Ralph Tafon- School of Natural Sciences, Technology and Environmental Studies, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden
Oceans are increasingly shaped by climate change, biodiversity loss, geopolitical tensions and maritime crime and insecurity. Climate-smart marine spatial planning (CSMSP) has emerged as a governance framework to integrate climate action, conservation, and equity into ocean planning. However, defense institutions–key actors in maritime security and major greenhouse gas emitters–remain absent from CSMSP discourse. This paper argues that integrating defense into CSMSP offers strategic and climate benefits: minimizing defense-driven offshore wind cancellation and thus accelerating approval, safeguarding environmental protection and undersea critical energy infrastructure, accelerating decarbonization through the military's green transition, and addressing the defense emissions gap. Yet, integration carries significant risks: power asymmetries, spatial exclusion, ecological harm, and militarization of green energy. To reconcile security imperatives with sustainability, transparency and equity, the paper proposes governance pathways: transparent data sharing, conflict-resolution and co-existence protocols, and defense marine zoning. “However, the paper warns that while green defense initiatives have climate benefits, there are reasons to curb our enthusiasm”. Specifically, rising global military spending and the resultant mineral-intensive extractivism to support war-readiness threaten to overshadow these benefits by locking in carbon-heavy supply chains and amplifying upstream emissions, environmental degradation, and social disposability. Aligning national security with climate security thus requires more than technological greening: it requires transparent cradle-to-grave emissions, and strategic restraint in defense spending, war-readiness, and material efficiency. Ultimately, integrating defense into CSMSP is not merely a technical exercise but a normative challenge that will determine whether ocean governance advances sustainability and transparency or succumbs to securitized emissions and green extractivism.
1 Introduction
Marine governance systems designed to support climate goals and reduce ecological and societal risks are lagging mitigation efforts (Morrison et al., 2025). Oceans and coasts are increasingly threatened by geopolitical rivalry, food insecurity and maritime crime and insecurity (Tafon et al., 2022; Bueger and Edmunds, 2020; Brennan and Germond, 2024). Climate-smart marine spatial planning (CSMSP) has emerged as a framework to integrate climate action, conservation, development and equity into the spatial governance of marine and coastal areas (Queirós et al., 2025; Frazão Santos et al., 2024).
However, one of the most critical yet underexplored aspects of CSMSP is its intersection with national defense. Naval forces and infrastructures are becoming increasingly vulnerable to climate change and maritime terrorism (Lesse et al., 2023). In response, defense agencies are shifting toward maritime security and climate-resilient operations (Bueger and Liebetrau, 2023). While this shift presents a timely opportunity for collaborative governance, defense considerations remain largely absent from CSMSP discourse, leaving a gap in addressing the full spectrum of climate-smart ocean governance that includes maritime crime and insecurity, and the military's green transition. The potential for CSMSP to support green defense initiatives, and for defense institutions to enhance CSMSP implementation, remains largely untapped. This perspective paper considers (1) why CSMSP must engage with security goals; (2) what risks may arise from integrating defense institutions, and (3) governance pathways for ensuring that defense integration does not compromise CSMSP's core sustainability, equity and transparency principles.
2 Four pillars of defense integration into climate-smart marine spatial planning
This section advances the rationale for and benefits of integrating defense considerations into CSMSP, organized into four pillars: (1) accelerate offshore wind energy approval: (2) combat maritime crime and insecurity; (3) leverage the military's green transition; and (4) address the defense emissions gap. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. Four pillars of defense integration into climate-smart marine spatial planning.
2.1 Accelerate offshore wind approval
A key role of CSMSP is to facilitate the deployment of offshore wind energy (OWE) as one of the core pillars of climate neutrality. However, in recent years, the OWE sector has faced a wave of cancellations globally. Since 2019, 164 OWE projects have been scrapped, including 47 in 2024 alone (Spinergie, 2025). Recent data indicates that canceled, delayed, and suspended projects globally now total 300 GW of capacity (North American Clean Energy, 2025). While economic headwinds, such as supply chain issues and inflation play a role, military concerns remain a significant factor in OWE delay and cancellation. Military zones, naval exercises, and security restrictions often limit access to vast ocean areas (RTÉ, 2024). In South Korea, in 2022 alone, the defense ministry opposed the development of 29 OWE projects (Da-hyun, 2024). In Europe and the United States (US), defense opposition has also stalled numerous projects. For instance, in 2024, Sweden canceled 13 projects (32 GW) and closed an entire Baltic Sea zone due to defense concerns. The Swedish Armed Forces argued that turbines near Kaliningrad would interfere with radar systems, reducing threat detection times. The decision, made amid heightened tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, jeopardized 47 billion in private investment (RTÉ, 2024; WindEurope, 2024b). These constraints increase costs, create investor uncertainties and delay OWE development, thereby undermining CSMSP objectives and renewable energy targets (Tafon et al., 2019a).
