- 1Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
- 2School of Intelligent Systems, Astana IT University, Astana, Kazakhstan
- 3School of Digital Public Administration, Astana IT University, Astana, Kazakhstan
- 4Economic Research Institute JSC, Astana, Kazakhstan
- 5Senior Energy Consultant and Lead Architect of the Energy System Model of Kazakhstan, Turin, Italy
Introduction: Kazakhstan's pledge to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 confronts a legacy of coal and oil dependence and the intertwined technical, economic, and social risks of a rapid energy transition. Because implementation will hinge on stakeholder cooperation, understanding how different actors perceive these risks is essential.
Methods: We conducted a two-round Policy Delphi with stakeholders, including government officials, managers from national companies, financiers/investors, experts, and civil society representatives. Responses were organized using a four-quadrant risk framework that distinguishes implementation from consequential risks and transition risks from physical climate risks.
Results: All risks raised by participants could be located within this framework, indicating that it captures the main concerns in the Kazakhstani context. Implementation-transition risks dominated, led by regulatory volatility, financing constraints, grid bottlenecks, fossil-fuel lobbying, and skills shortages. These risks were consistently rated as highly important across stakeholder groups, although financiers and civil society actors were less concerned about policy instability than government officials and experts.
Discussion: By clarifying where stakeholders perceive the greatest implementation risks, the study provides a practical risk map to prioritize reforms in regulation, finance, grid development, and skills, and adds a stakeholder-based perspective to research and policy debates on energy transitions in fossil-fuel-dependent economies such as Kazakhstan.
1 Introduction
Kazakhstan's economy remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels: according to Bureau of National statistics in 2024 about 15% of GDP was derived from oil revenues, and roughly 53% of its merchandise exports were fossil fuels. Domestically, around 90% of electricity generation still comes from fossil-fuel sources with coal alone accounting for 70% (International Energy Agency, 2022; Guliyev, 2024). This carbon-intensive development model has led to greenhouse-gas emissions and a CO2 intensity far above the world average, placing Kazakhstan among the top emitters per unit GDP in the region. In response, the country has ratified the Paris Agreement and set targets to increase the share of renewable electricity and improve energy efficiency, and in 2023 approved a Strategy for Achieving Carbon Neutrality by 2060 (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023; Mouraviev, 2021; Howie and Atakhanova, 2022; Neafie et al., 2025). In line with the Paris-aligned long-term objectives, recent work shows how offset architectures and budget-consistent pathways must be explicitly coordinated to keep a 2 °C trajectory credible (Perissi and Jones, 2024). These commitments signal a shift from an extractive, fossil fuel-based model toward a sustainable, low carbon future (Xenarios et al., 2024). Moreover, Kazakhstan operates a national emissions trading system created under the Environmental Code and administered through ministerial rules on allocation, administration, and trading of greenhouse gas quotas and carbon units (Environmental Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021). The competent ministry reports continuous development of trading periods and plans to raise reduction rates under the national allocation plan in the second half of this decade. In parallel, exporters face the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Ministry of Ecology, Geology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2024). CBAM entered a transitional phase with quarterly embedded emissions reporting for covered goods from 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2025, and the financial adjustment applies from 2026 under Regulation EU 2023/956. These policy instruments create a clearer domestic price signal and stronger external incentives for low carbon upgrading than suggested by a pessimistic reading of the record (Sembayeva et al., 2024).
Transitioning a coal- and oil-dependent energy system under these conditions is nevertheless fraught with risk. Decarbonization poses transition risks—socio-economic and policy challenges associated with shifting away from carbon-intensive assets and activities—and exposes Kazakhstan to physical risks from climate impacts if global warming is not constrained (Semieniuk et al., 2021). As one of Central Asia's largest energy producers, Kazakhstan must balance the risk of stranded fossil fuel assets, job losses, and fiscal revenue decline from aggressive climate policies against the escalating physical risks of climate inaction such as droughts or extreme weather affecting its arid and continental climate zones (Semieniuk et al., 2021; Mouraviev, 2021). This “double risk” facing fossil fuel dependent economies—climate damages from delayed action vs. economic and social dislocation from abrupt transition—has been widely analyzed (Sovacool et al., 2019; Laldjebaev et al., 2021).
A compact conceptual map helps to organize this risk space. We build on a four-quadrant framework with two orthogonal axes—implementation vs. consequential risks, and transition vs. physical risks—that has been developed in recent low-carbon transition research (van Vliet et al., 2020; Trutnevyte et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2024). This typology distinguishes barriers that can derail policies and technologies from the negative side-effects that arise once measures are in place, and separates risks stemming from decarbonization policies and market shifts from those driven by climate impacts. Using it as an organizing lens foregrounds real-world trade-offs: climate solutions may reduce long-run physical risks while increasing near-term transition risks, for example when rapid coal phase-out generates economic shocks and social strain in coal regions unless accompanied by just transition measures (Sovacool et al., 2019; Seeland et al., 2024; Sovacool, 2025). In Kazakhstan, where water stress, climate variability and regional dependence on carbon-intensive industries are already pressing concerns, the framework helps to locate which combinations of risks are most salient for different actors (Laldjebaev et al., 2021).
Stakeholder perspectives are essential to that diagnosis yet are often underrepresented in formal assessments. Integrated models and expert analyses catalog transition and physical risks with analytical precision, but they do not always mirror how risks are experienced by affected actors and tend to downplay social, political, and institutional dimensions (Morrison et al., 2015; Trutnevyte et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2024). Kazakhstan's experience with the ETS and related pricing reforms, where perceived competitiveness losses and household cost burdens have generated resistance within a market structure shaped by coal and large incumbents, is consistent with this pattern (Howie and Atakhanova, 2022; Wang et al., 2019; Mouraviev, 2021; Poberezhskaya and Bychkova, 2022). International evidence shows that stakeholder engagement broadens attention to these political, social, and institutional risks that quantitative models often omit and strengthens policy durability by surfacing implementation barriers early (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007; van Vliet et al., 2020; Reed et al., 2018; Cuppen et al., 2016; Pearson and Watson, 2023; Helm, 2023; Fiorino, 1990; Beierle, 2002; Nikas et al., 2017; Jäger et al., 2023).
