Abstract
Securitization of immigrants is the framing of immigrants as security threats that need to be curbed, thwarted and eliminated. Yet immigration is only but a small segment of migration, which is necessary for economic growth. Migration is an organic phenomenon that is as old as humanity itself. It happens within national borders, often referred to as internal migration, or even internal displacement at times. When migration happens in the international realm, immigration processes and laws become necessary, and should be adhered to, observed, and enforced. However, when immigrants become securitized, it often puts them at risk of being targeted, victimized and objectified, by not only the authorities of the host state, but communities where immigrants live in. This paper sets out to interrogate the claims that influence and inform movements such as Operation Dudula and other political parties in South Africa, that African immigrants particularly pose a security risk in South Africa. The research question that the paper seeks to answer is: Are African immigrants a national security risk for South Africa? The paper uses a qualitative research methodology to conduct textual analysis of primary and secondary sources, policy documents as well as government documents. A genealogical approach informs this research as it is interested in situating the current tensions in context.
1 Introduction
The phenomenon of migration has always existed with humanity since time immemorial. As indicated by some scholars, in South Africa particularly, African migrants are not a new phenomenon (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Tella, 2016; Chimucheka et al., 2019; Masuku and Nkala, 2021). For instance, during the apartheid era, African migrants were conscripted to work seasonally in mines and farms via the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), among other repressive practices of apartheid South Africa (Gewald, 2015, p. 47; Cavanagh, 2017, p. 291; Gutkind et al., 2024; Gardner, 2023). In fact, some Africans to date still refer to South Africa as Wenela, which is a corruption of the abbreviation of that conscription association (Gewald, 2015; Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). Although democratic South Africa has had a human-rights based, open door immigration policy, there has been a regression in the strides taken in recent years (Crush and Chikanda, 2015; Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Gordon, 2017). This has been partly due to the influx of African migrants, most of whom do not get documented and end up implicated in criminal activities. This has created fear in locals of illegal migrants who are now perceived as a security threat in South Africa (Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). As a result, some actors are now articulating migration as a security problem and are increasingly framing it in relation to crime and unemployment (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016, p. 985). However, scholars such as Gordon (2022) have disputed this framing, arguing that “there is no evidence that international migrants are a major cause of unemployment in South Africa.”
This article employs the securitization approach as an analytical tool to analyze the extent to which the securitization of migrants has shaped policy making in recent years, particularly in the post-covid and post-municipal election era. The concern of this article is not why migrants are now perceived as a security threat in the country, but why the sudden turnaround in perception. Why are migrants suddenly associated with insecurity? We argue that the securitization and subsequent rejection of migrants are mainly due to the government's failure to deliver on its promises to the electorate, hence the scapegoating of migrants. There is an intense anti-migrant discourse that links migrants to insecurity, which has been accepted by many among the poor communities and the unemployed youth, leading to anti-migrant movements such as the Alexander Dudula Movement and Operation Dudula (Sikhosana, 2025). Our main claim is that securitization is being used as a deflection strategy to camouflage failures of governance, and that immigrants are scapegoated so as to posture Government as doing something about the concerns of citizens, specifically failure to tackle illegal immigration and crime, especially at this crucial time in South Africa as it prepares for local government elections in 2026. In the process, non-state actors like Alexander Dudula Movement and Operation Dudula are reshaping the securitization discourse in South Africa. The terms migrants and immigrants will be used interchangeably to refer to all foreign nationals, including economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. An immigrant is someone who crosses international borders to move to another country (Abebe, 2019, p. 4).
2 Conceptual clarification: securitization of migration
Securitization is a concept that originated from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies through the works of Ole Weaver et al. The trio posits that securitization is a process of social construction that elevates an area of regular politics to an area of security by resorting to the rhetoric of discursive emergence, threat, and danger to justify extraordinary measures (Weaver et al., 1993). The issue is labeled an existential threat to fundamental values of society and the state, a construction that convinces a relevant section of society that extraordinary measures are required to respond to this existential threat. Thus, in the name of urgency and survival, such measures often reach above and beyond the law and ordinary politics (Atak and Crepeau, 2013; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016).
