HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY article
Front. Ecol. Evol.
Sec. Conservation and Restoration Ecology
Volume 13 - 2025 | doi: 10.3389/fevo.2025.1558254
This article is part of the Research TopicCoastal Wetlands: Conservation and Ecosystem ServicesView all articles
Mission Relationships, Employment Relationships, or Alliance Relationships: Wetland Management From the Perspective of Carbon Trading
Provisionally accepted- 1Taihu University of Wuxi, Wuxi, China
- 2Shandong Management University, Jinan, Shandong, China
- 3University of Liège, Liège, Liège, Belgium
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In recent years, wetland ecosystems have faced severe degradation, prompting governments to provide carbon compensations to enterprises engaged in wetland conservation efforts. The relationships between governments and enterprises in wetland management are primarily categorized into three models: mission relationships, employment relationships, and alliance relationships. Determining the optimal application scope for each model remains a critical challenge. To address this, this paper constructs three differential game models and conducts a comparative analysis of their equilibrium outcomes. The findings reveal distinct optimal scenarios for governments and enterprises. For governments, the employment relationships model maximizes social benefit when the per-unit benefit of wetland management is small; the mission relationships model is optimal for moderate benefits, and the alliance relationships model for large benefits. For enterprises, the employment relationships model maximizes social benefit when the per-unit benefit is small; the alliance relationships model is optimal for moderate benefits, and the mission relationships model for large benefits.
Keywords: wetland ecosystems, Differential games, Carbon offsets, maximizing benefits, government governance *
Received: 09 Jan 2025; Accepted: 15 May 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Wu, Bai, Li and Yang. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Yuntao Bai, Shandong Management University, Jinan, Shandong, China
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