Abstract
Since Morocco applied for membership in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in February 2017, it has only received an agreement in principle in 2018. As ECOWAS is a community of several West African countries whose objectives include promoting cooperation and integration to establish a West African economic union, raising the standard of living of its people, and other similar goals, Morocco wishes to join. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that this definitive membership is uncertain due to several factors. In addition, there is a lack of studies on the likelihood or unlikelihood of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS. To carry out this study credibly, a triangulation approach was necessary to demonstrate the uncertainty surrounding Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS. This uncertainty is linked to factors of governance and geography, time and currency, freedom of movement, of coming, and of staying, as well as strong European tendencies in Morocco and the economic and commercial advantages more in Morocco’s favor, which are hampering Morocco’s accession process to ECOWAS. Not all these factors have been highlighted by researchers. The article also proposes solutions in the form of perspectives likely to ensure the realization of this membership so desired by Morocco, provided, of course, that both Morocco and ECOWAS itself consider these solutions.
1 Introduction
According to DCG.media (2013), regional integration consists of overcoming, by common agreement, the political, physical, economic and social obstacles that separate countries from their neighbors, and of collaborating in the management of shared resources and regional common goods. It can be noted that regional integration presents several advantages for the States concerned. As is the case according to Birhan and Christopher (2024), for them regional integration enhances trade liberalization among member countries and reduces their dependence on external partners, encourages improvements in productivity, labor quality and human capital, it improves social and politics relations, and promotes peace and security. But also, community integration aims to create a stable economic and political spatial pole, leading to economic growth and all-round development of the said space. Furthermore, regional integration has long been recognized as an unavoidable necessity for rapid socioeconomic growth. This is the motivation for the implementation of Economic Community of West African States (Ayeni and Bassey, 2019). For Saudubray (2008), regional integration has allowed the African continent to benefit from considerable support which increases each year from the United States of America, China and India, through African regional organizations such as ECOWAS in the west of the continent, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa in its center, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa in the east or Southern African Development Community in the south.
This article deals with this form of integration and more specifically with the sub-regional economic integration of Morocco within ECOWAS. ECOWAS was created with the objective of promoting cooperation and integration in the economic, social and cultural fields, with a view to achieving an economic and monetary union through the full integration of the national economies of the Member States. This integration should improve the standard of living of the populations, ensure economic growth, promote relations between Member States and contribute to the progress and overall development of the African continent. As for the economic objectives, there is, among others, the achievement of a common market and a single currency; regarding the political objectives, there is the implementation of a West African parliament, an economic and social council and an ECOWAS Court of Justice to replace the existing court and implement the decisions of the community (Club cedeao, 2023). This is why on February 24, 2017, the Kingdom of Morocco applied for membership in ECOWAS, following which it obtained an agreement in principle in 2018 (Machloukh, 2024). However, this agreement in principle does not constitute an agreement aimed at making Morocco an effective member of ECOWAS. Indeed, according to Ahmed (2020), it is only an agreement in principle in favor of Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS.
It must be understood, however, that ECOWAS, as a West African community bringing together several African countries, including since January 25, 2025 Benin, Cabo Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo (ECOWAS, 2025), wishes to show courtesy to Morocco, which is also an African country, through this agreement in principle.
Morocco, for its part, wishes to join ECOWAS because of its African patriotism and its desire to reconnect with West Africa; unfortunately, several factors hinder this courtesy.
