Turkey as a middle power in Central Asia: regional cooperation amid geopolitical competition with Russia, China, and the United States

Abstract

Introduction:

Amid the transformation of the global order and intensified Eurasian competition, Turkey has expanded its engagement with Central Asia through connectivity diplomacy, identity-based multilateralism, and selective security and economic cooperation. This article argues that Turkey’s regional strategy is best understood as middle power diplomacy driven by strategic autonomy.

Methods:

The study triangulates institutional and documentary analysis with an original cross-sectional perception survey (2023–2024), used as exploratory evidence.

Results:

Central Asia functions for Turkey as a low-to-moderate cost arena to operationalize strategic autonomy while avoiding direct confrontation with dominant regional actors. Turkey’s leverage stems from the combination of connectivity initiatives aligned with regional diversification interests, soft-power infrastructure (education, cultural production, humanitarian visibility), and targeted defence-industrial cooperation that complements the existing security hierarchy. These practices are linked to domestic debates in Turkey over pan-Turkic identity narratives, the limits of socio-political Islam in external outreach, and Ankara’s contested relationship with Europe and the wider West.

Discussion:

The findings indicate that Turkey’s influence in Central Asia is conditional and layered: it grows where identity and connectivity are translated into institutional routines and business networks, but remains constrained by Russia’s entrenched security role, China’s geo-economic scale, and uneven regional receptivity.

1 Introduction

Central Asia has become an increasingly salient arena in Eurasian politics, where the interests of Russia, China, the United States, and a growing number of middle powers intersect. The region’s strategic geography, resource endowments, and role in emerging connectivity routes magnify its importance in a more fragmented global order. Against this background, Turkey has intensified its engagement with Central Asian states through economic cooperation, cultural diplomacy, and institution-building initiatives. For Ankara, Central Asia is not only a neighboring strategic space; it is also a region where foreign policy objectives overlap with domestic debates about national identity, geopolitical autonomy, and Turkey’s position between Europe and Asia.

From a conceptual standpoint, Turkey’s activity in Central Asia is often discussed through the framework of middle power diplomacy, understood as a strategy whereby states with limited material resources relative to great powers seek influence through active diplomacy, niche capabilities, multilateral platforms, and soft-power instruments. This lens is particularly relevant because it captures both Turkey’s structural constraints and the adaptive repertoire it deploys to manage them. Yet, the Central Asia case also requires attention to a more recent transformation in Turkish foreign policy, where strategic autonomy has become a guiding idea in Ankara’s external behavior and narrative framing (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025; Aslan, 2024). In this setting, Central Asia offers a pragmatic arena for autonomy-seeking: Turkey can expand partnerships, diversify connectivity options, and build institutional presence without committing to a single bloc alignment.

At the same time, Turkey operates in a competitive and institutionally layered environment. Russia retains deep security entrenchment through longstanding military, political, and economic ties, while China’s regional footprint has expanded through finance, infrastructure, and trade (Aron and Holoch, 1990). These realities limit Turkey’s ability to act as a dominant actor, but they do not eliminate space for maneuver. Instead, they encourage a strategy that blends soft power, selective economic engagement, and institutional entrepreneurship—particularly through Turkic multilateral formats—while avoiding a direct challenge to established great-power positions.

Accordingly, this study addresses the following research question: How does Turkey employ political, economic, security-related, and cultural instruments to position itself in Central Asia, and to what extent can these instruments compensate for Turkey’s relatively limited material resources compared to major powers? The article argues that the answer depends not only on what Turkey does in Central Asia, but also on how Ankara’s regional agenda is embedded in Turkey’s broader foreign-policy transformation and domestic ideological debate.

In this article, “transformation” refers not to a sudden rupture but to a cumulative reweighting of Turkey’s foreign-policy priorities and instruments. Recent scholarship depicts an increasingly explicit search for strategic autonomy—a posture that combines flexible alignments, selective normalization, and issue-based partnerships—while avoiding full anchoring in any single geopolitical camp. This shift is frequently discussed as a “post-Western” turn in which Ankara seeks room for maneuver amid systemic rivalry, but it is also shaped by domestic political economy constraints and the need to sustain external partnerships that serve trade, security, and regime legitimacy (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Ciftci, 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025).

Central Asia fits this transformation as a comparatively “high-leverage, lower-cost” theater where strategic autonomy can be operationalized through connectivity, trade governance, and identity-based cooperation. In this setting, Ankara can advance the Turkic World agenda primarily through institutional and societal channels while simultaneously presenting itself as a pragmatic middle power partner rather than an ideological challenger. The article therefore treats Central Asia as an empirical window into how strategic autonomy is translated into regional practice under competitive coexistence with Russia, China, and the United States.

Turkey’s “connectivity programme” should be understood as a geo-economic strand of foreign policy aimed at turning physical and regulatory interdependence into political leverage. In practice, this agenda rests on transport and logistics corridors, customs and transit facilitation, and the scaling of trade-enabling infrastructure that lowers transaction costs for firms. The Middle Corridor functions here not as a slogan but as a policy package: it links Turkey’s ambition to act as a Eurasian hub with Central Asian preferences for route diversification and reduced dependence on single transit gateways. Framed in these terms, connectivity becomes a concrete instrument through which Ankara pursues strategic autonomy—not by exiting Western institutions, but by expanding its room for maneuver through alternative corridors and partners.

To make this link explicit—and to reduce the gap between the scale of the manuscript and the empirical specificity demanded by the topic—the following two subsections clarify (i) the strategic drivers behind Turkey’s Central Asia ambitions and their domestic political context, and (ii) the evolution of Turkey’s Central Asia strategy and its “on-the-ground” manifestations.

1.1 Strategic drivers of Turkey’s ambitions in Central Asia and their domestic context

Turkey’s engagement with Central Asia is shaped by a strategic calculus that combines material interests with ideational positioning. Recent scholarship on Turkey’s foreign-policy transformation highlights the growing salience of strategic autonomy—a practical effort to widen policy options through diversified partnerships, flexible institutional engagement, and issue-specific coalitions (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025). Central Asia fits this approach because it enables Ankara to pursue influence incrementally, without the costs associated with high-intensity competition in more militarized theaters.

At the level of strategic interests, four considerations are particularly important. First, Central Asia is integral to Turkey’s connectivity agenda: Ankara’s ambition to function as a Eurasian hub is reinforced when it can promote alternative corridors linking Europe and Asia. Second, the region supports Turkey’s broader search for economic resilience through trade and investment networks that are compatible with a “trading-state” logic and with autonomy-seeking economic diplomacy (Altay, 2024; Ciftci, 2023). Third, Central Asia offers a setting for defence-industrial outreach and security cooperation that can be pursued selectively and pragmatically, which aligns with the idea of autonomy as a strategic choice that may be exercised defensively or offensively depending on context (Aslan, 2024). Fourth, Central Asia provides a platform for institutional entrepreneurship, allowing Turkey to shape agendas and networks through Turkic formats even when it remains outside Russia- and China-centered institutions.

These strategic drivers are inseparable from domestic debates in Turkey, where competing narratives define what Turkey is and how it should act internationally. One key narrative revolves around the “Turkic World”: a civilizational and identity-based framework that has gained institutional expression through Turkic multilateralism and has become a visible component of Turkey’s external branding. Rather than functioning as a simple ideological project, the “Turkic World” discourse often operates as a political resource: it legitimizes activism, supports elite networking, and gives Ankara a culturally resonant vocabulary that can travel across borders while remaining less confrontational than overt geopolitical language.

A second debate concerns the boundaries of socio-political Islam in foreign policy. The wider literature on Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era shows that external behavior is shaped by domestic political fields and by shifts in coalition politics, which can affect how ideology is projected and where it is constrained (D’Alema, 2024). Central Asia, however, tends to reward a calibrated posture: in several regional contexts, overt religious framing may be politically sensitive, and Ankara’s outreach therefore more often relies on cultural-civilizational themes, education, and humanitarian visibility than on explicit religious mobilization (Hu, 2023). In practice, this pushes Turkey toward a form of soft power that is identity-coded but institutionally pragmatic.

A third domestic debate concerns Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the wider West. Here, strategic autonomy does not replace Western interdependence; it reconfigures it. Economic ties, NATO membership, and the politics of recognition remain structural constraints and assets simultaneously, shaping how Turkey signals both continuity and differentiation (Aydın, 2021). Central Asia becomes relevant in this debate because it allows Ankara to demonstrate value as a broker of connectivity and regional engagement while also asserting that Turkey is not confined to Euro-Atlantic frameworks (Aydın-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015). In this sense, Central Asia functions as a testing ground where autonomy-seeking behavior and middle power diplomacy overlap: Turkey seeks influence not by displacing great powers, but by building room for maneuver through institutions, networks, and reputational resources.

1.2 Evolution of Turkey’s Central Asia strategy and “on-the-ground” manifestations

A further reason for strengthening the Introduction is to demonstrate how Turkey’s Central Asia policy has evolved—and what that evolution looks like in practice. A concise periodization helps align the manuscript’s ambition with observable indicators.

In the early post-Soviet period, Turkey approached Central Asia with high expectations and a strong symbolic narrative, seeking to translate linguistic and cultural affinity into political influence. Over time, the limits of this approach became apparent (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2022). The strategy gradually shifted toward more practical engagement: business ties, construction and services, educational exchange, and a widening set of cultural channels. In the last decade, and especially as strategic autonomy gained prominence in Turkish foreign-policy discourse, Ankara’s approach has become more modular and instrument-driven—less about sweeping integration claims and more about building durable linkages through targeted cooperation, niche capabilities, and institution-supported networks (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025).

On the ground, this evolution is visible through several types of markers. Institutionally, Turkey has invested in Turkic multilateral platforms that strengthen symbolic cohesion and provide a recurring diplomatic infrastructure for agenda-setting under the umbrella of the Turkic World. Societally, cultural diplomacy has expanded through education, scholarships, media circulation, and humanitarian initiatives that produce alumni networks and long-term familiarity (Cornell and Starr, 2018). Economically, Turkish engagement has frequently taken the form of entrepreneurial and SME-driven presence and sectoral cooperation, which fits the logic of geo-economic statecraft and trade-oriented foreign policy (Altay, 2024). In the security domain, Turkey has increasingly relied on selective defence cooperation and capacity-building, which resonates with autonomy-seeking behavior while avoiding the appearance of a direct challenge to the region’s established security hierarchy (Aslan, 2024). None of these channels alone is decisive; together, they constitute a layered and adaptive presence that corresponds to the behavioral repertoire associated with middle powers operating under structural constraints.

This evolution matters for the article’s core argument. If Turkey is understood as a middle power pursuing strategic autonomy, then Central Asia appears less as an ideological project and more as a strategic hinge: a space where Ankara can combine identity-based legitimacy, institutional entrepreneurship, and practical cooperation to remain relevant amid Russia–China dominance and fluctuating Western attention (Contessi, 2015; Trade between Turkey and Central Asia, n.d., Zholdasbay, 2024).

This article advances a clear claim: Turkey’s engagement with Central Asia is best explained as a strategic-autonomy–oriented form of middle power diplomacy, in which Ankara converts limited material capabilities into influence by combining (a) connectivity and trade instruments, (b) identity-based institutional entrepreneurship under the Turkic World framework, and (c) selective securitycooperation calibrated to remain complementary rather than confrontational (Aydın-Düzgit, 2025). The argument is supported by three strands of evidence. First, the literature on Turkey’s foreign-policy transformation clarifies why strategic autonomy has become a guiding logic and how it shapes regional activism. Second, institutional and documentary analysis shows how Ankara operationalizes this logic through Turkic multilateral formats and connectivity agendas in Central Asia. Third, the survey evidence— used conservatively as an exploratory dataset—indicates that favorable perceptions of Turkey are most strongly associated with cultural diplomacy, awareness of cooperation, and perceived contributions to security, thereby illustrating the reputational mechanisms that middle powers rely on.

The article answers the research question as follows: Turkey positions itself in Central Asia by pursuing strategic autonomy through a middle-power repertoire—one that relies less on material dominance and more on the interaction of identity-based institutional entrepreneurship under the “Turkic World” framework, connectivity and trade instruments associated with the Middle Corridor, and selective security and defence-industrial cooperation calibrated to remain complementary to the existing regional security hierarchy. The central claim is therefore not that Turkey “outcompetes” Russia or China, but that it expands room for maneuver by converting cultural affinity and institutional routines into reputational and transactional advantages.

By “transformation” we refer to a gradual but observable shift from expansive, identity-laden regional narratives toward a more pragmatic autonomy-seeking posture that combines selective normalization, transactional bargaining, and issue-based partnerships. This is not a linear retreat from activism, but a re-calibration of means and narratives: Ankara increasingly frames its regional engagement through the language of strategic autonomy and middle power agency, while relying on flexible instruments that range from connectivity initiatives to targeted security cooperation (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025; D’Alema, 2024).

Recent scholarship on Turkey’s foreign policy transformation increasingly treats strategic autonomy as more than a tactical adjustment; it is described as a contested narrative through which Ankara redefines its international positioning under conditions of intensified great-power competition. Aydın-Düzgit (2023) links Turkey’s evolving posture to broader tensions between authoritarian-leaning middle powers and the liberal international order, while Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2025) trace the lineages and contradictions of the autonomy agenda, showing how it combines long-standing aspirations for independent action with new justificatory frames.

Within this debate, engagement with non-Western platforms—including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—appears less as a clean “pivot” and more as a form of diplomatic optionality. Aslan (2024) usefully distinguishes between defensive and offensive versions of strategic autonomy, a distinction that helps interpret Turkey’s Eurasian outreach as a calibrated attempt to widen policy space without burning bridges to its Western anchors.

