Certificateless public auditing with data privacy preserving for cloud-based smart grid data

Abstract

As the promising next generation power system, smart grid can collect and analyze the grid information in real time, which greatly improves the reliability and efficiency of the grid. However, as smart grid coverage expands, more and more data is being collected. To store and manage the massive amount of smart grid data, the data owners choose to upload the grid data to the cloud for storage and regularly check the integrity of their data. However, traditional public auditing schemes are mostly based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) system, which will lead to complicated certificate management and inherent key escrow problems. We propose a certificateless public auditing scheme for cloud-based smart grid data, which can avoid the above two problems. In order to prevent the disclosure of the private data collected by the smart grid during the phase of auditing, we use the random masking technology to protect data privacy. The security analysis and the performance evaluation show that the proposed scheme is secure and efficient.

1 Introduction

With the development of information technology, the smart grid becomes a new promising power system, which is allowed to collect and analyze smart grid data and provides more reliable, cost-effetive and efficient power management compared to traditional power grids (Chen et al., 2014; He et al., 2018a; Zhang et al., 2021c; Peng et al., 2021). A large amount of data are colleted with the expansion of smart grid coverage. Nevertheless, the traditional smart grid data management system without large storage space is unable to meet the data owners’ storage requirements. Thus, more and more data owners choose to store smart grid data on the cloud.

Although the cloud provides a large amount of storage and computing resources for the data owners, there are some security issues that cannot be ignored (Zhang et al., 2021a; Yang et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2022). For example, the smart grid data stored in the cloud might be corrupted by hacker attacks, administrator’s error operation, and damaged devices. Once the data is uploaded to the cloud, the data owner will lose the physical control of the smart grid data stored in the cloud and cannot directly determine whether the data is intact or not. In order to ensure the integrity of cloud data, plenty of public auditing schemes are proposed (Ji et al., 2022; Li et al., 2021; Zhou et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2022). In public auditing, the data owner can delegate the data integrity auditing tasks to a Third Party Auditor (TPA) with abundant computation resources. In practice, the data collected by the smart grid might contain sensitive data, such as regional electricity consumption habits, residential electricity consumption patterns, etc (McDaniel and McLaughlin, 2009; Liu et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2021b). Once the TPA is delegated to audit the data integrity, the data owner’s data will inevitably be exposed to the TPA. The TPA is able to obtain sensitive information during the auditing phase. Therefore, it is critical to protect data privacy from the TPA in public auditing.

Nevertheless, most of the existing public auditing schemes are based on the traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which can lead to complex certificate management issue. In order to solve this problem, Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) had been proposed. In IBC system, there is a key generation center (KGC) which uses the data owner’s identity to generate a private key for the data owner. The data owner can use his own identity as his public key. IBC eliminates the certificate management problem of PKI. However, the KGC holds the user’s private key, the security of the user’s private key will completely depend on the KGC, which leads to the inherent key escrow problem (Al-Riyami and Paterson, 2003; Wang et al., 2013). Therefore, in order to obtain better efficiency and higher security, the certificateless public key cryptography is proposed (Zhou et al., 2022; Zhang J et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2021). In certificateless public key cryptography systems, the data owner’s private key is jointly generated by the KGC and the data owner. Therefore, the KGC does not know the data owner’s complete private key. Certificateless public key cryptography can solve the inherent key escrow problem of IBC.

1.1 Related work

Ateniese et al. (2007) proposed the first “Provable Data Possession” (PDP) scheme, in which the integrity of the remote data can be checked by the client. In this scheme, the homomorphic authenticators and the random sampling technique are employed to achieve the data integrity checking. Juels and Kaliski (2007) constructed a “Proofs of Retrievability” (PoR) scheme, which guarantees the data integrity and data retrievability on the cloud. However, in this scheme, the verifier can only perform a finite number of data integrity verification. In 2008, Shacham and Waters (2008) designed an improved PoR scheme, which is provably secure.