Despite this, integration remains incomplete. Many transition risk assessments are expert driven and narrowly scoped around techno economic metrics while stakeholder studies of acceptance and perception often lack a structured risk typology that would enable comparability and uptake in policy design (van Vliet et al., 2020; Trutnevyte et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2024; Lieu et al., 2018; Turnheim and Nykvist, 2019). Bridging the two by combining a clear typology with systematically elicited stakeholder perceptions can give decision makers a richer view of which risks are most salient to different groups, which are underestimated in official planning, and how risks interact in practice (Pearson and Watson, 2023; Reed et al., 2018; Cuppen et al., 2016). In addition, Kazakhstan's exporters and regulators now face concrete timelines and procedures under CBAM and a codified and evolving domestic ETS architecture, which makes a perception-based risk map directly policy relevant because it can inform the sequencing of measures that raise bankability and social acceptance while aligning with external compliance regimes (Bakdolotov et al., 2017).
In light of the above, this manuscript conducts a stakeholder-based risk assessment of Kazakhstan's energy transition grounded in a four-quadrant typology. By applying the van Vliet et al. and Sovacool frameworks in the context of a fossil fuel dependent economy under transition pressure, we map how different stakeholders perceive implementation vs. consequential risks and transition vs. physical risks in Kazakhstan's decarbonization journey. Drawing on a two-round Delphi study with forty-eight purposefully sampled participants, this approach clarifies the main challenges, situates them in relation to previous risk-assessment efforts, highlights the added value of integrating structured stakeholder evidence into national transition planning, and, taken together, helps answer two interrelated research questions:
(1) What are the key risks perceived by diverse stakeholder groups in Kazakhstan's energy transition, and how can these perceived risks be categorized? (2) In what ways do stakeholder risk perceptions converge with or diverge from the risks highlighted in expert-driven analyses, and what implications do these differences have for managing the energy transition in a just and effective manner?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the research methodology, describing how data were collected and analyzed. Section 3 presents the result analytics and findings, organized around initial key themes. Section 4 discusses the implications of these findings, while Section 5 concludes by summarizing how the applied framework helps resolve and weigh the identified risk factors.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Research design and analytical lens
First, following the EU TRANSrisk program, we distinguish implementation risks which are barriers that prevent planned policies or technologies from being realized from consequential risks which are unintended negative impacts that arise even when the pathway is successfully implemented (van Vliet et al., 2020). Implementation risks include political opposition, financing shortfalls, technological underperformance, or public resistance that can derail renewable energy projects and climate policies. Consequential risks include sectoral economic losses, inequities, or environmental tradeoffs that materialize after changes are in place and expectations of severe consequential risks can themselves become implementation barriers (van Vliet et al., 2020). Second, we draw on climate risk scholarship that distinguishes transition risks from physical risks. Transition risks stem from the shift to a low carbon economy and include policy changes, market and price shifts, technological disruption, and legal or reputational exposure, whereas physical risks arise from climate impacts both acute extremes and chronic changes (Semieniuk et al., 2021; Sun et al., 2024). Transition risks can manifest as stranded assets and cost shocks for carbon intensive sectors (Mercure et al., 2018). Physical risks threaten infrastructure and operations including in green systems for example hydropower under altered river flows or solar and wind under extreme weather (Cronin et al., 2018; Jackson et al., 2021). In Kazakhstan, water stress and climate variability heighten these concerns for agriculture, hydro potential, and the reliability of supply and demand (Laldjebaev et al., 2021; German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), 2021). Combining the axes produces four composite categories that we use as an organizing matrix for empirical evidence in this study.
We then applied a two-round Policy Delphi to elicit and compare risk perceptions across heterogeneous stakeholder groups involved in Kazakhstan's low-carbon transition. To structure elicitation and reporting, we used a four-quadrant risk typology with orthogonal axes: (i) implementation vs. consequential risks and (ii) transition vs. physical risks, yielding the quadrants IT, IP, CT and CP. This typology organizes both the questionnaire and the coding of open responses, and it anchors cross-stakeholder comparability (Khan and Dhakal, 2022; Rikkonen et al., 2021; Pahker et al., 2024; Feil et al., 2024; Mu'mina et al., 2024; Kattirtzi and Winskel, 2020; Tundys and Bretyn, 2023; Polk, 2015; Kochskämper et al., 2016).
2.2 Stakeholder mapping and sample justification
The initial universe comprised 900 individuals and organizations that submitted comments during the public consultation of the national Carbon-Neutrality Strategy (January-February 2023) (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023). Using proportional stratified sampling, invitations were sent to 120 candidates across seven strata: government bodies, national companies, private businesses, financial institutions, expert society, international organizations and civil-society/public groups. Inclusion criteria were: (i) substantive involvement in Kazakhstan's energy sector or the consultation process; (ii) willingness to complete two Delphi rounds; (iii) no declared conflict of interest. Invitations were stratified with attention to sectoral, regional, and gender diversity. Forty-eight invitees completed both rounds (40 % response), yielding a panel size that sits well within the 20–50 range recommended for heterogeneous Delphi studies aimed at thematic saturation (Patton, 2015; Hagaman and Wutich, 2017; Sovacool and Hess, 2017; Creswell and Poth, 2018). Panel composition was 27 % energy experts, 27 % policy-makers, 23 % investors/financiers and 23 % citizens/NGO representatives; 90 % held postgraduate qualifications and 90 % were aged 30–70.