The article’s novelty lies in integrating these dimensions into a single analytical frame: Turkey’s Central Asia policy is interpreted as a hybrid strategy in which strategic autonomy provides the operating logic, middle power diplomacy provides the behavioral pattern, and the Turkic World provides a legitimizing narrative and institutional vocabulary. The empirical sections then assess how this combination is reflected in economic engagement, institutional positioning, and societal perceptions.

The SCO dimension is particularly relevant because Turkey’s institutional link to the organization remains limited yet symbolically meaningful. Studies of Turkey’s post-2016 Eurasianist turn underline how SCO-related signaling can resonate domestically and regionally, even when it does not translate into membership or binding security commitments.

Crucially, this is where middle power and soft power logics intersect rather than compete. Turkey’s identity-centered institutionalism—advanced through the Turkic World narrative and the Organisation of Turkic States—operates alongside selective engagement with non-Western forums. In analytical terms, Ankara’s strategy is best read as middle-power diplomacy driven by strategic autonomy, with soft power and identity-based institution-building providing the durable layer, and non-Western platforms serving as instruments of hedging, signaling, and “forum-shopping” in a crowded regional order.

Definition and scope. In this article, the frequently used phrase “Turkey’s program of developing ties” is specified as Turkey’s connectivity development agenda (CDA)—a geoeconomic and institutional bundle of policies aimed at expanding cross-border connectivity between Türkiye and Eurasia through transport corridors, logistics hubs, trade facilitation, and corridor-related rulemaking. In practical terms, the CDA is operationalized through the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), widely referred to as the “Middle Corridor,” which links China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, with Türkiye positioned as the western gateway of the multimodal route.

Official Turkish policy documents explicitly frame the Middle Corridor as a priority connectivity route and associate it with infrastructure completion (e.g., the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway), the development of logistics centers and free trade areas, and inter-customs cooperation initiatives.

Conceptually, we treat the CDA as the geoeconomic arm of Turkey’s strategic autonomy, through which Ankara seeks to widen room for maneuver in Eurasia without relying exclusively on any single great power–centered corridor architecture (Öniş and Uluyol, 2025; Huntington, n.d., Tocci, 2021).

This claim is developed through three testable hypotheses:

H1 (Soft-power primacy): Within the achieved sample, favorable perceptions of Turkey are more strongly associated with evaluations of cultural initiatives and educational exposure than with purely economic awareness. This reflects the middle-power mechanism of influence via reputational capital and social embeddedness.

H2 (Institutional multiplier): Turkey’s influence increases when cultural affinity is translated into institutional routines (e.g., OTS-level coordination, repeated summits, working groups, mobility and connectivity agendas). Institutions function as “multipliers” that stabilize cooperation and reduce transaction costs for Ankara and its partners.

H3 (Complementary security): Turkey gains legitimacy as a security partner when its defence cooperation remains complementary rather than substitutive—that is, when it provides capacity-building, technology, and training without challenging Russia’s entrenched security position or provoking overt balancing by China. Under these conditions, security cooperation contributes positively to Turkey’s overall image.

H3 does not imply replacement of Russia’s traditional security role; it specifies an incremental, niche-capability mechanism through which Turkey accumulates reputational security capital as a middle-power partner.

The underlying mechanism linking these hypotheses is a layered influence pathway: identity narratives (“Turkic World”) → institutionalization (OTS routines) → networks (education, business, expert communities) → reputational capital → selective economic and security transactions. The argument also specifies clear scope conditions. Turkey’s strategy is most effective where Central Asian governments and societies seek diversification of external ties and where connectivity initiatives generate tangible administrative and commercial outcomes. It is less effective where domestic sensitivities (including concerns over ideological influence), structural dependence on Russia and China, or infrastructural bottlenecks constrain the space for maneuver.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 situates the study in recent scholarship on Turkish foreign-policy transformation, middle power diplomacy, and identity-based regionalism. Section 3 explains the research design and the survey’s bounded inferential scope. Section 4 presents empirical results on Turkey’s economic, institutional, and societal channels of influence and reports the correlational and regression patterns observed in the sample. Section 5 discusses the implications for debates on strategic autonomy and the Turkic World agenda, emphasizing the conditions under which Turkey’s influence expands or stalls. Section 6 concludes by summarizing contributions and outlining directions for further research.

In this article, middle power diplomacy is treated as the overarching strategic framework, whereas soft power is specified as one of the key causal mechanisms through which Turkey—an autonomy-seeking middle power—builds influence in Central Asia.

This study combines three concepts that are often conflated but analytically distinct. Middle power diplomacy is used here as an actor-level strategic framework: it describes how states with limited relative material capabilities pursue influence through niche diplomacy, coalition-building, multilateralism, and selective capability deployment. In this behavioral reading, “middle power” is not a purely quantitative label; it refers to a repertoire of practices aimed at shaping outcomes without structural dominance.

Strategic autonomy is treated as a guiding orientation that explains why Turkey seeks flexible positioning and diversified partnerships rather than exclusive alignment. Autonomy-seeking does not imply strategic isolation; it denotes the pursuit of maneuvering space by combining institutional engagement, transactional cooperation, and narrative framing.

Soft power, by contrast, is not the overarching framework in this article. It is specified as a mechanism—the pathway through which preferences, reputations, and networks are shaped, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing the acceptability of Turkey’s role in the region. In Central Asia, this mechanism operates through education, cultural production, humanitarian visibility, and the institutionalization of identity narratives under the “Turkic World” agenda.

The analytical logic of the paper is therefore hierarchical and integrated: Turkey’s middle-power strategy (framework) is implemented under an autonomy-seeking orientation (motivation/logic) and relies substantially on soft power (mechanism), complemented by niche geo-economic tools and selective security cooperation (instruments). This structure allows the study to evaluate “success” in middle-power terms—namely, the creation of institutional routines, reputational capital, and incremental transactional gains—rather than in terms of replacing Russia or China.

The analysis shows that Turkey’s effectiveness in Central Asia is best understood in middle-power terms: Ankara does not displace Russia or China, but it secures niche influence by combining institutional entrepreneurship (OTS), connectivity-centered geo-economic engagement, and reputational embeddedness through soft power. Survey evidence indicates that cultural and security-related perceptions significantly predict overall evaluations of Turkey, supporting the claim that soft power operates as a mechanism within an autonomy-seeking middle-power strategy.

We argue that Turkey’s Central Asia strategy is best understood as an autonomy-seeking middle-power approach in which soft power functions as an influence multiplier, while Russia–China dominance and U.S. selective engagement set the constraint conditions that limit Ankara to niche—yet durable—forms of regional embeddedness.

In this article, middle power denotes Turkey’s positional strategy, strategic autonomy is treated as a key driver shaping that strategy, and soft power is analyzed as one instrument within it. The Turkic World narrative is approached as a legitimizing frame that can amplify, but not substitute for, geoeconomic connectivity tools such as the Middle Corridor.

In this article, Turkey’s “connectivity development programme” refers to a geoeconomic strategy aimed at expanding logistical corridors, trade facilitation, and infrastructure-enabled interdependence linking Anatolia, the South Caucasus, the Caspian basin, and Central Asia. Operationally, the program is most visibly associated with the Middle Corridor (the Trans-Caspian East–West route), which Ankara frames as a mechanism for trade sovereignty, diversification of routes, and strategic resilience. Conceptually, connectivity functions here as a middle-power instrument: it seeks influence not through coercive dominance but through corridor entrepreneurship, standard-setting, and the provision of practical regional public goods (Altay, 2024; Ersoy et al., 2024).

2 Literature review

2.1 Why Turkey in Central Asia must be read through foreign-policy transformation, not only regional geopolitics

In recent debates, strategic autonomy has moved from a rhetorical aspiration to a structuring logic of Turkish foreign policy. The concept is typically used to capture Ankara’s attempt to widen room for maneuver vis-à-vis Western institutions and norms while diversifying partnerships, instruments, and narratives. This shift is not reducible to a single doctrinal turn; rather, it reflects a layered re-articulation of interests and identity under conditions of regional contestation and domestic political polarization. Recent scholarship therefore treats autonomy as both a strategic posture and a contested political narrative that is continuously renegotiated in response to crises, elections, and shifting alignments (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025; Ciftci, 2023).

Importantly, the autonomy discourse is increasingly intertwined with a middle power vocabulary in Turkish academic and policy circles. Here, “middle power” is not merely a rank in a static hierarchy; it is invoked as an enabling frame for activism through selective coalition-building, agenda-setting, and niche capabilities. In that sense, autonomy operates as the strategic premise, while middle-power behavior describes the mode of practice—especially when Ankara seeks influence through flexible regional initiatives rather than formal alliance leadership (Oğuzlu, 2023; Aslan, 2024).

This literature also emphasizes that autonomy is pursued through multiple channels that mix geoeconomic and security instruments. Domestic political economy dynamics are treated as central rather than residual: fiscal constraints, growth imperatives, and distributional politics shape both priorities and limits of activism (Ciftci, 2023). Likewise, identity-inflected debates—ranging from post-Western narratives and Eurasianist re-orientations to ontological security concerns—condition how strategic autonomy is justified and communicated (Tüysüzoğlu, 2023; Ermihan, 2025; Babul, 2024). Taken together, recent work suggests that Turkish foreign policy is best read as a pragmatic search for autonomy that is simultaneously strategic, domestic-political, and discursive—an interpretation that provides a stronger baseline for assessing Ankara’s agenda in Central Asia.

The article distinguishes between three related but non-identical concepts that are often conflated in discussions of Turkey’s regional activism. Strategic autonomy is treated as an overarching orientation: it captures Ankara’s search for policy flexibility, diversified partnerships, and reduced dependence on any single bloc in an increasingly multipolar environment (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025; Aslan, 2024).

Middle power diplomacy is used as a status–strategy category: it refers to the way a state with constrained material capabilities can still generate influence through niche leadership, institutional positioning, and calibrated bargaining among stronger actors. In the Turkish case, recent debates explicitly revisit the limits of overextension and argue for a more restrained, interest-based middle- power posture (Oğuzlu, 2023).

Finally, soft power is treated as a toolkit within this broader posture, not as a standalone grand strategy. It encompasses educational, cultural, and reputational instruments that can expand Turkey’s presence where hard-power leverage is structurally limited. The analytical implication is straightforward: this study examines soft power as one mechanism through which Turkey seeks to enact a middle-power role under a strategic-autonomy orientation—particularly in Central Asia.

A large share of the literature on Central Asia begins from the premise that the region is structurally shaped by great-power rivalry and dense institutional architectures. In this reading, external actors compete over security arrangements, transport corridors, and economic access, while regional states seek to preserve autonomy through diversification. Such perspectives—rooted in classical realist thinking about power, interest, and balance (Morgenthau, 2006; Aron, 2003)—remain influential in contemporary analyses of Eurasian competition. They are also consistent with broader civilizational arguments that see identity and cultural boundaries as relevant for regional ordering (Huntington, 1996), a point often invoked when discussing Turkey’s ties with Turkic-speaking societies.

Recent scholarship increasingly interprets the transformation of Turkish foreign policy through the lens of strategic autonomy, understood not as a single policy choice but as a broader re-orientation in Ankara’s external behavior and narrative repertoire. In this reading, autonomy reflects a sustained attempt to widen Turkey’s room for maneuver across competing poles of power; while managing the frictions this creates with established Western partners. Aydın-Düzgit shows how Ankara’s “post Western” turn is intertwined with contestation of key liberal-order expectations, producing a foreign-policy posture that is simultaneously status-seeking and selectively revisionist in tone.

Yet, if the analytical goal is to explain Turkey’s positioning in Central Asia, regional geopolitics alone is an insufficient starting point. The past decade has brought a noticeable shift in how scholars interpret Ankara’s foreign policy, increasingly emphasizing transformation in strategic orientation, domestic drivers, and the changing relationship with the West. The result is that Turkey’s Central Asia agenda is now more plausibly understood as part of a wider recalibration—one in which earlier expansive narratives associated in the broader debate with “neo-Ottoman” ambitions have given way to a more pragmatic language of strategic autonomy and a growing tendency to describe Turkey as a middle power operating under constraint.

Recent work captures this shift in a way that is directly relevant to the present study. Aydın-Düzgit (2023) discusses Turkey (alongside other cases) as an “authoritarian middle power” navigating a liberal international order without fully embracing its normative premises, while still benefiting from selective institutional engagement. Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2025) trace the lineages and contradictions of strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy, showing that autonomy operates both as a policy orientation and as a narrative that organizes external activism. Complementing these arguments, Aslan (2024) frames strategic autonomy as a contested practice that can carry defensive or more assertive implications depending on the theater and the domestic-international context. Other recent studies connect foreign policy to domestic political economy (Ciftci, 2023), to the political field dynamics of the AKP era (D’Alema, 2024), and to ontological security processes and emotions in external behavior (Babul, 2024; Ermihan, 2025). Taken together, this scholarship suggests a clear implication for a Central Asia–focused article: Turkey’s regional engagement should be interpreted through the lens of how Ankara seeks room for maneuver, rather than through an assumption of great-power equivalence.

Building on this literature, we treat Central Asia as a specific theater where strategic autonomy is operationalized through middle-power diplomacy, with “Turkic World” instruments functioning as a scalable soft-power toolkit alongside selective economic and security cooperation.