Therefore, as long as the recommendations at the end of this article are not taken into account, this accession will remain impossible, given all these factors and especially since it is not a priority for either Morocco or the ECOWAS member states. Indeed, Morocco is more focused on having its sovereignty over the Sahara recognized, as King Mohammed VI never fails to reiterate in every royal address. This was the case on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the Green March in a speech addressed to the Moroccan people, reaffirming that the Moroccan identity of the Sahara was not negotiable and that no economic or commercial approach that would exclude the Moroccan Sahara would be undertaken, thus responding to the countries and regional communities (Germany, Spain, the European Union) which displayed vague or ambivalent positions on the issue, ruling out any commercial approach between the kingdom and them (Challenge, 2021). As for ECOWAS, it is far more concerned with preserving the democratic system in West Africa and combating insecurity. This is why the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Omar Touray, at the 55th Ministerial Session of the Mediation and Security Council held on December 9, 2025, in Abuja, declared a state of emergency in West Africa, arguing that the region is facing its most serious security and political challenges in years. He cited a combination of military interventions, fragile transitions, increasingly limited political inclusion, and growing threats from terrorists and criminal networks (Diallo, 2025). Furthermore, while two of the interviewees believe that accession is possible, citing the open nature of the ECOWAS Treaty and its lack of geographical restrictions, two others believe it will not happen. They cite the time ECOWAS is taking to admit Morocco and Nigeria’s view of Morocco as a formidable economic competitor.
This leads us to ask what factors make Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS uncertain?
The factors hindering Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS, as highlighted in this article, include Morocco’s mode of governance, geographical location, the time taken by ECOWAS, the currency, freedom of movement, of coming, and of staying, and Morocco’s strong European leanings and the economic and commercial advantages more in Morocco’s favor.
However, these obstacles are not all fixed, as they are not all an invariable nature. Therefore, once overcome, Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS will be easier. This article will attempt to provide relevant answers to this question to clarify the problem of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS, which is long overdue, and will also propose solutions that would make Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS possible and acceptable to the latter.
This manuscript is organized as follows: Section 1 reviews the relevant literature and theoretical framework about Morocco integration in ECOWAS. Section 2 describes the methodology used in the study. Section 3 presents the results and discussions of the study in relation to existing research. Section 4 presents the limitation of study and suggests directions for future research. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing the main findings.
2 Methodology
To conduct scientific research, it is essential to adhere to a scientific methodology, whether purely quantitative, purely qualitative, or a combination of both.
In this article, a qualitative methodology was favored, employing the triangulation approach. This approach allows for the simultaneous use of several scientific methods, as in this study.
Indeed, this article employed non-participant observation, a qualitative method that allows for understanding and grasping behaviors and events (Belaidi, 2022). Documentary research, document analysis, and interviews were also used.
Qualitative research was chosen because it allows for the collection of rich data and the acquisition of in-depth understanding. It also allows for the exploration of nuanced issues and takes into account the human dimension of research (Webinar France, 2025). Finally, the choice of qualitative research for the development of this article is explained by pragmatic reasons, notably to save time, money, and energy during data collection, thus justifying the choice of this methodology.
Furthermore, the qualitative triangulation method was used to conduct the analysis presented in this article in order to strengthen the credibility of the results concerning Morocco’s uncertainty regarding its accession to ECOWAS. Triangulation is a scientific method that guarantees the validity of the results and enriches them (Rosine et al., 2023).
2.1 Materials and methods
Regarding the materials, documents such as ECOWAS legal texts, scientific articles, electronic works, press articles, and content from reliable websites were used to obtain some of the results presented in this article.
The documentation chosen for the analysis presented in this article concerns documents dating from 1979 to 2025, as some of these documents were developed since the advent of ECOWAS on May 28, 1975 (Economic Commission for Africa, 2025), and others due to their appearance over time.
For the legal texts, this refers to Protocol ECOWAS/A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, supplementing the Lomé Protocol of 10 December 1999 relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping, and security. This text reflects the awareness of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government of the need to prevent internal crises by ensuring good governance of public affairs, the democratic rotation of power, the promotion of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights (ECOWAS, 1999).
Subsequently, other written and electronic documents of an academic and scientific nature, discussing monetary issues or European trends in Morocco, including, respectively, those of Laffiteau and Samaké-Konaté (2016), Carretero (2018), and Al Qays Talha Jebril (2020), provided the basis for some of the results of this article.