2.3 Data collection instruments
A semi-structured interview guide of 28 open questions (Appendix A) was developed, aligned with the four-quadrant framework. Interviews (60–90 min) were conducted in person or via encrypted video link, recorded and transcribed verbatim (42,000 words). Written submissions from the same participants were collected concurrently to enhance data richness. The study was approved by the Astana IT University Research Ethics Committee. All participants received an information sheet, signed written informed-consent forms and were assigned anonymized codes; no personally identifiable information is reported.
2.4 Delphi procedure
Round 1 – exploration: participants listed and described perceived risks. Round 2 – evaluation: a consolidated catalog of risk themes, annotated with Round-1 median ratings and interquartile ranges (IQR), was returned to the panel. Members re-rated each theme on a five-point Likert scale for importance and likelihood (1 = very low, 5 = very high). Consensus criteria followed practice in recent energy-transition Delphis (Tundys and Bretyn, 2023): ΔMd between rounds ≤ 0.5 and IQR contraction ≥ 1 point. Where both conditions were satisfied, a theme was deemed to have reached stability; otherwise, a third round would have been triggered (not required).
After Round 1, all unique risk statements were deduplicated, semantically close items merged, and labels standardized (each with a one-sentence descriptor). We circulated a consolidated catalog back to the panel listing—per theme—the Round-1 median and IQR for importance/likelihood, plus each participant's own prior ratings. Round-2 consisted of re-rating the same themes given this structured feedback; no themes were dropped between rounds. “Stability” was defined according to these consensus criteria (documented in Supplementary Table S3).
2.5 Qualitative coding and matrix construction
Transcripts were imported into NVivo 14. We used a two-level codebook: Level 1 (the four-quadrant matrix: Implementation vs. Consequential - Transition vs. Physical; IT, IP, CT, CP) was deductive and anchored the analytical lens and comparability across groups, while Level-2 sub-themes (43 in total) were inductively derived from the Round-1 corpus and refined during coder calibration. Three analysts independently double-coded ~20% of the corpus; Cohen's κ = 0.82 indicated substantial agreement. Disagreements were resolved by majority rule on the first pass, followed by discussion to consensus, updating decision rules in the codebook and back-coding any earlier passages affected by rule changes; an NVivo audit trail documented all edits. For each sub-theme we then computed frequency (n) and median importance (Md). Sub-themes meeting n ≥ 12 (25% of the panel) and Md ≥ 4 were visualized in a heat map, with cell size proportional to n and shading proportional to Md and shading proportional to Md (provided in Supplementary Table S6).
2.6 Quantitative analyses
To complement the Delphi convergence criteria and explore whether specific respondent attributes shaped risk perceptions, a two-stage clustering and distance-based variability analysis was applied to our data set (Assubayeva et al., 2022). For every panelist we formed a vector comprising the round-2 importance scores (Likert 1–5) assigned to the five high-salience Implementation-Transition (IT) themes (policy volatility, financing constraints, grid bottlenecks, fossil lobbying, skills shortage). These five variables were chosen because IT risks accounted for 63% of all coded statements and are the principal focus of this study. Before distance calculations, each Likert score was re-binned into three ordered categories–low concern (1–2), moderate (3), high (4–5) – to mitigate scale idiosyncrasies across respondents.
Clustering was undertaken across four categorical descriptors:
(i) Stakeholder role – policy-maker, energy expert, investor/financier, citizen/NGO;
(ii) Education – up-to-bachelor vs. postgraduate;
(iii) Professional experience – early (0–3 years), mid-career (3–7 years), senior (> 8 years);
(iv) Field of activity – nine occupational fields (e.g. government ministry, RE facility manager, component supplier etc.).
Our quantitative layer complements the Delphi by describing patterns in respondents' Round-2 importance profiles on the five high-salience Implementation-Transition themes. Because these data are ordinal (Likert) and we re-binned the ratings into three ordered categories (low/medium/high), we used Gower distance, a standard measure for mixed and ordered variables. It returns values between 0 (identical answer pattern) and 1 (maximally different), which in our context can be read as “how different two respondents are across the five themes.” We then applied Ward's hierarchical clustering to this distance matrix to group respondents with similar rating profiles and to obtain clusters that are as internally coherent and as distinct from one another as possible. Inspection of the average silhouette width suggested that a three-cluster solution offered a reasonable balance between separation and parsimony (average silhouette = 0.46). We interpret these three clusters as heuristic “coalitions of perception” rather than statistical “types”. Non-parametric tests (Kruskal–Wallis; Wilcoxon signed-rank) and a permutation test on within-group distances provide independent evidence of Round-2 convergence and help guard against reading random structure into small samples.
For each respondent we computed the Euclidean distance between their five-item vector and the grand centroid (the vector of overall means across all panelists). Aggregating these distances within each subgroup provides a second lens on group divergence: values close to zero imply alignment with the majority opinion, whereas larger values flag outlier perspectives. Group-wise variability indices from rounds 1 and 2 were compared using two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests; Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple comparisons. In addition, a permutation test (10,000 resamples) assessed whether the observed reduction in mean within-group distance for the stakeholder-role variable could arise by chance when respondent labels are randomly reassigned. The observed decline (0.27 to 0.18) fell in the 1.2 percentile of the null distribution (p = 0.012), corroborating genuine convergence. All computations were scripted in SPSS 28 and R 4.3. Data credibility was strengthened through source triangulation (interviews + written comments), analyst triangulation (three coders), member checking (nine participants reviewed preliminary findings).
3 Results and interpretation
3.1 Typology coverage and quadrant distribution
The first task was to verify that the typology adopted from van Vliet et al. and Sovacool could accommodate the full breadth of stakeholder discourse. All 310 risk statements extracted from interview transcripts and written submissions were successfully mapped onto one of the seventeen cells of the matrix reproduced in Table 1 (documented in Supplementary Table S1). No statement required creation of an ad-hoc category, indicating that the typology is exhaustive for the Kazakh case. Implementation-Transition (IT) risks appear on the left-hand column of the implementation row, whereas Consequential-Physical (CP) risks sit in the lower-right corner. Although the typology itself is theoretically neutral, its empirical occupation is anything but even: as discussed below, the IT column is densely populated while the CP column is rarely invoked.