The autonomy debate has also matured conceptually. Rather than treating strategic autonomy as a mechanical form of hedging, Aydın-Düzgit, Keyman, and Kutlay trace its lineages and contradictions, highlighting how geopolitical imperatives, domestic political incentives, and economic constraints often pull Turkish policy in different directions. This perspective is particularly valuable for Central Asia, because it shifts attention from episodic initiatives to the underlying logic through which Ankara seeks influence without assuming the burdens of a major power.

This recalibration of ambition is also reflected in arguments for a more restrained middle-power strategy. Oğuzlu cautions that over-extension can undermine the very autonomy Ankara seeks, suggesting that middle-power effectiveness depends on carefully chosen theaters and instruments. For the purposes of this article, this insight helps explain why Central Asia is approached less through costly megaprojects and more through institutional, commercial, and cultural toolkits that promise incremental influence.

In parallel, Turkish foreign-policy debates increasingly frame Turkey as a middle power operating “between the West and the ‘Rest’.” Öniş and Uluyol emphasize that this positioning is closely tied to post-Western dynamics and to strategic autonomy as a practical response to intensified systemic rivalry. Importantly, the “middle power” label here is not purely descriptive: it functions as a justificatory language that renders selective engagement, transactional balancing, and issue-based alignment appear coherent rather than ad hoc.

2.2 What “middle power” means here: a behavioral repertoire, not a status claim

Contemporary literature increasingly frames Turkey’s external behavior through the lens of transformation from expansive, narrative-driven activism toward a more pragmatic autonomy seeking posture. This transformation is not described as linear. Rather, it is marked by contradictions—between autonomy and interdependence, between security-driven impulses and economic imperatives, and between identity-based rhetoric and transactional bargaining (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025).

Several strands of recent work specify the causal drivers behind this shift. A domestic political economy perspective emphasizes how currency volatility, investment needs, and trade dependencies shape foreign-policy choices and encourage selective normalization and economic pragmatist (Ciftci, 2023). A security-identity line of inquiry highlights how crises and perceived status threats generate ontological (in)security dynamics, which can push Ankara toward hedging and symbolic autonomy claims even when material constraints remain binding (Ermihan, 2025).

Another body of work traces an Eurasianist reframing in the aftermath of the coup attempt, pointing to changing narratives about Western alignment and growing interest in non-Western institutional platforms, including debates surrounding engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Tüysüzoğlu, 2023). Related discussions link autonomy to alternative alignments and geoeconomic positioning, including Turkey’s exploration of BRICS-related signaling and “geopolitical autonomy” narratives (Süsler, 2025).

Importantly, strategic autonomy is also debated as an active foreign-policy choice rather than a purely defensive posture. Aslan (2024) conceptualizes autonomy claims as potentially offensive—designed to expand bargaining space and shape regional outcomes—while Altay (2024) shows how trade instruments and regional agreements can be mobilized to pursue “trade sovereignty,” extending autonomy logic into economic statecraft.

Taken together, these studies suggest that Turkey’s transformation is best understood as a shift in:

• narrative framing (from expansive civilizational or interventionist claims to autonomy and normalization),

• instrument choice (from headline-grabbing activism to targeted geoeconomic and institutional tools),

• alignment management (from West-centric anchoring to multi-vector hedging).

This article builds on this literature to examine how such transformation is manifested in Central Asia, where identity resources and connectivity projects allow Ankara to pursue influence under sharper material constraints than in its near abroad.

The “middle power” concept is used inconsistently across international relations scholarship. In its most analytically productive form, however, it is not a simple descriptor of size; it is a behavioral category. Classic and contemporary works stress that middle powers compensate for limited material capabilities through niche diplomacy, coalition-building, agenda-setting in multilateral formats, and the careful selection of arenas where influence is feasible (Cooper, 1997; Chapnick, 1999; Jordaan, 2003; Beeson, 2011). This approach is especially helpful for the Turkish case because it avoids two common distortions: portraying Turkey either as an aspiring great power that can reorder regions at will, or as a purely “soft” actor without strategic intent.

In this manuscript, the middle-power framework is used in precisely this behavioral sense. It directs attention to how Ankara seeks influence: which instruments it prioritizes, which institutional arenas it invests in, and how it manages structural constraints imposed by stronger actors. Importantly, the framework also makes “success” interpretable in realistic terms: not as the displacement of Russia or China, but as the creation of durable cooperation routines, reputational capital, and niche transactional gains.

2.3 Strategic autonomy as the guiding orientation in Turkey’s contemporary foreign-policy discourse

The recent Turkish foreign-policy literature increasingly converges on the view that Ankara’s external behavior is shaped by an autonomy-seeking orientation, even when policy outcomes are contradictory. Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2025) argue that “strategic autonomy” functions as a narrative and an organizing principle that frames Turkey’s diversification of partnerships and its selective institutionalism. This helps explain why Turkey’s engagement in different regions can appear heterogeneous: the point is less to follow one ideological script than to preserve flexibility under uncertainty.

This autonomy-seeking orientation is also reflected in debates on Turkey’s positioning vis-à-vis non-Western platforms and regional groupings. Tüysüzoğlu (2023) examines an Eurasianist shift after the coup attempt through the lens of Turkey’s engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, capturing how institutional preferences can become part of broader strategic signaling. Süsler (2025) similarly situates Turkey’s interest in BRICS-related discussions within a search for “geopolitical autonomy,” illustrating how Ankara explores alternative diplomatic theaters without necessarily abandoning its existing ties. Even in domains that may appear technocratic, the autonomy logic is present: Altay (2024) treats Turkey’s engagement with regional trade agreements as a foreign-policy move toward “trade sovereignty,” while Ciftci (2023) emphasizes domestic economic drivers that push external policy toward market access, export opportunities, and risk hedging. Finally, Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2025) highlights how domestic political cycles—such as the 2024 local elections—intersect with foreign-policy “normalization,” reinforcing the notion that Turkey’s external posture is continually shaped by internal constraints and recalibrations.

For a study of Central Asia, these debates matter because they suggest a coherent interpretation: Turkey’s regional activism is not a residual ideological project, but a practical expression of autonomy-seeking under conditions where great powers dominate the region’s hard-security and large-scale investment structures.

2.4 Soft power is not an alternative framework: it is a mechanism within a middle-power strategy

This article adopts a clearer conceptual hierarchy. Middle-power diplomacy is the overarching framework that captures Turkey’s strategy under constraint; soft power is a key mechanism that explains how influence can be accumulated without material dominance.

The literature on Turkey’s soft power emphasizes education, cultural diplomacy, and institutional branding as channels for long-term embeddedness (Çolakoğlu, 2019; Donelli, 2019; Gultekin, 2019). These channels are often operationalized through agencies and platforms associated with cultural outreach and development cooperation, and they work by building networks of familiarity, alumni communities, and symbolic resonance. In Central Asia, the logic is amplified by identity narratives. Laruelle (2019a,b) shows how the “Turkic world” has been constructed as an imagined solidarity in the post-Soviet space, while Roy (2020) emphasizes Turkey’s bridge-building rhetoric between Europe and Asia through language and cultural ties. Yilmaz and Erturk (2022) frame Turkey’s evolving approach as moving “beyond” soft power, suggesting that cultural diplomacy increasingly interacts with economic and security instruments rather than standing alone.

At the same time, the literature is clear about limitations. Skeptical assessments point to constraints in Turkey’s economic capacity and the structural advantages enjoyed by Russia and China (Çaman and Akyurt, 2011). This reinforces a key analytical point for the present article: soft power may be Turkey’s comparative advantage, but it is most effective when coupled with institutional routines and tangible cooperation rather than when presented as a standalone doctrine.

2.5 Connectivity, energy, and geo-economic instruments: where Turkey competes, complements, and hedges

Transport and energy corridors constitute a central arena in which Turkey’s autonomy-seeking behavior intersects with regional diversification strategies. The “Middle Corridor” is widely discussed as Turkey’s effort to promote an alternative Eurasian route that interacts both with European connectivity preferences and with the region’s interest in diversification (Çolakoğlu, 2019; Kassenova, 2020). This agenda is inseparable from the broader debate about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its scale advantage, including the ways in which BRI intersects with sensitive domestic governance issues in China’s western regions (Clarke, 2022). In energy, Turkey’s role is often assessed through its potential contribution to Europe’s energy security and through projects that reposition transit politics in Eurasia (Cornell and Jonson, 2021; Chekanova, 2019).

The literature also demonstrates why these domains should be approached with analytic caution. Turkey’s corridor diplomacy can create options, but it rarely eliminates dependency structures; instead, it offers additional routes and bargaining space. That is precisely where the middle-power lens becomes useful: Turkey’s impact is most plausibly understood as marginal gains through diversification rather than as a wholesale restructuring of regional economic geography.

2.6 Central Asia as a constraint environment: institutions, great-power rivalry, and the limits of external agency

Central Asia’s institutional landscape is frequently described as dense and stratified. Cooley’s account of “Great Games” emphasizes that external competition is filtered through local rules and domestic bargaining, shaping how influence is accepted or resisted (Cooley, 2012). In parallel, scholarship on regional architectures highlights the enduring role of Russia-led and Russia-anchored formats, and debates about multi-speed integration in the post-Soviet space (Kaveshnikov, 2020; Torkunov et al., 2022). These analyses help explain why Turkey—lacking membership and structural authority in key regional security and economic institutions—must often rely on segmented engagement and carefully chosen policy niches.

Another dimension of the constraint environment is ideological and identity politics beyond Central Asia itself. Roberts (2020) documents the securitization and repression of Turkic identities in Xinjiang, while related geopolitical work situates Xinjiang within broader connectivity and strategic communication dynamics (Clarke, 2022). This matters for Turkey’s positioning because it shapes the symbolic resonance of Turkic identity narratives and affects how Turkey’s cultural diplomacy is received. At the same time, the empirical and political relevance of such identity dynamics should not be overstated; they operate unevenly across countries and audiences, and their effects are mediated by state policies and domestic sensitivities.

Finally, a number of applied and policy-oriented studies reinforce the point that Turkey’s room for maneuver is real but bounded. Analyses of regional security and threats highlight the strategic volatility of Central Asia (Aben, 2019), while work on the shifting geopolitics of the region underscores how Russia–China dynamics affect other actors’ options (Khan, 2023). Research on regional economic cooperation and transport-energy participation similarly demonstrates both opportunities and structural constraints for external partners (Akdidar Moldaliyeva et al., 2023).

2.7 Synthesis: how the framework is applied in this article

The literature reviewed above points to a clear analytical architecture for the present study. Central Asia is best treated as a constrained regional environment shaped by great-power institutional density, corridor politics, and uneven receptivity. Turkey’s foreign policy, meanwhile, is increasingly interpreted through the dual lens of strategic autonomy and middle-power diplomacy, a framing that has become more prominent in Turkish scholarly and policy discourse in the wake of earlier overextended narratives. Within this architecture, soft power is specified as a mechanism—one that can generate reputational capital and social embeddedness—while connectivity initiatives, trade diplomacy, and selective security cooperation function as complementary instruments.

This integrated framework resolves the earlier conceptual ambiguity. The article does not offer a “soft power approach” as a standalone explanation, nor does it treat the middle-power concept as a rhetorical label divorced from practice. Instead, it examines how Turkey, operating as an autonomy-seeking middle power, uses soft power and institutional entrepreneurship—especially under the Turkic World agenda—to convert cultural affinity and repeated diplomatic routines into durable influence, while remaining structurally constrained by Russia’s security role and China’s geo-economic scale.

Against this backdrop, the following review situates Turkey’s Central Asia policy at the intersection of (i) great-power competition in Eurasia, (ii) Turkey’s evolving autonomy-oriented foreign policy, and (iii) identity-based institutional entrepreneurship under the Turkic World framework.

Thus, an analysis of the geopolitical context demonstrates that Turkey’s diplomacy in Central Asia is built at the intersection of two vectors: first, its institutional affiliation with NATO, which enhances its international influence; and second, its cultural policy based on the promotion of Turkic identity, which becomes particularly significant against the backdrop of China’s policy in Xinjiang. It is precisely this duality that enables Turkey to strengthen its position amid the global rivalry of great powers.

3 Research methods and materials

Before turning to trade and investment dynamics, it is necessary to clarify why these indicators matter for the article’s core claim about strategic autonomy and middle-power practice. In the Turkish case, geoeconomic instruments—trade governance, SME networks, connectivity corridors, and sectoral agreements—constitute the most scalable channels for influence in a region where Russia and China dominate security and infrastructure finance. Recent debates on autonomy therefore imply that economic presence should be analyzed not as “statistics for their own sake” but as evidence of whether Ankara can convert limited resources into sustained regional positioning through niche advantages and institutional pathways.

This article employs a mixed-method design that combines institutional and documentary analysis of Turkey’s engagement with Central Asia (with particular attention to connectivity initiatives and Turkic multilateral platforms) and an original cross-sectional perception survey conducted in 2023–2024. The survey component is used in a deliberately modest way: it provides exploratory evidence on how respondents within the achieved sample perceive Turkey and which factors are associated with those perceptions. It is not used to estimate population parameters for any country or for Central Asia as a whole.

The questionnaire consisted of 11 structured questions grouped into economic, political, cultural, and social sections. The distribution of the sample is presented in Table 1, which reflects the geographical, demographic, and professional characteristics of the respondents (Table 1).

The survey was conducted as an academic project by the authors without the involvement of state institutions or third-party thematic branding. Its purpose was to measure the perception of Turkey as a partner in Central Asian countries and among neighboring actors (Turkey, Russia, China), as well as to identify associations between levels of awareness, evaluations of cultural diplomacy, perceptions of security, and the overall assessment of Turkey’s role. The design was cross-sectional and multimodal, incorporating source triangulation.