To support data dynamic, Ateniese et al. (2008) constructed a PDP scheme supporting data dynamic operations. Guo et al. (2020) designed a dynamic proof of data possession and replication scheme. In this scheme, the multiple replicas share a single authenticated tree. Erway et al. (2015) designed a rank-based skip list and constructed the PDP scheme supporting full data dynamic operations. Wang et al. (2019) proposed a blockchain-based private data integrity verification scheme by using RSA signature. Wang et al. (2017b) designed a cloud storage auditing scheme based on the online/offline signature, in which the data owner can reduce the burden of authenticator generation in the online phase. To improve the auditing efficiency, Gao et al. (2021) designed a data integrity checking scheme based on the keyword. This scheme allows the TPA to verify the integrity of files containing the specified keyword. To preserve the data privacy, Li et al. (2018) designed a privacy-preserving data integrity verification scheme with zero-knowledge proof. In addition, there are many researches devoted to the key exposure problem (Yu et al., 2016; Yu and Wang, 2017; Xu et al., 2020).

To solve complex certificate management, in 1984, Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) is proposed by Shamir (1985). In IBC system, the data owner’s private key is calculated by a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) with the data owner’s identity. The data owner uses his identity as the public key, which eliminates the complex certificate management. Wang et al. (2014) proposed the first identity-based data integrity checking scheme by using the Schnorr signature. To support efficient user revocation, Zhang Y et al. (2020) designed an identity-based data integrity verification scheme for shared data. Shen et al. (2019) proposed a data integrity checking scheme supporting data sharing and sensitive data hiding. In their scheme, the data owner’s sensitive data can be protected under the assistance of the sanitizer. Wang et al. (2017a) designed an identity-based comprehensive data integrity checking scheme, in which the authenticators can be generated with the help of the proxy. To protect the data owner’s identity privacy, Zhang et al. (2019) utilized the anonymous identity to replace the data owner’s real identity, and constructed a conditinal identity privacy-preserving data integrity checking scheme.

Unfortunately, although the IBC system can avoid the certificate management problem caused by PKI, it still has the inherent key escrow issue. Zhang et al. (2015) designed a secure certificateless public data integrity verification scheme, which can resist the malicious TPA. He et al. (2018b) proposed a certificateless data integrity auditing scheme which can resist the attacks of two types of adversaries in certificateless crytography (The adversary is able to replace the public keys of the users and the adversary is able to access the master key of the KGC). To eliminate the problem of key escrow in IBC, Wu et al. (2019) proposed a certificateless public auditing scheme which supports identity privacy protection. Zhou et al. (2022) applied the certificateless technology to the multi-replica environment. This scheme can realize the efficient data dynamic in the multi-replica environment by using the new Merkle Hash Tree structure.

1.2 Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the system model and design goals of our scheme; In Section 3, we describe the preliminaries and definition; We give a detailed algorithm of our scheme in Section 4; In Section 5, we analyzed the security of our scheme; We show the performance analysis of our scheme in Section 6; We make a conclusion in Section 7.

2 System model and design goals

We give the system model and the design goals in this section.

2.1 System model

As shown in Figure 1, the system model of our scheme contains four entities: the cloud, the data owner, the Key Generation Center (KGC) and the Third Party Auditor (TPA).

FIGURE 1

• 1) The cloud: The cloud is an entity which has enormous storage and computation resources. It is responsible for storing and managing the smart grid data for the data owner. After receiving the TPA’s challenge, the cloud needs to send the corresponding auditing proof to the TPA.

• 2) The data owner: The data owner is an entity with limited storage space and computation resources. He outsources his smart grid data to the cloud for storage and delegates the TPA to verify the integrity of cloud data.

• 3) KGC: The KGC is an entity which takes charge of producing the system parameters and calculating the partial private key for the data owner based on the data owner’s identity.

• 4) TPA: The TPA is an entity with powerful computing capabilities, which needs to generate and deliver the auditing challenge to the cloud and audit the integrity of the cloud data.

2.2 Design goals

In order to achieve privacy preserving in certificateless public auditing for cloud-based smart grid data, our scheme needs to meet the following design goals:

• 1) Correctness: If the KGC generates the partial private key for the data owner honestly, the partial private key can pass the data owner’s checking. If the cloud generates the auditing proof honestly, the auditing proof can pass the TPA’s checking.

• 2) Soundness: The cloud cannot pass the TPA’s verification if the data has been corrupted.

• 3) Privacy protection: In the phase of data integrity auditing, the TPA cannot obtain the smart grid data from the cloud’s auditing proof.

3 Preliminaries and definition

In this section, we present the preliminaries applied in our scheme. Then, we give the definitions of our scheme.