Integrating defense into CSMSP offers a powerful solution to these challenges. Early engagement with defense stakeholders can remove bottlenecks, streamline permitting, and reduce costly delays. By treating defense as a strategic partner rather than an obstacle, planners can assist developers in anticipating conflicts, adjusting turbine layouts, and deploying mitigation technologies–such as radar upgrades–before projects reach critical stages. This proactive approach not only accelerates OWE approvals but also strengthens national security by ensuring operational compatibility. In short, collaboration transforms defense from a barrier into an enabler of green transition and sustainable ocean governance. Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands exemplify this approach. Denmark avoids military zones in its wind farm planning, while the Netherlands permits limited naval activity within OWE zones under agreed protocols. Both nations integrate defense stakeholders early in the permitting process, enabling developers to adjust layouts or invest in radar mitigation technologies (Kusters et al., 2025). Similar trends are emerging in the US. In California, developers collaborate with the Navy to identify compatible sites, though large coastal areas remain off limits (Nikolewski, 2018). In Massachusetts, the Vineyard Wind 1 project reached a risk mitigation agreement with the Department of Defense, including radar upgrades and operational protocols [DoD (Department of Defence), 2022].
These cases highlight the value of integrating defense institutions into CSMSP. While the cases relate to developer-defense collaborations, they nonetheless indicate that marine authorities who proactively involve defense actors are better positioned to reduce conflict, balance security and sustainability, and advance climate goals at sea. When integrated, defense institutions can become proactive agents of CSMSP implementation rather than external impediments.
2.2 Combat maritime crime and insecurity
Integrating defense into CSMSP is essential for safeguarding critical offshore infrastructure and enhancing maritime governance. As OWE farms, undersea cables, and energy pipelines expand, so does the need to protect these assets from natural hazards, accidents, and deliberate attacks. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022 and recent Dutch military warnings about foreign surveillance of North Sea OWE farms underscore the growing strategic sensitivity of marine infrastructure (Control Risks, 2024; Bueger and Liebetrau, 2023). Given their strategic nature, offshore energy infrastructures require military-grade protection that marine planners do not possess. Defense actors, such as naval and coast guards, bring operational capabilities, surveillance technologies, and jurisdictional authority that can deter maritime sabotage, piracy, and terrorism. Their involvement also ensures rapid response to emergencies. NATO's Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure exemplifies this function, coordinating surveillance and threat response across member states to counter hybrid threats, including cyberattacks on offshore energy systems (WindEurope, 2024a).
Beyond maritime insecurity and terrorism, marine crimes such as illegal dumping, illegal fishing, marine pollution, and trafficking of hazardous substances are escalating [UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), 2022]. These crimes threaten marine biodiversity, undermine sustainable resource management, and compromise maritime governance. Integration of defense into CSMSP supports environmental protection by enhancing monitoring and enforcement compliance with environmental laws. Naval and coast guard units possess advanced surveillance technologies, operational capabilities, and jurisdictional reach that enable them to detect, deter, and respond to such violations (Bueger and Edmunds, 2020). The US Coast Guard, for example, enforces environmental regulations, responds to oil spills, and prevents illegal dumping through its Marine Environmental Protection mission (US Coast Guard, 2025). International cooperation further strengthens the military's role in maritime security. INTERPOL's Environmental Security Program, for instance, facilitates joint operations between navies, coast guards, and police to combat transnational fisheries crime and related offenses (INTERPOL, 2021).
Integrating defense into CSMSP thus fosters a holistic approach to ocean governance, where maritime security and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing. It enables planners to design spatial strategies that account for security needs while promoting resilience and multi-use zones. Ultimately, defense-integrated CSMSP ensures that environmental protection is not only a policy goal but also an operational priority.