Associated with the securitization approach is the Speech Act. Buzan et al.(1998, p. 26) argue that “the process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act.” They argue that merely saying the words accomplishes something, such as making a promise or naming a ship (Buzan et al., 1998). Similarly, Glover (2019) argues that the “meaning of security exists within the discourse of security, which identifies a threat and calls for emergency measures.” This is what is referred to as a securitization move. Instead, an issue is only securitized when the audience accepts it as such (Balzacq et al., 2015). If there is no evidence of such acceptance, we can only speak of a securitization move, not an object securitized (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Guillaume (2018, p. 477) posits that in the language theory, such a process of securitization is referred to as a speech act. Securitization in a nutshell has a way of altering the public perception thereby winning securitizing actors the support they need to take retaliatory action. Securitization was formulated as an analytical framework to describe the elite/state centered securitization regardless of whether the threat is real or perceived (Coen, 2017, p. 113). This would suggest that optics and posturing are dynamics that are often at play in matters of securitization, as confirmed by Sibanda and Nyere (2022).
The demise of the Cold War has seen the concept of security undergo a major transformation with issues such as migration and immigration increasingly being described in security terms. The process in which migration discourse shifts toward an emphasis on security has been referred to as the securitization of migration (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 167). The securitization of migration refers to the framing of migration as a security threat to a state or society, resulting in governments tightening regular migration pathways, including enhancing border controls and tightening visa policies (Abebe, 2019, p. 2). The securitization of migration differs a little from the original idea of securitization, which has mainly been state/elite centered securitization. Russo (2008) posits that: “In the case of migration, it has been observed that securitization occurs either by one actor, for instance, a political party, or by a group of actors such as a political party, the media, and a religious organization. The most common arguments used by the internal securitizing actors, are related with the fields of economic, social cohesion and political stability.”
Securitization of the immigrant as a risk or threat is based on the conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fear of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries Bigo, (2002, p. 65). (Bigo 2002), further posits that securitization is based on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of daily life. This worry is not psychological but is structural unease in a “risky society” framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated with danger and (in) security (Bigo, 2002, p. 65). As a result, several multilateral and bilateral agreements have been signed, with a plethora of international and domestic institutions being created, and extradition and deportation agreements between states have been authorized, and conventions and protocols have been ratified with, at their core, the link between migration and security (Bourbeau, 2011; Lazaridis and Skleparis, 2016). Politics of fear come into play in the securitization of migration.
The securitization of international migration has gained prevalence following the 9/11 attack on the United States and the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. International migration has become a key issue and is perceived by many as an existential security threat (Bourbeau, 2011). For instance, the European Union (EU) policies developed after migration was framed as a “crisis” between 2015 and 2016, and implemented in Africa, have contributed to the increased securitization of intra-African migration (Abebe, 2019, p. 2). These policies include the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, the Joint Valleta Action Plan and the EU Emergency Trust Fund, along with related mechanisms (Frontex and the deployment of European troops in African countries) (Scheel, 2022). In addition, Abebe (2019) points out that the African-Europe migration narrative does not reflect reality and provides the basis for migration to be securitized. This is so because fifty three percent of African migration is intra-continental and African migrants constitute only 12.9% of the migrant population in Europe (Abebe, 2019, p. 2). This trend has spread globally, even in the African continent where countries such as Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Botswana have/are adopting stricter immigration policies toward African migrants (mostly). This is despite the creation of regional agreements such as the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement, which seeks to promote regional integration through trade and the free movement of African citizens.