With the matrix established, attention turned to the numerical distribution of coded material. Table 2 tabulates the absolute frequency of statements by quadrant and stakeholder stratum, followed by the share that each quadrant represents within the 310-statement corpus. The overwhelming concentration of discourse in the IT quadrant (195 references, 62.9%) is immediately apparent; consequential-physical concerns occupy only 3.9% of the dataset. Two inferences follow. First, stakeholders are preoccupied with barriers they fear will prevent the low-carbon agenda from even leaving the starting blocks, rather than with possible environmental side-effects that might arise after implementation. Second, the dominance of IT risks is not confined to any one stratum but is shared by government officials, private developers and civil-society actors alike, suggesting a robust cross- constituency perception that the primary challenge is execution.
Descriptive frequency alone cannot indicate how seriously each risk type is regarded. That dimension emerges from the Likert ratings recorded in Round 2. Table 3 displays the median importance (Md) for each quadrant by stakeholder role as well as the overall panel median. The unanimous panel-level maximum score (Md = 5) for IT indicates that every group, including financiers and the public, ranks implementation barriers at least “highly important”, if not “very highly”. The Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test evaluated whether these distributions differ by stakeholder role. A statistically significant difference appears only for the IT quadrant (H = 15.3, df = 6, p = 0.018); post-hoc Dunn-Bonferroni contrasts reveal that financiers are significantly less alarmed than government officials (p = 0.02) and academic experts (p = 0.04), scoring IT a solid 4 rather than 5. All other quadrants register no significant divergence (p > 0.15). Therefore, despite minor nuance, the central statistical message is one of convergent risk salience across the board.
Applying the dual salience filter–frequency n ≥ 12 and median Md ≥ 4–isolates fifteen sub-themes that merit deeper scrutiny. They are presented in Tables 4, 5, which for compactness unites the four quadrants in a single matrix. Five reside in IT, three in IP, five in CT and two in CP. Each sub-theme is supported by at least a dozen separate statements and commands a median importance of at least four. Together the fifteen items capture 68% of the entire coded corpus, meaning that strategic or legislative interventions failing to address them will leave the broad consensus of stakeholders dissatisfied.
Item-level outcomes are summarized below (complete distributions by stratum/cluster: Supplementary Tables 4, 5).
One key objective of a Delphi investigation is to determine whether iteration drives respondents toward a shared assessment. To assess convergence quantitatively, internal-variability indices were derived from Gower distances calculated on each role's importance vectors. Table 6 presents mean within-role distances before and after feedback. For government officials, mean distance almost halved (0.26 to 0.13), a large and statistically significant contraction (Wilcoxon p = 0.004). National-company managers show a similar pattern (0.24 to 0.13, p = 0.010). Business developers and experts converge more moderately, whereas the public/NGO category exhibits negligible change and the highest residual dispersion. Aggregated over the whole panel, the decline from 0.27 to 0.18 is significant (Z = −3.14, p = 0.002), and a 10,000-draw permutation test places this reduction in the extreme 1.2 percentile of its null distribution; chance alone is therefore an implausible explanation.
Distance-based methods also help to visualize coalitions among individual respondents. Hierarchical clustering on the final distance matrix produced a three-cluster solution optimizing silhouette width (0.46). Cluster characteristics appear in Tables 4–7. Cluster A, comprising 18 respondents, unites government officials with academic experts; its hallmark is uncompromisingly high scores (5-5-4-4-4 across the five IT themes). Cluster B houses national-company managers and private developers, mirroring Cluster A on importance but devoting marginally more emphasis to grid and finance problems. Cluster C contains most financiers and civil-society actors, who assign importance values one point lower on average, especially for regulatory volatility and fossil lobbying. The dendrogram (Supplementary Table 5) shows Clusters A and B branching from a common stem, whereas Cluster C is an outer limb–consistent with the Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis findings that financiers and the public retain distinctive perceptions.
While cluster boundaries should not be over-interpreted, they do highlight an actionable difference: the constituencies wielding legislative authority (ministries) and operating assets (national companies) have largely converged, whereas external financiers whose capital is indispensable remain less alarmed by policy instability. That perceptual gap may explain muted green-bond issuance and points policy-makers toward the communication levers they must pull.
The final synthesis weaves together the multiple statistical strands. Frequency counts show where discourse volume lies; Likert medians reveal which of those topics command the greatest gravity; Kruskal–Wallis tests isolate the one material divergence (financiers under-rating IT risk); Wilcoxon and permutation tests document consensus tightening; and clustering locates the residual dissensus. Interpreted jointly, the data portray a transition whose Achilles' heel is execution capacity: unstable regulation, constrained finance, inadequate grids and a thin skills pipeline. Section 4 therefore pivots from diagnosis to prescription, outlining policy instruments tailored to the statistically validated risk hierarchy.
3.2 Stakeholder risk profiles (Delphi responses)
The analysis indicates that economic and financial risks represent the most significant concern in Kazakhstan's energy transition, particularly regarding the availability and sources of financing for measures aimed at achieving low-carbon development. Government bodies, identified in the matrix as expressing the highest level of concern, highlighted uncertainties surrounding investment sources and the substantial financial requirements involved (Figure 1). According to the national strategy, the projected volume of low-carbon investments amounts to $610 billion by 2060 (President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023; Zhumabayev et al., 2022). Respondents stressed that low domestic tariffs on energy resources make it difficult to mobilize both domestic and international capital without reforms, because developers struggle to recover costs while maintaining economic activity.