2.3 Leverage the military's green transition
Climate change is increasingly recognized as a threat multiplier by powerful institutions, defense agencies and states, such as the US, the European Union (EU), and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). As a threat multiplier, climate change exacerbates geopolitical tensions, resource conflicts, and humanitarian crises, while also challenging military infrastructure and operations (NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 2021; EEAS (European External Action Service), 2022; DoD, 2024). In response, defense policies are shifting toward climate-resilient military. This entails preparing military and security systems to withstand, adapt to, and recover from climate change impacts like extreme weather and rising sea levels, using nature-based solutions (mangroves), hard infrastructure (seawalls, resilient bases), renewable infrastructure (wind and solar energy, microgrids, energy storage) and new technologies (better data) to ensure operational continuity and protect assets (NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 2021).
EU-funded projects under the European Defense Fund (EDF) illustrate operational shifts toward clean energy. The INDY project (Energy Independent and Efficient Deployable Military Camps), concluded in January 2025, pinpointed renewable energy and microgrid solutions for deployable camps. Field tests in Estonia validated microgrids with tactical energy depots and geothermal integration–charting a roadmap for camps that are energy self-sufficient by 2050 (INDY Project, 2025). EDF 2025 funding lines further entrench green defense goals by supporting dual-use technologies: smart grids, resilient microgrids, energy storage, and renewable integration, thereby fortifying military installations while benefiting civilian energy systems (Euro Finding, 2025). The US Department of Defense (DoD) has also undertaken substantial renewable energy initiatives. In January 2024, it received over $55 million in federal grants to improve energy efficiency and resilience at multiple installations, including solar arrays at Hill Air Force Base (US Department of War, 2024). Similarly, NATO has set ambitious climate goals, committing to reducing its greenhouse (GHG) emissions by 45% by 2030 and achieving net-zero by 2050 (NATO, 2022). This evolving landscape presents a critical opportunity for CSMSP practitioners and renewable energy developers to engage defense actors as strategic partners in climate resilience and ocean governance. Integrating defense into CSMSP is not just desirable: it is logical. By leveraging the military's energy transition, planners can facilitate green defense ambitions and unluck synergies that accelerate the goal of climate neutrality by 2050.
2.4 Address the defense greenhouse gas emissions gap
The defense sector is one of the world's largest institutional emitters of GHGs (Depledge, 2023; Rajaeifar et al., 2022). The latest estimates suggest that militaries contribute approximately 5.5% of global GHG emissions, or around 2.75 billion tons of CO2e annually, making them the fourth-largest emitter globally–after China, the US, and India (Parkinson and Cottrell, 2022; Climate Change Performance Index, 2024). The GHG impacts of wars are particularly significant. Estimates suggest that the first 3 years of Russia's war with Ukraine resulted in 237 million tons CO2e, with the largest share of emissions resulting from warfare, landscape fires and damage to energy infrastructure (Initiative on GHG accounting of War, 2025). At sea, naval operations, exercises, coastal installations, and their supply chains constitute a substantial and under-accounted source of military GHG emissions. The US Navy alone consumes up to 28 million barrels of fossil fuels annually, and without alternative propulsion systems, this demand is expected to persist through 2050 (Fletcher et al., 2023). Moreover, military operations exert a profound and often detrimental influence on marine biodiversity and ecosystems, disrupting delicate ecological balances and threatening species survival (Tahmid et al., 2023).
However, military GHG emissions remain largely invisible in global climate governance, as they are frequently excluded from national climate reporting (Hicks et al., 2026). Under current international climate frameworks, reporting of defense-related GHG emissions is voluntary and often incomplete, creating a global military emissions gap. This omission traces back to the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, where US negotiators successfully opposed mandatory defense emissions reporting on national security grounds (Rajaeifar et al., 2022). This gap has profound implications for marine spatial planning (MSP) and its climate-smart agenda. Within MSP processes, defense is typically treated as a mere ocean space user–rather than a significant GHG emitter. Such treatment constitutes a critical blind spot in ocean climate policy, undermining efforts to achieve global climate targets. To be truly climate-smart, MSP must account for the GHG emissions of naval and coast guards, and other major emitters such as shipping.