YouTube also played a key role in gathering the results presented in this article. YouTube is an online video hosting and streaming service that integrates social features for sharing and commenting on content. It is among the most visited websites in the world (Futura, 2023). Thus, the videos viewed, which were used to provide data for the analysis of this article, are official videos dating from 2016 to 2018, because the period from 2016 to 2017 was the time when the issue of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS was most discussed on television channels and by the media. Nowadays this issue is no longer the center of interest in the media, perhaps due to other issues that seem much more important, such as conflicts and crises (wars, military coups, terrorism).
In addition, objective visual observation and listening to the media interactions between ECOWAS and Morocco made it possible to obtain the results presented in this article.
Some individuals with the expertise to comment on Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS were consulted via WhatsApp phone calls in the preparation of this article. These individuals are four university professors (three professors of public international law and one professor of process engineering, all over 32 years old). Knowledgeable about and interested in the issue of Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS, they provided answers based on their expertise, experience, and knowledge, resulting in telephone interviews.
In terms of methods, a documentary analysis was first conducted, consisting of examining all documents related to the causes of Morocco’s non-membership. This analysis was carried out using a text reader, highlighting passages of ideas relating to Morocco’s non-membership in ECOWAS, and simultaneously carrying out reflection and deduction. Some documents were searched directly on the Google search engine, an American internet giant known for its search engines (Google Search and Google Chrome) (Futura, 2020), and other documents in a university library.
Moreover, a non-participant observation allowed for an objective observation of the issue of interactions between ECOWAS and Morocco, the measures taken by ECOWAS, the membership decisions of the Moroccan authorities, the points of view of various people, newspapers, special editions of Africa 24 (Korchi et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) and other international channels like Medi1 TV Africa (Cisse Lo, 2017; Gaye, 2017; Dupuy, 2018) and The360.ma (Fassi and Boniface, 2018; Nasser and Marcel, 2017; Kaboré, 2017). This non-participant observation was carried out using an unknown method, which is one of the observation techniques of the human and social sciences (Norimatsu and Cazenave-Tapie, 2017). It took place in Morocco, more precisely in the city of Fes.
The non-participant observation focused on the various arguments put forward, during media interviews, by the leaders of Morocco and ECOWAS [for example, the president of ECOWAS Parliament on Cisse Lo (2017), or Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation, and Moroccans Abroad on Nasser and Marcel (2017) and other qualified personalities, regarding Morocco's accession to ECOWAS on Kaboré (2017) or on Gaye (2017)].
Regarding the interviews, the objective of the interview was first explained to each person and, once they had fully understood the study, direct questions concerning Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS were asked of them.
2.1.1 Analysis procedure
To analyze the results, the following keywords were first entered directly into the Google search engine: Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS; ECOWAS decisions regarding Morocco’s accession; Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS; ties between Morocco and Europe.
The following keywords were also entered directly into the YouTube search engine: reasons for Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS; why Morocco cannot join ECOWAS.
The Google search engine then provided various data of around forty, of which only 32 were selected for reasons of consistency and relevance. And among these, there are 11 that are directly linked to factors of uncertainty concerning Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS.
The YouTube search engine provided audiovisual data produced by media outlets, featuring senior ECOWAS officials and special guests: political scientists, analysts, journalists, NGO representatives, and researchers. These data perfectly matched the uncertainty surrounding Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS.
Listening and visual observation on YouTube made it possible to answer the hypotheses raised concerning the question of uncertainty surrounding Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS. Among these hypotheses were: “Does Morocco’s proximity to Europe alone justify the strong European tendencies in Morocco?” “Does Morocco’s situation, in terms of governance, currency, and geography, favor its accession to ECOWAS?” All these analyses made it possible to draw conclusions on the question related to the uncertainty surrounding Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS, which this article presents.
Finally, direct questions such as “Do you think Morocco’s accession could one day succeed?” and “Is there a risk that this integration will fail?” were posed to the interviewees during interviews lasting approximately 2, 5, 5, and 9 min, respectively.