3.1 Target population, frame, and representativeness

The total achieved sample comprised n = 1,000 adult respondents (18–65). The questionnaire was fielded across five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) and three contextual comparison countries (Turkey, Russia, China). The instrument also allowed a residual “Other” option for residence to screen out ineligible cases; such cases were excluded from country-comparative interpretation and treated as out-of-scope.

The paper’s substantive argument concerns Turkey’s positioning in Central Asia. Therefore, all central interpretations based on survey evidence are drawn primarily from the Central Asia analytical subsample. Responses from Turkey, Russia, and China are included only as contextual reference points and are interpreted descriptively. This framing avoids over-claiming and aligns the empirical design with what the data can reasonably support (Table 2).

The survey used a non-probability, quota-based sampling approach with multi-channel recruitment. This design choice reflects the practical constraints of cross-national fieldwork and the study’s exploratory purpose: to capture socio-demographic diversity and test associations among key attitudinal variables.

Within each target country, quotas were set on:

• Age group (18–30; 31–50; 51+),

• Education (secondary; vocational/technical; higher),

• Employment category (student; public sector; private sector; expert/researcher; other).

Recruitment was conducted through:

• targeted online distribution via university and professional networks and relevant online communities;

• face-to-face intercept recruitment in administrative centers and major cities (e.g., universities, service-sector locations, co-working spaces);

• telephone recruitment using mixed prefix sampling and random digit generation for final digits.

Because recruitment relied on accessibility through online and offline channels rather than a fully probabilistic sampling frame, the achieved sample is best interpreted as quota-based and not nationally representative.

3.2 Modes of data collection and mode coefficients

Operationalization of the connectivity development agenda. To avoid treating connectivity as a rhetorical claim, the CDA is handled as an observable policy package with measurable proxies. We rely on three clusters of indicators, aligned with corridor diagnostics in the recent policy literature:

• hard connectivity (bottlenecks, port/rail capacity and multimodal integration along the Middle Corridor),

• soft connectivity (trade facilitation, cross-border procedures, corridor coordination),

• institutional connectivity (formal corridor-related agreements and multilateral formats that standardize transport rules).

Where a single synthetic measure is needed for regression robustness checks, we define a normalized Connectivity Intensity Index for country c in year t as shown in Equation 1.

where denotes standardized proxies (e.g., corridor freight volumes, transit time proxies where available, trade facilitation measures, and the count of corridor-related agreements), is z-score standardization, and K is the number of included proxies. The index is used conservatively as a robustness device rather than as a claim of full corridor performance measurement.

Data collection followed a mixed-mode plan to widen access beyond digitally active respondents:

• Online questionnaire: ~70%

• Face-to-face interviews: ~20%

• Telephone interviews: ~10%

To address reviewer concerns about “weights by method,” we report the mode allocation and specify mode coefficients explicitly (Table 3). Mode coefficients were defined as shown in Equation 2:

where is the planned share of mode and is the achieved share.

3.3 Instrument design

The questionnaire consisted of 15 items grouped into four thematic blocks:

• Economic awareness and cooperation,

• Political perceptions,

• Cultural/educational engagement,

• Security perceptions and regional architecture.

Items used a mixture of dichotomous responses, multiple-choice formats, and Likert-type scales (4–5 response categories). To reduce order effects, thematic blocks and selected response options were randomized. To mitigate acquiescence bias, reverse-worded items were included, and the introduction emphasized that neutral or critical opinions were equally acceptable.

3.4 Translation, back-translation, and piloting

To reduce cross-linguistic measurement error, the questionnaire was prepared in Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkish, and Chinese. Translation followed a back-translation protocol carried out by independent linguists; disputed terms were resolved by consensus.

Pre-fieldwork quality checks included:

• cognitive interviews (approximately 10–15 per language) to assess comprehension of terms such as “soft power,” “regional security,” and “cultural initiatives”;

• a pilot survey (total n ≈ 60) to test routing logic, completion time, and perceived neutrality of wording.

3.5 Ethics, consent, and data protection

Participation was voluntary and anonymous. The survey did not collect names, addresses, payment details, or biometric identifiers. Respondents provided informed consent at the start of the questionnaire. IP addresses (for online responses) were hashed at collection and were not used for identification. Data are stored in access-restricted storage available only to the authors. Procedures were aligned with widely recognized ethical principles for social research (voluntary participation, informed consent, and confidentiality).

3.6 Data cleaning and quality filters

To improve internal data quality, we applied consistent exclusion criteria:

• incomplete questionnaires with less than 70% of items answered;

• duplicate cases identified via device/phone duplication indicators where available;

• “speeders” (completion times substantially below the median, consistent with inattentive responding);

• patterned responding suggestive of non-differentiation (straight-lining across multi-item sections) in combination with failed attention checks.

3.7 Weighting: calibration, not representativeness

Weights were applied as calibration adjustments to reduce observable imbalances by country, age, and education within the achieved sample. Importantly, weighting does not convert the survey into a nationally representative dataset; it is used to improve comparability and reduce distortions from uneven recruitment.

The final analytic weight for respondent i is defined as follows (Equation 3):

where:

• is the mode coefficient for the respondent’s mode,

• is the post-stratification (calibration) factor for the respondent’s country × age group × education cell.

A simple cell-based calibration factor can be written as follows (Equation 4):

where denotes an external benchmark total (from publicly available demographic distributions) and is the achieved sample count in that cell. Where full three-way margins were sparse, calibration relied on iterative proportional fitting (raking) across the one-way margins (country, age, education) to avoid unstable cell weights.

Weights were normalized to have a mean of 1 (Equation 5):

so that weighted and unweighted sample sizes remain comparable in regression modeling.

We model “complementary security” through a two-level operationalization. First, we construct a country-level Security Cooperation Footprint to document the presence of Turkish security cooperation instruments in each case country (Equation 6):

where indicates defence-industrial cooperation, indicates confirmed UAV procurement/co-production, and indicates structured military education/training cooperation. Second, at the individual level we capture perceived security partnership through the survey item measuring agreement that Turkey contributes positively to regional security, denoted .

The reputational mechanism implied by H3 is tested by linking security perceptions to overall partnership evaluations (Equation 7):

where is the vector of controls (age, education, occupation, country fixed effects). Evidence for H3 is supported if and if countries with higher also show systematically higher mean (reported descriptively due to cross-country sample constraints).

3.8 Analytical strategy

The analysis proceeds in three stages.

Stage 1: Descriptive profiling. We summarize awareness, cultural exposure, perceived security role, and overall evaluation of Turkey among respondents. Descriptive results are emphasized for the Central Asia subsample; non–Central Asia subsamples are presented only as contextual reference.

Stage 2: Association analysis. We compute Pearson correlations among key constructs and estimate OLS regression models to identify associations between:

• awareness of cooperation with Turkey,

• evaluation of cultural initiatives,

• perceived security role,

• participation in Turkish educational programs,

• education level,

• age,

and the dependent variable capturing overall evaluation of Turkey.

Stage 3: Robustness checks. We compare:

• unweighted vs. weighted models,

• specifications excluding small subsamples,

• models controlling for survey mode (online/face-to-face/telephone),

• heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC correction).

Given the non-probability nature of the sample, regression coefficients are interpreted as associations within the achieved sample, not causal estimates or population parameters.

3.9 Reliability and validity

Content validity was supported through expert review of the draft instrument by three independent specialists in international relations, regional studies, and survey methodology. Revisions were implemented before piloting.

Construct validity was assessed through factor-analytic checks for multi-item indices (e.g., cultural influence, perceived security role). Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used for dimensional screening, followed by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in robustness checks. Common fit indices (CFI/TLI/RMSEA) were evaluated against conventional thresholds (e.g., CFI/TLI ≥ 0.90; RMSEA ≤ 0.08), interpreted cautiously given the survey’s cross-national setting.

Internal consistency was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha for composite indices, with treated as an acceptable benchmark in applied social research.

Missing data. For index construction, if at least two-thirds of items were completed, we used mean substitution within the respondent’s available items; otherwise the index was treated as missing. Sensitivity tests confirmed that key associations were not driven by a single imputation choice.

3.10 What the survey can and cannot claim

To prevent over-interpretation, the manuscript treats the survey as an exploratory instrument with two legitimate outputs:

• descriptive patterns in the achieved sample (especially within Central Asia), and

• associational evidence on which predictors are linked to more favorable perceptions of Turkey.

The survey is not presented as nationally representative, and the article avoids claims such as “the population of Central Asia believes…”. Instead, it uses precise language: “respondents in our sample tended to…”, “within the achieved sample we observe…”, and “the model indicates an association between…”.

3.11 Limitations

The study has several limitations that shape interpretation. First, the mixed-mode, quota-based recruitment strategy does not provide a fully probabilistic sample; thus, results cannot be generalized to national populations. Second, cross-country comparisons are constrained by uneven subsample sizes and heterogeneous political and cultural contexts; small subsamples are treated as descriptive signals only. Third, mode effects and translation effects cannot be fully eliminated, even with piloting and back-translation. These constraints are addressed by conservative interpretation and triangulation with institutional analysis and secondary indicators.

Turkey’s engagement with Central Asia cannot be meaningfully assessed through trade and investment indicators alone unless these figures are situated within the region’s evolving geopolitical and institutional environment. The empirical strategy of this article therefore rests on a contextual premise: economic statistics are treated as outcomes of political choices and structural constraints, rather than as self-explanatory metrics.

Finally, because the design is quota-based and non-probabilistic, sampling uncertainty cannot be summarized solely through classical margins of error. We therefore report confidence intervals conservatively and treat inferential statements as frame-bound rather than population-general.

3.11.1 Turkey’s foreign-policy recalibration and the Central Asia vector

Over the past decade, Ankara’s regional activism has increasingly been described—both in academic debate and in policy-oriented discourse—through the language of strategic autonomy and middle-power diplomacy rather than earlier expansive narratives. This recalibration matters for Central Asia because it implies a shift from ambitions of comprehensive regional redesign to a more selective and pragmatic effort to widen Turkey’s room for maneuver through niche instruments, institutional entrepreneurship, and reputational leverage. In practical terms, this means that Central Asia is approached not as a theater for dominance, but as a domain where Turkey can incrementally expand connectivity options, diversify partnerships, and translate identity-linked cooperation into institutional routines.

3.11.2 Central Asia as a “constraint environment”: institutions and hierarchy

Central Asia is characterized by high institutional density and a pronounced hierarchy of external influence. Russia retains privileged positions through security and legacy ties and remains embedded in regional military and security arrangements, while China’s footprint is anchored in infrastructure, trade corridors, and capital-intensive projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. These structural features shape the operating space for other actors. For Turkey, they imply that most successful initiatives are those that remain complementary to the dominant architectures, avoid direct institutional displacement, and instead leverage areas where cooperation is politically acceptable and economically feasible.

3.11.3 Connectivity politics and why trade indicators are central in this article

Trade and investment variables are foregrounded in the Results section not simply because they are measurable, but because they serve as proxies for Turkey’s core geo-economic instrument in the region: connectivity statecraft. The “Middle Corridor” agenda—linking Turkey to Central Asia and onward to the South Caucasus, the Caspian, and Europe—has made logistics, customs facilitation, transport capacity, and corridor reliability central to Ankara’s regional strategy. In this setting, trade turnover and sectoral trade composition can be read as indicators of whether connectivity initiatives translate into tangible economic interaction, while FDI patterns reflect the extent to which Turkish firms embed themselves in local value chains rather than rely on one-off contracts.

3.11.4 Sanctions shock and route reconfiguration: post-2022 dynamics

A further contextual factor is the disruption of established trade and transit patterns after 2022, when sanctions regimes and heightened political risk reshaped Eurasian logistics and payment practices. For Central Asian states, the shock increased the salience of diversification—both of partners and of routes—because overreliance on any single corridor carries economic and political costs. For Turkey, this created incentives to intensify economic diplomacy, promote national-currency settlements, and support alternative logistics chains. In analytical terms, this is why the article treats post-2022 trade and investment dynamics as a stress test for Turkey’s middle-power strategy: if Ankara’s approach is effective, we should observe not dominance, but incremental gains in corridor-related trade, niche investment, and SME-driven commercial networks (Table 4).

3.11.5 Linking indicators to arguments: how the results should be read

The Results section therefore follows a structured logic. First, trade and FDI figures are used to evaluate Turkey’s niche geo-economic engagement—that is, whether Turkey is building resilient commercial presence in sectors compatible with its comparative advantages. Second, institutional discussion (OTS vis-à-vis SCO/EAEU/CSTO) is used to assess institutional entrepreneurship: the extent to which Ankara translates affinity and coordination rhetoric into repeated cooperation routines. Third, survey-based indicators are used to operationalize reputational embeddedness, capturing whether soft-power channels function as an influence multiplier typical of middle-power diplomacy. Read together, these strands allow the article to assess “success” in realistic middle-power terms: the creation of institutional routines and networks, reputational capital, and incremental transactional gains under constraint.

4 Research results

The security dimension of Turkey’s engagement in Central Asia is best understood as complementary security rather than competitive substitution. Ankara’s approach does not aim to displace the region’s inherited security architecture—where Russia remains institutionally embedded through bases, long-standing defence ties, and dominant legacy procurement patterns—but to expand room for maneuver by offering niche capabilities, training support, and defence-industrial cooperation framed as modern, flexible, and politically less constraining. This reading is consistent with the middle-power logic advanced in the conceptual framework: Turkey’s security contribution is selective, capability-centered, and reputation-oriented rather than hegemonic.