The framing of migration as a security threat invokes extraordinary responses to the perceived threat, most of which impact migrants negatively, such as limiting opportunities for regular migration and scapegoating migrants (Banai and Kreide, 2017). This forces many to resort to risky irregular migration and exploitation, with scapegoating exposing them to xenophobic attacks and marginalization. Thus, Weaver has argued that “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics'…while securitization may sometimes be necessary most issues are best dealt with outside of the security sphere, or ‘de-securitized”' (quoted in Nyman, 2018, p. 7). It is against this backdrop that we apply the securitization approach as an analytical tool to examine why there has been a sudden increase in the framing of migrants as a security threat in South Africa, a country that has always been applauded for its best constitution and welcoming immigration policies. We look at the implications of such framing on the human security of migrants.
3 Literature review: securitization of immigrants in South Africa
Post-Apartheid South Africa has prided itself on one of the most progressive immigration policies in the world grounded in democracy and centered on human rights. As a result, the country is a signatory of several international conventions, including the 1951 Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention regarding Specific Aspects of Refugees in Africa, with the country's Refugee Act coming into force in 2000 (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2009, p. 213). Furthermore, the 1996 SA Constitution protects the rights of all people in the country, including foreign nationals, documented or undocumented. Regardless of their undocumented status in the country, such individuals must still be treated with dignity and respect and thus must be treated in a fair humane manner, consistent with the Constitution (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018, p. 3). However, despite being party to all the mentioned conventions, and stipulations of the Constitutions that have necessitated a progressive immigration policy, there has been a huge paradigm shift in recent years leading to regression in the country's stance on immigration.
When pundits of the South African Constitution formulated it to facilitate the establishment of a rainbow nation, they never envisaged an African continent marred by perennial conflicts in countries such as the DRC, Central African Republic, Sudan, and so forth. Neither did they imagine Zimbabwe, once regarded as the breadbasket of Africa, now “reduced to a basket case itself,” in the words of renowned stalwart Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). It is noteworthy that former President Mbeki is on record disputing that South Africa's economic problems can be blamed on foreign nationals (Mbeki, 2024). Instead, Mbeki (2024) provides historical context on how African countries that include, but not limited to, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Swaziland (now eSwatini), Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, helped in South Africa's struggle against the apartheid regime. He notes that in the 1960s the Pan-African spirit and ideology was alive and well, and nationalists believed in the total independence of all African territories that were under some form of colonialism or apartheid. Sadly, as Mbeki would later recall, this is no longer the case, many African countries, not only South Africa, are slowly losing sight of this Pan-Africanist spirit and idea (Mbeki, 2025). Be that as it may, the writers of the South African Constitution, had a Pan-Africanist idea of South Africa. Their objective was to formulate a constitution that would facilitate the establishment of a rainbow nation. The idea of a rainbow was to signify the unity of multiculturalism and the coming together of many different nations (Gordon, 2016; Sidanius et al., 2019) in a country reeling from the impact of the segregation of the apartheid system. Associated with the idea of a rainbow nation is the open border policy that has been in place since 1994, which did not only make it easy for African migrants to enter the country but also allowed them to be integrated into local communities, thereby creating pressure on the limited resources (McLean, 2019; Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). All these developments have had a dire effect on this Southern African state, as it saw an influx of African migrants into the new democracy in search of refuge and/or greener pastures. The combination of all these factors has created an atmosphere of mistrust and fear of migrants which has since been exploited by politicians for political gains.
3.1 Operation Dudula
Dudula is an isiZulu word meaning to “push back” or to “bull doze” (Sinwell et al., 2023, p. 212). It signifies some forceful push back or plowing through some resistance. The semantics of the word signal some combative antics of Operation Dudula's operations. Operation Dudula has as its key priorities: “Constitutional reforms, Mass deportation of illegal immigrats (sic) and Economic Empowerment” (Operation Dudula, 2026). Although, there are talks suggesting that Operation Dudula will be seeking mandate from the electorate in the 2026 local government elections, it has not yet put out its election manifesto (Operation Dudula, 2026). Sikhosana (2025, p. 5142) posits that Operation Dudula emerged around the year 2021 as a manifestation of the institutional failures of government in post-1994 South Africa. He argues that Operational Dudula is distinct from xenophobic vigilantism groupings. It is its distinctive “quasi-institutional posture” that sets it apart (ibid). In other words, Operation Dudula may have started off as a citizens' movement against illegal immigration as it claims to enforce immigration laws, however, it has since morphed into an organized outfit which is centrally coordinated, not only to enforce immigration laws, it is involved in the auditing of clinics, hospitals, schools and labor laws (Newzroom Afrika, 2025a,b; Bailey, 2022; Gordon, 2022). Some have argued that Operation Dudula has been responsible for sowing “medical xenophobia” (Vanyoro, 2019).