Emerging guidance on CSMSP emphasizes integrating mitigation and adaptation across all sectors and planning phases (Frazão Santos et al., 2024). This creates a strategic opportunity to embed defense-sector emission baselines and reduction targets into MSP frameworks–an area historically overlooked in ocean governance. The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) 2023 Revised GHG Strategy sets clear decarbonization checkpoints –≥20% emission reduction by 2030; ≤ 70% by 2040; net zero by or around 2050; and 2-10% energy from zero or near-zero fuels by 2030 [MEPC (The Marine Environment Protection Committee) Resoultion, 2023]. These benchmarks provide a regulatory baseline for ocean decarbonization that CSMSP planners can leverage during bilateral consultations with defense actors, ensuring military operations align with global climate objectives. While defense institutions often resist sharing critical information with civilian actors due to national security concerns, evidence suggests a shift toward openness. For example, Hicks et al. (2026) show how the UK Ministry of Defense collaborated with researchers to establish a carbon baseline for military facilities–a precedent that CSMSP authorities can replicate. This case illustrates that structured military-civilian partnerships can overcome confidentiality barriers and deliver robust emissions data without compromising security. CSMSP authorities can build on this example by (1) initiating similar collaborations to develop emission baselines for naval and coast guard operations; (2) using these baselines as a foundation for future military emissions accounting and scenario planning for low-carbon naval operations; and (3) aligning military decarbonization pathways with IMO targets to position defense actors as contributors to global climate targets rather than exceptions to it. In sum, mainstreaming defense emissions into CSMSP transforms the latter from a civilian exercise into a whole-of-society climate governance tool, strengthens resilience, and signals leadership in meeting international commitments.
3 Inherent risks in integrating defense: typology of risks
While the integration of defense into CSMSP offers strategic, climate and operational benefits–such as infrastructure protection, environmental enforcement, and climate resilience–it also carries notable risks. These risks stem from the structural characteristics of defense institutions and are organized along four axes: power asymmetry; spatial squeezing; environmental harm; and security-first renewable energy planning. See Figure 2.
Figure 2. Inherent risks of integrating defense into climate-smart marine spatial planning.
3.1 Power asymmetry
A major barrier to equitable MSP is power asymmetry (Tafon, 2018; Flannery et al., 2018; Tafon et al., 2019b), particularly the outsized influence of defense actors (Tafon et al., 2024). This asymmetry stems from the hierarchical and politically insulated nature of defense agencies. For example, while the EU MSP Directive mandates binding marine plans across sectors, article 2 of this Directive explicitly exempts defense activities, stating: “This Directive shall not apply to activities the sole purpose of which is defense or national security” (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2014). This exemption positions defense as an unbound actor, undermining integrated governance and stakeholder parity. In Poland's MSP process, for instance, defense actors had preferential treatment: they bypassed public consultation, engaging planners behind closed doors to establish security zones, while “regular” stakeholders had to navigate complex, time-consuming public consultations (Tafon et al., 2024). This treatment undermines transparency and equity–core principles of CSMSP (Frazão Santos et al., 2024). Moreover, as seen in OWE cancellations, the defense sector often dominates marine decision-making due to strategic mandates, veto powers, and access to classified data. The outsized power of defense in CSMSP can reinforce the marginalization of weaker groups, such as local communities, small-scale fishers, and Indigenous groups. This can result in ocean grabbing, where defense objectives displace communities from traditional territories, stripping them of food security, cultural identity, and social cohesion. Without protecting weaker actors, integration of defense institutions into CSMSP risks serving (inter)national security and climate agendas rather than delivering benefits to coastal communities.
3.2 Spatial squeezing
As marine space becomes increasingly contested–driven by expanding blue growth, climate, conservation, and security activities–the risk of spatial competition intensifies. Defense actors, with large operational zones and training areas, especially amid rising security concerns, may restrict access to strategic marine areas. This complicates the siting of OWE infrastructure and affects conservation, fishing, aquaculture, leisure activities and the blue economy more broadly. This spatial squeezing can lead to delays, increased costs, and regulatory uncertainty for civilian sectors. Spatial squeezing can also lead to economic displacement for small-scale fishers. Economic displacement occurs when traditional fishing areas are re-designated for military or strategic purposes. This mirrors global trends in ocean enclosure prioritizing defense or industrial uses over artisanal access (Basurto et al., 2024). Spatial squeezing may also hinder the achievement of climate targets, particularly in regions where OWE is central to decarbonization strategies. Equitable governance in CSMSP requires mechanisms to mediate such conflicts and ensure that sustainability and equity are not subordinated to strategic imperatives.