Empirically, the most visible channel of this complementary posture is defence-industrial outreach, especially in unmanned systems. Publicly reported cooperation includes licensed production arrangements and procurement of Turkish UAV platforms in parts of the region, which function as both material capabilities and symbolic signals of technological partnership. Kazakhstan, for instance, has documented defence-industrial cooperation involving UAV production arrangements, alongside broader bilateral defence planning that includes training and capacity-building components. Kyrgyzstan’s documented procurement of Turkish UAVs similarly illustrates how Ankara’s security profile is often mediated through discrete capability packages rather than through permanent basing or alliance leadership. Turkmenistan’s reported acquisition of Turkish UAVs provides an additional example of niche capability diffusion that can enhance Turkey’s visibility as a security partner even in more closed political environments.

These instruments matter analytically because they generate what we conceptualize as reputational security capital: a perception that Turkey is a capable partner able to deliver concrete security-adjacent benefits (technology, training, interoperability know-how) without demanding exclusive alignment. Mechanistically, such capital is built through three reinforcing pathways. First, defence exports in high-salience niches (notably UAVs) are legible to both elites and publics as markers of technological competence. Second, training and maintenance packages—often embedded in defence cooperation planning—create repeated interaction, professional socialization, and credibility effects beyond the one-off transaction. Third, the narrative framing of these instruments as supportive rather than dominance-seeking aligns with the Turkic-framework diplomacy that legitimizes cooperation in cultural-civilizational terms while keeping policy commitments flexible.

Importantly, the complementary interpretation is not a rhetorical move but a constraint-sensitive assessment supported by wider regional patterns of arms dependence. Available evidence indicates that Russia remains the predominant supplier for several Central Asian states and retains structural leverage through legacy systems, institutional linkages, and security infrastructures. Against this background, Turkey’s role appears as a capability supplement—one that may diversify options and enhance autonomy margins for Central Asian partners without overturning the established hierarchy of security provision.

The survey results are consistent with this mechanism. Respondents who positively evaluate Turkey’s contribution to regional security also tend to report higher overall partnership evaluations, suggesting that perceived security cooperation operates as a reputational multiplier rather than as a standalone driver detached from broader political and economic perceptions. In line with H3, we therefore interpret the security findings not as evidence of replacement dynamics, but as support for a middle-power pattern in which Ankara expands influence through selective security goods and credibility-building, while Russia’s traditional security role remains largely intact.

The empirical sections that follow read trade and investment figures not as standalone descriptive statistics, but as outcomes and partial proxies of Turkey’s connectivity development agenda. This is methodologically necessary because the Middle Corridor is a multimodal and multi-jurisdictional route whose performance depends not only on capital investment but also on corridor governance and trade facilitation across multiple borders.

Accordingly, the analysis proceeds from (a) corridor-related economic exchange and investment patterns, to (b) institutional instruments that support connectivity (including corridor agreements and rule-setting), and then to (c) the societal layer—how cultural and educational channels interact with the geoeconomic agenda within a middle-power strategy.

Following the conceptual hierarchy outlined above, the results assess Turkey’s performance as an autonomy-seeking middle power across three channels: institutionalization, reputational embeddedness (soft power mechanism), and niche transactional gains. The survey indicators are used to operationalize reputational embeddedness, while trade/investment and cooperation patterns serve as proxies for niche geo-economic and complementary security instruments.

The analysis of Turkey’s interaction with the states of Central Asia reveals a stable and multidimensional dynamic of regional cooperation, within which economic, defense, and cultural channels of communication collectively shape Ankara’s complex and expanding influence (Gultekin, 2019). This occurs in the context of intensifying competition from other foreign policy actors—primarily Russia, China, and the United States. Unlike these major powers, Turkey employs a hybrid approach that combines soft power instruments with the selective use of hard power components, enabling it to occupy a unique position as a flexible and adaptive actor within the regional system of international relations.

A meaningful assessment of Turkey’s regional strategy requires an explicit account of the competitive environment in which it operates. Central Asia is not a neutral arena where external actors simply “add” cooperation initiatives. It is a hierarchical and institutionally dense space in which Russia and China set many of the structural parameters of security and geo-economics, while the United States maintains a selective, issue-specific presence. Turkey’s regional policy therefore unfolds under constraint: it can expand influence through niche instruments and institutional entrepreneurship, but it cannot credibly pursue primacy without triggering resistance and without exceeding its resource base.

Russia remains structurally embedded through legacy security ties, extensive elite networks, and a long-standing role in the region’s hard-security ecosystem. This does not imply uniform control, but it does mean that Turkey’s security engagement is most feasible when framed as capacity-building and complementarity rather than as an alternative security order. In policy terms, Russia’s presence raises the reputational and political costs of any initiative that could be interpreted as alignment politics, which helps explain why Ankara typically emphasizes training cooperation, technical packages, and selective defense-industrial cooperation rather than declaratory security leadership.

China shapes the region primarily through geo-economic scale, infrastructure finance, and corridor politics. For Central Asian states, China’s role is simultaneously an opportunity and a dependency risk; diversification is therefore politically valuable even when it is economically partial. This is the opening that Turkey targets. Ankara’s competitive advantage is not capital volume, but option creation—offering additional routes, partners, and commercial channels that marginally widen the autonomy of regional states. Consequently, Turkey’s connectivity agenda is best read as a strategy of incremental diversification in a landscape where China’s footprint is structurally dominant.

The United States represents a different type of constraint. Washington’s influence is often exercised through diplomatic signaling, programmatic cooperation (governance, resilience, connectivity standards), and episodic security engagement, but without the institutional depth that Russia enjoys in hard security or the economic scale associated with China. For Turkey, the U.S. factor matters in two ways. First, it conditions Ankara’s room for maneuver as a NATO member pursuing strategic autonomy, requiring careful calibration to avoid being perceived either as a proxy of Western containment or as a spoiler. Second, U.S. engagement reinforces Central Asian states’ preference for hedging and multi-vector strategies, which indirectly benefits Turkey when Ankara presents itself as a non-exclusive partner compatible with diversification.

Against this competitive backdrop, the empirical results reported below should be read with a clear benchmark. Turkey’s effectiveness in Central Asia is unlikely to manifest as displacement of dominant actors. Instead, success is better captured as the accumulation of niche geo-economic ties, repeated institutional routines (notably under the Turkic World agenda), and reputational embeddedness that lowers political resistance to cooperation. The trade and investment indicators in the next subsection are therefore treated as measurable outputs of this constraint-conditioned strategy, not as stand-alone economic facts.

To address the question of “how successful” Turkey’s Central Asia strategy has been, the analysis adopts a behavioral understanding of middle power diplomacy. In this approach, middle powers are defined less by sheer material capabilities and more by how they exercise influence—through niche diplomacy, coalition-building, institution-building, reputation-based leverage, and selective deployment of capabilities (Cooper, 1997; Chapnick, 1999; Jordaan, 2003; Beeson, 2011). In the Turkish case, this behavioral repertoire operates under a broader autonomy-seeking logic: strategic autonomy functions as the operating principle, while the Turkic World provides an identity-based narrative and institutional vocabulary that can be translated into repeated routines of cooperation (Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2025).

Accordingly, “success” in this article is measured relationally and conditionally, not in terms of displacement of Russia or China. We treat Turkey’s strategy as successful to the extent that it achieves three outcomes typical for middle-power influence under constraint:

• institutionalization (creation of recurring formats and routines that lower transaction costs and stabilize cooperation),

• social embeddedness and reputational capital (positive perceptions and durable networks created through culture and education), and.

• niche transactional gains (incremental economic and security cooperation that is complementary to the existing regional hierarchy).

The empirical sections below therefore do not present statistics as stand-alone descriptors; instead, they are used to test whether Turkey’s observed channels of engagement produce these middle-power outcomes and under what scope conditions (Table 5).

Over the past decade, Turkey has steadily strengthened its economic presence in Central Asia, focusing not on large-scale capital-intensive projects but rather on targeted entry into sectors with high added value, including the textile industry, mechanical engineering, construction materials production, and the service sector. By contrast, the Central Asian states remain oriented toward the export of raw materials—primarily hydrocarbons and metals—producing a marked structural asymmetry in economic exchange. This imbalance, illustrated in Figure 1, underscores the need to reconsider the model of mutual economic integration, particularly in the context of deepening multipolarity and competition for regional markets.

Figure 1

If Turkey operates as an autonomy-seeking middle power, its geo-economic influence should be visible not in megaproject dominance, but in incremental trade growth and sectoral niches that reduce partners’ dependence on single corridors. We therefore treat bilateral trade turnover and the composition of traded goods as proxies for Turkey’s capacity to translate connectivity diplomacy into repeatable economic exchange.

The Kazakhstan case illustrates a typical middle-power pattern: rather than replacing Russia or China, Turkey consolidates a high-frequency commercial relationship in a partner state that simultaneously pursues multi-vector diversification. In this setting, trade is not simply an economic outcome; it is a measurable expression of Turkey’s ability to remain relevant without structural primacy.

Turkey’s interaction with the Central Asian states demonstrates a steady trend toward the expansion of its economic presence, particularly in the context of deepening trade and investment cooperation. Kazakhstan serves as the key partner, with bilateral trade reaching $6.3 billion in 2022. This positioned Turkey as the fourth-largest foreign economic partner of Kazakhstan, behind only Russia, China, and Italy. The trade structure is characterized by Turkey’s predominance in the export of manufactured goods and Kazakhstan’s focus on the export of raw materials and semi-finished products. Turkish investments are primarily directed toward sectors such as industrial production and construction, reflecting an effort to establish a long-term presence in the infrastructural segments of the economy (TİKA and Turkish Red Crescent Strengthen Cooperation in International Projects, 2025).

Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan is primarily of a niche character. In Kyrgyzstan, engagement is concentrated in the textile and agro-industrial sectors, while in Turkmenistan, key areas include the construction materials market and, previously, the export of natural gas. In Tajikistan, economic partnership is reflected in the supply of textile products and mineral raw materials.

From an analytical perspective, the model of economic engagement pursued by Turkey in the region does not seek to displace the capital-intensive projects of China and Russia. On the contrary, it complements them through greater flexibility, well-developed entrepreneurial cooperation, and the ability to integrate into local market structures characterized by high levels of decentralization and weak connectivity.

Based on aggregated data (Table 5), it can be stated that Turkey demonstrates a consistent trend of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Central Asian countries, despite lagging behind China and Russia in absolute terms. The primary focus is on sectors such as manufacturing, construction, textiles, and services. By mid-2023, China held the leading position in cumulative investment in the region, while Russia remained in second place. Turkey, although ranked lower in terms of scale, has shown dynamic growth, recording a 39 percent increase in investments during 2021–2022. This investment strategy is not centered on the implementation of megaprojects but rather on the creation of flexible and institutionally adaptive infrastructure through a network of medium- and small-scale initiatives, including joint ventures, industrial zones, and service chains, making it less vulnerable to foreign policy risks. A middle power’s economic strategy in a constraint environment should favor embedded investments that create durable linkages (service chains, joint ventures, maintenance networks) over headline megadeals. FDI outflows and sectoral allocation are used here as indicators of the depth and durability of Turkey’s economic embeddedness in Central Asia (Table 6).

The pattern in Table 6 is consistent with a niche strategy: Turkish capital concentrates in manufacturing-adjacent and service-oriented sectors where entry costs are lower and institutional adaptation is feasible. This does not “match” China’s scale or Russia’s legacy networks; instead, it supports the article’s core argument that Turkey competes through selective embeddedness—a middle-power mode of engagement that expands autonomy for both Ankara and regional partners.

Particular emphasis in Turkey’s economic model is placed on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as digital trade, which shapes its distinctive regional profile. According to available data, the share of SMEs in Turkey’s exports to Central Asia reached 63 percent by 2024, significantly exceeding the comparable figures for Russia and China. The growth of e-commerce—from 10 to 40 percent between 2020 and 2024—has enabled the establishment of alternative logistical and trade channels with reduced transaction costs. This model facilitates the diffusion of Turkish standards and the creation of resilient horizontal linkages among enterprises, while simultaneously lowering barriers for new entrants from different regions of Central Asia to access the market. If sanctions and corridor disruptions increase the value of diversification, Turkey’s strategy should become more salient precisely in the post-2022 environment—when alternative routes and payment practices gain strategic value (Figure 2).

Figure 2

In competitive terms, this suggests that Turkey’s comparative advantage is not scale, but option-creation: it widens the menu of feasible economic routes for Central Asian states without forcing overt geopolitical alignment.

The imposition of sanctions by Western states against Russia and Iran has led to serious complications in the functioning of traditional trade routes, which has required Turkey to step up economic diplomacy in Central Asia. As a response, Ankara has taken steps to deepen investment cooperation with key partners such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, seeking to minimize the risks arising from the sanctions pressure. The dynamics of these efforts is reflected in the growth of investment volumes: if in 2020 investments in the economy of Kazakhstan amounted to 0.8 billion US dollars, by 2024 they increased to 1.7 billion US dollars, which indicates Turkey’s purposeful policy of diversifying its economic ties (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023).

Turkey’s active economic diplomacy has a positive impact on the development of small and medium-sized businesses, creating favorable conditions for the expansion of entrepreneurial activity. First of all, this is reflected in the support of the e-commerce and logistics sector, which contributes to the growth of trade between Turkey and Central Asian countries. As a result, the share of small and medium-sized businesses in Turkish exports to the region has increased significantly: if in 2020 this figure was 50%, then by 2024 it reached 63%, which confirms the effectiveness of Turkey’s strategy in the field of trade and economic cooperation. For middle powers, diplomacy is effective when it produces repeatable institutional outputs—agreements, routines, and platforms that lower transaction costs for firms and agencies. We treat the number of new agreements and corridor-related arrangements as outputs of institutional entrepreneurship rather than as symbolic diplomacy (Table 7).