On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that Operation Dudula is tantamount to a vigilante group that seeks to exploit the South African unemployment situation and purport that foreigners are responsible for the high unemployment rates in South Africa (Tarisayi, 2024, p. 34; Sikhosana, 2025, p. 5142), in spite of evidence that points to the contrary (Gordon, 2022).
On the other hand, there are also scholars who argue that Operation Dudula is a manifestation of unresolved colonial and political problems. Meaning that members of Operation Dudula may not entirely be xenophobic and anti-immigrants but rather should be understood as “native foreigners” who are also victims of the South African state failure to address their concerns (Mthombeni, 2022, p. 63; Morreira and Chekero, 2022; Sikhosana, 2025, p. 5142). Put differently, this view exposes that Operation Dudula is a manifestation of the failures of the governance system of the state in South Africa.
Regardless of how Operation Dudula is perceived or understood, what is clear is that it is a movement of citizens that has no mandate or authority to enforce immigration laws, the Health Act or Education Act of the Republic of South Africa. Therefore, its operations are illegal. While it raises salient issues, it remains an outlaw outfit. Ironically, Operation Dudula is “supposedly” enforcing South African laws in its operations.
4 Methodology
This paper uses qualitative research methodology in its inquiry. Qualitative research methodology was chosen for its ability to be reflective as it is also reflexive (Creswell and Creswell, 2018). This methodology allows for the interpretation and reinterpretation of data (Fossey et al., 2002, p. 717), as the study interrogated primary sources and secondary sources of data. The paper used a critical literature analysis which relied on the genealogical (historical) approach to evince the antecedents of the subject matter of securitization of African immigrants in South Africa. In this paper, the securitization of immigrants' forms part of the broader debate on migration. Aware of the various migration trends between the people of Zimbabwe and South Africa specifically, the genealogical approach is well suited to capture and trace this phenomenon of migration between these two countries specifically. As such, the genealogical approach emphasizes the selection of, or picking of credible information (Zavala-Pelayo, 2021, p. 286); it is about selecting appropriate and accurate knowledge on phenomena (Kusch and McKenna, 2020, p. 1059). While the genealogical approach is not without its limitations (Lorenzini, 2024, p. 2175), it remains credible as it interrogates not only credible and established literature, but it also allows for researchers to interrogate their own observations and experiences, thereby ensuring flexibility in the acquisition of knowledge. As such, the study was desktop research which infused the researchers' experiences to inform the study. A critical literature analysis was chosen as the researchers had access to a lot of literature found using Google Scholar, Web of Science and Scopus search engines. The key search words that were used across the search engines, included: Securitization of Migration; Securitization of Immigration; South Africa on Immigration; Illegal Immigration in South Africa; Xenophobia in South Africa; Afrophobia in South Africa; Governance in South Africa, among others. The selection of sources was determined by dates. Initially, the search was formulated to source for literature that was produced in the past 5 years. This was further extended to cater for literature proffered in the past 10 years owing to scarcity of newer literature.
5 Discussion and analysis
In recent years, the SA government has been farming immigration as a national security threat that is so imminent that their need to counter it as such is so evidently needed that citizens may fail to question the institutional underpinnings of the state (Duncan, 2020). The framing of migration as a security threat invokes extraordinary responses to the perceived threat, most of which impact migrants negatively, such as limiting opportunities for regular migration and scapegoating migrants. As such, there have been major policy changes that have led to the tightening of immigration policies and tighter border control, thereby securitizing immigration.
