentionduring the electoral campaign, represented a concerted effort to reformIsrael’s judicial framework (Roznai and Cohen, 2023). Framing this initiative asan “initial step” toward a more comprehensive endeavor to “repair Israeli democracy,”Minister Levin has delineated a series of legislative proposals intendedto diminish the judiciary’s influence while simultaneously amplifying executivepower. This proposed judicial overhaul aimed to restrict the authority of theSupreme Court, reflecting broader tendencies to centralize power within the executivebranch (Ariely, 2024; Mark, 2023) and potentially lead to a significantconcentration of governmental authority and executive aggrandizement. In hisaddress, Levin aimed to transfer authority over the Judicial Appointments Committeeto the coalition, seeking to abolish the judiciary’s capacity to employ a“reasonableness” standard when evaluating governmental actions and decisions.1This government has been characterized as the most right-wing administration in Israel’shistory, to the extent that it has garnered the colloquial designation among Israelis as the"Yamin al Male" which translates from Hebrew to right-wing to its fullest government.1Furthermore, he proposed that the Knesset—the Israeli Parliament—should begranted the power to overturn Supreme Court rulings by a simple majority. Furthermore,Levin’s proposal included measures to allow ministers to select theirown legal advisors, potentially reshaping the legal oversight and accountabilityframework within the Israeli political system (e.g., Akirav (2025a); Ariely(2024); Mark (2023); Navot (2023); Roznai and Cohen (2023).The announcement of Levin’s judicial plan sparked an unprecedented waveof public resistance, culminating in what became the largest and most persistentprotest movement in Israeli history (Tal and Gold, 2023; Wright, 2023). Weeklymass demonstrations erupted across the country, with the largest protests takingplace every Saturday evening in Tel Aviv. Protesters also surrounded theKnesset during key votes and marched from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in oppositionto the judicial overhaul. The resistance movement led various forms of civil disobedience,including “disruption days,” strikes in the private and public sectors,sit-ins, slow-moving convoys, and direct confrontations with coalition members,all conducted within the bounds of non-violent protest.Indeed, Levin’s proposal was met with immediate resistance, with criticsbranding it a judicial overhaul designed to neutralize already limited judicialchecks on government power. The political framework of Israel is characterizedby a relatively subdued parliamentary system, in which the ruling coalitionpossesses an inherent legislative majority. Critics argue that the elimination ofjudicial oversight would lead to a significant concentration of unchecked authoritywithin the executive branch. This situation potentially threatens democraticprinciples and institutional integrity within the country (The Israeli Law ProfessorForum for Democracy, 2023).In the face of this wave of legislation, and unlike many established democracies,Israel lacks several key institutional checks and balances that serve asguardrails against the overreach of executive power. Unlike countries with aformal, codified constitution, Israel’s legal framework is based on a set of BasicLaws, most of which can be amended by a simple parliamentary majority, makingthem far more susceptible to political manipulation (Taylor et al., 2014).Furthermore, the Israeli system does not have a bicameral legislature—thereis no upper house to counter the Knesset, nor does it operate within a federalstructure, which in other democracies grants regional governments a degree ofautonomy and limits centralized authority. The absence of these institutionalbuffers, coupled with the fusion of the government and the Knesset, makes Israel’sdemocracy heavily dependent on judicial oversight, particularly the role ofthe Supreme Court in reviewing government actions and legislation. Therefore,any fundamental restructuring of the judiciary, especially one that weakens itspower to review and overturn government decisions and legislation, and enablesthe government to control the justices’ nomination process, poses an acute riskto democratic governance by removing one of the few remaining institutionalchecks on executive authority.While the “judicial overhaul” initially centered on curtailing the power ofthe Supreme Court, it must be analyzed within a broader political context.The reforms aligned with patterns of executive aggrandizement and populist in2power democratic backsliding, where governing coalitions seek to centralize authorityand reduce vertical, horizontal, and diagonal accountability mechanisms(Khaitan, 2020), which could restrict their ability to govern without constraints.Political Scientists for Israeli Democracy (2023) have characterized this overarchinggovernmental agenda as a “regime coup,” aimed at eroding the democraticfabric of the state.This characterization invites critical inquiry into the nature of the judicialoverhaul: Was it merely a targeted effort to recalibrate power relations withinthe legal system, or does it represent a more systemic trajectory towards democraticerosion and the