The business stakeholder group expressed concerns related to the volume of required investments and uncertainties surrounding their sources (Figure 2). They highlighted the absence of necessary investment conditions, which has resulted in high costs even for existing funding mechanisms. Experts and public representatives echoed these concerns, emphasizing that the low attractiveness of investments could hinder the transition process, particularly given that domestic funding is insufficient and greater reliance on international finance will be required. Representatives of international organizations suggested that prioritizing energy- efficiency measures could partially reduce the investment burden (Soltangazinov et al., 2020) (Figure 3).
From the perspective of national companies, low tariffs on energy resources and subsidies extracted from large enterprises undermine their ability to invest in and participate in the transition process (Figure 4). These stakeholders called for a clear plan to gradually increase tariffs, which would enable them to plan and initiate low-carbon projects. Similar configurations of institutional and cost-related barriers—high transaction costs, weak coordination along the supply chain, and the dominance of financial risks in stakeholder concerns—are discussed in Falcone et al. (2018) and Sharma et al. (2020), underscoring the centrality of financial obstacles for clean-energy deployment.
Respondents also pointed to the current level of debt held by national companies to international funds and to plans for new high-carbon projects (including coal power plants) as factors that could further weaken the investment case for low-carbon capacities and reduce overall attractiveness. Government participation in such projects was seen as risky because of suboptimal public-investment practices and lengthy procedures.
Across stakeholder groups, public opposition was highlighted as one of the main and least predictable risks: it can delay projects, increase costs, damage the reputation of developers and, in extreme cases, lead to project cancellation by the government (Cuppen et al., 2016; Wesselink et al., 2011) (Figure 5).
Financial stakeholders report the highest salience for economic and financial risks, with Financing constraints (IT-2) scoring Md = 5 and n = 38 in Table 4. Their radar profile (Figure 6) peaks on economic and regulatory axes, reflecting concerns about tariff levels, counterparty risk and the bankability of power-purchase agreements. In interviews, financiers stressed that double-digit domestic interest rates render most projects non-viable without de-risking instruments and highlighted exposure to currency and policy volatility. These views align with literature that identifies financing frictions and policy incoherence as primary barriers to clean-energy deployment and calls for coherent policy mixes and credible long-term signals to reduce risk premia (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Babic, 2024).
Financiers also emphasized SME competitiveness risk (CT-5, Md = 4, n = 12), noting that carbon-cost pass-through and compliance expenses may disproportionately burden smaller manufacturers that lack access to concessional capital, even as balance-sheet exposure to stranded assets and shifting demand in export markets strengthens the case for low-carbon upgrading where credible safeguards exist (Mercure et al., 2018). They repeatedly called for standardization of contracts and processes—index-linked auctions, longer tenors, predictable curtailment compensation, robust measurement and verification, and credit enhancements through guarantees or blended finance—echoing evidence from emerging markets that such design choices raise participation and reduce bid spreads (Shrimali et al., 2016; Ronaldo and Suryanto, 2022).
Experts prioritize Grid integration gaps (IT-3, Md = 4, n = 29) and environmental side-effects (CP-1, Md = 4, n = 13), which is reflected in their radar profile (Figure 7). On the implementation side, they point to curtailment, seasonal congestion on the north–south axis, and insufficient flexible capacity. This aligns with research that documents system-level vulnerabilities under climate variability and extreme weather, where the costs of climate-proofing assets and the need for reserves and storage rise with higher shares of variable renewables (Cronin et al., 2018; Jackson et al., 2021). Experts argue for accelerated grid reinforcement, modern dispatch rules, and a flexibility portfolio that combines demand response, storage, and strategically sited peaking capacity.
On the consequential side, experts draw attention to biodiversity and land-use risks and to supply-chain footprints for critical minerals (CP-2, Md = 4, n = 12). They recommend early spatial screening, cumulative-impact assessment, and clear mitigation hierarchies for wind and solar siting, together with responsible sourcing standards for minerals. Water availability is another cross-cutting constraint raised by experts, who note the sensitivity of hydropower and prospective hydrogen pathways to transboundary inflows and drought regimes in Central Asia (Laldjebaev et al., 2021). Finally, experts stress capability gaps in modeling and regulation, including the need for open data, transparent assumptions in scenario design, and targeted training to expand the pool of specialists in carbon accounting and grid planning (Sun et al., 2024).
Strategic and planning risks rank second in significance, particularly concerning challenges that may arise during the preparation and implementation of detailed plans for low-carbon development and uncertainties regarding the scenarios for the country's decarbonization path. They highlighted specific assumptions problematic, such as overestimations of electricity generation levels at the end of the transition period, an overly rapid coal phase-out, insufficient development of alternative energy sources like hydrogen compared to renewables, and a lack of clearly defined adaptation measures to mitigate potential increases in greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally, stakeholders criticized measures to increase absorption by trees, arguing that the country's climate conditions are not suitable for the large-scale afforestation required.
4 Discussion
Across stakeholder groups, the coal phase-out was the single contentious planning issue. Respondents saw a rapid withdrawal from “cheap” coal as incompatible with maintaining economic activity unless measures are sequenced gradually, with compensation for affected workers and opportunities for coal assets to participate in new low-carbon projects.
Stakeholders warned that an overly rapid coal phase-out, without timely deployment of alternative capacity, could trigger energy shortages. Government representatives therefore called for detailed plans for hydro and other firm or flexible resources to mitigate these risks. This concern echoes case-study evidence, such as the Gela experience, where insufficient infrastructure investment increased transition risks (Falcone et al., 2018).
Energy-related issues are surrounded by inherent uncertainties, including environmental risks associated with energy technologies, impacts on climate change, and external factors affecting energy pricing. In Kazakhstan's case, these uncertainties interact with high dependence on fossil exports and a legacy power system, making it is essential for Kazakhstan to address its dependence on coal consistently and effectively to ensure sustainable low-carbon development as global pressure on the coal industry grows (Aubakirova et al., 2023; De Miglio and Bakdolotov, 2024).
