ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Polit. Sci.
Sec. Comparative Governance
Volume 7 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fpos.2025.1664786
This article is part of the Research TopicPragmatism and Democratic Backsliding: Local Election Dynamics in Southeast AsiaView all articles
CLIENTELISM, COALITIONS, AND CONCESSIONS: PRAGMATISM IN LOCAL ELECTIONS AND ITS DEMOCRATIC COSTS
Provisionally accepted
- Universitas Muhammadiyah Buton, Bau-bau, Indonesia
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This study examines how clientelism, coalitions, and political concessions shape democratic costs in local elections, with political pragmatism as a mediating factor. Using a partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) with survey data from 100 respondents in Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia, the analysis identifies both direct and indirect effects. The results indicate that clientelism does not have a direct impact on democratic costs. However, its influence emerges indirectly through political pragmatism, which channels voter behavior toward transactional choices. Coalitions, in contrast, demonstrate a direct negative effect on democratic costs by stabilizing the electoral process and reducing conflict. Concessions reveal the opposite pattern: they directly increase democratic costs, reflecting compromises that weaken institutional integrity, and they further escalate costs through the mediating role of pragmatism. Overall, the findings underscore that pragmatic strategies in local politics are a double-edged sword. While coalition-building can mitigate democratic erosion, clientelism and concessions elevate risks to electoral accountability when mediated by pragmatism. This study contributes to the literature on subnational democracy by clarifying the pathways through which informal practices shape institutional outcomes and by highlighting the central role of pragmatism in linking elite strategies to democratic vulnerabilities.
Keywords: clientelism, Coalitions, Concessions, Pragmatism, democratic costs, Local election, PLS-SEM
Received: 12 Jul 2025; Accepted: 15 Sep 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Sadat and Basir. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Anwar Sadat, anwarsadat685@gmail.com
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