establishment of illiberal governance? This inquiry isfundamental to understanding the implications of such reforms for the future ofdemocracy in Israel. If the latter is accurate, we would expect signs of democraticerosion to manifest beyond the judiciary, extending into other criticalgovernance domains. This means that the erosion of democracy should be observablenot just in legal reforms but also in other areas such as civil liberties,political pluralism, media freedom, and electoral integrity. Shomer and Lavi(2025) collected and examined the coalition-sponsored legislation (more than380 anti-democratic bill proposals by April 2025), concluding that the judicialoverhaul was symptomatic of a deeper attempt to deteriorate Israel’s democracy.The objectives of the current edited volume are to present a comprehensiveand nuanced analysis that engages in a critical discourse regarding whetherthese changes represent an effort to revert the pendulum of power away froman empowered Supreme Court, a shift that followed the Knesset’s enactmentof two Basic Laws in 1992 and the subsequent broadening of judicial review,or whether these initiatives constitute a systematic effort to undermine Israel’sdemocratic principles, potentially steering the state toward an illiberal, nondemocraticregime.The Contributions of this Edited VolumeThe six articles in this research topic address the central query of whether theevents that transpired from January 4th, 2023, constitute a systemic democraticbacksliding effort or whether they merely constitute an overdue judicial reform.The work of Mussel and Shugart (2025) puts the recent events in a broaderinstitutional perspective, arguing for the important role of increased majoritarianismin a traditionally consensual democracy, while Navot and Goldshmidt(2025) argue that the crisis can lead to and be designed for the deconstructionof the Israeli state. Both the works of Sommer, Colson and Schmidt (2025)and Rosenthal and Meydani (2025) revoke popular claims regarding the HighCourt of Justice (HCJ) and its role in Israeli politics. The former demonstratesthat the judicial evolution of the courts from the 1990s onward should not beunderstood as a power struggle between the judiciary and the legislature, buta reaction to the popular will and changes in international politics. Similarly,Rosenthal and Meydani (2025) show that the HJC is a legal problem-solver,rather than an activist institution. One cause of the current crisis is the legislators’lack of commitment to democratic values. Arad and Freedman (2025) find3strong partisan differences in the conceptualization of democracy among Membersof the Knesset (MKs). Akirav (2025b) introduces theoretical claims andempirical evidence that the increase in populist views and behavior of Israelilegislators translates into a decline in the quality of legislative work. Below, wefurther discuss these articles. In what follows, we briefly delineate each article,and in the next section, we provide a few suggestions for future research.The article by Mussel and Shugart (2025) examines the emergent paradox ofmajoritarianism within Israel’s traditionally consensus-based democratic framework,a phenomenon catalyzed by increasing judicialization and political polarization.They present a theoretical argument and place it in a comparativeprism. Israel, often characterized as a consensus democracy due to its proportionalrepresentation (PR) electoral system and coalition governance, has seen apronounced deviation from this model following the 2022 elections. The authorsassert that consolidating a right-wing coalition under Netanyahu has leverageda parliamentary majority to instigate significant judicial reforms, thereby surfacinga previously obscured majoritarian dynamic.Mussle and Shugart contend that the Israeli Supreme Court’s expandingjudicial activism since the 1990s has, perhaps unintentionally, undermined themechanisms of consensus democracy. By interjecting its authority into legislativeand executive domains, the court has elicited perceptions of partisanship,particularly among right-wing and religious constituencies, exacerbating politicalpolarization. This perception of judicial bias has galvanized efforts fromthe current coalition to curtail judicial independence, indicating a troubling dynamicwhere the designed accommodation of diverse interests through coalitionbuildingis increasingly threatened.Moreover, the authors highlight that Israel’s unentrenched constitutionalframework, which permits alterations with a simple majority, renders the politicalsystem particularly vulnerable to majoritarian encroachment during periodsof heightened polarization. Mussle and Shugart caution that, unless mechanismsto foster political compromise are restored and judicial overreach curtailed, Israelmay face further decline in its democratic integrity. Nevertheless, theyexpress a measured optimism, proposing that Israel’s historical commitment toconsensus politics may ultimately prevail through adaptive political practicesand societal resilience.In “The Deconstruction of the Israeli State,” Navot and Goldshmidt providea convincing, original, and parsimonious explanation for Netanyahu’s coalition’sattempts at state capture: the raw pursuit of these elements. Using politicaldeclarations, legislative