3.3 Environmental harm
Military use of marine space poses significant risks to ecological integrity. Military activities, such as the use of active sonar, underwater explosions, naval vessel movements, and accidental pollution, directly compromise key targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. For instance, Target 1 mandates participatory, integrated spatial planning to eliminate biodiversity loss in high-value marine areas; yet naval training zones are often established without public consultation, fragmenting habitats and excluding stakeholders. Target 2 requires at least 30 % of degraded marine ecosystems to be under active restoration, but physical damage from ship maneuvers and warfare, pollution from oil spills and shipwrecks, and habitat destruction during exercises, hinder restoration processes and reduce ecosystem integrity. Moreover, Target 3 aims for 30 % of coastal and marine areas to be effectively conserved and equitably governed. This goal is undermined when underwater noise from military sonar causes mortality and behavior disruption in marine mammals, eroding biodiversity and interrupting conservation management. Naval exercises using sonar and explosives have been linked to whale strandings, coral damage, and disruption of marine mammal communication and migration (Bueger and Edmunds, 2020; Orca Network, 2020). Unless CSMSP adopts innovative ways to minimize noise, physical, and chemical impacts of military maritime operations, defense activities will continue to obstruct the achievement of multiple Global Biodiversity Framework targets focused on conserving and restoring healthy marine ecosystems.
3.4 Security-first energy planning
The military increasingly views renewable energy infrastructures as strategic assets vital for operational autonomy and energy resilience. As a result, defense agencies are investing heavily in these technologies. While this green shift aligns with broader climate goals, it introduces the risk of militarization of green infrastructure–what I call a security-first energy transition planning. This risk becomes particularly acute when defense-led offshore renewable energy projects are prioritized over civilian initiatives (Jorgenson et al., 2025; Jayaram and Vogler, 2025). The consequences are numerous. First, a security-first approach can distort energy markets by privileging defense-sponsored projects, reducing competition and hindering cost-effective, large-scale civilian projects. Second, military energy projects proceed with limited transparency, as military demands drive site selection and operational planning without public input, undermining democratic oversight. Third, defense-led renewable infrastructure may be sited for operational resilience (tactical advantage) rather than optimal environmental performance, leading to suboptimal climate outcomes (Jorgenson et al., 2025). Finally, concentrating infrastructure within strategic zones introduces a security paradox: while intended to safeguard national interests, it creates critical single-point vulnerabilities–making military energy assets potential targets during military conflict or espionage, as flagged by Germany when considering Chinese-supplied turbine systems (Offshore, 2025). These risks can reshape marine governance, skew resource allocation, and undermine equity and sustainability central to CSMSP.
4 Governance pathways for integrating defense into climate-smart marine spatial planning
While this article remains optimistic about the potential benefits of integrating defense institutions into CSMSP, the former operates under legal exemptions and confidentiality norms that can clash with CSMSP's requirements for openness and equity, making the two seemingly ontologically incompatible. National defense rules often allow exemptions to protect essential security interests, reinforcing insulated decision-spaces. Nevertheless, this section sets key governance pathways for a more transparent, less lobsided, and ecologically sensitive defense integration into CSMSP. The governance pathways focus on three operational strategies: (1) transparency and data sharing; (2) conflict-resolution and co-existence protocols; (3) defense zoning and impact assessment. See Figure 3.
Figure 3. Governance pathways for integrating defense into climate-smart marine spatial planning.
4.1 Transparency & data sharing protocols
In the Arctic, where climate change is reshaping strategic dynamics–as melting ice opens new shipping routes and resource frontiers–NATO has called for civil-military cooperation and marine spatial strategies that integrate environmental and security considerations (Bastian et al., 2023). This is an area where CSMSP can facilitate shared governance and resilience. However, to be effective, CSMSP requires environmental and rights-respecting norms, and transparency. This can be achieved through three key areas of intervention. First, establishing defense-civilian working groups (e.g., in the form of CSMSP task forces). Composed of diverse sectors (e.g., navy/coast guards, fisheries, environment agencies, and academia), the duty of such task forces could be to co-design zoning maps, mitigation areas, and operational protocols. Second, transparency rules require embedding tiered confidentiality clauses to reconcile security with transparency. Specifically, defense institutions should publish non-classified siting rationales, environmental baselines, and mitigation commitments; disclose where defense interests impose constraints and specify compensations (e.g., offset radar upgrades); and maintain public dashboards tracking permit conditions and compliance. Finally, establishing secure, standardized data-sharing frameworks. Defense agencies can participate through federated, access-controlled ecosystems that expose “need-to-know” maritime situational awareness layers (e.g., Automatic Identification System, surveillance footprints, exclusion zones) while withholding classified content. In the EU, the Common Information Sharing Environment operationalized in July 2024 enables structured, secure information sharing across civil and military maritime authorities, supporting cross-border awareness and resilience of critical infrastructure (European Commission, 2024). In practice, authorities should (i) establish a CSMSP “mission partner environment” with role-based access; (ii) publish wind-farm radar/sonar mitigation metadata (frequency bands, turbine heights, array spacing) as unclassified engineering profiles and (iii) adopt shared vocabularies aligned to maritime domain awareness tools.