The South African Human Right Commission has identified the 2011 amendment to the Immigration Act, which made the refugee and asylum system difficult for refugees and asylum seekers as the first indicator that South Africa is moving toward a securitized approach to migration (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018). Ncumisa Willie, a research advisor at the SAHRC, during a panel of discussion hosted by the University of Cape Town, posited that the 2011 amendment aimed at restricting or reducing the period (from 14 days to five) of the asylum transit permit which allows refugees to travel from border entry points to refugee reception offices (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018). Willies argues that this is problematic because “Not only are they [refugees] vulnerable in terms of lacking social capital, often they don't know the rules and the legal requirements of the country. Second, the ports of entry are not close to the refugee reception offices, so this has financial implications when you fled with nothing” (South African Human Rights Commission, 2018). This policy has restrictive implications for refugees and asylum seekers. Since then, several amendments have been made to the Immigration Act, which makes it exceedingly difficult for migrants to legalize their stay in the country.
Labeling migration and migrants as national security threats leads to a massive expansion of the security powers of the state and an intensive surveillance society. There is a heightened perception that African migrants are a security threat, as such, the escalation of securitization of regional migration is evident in the government's decision to subsume the Department of Home Affairs under the newly established National Security Council, as well as statements that porous borders are SA's major national security threat (Duncan, 2020). Thus, the South African government has invested a lot into reinforcing the border between SA and Zimbabwe, despite sufficient evidence that tightening borders does not decrease irregular migration (Sutherland, 2022). Sutherland (2022) posits that the establishment of the Border Management Authority (BMA) was the latest in the country's regression toward more conservative anti-African migration policies. This Act has been met with criticism by some analysts who view it as xenophobic and seeking to restrict access to migrants and violate their rights (Maunganidze and Mbiyozo, 2020). Furthermore, Maunganidze and Mbiyozo (2020) argue that although the Act requires the BMA officers to respect fundamental rights, including vulnerable groups such as human trafficking victims, refugees, and asylum seekers, the Department of Home Affairs' poor track record on managing xenophobia validates concerns raised about that Act.
National security risks are identified and socially constructed by state actors to legitimize actions that may promote wider state interests and agendas, rather than migrants posing substantive threats (Bigo, 2002). The most common arguments used by the internal securitizing actors are related to the fields of economic, social cohesion, and political stability (Russo, 2008). This has been in South Africa where poor governance and corruption coupled with economic shocks resulting from the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2018 trade wars, and the current COVID-19 pandemic have had a dire effect on the socioeconomic development in the country. These economic shocks led to job losses and a high unemployment rate, with poor governance and corruption leading to the government's failure to fulfill its social contract. Moreover, poor governance, corruption, and mismanagement of public funds have had a destabilizing effect on society, which manifests in the form of protests and uprisings as seen in the July unrest of 2021 in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal. As such, most politicians in the ruling ANC party have resorted to shifting the blame on the migrants and have been blamed for putting pressure on the limited resources at the expense of South Africans. This has been to the extent that the government warned that South Africans will revolt against it “if they felt they are in competition with everybody” (Bendile, 2017). Thus, this heightened perception of African migrants as security threats, particularly to the safety and job opportunities of the South African working class is reflected in the anti-foreign rhetoric as well as government policy (Moyo and Nshimbi, 2020). Several government officials have been reported making anti-migrant comments and threats to foreign nationals. A case in point is that of the then Limpopo MEC for health Dr Phophi Ramathuba, now Premier of the Limpopo Province who was caught on camera lecturing a patient awaiting surgery about how much Zimbabweans are putting a strain on the resources that should be catering for South Africans. This has been disputed by many analysts who have blamed that collapsing health care in the country on corruption and mismanagement of public funds. This demonstrates SA's increasing use of exceptional suspension of ordinary societal procedures to protect the nation against certain groups of migrants constructed as undesirable and threatening (Moyo and Nshimbi, 2020).