proposals, policy measures, and structural changes, theauthors highlight a process whereby Netanyahu’s regime has been underminingthe moral and legal authority of unelected state institutions. This is accomplishedby challenging the very idea that state institutions can serve the publicinterest, by questioning the objectivity of laws, and by suggesting that the overarchingstate structure has never promoted the interests of the populace. Thisattack is part of a deconstructive move that offers leaders greater leeway underthe protection of a new state ideology; under this ideology, a politicized stateapparatus will have replaced the old, illegitimate system. These processes echo4some of the well-researched authoritarian populist strategies, and the authorsconcede that some elements in Netanyahu’s coalition use populist imagery andpromote policies that can be construed as populist. However, focusing on populismmisses a key element: a coordinated attack on the state, the dismantlingand deconstruction of the state’s institutions and the liberal-democratic order,and the creation of a vacuum that can then be filled by a politicized versionof state apparatus under the control of the government, in the name of a newsovereign—the Jewish population in Israel.The conditions for such an attack are ripe in Israel. Parties representing Israelisettlers have, for decades, been targeting and vilifying counter-majoritarianinstitutions as political foes. They have saved their most aggressive lines of attackfor the judiciary, which is the highest hurdle to the implementation of aradical-right vision of a legal system that would legalize and institutionalize thediscrimination of Palestinians in the territories and the Arab minority withinIsrael. Further, Ultra-Orthodox parties, representing a sector that is disproportionatelysubsidized by the state, have declared their loyalty to Netanyahu,who, facing serious corruption allegations, requires a political alliance willingto challenge the rule of law. With the Likud party now hollowed and acting inNetanyahu’s name, this triad of political forces is unleashing its attacks on thestate, in an attempt to deconstruct it.But, as the authors note, there are important parallels and similarities betweenIsrael and other cases. For example, in March 2025, Netanyahu seemedto have crossed yet another Rubicon, stating on the Plenary floor of the IsraeliParliament that the cooperation between his two enemies, the bureaucracy ofthe Deep State and the Israeli mainstream media, "did not work in the UnitedStates, and it will not work here." Indeed, attacks on state institutions and theidea of state impartiality resonate most recently in the United States, but theyalso remind us of the Hungarian case, where a coordinated assault on state institutionsled to the consolidation of an "illiberal democracy," in which loyaltyto party and leader replaced allegiance to liberal-democratic institutions. In allcases, the probability of state deconstruction depends, at least in part, on theability of those deconstructing to create and sustain a belief that the state, as aconcept, has failed. If state institutions are so dysfunctional and corrupt, andthe underlying ethos that served to bring people together was manufactured andfalse, then there is little harm in letting the state be dismantled and captured.The article “Reconceptualizing the 1990s Judicial Revolution in Israel andits Implications for 2023-25,” by Sommer, Colson, and Schmidt, challenges thenarrative that frames Israel’s 2023 judicial reform as a necessary correction tojudicial overreach from the 1990s. Instead, the authors argue that the constitutionaltransformations of the 1990s, often attributed to Chief Justice AharonBarak, were not a unilateral power grab by the judiciary but rather a broaderresponse to global shifts following the Cold War. The article presents an innovativeidea that Israel’s democratization in the 1990s was part of a globaltrend toward aligning with Western liberal democracies, which emerged as thedominant form following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors supportthis argument with empirical evidence, including quantitative content analysis5(e.g., WordCloud) of Knesset debates, legislative initiatives, and internationaltreaty ratifications. This shows that elected political leaders, not just the judiciary,were actively steering Israel towards a more democratic and rights-basedgovernance model.The study also proposes an alternative framework for understanding Israelipolitics, shifting away from the traditional left-right ideological axis toward acontinuum between democratic and Jewish elements in Israel’s national identity.The authors argue that the constitutional ambiguity of Israel, particularly itslack of a formal constitution, has historically allowed political leaders to navigatetensions between these two foundational elements. In this context, the judicialchanges of the 1990s were not a power grab but rather a manifestation of popularwill and a broader political shift toward democratization. The 2023 judicialreform, the authors contend, is not merely an effort to correct judicial activismbut should be understood as an attempt to tilt Israel’s balance back toward itsJewish identity at the expense of its democratic institutions. By