4.2 Conflict-resolution and co-existence protocols
A key function of CSMSP should be to enable effective conflict resolution and co-existence of different maritime sectors. This can be achieved along three key lines. First, CSMSP authorities should codify a graduated conflict-resolution ladder that starts with early scoping and moves through facilitated negotiation to regulatory arbitration. Comparative analyses of Denmark, England, and the Netherlands show that spatial reservation, multi-use, co-existence, ecosystem-based planning, and financial compensation are recurring measures deployed through plans and permits to mitigate offshore renewable energy conflicts (Kusters et al., 2025). Second, establish compensatory mechanisms for defense radar upgrades. Estonia coordinates OWE permitting with its Ministry of Defense, requiring project-specific modeling of array layouts and compensatory radar upgrades rather than blanket moratoria–embedding mitigation into permits. Financing of defense radar upgrades by developers has been considered recently (ERR News, 2024). Third, the development of fisheries co-management tools (e.g., Memoranda of Understanding) can provide templates for shared governance with local communities that can be adapted to defense contexts, for instance by defining access windows, gear restrictions, and incident reporting lines.
4.3 Defense marine zoning and impact assessment
CSMSP must embed naval and coast-guard activities into marine zoning and impact assessment processes to reduce ecological harm (noise, explosives, strikes, habitat degradation) and align operations with climate and biodiversity objectives. This can be achieved through four core mechanisms. First, map biologically important areas, critical habitats, spawning/breeding grounds, migratory corridors, and seabed features (reefs, live hard bottom, shipwrecks). Thereafter, these overlays can be used to steer training/testing away from high-risk zones and to define mitigation areas around seafloor resources (e.g., prohibiting precision anchoring and explosive mine countermeasures near coral and hard-bottom habitats) as flagged by the US Department of the Navy (2024). Second, apply seasonal restrictions (e.g., breeding/migration periods) and dynamic closures triggered by real-time detections of marine mammals (visual, passive acoustic, autonomous systems). Third, predefine ecological mitigation zones around acoustic and explosive activities (sonar, pile driving, in-water devices), and halt or modify rules when marine species enter military zones (US Navy, 2018). Finally, apply noise-smart routing by developing soft-start protocols, directional sonar beams, and quieter sonar modes where feasible, while using route planning to avoid dense marine mammal areas identified in density databases environmental impact studies (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2018).
5 Curbing enthusiasm about the military's green transition
I have argued that the military's green transition–characterized by renewable energy adoption, efficiency upgrades, and climate-resilient infrastructure–offers environmental and operational benefits, and that key governance pathways can mitigate inherent risks in integrating defense institutions into CSMSP. However, there is need to curb our enthusiasm about the military's green transition rhetoric. The climate gains of green defense are increasingly diluted by two interlocking forces: the sharp rise in global military outlays and the mineral and carbon-intensive extractivism that those outlays accelerate. Together, these factors expand lifecycle emissions across procurement, operations, and reconstruction, overshadowing incremental efficiency improvements. First, world military spending has surged over the last decade and is strongly associated with higher carbon intensity. Recent studies report that a 1% increase in per-capita military spending is associated with a ~0.05% rise in per-capita CO2 emissions across high-spending states (Tarczyński et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2025), while panel analyses over large country samples similarly link higher defense outlays to greater emissions (Azam et al., 2025). These scientific findings dovetail with defense statistics showing unprecedented global expenditures since 2023, reinforcing the broader emissions risk landscape (SIPRI, 2024, 2025).