3 Results and discussion
3.1 The governance and geographical factors
First, when looking at the legal provisions established by ECOWAS, many of them do not correspond to the realities of Morocco. From the point of view of the form of ECOWAS member States, these are States at the head of which there is a President of the Republic democratically elected by the people, called to serve presidential terms, which is not the case in Morocco where monarchy and royalty is the means of ruling the country, at the head of which is a King for life. ECOWAS ensures that presidential mandates are respected to guarantee democratic alternation, i.e., the transfer of presidential power from a democratically elected president to another democratically elected president, by the sovereign people. To this end, ECOWAS has adopted a protocol (protocol A/SP/1/12/01) on good governance based on democracy.
All 12 ECOWAS member countries are democratic, federal, or unitary states, within which presidential, legislative, and municipal elections are held. Morocco, for its part, remains a kingdom without presidential elections. Indeed, from its independence until 2025, Morocco has been governed by a King.
For ECOWAS, this means that any accession to power must be through free, fair, and transparent elections (ECOWAS, 1999). Thus, any country wishing to join ECOWAS must meet this criterion, which can be described as a factor linked to the mode of governance, or even the political mode in certain circumstances.
Furthermore, ECOWAS countries are interconnected, except Cape Verde, located a few kilometers from Senegal, while Morocco is in the far north and separated by Mauritania and other countries such as Algeria. Geographical location is an important strategic factor for the integration of a regional community like ECOWAS. Indeed, geographical proximity represents the distance in kilometers between two things (individuals, organizations, networks of organizations, cities, etc.), multiplied by the monetary and hourly cost of crossing it (Younes and Hocine, 2022).
It is worth noting that between Morocco and Senegal, the nearest ECOWAS member country, there are 2063 km as the crow flies (Distance Calculator, 2025a, 2025b), while on the contrary, between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, both (2) ECOWAS member countries, there is only a distance of 500 km as the crow flies (Distance Calculator, 2025a, 2025b).
Figure 1 perfectly illustrates how geography puts Morocco, which is completely to the north and separated by a non-ECOWAS member country (Mauritania), at a disadvantage in its attempt to join ECOWAS. This demonstrates the uncertainty of Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS.
Figure 1
3.2 The factor related to freedom of movement, of coming, and of staying
Another source of uncertainty regarding Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS lies in the various measures Morocco has taken concerning foreigners on its territory. These measures have legal consequences for the mobility, residency rights, and stay rights of nationals of ECOWAS member states.
Nationals of West African countries are exempt from entry permits, visas, and residence permits for short stays in ECOWAS member states. An ECOWAS passport is sufficient for travel, and they can settle or reside in any of these countries without having to pay stamp duty to obtain a short-term residence permit.
Indeed, while citizens of ECOWAS member states benefit from visa-free entry and do not pay residence stamp duty for short stays, it is important to note that for longer stays, an ECOWAS residence permit application is required, which entails the payment of long-stay residence stamp duty, collected by the host state. This is because the visa exemption only applies to travel between ECOWAS member states, and a residence permit is not required for temporary stays (Globetrotting Investor, 2025).
It is also worth recalling that freedom of movement is a fundamental right enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Serge, 2025).
It should be noted, however, that Morocco does not require entry visas for citizens of certain West African countries. Indeed, according to a non-participant observation, Morocco does not require visas or entry permits for Senegalese citizens, and Senegalese citizens are not subject to residency stamp duties to establish or reside in Morocco. The same could apply, at Morocco’s discretion, to the entry and establishment of other nationals of ECOWAS member states.
Regarding ECOWAS, its protocol on freedom of movement, residence, and establishment allows nationals of member states to travel without a visa or entry permit, and to reside and establish themselves temporarily without a residence permit. As for Morocco, it generally requires a visa and entry permit for certain countries and sets a three (3) month deadline for regularizing any travel, stay, or establishment within its territory. Once this deadline has expired, the individuals concerned can no longer regularize their situation. They then have the choice of leaving the country and returning, or remaining in Morocco and obtaining a laissez-passer if they need to travel. In this case, the possibility of finding formal employment disappears, and these individuals find themselves in a precarious situation.