In line with the Dephi results on implementation–transition risks, the business and financial groups primarily emphasized the importance of developing detailed short-term regional plans for decarbonization measures. Without such plans, the transition could have detrimental consequences for the country's economy. Stakeholders also expressed significant interest in tax policies and support mechanisms during the transition process, consistent with evidence that clear and predictable support instruments shape public and investor acceptance (Lennon et al., 2019).
Technological and human resources risks are primarily associated with the high costs of low-carbon technologies, such as carbon capture and storage systems, the expenses related to renewable energy sources and the shortage of experts in the sphere on GHG emissions and carbon regulations (Zhakiyev et al., 2024). Although the cost of renewables has fallen, respondents stressed that scaling capacity will increase demand for critical materials and may expose projects to cost volatility. They also emphasized unresolved concerns about grid stability under high variable-renewable shares. There is also a notable issue with flexible (peaking) gas capacity (dispatchable gas capacity), as current reserves are insufficient, and a significant number of energy storage systems are required. To maintain grid stability, stable alternative energy sources must be deployed, or a more decentralized approach to the placement of renewable energy capacities should be developed. There is a shortage of trained personnel for low-carbon technologies and of research support for their deployment. Stakeholders linked this skills gap to limited and unstable funding for research and specialized training.
Delays in enabling public infrastructure were seen as a further implementation risk. In this context, stakeholders repeatedly raised the role of firm low-carbon capacity (especially nuclear power) as a potential complement to renewables. In October 2024, a national referendum approved the construction of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan (Central Referendum Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024; Batyrbekov et al., 2024). Stakeholders remain divided: some view nuclear as an essential complement to renewables because it can provide stable capacity that replaces coal and helps contain system costs; others emphasize potential downsides and advocate a renewables-only portfolio. System studies indicate that firm low-carbon resources, including nuclear, can lower overall system costs and improve reliability as variable renewables scale by reducing the need for very large storage and grid expansions (Sepulveda et al., 2018). At the same time, post-Fukushima evidence shows that public acceptance of nuclear is highly sensitive to risk perception and institutional trust, which can create implementation barriers when engagement and transparency are weak (Visschers and Siegrist, 2013). Physical constraints also matter: thermoelectric plants are vulnerable to warming rivers and low summer flows, which can depress output and require costly climate-proofing of cooling systems (van Vliet et al., 2012). Kazakhstan-specific system modeling already treats nuclear as a candidate resource in long-term decarbonization scenarios to 2060, alongside renewables and gas, which makes a structured appraisal of nuclear risks and benefits directly relevant for national planning (Zhakiyev et al., 2023).
As highlighted in the study by Aubakirova et al. (2023), a rapid transition to renewable energy sources and a complete abandonment of coal could exacerbate systemic issues related to energy and environmental security in Kazakhstan's economy within the context of a shifting energy paradigm. Even the anticipated increase in output from variable renewable energy sources will not resolve the challenges of regulating the country's energy system, which currently lacks an internal reserve capable of achieving stability and ensuring energy security. Our findings on perceived grid-integration gaps, flexible-capacity shortages and water constraints are consistent with this system-level evidence and suggest that sequencing of coal phase-out, firm capacity and grid upgrades will be critical.
Regulatory risks are primarily associated with concerns that the government may fail to establish the necessary legislative framework for the energy transition or revise existing regulatory mechanisms to align with the low-carbon agenda. Stakeholders noted that low-carbon requirements could conflict with other environmental standards for businesses, thereby imposing double pressure. Consequently, the government plays a critical role in developing synchronized regulatory norms, which should be among the first steps in the transition process. For example, regulations on the “best available techniques” required for use by high-emission enterprises must be aligned with low-carbon standards.
The importance of reducing bureaucratic burdens and creating aligned regulatory frameworks to support the energy transition is emphasized in Lennon et al. (2019). Simplifying administrative procedures and implementing transparent policies were identified as essential measures. The role of institutions and whether regulators should prioritize decarbonization were also discussed with stakeholders in the study by Sharma et al. (2020). Key themes from stakeholder discussions included the role of policy as a push or enabling factor, examples of successful policies, and specific policy needs in critical areas.
One significant regulatory risk is the limited effectiveness of Kazakhstan's carbon-management instruments, notably the emissions trading system, in transmitting a robust carbon price into domestic investment decisions (Howie and Atakhanova, 2022; Howie and Akhmetov, 2024). As carbon costs are increasingly applied at the border in key markets, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will impose charges based on embedded emissions, which can reallocate financial resources away from exporters toward compliance and weaken the funds available for low-carbon upgrading unless domestic pricing and support frameworks are strengthened (Lin and Zhao, 2023; Beaufils et al., 2023; Amendola et al., 2025). A further regulatory hazard is policy incoherence: sectoral strategies that proceed without integrating low-carbon objectives tend to generate misaligned incentives and slower diffusion of clean technologies (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016; Kern et al., 2019). Together, these findings from respondents and the literature point to the need for a more coherent and credible policy mix that aligns ETS design, CBAM responses and sectoral strategies.
Social risks concentrate on vulnerable groups. International evidence shows that decarbonization can produce employment losses in carbon-intensive regions and distributional pressures on households unless “just transition” measures are designed and funded with affected communities (Mirzania et al., 2023; Sovacool et al., 2019). Energy-poverty dynamics can intensify during price realignments, particularly where household incomes and social protection lag the pace of reform (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015). Governance arrangements that are participatory and inclusive improve legitimacy and policy durability by surfacing implementation barriers early and enabling targeted mitigation such as compensation, retraining, and tariff design (Reed et al., 2018; Cuppen et al., 2016). The Delphi responses on coal regions, tariff reform and public opposition align with this literature and underline the centrality of “just transition” instruments in the Kazakhstani context.
