ORIGINAL RESEARCH article
Front. Sustain. Food Syst.
Sec. Agro-Food Safety
Food Safety and Its Digital Traceability Strategies: A Supplier-Processor Profit Distribution Perspective
Provisionally accepted- School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin, China
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Food safety incidents in the food processing industry have frequently occurred, exposing significant management loopholes in the food supply chain. To address these deficiencies, digital traceability serves as a promising solution. However, its implementation alters profit structures, creating new supply chain coordination challenges. To investigate these changes, we develop a differential game model between a supplier and a processor. This study aims to systematically analyze the influence of digital traceability on food safety and supply chain profits. On this basis, it further explores effective methods for profit distribution and the key conditions required for their success. The research results are as follows. First, digital traceability is effective in improving the safety of food raw materials and food, except in cases where profit is distributed based on safety level or supplier effort, combined with an insufficient profit share for the supplier. Second, when the raw material safety attenuation factor is high, it is more favorable to distribute profit based on the raw material safety level, and when it is low, it is more favorable to distribute profit based on the supplier’s effort. Third, in the initial distribution modes, digital traceability usually leads to a decrease in supplier profit and an increase in processor profit. In other modes, the effect depends on the distribution coefficient. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate profit distribution plan must be determined by key parameters such as the decay rate of raw material safety levels and the penalty amount, to ensure both food safety and mutual profitability.
Keywords: Digital traceability, Food Safety, Food processing industry, Differential game, Profit distribution
Received: 17 Sep 2025; Accepted: 24 Nov 2025.
Copyright: © 2025 Zhang and Li. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
* Correspondence: Chunfa Li
Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