Regarding ECOWAS, in accordance with the Protocol on Freedom of Movement, Residence and Establishment (ECOWAS, 1979), citizens of the Community have the right to enter without a visa or residence permit, to conduct business, and to establish themselves in the territory of Member States (with ECOWAS residence permit, if it’s for long stays).
According to Suleiman et al. (2024), more than half of the ECOWAS Member States do not require a full entry visa, as clearly illustrated in Table 1. This diplomatic policy, far from being judicious for Morocco within ECOWAS, jeopardizes its future integration. Although most of these member countries, unlike Morocco, do not impose visa requirements on Moroccan nationals, let alone establishment and residence fees for short stays, Morocco’s approach to its territory creates uncertainty regarding its possible accession to ECOWAS.
Table 1
| List of states with applicable visa regimes | ||
|---|---|---|
| N° | States | Status |
| 1 | Benin | Visa stamps are required before departure |
| 2 | Burkina Faso | Visa exemption in force |
| 3 | Cape Verde | Visa required |
| 4 | Gambia | Visa required |
| 5 | Ghana | Visa required |
| 6 | Guinea Conakry | Travel authorization request (AEMV) |
| 7 | Guinea-Bissau | Visa required |
| 8 | Ivory Coast | Visa exemption in force |
| 9 | Liberia | Visa required |
| 10 | Mali | Travel authorization request |
| 11 | Niger | Visa exemption in force |
| 12 | Nigeria | Visa required |
| 13 | Senegal | Visa waiver in force |
| 14 | Sierra Leone | Visa required |
| 15 | Togo | Visa exemption in force |
Visa regime applicable between Morocco and ECOWAS.
Source: Suleiman et al. (2024).
3.3 The time factor for Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS and the currency factor in West African countries and Morocco
In addition to these preliminary factors, which make Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS uncertain, there is the time factor, which is more specific to ECOWAS. Indeed, documentary analysis and non-participant observation demonstrate that Morocco submitted its application to ECOWAS more than eight (8) years ago, but has still not received a favorable response, it has only obtained an agreement in principle.
In principle, membership should not have been delayed, especially after ECOWAS gave its agreement in principle, and after its promise, which can be described as consent. Indeed, according to Aujourd’hui Le Maroc (2017), according to the President of the ECOWAS Commission (Marcel Alain de Souza), Morocco’s accession would only be a matter of time, because the process is well underway and will be confirmed at a forthcoming ordinary session of the Community, held on December 16, 2017, in Lomé. This leaves something to be desired, because to date (in 2025), this confirmation has not been real. This is nothing more than a false promise to be interpreted, as ECOWAS’s words and actions do not align on the issue of Morocco’s membership.
As for the second factor, the literature review shows that the monetary geography of ECOWAS includes, on the one hand, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries and Cape Verde, whose currencies are pegged to the euro and operate according to the principles of the franc zone, and, on the other hand, the English-speaking countries of West Africa and Guinea, which have independent currencies (Laffiteau and Samaké-Konaté, 2016). However, these currencies are particularly accessible outside their country of origin, unlike the Moroccan dirham, a closed currency, which makes it difficult to obtain outside Morocco. Furthermore, finding a currency exchange office abroad is expensive, and the currency (dirham) is non-convertible outside Morocco (Moroccan Dream Safari, 2025). The Moroccan dirham is by far the most distinctive currency among those with a fixed exchange rate relative to the euro and operating within the CFA franc zone, as described in Table 2.