Climate- and resource-related risks arise from both physical change and resource constraints. Central Asia's transboundary basins already exhibit reduced or highly variable inflows—documented for the Ili–Balkhash system and other regional rivers—due to upstream withdrawals and climate change, with direct implications for hydropower output and water-dependent energy options (Duan et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2024). Physical climate impacts also threaten energy infrastructure and operations across technologies, raising the cost of climate-proofing new assets (Cronin et al., 2018). Water demand is a salient constraint where hydrogen is pursued via electrolysis, since life-cycle assessments show non-trivial water requirements that must be planned for in arid basins (Bhandari et al., 2014). Regionally, domestic gas demand has been expanding with gasification programs, which heightens short-term supply risks if new upstream resources or import arrangements do not keep pace (Laldjebaev et al., 2021). Stakeholders' emphasis on water stress, winter gas tightness and vulnerability of hydro and hydrogen pathways confirms that physical-resource risks are already perceived as binding constraints, not distant future issues.
Taken together, these regulatory, social, and physical-resource risks argue for a coherent policy mix that aligns carbon pricing with sectoral strategies, ring-fences CBAM-exposed revenue for domestic decarbonization, embeds just-transition instruments, and mainstreams water- and climate-resilience constraints into project appraisal. This approach is consistent with the comparative literature on effective transition governance and risk-aware investment planning cited above.
The findings provide insights for both national policy and investment practice. For government agencies, the identified high-salience risks (regulatory volatility, financing constraints, and skills shortages) can directly inform the implementation roadmap of Kazakhstan's Carbon-Neutrality Strategy. Prioritizing policy stability, transparent tariff reforms, and workforce development will reduce uncertainty and build institutional confidence in the transition process. For international investors, the results highlight where projects can be strengthened through predictable regulation, improved grid reliability, and de-risking instruments such as guarantees or blended-finance facilities. By addressing these factors, Kazakhstan can simultaneously advance its decarbonization goals and attract sustained low-carbon investment (Boulton and Krumdieck, 2025).
4.1 Limitations
Our 48-member Delphi panel was intentionally assembled to capture a wide range of institutional perspectives; nevertheless, it remains a purposeful rather than statistically representative sample of Kazakhstan's society. Voices from organized labor, coal-region communities, and small rural consumers–groups likely to experience the transition most acutely–were present only indirectly through NGO proxies. To mitigate this limitation, we (i) stratified the sample across seven institutional categories, (ii) sought maximum variation in sector, region and gender, and (iii) interpret our results as an institutional risk map rather than as population-level estimates. Even so, salience may be tilted toward macro-economic and policy concerns and understate fine-grained livelihood issues, which future work should address through larger panels or targeted focus groups with these constituencies.
Moreover, risk perceptions in this study capture a snapshot from early 2023, immediately after the Carbon-Neutrality Strategy was announced. As policies mature, technologies diffuse and climate impacts materialize, stakeholder priorities will almost certainly evolve. Geopolitical developments such as regional fuel-price agreements or EU CBAM implementation could quickly reorder the risk landscape We partly mitigated this limitation by situating all interviews relative to the Strategy's adoption and by focusing on structural risk categories (e.g., regulatory volatility, grid capacity, skills) that are less sensitive to short-term shocks. Nonetheless, our findings should be treated as an early-warning baseline rather than a fixed ranking of risks, and follow-up surveys and periodic Delphi iterations is essential to keep the national risk register current and decision-relevant.
4.2 Directions for future research
The empirical portrait that emerges from our Delphi exercise is unambiguous: Kazakhstan's carbon-neutrality agenda will succeed or fail on the quality of execution—policy stability, capital mobilization, grid readiness and human-capital depth. In our material, Implementation–Transition (IT) risks dominate stakeholder discourse, and the quantitative layer reveals three coalitions of perception rather than a single homogeneous view. These patterns point to several lines of inquiry that follow directly from our findings and from comparison with other fossil-fuel-dependent economies, with a focus on identifying which international experiences and policy instruments can be adapted to the Kazakhstani context.
First, comparative studies could apply the same four-category risk framework to other hydrocarbon exporters and countries with emissions trading schemes, and then systematically contrast their stakeholder risk maps with ours. Such work would clarify whether the dominance of implementation-transition risks is a broader pattern or specific to Kazakhstan, and would help identify policy instruments around tariff reform, carbon pricing, just-transition funds or stakeholder participation that have proven effective elsewhere and could be incorporated into Kazakhstan's Carbon-Neutrality Strategy.
Second, the temporal and distributive dimensions of the risks highlighted in this study warrant closer examination. The present Delphi provides a post-strategy snapshot, but international evidence shows that risk salience can shift rapidly as coal plants close, carbon prices bite and renewables scale (Mirzania et al., 2023). Future work could periodically revisit the same or similar stakeholder groups to track whether perceptions converge or diverge over time and to distinguish transient anxieties from persistent structural barriers, drawing on longitudinal evidence from Germany, South Africa and other coal-dependent systems. Our cross-sectional results already suggest partial convergence on high-salience IT risks alongside residual differences between, for example, financiers and government officials. At the same time, our CT-coded findings on layoffs, energy poverty and regional inequality underline the need for micro-level studies of justice outcomes in Kazakhstan's coal regions. Comparative case studies of coal regions in Kazakhstan and in countries such as Poland and Spain could help identify which combinations of compensation, retraining and participatory governance are most likely to secure social license for concrete projects.
Third, many of the implementation–transition obstacles emphasized by our panelists (tariff instability, weak green-bond uptake, uncertainty around contract design) are inherently policy-contingent and invite closer comparative study of policy mixes and instrument design. Future research could systematize how countries with similar concerns have structured tariff reforms, renewable-energy auctions, green-bond programmes and guarantee schemes, and assess which elements of these international experiences are transferable to Kazakhstan's context. Such comparative work would complement model-based analyses and help design de-risking packages that are credible both for domestic stakeholders and international financiers (Zhakiyev et al., 2025).