Securitization of the immigrant as a risk or threat is based on the conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fear of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries (Bigo, 2002, p. 65). In recent years there has been a surge of populist political leaders such as Herman Mashaba of Action SA and Gayton McKenzie of the Patriotic Front, who exploited the immigration crisis in the country and used it as a campaign tool in the recent Local Government Elections (LGE). The duo pontificated that the country has been taken over by migrants, and all the societal ills were due to too many undocumented foreign nationals (Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). They called upon citizens to reclaim their country even if it means going into the communities and removing these illegal migrants forcefully. While the strategic move paid off for the two parties, it cost the ruling ANC several constituencies and triggered panic in the ruling elite. In a bid to appease the masses, extraordinary decisions had to be made by the cabinet which sought to make the government appear to be listening to the concerns on the ground, particularly on immigration. The first sacrificial lambs were the Zimbabwe Exemption Permit (ZEP) holders, who had their permits canceled abruptly. This is ironic considering that the call on the ground is for the government to deal with undocumented migrants (Sibanda and Nyere, 2022). Despite the negative implications of this decision on the ZEP holders, it was welcomed by the anti-migrant forces who viewed this as a victory and supported the Minister of Home Affairs for this decision. We argue that the decision was made for political expediency, rather than for the ZEP holders posing substantive threats. How does reversing the “documentation” of over 180 000 law-abiding and tax-paying immigrants who have contributed to the economy and development of South Africa solve the illegal immigration crisis? How are these immigrants even a national security threat? They are traceable and have declared their residential addresses in the republic. The Department of Home Affairs has these people's biometric details. This only suggests that immigrants are being securitized, criminalized and intentionally targeted by the authorities, probably to appease the populist notions of Operation Dudula.
South Africa's struggle for freedom against apartheid was Africa's collective struggle. South Africa's struggle against apartheid was fought on many fronts, within South Africa but also outside South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe actively played significant roles in the fight against the apartheid government (Mbeki, 2024). From collecting money to support the nationalist movement to housing the nationalists, from providing places for military training, to providing ideological training and orientation of South Africa's would be combatants, African countries played a crucial role in bringing the apartheid regime to its knees (Luthuli et al., 2025). It was only natural for many African nationals to have an affinity to South Africa and, as it was doing well in comparison to other African countries, it only made sense that African migrant sought some refuge, be it economic, political or otherwise in South Africa (Mbeki, 2024). For this reason, many African migrants believed that they would be welcomed in South Africa as its citizens had been welcomed in most of these African countries during South Africa's apartheid era. It was expected, or assumed, to be a natural evolution of South Africa's relationship with its neighbors. That is why it is a misnomer for most African immigrants to have experienced xenophobia attacks.
South African authorities, especially nationalists from the African National Congress (ANC) and other Pan-Africanist movements, have stood with foreign nationals because they understood that their own cause was fought from other “foreign” territories and the struggle against apartheid was won because of the support of these same foreigners' support (Mbeki, 2024, 2025). However, since the 2017 parliamentary elections and presidential elections, the ANC has not been doing well. South Africa's citizens have grown restively over the slow pace at which the transformation that was promised in 1994 has been happening, if at all (Landau and Misago, 2022). The ANC seeing that they are losing the support of its citizens has become quiet in telling its citizenry its liberation story and its struggle against apartheid. Under its watch, foreigners have been taunted for causing South Africa's economic woes (Gordon, 2022), a fact that has no correlation to data and has been publicly refuted by South Africa's former president, Mbeki (2024).
Senior government officials who belong to the ANC are on record using deflecting tactics to scapegoat foreign nationals especially African immigrants and blaming them for the collapse of South Africa's infrastructure that was created with the ratios and demographics of the apartheid regime in mind (Gordon, 2022). For instance, the current Health Minister, in his previous tenure as Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Aaron Motswoaledi came across as harsh and biased toward, particularly Zimbabweans. The current Premier of Limpopo, Dr Phophi Ramathuba, who in 2022/3 as Member of Executive Committee (MEC) of Health in Limpopo Province was perceived as ill-disposed toward a Zimbabwean woman who was admitted at a hospital in Limpopo who was seen being talked down at by the then MEC, as the woman was clearly frail (Bailey, 2022).