Table 2
| Countries | Issuing institute | Currency | Exchange regime |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benin Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Guinea-Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo | Central Bank of West Africa (BCAO) | African Financial Community Franc (XOF) | Fixed parity with the euro 1 EUR = 655957 |
| Cape Verde | Centrale Banque of Cape Verde | Escudo (CVE) | Fixed parity with the euro 1 EUR = 110265 CVE |
| Gambia | Centrale Banque of Gambia | Dalasi (GMD) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 530354 GMD |
| Ghana | Bank of Ghana | New Cedi (GHS) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 396776 GHS |
| Guinea | Centrale Banque of the Republic of Guinea | Guinean Franc (GNF) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 867597 GNF |
| Liberia | Centrale Banque of Liberia | Liberian Dollar (LRD) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 113265 LRD |
| Nigeria | Centrale Banque of Nigeria | Naira (NGN) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 218651 NGN |
| Sierra Leone | Bank of Sierra Leon | Leon (SLL) | Change flexible 1 EUR = 539564 SLL |
Issuing institutes and currencies of African ECOWAS countries.
Source: Laffiteau and Samaké-Konaté (2016).
Furthermore, there is also the issue of money transfers, which is very difficult from Morocco to an ECOWAS member State. From all ECOWAS member States, there is the possibility of transferring money to Morocco, as also noted by non-participant observation. Another point could make Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.
3.4 The factors linked to Morocco’s strong European leanings and the economic and commercial advantages more in Morocco’s favor
Morocco has a strong European vocation, due to its proximity to Europe via the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Indeed, according to Carretero (2018), the distance between Morocco and Spain is estimated at only about 14 km. Furthermore, Al Qays Talha Jebril (2020) points out that Morocco’s candidacy has since failed because West African economic actors fear that goods imported under free trade agreements concluded by Morocco with Europe and other countries will flood their market and constitute unfair competition. Added to this is their desire (West African economic actors) to maintain customs duties on imported goods, as these represent a considerable portion of government revenue. Documentary analysis revealed that Morocco’s policies and actions towards migrants, particularly those from Europe, do not inspire confidence among West Africans, and that economic and political considerations constitute obstacles to Morocco’s full membership in ECOWAS, with West African economic actors complicating negotiations for this membership (Al Qays Talha Jebril, 2020).
Indeed, with the support of non-participant observation based on audiovisual materials, it appears that former Senegalese President Macky Sall subtly opposed Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS. The former President reportedly stated in 2017 that before Morocco’s accession, the ins and outs of the ECOWAS membership project would first be studied, which is one of the reasons why Morocco’s membership was not automatically refused. Furthermore, this position taken eight (8) years ago by former President Macky Sall could now cost him the cost of leaving Morocco following the establishment of his company Semo Holding, founded in December 2024, and his residence in Marrakech. Indeed, according to Sylvanus (2025), the Moroccan authorities reportedly asked the former Senegalese president to leave Moroccan territory.
Furthermore, incognito non-participant observation also allowed us to observe that there is a strong European influence in Morocco compared to the African influence, on several levels (religious, dietary, lifestyle, or clothing, etc.). But, for example, regarding the adoption of the European lifestyle or clothing in Morocco, this can also be considered the most suitable for the Moroccan climate. Indeed, the Moroccan climate is like that of Europe, as demonstrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2
According to the report of the General Directorate of Meteorology of Morocco (2023), rainfall and temperatures are strongly influenced by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Mediterranean Sea to the north, and the Sahara Desert to the south and southeast. Most of the country’s rainfall occurs between September and May, which is considered the rainy and growing season in Morocco.
Most of Morocco, particularly along the coast, experiences a typically Mediterranean climate, with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers (General Directorate of Meteorology of Morocco, 2023).
However, this strong European bias in Morocco is not solely due to its proximity to Europe or its climate; it is also due to its civilization. This means that it is a factor that could make Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.
The final factor making Morocco’s membership uncertain relates to the economic and commercial advantages that ECOWAS integration brings. Documentary research and analysis reveal that these benefits will benefit Morocco more than West African States.