Finally, the prominence of firm low-carbon capacity in our Delphi responses and the October 2024 referendum approving a nuclear power plant underline the need to examine the “nuclear option” in an integrated way. Stakeholders in our panel were divided on nuclear power, reflecting global debates about its role in low-carbon portfolios. System studies indicate that firm low-carbon resources, including nuclear, can lower total system costs and improve reliability at high shares of variable renewables by reducing storage and grid-expansion needs (Sepulveda et al., 2018), while public acceptance of nuclear is highly sensitive to risk perceptions and institutional trust (Visschers and Siegrist, 2013). Physical constraints also matter because thermoelectric plants depend on cooling water and may face output reductions under warming and low summer flows (van Vliet et al., 2012). Kazakhstan-specific modeling already treats nuclear as a scenario option to 2060 alongside renewables and gas (Zhakiyev et al., 2023; Batyrbekov et al., 2024). Future research could therefore compare Kazakhstan's evolving portfolio choices with experiences in countries that have recently expanded or phased out nuclear power, integrating insights on system costs, climate resilience and public acceptance to identify which combinations of firm capacity are both technically robust and socially acceptable.
4.3 Conclusion
The analysis revealed that the public perceived the highest level of risk, while international organizations expressed the least concern. This discrepancy is largely attributed to differences in awareness and understanding of the transition process. A matrix was developed to map risks by type and stakeholder group, providing a comprehensive overview for analysis. Among the identified risks, financial, planning, and economic risks were most frequently discussed. These risks encompassed issues such as investment levels, funding sources, economic development impacts, and the strain on key economic sectors within the framework of the country's climate agenda. Five sub-themes captured 71% of IT discourse and all scored a median importance ≥ 4. Delphi iteration reduced within-group variability (mean Gower distance 0.27 to 0.18; p = 0.002) and produced three perceptual clusters: (A) government + experts, (B) national companies + developers, and (C) financiers + NGOs, the latter less alarmed by policy instability.
The study highlights significant challenges in Kazakhstan's transition to a low-carbon energy system. Stakeholders identified financial risks, including uncertainties around investment sources, low energy tariffs, and limited attractiveness for both domestic and international investors, as the most critical barriers. Planning and economic risks, particularly those related to coal phase-out strategies and regional decarbonization plans, were also prominent concerns. These findings underscore the complexity of the risk landscape and its impact on progress toward carbon neutrality.
Political, economic, and institutional factors exacerbate these challenges. Kazakhstan's economic reliance on fossil fuel revenues creates financial and structural inertia, impeding the adoption of renewable energy technologies. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and the absence of synchronized regulatory frameworks further hinder the implementation of low-carbon strategies. The dependency on hydrocarbons not only limits funding for renewable energy projects but also fosters resistance to transitioning from coal and other high-carbon energy sources.
This study provides a novel and comprehensive perspective on the risks of Kazakhstan's energy transition, informed by diverse stakeholder insights. It underscores the importance of addressing these challenges through inclusive and systemic approaches, recognizing that the energy transition must engage society as a whole, not just experts. By understanding stakeholder concerns and systemic barriers, this research lays the groundwork for informed strategies to advance Kazakhstan's energy transition and achieve its carbon neutrality goals.
Data availability statement
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Ethics statement
The protocol was approved by the Astana IT University Research Ethics Committee. Participants received an information sheet and signed informed-consent forms. Personal identifiers were removed at transcription; unique alphanumeric codes (e.g., GOV-07) maintain anonymity throughout the analysis.
Author contributions
NZ: Data curation, Funding acquisition, Validation, Visualization, Writing – review & editing. AK: Methodology, Software, Validation, Writing – original draft. AB: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Writing – original draft. RD: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – review & editing.
Funding
The author(s) declared that financial support was received for this work and/or its publication. This research was funded by the Science Committee of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Grant No. AP23490690) and by the National Conservation Initiative Corporate Fund in the framework of the Chevron social investment projects. The funders were not involved in the study design, collection, analysis, interpretation of data, the writing of this article, or the decision to submit it for publication.
Acknowledgments
Authors acknowledge experts who were involved in the investigation of carbon neutrality pathways in Kazakhstan, and worked on further development of the “Kazakhstan's Road to Net Zero GHG Emissions”. Authors acknowledge Dr. Kanat Baigarin and Ms. Assel Baibakisheva for advising a research design and for their valuable comments on the early draft stage.
Conflict of interest
The author(s) declared that this work was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Generative AI statement
The author(s) declared that generative AI was not used in the creation of this manuscript.
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Supplementary material
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsus.2025.1706204/full#supplementary-material
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Keywords: Delphi method, Kazakhstan, low-carbon transition, risk concern, the energy transition
Citation: Zhakiyev N, Khamzina A, Bakdolotov A and De Miglio R (2026) Qualitative analysis of stakeholder risk perceptions in Kazakhstan's energy transformation. Front. Sustain. 6:1706204. doi: 10.3389/frsus.2025.1706204
Received: 15 September 2025; Revised: 02 December 2025;
Accepted: 08 December 2025; Published: 21 January 2026.
Edited by:
Mary Engels, University of Idaho, United StatesReviewed by:
Stefanos Xenarios, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), AustraliaILARIA Perissi, Istituto di Chimica dei Composti Organo Metallici Consiglio Nazionale Delle Ricerche Sezione di Firenze, Italy
Copyright © 2026 Zhakiyev, Khamzina, Bakdolotov and De Miglio. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
*Correspondence: Ayagoz Khamzina, a2guYXlhZ296QGdtYWlsLmNvbQ==