3.1 Preliminaries

3.1.1 Bilinear pairing

3.1.2 Computational diffie-hellman problem

Given g, g^α, g^β ∈ G₁, where g is the generator of G₁ and , compute g^αβ ∈ G₁. The CDH assumption in G₁ holds if it is hard to solve the CDH problem in G₁ (Bao et al., 2003).

3.1.3 Discrete logarithm problem

Given g, g^α ∈ G₁, where g is the generator of G₁ and , compute α. The DL assumption in G₁ holds if it is hard to solve the DL problem in G₁ (McCurley, 1990).

3.2 Definition

4 The proposed scheme

5 Security analysis

In this section, we give the security proof of our scheme from the aspects of correctness, soundness and data privacy protection.

5.1 Theorem 1 (Correctness)

In our scheme, if the KGC, the TPA, and the cloud honestly perform the specified procedures, the partial private key and the auditing proof are able to pass the verification.

5.1.1 Proof

The derivation process for the data owner to verify whether the partial key is correct is as follows:

The derivation process for the TPA to verify whether the auditing proof is valid is as follows:

5.2 Theorem 2 (Soundness)

Suppose the CDH assumption holds in G₁ and the signature scheme used for generating tag is existentially unforgeable. In our scheme, for an adversary, it is computationally infeasible to generate a bogus proof that is able to pass the TPA’s checking if the cloud data has been damaged.

• Proof. We will prove this theorem with the method of knowledge proof. The malicious cloud is viewed as adversary and the user plays the role on the challenger.

• Game 0. If the adversary submits one tag, the challenger will abort if the tag is a valid SSig signature but not signed by the challenger.

• Analysis. If the challenger aborts in Game 0 with non-negligible probability, the adversary is able to forge a valid SSig signature. This contradicts the assumption that SSig is an unforgeable signature. Therefore, the file identifier and the number of data blocks in the interactions with the adversary are all valid and generated by the challenger.

• Game 1. Game 1 is the same as Game 0, with only one difference. The challenger keeps a list of his responses to the queries from the adversary. If the adversary wins the game 1 but the aggregated authenticator Γ* in the proof is different from , then the challenger will abort.

• Analysis. Assume proof = (μ, Γ, R) is a valid proof. We have:

  Suppose proof * = (μ*, Γ*, R) is a forged auditing proof, where Γ* is different from Γ. Because the forgery is successful, proof* can pass the verification of the following equation:

  It is obviously that μ ≠ μ*; otherwise Γ = Γ*, which contradicts the above assumption. Let Δμ = μ* − μ. The adversary can win the game 1 with a non-negligible probability only if there is a simulator can solve the CDH problem.

  Given g, g^ɛ, h ∈ G₁, the simulator needs to generate h^ɛ. The simulator picks two random values and sets u = g^βh^θ and pk_O = g^ɛ. For each l_j, the simulator selects a random value v_j and programs a random oracle at l_j as . So, we can obtain .

  Dividing Eq. 4 by Eq. 3, we have

  According to the above equation, we can obtain . So, we have .

  The probability of θΔμ ≠ 0 is , which is non-negligible. So, we can solve the CDH problem with the probability , which is contradiction with the assumption that the CDH problem in G₁ is computationally infeasible.

• Game 2. Game 2 is similar to Game 1, with one difference. The challenger records all interactions with the adversary.

  If the adversary wins the game 2 but the aggregated data block μ* in the proof is different from the expected one μ, then the challenger will abort.

• Analysis. Suppose proof = (μ, Γ, R) is a valid proof. We get:

  Assume proof* = (μ*, Γ*, R) is a forged auditing proof. Because the forgery is successful, we get:

  Based on Game 1, we have Γ = Γ*. Set Δμ = μ* − μ, we can design a simulator to solve the DL problem.

  Inputting g, h ∈ G₁, the simulator needs to output ɛ satisfying h = g^ɛ. The simulator selects two random values and sets u = g^βh^θ. Based on Γ = Γ*, we obtain

  Further, we obtain that and . Hence, we can solve the DL problem as follow:

  The probability of θ ≠ 0 is , and it is non-negligible. So, we can solve the DL problem with the non-negligible probability , which is contradiction with the assumption that the DL problem in G₁ is computationally infeasible.

  Therefore, if the cloud can pass the TPA’s verification with non-negligible probability, it means that the cloud correctly stores the smart grid data.