Indeed, according to Ndiaye (2017), integration is an important economic tool, and Morocco wishes to become a full member of ECOWAS, rather than a mere observer, to benefit from the advantages offered by its membership. Morocco benefits from significant trade and economic flows across Africa thanks to its air network and a significant banking presence on a continental scale. Morocco also wishes to strengthen its private sector with the help of Africa and is seeking an appropriate integration framework to increase its economic, financial, and commercial influence (Ndiaye, 2017). For Babou (2017), Morocco, as a member of ECOWAS, will benefit from the expansion of its market, and the ECOWAS market will be more easily accessible thanks to the advantages of full membership, thus stimulating its investments in the subregion and Africa. Moreover, according to Babou (2017), ECOWAS countries will not be able to benefit from the Moroccan market due to its severe closure. Morocco is a major industrial, mining, agricultural, artisanal, oil, and financial producer. Ultimately, it is Morocco that opens the doors to a vast market in the ECOWAS region, where it has much to gain in terms of production, investment, and consumption. On the other hand, ECOWAS countries have little to offer to an already saturated and closed Moroccan market. Morocco’s integration will therefore appear as an unfair and unequal exchange (Babou, 2017).
Indeed, it emerges from Dodo (2019), that even as a non-member, Morocco’s imports from ECOWAS had an estimated value of 2.7 billion dirhams in 2011, then decreased to 0.8 billion dirhams in 2017. While trade between Morocco and ECOWAS countries has experienced an upward trend in recent years, reaching 10.3 billion dirhams in 2017 compared to 1.5 billion in 2000. This significant rebound particularly reflects the dynamism of Moroccan exports, which increased from 2.8 billion dirhams in 2008 to 9.4 billion in 2017. This demonstrates that the overall trade balance is in surplus in favor of Morocco (more than 8.5 billion dirhams in 2017 after 0.2 billion in 2000) (Dodo, 2019).
We can therefore already get an idea of Morocco’s economic and commercial growth compared to the current ECOWAS member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea (suspended), Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). Thus, we can consider that the economic and commercial advantages more in favor of Morocco are therefore one of the factors making Morocco’s membership in ECOWAS uncertain.
4 Limitations and future research
This analysis has limitations. These stem from the impossibility of conducting face-to-face interviews and the absence of a quantitative methodology. However, a qualitative methodology, offering numerous advantages from a research perspective, was employed by combining several methods: non-participant observation, documentary research, document analysis, and virtual interviews (which yielded more precise information regarding Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS).
The limitations are therefore related to data collection, and more specifically to the lack of a quantitative methodology, which allows for the use of statistical tools and numerical data to reveal information and trends. This methodology also provides businesses with empirical data and numerical information to guide their decision-making processes, helping them, for example, to collect and analyze data on consumer preferences. Furthermore, conducting face-to-face interviews was not possible due to a lack of logistical and financial resources, as well as several factors such as geographical distance.
It therefore seems logical that, for the development of this article, a qualitative methodology and a triangular approach were chosen for the collection of qualitative data.
The impossibility of conducting face-to-face interviews with ECOWAS authorities regarding Morocco’s accession, and in particular with the President of the ECOWAS, led to virtual interviews with a representative sample of four individuals selected for their knowledge, experience, and expertise on the issue of Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS. This approach allowed for a better understanding of the subject and made it possible to determine whether this accession will occur immediately, whether it depends on other factors, or whether this integration will not take place. One of the interviewees is a professor of public international law and a lecturer at the university; two others have lived and studied in Morocco, recently obtained doctorates in public international law in Morocco, and also teach at the university. The fourth author holds a doctorate in process engineering, studied in Morocco, has resided there for over ten years, and currently teaches at a Moroccan university.
Further research could nevertheless be conducted using methods different from those employed in this article. This research could focus on the reasons for Morocco’s delayed integration into ECOWAS, or examine the concrete results of its membership, In order to know if ECOWAS has much to lose compared to Morocco and if Morocco has much to gain by joining it, compared to other member states, if Morocco were to join ECOWAS.