The upward trajectory in Table 7 supports the argument that Ankara’s influence is institutionalized through accumulating routines rather than through a single breakthrough project. This pattern aligns with the strategic autonomy logic: Turkey deepens cooperation while preserving flexibility and avoiding commitments that would trigger balancing by dominant actors.

Taken together, the economic evidence supports a specific claim about Turkey’s effectiveness as a middle power: Ankara’s success in Central Asia is incremental rather than transformative. The trade and investment patterns described in Figures 1–3 do not indicate an attempt to outspend China or to replace Russia’s entrenched economic linkages. Instead, they point to a niche geo-economic strategy built around SMEs, sectoral entry points, and trade facilitation. This is consistent with the behavioral definition of middle power diplomacy, where influence is generated through flexibility, targeted partnerships, and the ability to operate across fragmented markets. In other words, the economic data are used here to substantiate the argument that Turkey’s comparative advantage lies in networked commercial presence and adaptability, not in project-scale dominance. Small and medium-sized businesses play a leading role in Turkey’s exports to Central Asian countries, providing more than 60% of foreign trade operations. Over the past 5 years, the volume of investments in this sector has doubled, which indicates a growing interest in the development of local entrepreneurship. The dynamic expansion of e-commerce indicates a growing demand for digital platforms and online services, which creates additional opportunities for further business development (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Within Turkey’s economic strategy in Central Asia, particular importance is attached to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and e-commerce. This model ensures the flexibility and resilience of foreign economic relations. According to available estimates, the share of SMEs in Turkey’s exports to the region reached 63 percent by 2024, significantly exceeding the comparable figures for Russia and China. The rapid expansion of e-commerce, which grew from approximately 10 percent in 2020 to 40 percent in 2024, has become a tool for creating alternative trade routes with reduced transaction costs.

Strengthening the position of small and medium-sized businesses, in turn, helps to reduce the negative impact of sanctions restrictions on the Turkish economy. The expansion of settlement volumes in national currencies, which increased by 35% by 2024, has reduced dependence on traditional international payment systems and minimized the impact of sanctions. An additional factor in adapting to the new conditions was the digitalization of trade: the development of e-commerce over the past 5 years has shown an increase of 30%, which allowed Turkish entrepreneurs to use alternative financial instruments, bypassing sanctions barriers (Figure 4).

Figure 4

This structure influences regional integration in several ways. Small and medium-sized enterprises, in conjunction with digital platforms, contribute to the accelerated diffusion of Turkish quality standards, including aspects of design, packaging, and service. At the same time, horizontal interactions among companies are intensified, fostering the development of resilient B2B networks. Moreover, this model substantially lowers market entry barriers for new economic actors within Central Asia, facilitating the spatial diversification of economic ties and the inclusion of smaller regions into transnational supply chains.

Turkey’s regional cooperation in Central Asia is often described in institutional terms—membership formats, summitry, and memoranda. Yet this “inventory approach” obscures the political logic that matters for analysis. The central issue is not whether Turkey can outbuild China’s infrastructure footprint or rival Russia’s security entrenchment. Rather, the question is how an autonomy-seeking middle power converts limited material capabilities into influence by selecting arenas where incremental gains are feasible, reputational costs are manageable, and cooperation does not trigger direct pushback from stronger actors.

Ankara’s engagement with non-Western platforms—most notably its longstanding relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a dialogue partner—should be read primarily as a signaling and hedging practice within a broader autonomy narrative. Rather than a substitute for Turkey’s Western ties, SCO-related rhetoric and engagement often perform a discursive function: they underscore non-alignment options and reinforce the claim of strategic autonomy. In Central Asia, however, the more operational vehicle for Turkey’s regional agenda is the Organisation of Turkic States, where the idea of a Turkic World is translated into institutional routines, cooperation formats, and legitimacy-building narratives. This dual track matters for analysis because it clarifies that Turkey’s middle-power posture is enacted through flexible institutional pluralism: rhetorical proximity to non-Western platforms coexists with practical regionalization through Turkic-framework diplomacy (Tüysüzoğlu, 2023; Aydın-Düzgit A., 2023; Aydın-Düzgit S., 2023).

Turkey’s relationship with the SCO illustrates this logic of selective alignment. Ankara does not participate in the organization as a rule-maker; instead, it operates through a dialogue partnership that enables political contact, agenda visibility, and symbolic proximity to a China–Russia-led platform without committing Turkey to the SCO’s security architecture. The dialogue-partner memorandum was signed in Almaty in 2013, a fact that remains central for interpreting Turkey’s institutional posture: it is connected to the SCO, yet deliberately not embedded in it.

This positioning matters for Central Asia. For regional elites, engagement with a NATO member that can also communicate with non-Western formats offers a pragmatic hedge in an increasingly segmented regional order. For Ankara, the SCO channel complements—rather than replaces—its identity-driven institutional strategy through the Organization of Turkic States and its connectivity agenda. Put differently, the SCO is useful as a platform of signaling and access, whereas the OTS is designed as a platform of belonging and long-term socialization within the Turkic World.

4.1 The Organization of Turkic States as institutional entrepreneurship, not an economic bloc

In this architecture, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) functions less as an economic integration machine and more as a platform of institutional entrepreneurship. Its value lies in the ability to stabilize a shared political vocabulary—most notably the idea of the Turkic World—and translate it into repeated diplomatic routines: regular summits, education and mobility initiatives, cultural programming, and agenda-setting around connectivity. This matters because institutional routines, even when legally “light,” can have cumulative effects: they normalize cooperation, reduce coordination costs, and make Turkish presence appear familiar rather than disruptive.

At the same time, the OTS should not be overstated as a substitute for the region’s hard economic and security institutions. Its economic pillar remains uneven, partly because Central Asian states differ in their external dependencies, domestic priorities, and tolerance for any single organizing center. For Turkey, this limitation is not merely a weakness; it also explains why Ankara often prefers flexible, low-commitment institutionalism consistent with strategic autonomy. A light institutional footprint reduces the risk of being perceived as imposing a hierarchy, while still enabling Turkey to accumulate symbolic and relational capital.

4.2 Competing architectures and the logic of “forum-shopping”

Turkey’s institutional strategy becomes clearer when the OTS is read against the region’s dominant formats. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provides the main multilateral stage for security-related coordination where China and Russia possess structural advantages and where the agenda is shaped by their threat perceptions and institutional preferences. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) functions as a rule-producing economic space in which Turkey has no formal role, limiting Ankara’s ability to shape regulatory outcomes even where bilateral trade is rising. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), in turn, anchors Russia’s hard-security presence and signals that the regional security order has gatekeepers.

Within this institutional density, Turkey’s behavior aligns with a recognizable middle-power pattern: forum-shopping and segmentation. Ankara rarely attempts to displace the dominant architectures. Instead, it builds parallel or complementary channels—bilateral agreements with key partners, sector-specific cooperation (SMEs, construction, education), and identity-based multilateralism through the OTS. This strategy does not remove structural constraints; it works around them, prioritizing arenas where Turkish involvement is both politically acceptable and practically deliverable.

4.3 NATO membership as a latent asset and deliberate ambiguity

A further layer—often present in practice but under-articulated in rhetoric—is Turkey’s NATO membership. In Central Asia, Ankara typically avoids framing itself as an Alliance proxy, and regional elites frequently interpret Turkey primarily as an independent actor. This is not accidental. It reflects deliberate strategic ambiguity: Turkey benefits from the credibility, standards, and networks associated with NATO membership, but it downplays this dimension to avoid being read as importing a confrontational West–Russia/China logic into a region where most states prefer hedging.

For an autonomy-seeking middle power, this ambiguity can be useful. It allows Turkey to offer cooperation in training, interoperability practices, or technology transfer without requiring partners to make symbolic alignment choices. In other words, NATO membership operates as a latent enabling condition rather than a public identity. The payoff is political: Turkey can maintain access to Western security capital while presenting its Central Asia agenda as regionally grounded and non-zero-sum.

4.4 What “success” looks like for a middle power in Central Asia

Once the institutional environment is interpreted this way, the empirical question becomes more precise. Turkey’s effectiveness should not be measured by whether it replaces dominant actors. The more realistic benchmark is whether Turkey can institutionalize recurring cooperation routines, build reputational embeddedness that lowers political resistance to its initiatives, and secure niche economic and connectivity gains that reinforce its regional relevance. In this sense, regional cooperation is not a bureaucratic add-on to Turkey’s policy; it is the core mechanism through which a middle power operationalizes strategic autonomy—by multiplying influence through institutions, narratives, and carefully selected deliverables.

Turkey’s security engagement in Central Asia is best understood as a selective, capacity-oriented approach rather than as an attempt to reshape the regional security order. This distinction matters analytically. In a region where hard-security institutions and legacy arrangements remain heavily structured by Russia and, increasingly, by China, Ankara’s security policy operates as a middle-power instrument: it aims to widen Turkey’s strategic relevance and to support partner states’ capabilities without assuming the role of a dominant guarantor.

4.5 The regional security environment: why Central Asia is a “high-constraint” space

Central Asia’s security agenda is shaped by a combination of structural and contingent pressures: cross-border criminality and trafficking routes, risks of militant spillover from adjacent theaters, periodic domestic instability, and the growing salience of cyber and information security. These challenges are managed within an institutional landscape in which security governance is not neutral. Russia retains entrenched advantages through historical military ties, training infrastructures, and security commitments embedded in regional arrangements, while China’s involvement is more closely connected to border management, infrastructural security, and the stabilization of transport and investment corridors.

For external actors, this environment creates a clear constraint: meaningful engagement in security must be calibrated so that it is acceptable to regional governments and does not trigger costly resistance from dominant security stakeholders. This is precisely the setting in which a middle power tends to operate through niche deliverables and incremental trust-building rather than through overt alignment projects.

4.6 Turkey’s security policy in the region: strategic autonomy and “complementary security”

In Central Asia, Turkey’s security policy is closely aligned with its broader orientation toward strategic autonomy. Ankara seeks to remain a relevant security partner without tying its regional role to a single alliance narrative or a confrontational posture. This produces a pattern of complementary security cooperation: Turkey offers partner states training, technical assistance, and selected technologies that strengthen national capabilities, while avoiding moves that would resemble a bid for security primacy.

This approach also fits the logic of middle-power diplomacy. Turkey cannot compete symmetrically with the largest arms suppliers or with the institutional weight of established security organizations, but it can create value through practical cooperation packages that are politically easier to adopt and more visible to domestic audiences in partner states.

4.7 Instruments and channels: what Turkey actually does in security cooperation

Empirically, Turkey’s security engagement in Central Asia tends to cluster around three channels.

First, capacity-building and training: officer education, short courses, and professional exchanges aimed at improving operational competence and interoperability at the bilateral level. In middle-power terms, these activities are not only technical; they create networks and routines that can persist even when political conditions fluctuate.

Second, defense-industrial and technological cooperation, including the provision of selected systems and the development of maintenance and service linkages. Where such cooperation exists, it often generates a longer-term relationship than one-off procurement because it ties partners to training cycles, technical support, and standards.

Third, security-adjacent cooperation, where Turkey’s contribution is not framed as military alignment but as assistance in areas such as border management practices, counterterrorism coordination, and—importantly in recent years—elements of cyber resilience. The advantage of this channel is political: it allows regional governments to cooperate on security while minimizing the optics of choosing sides.

4.8 Institutional competition and why Turkey’s role remains bounded

The scope of Turkish security engagement is constrained by the region’s institutional hierarchy. Russia retains a dominant position through legacy presence and security commitments, while China’s footprint is anchored in the broader stability of connectivity corridors. The United States maintains a narrower thematic presence via assistance and counterterrorism-related programming but lacks permanent regional security architecture comparable to Russia’s.

In this setting, Turkey’s NATO membership functions as a latent asset rather than an explicit identity marker. Central Asian elites often treat Turkey primarily as a regional partner and a “Turkic interlocutor,” not as an Alliance representative. This ambiguity is strategically useful: it allows Ankara to benefit from reputational and standards-related advantages associated with NATO membership while avoiding a framing that would make cooperation appear as geopolitical alignment.

4.9 Local perceptions: how the survey operationalizes “security reputation” and why it matters

To distinguish Turkey’s security policy from regional structures and from local perception, this study treats “security” primarily as a reputational dimension—that is, the extent to which publics interpret Turkey as a meaningful contributor to stability and protection. The survey instrument captures this through the item assessing Turkey’s role in strengthening regional security. The distribution suggests that respondents do not view Turkey as irrelevant in this domain: 35% rate Turkey’s role as “very important” and 40% as “important,” while only a small minority classify it as insignificant.

More importantly for the article’s conceptual claims, the perception of Turkey in the security domain is not isolated from broader attitudes. The correlation matrix indicates that “Turkey’s role in security” is strongly associated with overall perceptions of Turkey (r = 0.70; p < 0.01). In the regression model, security perception remains a statistically significant predictor of overall attitudes even when controlling for awareness, cultural initiatives, educational participation, education level, and age (β = 0.28; p < 0.01). This result is substantively meaningful: it suggests that, in the eyes of respondents, Turkey’s attractiveness is not built on culture alone. Perceived security contribution functions as a second pillar that complements cultural embeddedness.