5.3 Theorem 3 (data privacy protection)

In our scheme, the TPA cannot extract the real data from the cloud’s auditing proof.

• Proof. On the one hand, in the auditing proof = (μ, Γ, R), the original aggregated data block is blinded as μ by the random value r, where μ = μ′ − r. Because the DL problem in G₁ is hard, the TPA cannot extract the value r from R, where R = u^r. Thus, the TPA cannot obtain the original aggregated data block μ′ from μ. On the other hand, we get thatFrom the above equation, we know that is blinded by . It is computational infeasible to compute from and g^x because the CDH problem in G₁ is hard. So, the TPA cannot get from Γ. Consequently, the TPA cannot obtain the real smart grid data during the auditing phase.

6 Performance analysis

In this section, we systematically analyze the performance of our scheme from both theoretical analysis and experimental results.

6.1 Theoretical analysis

We respectively use P, H, M, E, and A to denote one pairing operation, one hash operation, one multiplication operation, one exponentiation operation and one addition operation. Suppose that the file is divide into n data blocks, and the TPA challenges s data blocks. In Table 1, we describe the computation overhead of our scheme in different phases. In the phase of partial key generation, the computation overhead is (2P + 2H + E). In the phase of authenticator generation, the user requires n (H + 2M + 2E) computation overhead to generate the authenticators. In the phase of proof generation, the computation overhead on the cloud side is (2s − 1)M + sE + (s − 1)A. In the phase of proof verification, the TPA needs to cost 3P + (s + 1) (H + M) + (s + 2)E + (s − 1) to verify the auditing proof.

Let |q|, |p| and |n| be the size of an element in G₁, and set [1, n] respectively. We present the communication overhead of our scheme in Table 2. The communication overhead of partial key generation is |q| + |p|. The communication overhead of data outsourcing is n|q| + (n + 1)|p|. In the data integrity auditing phase, the communication overhead is |n| + 2|q| + 3|p|.

6.2 Experimental results

In order to show the performance of our scheme, we design a series of experiments to simulate our scheme. We utilize C programming language with the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library (GMP-6.2.1) (GMP, 1991) and the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) Library (PBC-0.5.14) (Lynn, 2015) to implement the experiments. The experiments are conducted on the Ubuntu 20.04 (4 GB memory) VMware 16.1 pro in a desktop running Windows 10 with Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-9700T @ 2.0 GHZ and 16 GB RAM. In the following experiments, we set the base field size to be 512 bits, the size of an element in to be |p| = 160 bits.

6.2.1 Authenticator generation

In the proposed scheme, we test the time of authenticator generation for different numbers of data blocks, ranging from 100 to 1,000. The experimental result is represented in Figure 2. When the data owner outsources 100 data blocks and calculates the authenticators for these data blocks, the time to generate the authenticators is 0.390975s. When the number of data blocks is 1,000, the time of authenticator generation is 3.951747s. We can find that the time of authenticator generation is related to the number of data blocks.

FIGURE 2

6.2.2 Challenge generation

In the following experiment, we set the number of data blocks to 1,000, and the number of queried data blocks ranges from 100 to 1,000. As shown in Figure 3. When the number of challenged data blocks is 100, the time of challenge generation is 0.000064s. And if the number of challenged data blocks is 1,000, the challenge generation time is 0.000063s. Obviously, the overhead of challenge generation is independent of the number of challenged data blocks.

FIGURE 3

6.2.3 Proof generation

In Figure 4, we can obtain that the computation overhead of proof generation increases linearly with the number of challenged data blocks. When the number of queried data blocks is 100, the proof generation time is 0.081322s. When the number of challenged data blocks is 1,000, the time cost is 0.525229s.

FIGURE 4

6.2.4 Proof verification

Figure 5 shows that there is a proportional relationship between the computation cost of proof verification and the number of challenged data blocks. As the number of challenged data blocks increases from 100 to 100, the time of proof verification increases from 0.261052s to 1.691584s.

FIGURE 5

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a certificateless public auditing scheme for cloud-based smart grid data, which supports data privacy preserving. Compare with the traditional public auditing schemes based on PKI or IBC, our scheme can avoid the complex certificate management issue and key escrow isssue. In addition, the TPA cannot obtain the original smart grid data during the data integrity auditing phase. We give the security proof of the scheme, and the results show that our scheme is secure. We also evaluate the efficiency of our scheme through a series of experiments.

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