5 Conclusion
Ultimately, previous research is generally limited to the pros and cons of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS. This suggests a lack of studies on the likelihood or improbability of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS. Thus, the facts supporting the likelihood or improbability have been the subject of this study, on the one hand. On the other hand, the article offers perspectives in the form of solutions to make Morocco’s accession to ECOWAS plausible. This is to promote African unity and sub-regional collaboration to promote shared sustainable development, beneficial to Morocco, ECOWAS member countries, and the entire African continent. Then, concerning Morocco, the Cherifian Kingdom must also maintain equitable relations with Europe and West Africa as well as with Africa in general; it must not have a subjective preference for one ECOWAS member country over another; Morocco must take non-binding measures, while ensuring the security of its territory, regarding the treatment of West African foreigners on its territory in matters of regularization; Morocco must, to the extent possible, review its mode of governance so that it partially meets ECOWAS expectations; and finally, Morocco must redefine the principles governing its currency (the dirham) without compromising it. Finally, Morocco should also review its economic and trade policy towards ECOWAS member states so that they mutually benefit from its economic and commercial integration.
As for ECOWAS, one of the first things to do is to emphasize the interest the African continent may have in its unification or sub-regional integration with various countries in East and West Africa and from North to South, such as the United States of America. This can thus contribute to the sustainable development of the African continent. Secondly, ECOWAS should perhaps also consider the reality of Morocco, which was a kingdom a very long time ago. Thus, ECOWAS can establish exceptional rules allowing for derogations from the rules of principle, even though Morocco is a kingdom that can integrate in the same way as other ECOWAS States.
Furthermore, ECOWAS should be able to decide on the question of Morocco’s integration, which has been pending since February 24, 2017 (Machloukh, 2024), the day Morocco expressed its wish to join ECOWAS. Thus, the uncertainty surrounding Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS will be an informed and incontestable question, both for Morocco and for researchers who believe in this integration one day or another. And ECOWAS should also consider Morocco as a country potentially eligible for membership, given the large number of Moroccan communities residing in various West African countries. Indeed, the non-participant observation also shows that countries such as Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal have large communities of Moroccan nationals, as do West African nationals who are part of many communities residing in Morocco.
Returning to the study in this article, it should be recognized that it has shortcomings, both in substance and in form. However, throughout the study, the rules of ethics and principles established in the field of science and research were applied and respected, and this contributed to the originality of this article.
However, studies on possible exceptions to the fundamental rules (or simply exceptional integration processes) that could allow integration into a sub-regional community, such as ECOWAS, would be interesting to address a scenario like that of Morocco’s integration into ECOWAS, impacted by certain factors, not all of which are beyond Morocco’s control, making this membership uncertain.
Statements
Data availability statement
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Ethics statement
Written informed consent was obtained from the individual(s) for the publication of any potentially identifiable images or data included in this article.
Author contributions
IT: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. AT: Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Writing – review & editing. AM: Formal analysis, Methodology, Validation, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.
Acknowledgments
All authors of this article would like to sincerely thank all those who contributed to the collection of data used in its writing. As well as the EUROMED University of Fes, for providing scientific work materials such as the library and the internet connection.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Generative AI statement
The author(s) declared that Generative AI was used in the creation of this manuscript. Recognize the usefulness of Google Translate as a tool for using English, which is not the main language spoken by the authors, and of Grammarly for good communication in English.
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Summary
Keywords
cooperation, ECOWAS, integration, international cooperation, Morocco
Citation
Tangui IZZ, Tenkoul A and Muchie AG (2026) Factors determining the uncertainty of Morocco’s membership of the Economic Community of West African States. Front. Polit. Sci. 7:1651409. doi: 10.3389/fpos.2025.1651409
Received
21 June 2025
Revised
18 December 2025
Accepted
19 December 2025
Published
09 January 2026
Volume
7 - 2025
Edited by
Stylianos Ioannis Tzagkarakis, Hellenic Open University, Greece
Reviewed by
Carla Morasso, Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina
Sampson Edodi, University of Abuja, Nigeria
Updates
Copyright
© 2026 Tangui, Tenkoul and Muchie.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Ibrahim Zeidane Zainou Tangui, ibrahimztangui8@gmail.com
Disclaimer
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.