While the Pan-African Congress (PAC) had always distanced itself from the ANC owing to political and ideological differences between the two especially post-1994, has also shown very little support for African foreign nationals that are scapegoated by the ANC-led government when it suits it. Understandably, the PAC is not government, however because it too survived and lived outside South Africa's colonial borders in the struggle against apartheid, one would have thought that it would embrace Pan-Africanism and speak out against the securitization of migrants and immigrants in South Africa. However, there are some scholars who constantly are the voice of reason in what could be explained away as an immigration question, but who choose to go against the populist grain of the Operation Dudula kind (Sinwell et al., 2023; Sikhosana, 2025; Mahlatsi, 2025).
After the May 2024 general elections, the ANC significantly lost such that it could not constitute government on its own; it needed other parties to come to the fore and form government. This compelled the ANC to form a Government of National Unity (GNU) (Booysen, 2024), some describing that arrangement as a coalition in government (Naidoo and Levy, 2025). The loss of the ANC was a punishment of the ANC by citizens of South Africa, as citizens blamed the ANC for the presence of illegal immigrants in SA (Hirsch, 2024). Some political parties, such as Sports Minister Gayton McCkenzie's Patriotic Alliance (PA) and Action South Africa (Action SA) only got sizeable votes precisely because their campaigns used the securitization move against illegal immigrants, and South African citizens that believe their misfortunes are a result of African immigrants' presence rewarded these parties with votes (Patriotic Alliance, 2024; Action South Africa, 2024). Currently, national government which is comprised of the GNU partners continues to use language as a securitization move. The announcement by the South African government to deploy surveillance drones at SA's busiest Beit bridge-Musina border by the Border Management Authority (BMA) and the use of body cameras attached to frontline personnel of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) gives credence to the issue of the securitization of immigrants. It is clear the two significant issues are at play (Government of South Africa, 2025). The first one is that government continues to deflect the attention of its citizens by scapegoating and blaming foreign nationals, especially from the African continent, from its failure to grow and transform the economy. As evinced by (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw 2016, p. 985), that “the criminalization of immigrants allows some government officials to direct attention away from corruption and other pressing issues, including state crimes”.
The second issue is that both government and certain political parties, including vigilante groups like Operation Dudula, continue to use the securitization move to garner votes or popularity, in so doing furthering the wedge between South Africa's citizens and African foreign nationals, which is a misnomer itself as it is arguable that Africans can be foreigners in their own continent. Operation Dudula's actions are mutually defining of the Government's securitization move, suggesting that there could be government officials who strategize and inform Operation Dudula on what to say or do for Government have a reason to securitize immigrants and hopefully appease the populace. Either way, this is a grand form of deflection as the genuine issues that have to do with the economy are left unattended, it will be a matter of time before violence erupts again, with a different descriptor and perhaps even with more casualties and intensity than ever before.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated how the securitization moves gives rise to securitization of any sector of society, but immigrants specifically. The paper also revealed how securitization often leads to criminalization of the target population of securitization in a country. There is need for South African authorities to deal with crime head on that is threatening the security of South Africa without deflecting its failures by creating a false narrative and blaming its governance failures on African immigrants. Crime remains a grave concern on the security and wellbeing of every South African and foreigner in South Africa. There is no doubt that crime knows no nationality, meaning there are African immigrants that have been involved in criminal activities; African immigrants are not immune to criminality, and they should be prosecuted like everyone else of their crimes. However, the idea and narrative of highlighting the fact that when it is foreigners that are found wanting, it is overstated that they are foreigners, it inadvertently contributes to the securitization of all immigrants, and not necessarily the criminals of foreign origins.