This finding fits the article’s middle-power argument. Middle powers rarely project influence through coercion, but they can gain standing when publics and elites interpret them as useful and reliable partners in managing practical risks. In Central Asia, Turkey’s security profile appears to operate in that middle-power register: not as domination, but as contributive capacity.

4.10 Interpretation: what “success” looks like for Turkey as a middle power in security terms

Within the conceptual hierarchy developed in this article, Turkey’s security engagement supports its regional strategy in two ways. First, it signals that Turkey is not merely a cultural actor but a partner with deliverable capabilities—an image that can reinforce credibility for economic and institutional initiatives. Second, it provides a channel of cooperation that can be pursued bilaterally and incrementally, reducing the political cost of engagement in a region where states prefer hedging strategies.

At the same time, the findings should be interpreted conservatively. The survey measures perceived security relevance rather than the operational effectiveness of specific security programs. Moreover, Turkey’s room for maneuver remains bounded by Russia’s entrenched security role and China’s growing security-adjacent involvement. These constraints are consistent with the broader claim of the article: Turkey’s strategy is best understood as middle-power, autonomy-seeking, and niche-oriented, with security cooperation functioning as a complementary instrument rather than as a pathway to regional primacy.

Accordingly, the paper distinguishes analytically between Turkey’s security policy as a set of capacity-oriented instruments, the regional security environment as a hierarchy of dominant institutions and actors, and local perceptions of Turkey’s security reputation as captured by the survey indicators.

Turkey’s cultural policy in Central Asia establishes a stable soft power infrastructure through educational programs, scholarships, cultural events, the activities of agencies such as TİKA and institutions of Turkish language and culture, as well as through media content. These channels contribute to the creation of alumni networks and expert communities loyal to Turkey.

Against the backdrop of China’s policies in Xinjiang, which affect Turkic-speaking groups (Uyghurs, Kazakhs), Turkey’s promotion of the “Turkic World” idea is perceived as a more attractive cultural alternative, strengthening its symbolic capital in the region.

Survey results confirm the effectiveness of Turkey’s cultural diplomacy: 75% of respondents positively evaluate Turkey’s cultural initiatives, a quarter report direct experience of participation in educational programs, and cultural perception shows a strong correlation with the country’s overall image (r = 0.73; p < 0.01). Moreover, cultural initiatives emerge as the most powerful predictor of positive perceptions of Turkey (β = 0.40; p < 0.01). At the same time, a generational effect was recorded—positive perceptions decline with age (r = −0.20)—indicating that receptivity is concentrated primarily among younger cohorts, which opens a window of opportunity for Ankara in shaping long-term influence.

The security-related evidence is used to support the argument that Turkey’s effectiveness depends on complementarity. Turkey’s defence cooperation appears most successful when framed as capacity-building, training, and selective technology transfer rather than as an alternative security umbrella. Conceptually, this aligns with middle power diplomacy: Ankara can increase legitimacy by providing niche capabilities while avoiding escalation with the region’s dominant security actor. Empirically, this logic is consistent with the survey associations reported later (Tables 7, 8), where perceptions of Turkey’s security role correlate strongly with overall evaluations—suggesting that even limited security engagement can generate reputational returns when it remains politically non-threatening.

In a constraint environment, a middle power’s influence depends not only on material exchange but also on reputational embeddedness—the extent to which publics interpret the actor as useful, legitimate, and culturally proximate. Survey-based indices are used to operationalize this reputational channel and to test whether cultural and security perceptions function as influence multipliers (Table 8).

The following table shows the results of regression analysis (linear model) (Table 9).

The regression results provide direct support for the article’s conceptual hierarchy. Cultural initiatives and security-related perceptions are not merely background variables; they are statistically significant predictors of overall attitudes toward Turkey. This finding is consistent with the claim that soft power operates as a mechanism within a middle-power strategy, while security cooperation contributes as a complementary credibility signal. In other words, the survey evidence does not replace policy analysis; it specifies the societal channel through which Turkey’s strategy can become politically sustainable.

The survey results provide the clearest empirical support for the article’s central claim about middle-power influence. In the achieved sample, cultural initiatives show the strongest association with positive perceptions of Turkey (Table 7) and remain the most powerful predictor in the regression model (Table 8). This pattern is used to substantiate a conceptual point: because Turkey cannot compete symmetrically with great powers in material resources, its most effective channel is reputational and network-based leverage—education, cultural production, humanitarian visibility, and alumni effects that translate affinity into durable ties. In middle-power terms, this is precisely how soft power functions as an influence multiplier: it does not replace structural constraints, but it can expand room for maneuver by shaping preferences, lowering uncertainty, and sustaining cooperation over time.

Awareness of trade and economic cooperation showed a strong positive correlation with the perception of Turkey as a positive partner (r = 0.68, p < 0.01). The respondent’s level of education had a moderate positive correlation (r = 0.45, p < 0.05). Participation in Turkish educational programs also had a positive correlation with the assessment of Turkey’s role (r = 0.59, p < 0.01). The age of the respondent showed a weak negative correlation (r = −0.20, p < 0.05), indicating a less positive perception of Turkey among an older audience. Evaluation of cultural initiatives in Turkey had a strong positive correlation (r = 0.73, p < 0.01). The perception of Turkey’s role in regional security also strongly correlated with the overall assessment of Turkey as a positive partner (r = 0.70, p < 0.01). The regression model showed that the key predictors (influencing factors) of Turkey’s perception as a positive partner are:

• Awareness of cooperation with Turkey (β = 0.35, p < 0.01).

• Evaluation of cultural initiatives (β = 0.40, p < 0.01).

• Perception of Turkey’s role in security (β = 0.28, p < 0.01).

• Participation in educational programs (β = 0.25, p < 0.05).

The model had a high coefficient of determination (R² = 0.62), which means that 62% of the variation in Turkey’s assessment as a positive partner is explained by these variables.

Survey analysis and statistical modeling reinforce the notion that Turkey’s influence in Central Asia is closely linked to public perception, awareness of economic cooperation, and participation in cultural and educational initiatives. Respondents with higher levels of education and engagement in Turkish programs tend to view Turkey’s role more favorably, while younger demographics exhibit a stronger inclination toward Ankara’s regional initiatives. Furthermore, Turkey’s emphasis on cultural diplomacy, including humanitarian projects and educational exchanges, plays a crucial role in shaping its image as a strategic partner.

Overall, Turkey’s approach to Central Asia is characterized by a balance between economic pragmatism and cultural diplomacy. While it cannot match the financial and security dominance of China and Russia, Turkey’s strategy of fostering regional partnerships, expanding SMEs, and integrating digital trade positions it as a flexible and increasingly influential player. To further solidify its role, Turkey must continue strengthening institutional ties, increasing investment in infrastructure, and leveraging its cultural and historical connections to maintain its competitive edge in the region.

The analysis of country cases demonstrates the differentiated nature of Turkey’s presence in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan functions as an economic “anchor” due to high levels of trade turnover, investment activity, and stable defense and educational cooperation. In this context, participation in the OTS agenda and the development of transport connectivity remain priorities.

Uzbekistan is perceived as a driver of reforms and diversification, where engagement with Turkish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is particularly active in sectors such as light industry, agriculture, and mechanization. Kyrgyzstan is characterized by a niche specialization concentrated in textiles and the agricultural sector, with high potential for expanding ties through SMEs and educational initiatives.

In Turkmenistan, opportunities persist in the field of construction materials and infrastructure, although energy cooperation remains sensitive to the geopolitical configuration of transport routes. For Tajikistan, cooperation is marked by small-scale projects, with humanitarian and educational initiatives gaining greater significance compared to capital-intensive investment programs.

Based on empirical and institutional data, several typological roles that Turkey plays in the region can be identified. In geo-economic terms, it acts as an integrator of low connectivity, relying on the development of SMEs, digital platforms, and service chains. From the perspective of cultural policy, Turkey establishes an identity pole, promoting the agenda of Turkic unity through the OTS and humanitarian programs. In the security sphere, the country assumes the role of a middle-power partner, providing training, technological cooperation, and exchanges. Additionally, Turkey seeks to position itself as a logistical broker of the “Middle Corridor,” the effectiveness of which depends on overcoming infrastructural constraints.

The successful implementation of these roles requires institutional alignment with dominant regional formats (SCO, EAEU), investment in the development of transport and energy corridors, the scaling up of educational initiatives, and targeted support for entrepreneurial activity. However, Ankara’s strategy faces a number of constraints, including the structural dominance of Russia and China within key institutions, the presence of infrastructural bottlenecks, and the impact of external economic turbulence associated with sanctions regimes.

5 Discussion

The discussion returns to the article’s central claim: Turkey’s Central Asia strategy is neither purely cultural nor primarily coercive; it is a layered middle-power approach aimed at widening strategic autonomy. Interpreting the findings through this lens helps explain why Ankara’s influence is most visible where identity and connectivity can be translated into institutional routines and social networks, and why it is limited where Russia’s security entrenchment and China’s geo-economic scale set high structural barriers.

The quantitative evidence presented in Section 4 is not offered as descriptive background. Each indicator maps onto a specific component of the analytical framework: trade and FDI patterns capture Turkey’s niche geo-economic engagement; institutional outputs reflect middle-power institutional entrepreneurship (especially through the OTS agenda); and survey-based measures operationalize reputational embeddedness, the mechanism through which soft power strengthens an autonomy-seeking middle-power strategy under structural constraints imposed by Russia and China.

This article set out to explain how Turkey positions itself in Central Asia amid intensified competition with Russia, China, and the United States, and whether its instruments allow it to compensate for structural constraints associated with limited relative material power. The evidence presented in the Results section can be interpreted coherently once the analytical hierarchy is kept explicit: middle-power diplomacy is the overarching strategic framework; strategic autonomy captures the guiding orientation; soft power operates as a core mechanism of reputational embeddedness; and the Turkic World narrative is treated as a policy resource that is institutionalized through repeated cooperation routines (not as a deterministic civilizational “given”). The discussion below follows this structure and therefore separates strategy and instruments, constraint environment and competition, and local perceptions as an enabling mechanism rather than the outcome of interest in itself.

The findings suggest that Turkey’s Central Asia posture fits a middle-power pattern in which influence is pursued through selective and legible contributions rather than systemic dominance. Security cooperation operates as a reputational accelerator: niche defence capabilities and training cooperation increase Turkey’s visibility as a practical partner and help translate the strategic autonomy narrative into observable outcomes. This matters conceptually because it clarifies how soft-power narratives and middle-power practice interact: rather than competing frameworks, soft power functions here as an enabling layer that legitimizes and amplifies a broader middle-power toolkit.

At the same time, the evidence does not support an interpretation of Turkey as a security substitute for Russia. Structural constraints—legacy procurement dependence, institutionalized security ties, and Russia’s entrenched role—shape the opportunity space within which Ankara operates. The more accurate inference is therefore a layered regional security ecology: Turkey contributes incrementally through niche capabilities and credibility-building, while Russia retains traditional security primacy. This distinction strengthens the article’s argument by aligning empirical observations with a precise conceptual claim, thereby reducing the ambiguity between “soft power” and “middle power” approaches.

5.1 Turkey’s Central Asia strategy as middle-power practice under an autonomy-seeking orientation

A middle-power reading shifts the benchmark of “success.” Turkey’s strategy in Central Asia is not plausibly evaluated by its capacity to displace the dominant providers of security or capital. Instead, the relevant benchmark is whether Ankara can accumulate incremental but durable influence through niche deliverables, institutional entrepreneurship, and reputational capital that lowers the political cost of cooperation for partner states.

The empirical patterns reported in the article support this interpretation. Turkey’s geo-economic footprint is concentrated in sectors and channels consistent with a middle-power toolkit: commercial presence through firms with adaptive entry strategies, SME-driven trade, and corridor-linked connectivity agendas rather than capital-intensive megaprojects. In parallel, institutional engagement—especially through the Organization of Turkic States—functions primarily as a mechanism for stabilizing interaction routines and a shared vocabulary of cooperation. In this setting, “strategic autonomy” is not an abstract label; it is visible in the preference for flexible, low-commitment forms of cooperation that preserve maneuvering space for all parties, including the Central Asian states themselves.

5.2 Competition and constraints: why Turkey’s gains are necessarily “niche” rather than structural

The region’s institutional and geopolitical environment is best understood as a constraint field. Russia retains entrenched advantages in security governance and legacy ties; China’s position is anchored in large-scale infrastructure finance and corridor security; and the United States maintains a narrower, programmatic presence without comparable regional institutional depth. This hierarchy matters because it sets the ceiling for what a non-dominant actor can achieve.

Turkey’s approach is therefore shaped by a practical political logic: maximize relevance without triggering counterbalancing. The evidence in this article is consistent with a strategy of complementarity and hedging rather than confrontation. Ankara’s initiatives are often framed in ways that are politically acceptable to regional governments precisely because they do not require symbolic alignment choices. Where Turkey advances connectivity narratives (including corridor thinking), it does so by presenting them as diversification options. Where it advances security cooperation, it does so primarily through capacity-building and technical packages rather than through claims of security primacy. This explains why the empirical results show meaningful engagement, but not a scale comparable to China’s economic footprint or Russia’s security role.

5.3 Security cooperation: separating policy instruments, regional order, and perception effects

The revised security section makes it possible to distinguish analytically between three layers that were previously conflated: Turkey’s security policy instruments, the regional security order, and public perceptions of Turkey’s security relevance. Turkey’s security engagement appears as a middle-power instrument in two senses. First, it is selective: training, technical support, and certain forms of defense-industrial cooperation can generate durable ties without transforming the regional security architecture. Second, it is politically calibrated: Turkey benefits from being perceived as a capable partner while avoiding an “alignment proxy” image that would be costly in a region where hedging is the dominant strategy.