situating thesejudicial and political shifts in a larger historical and international framework, thearticle refutes populist claims that frame the judicial reform as merely a reactionto Barak’s legacy and instead reveals deeper ideological struggles shaping Israel’spolitical trajectory.One of the more intellectually coherent justifications for the executive’s attemptsto limit the power of the judicial branch in Israel is the claim that ithas become an overly active political actor. This perspective is supported bya developed theoretical literature addressing the judicialization of politics, atrend identified by constitutional scholars and pointed out by scholars of populismas a potential trigger for populist backlash and efforts to curb judicialpower (Hirschl, 2011; Mudde, 2021). This conception is clearly articulated inthe thinking and writing of one of Israel’s most influential politicians advocatingfor judicial overhaul, Member of Knesset Simcha Rotman. Rotman, whoheads the current Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee, has authored abook titled The High Court of Justice Party, in which he claims that judicialoverreach in Israel has morphed into “judicial imperialism.”Rosenthal and Meydani’s article (2025), “The agenda premises of the judicializationof politics: policy attention in Israel’s high court of justice” is anempirically and methodologically ambitious test of this judicialization thesis.Based on the Comparative Agenda Project coding system, the authors developclear theoretical expectations on the extent to which the Israeli High Court ofJustice (HCJ) is a judicializing politics court. In short, if the HCJ is acting asa judicializing actor, then its limited attention should be devoted to core politicalissues—those that are promoted and emphasized by partisan actors—and itshould not be "distracted" by a variety of issues. In contrast, the authors positthat the agenda of a court functioning more as a legal problem-solver should bemore diverse, as the court responds to whatever legal challenges are presentedto it.To test these expectations, the authors created an original dataset of decisionsfrom Israel’s High Court of Justice, coding them according to the ComparativeAgendas Project criteria. They examined both the distribution of policy6attention—testing whether the court’s attention is stable or punctuated— andthe diversity of topics the court engages with. They find that along both dimensions,although the court periodically engages more with specific core topics, itacts as a legal problem solver. Of course, the findings do not imply that thecourt is completely non-political. It would be naive to expect such institutionalbehavior, especially given the lack of a rigid, written constitution in Israel. However,claims that the court engages in judicial imperialism have, as the authorsconvincingly state, been extremely exaggerated. In other words, the researchelegantly undermines claims of judicial imperialism as the motivation for a rapidand uncompromising judicial overhaul in the Israeli case.Moving from the court’s agenda to the Knesset’s, Arad and Freedman, intheir article "The Crises of Israeli Democracy: Political-Ideological Framings byMembers of Israel’s 24th Knesset", explore how political and ideological identitiesof MKs shape their conceptualization, understanding, and definition ofdemocracy. Through qualitative critical discourse analysis of public statements,media, and social media content of 72 Knesset Members, the authors find clearideological patterns. Liberal Knesset Members emphasize substantive democraticvalues such as pluralism, minority rights, and institutional safeguards,whereas conservative representatives primarily define democracy through a populistinterpretation emphasizing majority rule. Furthermore, religious MKs tendto subordinate democratic governance to Jewish religious law. Their findingscomplement existing literature on parties’ announced policy positions on theseissues (Zur and Bakker, 2025) and politicians’ social media behavior (Tzelgovand Wilson, 2024).Arad and Freedman assert that these ideological differences highlight deepeningtensions within Israeli democracy, reflecting divergent interpretations ofIsrael’s dual identity as a "Jewish and democratic state." The authors arguethat this ideological fragmentation threatens Israeli democratic stability, as legislatorsincreasingly prioritize ideological, religious, or ethnic identities over universaldemocratic principles. Moreover, the frequent willingness of legislatorsto manipulate constitutional norms and institutions, such as the judiciary orBasic Laws, to achieve short-term political goals further exacerbates risks todemocratic governance.Finally, the article situates the Israeli case within broader theoretical frameworksof democratic backsliding and institutional erosion observed globally. Itunderscores that Israel’s unique institutional setting, lacking a formal constitutionand possessing limited checks and balances, increases vulnerability to democraticerosion through political maneuvers legitimized by democratic rhetoric.The authors conclude by emphasizing the need for both institutional reform anda renewed commitment among legislators to foundational democratic norms inorder to halt or reverse the ongoing erosion