Second, the green transition inside armed forces does not occur in a vacuum; it is materially contingent on vast quantities of the same energy-transition minerals–lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, copper, rare earth elements–and digital-transition minerals (e.g., coltan, gallium, silicon, tungsten) that underpin civilian twin transitions. The literature details how military demand is shaping demand, geopolitics, supply chains, and stockpiling (Vivoda et al., 2025). The US Defense Logistics Agency's planned stockpile of roughly 7,500 metric tons of cobalt alone could otherwise support on the order of 80 GWh of battery capacity–enough material for approximately 100,000 electric buses–illustrating an acute allocation trade-off between military procurement and civilian electrification (Steichen, 2025; CSIS, 2025). Research further emphasizes that accelerated military mobilization is a neglected driver of intensified extractivism, with mounting evidence of environmental degradation, social conflict, human rights abuses and governance challenges in key mining regions as militarized states seek to secure defense-critical minerals [Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 2025]. Moreover, these critical minerals are energy, water and carbon intensive to extract and process. Because mining and mineral processing remain fossil-fuel intensive and are associated with social and ecological harm, higher defense-led mineral demand propagates upstream emissions. Because mining and mineral processing remain fossil-fuel intensive and are often associated with ecological and social harm, higher defense-led mineral demand propagates upstream emissions and locks in carbon-heavy industrial footprints and socioecological disposability.
It follows from the above that greening defense not only entrenches externalized disposability–both social and ecological–its decarbonization trajectories are increasingly dwarfed by increased militarization and defense expenditure (Dong et al., 2025)–with militarized conflict generating massive, often uncounted climate burdens through direct operations, industrial surge, and post-conflict reconstruction. A recent study found that cutting defense budgets reduces energy use much more than similar increases raise it, meaning budget cuts can deliver climate benefits that efficiency improvements alone cannot (Thombs et al., 2025). In conclusion, defense-sector greening is necessary but insufficient: without caps or at least constraints on aggregate military spending, transparent cradle-to-grave accounting of military and defense-industrial emissions, and governance of defense-driven mineral supply chains, the net climate effect of “green militaries” will be watered down by scale effects and extractivist lock-ins. Aligning national security with climate security thus requires pairing technological greening with strategic restraint and material-efficiency policies that reduce mineral intensity across both military and civilian domains.
6 Concluding remarks and future research directions
The climate-security nexus in ocean governance is no longer a theoretical construct; it is a lived reality shaping the future of marine sustainability. This paper demonstrates that integrating defense into CSMSP can unlock significant strategic and climate benefits. Yet such opportunities coexist with profound risks. Without robust governance safeguards, CSMSP could compromise its foundational principles of equity, transparency, and ecological integrity.
Crucially, the rhetoric of “green militaries” must be tempered by structural realities. Rising global defense budgets and the carbon- and mineral-intensive extractivism that it entails, threaten to overshadow incremental efficiency gains, locking in carbon-heavy supply chains and amplifying upstream emissions. Scientific evidence confirms that military spending correlates strongly with higher carbon intensity, while extractive pressures linked to defense procurement deepen socioecological vulnerabilities. In short, greening defense without curbing militarization risks perpetuating climate injustice and undermining global decarbonization trajectories. Moving forward, aligning national security with climate security requires more than technological fixes. It demands strategic restraint in defense spending, transparent cradle-to-grave emissions accounting, and governance frameworks that embed defense actors into CSMSP without eroding participatory norms. Scholars and practitioners must co-create knowledge that anticipates converging risks–climate shocks, geopolitical tensions, and maritime crime–while designing adaptive, inclusive governance models. Integrating defense into CSMSP is not merely a technical exercise; it is a normative challenge that will define whether ocean governance advances sustainability or succumbs to securitized extractivism. The stakes are high: the contested, climate-changed ocean will either become a theater of resource militarized competition or a space of collaborative resilience. The choice is ours–and it must be informed by science, equity, and foresight.
Data availability statement
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Author contributions
RT: Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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Keywords: Climate-security nexus, climate-smart marine spatial planning, defense emissions gap, green defense transition, maritime security and governance, offshore wind energy approval, power asymmetry and spatial conflict, securitization of ocean governance
Citation: Tafon R (2026) Securitizing and greening the contested, climate-changed ocean: benefits, risks and governance pathways for integrating defense into climate-smart marine spatial planning. Front. Ocean Sustain. 3:1743635. doi: 10.3389/focsu.2025.1743635
Received: 10 November 2025; Revised: 19 December 2025;
Accepted: 22 December 2025; Published: 21 January 2026.
Edited by:
Gerardo Damonte, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, PeruReviewed by:
Lydia Papadaki, Athena Research Center, GreeceCopyright © 2026 Tafon. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Ralph Tafon, cmFscGgudGFmb25Ac2guc2U=