The survey results matter here, but they should be interpreted as reputational embeddedness, not as proof of operational security outcomes. The strong association between perceived Turkish security relevance and the overall evaluation of Turkey indicates that publics do not reduce Turkey to cultural attraction alone. In middle-power terms, this is consequential: a reputation for being “useful” in security-adjacent domains can amplify the credibility of Ankara’s economic and institutional initiatives and reduce domestic resistance to cooperation among partner states. At the same time, reputational effects do not remove structural constraints: Turkey’s security role remains bounded by the region’s dominant security stakeholders.

5.4 Soft power and the Turkic world: mechanism and narrative resource, not a competing theory

The results support a cleaner interpretation: soft power is the mechanism through which a middle-power strategy becomes socially embedded, particularly in a region where direct coercion is either unavailable or counterproductive.

Under this reading, the Turkic World agenda functions as a narrative resource that can lower transaction costs and support repeated cooperation routines, but it does not operate uniformly across countries or audiences. Its practical relevance depends on domestic political sensitivities, state-led nation-building narratives, and the perceived material benefits of cooperation. The survey evidence is consistent with the notion that cultural initiatives and educational mobility are powerful correlates of positive perceptions, especially among younger cohorts. This is precisely the pattern one would expect if soft power operates as a mechanism of long-term embeddedness rather than as a standalone foreign-policy doctrine.

Crucially, this interpretation allows the manuscript to avoid civilizational determinism. The point is not that “civilizations” drive alignment, but that policy-driven narratives and institutions can shape receptivity, especially when they are paired with tangible cooperation. This is a more precise and defensible way to discuss identity politics in Central Asia than invoking broad civilizational templates that do not map well onto the region’s empirical heterogeneity.

5.5 How the evidence supports the core claim: what Turkey can (and cannot) do as a middle power

Read together, the empirical strands in the article support a bounded but meaningful conclusion. Turkey’s strategies in Central Asia are partly successful in middle-power terms: Ankara appears capable of building reputational capital, maintaining institutional routines of cooperation, and generating niche geo-economic gains that increase its regional relevance. These achievements are real precisely because they do not rely on structural dominance.

At the same time, the evidence also clarifies what Turkey cannot do. It cannot set the region’s security agenda in the way that Russia can, nor can it match China’s scale in infrastructure finance and corridor-building. This is not a failure of strategy; it is a predictable implication of the constraint environment. The contribution of the article is therefore not to claim that Turkey “wins” the Central Asia competition, but to specify how middle-power strategies operate under hierarchy: by translating selective deliverables and reputational embeddedness into stable, incremental influence.

5.6 Implications for scholarship and for policy interpretation

For scholarship, the article reinforces a behavioral interpretation of middle-power diplomacy: effectiveness is better captured by institutionalization, reputational embeddedness, and niche deliverables than by aggregate capability comparisons. It also shows why soft power should be treated as a mechanism within a broader strategy rather than as a competing framework.

For policy interpretation, the findings suggest that Central Asian states do not necessarily view Turkey’s engagement as zero-sum. Turkey’s value is frequently tied to diversification—of routes, partners, and cooperation formats—rather than to bloc politics. That observation aligns with the broader regional preference for hedging and multi-vector foreign policies.

5.7 Limitations and how they shape interpretation

The survey evidence captures perceptions and associations rather than causal effects or the operational performance of specific policy instruments. Cross-country comparisons must also be treated cautiously where subsamples are small. These limitations do not invalidate the results; they narrow the claim. The article therefore interprets the survey indicators as measures of reputational embeddedness—an important mechanism for middle-power influence—while treating trade, investment, and institutional cooperation as complementary indicators of niche engagement under constraint.

For this reason, the article proposes an original model. This model allows Turkey to be interpreted not only as a “soft power promoter” or a “middle power” in the classical sense but as a hybrid actor combining elements of cultural, institutional, and geopolitical diplomacy. This makes its strategy in Central Asia unique and opens opportunities for comparative studies with other regions where Turkey implements similar approaches.

The model is based on four key areas that ensure Turkey’s sustainable presence in Central Asia:

• Sustainable economic development:

• Traditional trading schemes are based on the supply of raw materials from Central Asia to Turkey and the export of manufactured goods in the opposite direction. However, the IESP model assumes the expansion of value chains, which will ensure:

• Creation of joint ventures in Central Asia, especially in the sectors of light industry, agro-industrial complex and automotive industry.

• The development of industrial zones with the participation of Turkish capital and technology clusters.

• Strengthening the small and medium-sized business (SME) sector through investment funds, credit lines and educational programs.

• Given the rapid growth of e-commerce and digital services, the IESP model includes the integration of Central Asia into global technological processes by:

• The development of digital trade corridors between Turkey and Central Asia.

• Creation of e-commerce platforms for small and medium-sized enterprises providing access to Turkish and international markets.

• Investing in the development of fintech infrastructure for settlements in national currencies and cryptocurrencies, which reduces dependence on international sanctions mechanisms.

• Taking into account the growing security challenges, including cross-border threats, cybercrime and regional instability, the IESP model assumes the development of an innovative security partnership, including:

• Military cooperation: training of military personnel, supply of high-tech systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber defense systems.

• Hybrid security: joint programs to combat terrorism, cyber threats, and illegal migration.

• Development of strategic infrastructure, including modernization of transport and energy routes.

• Turkey has a unique cultural capital in the region, which must be actively used to strengthen cooperation. Within the framework of the IESP model, it is proposed:

• Expansion of educational programs, including scholarships for students, exchange programs and the development of joint research centers.

• Promotion of the Turkic cultural heritage through the creation of international festivals, forums and the development of the tourism industry.

• Expanding the influence of Turkish media and digital content to create a positive image of the country among young people.

• For the successful implementation of the IESP, a three-tier partnership system is proposed:

• State cooperation involves integrating Central Asia into Turkey’s regional initiatives, such as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), along with fostering new bilateral trade and economic agreements.

• Business initiatives focus on supporting the private sector through the establishment of joint ventures, investment funds, and special economic zones.

• Public diplomacy encompasses the development of educational and cultural programs aimed at strengthening long-term ties between Turkey and Central Asia (Table 10).

The proposed model, which integrates the cultural, institutional, and geopolitical dimensions of Turkey’s engagement with the Central Asian states, has certain limitations that must be taken into account in its analytical application. First, the cultural-identity component of this conceptual framework is difficult to subject to strict quantitative operationalization. The perception of Turkey as a center of Turkic identity is heterogeneous and context-dependent, varying according to domestic political conditions, prevailing national narratives, and the historical and cultural specificities of each country in the region. This reduces the universality of the model’s cultural dimension and necessitates caution when extrapolating it.

The institutional component, in turn, is closely linked to the dynamics of the functioning and transformation of regional integration formats such as the SCO, EAEU, and CSTO. In the event of shifts in the balance of influence between Russia and China, or adjustments in the architecture of regional alliances, the predictive value of the model may be significantly diminished. The geopolitical dimension is likewise vulnerable to external shocks and uncertainties—from global energy and economic crises to domestic political changes within Turkey itself or intensifying competition from other foreign policy actors. These factors may substantially alter the parameters of Turkey’s regional engagement.

Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the proposed model possesses significant analytical potential. Its principal value lies in its ability to move beyond one-dimensional interpretations based solely on the concepts of “middle power” or cultural-civilizational leadership. The model offers a more comprehensive explanation of the adaptive strategies of Turkish foreign policy, demonstrating how different levels—from soft power to institutional flexibility—are integrated into a single system of engagement with regions characterized by a high degree of internal fragmentation.

The synthetic and interdisciplinary nature of the model ensures its applicability beyond the Central Asian context. It can be employed to analyze Turkey’s foreign policy dynamics in other regions—particularly the Balkans, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East—where cultural, political, and geo-economic factors are similarly intertwined. Moreover, the practical significance of the model lies in its capacity to serve as a tool for forecasting the trajectories of external actor’s engagement with Central Asia. By emphasizing that Turkey acts not only as an economic or defense partner but also as an active carrier of cultural and identity agendas, the model opens new perspectives for understanding the transformation of regional order under conditions of growing global competition.

The application of the IESP model contributes to the expansion of trade between Turkey and Central Asia by strengthening economic integration and technological partnership. At the same time, it enables the reduction of the region’s dependence on Russia and China in trade and financial cooperation, while also creating a solid platform for partnership between government, business, and universities. Furthermore, the model enhances security and stability through multi-level strategic and defense cooperation.

The IESP model represents a new mechanism for Turkey’s relations with Central Asia, based on the integration of economic, technological, military, and cultural instruments. Unlike traditional models, it places sustainable growth, digitalization, and comprehensive security policy at the forefront. The implementation of this model will allow Turkey not only to strengthen its economic position in the region but also to establish an alternative order based on partnership, creativity, and cultural unity.

Viewed through the lens of middle power diplomacy, Turkey’s Central Asia strategy appears meaningfully successful in reputational and institutional terms, and only moderately successful in material-economic terms. The evidence presented in the results supports a layered assessment. First, Turkey performs strongly on the middle-power dimension of soft-power leverage: cultural and educational channels are the most consistent correlates of favorable perceptions, indicating that Ankara is able to generate reputational capital even without material dominance. Second, Turkey demonstrates relative success in institutional entrepreneurship by using Turkic multilateral formats to routinize cooperation and translate the “Turkic World” narrative into practical agendas. Third, Turkey’s economic presence is better described as niche and networked—SME-driven and sectoral—rather than transformative, which fits the profile of middle-power geo-economic statecraft under constraint. Finally, the security dimension illustrates the importance of scope conditions: Turkey gains legitimacy where cooperation remains complementary, but its influence is capped by Russia’s entrenched security role and China’s geo-economic scale. In short, Turkey’s strategy is successful not because it overturns the regional hierarchy, but because it converts identity and connectivity into institutional routines and social networks that expand strategic autonomy at relatively contained cost.

To strengthen its position in Central Asia amid global geopolitical competition, Turkey should advance transport and infrastructure projects, reinforce cultural and educational cooperation, deepen economic collaboration, enhance security, and promote peacebuilding initiatives. In addition, it is important to employ “soft power” to consolidate regional leadership, maintain a balance of interests among major global players, and develop energy partnerships, including environmentally oriented projects.

6 Conclusion

This article examined how Turkey positions itself in Central Asia amid intensified competition with Russia, China, and the United States, and to what extent Ankara can compensate for limited relative material capabilities through a middle-power repertoire. The analysis supports a bounded conclusion: Turkey does not—and cannot—compete symmetrically with Russia’s entrenched security role or China’s geo-economic scale. Nevertheless, it can secure incremental and durable influence by combining three mutually reinforcing channels: niche geo-economic engagement linked to connectivity agendas, institutional entrepreneurship (especially through Turkic World-framed cooperation routines), and reputational embeddedness amplified by cultural and educational instruments.

A key implication is conceptual. The evidence is most coherent when “soft power” is treated not as an alternative theory but as a mechanism within an autonomy-seeking middle-power strategy. Cultural initiatives and educational mobility shape receptivity and lower the political cost of cooperation, while security-adjacent cooperation functions as a complementary credibility signal. In middle-power terms, Turkey’s effectiveness lies less in hierarchy-building than in option creation: it widens the menu of feasible partnerships and routes for Central Asian states that seek diversification without bloc alignment.

Importantly, the competitive environment is not external to the argument but constitutive of it. Russia, China, and the United States structure Central Asia as a constraint field: Russia through security embeddedness and long-standing networks; China through corridor politics and investment scale; and the United States through selective engagement that reinforces hedging logics in the region. Turkey’s strategic autonomy in Central Asia is therefore best understood as calibrated behavior within this hierarchy, rather than as a claim to regional primacy.

The study has limitations that narrow the scope of inference without undermining the central claim. Survey data capture perceptions and associations rather than causal effects, and country subsamples should be interpreted cautiously where sizes are small. Accordingly, the article uses public opinion indicators to operationalize reputational embeddedness—one channel of middle-power influence—while treating trade, investment, and institutional routines as complementary evidence of niche engagement under constraint.

Limits of inference and generalizability. The survey evidence used in this article is based on a quota-based, non-probability sample collected through mixed recruitment channels. Accordingly, our statistical results should be interpreted as associational and descriptive, capturing patterns among respondents accessible through the study’s fieldwork frame rather than providing population estimates for entire national societies. Cross-country differences are reported with particular caution where subsamples are small, and no causal claims are inferred from the observed correlations and regression coefficients. In substantive terms, the findings are best read as evidence about perceptions and reputational mechanisms consistent with Turkey’s middle-power strategy—rather than as definitive measurements of public opinion across Central Asia.

Because the survey relies on quota-based recruitment rather than a fully probabilistic design, the results are interpreted as descriptive of the study frame and are not treated as nationally representative estimates.

Future research can build on this framework in two directions: first, by deepening country-specific process tracing of Turkey’s policy instruments (connectivity, security cooperation, and institutional entrepreneurship) in individual Central Asian states; and second, by examining how shifts in Russia–China coordination and U.S. Eurasia policy recalibrate the regional opportunity set for middle powers. Even under such shifts, the core analytical expectation remains: Turkey’s influence in Central Asia is most plausibly generated through a middle-power toolkit that blends pragmatic cooperation, institutional routines, and reputational mechanisms rather than through structural dominance.

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