of Israeli democracy.In “Populism and Legislative Backsliding,” Akirav examines an arena ofdemocratic backsliding that has been researched less than other institutions.Her measurements for legislative backsliding and authoritarian populist rhetoricmostly build on the scarce work on the decline in quality of parliamentary workin backsliding democracies. The research identifies clear, intuitive, and objective7indicators to gauge the quality of legislative work. To assess the hypothesis thatthe 25th session of the Knesset, particularly the discussions regarding the BasicLaw: The Judiciary, reflects significant backsliding in the quality of parliamentarywork, the author contrasts this session with another highly controversialpiece of legislation: Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People,which was debated and passed during the Knesset’s 20th session. To this end,she uses discourse analysis to analyze basic law changes and protocols of committeemeetings in which those changes were debated, and she supplements thiswith interviews with experts who participated in the committee meetings.Even using this high hurdle for comparison, the analysis is staggering. Inevery aspect, for example, the duration of debates and the time given to participantsto prepare, the number of amendments to the bill, the seeking of consensus,the quality of deliberation, the ability of legislators to participate andmake informed interventions in the debates and the treatment of legal opinions,civil servants, and external stakeholders, Akirav observe a significant decline indeliberation, professionalism, and adherence to both formal and informal rules.In short, Akirav’s research “hits you between the eyes”: one cannot help but feelthat the coalition’s attempt to rush and push through such a massive change tothe country’s institutional power balance, while ignoring notions of consensusbuilding and deliberation, formal and informal procedures, and adherence to therule of law as presented by legal experts, is a power grab aimed at politicizingthe work of the judiciary and subordinating it to the power of the majority.The contributions to this research topic provide a depth of analysis thattranscends the summaries presented above. Each piece critically examines therecent initiatives introduced by the Israeli government, employing a multi-focalperspective that allows for a nuanced understanding of their implications. Whilethere is variation in the conclusions drawn, a shared perspective emerges: theIsraeli government’s actions cannot be merely characterized as a "reform" torestore a previously disrupted balance of power among the judiciary, executive,and legislative branches. The initiatives in question serve as indicators of democraticbacksliding that extend beyond the judiciary. They represent deliberateactions aimed at undermining the foundational democratic principles, practices,and values of Israel. These moves utilize populist rationales to facilitate an expansionof governmental power and enhance government aggrandizement, consequentlysteering the nation toward an illiberal future.The Road Ahead: thematic insightsThe attack orchestrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023, significantly disruptedthe Israeli government’s agenda concerning constitutional reform. However,this interruption was temporary. The government strategically leveraged theongoing conflict as both a façade and a justification for advancing its democraticbacksliding initiatives.While the majority of Israeli public attention was focused on the ongoingwar—the casualties, the plight of hostages, and the sacrifices made by reservesoldiers—the government capitalized on this diversion, thus obscuring its pro-8gression on constitutional matters. By 2025, several key pieces of legislationderived from Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s initial proposals (with modifications)had been enacted. Notably, in March 2025, the Knesset approved significantpieces of legislation that politicized the Judicial Appointment Committeeand the role of the Ombudsman for Judges. These legislative measures wereenacted with minimal public scrutiny and protest, as the government adeptlytook advantage of widespread disinterest in domestic reforms amidst the ongoingconflict. This dynamic illustrates a troubling trend of utilizing crises tofacilitate shifts in governance that may undermine democratic principles.The government has adopted the ongoing war not merely as a mechanism toobscure its implementation of judicial reforms but also as a pretext for infringingupon other democratic principles, such as civil liberties and human rights.The government also tried to control the media and increased its scrutiny of theeducation system, particularly higher education. Notable actions include thepromotion of the privatization of the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporationand Galei Tzahal, the Israel Defense Forces’ radio station, which aims to consolidategovernmental influence over media narratives. Additionally, legislation hasbeen passed to prohibit the display of flags from countries that do not recognizeIsrael as a Jewish and democratic state, as well as laws allowing the Shin Betand IDF to access any computer equipped with stationary cameras. Furthermore,the