Additionally, when political figures such as Minister Aaron Motswoaledi and Premier Poppy Ramathuba speak of, and to, immigrants as if they are responsible for South Africa's economic, political and social woes including crime statistics, it gives the impression that the failures of government are caused by African immigrants. Security speech becomes the vehicle used by society to want to defend itself against criminals, which would be a correct thing to do; only it is false and just a deflecting tactic by government officials. Although there is no official position of the government of South Africa on the securitization of African immigrants, society may not necessarily be able to distinguish what the Government says from what Government Officials say. There is a danger in allowing the securitization moves or act airplay as there are elements in society that are bound to misinterpret and misread what government officials say.
While the paper evinced how movements such as Operation Dudula have resorted to vigilanteism, it represents a section of the population that gives rise to the securitization move, and cyclically and in some perverse way, gives credence to government's response to securitize immigration and migration is South Africa. Operation Dudula may very well be acting on what some government officials have publicly said to mobilize its members to act on “illegal” African immigrants that have been caricatured as criminals and outlaws. This means that there is a thin line between the securitization move and what presents as crime on the ground. It is of paramount importance for government officials to stick to facts when interfacing with the public instead of trying to win people over for their votes, otherwise this is detrimental to some sections of society, especially African immigrants in South Africa. Despite Operation Dudula's seeming legitimate concerns regarding immigration laws and their enforcement or, in this case, lack thereof, it remains an outlaw organization and should seek to operate within the confines of the law. Operation Dudula (2026) has an opportunity to seek that kind of mandate from the electorate this year which would legitimatize the organization; however, it has not publicly put out a manifesto so that the public may engage it and evaluate it against other parties. Clearly as shown by this paper, most immigrants are not the problem that some locals perceive them to be but are then exploited and criminalized by government official's securitization move. This paper has shown the undisputable need for government to lead in the enforcement of all laws and providing security for everyone, which entails the enforcement of immigration laws and not informally outsource that from the likes of Operation Dudula. Operation Dudula seems to be playing into what the government seemingly wants to say or do, but because it is government, it is bound to act within the human rights framework that has always informed government's approach especially in post-apartheid South Africa. Government must take accountability for its failures and blunders made by some of its officials and rectify them instead of being the source of securitization of African immigrants as this goes against the spirit of Pan-Africanism and Ubuntu.
7 Recommendations
Firstly, the paper urges the South African government and its officials to curb their use of the securitization of immigration and the securitization narrative as these create division and goes against the spirit and principles of Pan-Africanism.
Secondly, the paper urges the so-called African illegal immigrants to seek the right and proper documentation to be legally compliant with the laws of South Africa.
Thirdly, the paper urges movements such as Operation Dudula to desist from vigilanteism and taking matters into their own hands and let the immigration officials of the Department of Home Affairs do their work. Furthermore, it recommends that the South African Police Services (SAPS) be involved in ensuring that everyone, foreigners and citizens alike, abides by the laws of the Republic of South Africa.
Lastly, the paper implores the Department of Home Affairs to enforce its Immigration Act as failure to do so has proven to be not only dangerous for all immigrants, whether legal or otherwise, but also the stand offs between migrants and locals has adverse effects on human security and development of everyone, South African and foreigner alike.
Statements
Data availability statement
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Author contributions
CN: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft. SS: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was not received for this work and/or its publication.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
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Summary
Keywords
afrophobia, deflection, immigration laws, Operation Dudula, securitization, Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), xenophobia
Citation
Sibanda S and Nyere C (2026) The securitization of African immigrants in South Africa. Front. Polit. Sci. 8:1719953. doi: 10.3389/fpos.2026.1719953
Received
07 October 2025
Revised
26 January 2026
Accepted
26 January 2026
Published
13 February 2026
Volume
8 - 2026
Edited by
Jane Freedman, Université Paris 8, France
Reviewed by
Essien Oku Essien, Drexel University, United States
Funmi Abioye, University of Saskatchewan, Canada
Updates
Copyright
© 2026 Sibanda and Nyere.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Chidochashe Nyere, chidonyere@gmail.com
ORCID: Sehlule Sibanda orcid.org/0009-0007-8002-094X; Chidochashe Nyere orcid.org/0000-0002-3136-6588
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