government is promoting a bill empowering the Vice Chairperson ofthe Education Ministry to dismiss educators suspected of supporting terrorismwithout due process.These measures, among many others, have been legitimized through argumentsrelated to the war on terrorism, the imperative to bolster security, andthe unique circumstances Israel has faced since October 7th, 2023. It is noteworthythat several of these bills were initiated prior to the devastating terroristattack and subsequent conflict, suggesting that the government’s agenda mayhave been premeditated, utilizing the wartime context as a façade to justify thenecessity of such legislation. Indeed, while before October 7th, 2023, the governmentinitiated 223 anti-democratic laws, in the year and a half that passed,it added 173 such bills (Shomer and Lavi, 2025).Overall, the research presented in this volume clearly indicates that the objectivesof the 37th Israeli government—the most right-wing coalition in Israel’shistory—extend beyond merely reforming the judiciary and restructuring thebalance of power among the three branches of government. “Together, we willwin!” was the slogan coined by Netanyahu’s government following the October7th attacks, a slogan that quickly swept the nation and could be seen onthousands of billboards across Israel. Five days after the attacks, the centristNational Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) party supported Netanyahu’s coalitionand formed an emergency government. Given how controversial the regimecoup/judicial overhaul/judicial reform was among the Israeli public prior to October7th, one could plausibly assume that the government would follow its ownslogan and halt, or at least slow down, its attempts to change Israel’s regime.Indeed, even some coalition legislators suggested that a period of reflection,9soul-searching, and consensus-building would be required.2However, the evidence indicates that these expectations were misplaced, andrather than stopping, the government is pushing ahead and even expanding itsattempts, most recently by attacking and attempting to politicize the militaryand the Israeli Security Agency—two institutions that were previously consideredcentral to Israeli consensus. One of the main objectives of future researchwill therefore be to investigate the extent to which the security crisis that aroseon October 7th has impacted or modified the government’s objectives, and howit has been used by the radical-right government to expand its attempts atregime change. In that regard, further attacks on civil liberties and the useof emergency powers, as well as assaults on electoral institutions or even thepostponement of the electoral process, seem as avenues for future research.The Israeli experience offers key insights into how democratic backslidingcan unfold gradually through legal reforms that weaken checks and balanceswhile preserving the appearance of democratic rule. Like recent developmentsin countries such as the United States, Hungary, and Poland, Israel’s case showshow attacks on judicial independence and democratic norms often come fromwithin elected governments. It also demonstrates that civil society, the media,political actors, and citizens should take populists at their word: when theyclaim that one day they intend to, for example, dismantle the Supreme Court,or “encourage” Palestinians to emigrate, if given the opportunity, they are notlikely to moderate and will act to implement their vision (Pappas, 2019).3 Otherdemocracies should closely examine how populist leaders justify such reformsas efforts to "restore balance" or "correct judicial overreach," when in fact theymay be centralizing power and eroding democratic safeguards. Recognizingthese patterns early is essential to preventing deeper institutional decay.2For example, see: Maariv Online,Galit Distel Reflects: The division I created in societycontributed to the massacre on October 7th. Accessed May 13th, 2025.3Betzael Smotrich, the Chairman of the Religious Zionism list, and a minister in the DefenseMinistry, has written a strategic plan in 2015 in which he recommends encouragingPalestinians to leave the occupied territories. See, Betzael Smotrich, “Israel’s Decisive Plan”,Accessed June 3rd 2025,https://hashiloach.org.il/israels-decisive-plan/. Moti Yogev, a parliamentarianfrom the Jewish Home party suggested in 2015 that it was time to use an armoredbulldozer in order to put the judicial branch in its place and show who the real sovereign is.,See, Moti Yogev, "Use an Armored Bulldozer Against the Supreme Court," Israel Hayom,accessed June 9, 2025, https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/301987..10ReferencesAkirav, Osnat. 2025a. “Democratic backsliding and the constitutional blitz.”European Politics and Society 26(1):94–115.Akirav, Osnat. 2025b. “Populism and Legislative Backsliding.” Frontiers in PoliticalScience 7:1549528.Arad, Yoav and Michael Freedman. 2025. “The crises of Israeli democracy:political-ideological framings by members of Israel’s 24th Knesset.” Frontiersin Political Science 7:1530752.Ariely, Gal. 2024. “The Democratic Backsliding Debate and the Controversyover Regime Classification in Israel.” Israel Studies Review 39(1):66–82.Cohen, A. and Y. 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